text stringlengths 100 9.93M | category stringclasses 11
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ATT&CK ID:S0690
ATT&CK Technique Name:Green Lambert
Green Lambert can add init.d and rc.d files in the /etc folder to establish persistence.[9][10] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M0930
ATT&CK Technique Name:Network Segmentation
Segment operational network and systems to restrict access to critical system functions to predetermined management systems. [3] [4] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0037
ATT&CK Technique Name:FIN6
To move laterally on a victim network, FIN6 has used credentials stolen from various systems on which it gathered usernames and password hashes.[29][30][31] | secon |
titleblackhat:asia-23 Weaponizing Mobile Infrastructure: Are Politically Motivated Cyber Attacks a Threat to Democracy?
The talk is mainly driven by the cyber intelligence gathered in response to political shifts in the region. The core focus of the talk is to bring awareness, and reveal actionable intelligence to a la... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G1005
ATT&CK Technique Name:POLONIUM
POLONIUM has used valid compromised credentials to gain access to victim environments.[53] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0395
ATT&CK Technique Name:LightNeuron
LightNeuron gathers information about network adapters using the Win32 API call GetAdaptersInfo.[129] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0031
ATT&CK Technique Name:BACKSPACE
BACKSPACE achieves persistence by creating a shortcut to itself in the CSIDL_STARTUP directory.[5] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0679
ATT&CK Technique Name:Ferocious
Ferocious can use PowerShell scripts for execution.[90] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0468
ATT&CK Technique Name:Skidmap
Skidmap has the ability to install several loadable kernel modules (LKMs) on infected machines.[13] | secon |
titleblackhat:eu-21 Embedding a Human-Centric Approach Into a Global Cyber Security Program
Humans are the weakest link in cyber security – or so the famous saying goes! This talk will challenge this age old expression to focus on the human elements of the protection pillars; people, process, and technology.Organisati... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G1004
ATT&CK Technique Name:LAPSUS$
LAPSUS$ has gathered detailed knowledge of an organization's supply chain relationships.[3] | secon |
titleblackhat:us-23 Make KSMA Great Again: The Art of Rooting Android Devices by GPU MMU Features
With more and more hardware and software mitigations, rooting Android 13 devices now requires better bugs and more advanced exploitation techniques. Five years ago, I introduced the Kernel Space Mirroring Attack (KSMA) exp... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0096
ATT&CK Technique Name:APT41
APT41 leveraged sticky keys to establish persistence.[8] | secon |
title:botconf2018 Leaving no Stone Unturned – in Search of HTTP Malware Distinctive Features
When we analyze malware C&C network traffic we often see that it contains HTTP protocol. Sometimes the messages are obfuscated and sometimes sent as plain text. They can be intentionally crafted to look like sent by a web brow... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:T1547.008
ATT&CK Technique Name:LSASS Driver
Adversaries may modify or add LSASS drivers to obtain persistence on compromised systems. The Windows security subsystem is a set of components that manage and enforce the security policy for a computer or domain. The Local Security Authority (LSA) is the main comp... | secon |
titleblackhat:us-23 MoustachedBouncer: AitM-Powered Surveillance via Belarus ISPs
An APT group conducting long-term espionage against diplomats, leveraging email-based C&C protocols, C++ modular backdoors, and adversary-in-the-middle (AitM) attacks… Sounds like the infamous Turla? Think again! We will introduce Moustac... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0368
ATT&CK Technique Name:NotPetya
NotPetya creates a task to reboot the system one hour after infection.[118] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0260
ATT&CK Technique Name:InvisiMole
InvisiMole can gather network share information.[34] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0305
ATT&CK Technique Name:SpyNote RAT
SpyNote RAT can copy files from the device to the C2 server.[26] | secon |
title:blackhat:us-22 Glitched on Earth by Humans: A Black-Box Security Evaluation of the SpaceX Starlink User Terminal
The SpaceX operated Starlink low Earth orbit satellite constellation aims to provide satellite internet coverage to the whole world. The widespread availability of Starlink User Terminals (UT) exposes ... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0386
ATT&CK Technique Name:Ursnif
Ursnif has used Registry modifications as part of its installation routine.[169][170] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0088
ATT&CK Technique Name:Kasidet
Kasidet has the ability to search for a given process name in processes currently running in the system.[140] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S1028
ATT&CK Technique Name:Action RAT
Action RAT can identify AV products on an infected host using the following command: cmd.exe WMIC /Node:localhost /Namespace:\\root\SecurityCenter2 Path AntiVirusProduct Get displayName /Format:List.[4] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0093
ATT&CK Technique Name:Backdoor.Oldrea
Execution of Backdoor.Oldrea relies on a user opening a trojanized installer attached to an email. [2] [4] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0091
ATT&CK Technique Name:Silence
Silence has used the Farse6.1 utility (based on Mimikatz) to extract credentials from lsass.exe.[81] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0093
