text stringlengths 100 9.93M | category stringclasses 11
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ATT&CK ID:M1050
ATT&CK Technique Name:Exploit Protection
Security applications that look for behavior used during exploitation such as Windows Defender Exploit Guard (WDEG) and the Enhanced Mitigation Experience Toolkit (EMET) can be used to mitigate some exploitation behavior. [96] Control flow integrity checking is a... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0692
ATT&CK Technique Name:SILENTTRINITY
SILENTTRINITY can create a WMI Event to execute a payload for persistence.[18] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0524
ATT&CK Technique Name:AndroidOS/MalLocker.B
AndroidOS/MalLocker.B has employed both name mangling and meaningless variable names in source. AndroidOS/MalLocker.B has stored encrypted payload code in the Assets directory, coupled with a custom decryption routine that assembles a .dex file by passing data... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0340
ATT&CK Technique Name:Octopus
Octopus has used wmic.exe for local discovery information.[93] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0019
ATT&CK Technique Name:Regin
Regin appears to have functionality to modify remote Registry information.[131] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:C0022
ATT&CK Technique Name:Operation Dream Job
During Operation Dream Job, Lazarus Group used file hosting services like DropBox and OneDrive.[17] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M0949
ATT&CK Technique Name:Antivirus/Antimalware
Install anti-virus software on all workstation and transient assets that may have external access, such as to web, email, or remote file shares. | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0588
ATT&CK Technique Name:GoldMax
GoldMax has used decoy traffic to surround its malicious network traffic to avoid detection.[4] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0677
ATT&CK Technique Name:AADInternals
AADInternals can inject a malicious DLL (PTASpy) into the AzureADConnectAuthenticationAgentService to backdoor Azure AD Pass-Through Authentication.[3] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:T1556.002
ATT&CK Technique Name:Password Filter DLL
Adversaries may register malicious password filter dynamic link libraries (DLLs) into the authentication process to acquire user credentials as they are validated. | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0018
ATT&CK Technique Name:Sykipot
Sykipot may use net start to display running services.[51] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0690
ATT&CK Technique Name:Green Lambert
Green Lambert can use uname to identify the operating system name, version, and processor type.[150][151] | secon |
titleblackhat:eu-21 The Bad Guys Win – Analysis of 10,000 Magecart Vulnerabilities
"Magecart" is the common name for an attack in which hackers compromise 3rd party Javascript code to steal information from web-applications or websites that incorporate the code.Over the last two years, we monitored the web for vulnerab... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0648
ATT&CK Technique Name:JSS Loader
JSS Loader has the ability to launch scheduled tasks to establish persistence.[89] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0032
ATT&CK Technique Name:Lazarus Group
Lazarus Group has collected data and files from compromised networks.[102][103][104][105] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0625
ATT&CK Technique Name:Cuba
Cuba can modify services by using the OpenService and ChangeServiceConfig functions.[39] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0650
ATT&CK Technique Name:QakBot
QakBot can use PowerShell to download and execute payloads.[194] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0096
ATT&CK Technique Name:APT41
APT41 used VMProtected binaries in multiple intrusions.[37] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M1026
ATT&CK Technique Name:Privileged Account Management
Limit credential overlap across systems to prevent the damage of credential compromise and reduce the adversary's ability to perform Lateral Movement between systems. | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0612
ATT&CK Technique Name:WastedLocker
WastedLocker checked if UCOMIEnumConnections and IActiveScriptParseProcedure32 Registry keys were detected as part of its anti-analysis technique.[60] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0140
ATT&CK Technique Name:Shamoon
Shamoon can impersonate tokens using LogonUser, ImpersonateLoggedOnUser, and ImpersonateNamedPipeClient.[12] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0126
ATT&CK Technique Name:Higaisa
