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titleblackhat:us-21 Internal Affairs: Hacking File System Access from the Web
The File System Access API deployed to browsers this year is the current version of a W3C draft to give websites, with user approval, the ability to read, write, and edit files and folders the user selects on their devices, an outgrowth of an... | secon |
title:blackhat:eu-21 Burning Bridges - Stopping Lateral Movement via the RPC Firewall
In Windows based environments, RPC is the main underlying protocol required for remote administration and for Active Directory services. As such, it is often used by IT admins, but also by ransomware and advanced attackers to spread b... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0604
ATT&CK Technique Name:Industroyer
Industroyer can use an arbitrary system service to load at system boot for persistence and replaces the ImagePath registry value of a Windows service with a new backdoor binary.[6] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:C0002
ATT&CK Technique Name:Night Dragon
During Night Dragon, threat actors disabled anti-virus and anti-spyware tools in some instances on the victim’s machines. The actors also disabled proxy settings to allow direct communication from victims to the Internet.[68] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M1056
ATT&CK Technique Name:Pre-compromise
This technique cannot be easily mitigated with preventive controls since it is based on behaviors performed outside of the scope of enterprise defenses and controls. | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0035
ATT&CK Technique Name:Dragonfly
Dragonfly has exploited a Windows Netlogon vulnerability (CVE-2020-1472) to obtain access to Windows Active Directory servers.[10] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0513
ATT&CK Technique Name:LiteDuke
LiteDuke has the ability to decrypt and decode multiple layers of obfuscation.[86] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0120
ATT&CK Technique Name:Evilnum
Evilnum can steal cookies and session information from browsers.[10] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:T1110.004
ATT&CK Technique Name:Credential Stuffing
Adversaries may use credentials obtained from breach dumps of unrelated accounts to gain access to target accounts through credential overlap. Occasionally, large numbers of username and password pairs are dumped online when a website or service is compromis... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S1027
ATT&CK Technique Name:Heyoka Backdoor
Heyoka Backdoor can check if it is running as a service on a compromised host.[23] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0092
ATT&CK Technique Name:TA505
TA505 has used base64 encoded PowerShell commands.[82][83] | secon |
title:blackhat:asia-20 From an URGENT/11 Vulnerability to a Full Take-Down of a Factory, Using a Single Packet
Industrial Controllers are the basic building blocks for any automated factory. Our talk will demonstrate how an attacker can take over an entire factory by transmitting a single packet that will exploit one o... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M1040
ATT&CK Technique Name:Behavior Prevention on Endpoint
On Windows 10, enable Attack Surface Reduction (ASR) rules to prevent malware from abusing WMI to attain persistence.[23] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:T1003.002
ATT&CK Technique Name:Security Account Manager
Adversaries may attempt to extract credential material from the Security Account Manager (SAM) database either through in-memory techniques or through the Windows Registry where the SAM database is stored. The SAM is a database file that contains local ... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M1013
ATT&CK Technique Name:Application Developer Guidance
Application developers uploading to public code repositories should be careful to avoid publishing sensitive information such as credentials and API keys. | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0681
ATT&CK Technique Name:Lizar
Lizar has encrypted data before sending it to the server.[34] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0374
ATT&CK Technique Name:SpeakUp
SpeakUp checks for availability of specific ports on servers.[58] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0599
ATT&CK Technique Name:Kinsing
Kinsing has used valid SSH credentials to access remote hosts.[38] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0674
ATT&CK Technique Name:CharmPower
CharmPower has the ability to download additional modules to a compromised host.[102] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0517
ATT&CK Technique Name:Pillowmint
Pillowmint has deleted the filepath %APPDATA%\Intel\devmonsrv.exe.[176] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0212
ATT&CK Technique Name:CORALDECK
CORALDECK has exfiltrated data in HTTP POST headers.[15] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:T1629.003
ATT&CK Technique Name:Disable or Modify Tools
Adversaries may disable security tools to avoid potential detection of their tools and activities. This can take the form of disabling security software, modifying SELinux configuration, or other methods to interfere with security tools scanning or repor... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0409
ATT&CK Technique Name:Machete
Machete has scanned and looked for cryptographic keys and certificate file extensions.[14] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M1037
ATT&CK Technique Name:Filter Network Traffic
Limit access to the Instance Metadata API. A properly configured Web Application Firewall (WAF) may help prevent external adversaries from exploiting Server-side Request Forgery (SSRF) attacks that allow access to the Cloud Instance Metadata API.[3] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0038
ATT&CK Technique Name:Stealth Falcon
Stealth Falcon malware gathers data from the local victim system.[175] | secon |
titleblackhat:eu-18 I Block You Because I Love You: Social Account Identification Attack Against a Website Visitor
In this talk, we present a practical side-channel attack that identifies the social web service account of a visitor to an attacker's website. As user pages and profiles in social web services generally in... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0376
ATT&CK Technique Name:HOPLIGHT
HOPLIGHT can launch cmd.exe to execute commands on the system.[160] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0096
ATT&CK Technique Name:APT41
APT41 used HTTP to download payloads for CVE-2019-19781 and CVE-2020-10189 exploits.[26] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0532
ATT&CK Technique Name:Lucifer
Lucifer has established persistence by creating the following scheduled task schtasks /create /sc minute /mo 1 /tn QQMusic ^ /tr C:Users\%USERPROFILE%\Downloads\spread.exe /F.[96] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M0813
ATT&CK Technique Name:Software Process and Device Authentication
Authenticate connections from software and devices to prevent unauthorized systems from accessing protected management functions. | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0039
ATT&CK Technique Name:Net
Net commands used with the /domain flag can be used to gather information about and manipulate user accounts on the current domain.[32] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S1062
ATT&CK Technique Name:S.O.V.A.
