text stringlengths 100 9.93M | category stringclasses 11
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ATT&CK ID:S0187
ATT&CK Technique Name:Daserf
Daserf uses custom base64 encoding to obfuscate HTTP traffic.[15] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0081
ATT&CK Technique Name:Elise
Elise performs timestomping of a CAB file it creates.[22] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S1056
ATT&CK Technique Name:TianySpy
TianySpy has encrypted C2 details, email addresses, and passwords.[32] | secon |
title:botconf2018 Triada: the Past, the Present, the (Hopefully not Existing) Future
Triada is an Android threat known within the malware research field for a couple of years. Despite that, it still remains a very interesting threat as their authors did something very rarely seen in any malicious software – instead of ... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0408
ATT&CK Technique Name:FlexiSpy
FlexiSpy uses a FileObserver object to monitor the Skype and WeChat database file and shared preferences to retrieve chat messages, account information, and profile pictures of the account owner and chat participants. FlexiSpy can also spy on popular applications, includin... | secon |
titleblackhat:eu-20 Locknote: Conclusions and Key Takeaways from Day 2
Join members of the Black Hat Review Board for an insightful conversation on the most pressing issues facing the InfoSec community. This Locknote will feature a candid discussion on the key takeaways from day one and how these trends will impact fut... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0091
ATT&CK Technique Name:Epic
Epic has overwritten the function pointer in the extra window memory of Explorer's Shell_TrayWnd in order to execute malicious code in the context of the explorer.exe process.[7] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M1022
ATT&CK Technique Name:Restrict File and Directory Permissions
Restrict read/write access to system-level process files to only select privileged users who have a legitimate need to manage system services. | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0650
ATT&CK Technique Name:QakBot
QakBot can use Regsvr32 to execute malicious DLLs.[29][30][31][32][33][34] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0117
ATT&CK Technique Name:XTunnel
XTunnel has been used to execute remote commands.[354] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0411
ATT&CK Technique Name:Rotexy
Rotexy processes incoming SMS messages by filtering based on phone numbers, keywords, and regular expressions, focusing primarily on banks, payment systems, and mobile network operators. Rotexy can also send a list of all SMS messages on the device to the command and control... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0693
ATT&CK Technique Name:CaddyWiper
CaddyWiper can obtain a list of current processes.[48] | secon |
titleblackhat:us-18 A Deep Dive into macOS MDM (and How it can be Compromised)
On macOS, DEP (Device Enrollment Program) and MDM (Mobile Device Management) are the recommended methods for automating the initial setup & configuration of new devices. MDM can offer sophisticated system configuration options, including pri... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M1017
ATT&CK Technique Name:User Training
Ensure that developers and system administrators are aware of the risk associated with sharing unsecured passwords across communication services. | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0039
ATT&CK Technique Name:Suckfly
Suckfly the victim's internal network for hosts with ports 8080, 5900, and 40 open.[59] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0038
ATT&CK Technique Name:Duqu
Duqu's purpose is to gather intelligence data and assets from entities such as industrial infrastructure and system manufacturers, amongst others not in the industrial sector, in order to more easily conduct a future attack against another third party.[4] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0569
ATT&CK Technique Name:Explosive
Explosive has leveraged its keylogging capabilities to gain access to administrator accounts on target servers.[64][65] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M1026
ATT&CK Technique Name:Privileged Account Management
Limit the number of cloud accounts with permissions to remotely execute commands on virtual machines, and ensure that these are not used for day-to-day operations. In Azure, limit the number of accounts with the roles Azure Virtual Machine Contributer ... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0080
ATT&CK Technique Name:Cobalt Group
Cobalt Group has used regsvr32.exe to execute scripts.[13][14][15] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0010
ATT&CK Technique Name:Turla
Turla used net use commands to connect to lateral systems within a network.[52] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0089
ATT&CK Technique Name:BlackEnergy
One variant of BlackEnergy creates a new service using either a hard-coded or randomly generated name.[27] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0532
ATT&CK Technique Name:Lucifer
Lucifer can check for specific usernames, computer names, device drivers, DLL's, and virtual devices associated with sandboxed environments and can enter an infinite loop and stop itself if any are detected.[29] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S1032
ATT&CK Technique Name:PyDCrypt
PyDCrypt has been compiled and encrypted with PyInstaller, specifically using the --key flag during the build phase.[99] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:C0021
