text stringlengths 100 9.93M | category stringclasses 11
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ATT&CK ID:S0601
ATT&CK Technique Name:Hildegard
Hildegard has modified DNS resolvers to evade DNS monitoring tools.[42] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0087
ATT&CK Technique Name:APT39
APT39 has utilized malicious VBS scripts in malware.[14] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0438
ATT&CK Technique Name:Attor
Attor's dispatcher disguises itself as a legitimate task (i.e., the task name and description appear legitimate).[8] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0194
ATT&CK Technique Name:PowerSploit
PowerSploit contains a collection of Privesc-PowerUp modules that can discover and exploit path interception opportunities in the PATH environment variable.[2][3] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0353
ATT&CK Technique Name:NOKKI
NOKKI can gather information on the victim IP address.[159] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:T0815
ATT&CK Technique Name:Denial of View
Adversaries may cause a denial of view in attempt to disrupt and prevent operator oversight on the status of an ICS environment. This may manifest itself as a temporary communication failure between a device and its control source, where the interface recovers and be... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0069
ATT&CK Technique Name:MuddyWater
MuddyWater uses various techniques to bypass UAC.[43] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0584
ATT&CK Technique Name:AppleJeus
During AppleJeus's installation process, it uses postinstall scripts to extract a hidden plist from the application's /Resources folder and execute the plist file as a Launch Daemon with elevated permissions.[6] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G1007
ATT&CK Technique Name:Aoqin Dragon
Aoqin Dragon obtained the Heyoka open source exfiltration tool and subsequently modified it for their operations.[2] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0482
ATT&CK Technique Name:Bundlore
Bundlore has the ability to enumerate what browser is being used as well as version information for Safari.[3] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0251
ATT&CK Technique Name:Zebrocy
Zebrocy creates an entry in a Registry Run key for the malware to execute on startup.[281][282][283] | secon |
titleblackhat:eu-18 In Search of CurveSwap: Measuring Elliptic Curve Implementations in the Wild
We survey elliptic curve implementations from several vantage points. We perform internet-wide scans for TLS on a large number of ports, as well as SSH and IPsec to measure elliptic curve support and implementation behavior... | secon |
titleblackhat:us-21 hAFL1: Our Journey of Fuzzing Hyper-V and Discovering a 0-Day
Fuzzers are tremendously important in the realm of vulnerability research, as they automate the process of bug discovery by rapidly feeding a target with numerous inputs. Several factors make up an efficient fuzzer. One of them is structu... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0176
ATT&CK Technique Name:Wingbird
Wingbird uses services.exe to register a new autostart service named "Audit Service" using a copy of the local lsass.exe file.[64][65] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M1056
ATT&CK Technique Name:Pre-compromise
This technique cannot be easily mitigated with preventive controls since it is based on behaviors performed outside of the scope of enterprise defenses and controls. | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0032
ATT&CK Technique Name:Lazarus Group
Lazarus Group has developed custom malware for use in their operations.[17][18] | secon |
title:blackhat:us-22 Controlling the Source: Abusing Source Code Management Systems
Source Code Management (SCM) systems play a vital role within organizations and have been an afterthought in terms of defenses compared to other critical enterprise systems such as Active Directory. SCM systems are used in the majority ... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:C0015
ATT&CK Technique Name:C0015
During C0015, the threat actors used the command net localgroup "adminstrator" to identify accounts with local administrator rights.[3] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0622
ATT&CK Technique Name:AppleSeed
AppleSeed has the ability to use JavaScript to execute PowerShell.[10] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0695
ATT&CK Technique Name:Donut
Donut can generate shellcode outputs that execute via PowerShell.[75] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0266
ATT&CK Technique Name:TrickBot
Some TrickBot samples have used HTTP over ports 447 and 8082 for C2.[39][40][41] Newer versions of TrickBot have been known to use a custom communication protocol which sends the data unencrypted over port 443. [42] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0558
ATT&CK Technique Name:Tiktok Pro
Tiktok Pro can check the device’s battery status.[37] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:T1430.002
ATT&CK Technique Name:Impersonate SS7 Nodes
Adversaries may exploit the lack of authentication in signaling system network nodes to track the to track the location of mobile devices by impersonating a node. | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G1008
ATT&CK Technique Name:SideCopy
SideCopy has sent Microsoft Office Publisher documents to victims that have embedded malicious macros that execute an hta file via calling mshta.exe.[142] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S1014
ATT&CK Technique Name:DanBot
DanBot can use use IPv4 A records and IPv6 AAAA DNS records in C2 communications.[20] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:C0014
ATT&CK Technique Name:Operation Wocao
During Operation Wocao, threat actors targeted people based on their organizational roles and privileges.[15] | secon |
titleblackhat:us-18 DeepLocker - Concealing Targeted Attacks with AI Locksmithing
In this talk, we describe DeepLocker, a novel class of highly targeted and evasive attacks powered by artificial intelligence (AI). As cybercriminals increasingly weaponize AI, cyber defenders must understand the mechanisms and implicatio... | secon |
title:blackhat:us-22 Blasting Event-Driven Cornucopia: WMI-based User-Space Attacks Blind SIEMs and EDRs
Security solutions engineers always find new ways to monitor OS events to mitigate threats on endpoints. These approaches typically reuse different built-in Windows mechanisms that were never designed with security ... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M0953
ATT&CK Technique Name:Data Backup
Take and store data backups from end user systems and critical servers. Ensure backup and storage systems are hardened and kept separate from the corporate network to prevent compromise. Maintain and exercise incident response plans [7], including the management of go... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0495
