text stringlengths 100 9.93M | category stringclasses 11
values |
|---|---|
ATT&CK ID:S0363
ATT&CK Technique Name:Empire
Empire contains modules that can discover and exploit path interception opportunities in the PATH environment variable.[1] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0623
ATT&CK Technique Name:Siloscape
Siloscape impersonates the main thread of CExecSvc.exe by calling NtImpersonateThread.[14] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:TA0001
ATT&CK Technique Name:Initial Access
The adversary is trying to get into your network. | secon |
ATT&CK ID:T1571
ATT&CK Technique Name:Non-Standard Port
Adversaries may communicate using a protocol and port pairing that are typically not associated. For example, HTTPS over port 8088 or port 587 as opposed to the traditional port 443. Adversaries may make changes to the standard port used by a protocol to bypass fi... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0260
ATT&CK Technique Name:InvisiMole
InvisiMole has a command to disable routing and the Firewall on the victim’s machine.[16] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0522
ATT&CK Technique Name:Exobot
Exobot has used web injects to capture users’ credentials.[7] | secon |
titleblackhat:eu-21 "We Wait, Because We Know You" - Inside the Ransomware Negotiation Economics
Organizations worldwide continue to face waves of digital extortion in the form of targeted ransomware. Digital extortion is therefore now classified as the most prominent form of cybercrime and the most devastating... | secon |
title:botconf2015 DGArchive – A deep dive into domain generating malware
An observable trend in recent years of malware development is the increased use of Domain Generation Algorithms (DGAs). After having announced the project “DGArchive” in a lightning talk of last year’s Botconf, we would like to follow up with a fu... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0618
ATT&CK Technique Name:FIVEHANDS
FIVEHANDS can use an embedded NTRU public key to encrypt data for ransom.[41][47][48] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0661
ATT&CK Technique Name:FoggyWeb
FoggyWeb's loader can use API functions to load the FoggyWeb backdoor into the same Application Domain within which the legitimate AD FS managed code is executed.[79] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0118
ATT&CK Technique Name:Nidiran
Nidiran can create a new service named msamger (Microsoft Security Accounts Manager), which mimics the legitimate Microsoft database by the same name.[50][51] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0024
ATT&CK Technique Name:Dyre
Dyre registers itself as a service by adding several Registry keys.[44] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0030
ATT&CK Technique Name:Carbanak
Carbanak performs desktop video recording and captures screenshots of the desktop and sends it to the C2 server.[32] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0398
ATT&CK Technique Name:HyperBro
HyperBro can list all services and their configurations.[27] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0010
ATT&CK Technique Name:Turla
Turla has modify Registry values to store payloads.[166][167] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S1065
ATT&CK Technique Name:Woody RAT
Woody RAT can retrieve a list of user accounts and usernames from an infected machine.[202] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0084
ATT&CK Technique Name:Mis-Type
Mis-Type has created registry keys for persistence, including HKCU\Software\bkfouerioyou, HKLM\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Active Setup\Installed Components\{6afa8072-b2b1-31a8-b5c1-{Unique Identifier}, and HKLM\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Active Setup\Installed Components\{3BF41072-B2B1-31... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0078
ATT&CK Technique Name:Gorgon Group
Gorgon Group has used -W Hidden to conceal PowerShell windows by setting the WindowStyle parameter to hidden. [18] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M1022
ATT&CK Technique Name:Restrict File and Directory Permissions
Ensure that proper permissions and directory access control are set to deny users the ability to write files to the top-level directory C: and system directories, such as C:\Windows\, to reduce places where malicious files could be placed for... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0495
ATT&CK Technique Name:RDAT
RDAT has used Windows Video Service as a name for malicious services.[62] | secon |
title:botconf2016 Vawtrak Banking Trojan : A Threat to the Banking Ecosystem
Vawtrak has been among the top banking Trojans since quite a long time now. Banking Trojans have not been discussed much in security conferences contrary to APT’s and other type of malwares. This research is based on in-depth analysis of Vawtr... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:T1595.001
ATT&CK Technique Name:Scanning IP Blocks
Adversaries may scan victim IP blocks to gather information that can be used during targeting. Public IP addresses may be allocated to organizations by block, or a range of sequential addresses. | secon |
ATT&CK ID:C0025
ATT&CK Technique Name:2016 Ukraine Electric Power Attack
During the 2016 Ukraine Electric Power Attack, Sandworm Team used valid accounts to laterally move through VPN connections and dual-homed systems.[2] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0153
ATT&CK Technique Name:RedLeaves
