text stringlengths 100 9.93M | category stringclasses 11
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ATT&CK ID:S0400
ATT&CK Technique Name:RobbinHood
RobbinHood deletes shadow copies to ensure that all the data cannot be restored easily.[56] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:T1583.005
ATT&CK Technique Name:Botnet
Adversaries may buy, lease, or rent a network of compromised systems that can be used during targeting. A botnet is a network of compromised systems that can be instructed to perform coordinated tasks. Adversaries may purchase a subscription to use an existing botnet fro... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0345
ATT&CK Technique Name:Seasalt
Seasalt has a command to perform a process listing.[31] | secon |
title:botconf2013 Using cyber intelligence to detect and localize botnets
Our purpose is to present a cyber intelligence system created to analyze network communications in order to detect and identify botnet activities and distribution of malware related to botnets, both over the internet and within targeted networks.... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M1012
ATT&CK Technique Name:Enterprise Policy
Configuration of per-app VPN policies instead of device-wide VPN can restrict access to internal enterprise resource access via VPN to only enterprise-approved applications | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0447
ATT&CK Technique Name:Lokibot
Lokibot has stolen credentials from multiple applications and data sources including Windows OS credentials, email clients, FTP, and SFTP clients.[14] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0034
ATT&CK Technique Name:Sandworm Team
Sandworm Team has developed malware for its operations, including malicious mobile applications and destructive malware such as NotPetya and Olympic Destroyer.[29] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M1012
ATT&CK Technique Name:Enterprise Policy
When using Samsung Knox, third-party keyboards must be explicitly added to an allow list in order to be available to the end-user.[14] | secon |
title:blackhat:us-21 PCIe Device Attacks: Beyond DMA. Exploiting PCIe Switches, Messages and Errors
PCIe is a high speed peripheral IO bus standard that is used inside systems today for connecting virtually all high-bandwidth peripherals like graphics cards, FPGAs, Thunderbolt, etc. - and is found on everything from se... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0673
ATT&CK Technique Name:DarkWatchman
DarkWatchman can use WMI to execute commands.[33] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0262
ATT&CK Technique Name:QuasarRAT
QuasarRAT contains a .NET wrapper DLL for creating and managing scheduled tasks for maintaining persistence upon reboot.[144][145] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:T1499.001
ATT&CK Technique Name:OS Exhaustion Flood
Adversaries may launch a denial of service (DoS) attack targeting an endpoint's operating system (OS). A system's OS is responsible for managing the finite resources as well as preventing the entire system from being overwhelmed by excessive demands on its c... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:T1521.002
ATT&CK Technique Name:Asymmetric Cryptography
Adversaries may employ a known asymmetric encryption algorithm to conceal command and control traffic, rather than relying on any inherent protections provided by a communication protocol. Asymmetric cryptography, also known as public key cryptography, u... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0093
ATT&CK Technique Name:Backdoor.Oldrea
Backdoor.Oldrea contains a cleanup module that removes traces of itself from the victim.[22] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M1031
ATT&CK Technique Name:Network Intrusion Prevention
If a link is being visited by a user, network intrusion prevention systems and systems designed to scan and remove malicious downloads can be used to block activity. | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S1061
ATT&CK Technique Name:AbstractEmu
AbstractEmu can modify system settings to give itself device administrator privileges.[1] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S1018
ATT&CK Technique Name:Saint Bot
Saint Bot has injected its DLL component into EhStorAurhn.exe.[62] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0625
ATT&CK Technique Name:Cuba
Cuba can modify services by using the OpenService and ChangeServiceConfig functions.[39] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0280
ATT&CK Technique Name:MirageFox
MirageFox is likely loaded via DLL hijacking into a legitimate McAfee binary.[27] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0344
ATT&CK Technique Name:Azorult
Azorult can check for installed software on the system under the Registry key Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Uninstall.[7] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S1018
ATT&CK Technique Name:Saint Bot
Saint Bot has used is_debugger_present as part of its environmental checks.[15] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0660
ATT&CK Technique Name:Clambling
Clambling can execute binaries through process hollowing.[15] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0117
ATT&CK Technique Name:Fox Kitten
Fox Kitten has downloaded additional tools including PsExec directly to endpoints.[184] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0140
ATT&CK Technique Name:Shamoon
Once Shamoon has access to a network share, it enables the RemoteRegistry service on the target system. It will then connect to the system with RegConnectRegistryW and modify the Registry to disable UAC remote restrictions by setting SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersio... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0417