S.O.V.A. can take screenshots and abuse the Android Screen Cast feature to capture screen data.[17] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0242
ATT&CK Technique Name:SynAck
SynAck enumerates Registry keys associated with event logs.[91] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0438
ATT&CK Technique Name:Attor
Attor has a file uploader plugin that automatically exfiltrates the collected data and log files to the C2 server.[1] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0230
ATT&CK Technique Name:ZeroT
Many ZeroT samples can perform UAC bypass by using eventvwr.exe to execute a malicious file.[65] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0561
ATT&CK Technique Name:GuLoader
GuLoader has relied upon users clicking on links to malicious documents.[43] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M1026
ATT&CK Technique Name:Privileged Account Management
Modify Registry settings (directly or using Dcomcnfg.exe) in HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SOFTWARE\Classes\AppID\{{AppID_GUID}} associated with the process-wide security of individual COM applications.[3]Modify Registry settings (directly or using Dcomcnfg.exe) ... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0102
ATT&CK Technique Name:nbtstat
nbtstat can be used to discover local NetBIOS domain names. | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M1006
ATT&CK Technique Name:Use Recent OS Version
Android 8 introduced additional limitations on the implicit intents that an application can register for.[1] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0377
ATT&CK Technique Name:Ebury
Ebury has verified C2 domain ownership by decrypting the TXT record using an embedded RSA public key.[80] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0436
ATT&CK Technique Name:TSCookie
TSCookie has been executed via malicious links embedded in e-mails spoofing the Ministries of Education, Culture, Sports, Science and Technology of Japan.[101] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M1018
ATT&CK Technique Name:User Account Management
Periodically review user accounts and remove those that are inactive or unnecessary. Limit the ability for user accounts to create additional accounts. | secon |
title:blackhat:asia-20 May the Trust be with You: Empowering TrustZone-M with Multiple Trusted Environments
Over the last decade, Arm TrustZone has been pivotal for securing hundreds of millions of mobile devices. Within the realm of the Internet of Things (IoT), Arm has recently introduced TrustZone on its new generat... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G1005
ATT&CK Technique Name:POLONIUM
POLONIUM has used the AirVPN service for operational activity.[10] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0673
ATT&CK Technique Name:DarkWatchman
DarkWatchman can search for anti-virus products on the system.[30] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0649
ATT&CK Technique Name:SMOKEDHAM
SMOKEDHAM has been delivered via malicious links in phishing emails.[29] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0034
ATT&CK Technique Name:Sandworm Team
Sandworm Team's BCS-server tool uses base64 encoding and HTML tags for the communication traffic between the C2 server.[80] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0046
ATT&CK Technique Name:FIN7
FIN7 sent spearphishing emails with either malicious Microsoft Documents or RTF files attached.[94][95][96][97][98] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0458
ATT&CK Technique Name:Ramsay
Ramsay has created Registry Run keys to establish persistence.[217] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0134
ATT&CK Technique Name:Transparent Tribe
Transparent Tribe has used weaponized documents in e-mail to compromise targeted systems.[239][240][241][242][243] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M0807
ATT&CK Technique Name:Network Allowlists
Implement network allowlists to minimize serial comm port access to only authorized hosts, such as comm servers and RTUs. | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0329
ATT&CK Technique Name:Tangelo
Tangelo accesses databases from WhatsApp, Viber, Skype, and Line.[17] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S1070
ATT&CK Technique Name:Black Basta
Black Basta can encrypt files with the ChaCha20 cypher and using a multithreaded process to increase speed.[21][22][23][24][25][26][27][28][29] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0373
ATT&CK Technique Name:Astaroth
Astaroth's initial payload is a malicious .LNK file. [3][4] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0143
ATT&CK Technique Name:Aquatic Panda
Aquatic Panda has acquired and used Cobalt Strike in its operations.[20] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0115
ATT&CK Technique Name:Crimson
Crimson can perform audio surveillance using microphones.[6] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M1027
ATT&CK Technique Name:Password Policies
Refer to NIST guidelines when creating password policies. [4] | secon |
titleblackhat:us-19 Attack Surface as a Service