RedLeaves can receive and execute commands with cmd.exe. It can also provide a reverse shell.[212][278] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0154
ATT&CK Technique Name:Cobalt Strike
Cobalt Strike can explore files on a compromised system.[80] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S1026
ATT&CK Technique Name:Mongall
Mongall has the ability to decrypt its payload prior to execution.[108] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0467
ATT&CK Technique Name:TajMahal
TajMahal has the ability to identify connected Apple devices.[45] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0106
ATT&CK Technique Name:Rocke
Rocke has used uname -m to collect the name and information about the infected system's kernel.[312] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:C0020
ATT&CK Technique Name:Maroochy Water Breach
In the Maroochy Water Breach, the adversary used a dedicated analog two-way radio system to send false data and instructions to pumping stations and the central computer.[8] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M0947
ATT&CK Technique Name:Audit
Perform audits or scans of systems, permissions, insecure software, insecure configurations, etc. to identify potential weaknesses. Perform periodic integrity checks of the device to validate the correctness of the firmware, software, programs, and configurations. Integrity c... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0470
ATT&CK Technique Name:BBK
BBK can extract a malicious Portable Executable (PE) from a photo.[3] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0114
ATT&CK Technique Name:Chimera
Chimera has used direct Windows system calls by leveraging Dumpert.[52] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M0807
ATT&CK Technique Name:Network Allowlists
Use host-based allowlists to prevent devices from accepting connections from unauthorized systems. For example, allowlists can be used to ensure devices can only connect with master stations or known management/engineering workstations. [6] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M1038
ATT&CK Technique Name:Execution Prevention
Adversaries may use new payloads to execute this technique. Identify and block potentially malicious software executed through hijacking by using application control solutions also capable of blocking libraries loaded by legitimate software. | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S1029
ATT&CK Technique Name:AuTo Stealer
AuTo Stealer can store collected data from an infected host to a file named Hostname_UserName.txt prior to exfiltration.[9] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0089
ATT&CK Technique Name:BlackEnergy
BlackEnergy injects its DLL component into svchost.exe.[7] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M1051
ATT&CK Technique Name:Update Software
For the Outlook methods, blocking macros may be ineffective as the Visual Basic engine used for these features is separate from the macro scripting engine.[1] Microsoft has released patches to try to address each issue. Ensure KB3191938 which blocks Outlook Visual B... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0475
ATT&CK Technique Name:BackConfig
BackConfig can download and run batch files to execute commands on a compromised host.[33] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0538
ATT&CK Technique Name:Crutch
Crutch has the ability to persist using scheduled tasks.[47] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0124
ATT&CK Technique Name:Pisloader
Pisloader uses cmd.exe to set the Registry Run key value. It also has a command to spawn a command shell.[259] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0040
ATT&CK Technique Name:Patchwork
Patchwork embedded a malicious macro in a Word document and lured the victim to click on an icon to execute the malware.[183][184] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:C0009
ATT&CK Technique Name:Oldsmar Treatment Plant Intrusion
During the Oldsmar Treatment Plant Intrusion, the threat actors raised the sodium hydroxide setpoint value from 100 part-per-million (ppm) to 11,100 ppm, far beyond normal operating levels.[5] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M1040
ATT&CK Technique Name:Behavior Prevention on Endpoint
On Windows 10, enable Attack Surface Reduction (ASR) rules to prevent execution of potentially obfuscated scripts.[15] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M1018
ATT&CK Technique Name:User Account Management
Ensure that proper policies are implemented to dictate the secure enrollment and deactivation of MFA for user accounts. | secon |
ATT&CK ID:C0020
ATT&CK Technique Name:Maroochy Water Breach
In the Maroochy Water Breach, the adversary gained remote computer access to the control system and altered data so that whatever function should have occurred at affected pumping stations did not occur or occurred in a different way. This ultimately led to 80... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0045
ATT&CK Technique Name:menuPass
menuPass has installed updates and new malware on victims.[283][284] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0100
ATT&CK Technique Name:Inception
Inception used a file hunting plugin to collect .txt, .pdf, .xls or .doc files from the infected host.[88] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0438
ATT&CK Technique Name:Attor
Attor's dispatcher can inject itself into running processes to gain higher privileges and to evade detection.[6] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G1004
ATT&CK Technique Name:LAPSUS$