ATT&CK Technique Name:GRIFFON
GRIFFON has used a persistence module that stores the implant inside the Registry, which executes at logon.[110] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0069
ATT&CK Technique Name:MuddyWater
MuddyWater has used malware to check running processes against a hard-coded list of security tools often used by malware researchers.[69] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0061
ATT&CK Technique Name:FIN8
FIN8 has used WMI event subscriptions for persistence.[10] | secon |
title:blackhat:asia-22 A False Door: Crack the Bluetooth Digital Vehicle Key
In an era of intelligent vehicles, smartphones have gradually become the main carrier of vehicle keys, making people's lives more convenient. At present, digital vehicle keys mainly include Bluetooth and NFC keys, and the advantages of Bluetoo... | secon |
title:blackhat:eu-20 Discovering 20 Year Old Vulnerabilities in Modern Windows Kernel
With the continuous upgrade by Microsoft, the latest windows 10 version has become more and more powerful and supports more and more features. On the other hand, certain components always exist in windows system, such as printer drive... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0073
ATT&CK Technique Name:APT19
APT19 launched an HTTP malware variant and a Port 22 malware variant using a legitimate executable that loaded the malicious DLL.[2] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0456
ATT&CK Technique Name:Aria-body
Aria-body has the ability to enumerate loaded modules for a process.[14]. | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0485
ATT&CK Technique Name:Mandrake
Mandrake can capture all device notifications and hide notifications from the user.[6] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0133
ATT&CK Technique Name:Nomadic Octopus
Nomadic Octopus as attempted to lure victims into clicking on malicious attachments within spearphishing emails.[169][170] | secon |
title:blackhat:eu-21 Zen and the Art of Adversarial Machine Learning
Machine learning has so far been relatively unchecked on its way to world domination. As the high pace of ML research continues, ML is being integrated into all manner of business processes – chatbots, sales lead generation, maintenance decisions, pol... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0344
ATT&CK Technique Name:Azorult
Azorult can steal credentials from the victim's browser.[12] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0129
ATT&CK Technique Name:Mustang Panda
Mustang Panda has created a scheduled task to execute additional malicious software, as well as maintain persistence.[113][114][115] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0018
ATT&CK Technique Name:admin@338
admin@338 actors used the following command following exploitation of a machine with LOWBALL malware to display network connections: netstat -ano >> %temp%\download[5] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0615
ATT&CK Technique Name:SombRAT
SombRAT has the ability to use TCP sockets to send data and ICMP to ping the C2 server.[65][66] | secon |
titleblackhat:us-22 Monitoring Surveillance Vendors: A Deep Dive into In-the-Wild Android Full Chains in 2021
Over the past 12 months, Google's TAG (Threat Analysis Group) and Android Security teams have discovered and analyzed several in-the-wild 1day/0day exploits by surveillance vendors. We will present in-the-wild ... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0170
ATT&CK Technique Name:Helminth
Helminth splits data into chunks up to 23 bytes and sends the data in DNS queries to its C2 server.[6] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0266
ATT&CK Technique Name:TrickBot
TrickBot uses the Windows API call, CreateProcessW(), to manage execution flow.[174] TrickBot has also used Nt* API functions to perform Process Injection.[175] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G1006
ATT&CK Technique Name:Earth Lusca
Earth Lusca used the command move [file path] c:\windows\system32\spool\prtprocs\x64\spool.dll to move and register a malicious DLL name as a Windows print processor, which eventually was loaded by the Print Spooler service.[51] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0494
ATT&CK Technique Name:Zen
Zen can inject code into the Setup Wizard at runtime to extract CAPTCHA images. Zen can inject code into the libc of running processes to infect them with the malware.[7] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0032
ATT&CK Technique Name:gh0st RAT
gh0st RAT can inject malicious code into process created by the "Command_Create&Inject" function.[25] | secon |
title:blackhat:us-22 Real 'Cyber War': Espionage, DDoS, Leaks, and Wipers in the Russian Invasion of Ukraine
The Russian invasion of Ukraine has included a wealth of cyber operations that have tested our collective assumptions about the role that cyber plays in modern warfare. The concept of 'Cyber War' has been subjec... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0240
ATT&CK Technique Name:ROKRAT
ROKRAT can decrypt strings using the victim's hostname as the key.[201][202] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0114
ATT&CK Technique Name:BOOTRASH
BOOTRASH is a Volume Boot Record (VBR) bootkit that uses the VBR to maintain persistence.[1][5][6] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S1059
ATT&CK Technique Name:metaMain
metaMain can inject the loader file, Speech02.db, into a process.[37] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:T1055.012
ATT&CK Technique Name:Process Hollowing
Adversaries may inject malicious code into suspended and hollowed processes in order to evade process-based defenses. Process hollowing is a method of executing arbitrary code in the address space of a separate live process. | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0236
