text stringlengths 100 9.93M | category stringclasses 11
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|---|---|
ATT&CK ID:S0458
ATT&CK Technique Name:Ramsay
Ramsay can insert itself into the address space of other applications using the AppInit DLL Registry key.[6] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M1012
ATT&CK Technique Name:Enterprise Policy
An EMM/MDM can use the Android DevicePolicyManager.setPermittedAccessibilityServices method to set an explicit list of applications that are allowed to use Android's accessibility features. | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0409
ATT&CK Technique Name:Machete
Machete used the startup folder for persistence.[149][150] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0126
ATT&CK Technique Name:ComRAT
ComRAT has injected its orchestrator DLL into explorer.exe. ComRAT has also injected its communications module into the victim's default browser to make C2 connections appear less suspicious as all network connections will be initiated by the browser process.[15][16] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0366
ATT&CK Technique Name:WannaCry
WannaCry uses attrib +h to make some of its files hidden.[51] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0491
ATT&CK Technique Name:StrongPity
StrongPity can exfiltrate collected documents through C2 channels.[124][125] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0624
ATT&CK Technique Name:Ecipekac
Ecipekac can use XOR, AES, and DES to encrypt loader shellcode.[110] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0234
ATT&CK Technique Name:Bandook
Bandook is delivered via a malicious Word document inside a zip file.[41] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0575
ATT&CK Technique Name:Conti
Conti can spread itself by infecting other remote machines via network shared drives.[3][4] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0588
ATT&CK Technique Name:GoldMax
GoldMax has impersonated systems management software to avoid detection.[30] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M1031
ATT&CK Technique Name:Network Intrusion Prevention
Network intrusion prevention systems and systems designed to scan and remove malicious email attachments or links can be used to block activity. | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0102
ATT&CK Technique Name:Wizard Spider
Wizard Spider has used HTTP for network communications.[371] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0239
ATT&CK Technique Name:Bankshot
Bankshot encodes commands from the control server using a range of characters and gzip.[4] | secon |
titleblackhat:us-22 Morning Break
Morning Coffee Break will be served in the following areas for Briefings pass holders.Bay View Court North Corridor (North Convention Center)Bay View Court South Corridor (North Convention Center)Breakers Registration Corridor, Lagoon Corridor (Level 2)South Seas Foyer North, Jasmine F... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0446
ATT&CK Technique Name:Ryuk
Ryuk has called kill.bat for stopping services, disabling services and killing processes.[38] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M1053
ATT&CK Technique Name:Data Backup
Consider implementing IT disaster recovery plans that contain procedures for taking regular data backups that can be used to restore organizational data.[7] Ensure backups are stored off system and is protected from common methods adversaries may use to gain access and ... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0476
ATT&CK Technique Name:Valak
Valak can execute JavaScript containing configuration data for establishing persistence.[66] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:T1543.002
ATT&CK Technique Name:Systemd Service
Adversaries may create or modify systemd services to repeatedly execute malicious payloads as part of persistence. Systemd is a system and service manager commonly used for managing background daemon processes (also known as services) and other system resources.... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S1058
ATT&CK Technique Name:Prestige
Prestige has attempted to stop the MSSQL Windows service to ensure successful encryption using C:\Windows\System32\net.exe stop MSSQLSERVER.[31] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M1052
ATT&CK Technique Name:User Account Control
Changing UAC settings to "Always Notify" will give the user more visibility when UAC elevation is requested, however, this option will not be popular among users due to the constant UAC interruptions. | secon |
title:blackhat:asia-21 Racing the Dark: A New TOCTTOU Story From Apple's Core
When developing operating system kernels and drivers, functions related to user data mapping, accessing and parsing are often found vulnerable. In order to solve this type of problem, almost every system defines standard operating rules w... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M0921
ATT&CK Technique Name:Restrict Web-Based Content
Restrict browsers to limit the capabilities of malicious ads and Javascript. | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0064
ATT&CK Technique Name:APT33
APT33 has used base64 to encode command and control traffic.[5] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0249
ATT&CK Technique Name:Gold Dragon
Gold Dragon checks the running processes on the victim’s machine.[41] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0077
ATT&CK Technique Name:Leafminer
Leafminer has infected victims using watering holes.[33] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M1018