Higaisa dropped and added officeupdate.exe to scheduled tasks.[80][81] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M1028
ATT&CK Technique Name:Operating System Configuration
Protect domain controllers by ensuring proper security configuration for critical servers. | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0093
ATT&CK Technique Name:Backdoor.Oldrea
Backdoor.Oldrea collects information about the OS and computer name.[42][43] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0685
ATT&CK Technique Name:PowerPunch
PowerPunch can download payloads from adversary infrastructure.[193] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0366
ATT&CK Technique Name:WannaCry
WannaCry uses attrib +h and icacls . /grant Everyone:F /T /C /Q to make some of its files hidden and grant all users full access controls.[11] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0056
ATT&CK Technique Name:Net Crawler
Net Crawler uses PsExec to perform remote service manipulation to execute a copy of itself as part of lateral movement.[37] | secon |
titleblackhat:us-22 The Journey of Hunting In-the-Wild Windows LPE 0day
From 2017 to 2021, Microsoft disclosed a total of 28 in-the-wild Windows LPE 0days, most of which are Windows kernel LPE vulnerabilities. These vulnerabilities are often used by top level APT and could cause great harm. For security vendors, it is ... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0170
ATT&CK Technique Name:Helminth
Helminth has checked for the domain admin group and Exchange Trusted Subsystem groups using the commands net group Exchange Trusted Subsystem /domain and net group domain admins /domain.[16] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0513
ATT&CK Technique Name:LiteDuke
LiteDuke can create persistence by adding a shortcut in the CurrentVersion\Run Registry key.[88] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0689
ATT&CK Technique Name:WhisperGate
WhisperGate can download additional stages of malware from a Discord CDN channel.[472][473][474][475] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M1028
ATT&CK Technique Name:Operating System Configuration
If the computer is domain joined, then group policy can help restrict the ability to create or hide users. Similarly, preventing the modification of the /Library/Preferences/com.apple.loginwindow Hide500Users value will force all users to be visible. | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0027
ATT&CK Technique Name:Threat Group-3390
Threat Group-3390 has exfiltrated stolen data to Dropbox.[5] | secon |
title:blackhat:asia-23 Breaking Managed Data Services in the Cloud
Cloud is the new operating system of the internet – almost all companies use the cloud to host workloads and data. While there are many talks about how to configure and maintain secure public cloud environments, there's little security research into the... | secon |
titleblackhat:us-20 Breaking Samsung's Root of Trust: Exploiting Samsung S10 Secure Boot
Being the highest market share smartphone manufacturer, Samsung conducts a series of protection on Android called Knox Platform to ensure the security of its smartphones. During the booting process, Samsung uses S-boot (Secure Boot... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:T1596.004
ATT&CK Technique Name:CDNs
Adversaries may search content delivery network (CDN) data about victims that can be used during targeting. CDNs allow an organization to host content from a distributed, load balanced array of servers. CDNs may also allow organizations to customize content delivery based ... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:C0022
ATT&CK Technique Name:Operation Dream Job
During Operation Dream Job, Lazarus Group targeted Windows servers running Internet Information Systems (IIS) to install C2 components.[11] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0035
ATT&CK Technique Name:Dragonfly
Dragonfly has created accounts on victims, including administrator accounts, some of which appeared to be tailored to each individual staging target.[7] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0010
ATT&CK Technique Name:Turla
Turla has used fsutil fsinfo drives to list connected drives.[47] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0121
ATT&CK Technique Name:Sidewinder
Sidewinder has sent e-mails with malicious links often crafted for specific targets.[96][97] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0378
ATT&CK Technique Name:PoshC2
PoshC2 contains an implementation of netstat to enumerate TCP and UDP connections.[65] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S1070
ATT&CK Technique Name:Black Basta
Black Basta can use LDAP queries to connect to AD and iterate over connected workstations.[19] | secon |
title:blackhat:eu-19 Is Your Mental Health for Sale?