ATT&CK Technique Name:Backdoor.Oldrea
The Backdoor.Oldrea payload gathers server information that includes CLSID, server name, Program ID, OPC version, vendor information, running state, group count, and server bandwidth. This information helps indicate the role the server has in the control process. [1... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M1011
ATT&CK Technique Name:User Guidance
Users should be taught the danger behind granting unnecessary permissions to an application and should be advised to use extra scrutiny when an application requests them. | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0604
ATT&CK Technique Name:Industroyer
Industroyer attempts to perform an HTTP CONNECT via an internal proxy to establish a tunnel.[21] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0148
ATT&CK Technique Name:RTM
RTM tries to add a scheduled task to establish persistence.[151][152] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:T1546.012
ATT&CK Technique Name:Image File Execution Options Injection
Adversaries may establish persistence and/or elevate privileges by executing malicious content triggered by Image File Execution Options (IFEO) debuggers. IFEOs enable a developer to attach a debugger to an application. When a process is c... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S1049
ATT&CK Technique Name:SUGARUSH
SUGARUSH has used cmd for execution on an infected host.[320] | secon |
title:blackhat:eu-22 Deep into Android Bluetooth Bug Hunting: New Attack Surfaces and Weak Code Patterns
In the past few years, researchers have found hundreds of security vulnerabilities in the AOSP Bluetooth module such as Blueborne and BlueFrag. Almost all of these vulnerabilities are caused by the process not prope... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0106
ATT&CK Technique Name:Rocke
Rocke installed a cron job that downloaded and executed files from the C2.[11][12][13] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0246
ATT&CK Technique Name:HARDRAIN
HARDRAIN uses the command cmd.exe /c netsh firewall add portopening TCP 443 "adp" and makes the victim machine function as a proxy server.[20] | secon |
title:blackhat:eu-22 IoT Manufacturers' New Nightmare: Design Flaws and Deployment Chaos in Cloud-based IoT Access Control Policies
Modern internet-of-things device manufacturers are taking advantage of the managed Platform-as-a-Service (PaaS) and Infrastructure-as-a-Service (IaaS) IoT clouds (e.g., AWS IoT, Azure IoT)... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0059
ATT&CK Technique Name:Magic Hound
Magic Hound malware has a function to determine whether the C2 server wishes to execute the newly dropped file in a hidden window.[28] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0645
ATT&CK Technique Name:Wevtutil
Wevtutil can be used to export events from a specific log.[194][195] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0184
ATT&CK Technique Name:POWRUNER
POWRUNER persists through a scheduled task that executes it every minute.[132] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:T1543.004
ATT&CK Technique Name:Launch Daemon
Adversaries may create or modify Launch Daemons to execute malicious payloads as part of persistence. Launch Daemons are plist files used to interact with Launchd, the service management framework used by macOS. Launch Daemons require elevated privileges to instal... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M0941
ATT&CK Technique Name:Encrypt Sensitive Information
When at rest, project files should be encrypted to prevent unauthorized changes. [4] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0578
ATT&CK Technique Name:SUPERNOVA
SUPERNOVA has masqueraded as a legitimate SolarWinds DLL.[161][162] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0382
ATT&CK Technique Name:ServHelper
ServHelper has a module to delete itself from the infected machine.[213][214] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0579
ATT&CK Technique Name:Waterbear
Waterbear has deleted certain values from the Registry to load a malicious DLL.[179] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0687
ATT&CK Technique Name:Cyclops Blink
Cyclops Blink can use the Linux API if_nameindex to gather network interface names.[66][67] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:T1011.001
ATT&CK Technique Name:Exfiltration Over Bluetooth
Adversaries may attempt to exfiltrate data over Bluetooth rather than the command and control channel. If the command and control network is a wired Internet connection, an adversary may opt to exfiltrate data using a Bluetooth communication channel. | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0140
ATT&CK Technique Name:Shamoon
Shamoon creates a new service named "ntssrv" to execute the payload. Newer versions create the "MaintenaceSrv" and "hdv_725x" services.[108][109] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0041
ATT&CK Technique Name:Wiper
It is believed that a patch management system for an anti-virus product commonly installed among targeted companies was used to distribute the Wiper malware.[6] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0265
ATT&CK Technique Name:Kazuar
Kazuar can sleep for a specific time and be set to communicate at specific intervals.[9] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0679
ATT&CK Technique Name:Ferocious
Ferocious can use COM hijacking to establish persistence.[8] | secon |
titleblackhat:asia-21 New Attack Surface in Safari: Using Just One Web Audio Vulnerability to Rule Safari
In the past, Safari vulnerability researchers often focused on the DOM or JS engine, but some system libraries used by Safari, such as audio, video, font, etc., haven't received enough attention. There are few succ... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:T1137.006
ATT&CK Technique Name:Add-ins