LAPSUS$ has removed a targeted organization's global admin accounts to lock the organization out of all access.[3] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0138
ATT&CK Technique Name:OLDBAIT
OLDBAIT obfuscates internal strings and unpacks them at startup.[88] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0670
ATT&CK Technique Name:WarzoneRAT
WarzoneRAT has the capability to act as a reverse proxy.[51] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G1009
ATT&CK Technique Name:Moses Staff
Moses Staff has used batch scripts that can enable SMB on a compromised host.[36] | secon |
titleblackhat:us-21 Come to the Dark Side, We Have Apples: Turning macOS Management Evil
This talk discusses advanced offensive tradecraft considering macOS management platforms such as Jamf and native MDM. We will be introducing new macOS exclusive TTPs covering initial access, command and control, persistence and lat... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0144
ATT&CK Technique Name:ChChes
ChChes can encode C2 data with a custom technique that utilizes Base64.[22][23] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M1038
ATT&CK Technique Name:Execution Prevention
Use application controls to mitigate installation and use of payloads that may be utilized to spoof security alerting. | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M0918
ATT&CK Technique Name:User Account Management
Ensure users and user groups have appropriate permissions for their roles through Identity and Access Management (IAM) controls. Implement strict IAM controls to prevent access to systems except for the applications, users, and services that require access. ... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0095
ATT&CK Technique Name:Machete
Machete has distributed Machete through a fake blog website.[36] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0363
ATT&CK Technique Name:Empire
Empire contains multiple modules for injecting into processes, such as Invoke-PSInject.[22] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0194
ATT&CK Technique Name:PowerSploit
PowerSploit's New-UserPersistenceOption Persistence argument can be used to establish via the HKCU\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run Registry key.[201][202] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0007
ATT&CK Technique Name:APT28
APT28 has changed extensions on files containing exfiltrated data to make them appear benign, and renamed a web shell instance to appear as a legitimate OWA page.[7] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G1006
ATT&CK Technique Name:Earth Lusca
Earth Lusca has used compromised web servers as part of their operational infrastructure.[3] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:T0814
ATT&CK Technique Name:Denial of Service
Adversaries may perform Denial-of-Service (DoS) attacks to disrupt expected device functionality. Examples of DoS attacks include overwhelming the target device with a high volume of requests in a short time period and sending the target device a request it does n... | secon |
title:blackhat:us-22 From Hackathon to Hacked: Web3's Security Journey
If there's one prediction you can make with certainty, it's that security in the Web3/blockchain space will get a whole lot worse before it gets better. We have the perfect cocktail of inexperience mixed with emerging technology playing out in full ... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0081
ATT&CK Technique Name:Tropic Trooper
Tropic Trooper has installed a service pointing to a malicious DLL dropped to disk.[127] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0226
ATT&CK Technique Name:Smoke Loader
Smoke Loader adds a Registry Run key for persistence and adds a script in the Startup folder to deploy the payload.[247] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0265
ATT&CK Technique Name:Kazuar
Kazuar adds a sub-key under several Registry run keys.[130] | secon |
title:blackhat:asia-21 X-in-the-Middle: Attacking Fast Charging Piles and Electric Vehicles
Electric vehicles represented by Tesla are changing the way people travel. How to safely and quickly charge electric vehicles is a problem that manufacturers of electric vehicles and charging piles need to solve. We conducted a... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M1051
ATT&CK Technique Name:Update Software
Update software regularly to include patches that fix DLL side-loading vulnerabilities. | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0409
ATT&CK Technique Name:Machete
Machete sends stolen data to the C2 server every 10 minutes.[12] | secon |
title:blackhat:us-20 CloudLeak: DNN Model Extractions from Commercial MLaaS Platforms
Deep Neural Networks (DNN) have been widely deployed for a variety of tasks across many disciplines, for example, image processing, natural language processing, and voice recognition. However, creating a successful DNN model depends o... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0225
ATT&CK Technique Name:sqlmap
sqlmap can be used to automate exploitation of SQL injection vulnerabilities.[56] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0477
ATT&CK Technique Name:Goopy
Goopy has the ability to side-load malicious DLLs with legitimate applications from Kaspersky, Microsoft, and Google.[6] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M0813
ATT&CK Technique Name:Software Process and Device Authentication
Authenticate connections fromsoftware and devices to prevent unauthorized systems from accessing protected management functions. | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0650