According to the WHO, 25% of the European population suffer from depression or anxiety each year and depression accounts for up to 50% of chronic sick leaves. This means that every day, millions of people are looking for information about depression online - whether ... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M1031
ATT&CK Technique Name:Network Intrusion Prevention
Network intrusion detection and prevention systems that use network signatures to identify traffic for specific adversary malware can be used to mitigate activity at the network level. Signatures are often for unique indicators within protocols and may ... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0612
ATT&CK Technique Name:WastedLocker
WastedLocker can delete shadow volumes.[63][64][65] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0085
ATT&CK Technique Name:S-Type
The initial beacon packet for S-Type contains the operating system version and file system of the victim.[232] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:T1553.005
ATT&CK Technique Name:Mark-of-the-Web Bypass
Adversaries may abuse specific file formats to subvert Mark-of-the-Web (MOTW) controls. In Windows, when files are downloaded from the Internet, they are tagged with a hidden NTFS Alternate Data Stream (ADS) named Zone.Identifier with a specific value kno... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0019
ATT&CK Technique Name:Regin
Regin stage 1 modules for 64-bit systems have been found to be signed with fake certificates masquerading as originating from Microsoft Corporation and Broadcom Corporation.[7] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0386
ATT&CK Technique Name:Ursnif
Ursnif has used process hollowing to inject into child processes.[43] | secon |
titleblackhat:eu-22 Fuzzing and Breaking Security Functions of SIMATIC PLCs
<span style="font-size: 10pt;" data-mce-style="font-size:
10pt;">Siemens SIMATIC PLC is widely used in the world and accounts for a high proportion of the PLC market share, these PLCs are often used in critical infrastructure control scenarios,... | secon |
titleblackhat:us-21 IPvSeeYou: Exploiting Leaked Identifiers in IPv6 for Street-Level Geolocation
While IP Geolocation -- tying an IP address to a physical location -- is in common use, available public and commercial techniques and tools provide only coarse city-level locations that are often wrong. With "IPvSeeYou," ... | secon |
titleblackhat:us-18 Squeezing a Key through a Carry Bit
The Go implementation of the P-256 elliptic curve had a small bug due to a misplaced carry bit affecting less than 0.00000003% of field subtraction operations. We show how to build a full practical key recovery attack on top of it, capable of targeting JSON Web En... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0371
ATT&CK Technique Name:POWERTON
POWERTON can install a Registry Run key for persistence.[203] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0069
ATT&CK Technique Name:MuddyWater
MuddyWater has used a PowerShell backdoor to check for Skype connectivity on the target machine.[19] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0180
ATT&CK Technique Name:Volgmer
Volgmer can gather system information, the computer name, OS version, drive and serial information from the victim's machine.[389][390][391] | secon |
titleblackhat:asia-20 Wi-Fi Brokering
The common perception of 802.1X WiFi networks using tunneled authentication methods such as PEAP, are that they offer good enough security. Attacks introduced in 2004 by Joshua Wright and Brad Antoniewicz allow the inner MSCHAPv2 challenge/response to be captured, and cracked offli... | secon |
title:blackhat:eu-19 Implementing the Lessons Learned From a Major Cyber Attack
In June 2017, Maersk suffered a major notpetya cyber-attack, this session explains lessons learned and how they are now being applied within Maersk. | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0022
ATT&CK Technique Name:APT3
APT3 has been known to brute force password hashes to be able to leverage plain text credentials.[3] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M1035
ATT&CK Technique Name:Limit Access to Resource Over Network
Limit access to network infrastructure and resources that can be used to reshape traffic or otherwise produce AiTM conditions. | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0012
ATT&CK Technique Name:Darkhotel
Darkhotel malware can collect a list of running processes on a system.[73] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0088
ATT&CK Technique Name:Kasidet
Kasidet has the ability to download and execute additional files.[237] | secon |
titleblackhat:us-19 SSO Wars: The Token Menace
It is the year 2019. Humanity has almost won its long-standing war against Single-Sign On (SSO) bugs. The last of them were discovered and eradicated some time ago and the world is now living in an era of prosperity while the Auth Federation enjoys peaceful CVE-free times.... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0488
ATT&CK Technique Name:CrackMapExec
CrackMapExec can brute force supplied user credentials across a network range.[9] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0059
ATT&CK Technique Name:Magic Hound
Magic Hound has used a web shell to exfiltrate a ZIP file containing a dump of LSASS memory on a compromised machine.[113][114] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M0802
ATT&CK Technique Name:Communication Authenticity
Protocols used for control functions should provide authenticity through MAC functions or digital signatures. If not, utilize bump-in-the-wire devices or VPNs to enforce communication authenticity between devices that are not capable of supporting this (e... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0514
ATT&CK Technique Name:WellMess
WellMess can execute command line scripts received from C2.[349] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0454
ATT&CK Technique Name:Cadelspy
Cadelspy has the ability to compress stolen data into a .cab file.[13] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0265
ATT&CK Technique Name:Kazuar
Kazuar captures screenshots of the victim’s screen.[85] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0266
ATT&CK Technique Name:TrickBot
TrickBot has the ability to capture RDP credentials by capturing the CredEnumerateA API[13] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0646
ATT&CK Technique Name:SpicyOmelette
SpicyOmelette has been distributed via emails containing a malicious link that appears to be a PDF document.[34] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0501