ATT&CK Technique Name:C0021
For C0021, the threat actors uploaded malware to websites under their control.[6][7] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:T1068
ATT&CK Technique Name:Exploitation for Privilege Escalation
Adversaries may exploit software vulnerabilities in an attempt to elevate privileges. Exploitation of a software vulnerability occurs when an adversary takes advantage of a programming error in a program, service, or within the operating system... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:C0016
ATT&CK Technique Name:Operation Dust Storm
During Operation Dust Storm, the threat actors used a watering hole attack on a popular software reseller to exploit the then-zero-day Internet Explorer vulnerability CVE-2014-0322.[38] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0114
ATT&CK Technique Name:Chimera
Chimera has used time /t and net time \ip/hostname for system time discovery.[23] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S1050
ATT&CK Technique Name:PcShare
PcShare can upload files and information from a compromised host to its C2 servers.[47] | secon |
titleblackhat:us-18 Kernel Mode Threats and Practical Defenses
Recent advancements in OS security from Microsoft such as PatchGuard, Driver Signature Enforcement, and SecureBoot have helped curtail once-widespread commodity kernel mode malware such as TDL4 and ZeroAccess. However, advanced attackers have found ways of ... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M0946
ATT&CK Technique Name:Boot Integrity
Check the integrity of the existing BIOS or EFI to determine if it is vulnerable to modification. Use Trusted Platform Module technology. [2] Move system's root of trust to hardware to prevent tampering with the SPI flash memory. [3] Technologies such as Intel Boot G... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0129
ATT&CK Technique Name:Mustang Panda
Mustang Panda has installed TeamViewer on targeted systems.[22] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S1046
ATT&CK Technique Name:PowGoop
PowGoop can send HTTP GET requests to malicious servers.[252] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0683
ATT&CK Technique Name:Peirates
Peirates can use stolen service account tokens to perform its operations.[9] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M1025
ATT&CK Technique Name:Privileged Process Integrity
Enabled features, such as Protected Process Light (PPL), for LSA.[6] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0579
ATT&CK Technique Name:Waterbear
Waterbear can use thread injection to inject shellcode into the process of security software.[5] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0037
ATT&CK Technique Name:FIN6
FIN6 has used Windows Credential Editor for credential dumping.[29][30] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S1020
ATT&CK Technique Name:Kevin
Variants of Kevin can communicate with C2 over HTTP.[176] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0054
ATT&CK Technique Name:CloudDuke
One variant of CloudDuke uses a Microsoft OneDrive account to exchange commands and stolen data with its operators.[18] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0097
ATT&CK Technique Name:Ping
Ping can be used to identify remote systems within a network.[68] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:C0024
ATT&CK Technique Name:SolarWinds Compromise
During the SolarWinds Compromise, APT29 used GoldFinder to perform HTTP GET requests to check internet connectivity and identify HTTP proxy servers and other redirectors that an HTTP request travels through.[3] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0032
ATT&CK Technique Name:Lazarus Group
Lazarus Group has used social media platforms, including LinkedIn and Twitter, to send spearphishing messages.[7] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:C0012
ATT&CK Technique Name:Operation CuckooBees
During Operation CuckooBees, the threat actors executed an encoded VBScript file.[64] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:T1499
ATT&CK Technique Name:Endpoint Denial of Service
Adversaries may perform Endpoint Denial of Service (DoS) attacks to degrade or block the availability of services to users. Endpoint DoS can be performed by exhausting the system resources those services are hosted on or exploiting the system to cause a p... | secon |
titleblackhat:eu-21 Lost in the Loader: The Many Faces of the Windows PE File Format
This Briefing presents our research on parser differentials for the PE format. We defined a custom language to write "formal models" of various PE loaders, for different versions of Windows and reverse-engineering tools. We then built ... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:T1018
ATT&CK Technique Name:Remote System Discovery
Adversaries may attempt to get a listing of other systems by IP address, hostname, or other logical identifier on a network that may be used for Lateral Movement from the current system. Functionality could exist within remote access tools to enable this, bu... | secon |
title:blackhat:us-18 Finding Xori: Malware Analysis Triage with Automated Disassembly
In a world of high volume malware and limited researchers, we need a dramatic improvement in our ability to process and analyze new and old malware at scale. Unfortunately, what is currently available to the community is incredibly co... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G1003
ATT&CK Technique Name:Ember Bear