ATT&CK Technique Name:User Account Management
Limit privileges of user accounts and groups so that only authorized administrators can interact with service changes and service binary target path locations. Deny execution from user directories such as file download directories and temp directories where ... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0520
ATT&CK Technique Name:BLINDINGCAN
BLINDINGCAN has collected from a victim machine the system name, processor information, OS version, and disk information, including type and free space available.[63] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0154
ATT&CK Technique Name:Cobalt Strike
Cobalt Strike can perform port scans from an infected host.[20][21][22] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0395
ATT&CK Technique Name:LightNeuron
LightNeuron encrypts its configuration files with AES-256.[198] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0673
ATT&CK Technique Name:DarkWatchman
DarkWatchman has used an icon mimicking a text file to mask a malicious executable.[12] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0027
ATT&CK Technique Name:Threat Group-3390
Threat Group-3390 has registered domains for C2.[67] | secon |
title:botconf2020 A detailed look into the Mozi P2P IoT botnet
Since December 2019, we have reverse engineered and tracked the activity and infection population of a botnet family referred to as Mozi that infects Linux-based Internet-of-Things (IoT) devices. Mozi implements a peer-to-peer (P2P) command-and-control (C2)... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0007
ATT&CK Technique Name:APT28
APT28 installed a Delphi backdoor that used a custom algorithm for C2 communications.[3] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0288
ATT&CK Technique Name:KeyRaider
Most KeyRaider samples hook SSLRead and SSLWrite functions in the itunesstored process to intercept device communication with the Apple App Store.[1] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0032
ATT&CK Technique Name:Lazarus Group
Lazarus Group keylogger KiloAlfa obtains user tokens from interactive sessions to execute itself with API call CreateProcessAsUserA under that user's context.[8][9] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0549
ATT&CK Technique Name:SilkBean
SilkBean has attempted to trick users into enabling installation of applications from unknown sources.[3] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0483
ATT&CK Technique Name:IcedID
IcedID has utilzed encrypted binaries and base64 encoded strings.[165] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0011
ATT&CK Technique Name:Taidoor
Taidoor has downloaded additional files onto a compromised host.[436] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S1071
ATT&CK Technique Name:Rubeus
Rubeus can reveal the credentials of accounts that have Kerberos pre-authentication disabled through AS-REP roasting.[5][6][7] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0034
ATT&CK Technique Name:Sandworm Team
Sandworm Team have used previously acquired legitimate credentials prior to attacks.[54] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0203
ATT&CK Technique Name:Hydraq
Hydraq creates a backdoor through which remote attackers can load and call DLL functions.[11][12] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0312
ATT&CK Technique Name:WireLurker
WireLurker monitors for iOS devices connected via USB to an infected OSX computer and installs downloaded third-party applications or automatically generated malicious applications onto the device.[7] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0271
ATT&CK Technique Name:KEYMARBLE
KEYMARBLE can execute shell commands using cmd.exe.[176] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0102
ATT&CK Technique Name:Wizard Spider
Wizard Spider has used scheduled tasks to install TrickBot, using task names to appear legitimate such as WinDotNet, GoogleTask, or Sysnetsf.[77] It has also used common document file names for other malware binaries.[78] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0440
ATT&CK Technique Name:Agent Smith
Agent Smith obtains the device’s application list.[2] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0488
ATT&CK Technique Name:CrackMapExec
CrackMapExec can set a scheduled task on the target system to execute commands remotely using at.[6] | secon |
titleblackhat:us-22 The Battle Against the Billion-Scale Internet Underground Industry: Advertising Fraud Detection and Defense
Advertising is the main profit model of internet companies; the annual industry scale of global internet advertising has reached hundreds of billions of dollars. In fact, internet advertising ... | secon |
title:botconf2013 Disass
Disass is a binary analysis framework written in Python to automate static malware reverse engineering. Currently Disass is not designed to handle packed binary as static unpacking is a pretty tough task on its own.The approach is simple : it’s stupid to repeat the same reverse engineering step... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:T1556.007
ATT&CK Technique Name:Hybrid Identity
Adversaries may patch, modify, or otherwise backdoor cloud authentication processes that are tied to on-premises user identities in order to bypass typical authentication mechanisms, access credentials, and enable persistent access to accounts. | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0106
ATT&CK Technique Name:Rocke
Rocke can detect a running process's PID on the infected machine.[217] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M1022