ATT&CK Technique Name:PipeMon
PipeMon can install additional modules via C2 commands.[343] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0162
ATT&CK Technique Name:Komplex
The OsInfo function in Komplex collects the current running username.[90] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G1006
ATT&CK Technique Name:Earth Lusca
Earth Lusca has registered domains, intended to look like legitimate target domains, that have been used in watering hole attacks.[23] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:C0017
ATT&CK Technique Name:C0017
During C0017, APT41 used cmd.exe /c ping %userdomain% for discovery.[45] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0461
ATT&CK Technique Name:SDBbot
SDBbot has the ability to use image file execution options for persistence if it detects it is running with admin privileges on a Windows version newer than Windows 7.[9] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M1015
ATT&CK Technique Name:Active Directory Configuration
For containing the impact of a previously forged SAML token, rotate the token-signing AD FS certificate in rapid succession twice, which will invalidate any tokens generated using the previous certificate.[8] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M1046
ATT&CK Technique Name:Boot Integrity
Use Trusted Platform Module technology and a secure or trusted boot process to prevent system integrity from being compromised. Check the integrity of the existing BIOS or EFI to determine if it is vulnerable to modification. [2] [3] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0659
ATT&CK Technique Name:Diavol
Diavol can delete specified files from a targeted system.[14] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0046
ATT&CK Technique Name:CozyCar
CozyCar has executed Mimikatz to harvest stored credentials from the victim and further victim penetration.[24] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0087
ATT&CK Technique Name:APT39
APT39 has maintained persistence using the startup folder.[26] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0468
ATT&CK Technique Name:Skidmap
Skidmap has created a fake rm binary to replace the legitimate Linux binary.[151] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0091
ATT&CK Technique Name:Silence
Silence has sent emails with malicious DOCX, CHM, LNK and ZIP attachments. [207][208][209] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0692
ATT&CK Technique Name:SILENTTRINITY
SILENTTRINITY can determine if an anti-virus product is installed through the resolution of the service's virtual SID.[92] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0121
ATT&CK Technique Name:Sidewinder
Sidewinder has used tools to collect the computer name, OS version, installed hotfixes, as well as information regarding the memory and processor on a compromised host.[333][334] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0512
ATT&CK Technique Name:FatDuke
FatDuke has used HKLM\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\CurrentVersion\Run to establish persistence.[88] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0032
ATT&CK Technique Name:Lazarus Group
Various Lazarus Group malware enumerates logged-on users.[93][94][95][96][97][44][98] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0436
ATT&CK Technique Name:TSCookie
TSCookie has the ability to inject code into the svchost.exe, iexplorer.exe, explorer.exe, and default browser processes.[64] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0494
ATT&CK Technique Name:Zen
Zen can dynamically load executable code from remote sources.[32] | secon |
titleblackhat:us-21 Your Software IS/NOT Vulnerable: CSAF, VEX, and the Future of Advisories
As more attention is paid to security and the underlying components used in developing software, more organizations will be sending out security advisories. As SBOMs become more widespread, many of these advisories will actuall... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0049
ATT&CK Technique Name:GeminiDuke
GeminiDuke collects information on programs and services on the victim that are configured to automatically run at startup.[20] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0586
ATT&CK Technique Name:TAINTEDSCRIBE
TAINTEDSCRIBE can download additional modules from its C2 server.[437] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S1066
ATT&CK Technique Name:DarkTortilla
DarkTortilla can download a keylogging module.[51] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0080
ATT&CK Technique Name:Cobalt Group
Cobalt Group deleted the DLL dropper from the victim’s machine to cover their tracks.[44] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0139
ATT&CK Technique Name:TeamTNT
TeamTNT has checked for running containers with docker ps and for specific container names with docker inspect.[5] TeamTNT has also searched for Kubernetes pods running in a local network.[6] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0137
ATT&CK Technique Name:CORESHELL
CORESHELL is installed via execution of rundll32 with an export named "init" or "InitW."[35] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0339
ATT&CK Technique Name:Micropsia
Micropsia gathers the hostname and OS version from the victim’s machine.[227][228] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0453
ATT&CK Technique Name:Pony
Pony has used a small dictionary of common passwords against a collected list of local accounts.[17] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S1064
ATT&CK Technique Name:SVCReady
SVCReady can use Windows API calls to gather information from an infected host.[164] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:T0847
ATT&CK Technique Name:Replication Through Removable Media
Adversaries may move onto systems, such as those separated from the enterprise network, by copying malware to removable media which is inserted into the control systems environment. The adversary may rely on unknowing trusted third parties, such ... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0083
ATT&CK Technique Name:Misdat
Misdat has created registry keys for persistence, including HKCU\Software\dnimtsoleht\StubPath, HKCU\Software\snimtsOleht\StubPath, HKCU\Software\Backtsaleht\StubPath, HKLM\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Active Setup\Installed. Components\{3bf41072-b2b1-21c8-b5c1-bd56d32fbda7}, and HKLM... | secon |
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