Ember Bear has attempted to lure victims into executing malicious files.[79] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0428
ATT&CK Technique Name:PoetRAT
PoetRAT has used a Python tool named klog.exe for keylogging.[134] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0143
ATT&CK Technique Name:Aquatic Panda
Aquatic Panda has attempted and failed to run Bash commands on a Windows host by passing them to cmd /C.[27] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0630
ATT&CK Technique Name:Nebulae
Nebulae has the capability to upload collected files to C2.[124] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0237
ATT&CK Technique Name:GravityRAT
GravityRAT steals files with the following extensions: .docx, .doc, .pptx, .ppt, .xlsx, .xls, .rtf, and .pdf.[82] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:T1137.003
ATT&CK Technique Name:Outlook Forms
Adversaries may abuse Microsoft Outlook forms to obtain persistence on a compromised system. Outlook forms are used as templates for presentation and functionality in Outlook messages. Custom Outlook forms can be created that will execute code when a specifically ... | secon |
titleblackhat:us-21 Another Road Leads to the Host: From a Message to VM Escape on Nvidia vGPU
NVIDIA has a huge market share in the area of vGPU. Starting from supporting artificial intelligence, deep learning, data science to cloud gaming, the vGPU is getting more and more perceived to the general public. The vGPU ca... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0352
ATT&CK Technique Name:OSX_OCEANLOTUS.D
OSX_OCEANLOTUS.D encrypts its strings in RSA256 and encodes them in a custom base64 scheme and XOR.[245] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0007
ATT&CK Technique Name:APT28
APT28 has used a variety of public exploits, including CVE 2020-0688 and CVE 2020-17144, to gain execution on vulnerable Microsoft Exchange; they have also conducted SQL injection attacks against external websites.[10][11] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0694
ATT&CK Technique Name:DRATzarus
DRATzarus can collect information from a compromised host.[61] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0689
ATT&CK Technique Name:WhisperGate
WhisperGate can download and execute AdvancedRun.exe to disable the Windows Defender Theat Protection service and set an exclusion path for the C:\ drive.[94][95][96] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:T1456
ATT&CK Technique Name:Drive-By Compromise
Adversaries may gain access to a system through a user visiting a website over the normal course of browsing. With this technique, the user's web browser is typically targeted for exploitation, but adversaries may also use compromised websites for non-exploitati... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:C0016
ATT&CK Technique Name:Operation Dust Storm
For Operation Dust Storm, the threat actors used dynamic DNS domains from a variety of free providers, including No-IP, Oray, and 3322.[11] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0684
ATT&CK Technique Name:ROADTools
ROADTools leverages valid cloud credentials to perform enumeration operations using the internal Azure AD Graph API.[10] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0584
ATT&CK Technique Name:AppleJeus
AppleJeus has exfiltrated collected host information to a C2 server.[3] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0558
ATT&CK Technique Name:Tiktok Pro
Tiktok Pro can launch a fake Facebook login page.[32] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0554
ATT&CK Technique Name:Egregor
Egregor has the ability to download files from its C2 server.[160][161] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0045
ATT&CK Technique Name:menuPass
menuPass uses scripts to enumerate IP ranges on the victim network. menuPass has also issued the command net view /domain to a PlugX implant to gather information about remote systems on the network.[56][57] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M1047
ATT&CK Technique Name:Audit
Toolkits like the PowerSploit framework contain PowerUp modules that can be used to explore systems for permission weaknesses in scheduled tasks that could be used to escalate privileges. [9] Windows operating system also creates a registry key specifically associated with th... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0004
ATT&CK Technique Name:Ke3chang
Ke3chang has gained access through VPNs including with compromised accounts and stolen VPN certificates.[22][23] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:T1218.012
ATT&CK Technique Name:Verclsid
Adversaries may abuse verclsid.exe to proxy execution of malicious code. Verclsid.exe is known as the Extension CLSID Verification Host and is responsible for verifying each shell extension before they are used by Windows Explorer or the Windows Shell. | secon |
title:botconf2013 A General-purpose Laboratory for Large-scale Botnet Experiments
We will present a general-purpose laboratory for large-scale botnet experiments. We reveal how several key points have been implemented, e.g., realistic simulation of the Internet or total observability within the laboratory. As a case st... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0485
ATT&CK Technique Name:Mandrake
Mandrake can enable app installation from unknown sources.[4] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0106
ATT&CK Technique Name:Rocke
Rocke used scripts which killed processes and added firewall rules to block traffic related to other cryptominers.[33] | secon |
title:botconf2018 Trickbot The Trick is On You!