ATT&CK Technique Name:Restrict File and Directory Permissions
The sudoers file should be strictly edited such that passwords are always required and that users can't spawn risky processes as users with higher privilege. | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0427
ATT&CK Technique Name:TrickMo
TrickMo can inject input to set itself as the default SMS handler, and to automatically click through pop-ups without giving the user any time to react.[13] | secon |
title:blackhat:eu-20 Effective Vulnerability Discovery with Machine Learning
Software Composition Analysis (SCA) products report vulnerabilities in third-party dependencies by comparing libraries detected in an application against a database of known vulnerabilities. These databases typically incorporate multiple sourc... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0576
ATT&CK Technique Name:MegaCortex
MegaCortex was used to kill endpoint security processes.[58] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:T1558
ATT&CK Technique Name:Steal or Forge Kerberos Tickets
Adversaries may attempt to subvert Kerberos authentication by stealing or forging Kerberos tickets to enable Pass the Ticket. Kerberos is an authentication protocol widely used in modern Windows domain environments. In Kerberos environments, referred... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0114
ATT&CK Technique Name:Chimera
Chimera has dumped password hashes for use in pass the hash authentication attacks.[5] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0034
ATT&CK Technique Name:Sandworm Team
Sandworm Team has used a large-scale botnet to target Small Office/Home Office (SOHO) network devices.[5] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0279
ATT&CK Technique Name:Proton
Proton uses an encrypted file to store commands and configuration values.[177] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:T1417.002
ATT&CK Technique Name:GUI Input Capture
Adversaries may mimic common operating system GUI components to prompt users for sensitive information with a seemingly legitimate prompt. The operating system and installed applications often have legitimate needs to prompt the user for sensitive information ... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0672
ATT&CK Technique Name:Zox
Zox has used the .PNG file format for C2 communications.[1] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0260
ATT&CK Technique Name:InvisiMole
InvisiMole can use the ITaskService, ITaskDefinition and ITaskSettings COM interfaces to schedule a task.[10] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0004
ATT&CK Technique Name:Ke3chang
Ke3chang has used tools to download files to compromised machines.[239] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M1012
ATT&CK Technique Name:Enterprise Policy
When using Samsung Knox, third-party keyboards must be explicitly added to an allow list in order to be available to the end-user.[1] An EMM/MDM can use the Android DevicePolicyManager.setPermittedAccessibilityServices method to set an explicit list of application... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M1047
ATT&CK Technique Name:Audit
Review changes to the cron schedule. cron execution can be reviewed within the /var/log directory. To validate the location of the cron log file, check the syslog config at /etc/rsyslog.conf or /etc/syslog.conf | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0059
ATT&CK Technique Name:Magic Hound
Magic Hound has used scheduled tasks to establish persistence and execution.[101][102] | secon |
title:blackhat:asia-20 Demystify Today's Binary Disassembling and How Modern ABI Makes it Easier
Disassembling is the process of restoring instructions and structure information from binary code, forming the foundation of nearly all the solutions for binary security. Incentivized by both industry needs and governme... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0056
ATT&CK Technique Name:PROMETHIUM
PROMETHIUM has created admin accounts on a compromised host.[11] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0625
ATT&CK Technique Name:Cuba
Cuba can enumerate local drives, disk type, and disk free space.[101] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0034
ATT&CK Technique Name:Sandworm Team
Sandworm Team has used stolen credentials to access administrative accounts within the domain.[17][18] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S1023
ATT&CK Technique Name:CreepyDrive
CreepyDrive can specify the local file path to upload files from.[87] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0130
ATT&CK Technique Name:Unknown Logger
Unknown Logger is capable of recording keystrokes.[25] | secon |
titleblackhat:eu-18 Divide et Impera: MemoryRanger Runs Drivers in Isolated Kernel Spaces
In Windows 10, Microsoft is introducing a new memory protection concept: Windows Defender Device Guard, which provides code integrity for all modules in the kernel-mode, while PatchGuard prevents patching the kernel. These feature... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G1004
ATT&CK Technique Name:LAPSUS$
LAPSUS$ has used compromised credentials to access cloud assets within a target organization.[8] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0240
ATT&CK Technique Name:ROKRAT
ROKRAT can steal credentials by leveraging the Windows Vault mechanism.[14] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M1018
ATT&CK Technique Name:User Account Management
Ensure proper user permissions are in place to prevent adversaries from disabling or interfering with security services. | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0117