Protecting public facing assets is becoming increasingly problematic for any company with an online presence today. Growing online communities providing pre-built tools to easily bypass traditional defenses and a constant tug-of-war between usability and security contribu... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0380
ATT&CK Technique Name:StoneDrill
StoneDrill has been observed deleting the temporary files once they fulfill their task.[225] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:T1546.003
ATT&CK Technique Name:Windows Management Instrumentation Event Subscription
Adversaries may establish persistence and elevate privileges by executing malicious content triggered by a Windows Management Instrumentation (WMI) event subscription. WMI can be used to install event filters, providers, con... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M1031
ATT&CK Technique Name:Network Intrusion Prevention
Network intrusion detection and prevention systems that use network signatures to identify traffic for specific adversary malware can be used to mitigate activity at the network level. | secon |
titleblackhat:us-21 Over the Air Baseband Exploit: Gaining Remote Code Execution on 5G Smartphones
In recent years we saw the widespread adoption of 5G Cellular Networks, both for consumer devices, IoT, and critical infrastructure. The estimate of the number of devices connected to a 5G network varies, but statistics ... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0112
ATT&CK Technique Name:Windshift
Windshift has used malware to identify the computer name of a compromised host.[396] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0037
ATT&CK Technique Name:FIN6
To move laterally on a victim network, FIN6 has used credentials stolen from various systems on which it gathered usernames and password hashes.[29][30][31] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S1013
ATT&CK Technique Name:ZxxZ
ZxxZ has used scheduled tasks for persistence and execution.[29] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0274
ATT&CK Technique Name:Calisto
Calisto adds a .plist file to the /Library/LaunchAgents folder to maintain persistence.[10] | secon |
title:blackhat:us-19 Planning a Bug Bounty: The Nuts and Bolts from Concept to Launch
Thinking about launching a vulnerability disclosure or bug bounty program and not sure where to start? Do you use a bug bounty platform or self-host; hire a 3rd party service provider or run things yourself? What should your program r... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0128
ATT&CK Technique Name:BADNEWS
BADNEWS is capable of executing commands via cmd.exe.[35][36] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S1020
ATT&CK Technique Name:Kevin
Kevin can collect the MAC address and other information from a victim machine using ipconfig/all.[100] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0087
ATT&CK Technique Name:APT39
APT39 has created scheduled tasks for persistence.[18][19][20] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0697
ATT&CK Technique Name:HermeticWiper
The HermeticWiper executable has been signed with a legitimate certificate issued to Hermetica Digital Ltd.[39][40][41][42] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M1051
ATT&CK Technique Name:Update Software
Upgrade management services to the latest supported and compatible version. Specifically, any version providing increased password complexity or policy enforcement preventing default or weak passwords. | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0363
ATT&CK Technique Name:Empire
Empire can use Inveigh to conduct name service poisoning for credential theft and associated relay attacks.[8][9] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M1035
ATT&CK Technique Name:Limit Access to Resource Over Network
Limit access to remote services through centrally managed concentrators such as VPNs and other managed remote access systems. | secon |
ATT&CK ID:T0888
ATT&CK Technique Name:Remote System Information Discovery
An adversary may attempt to get detailed information about remote systems and their peripherals, such as make/model, role, and configuration. Adversaries may use information from Remote System Information Discovery to aid in targeting and shaping... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0363
ATT&CK Technique Name:Empire
Empire is capable of capturing screenshots on Windows and macOS systems.[58] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0683
ATT&CK Technique Name:Peirates
Peirates can deploy a pod that mounts its node’s root file system, then execute a command to create a reverse shell on the node.[7] | secon |
titleblackhat:asia-22 A False Door: Crack the Bluetooth Digital Vehicle Key
In an era of intelligent vehicles, smartphones have gradually become the main carrier of vehicle keys, making people's lives more convenient. At present, digital vehicle keys mainly include Bluetooth and NFC keys, and the advantages of Bluetoot... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0050
ATT&CK Technique Name:CosmicDuke
CosmicDuke collects user credentials, including passwords, for various programs including popular instant messaging applications and email clients as well as WLAN keys.[7] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:C0024