Bot malware landscape always changes with both new and old families being updated with new techniques to perform cybercrime. And due to their sheer number, manually analysing and tracking them is a tedious affair. This entails delayed response to the threat. Because of th... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0050
ATT&CK Technique Name:CosmicDuke
CosmicDuke can use HTTP or HTTPS for command and control to hard-coded C2 servers.[66][80] | secon |
title:blackhat:eu-19 Practical Side-Channel Attacks Against WPA-TKIP
Wireless networks and their security protocols keep evolving due to increased performance and reliability demands. For instance, recently the Wi-Fi Alliance released WPA3, which offers better security guarantees (e.g., longer keys). In light of this, ... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0376
ATT&CK Technique Name:HOPLIGHT
HOPLIGHT has the ability to connect to a remote host in order to upload and download files.[216] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0433
ATT&CK Technique Name:Rifdoor
Rifdoor has the ability to identify the IP address of the compromised host.[198] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S1025
ATT&CK Technique Name:Amadey
Amadey has changed the Startup folder to the one containing its executable by overwriting the registry keys.[10][11] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0558
ATT&CK Technique Name:Tiktok Pro
Tiktok Pro has contained an alarm that triggers every three minutes and timers for communicating with the C2.[5] | secon |
titleblackhat:us-19 DevSecOps : What, Why and How
Security is often added towards the end, in a typical DevOps cycle through a manual/automated review. However, with DevSecOps, security can be injected at every stage of a DevOps pipeline in an automated fashion. Having a DevSecOps pipeline enables an organization to:Cr... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M1042
ATT&CK Technique Name:Disable or Remove Feature or Program
Consider removing previous versions of tools that are unnecessary to the environment when possible. | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0406
ATT&CK Technique Name:Gustuff
Gustuff can use SMS for command and control from a defined admin phone number.[5] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0039
ATT&CK Technique Name:Net
The net user username \password commands in Net can be used to create a local account.[20] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0010
ATT&CK Technique Name:Turla
Turla surveys a system upon check-in to discover the system time by using the net time command.[34] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M1038
ATT&CK Technique Name:Execution Prevention
Use application control configured to block execution of mavinject.exe if it is not required for a given system or network to prevent potential misuse by adversaries. | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0046
ATT&CK Technique Name:FIN7
FIN7 created new Windows services and added them to the startup directories for persistence.[52] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0443
ATT&CK Technique Name:MESSAGETAP
After loading the keyword and phone data files, MESSAGETAP begins monitoring all network connections to and from the victim server. [53] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G1006
ATT&CK Technique Name:Earth Lusca
Earth Lusca has acquired multiple servers for some of their operations, using each server for a different role.[2] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0065
ATT&CK Technique Name:Leviathan
Leviathan has used JavaScript to create a shortcut file in the Startup folder that points to its main backdoor.[142][143] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S1045
ATT&CK Technique Name:INCONTROLLER
INCONTROLLER can use the CODESYS protocol to remotely connect to Schneider PLCs and perform maintenance functions on the device.[6]INCONTROLLER can use Telnet to upload payloads and execute commands on Omron PLCs. [7][8] The malware can also use HTTP-based CGI script... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0418
ATT&CK Technique Name:ViceLeaker
ViceLeaker uses HTTP requests for C2 communication.[31][32] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0640
ATT&CK Technique Name:Avaddon
Avaddon can collect the external IP address of the victim.[24] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0604
ATT&CK Technique Name:Industroyer
The Industroyer SIPROTEC DoS module exploits the CVE-2015-5374 vulnerability in order to render a Siemens SIPROTEC device unresponsive. While the vulnerability does not directly cause the restart or shutdown of the device, the device must be restarted manually before it... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0496
ATT&CK Technique Name:REvil
REvil can save encryption parameters and system information in the Registry.[23][24][25][26][27] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0143
ATT&CK Technique Name:Aquatic Panda
Aquatic Panda has downloaded additional malware onto compromised hosts.[37] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M1009
ATT&CK Technique Name:Encrypt Network Traffic
Applications that properly encrypt network traffic may evade some forms of AiTM behavior. | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0065
ATT&CK Technique Name:Leviathan
Leviathan has used publicly available tools to dump password hashes, including ProcDump and WCE.[48] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S1053
ATT&CK Technique Name:AvosLocker
AvosLocker has enumerated shared drives on a compromised network.[10][11] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M1028
ATT&CK Technique Name:Operating System Configuration
Starting in Windows 11 22H2, the EnableMPRNotifications policy can be disabled through Group Policy or through a configuration service provider to prevent Winlogon from sending credentials to network providers.[6] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M1056
ATT&CK Technique Name:Pre-compromise
This technique cannot be easily mitigated with preventive controls since it is based on behaviors performed outside of the scope of enterprise defenses and controls. Efforts should focus on minimizing the amount and sensitivity of data available to external parties. | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0180
ATT&CK Technique Name:Volgmer
Some Volgmer variants add new services with display names generated by a list of hard-coded strings such as Application, Background, Security, and Windows, presumably as a way to masquerade as a legitimate service.[75][76] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0452
ATT&CK Technique Name:USBferry
USBferry can execute rundll32.exe in memory to avoid detection.[99] | secon |
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