ATT&CK Technique Name:Fox Kitten
Fox Kitten has installed TightVNC server and client on compromised servers and endpoints for lateral movement.[13] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0273
ATT&CK Technique Name:Socksbot
Socksbot can write and execute PowerShell scripts.[175] | secon |
titleblackhat:us-18 Decompiler Internals: Microcode
This talk sheds some light into the intermediate language that is used inside the Hex-Rays Decompiler. The microcode is simple yet powerful to represent real world programs. With the microcode details publicly available, now it is possible to build more intelligent bi... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M1028
ATT&CK Technique Name:Operating System Configuration
Consider disabling or restricting NTLM.[32] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0314
ATT&CK Technique Name:X-Agent for Android
X-Agent for Android was believed to have been used to obtain locational data of Ukrainian artillery forces.[39] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S1050
ATT&CK Technique Name:PcShare
PcShare can capture camera video as part of its collection process.[33] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0082
ATT&CK Technique Name:APT38
APT38 has used VBScript to execute commands and other operational tasks.[13] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:T1638
ATT&CK Technique Name:Adversary-in-the-Middle
Adversaries may attempt to position themselves between two or more networked devices to support follow-on behaviors such as Transmitted Data Manipulation or Endpoint Denial of Service. | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0579
ATT&CK Technique Name:Waterbear
Waterbear can leverage API functions for execution.[182] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0663
ATT&CK Technique Name:SysUpdate
SysUpdate has used DES to encrypt all C2 communications.[132] | secon |
title:blackhat:us-18 Real Eyes, Realize, Real Lies: Beating Deception Technologies
Recent advancements have reinvented deception technologies and their use as a security layer of defense, making them no longer passé but so effective and believable that they are fast-becoming widespread in mature organizations. Many sec... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0189
ATT&CK Technique Name:ISMInjector
ISMInjector is obfuscated with the off-the-shelf SmartAssembly .NET obfuscator created by red-gate.com.[171] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0376
ATT&CK Technique Name:HOPLIGHT
HOPLIGHT has multiple proxy options that mask traffic between the malware and the remote operators.[21] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0050
ATT&CK Technique Name:APT32
APT32 performed network scanning on the network to search for open ports, services, OS finger-printing, and other vulnerabilities.[4] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M1021
ATT&CK Technique Name:Restrict Web-Based Content
Update corporate policies to restrict what types of third-party applications may be added to any online service or tool that is linked to the company's information, accounts or network (e.g., Google, Microsoft, Dropbox, Basecamp, GitHub). However, rather ... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0615
ATT&CK Technique Name:SombRAT
SombRAT has the ability to use an embedded SOCKS proxy in C2 communications.[44] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0353
ATT&CK Technique Name:NOKKI
NOKKI uses the Windows call SetWindowsHookEx and begins injecting it into every GUI process running on the victim's machine.[10] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0007
ATT&CK Technique Name:APT28
APT28 has used Forfiles to locate PDF, Excel, and Word documents during collection. The group also searched a compromised DCCC computer for specific terms.[12][13] | secon |
titleblackhat:us-22 GPT-3 and Me: How Supercomputer-scale Neural Network Models Apply to Defensive Cybersecurity Problems
A key lesson of recent deep learning successes is that as we scale neural networks, they get better, and sometimes in game-changing ways.In this talk, we'll demonstrate and explain how supercomputer... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0520
ATT&CK Technique Name:BLINDINGCAN
BLINDINGCAN has modified file and directory timestamps.[11][12] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:T1564.006
ATT&CK Technique Name:Run Virtual Instance
Adversaries may carry out malicious operations using a virtual instance to avoid detection. A wide variety of virtualization technologies exist that allow for the emulation of a computer or computing environment. By running malicious code inside of a virtua... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0127
ATT&CK Technique Name:BBSRAT
DLL side-loading has been used to execute BBSRAT through a legitimate Citrix executable, ssonsvr.exe. The Citrix executable was dropped along with BBSRAT by the dropper.[11] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G1011
ATT&CK Technique Name:EXOTIC LILY
EXOTIC LILY has uploaded malicious payloads to file-sharing services including TransferNow, TransferXL, WeTransfer, and OneDrive.[9] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0220
ATT&CK Technique Name:Chaos
Chaos provides a reverse shell connection on 8338/TCP, encrypted via AES.[9] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0352
ATT&CK Technique Name:OSX_OCEANLOTUS.D
OSX_OCEANLOTUS.D can create a persistence file in the folder /Library/LaunchAgents.[25][26] | secon |
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