ATT&CK Technique Name:QakBot
QakBot can inject itself into processes including explore.exe, Iexplore.exe, Mobsync.exe., and wermgr.exe.[46][47][48][49][50] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:C0002
ATT&CK Technique Name:Night Dragon
During Night Dragon, threat actors purchased hosted services to use for C2.[5] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0525
ATT&CK Technique Name:Android/AdDisplay.Ashas
Android/AdDisplay.Ashas has communicated with the C2 server using HTTP.[2] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0438
ATT&CK Technique Name:Attor
Attor has a plugin that enumerates files with specific extensions on all hard disk drives and stores file information in encrypted log files.[21] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0184
ATT&CK Technique Name:POWRUNER
POWRUNER may collect information on the victim's anti-virus software.[79] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0480
ATT&CK Technique Name:Cerberus
Cerberus can uninstall itself from a device on command.[1] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0007
ATT&CK Technique Name:APT28
APT28 regularly deploys both publicly available (ex: Mimikatz) and custom password retrieval tools on victims.[1][2][3] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0092
ATT&CK Technique Name:TA505
TA505 has used spearphishing emails with malicious attachments to initially compromise victims.[213][214][215][216][217][218][219][220][221] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M1040
ATT&CK Technique Name:Behavior Prevention on Endpoint
Some endpoint security solutions can be configured to block some types of process injection based on common sequences of behavior that occur during the injection process. | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0596
ATT&CK Technique Name:ShadowPad
ShadowPad has collected the domain name of the victim system.[206] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0448
ATT&CK Technique Name:Rising Sun
Rising Sun can detect network adapter and IP address information.[199] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0687
ATT&CK Technique Name:Cyclops Blink
Cyclops Blink has the ability to upload exfiltrated files to a C2 server.[33] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S1073
ATT&CK Technique Name:Royal
Royal can enumerate IP addresses using GetIpAddrTable.[201] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0223
ATT&CK Technique Name:POWERSTATS
POWERSTATS uses PowerShell for obfuscation and execution.[185][156][186][160] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0034
ATT&CK Technique Name:Sandworm Team
Sandworm Team has used port 6789 to accept connections on the group's SSH server.[34] | secon |
title:blackhat:us-19 Preventing Authentication Bypass: A Tale of Two Researchers
“I discovered a critical security issue that lets an attacker compromise any other user’s account without any user interaction."Join Terry Zhang, Ron Chen, and a Microsoft Engineer for the coordinated public disclosure of a critical elevat... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0260
ATT&CK Technique Name:InvisiMole
InvisiMole can check for artifacts of VirtualBox, Virtual PC and VMware environment, and terminate itself if they are detected.[28] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0452
ATT&CK Technique Name:USBferry
USBferry can detect the victim's file or folder list.[306] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0606
ATT&CK Technique Name:Bad Rabbit
Bad Rabbit initially infected IT networks, but by means of an exploit (particularly the SMBv1-targeting MS17-010 vulnerability) spread to industrial networks. [2] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0399
ATT&CK Technique Name:Pallas
Pallas gathers and exfiltrates data about nearby Wi-Fi access points.[5] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:T1059.006
ATT&CK Technique Name:Python
Adversaries may abuse Python commands and scripts for execution. Python is a very popular scripting/programming language, with capabilities to perform many functions. Python can be executed interactively from the command-line (via the python.exe interpreter) or via scrip... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0331
ATT&CK Technique Name:Agent Tesla
Agent Tesla has had its code obfuscated in an apparent attempt to make analysis difficult.[11] Agent Tesla has used the Rijndael symmetric encryption algorithm to encrypt strings.[12] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:C0002
ATT&CK Technique Name:Night Dragon
During Night Dragon, threat actors dumped account hashes using gsecdump.[24] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0331
ATT&CK Technique Name:Agent Tesla
Agent Tesla can collect account information from the victim’s machine.[2] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0697
ATT&CK Technique Name:HermeticWiper
HermeticWiper has the ability to deploy through an infected system's default domain policy.[11] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S1062
ATT&CK Technique Name:S.O.V.A.
S.O.V.A. has included adversary-in-the-middle capabilities.[3] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0593
ATT&CK Technique Name:ECCENTRICBANDWAGON
ECCENTRICBANDWAGON can capture screenshots and store them locally.[57] | secon |
Subsets and Splits
No community queries yet
The top public SQL queries from the community will appear here once available.