Adversaries may abuse Microsoft Office add-ins to obtain persistence on a compromised system. Office add-ins can be used to add functionality to Office programs. There are different types of add-ins that can be used by the various Office products; including Word/Excel ... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0068
ATT&CK Technique Name:PLATINUM
PLATINUM has used keyloggers that are also capable of dumping credentials.[71] | secon |
titleblackhat:asia-23 Grand Theft House: RF Lock Pick Tool to Unlock Smart Door Lock
Recently, many people have installed smart door locks in their homes and offices, as a way to maximize convenience and security. The wireless link provides a simple and convenient connection to the doorlock from anywhere in the IoT-cov... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0208
ATT&CK Technique Name:Pasam
Pasam creates a backdoor through which remote attackers can retrieve lists of files.[224] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0022
ATT&CK Technique Name:APT3
APT3 has a tool that looks for files and directories on the local file system.[14][15] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0094
ATT&CK Technique Name:Kimsuky
Kimsuky has gathered credentials using Mimikatz and ProcDump.[43][44][45] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0528
ATT&CK Technique Name:Javali
Javali has achieved execution through victims clicking links to malicious websites.[45] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0112
ATT&CK Technique Name:Windshift
Windshift has included keylogging capabilities as part of Operation ROCK.[13] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0038
ATT&CK Technique Name:Duqu
The reconnaissance modules used with Duqu can collect information on network configuration.[74] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:T1059.008
ATT&CK Technique Name:Network Device CLI
Adversaries may abuse scripting or built-in command line interpreters (CLI) on network devices to execute malicious command and payloads. The CLI is the primary means through which users and administrators interact with the device in order to view system info... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S1070
ATT&CK Technique Name:Black Basta
The Black Basta binary can use chmod to gain full permissions to targeted files.[5] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0632
ATT&CK Technique Name:GrimAgent
GrimAgent has used Rotate on Right (RoR) and Rotate on Left (RoL) functionality to encrypt strings.[144] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0047
ATT&CK Technique Name:Gamaredon Group
Gamaredon Group has compiled the source code for a downloader directly on the infected system using the built-in Microsoft.CSharp.CSharpCodeProvider class.[6] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0234
ATT&CK Technique Name:Bandook
Bandook has modules that are capable of capturing audio.[3] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0153
ATT&CK Technique Name:RedLeaves
RedLeaves attempts to add a shortcut file in the Startup folder to achieve persistence. If this fails, it attempts to add Registry Run keys.[56][220] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:T1020
ATT&CK Technique Name:Automated Exfiltration
Adversaries may exfiltrate data, such as sensitive documents, through the use of automated processing after being gathered during Collection. | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M1028
ATT&CK Technique Name:Operating System Configuration
Applications with known vulnerabilities or known shell escapes should not have the setuid or setgid bits set to reduce potential damage if an application is compromised. Additionally, the number of programs with setuid or setgid bits set should be min... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S1010
ATT&CK Technique Name:VPNFilter
The VPNFilter's ssler module configures the device's iptables to redirect all traffic destined for port 80 to its local service listening on port 8888. Any outgoing web requests on port 80 are now intercepted by ssler and can be inspected by the ps module and manipulated ... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0395
ATT&CK Technique Name:LightNeuron
LightNeuron has the ability to download and execute additional files.[261] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0181
ATT&CK Technique Name:FALLCHILL
FALLCHILL can modify file or directory timestamps.[25] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0105
ATT&CK Technique Name:DarkVishnya
DarkVishnya created new services for shellcode loaders distribution.[40] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0368
ATT&CK Technique Name:NotPetya
NotPetya searches for files ending with dozens of different file extensions prior to encryption.[208] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M1041
ATT&CK Technique Name:Encrypt Sensitive Information
Ensure that all wired and/or wireless traffic is encrypted appropriately. Use best practices for authentication protocols, such as Kerberos, and ensure web traffic that may contain credentials is protected by SSL/TLS. | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0122
ATT&CK Technique Name:Silent Librarian
Silent Librarian has obtained free Let's Encrypt SSL certificates for use on their phishing pages.[7][8] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M1018
ATT&CK Technique Name:User Account Management
Consider implementing WMI and security filtering to further tailor which users and computers a GPO will apply to.[2][6][7] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0050
ATT&CK Technique Name:APT32
APT32 has used scheduled tasks to persist on victim systems.[11][12][13][14] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0363
ATT&CK Technique Name:Empire