ATT&CK Technique Name:SolarWinds Compromise
During the SolarWinds Compromise, APT29 extracted files from compromised networks.[171] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0125
ATT&CK Technique Name:Remsec
Remsec is capable of using ICMP, TCP, and UDP for C2.[60][61] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:C0014
ATT&CK Technique Name:Operation Wocao
During Operation Wocao, threat actors used valid VPN credentials to gain initial access.[51] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0053
ATT&CK Technique Name:SeaDuke
SeaDuke uses a module to execute Mimikatz with PowerShell to perform Pass the Ticket.[13] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0415
ATT&CK Technique Name:BOOSTWRITE
BOOSTWRITE has exploited the loading of the legitimate Dwrite.dll file by actually loading the gdi library, which then loads the gdiplus library and ultimately loads the local Dwrite dll.[13] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0403
ATT&CK Technique Name:Riltok
Riltok injects input to set itself as the default SMS handler by clicking the appropriate places on the screen. It can also close or minimize targeted antivirus applications and the device security settings screen.[9] | secon |
title:blackhat:us-21 Demystify AI Security Products With a Universal Pluggable XAI Translator
In the past years, we witnessed a dramatic rise in the platforms and apps based on machine learning and artificial intelligence. Inevitably, nearly every security product claims to be powered by deep learning technology and ac... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0433
ATT&CK Technique Name:Rifdoor
Rifdoor has the ability to identify the Windows version on the compromised host.[310] | secon |
titleblackhat:us-18 Software Attacks on Hardware Wallets
Almost all security research has a question often left unanswered: what would be the financial consequence, if a discovered vulnerability is maliciously exploited? The security community almost never knows, unless a real attack takes place and the damage becomes ... | secon |
title:blackhat:us-19 New Vulnerabilities in 5G Networks
The security in the 5G network has evolved and is more efficient than the previous generations. In this talk, we visit security features of 5G radio networks and reveal new vulnerabilities affecting both the operator infrastructure and end-devices (including mobil... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0095
ATT&CK Technique Name:Machete
Machete has relied on users opening malicious attachments delivered through spearphishing to execute malware.[134][135][136][137] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M0801
ATT&CK Technique Name:Access Management
All devices or systems changes, including all administrative functions, should require authentication. Consider using access management technologies to enforce authorization on all management interface access attempts, especially when the device does not inherentl... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M1032
ATT&CK Technique Name:Multi-factor Authentication
Use multi-factor authentication wherever possible. | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M1056
ATT&CK Technique Name:Pre-compromise
This technique cannot be easily mitigated with preventive controls since it is based on behaviors performed outside of the scope of enterprise defenses and controls. | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0689
ATT&CK Technique Name:WhisperGate
WhisperGate overwrites the MBR with a bootloader component that performs destructive wiping operations on hard drives and displays a fake ransom note when the host boots.[13][14][15][16][17] | secon |
title:blackhat:eu-19 Advanced VBA Macros Attack & Defence
In 2019, VBA macros are still heavily used to deliver malware, and new obfuscation techniques such as VBA Stomping implemented in EvilClippy allow attackers to deliver malicious payloads to end users without being detected. Luckily, analysis and detection tools ... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:C0018
ATT&CK Technique Name:C0018
During C0018, the threat actors opened a variety of ports, including ports 28035, 32467, 41578, and 46892, to establish RDP connections.[9] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0002
ATT&CK Technique Name:Mimikatz
Mimikatz’s LSADUMP::DCShadow module can be used to make AD updates by temporarily setting a computer to be a DC.[3][2] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0540
ATT&CK Technique Name:Asacub
Asacub can request device administrator permissions.[2] | secon |
titleblackhat:asia-21 The Tangled Webview ----- Javascriptinterface Once More
WebView is a widely used Android component and with the method addJavascriptInterface, native applications can interact with web pages. This is a powerful feature, but also presents some security risks like CVE-2012-6336 and "App Clone Attack... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0404
ATT&CK Technique Name:esentutl
esentutl can be used to collect data from local file systems.[65] | secon |
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