ATT&CK Technique Name:Kwampirs
Kwampirs uses a large list of C2 servers that it cycles through until a successful connection is established.[26] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0034
ATT&CK Technique Name:Sandworm Team
Sandworm Team has crafted spearphishing emails with hyperlinks designed to trick unwitting recipients into revealing their account credentials.[21] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0694
ATT&CK Technique Name:DRATzarus
DRATzarus can use various API calls to see if it is running in a sandbox.[71] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0427
ATT&CK Technique Name:TrickMo
TrickMo can use the MediaRecorder class to record the screen when the targeted application is presented to the user, and can abuse accessibility features to record targeted applications to intercept transaction authorization numbers (TANs) and to scrape on-screen text.[21] | secon |
titleblackhat:eu-20 A New Hope: The One Last Chance to Save Your SSD Data
There are some reasons why vendors keep their details of controller and flash chip information confidential. One of the reasons is that their unique management techniques are deployed differently, that is relevant to SSD capacity and speed, such ... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0531
ATT&CK Technique Name:Grandoreiro
Grandoreiro can block the Deibold Warsaw GAS Tecnologia security tool at the firewall level.[12] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0182
ATT&CK Technique Name:FinFisher
Some FinFisher variants incorporate an MBR rootkit.[8][9] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:C0012
ATT&CK Technique Name:Operation CuckooBees
During Operation CuckooBees, the threat actors used the net start command as part of their initial reconnaissance.[39] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S1055
ATT&CK Technique Name:SharkBot
SharkBot can exfiltrate captured user credentials and event logs back to the C2 server. [10] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S1066
ATT&CK Technique Name:DarkTortilla
DarkTortilla has been obfuscated with the DeepSea .NET and ConfuserEx code obfuscators.[96] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0091
ATT&CK Technique Name:Silence
Silence has used Nmap to scan the corporate network, build a network topology, and identify vulnerable hosts.[80] | secon |
titleblackhat:us-21 Wibbly Wobbly, Timey Wimey – What's Really Inside Apple's U1 Chip
Apple introduced an Ultra Wideband (UWB) chip in the iPhone 11. Its cryptographically secured spatial measurement capabilities are accessible via the Nearby Interaction framework since iOS 14. As of now, it only supports interaction w... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0642
ATT&CK Technique Name:BADFLICK
BADFLICK has been distributed via spearphishing campaigns containing malicious Microsoft Word documents.[40] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S1050
ATT&CK Technique Name:PcShare
PcShare can obtain the proxy settings of a compromised machine using InternetQueryOptionA and its IP address by running nslookup myip.opendns.comresolver1.opendns.com\r\n.[90] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0440
ATT&CK Technique Name:Agent Smith
Agent Smith’s core malware is disguised as a JPG file, and encrypted with an XOR cipher.[1] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0666
ATT&CK Technique Name:Gelsemium
Gelsemium can use a batch script to delete itself.[138] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0027
ATT&CK Technique Name:Threat Group-3390
Threat Group-3390 actors obtain legitimate credentials using a variety of methods and use them to further lateral movement on victim networks.[63] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0660
ATT&CK Technique Name:Clambling
Clambling can create and start services on a compromised host.[16] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0167
ATT&CK Technique Name:Matryoshka
Matryoshka uses rundll32.exe in a Registry Run key value for execution as part of its persistence mechanism.[65] | secon |
title:blackhat:us-21 Bam the BAM - Electromagnetic Fault Injection & Automotive Systems
This talk introduces an example of how electromagnetic fault injection (EMFI) can be used to bypass security used to prevent ECU modifications on a recent (tested on a 2019 model year) automotive ECU. This attack requires extensive ... | secon |
titleblackhat:us-18 Measuring the Speed of the Red Queen's Race; Adaption and Evasion in Malware
Security is a constant cat-and-mouse game between those trying to keep abreast of and detect novel malware, and the authors attempting to evade detection. The introduction of the statistical methods of machine learning int... | secon |
titleblackhat:asia-22 Backdoor Investigation and Incident Response: From Zero to Profit
Every day online gaming companies are breached, however, you don't often hear about how it occurred, even yes, it is most likely related to DDoS, but how the attacker found their way in, what were the IOCs, was it financially lucra... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0040
ATT&CK Technique Name:Patchwork
Patchwork has obtained and used open-source tools such as QuasarRAT.[83] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0021
ATT&CK Technique Name:Molerats
Molerats has delivered compressed executables within ZIP files to victims.[217] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0453
ATT&CK Technique Name:Pony
Pony has collected the Service Pack, language, and region information to send to the C2.[280] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0673