Empire can enumerate Security Support Providers (SSPs) as well as utilize PowerSploit's Install-SSP and Invoke-Mimikatz to install malicious SSPs and log authentication events.[2] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0411
ATT&CK Technique Name:Rotexy
Rotexy collects the device's IMEI and sends it to the command and control server.[24] | secon |
title:botconf2017 Exploring a P2P Transient Botnet — From Discovery to Enumeration
From DDoS attacks to malicious code propagation, Botnets continue to represent a strength threat to entities and users connected to the Internet and, due to this, continue to be an important research area. The power of those numerous net... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M1047
ATT&CK Technique Name:Audit
Find and eliminate path interception weaknesses in program configuration files, scripts, the PATH environment variable, services, and in shortcuts by surrounding PATH variables with quotation marks when functions allow for them. Be aware of the search order Windows uses for e... | secon |
titleblackhat:us-18 Stress and Hacking: Understanding Cognitive Stress in Tactical Cyber Ops
Hacking is a high-risk, high-reward, with a high-cost to human capital. In this session, we will talk about the effects of human factors in cyber operations and why you should care about them. Specifically, we will focus on res... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0066
ATT&CK Technique Name:3PARA RAT
3PARA RAT command and control commands are encrypted within the HTTP C2 channel using the DES algorithm in CBC mode with a key derived from the MD5 hash of the string HYF54&%9&jkMCXuiS. 3PARA RAT will use an 8-byte XOR key derived from the string HYF54&%9&jkMCXuiS if the ... | secon |
titleblackhat:asia-20 Securing the Next Version of HTTP: How QUIC and HTTP/3 Compare to HTTP/2
QUIC is a new always-encrypted general-purpose transport protocol being standardized at the IETF designed for multiplexing multiple streams of data on a single connection. HTTP/3 runs over QUIC and roughly replaces HTTP/2 ove... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M0930
ATT&CK Technique Name:Network Segmentation
Configure internal and external firewalls to block traffic using common ports that associate to network protocols that may be unnecessary for that particular network segment. | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0266
ATT&CK Technique Name:TrickBot
TrickBot uses module networkDll for process list discovery.[257][258] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0096
ATT&CK Technique Name:APT41
APT41 used a keylogger called GEARSHIFT on a target system.[21] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M0948
ATT&CK Technique Name:Application Isolation and Sandboxing
Make it difficult for adversaries to advance their operation through exploitation of undiscovered or unpatched vulnerabilities by using sandboxing. Other types of virtualization and application microsegmentation may also mitigate the impact of s... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:C0024
ATT&CK Technique Name:SolarWinds Compromise
During the SolarWinds Compromise, APT29 used compromised local accounts to access victims' networks.[12] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0425
ATT&CK Technique Name:Corona Updates
Corona Updates can record MP4 files and monitor calls.[9] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0428
ATT&CK Technique Name:PoetRAT
PoetRAT used TLS to encrypt command and control (C2) communications.[41] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M1018
ATT&CK Technique Name:User Account Management
Limit user access to system utilities such as systemctl to only users who have a legitimate need. | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0615
ATT&CK Technique Name:SombRAT
SombRAT has the ability to download and execute additional payloads.[124][142][420] | secon |
title:blackhat:asia-19 Finally, I Can Sleep Tonight: Catching Sleep Mode Vulnerabilities of the TPM with the Napper
Trusted Platform Module (TPM) is a tamper-resistant device and designed to provide hardware-based security functions. A TPM chip has a random number generator, non-volatile storage, encryption/decryption ... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:T1555.004
ATT&CK Technique Name:Windows Credential Manager
Adversaries may acquire credentials from the Windows Credential Manager. The Credential Manager stores credentials for signing into websites, applications, and/or devices that request authentication through NTLM or Kerberos in Credential Lockers (prev... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G1006
ATT&CK Technique Name:Earth Lusca
Earth Lusca has established GitHub accounts to host their malware.[7] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0324
ATT&CK Technique Name:SpyDealer
SpyDealer exfiltrates data from over 40 apps such as WeChat, Facebook, WhatsApp, Skype, and others.[16] | secon |
titleblackhat:us-22 Process Injection: Breaking All macOS Security Layers With a Single Vulnerability
macOS local security is shifting more and more to the iOS model, where every application is codesigned, sandboxed and needs to ask for permission to access data and features. New security layers have been added to make... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S1017
ATT&CK Technique Name:OutSteel
OutSteel can search for specific file extensions, including zipped files.[222] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0082
ATT&CK Technique Name:Emissary
Variants of Emissary encrypt payloads using various XOR ciphers, as well as a custom algorithm that uses the "srand" and "rand" functions.[115][116] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0240
ATT&CK Technique Name:ROKRAT
ROKRAT can collect host data and specific file types.[160][161][162] | secon |
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