ATT&CK Technique Name:DarkWatchman
DarkWatchman can identity the OS locale of a compromised host.[9] | secon |
title:blackhat:eu-19 BluePill: Neutralizing Anti-Analysis Behavior in Malware Dissection
In the malware realm designing transparent sandboxes is only one part of the story. When analysts intervene to understand structure and functional capabilities of complex samples, a good deal of their time is wasted in disarming pi... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0216
ATT&CK Technique Name:POORAIM
POORAIM can identify system information, including battery status.[155] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S1039
ATT&CK Technique Name:Bumblebee
Bumblebee has the ability to perform anti-virtualization checks.[7] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0047
ATT&CK Technique Name:Gamaredon Group
Gamaredon Group has used legitimate process names to hide malware including svchosst.[62] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0260
ATT&CK Technique Name:InvisiMole
InvisiMole has deleted files and directories including XML and files successfully uploaded to C2 servers.[111][112] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0631
ATT&CK Technique Name:Chaes
Chaes has used search order hijacking to load a malicious DLL.[15] | secon |
title:blackhat:asia-20 Patching Loopholes: Finding Backdoors in Applications
In this digital age, we live in a world of applications that enable us to conduct digital transactions ranging from everyday tasks to storage of sensitive data. But how secure are these applications?As the cybersecurity lead in the Singapore G... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0631
ATT&CK Technique Name:Chaes
Chaes has used JavaScript and Node.Js information stealer script that exfiltrates data using the node process.[20] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0610
ATT&CK Technique Name:SideTwist
SideTwist has exfiltrated data over its C2 channel.[113] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0125
ATT&CK Technique Name:Remsec
Remsec can obtain a list of active connections and open ports.[74] | secon |
titleblackhat:eu-21 Hand in Your Pocket Without You Noticing: Current State of Mobile Wallet Security
Apple Pay, Google Pay, and Samsung Pay are the de-facto payment services for mobile users. Their growth and popularity during COVID-19 have given mobile users the option to pay with ease, often without the need to tou... | secon |
title:blackhat:eu-21 The Art of Exploiting UAF by Ret2bpf in Android Kernel
In early 2021, an external researcher reported to Google three lines of code indicating the xt_qtaguid kernel module, used for monitoring network socket status, had a Use-After-Free vulnerability (CVE-2021-0399) for 10 years. Unfortunately, the... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:T1552.006
ATT&CK Technique Name:Group Policy Preferences
Adversaries may attempt to find unsecured credentials in Group Policy Preferences (GPP). GPP are tools that allow administrators to create domain policies with embedded credentials. These policies allow administrators to set local accounts. | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M1026
ATT&CK Technique Name:Privileged Account Management
Ensure containers are not running as root by default. In Kubernetes environments, consider defining Pod Security Standards that prevent pods from running privileged containers.[5] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0655
ATT&CK Technique Name:BusyGasper
BusyGasper can use its keylogger module to take screenshots of the area of the screen that the user tapped.[7] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0681
ATT&CK Technique Name:Lizar
Lizar can take JPEG screenshots of an infected system.[91][92] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0021
ATT&CK Technique Name:Molerats
Molerats used PowerShell implants on target machines.[150] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0038
ATT&CK Technique Name:Stealth Falcon
Stealth Falcon malware gathers system information via WMI, including the system directory, build number, serial number, version, manufacturer, model, and total physical memory.[351] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0655
ATT&CK Technique Name:BusyGasper
BusyGasper can be controlled via IRC using freenode.net servers.[1] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:T1055.015
ATT&CK Technique Name:ListPlanting
Adversaries may abuse list-view controls to inject malicious code into hijacked processes in order to evade process-based defenses as well as possibly elevate privileges. ListPlanting is a method of executing arbitrary code in the address space of a separate live p... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0595
ATT&CK Technique Name:ThiefQuest
ThiefQuest uses various API functions such as NSCreateObjectFileImageFromMemory to load and link in-memory payloads.[21] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0487
ATT&CK Technique Name:Kessel
Kessel can split the data to be exilftrated into chunks that will fit in subdomains of DNS queries.[7] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0476
ATT&CK Technique Name:Valak
Valak has the ability to modify the Registry key HKCU\Software\ApplicationContainer\Appsw64 to store information regarding the C2 server and downloads.[171][172][173] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0276
ATT&CK Technique Name:Keydnap
Keydnap uses a copy of tor2web proxy for HTTPS communications.[14] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0060
ATT&CK Technique Name:BRONZE BUTLER
BRONZE BUTLER has used at to register a scheduled task to execute malware during lateral movement.[5] | secon |
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