ATT&CK Technique Name:RDAT
RDAT has created a service when it is installed on the victim machine.[104] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0583
ATT&CK Technique Name:Pysa
Pysa has used brute force attempts against a central management console, as well as some Active Directory accounts.[20] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0498
ATT&CK Technique Name:Cryptoistic
Cryptoistic can use TCP in communications with C2.[21] | secon |
title:blackhat:us-23 Making and Breaking NSA's Codebreaker Challenge
For the past 10 years, the National Security Agency (NSA) has hosted the Codebreaker Challenge. This competition, written and run by NSA's technical experts, includes a new theme and challenge each year. The challenges are custom designed by NSA to mi... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0648
ATT&CK Technique Name:JSS Loader
JSS Loader can download and execute VBScript files.[52] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S1011
ATT&CK Technique Name:Tarrask
Tarrask is able to create "hidden" scheduled tasks for persistence.[3] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S1066
ATT&CK Technique Name:DarkTortilla
DarkTortilla can use a variety of API calls for persistence and defense evasion.[65] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0250
ATT&CK Technique Name:Koadic
Koadic can perform process injection by using a reflective DLL.[38] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S1018
ATT&CK Technique Name:Saint Bot
Saint Bot has created a scheduled task named "Maintenance" to establish persistence.[154] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0122
ATT&CK Technique Name:Silent Librarian
Silent Librarian has collected lists of names for individuals from targeted organizations.[4] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S1053
ATT&CK Technique Name:AvosLocker
AvosLocker has been executed via the RunOnce Registry key to run itself on safe mode.[34] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M1026
ATT&CK Technique Name:Privileged Account Management
Follow best practices in restricting access to privileged accounts to avoid hostile programs from accessing sensitive information. | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0509
ATT&CK Technique Name:FakeSpy
FakeSpy stores its malicious code in encrypted asset files that are decrypted at runtime. Newer versions of FakeSpy encrypt the C2 address.[15] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0603
ATT&CK Technique Name:Stuxnet
In states 3 and 4 Stuxnet sends two network bursts (done through the DP_SEND primitive). The data in the frames are instructions for the frequency converter drives. For example one of the frames contains records that change the maximum frequency (the speed at which the moto... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0098
ATT&CK Technique Name:T9000
T9000 gathers and beacons the system time during installation.[74] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0044
ATT&CK Technique Name:JHUHUGIT
JHUHUGIT has registered itself as a service to establish persistence.[67] | secon |
title:blackhat:us-21 Small Wonder: Uncovering Planned Obsolescence Practices in Robotics and What This Means for Cybersecurity
Security in robotics is nothing really new if one considers modern OT and IT approaches, and most security practices translate directly to robots. However, there's almost no security culture am... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M1022
ATT&CK Technique Name:Restrict File and Directory Permissions
Restrict write access to the /Library/Security/SecurityAgentPlugins directory. | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0604
ATT&CK Technique Name:Industroyer
Industroyer's OPC module can brute force values and will send out a 0x01 status which for the target systems equates to a Primary Variable Out of Limits misdirecting operators from understanding protective relay status. [4] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0534
ATT&CK Technique Name:Bazar
Bazar can identity the current process on a compromised host.[29] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0608
ATT&CK Technique Name:Conficker
A Conficker infection at a nuclear power plant forced the facility to temporarily shutdown. [5] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0047
ATT&CK Technique Name:Gamaredon Group
Gamaredon Group has left taunting images and messages on the victims' desktops as proof of system access.[15] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:C0024
ATT&CK Technique Name:SolarWinds Compromise
During the SolarWinds Compromise, APT29 downloaded source code from code repositories.[4] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M1013
ATT&CK Technique Name:Application Developer Guidance
Ensure that applications do not store sensitive data or credentials insecurely. (e.g. plaintext credentials in code, published credentials in repositories, or credentials in public cloud storage). | secon |
titleblackhat:eu-22 Locknote: Conclusions and Key Takeaways from Day 1
At the end of day one, join Black Hat Founder Jeff Moss and Review Board members Sharon Conheady, Meadow Ellis, Matt Suiche and Stefano Zanero for an insightful conversation on the most pressing issues facing the InfoSec community. This Locknote wil... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0167
ATT&CK Technique Name:Matryoshka
Matryoshka can establish persistence by adding a Scheduled Task named "Microsoft Boost Kernel Optimization".[103][104] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:T1547.014
ATT&CK Technique Name:Active Setup
Adversaries may achieve persistence by adding a Registry key to the Active Setup of the local machine. Active Setup is a Windows mechanism that is used to execute programs when a user logs in. The value stored in the Registry key will be executed after a user logs ... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:T1597
ATT&CK Technique Name:Search Closed Sources
Adversaries may search and gather information about victims from closed sources that can be used during targeting. Information about victims may be available for purchase from reputable private sources and databases, such as paid subscriptions to feeds of tech... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0004
ATT&CK Technique Name:Ke3chang
Ke3chang has dropped their malware into legitimate installed software paths including: C:\ProgramFiles\Realtek\Audio\HDA\AERTSr.exe, C:\Program Files (x86)\Foxit Software\Foxit Reader\FoxitRdr64.exe, C:\Program Files (x86)\Adobe\Flash Player\AddIns\airappinstaller\airappin... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0039
ATT&CK Technique Name:Net
The net view \remotesystem and net share commands in Net can be used to find shared drives and directories on remote and local systems respectively.[38] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S1009
ATT&CK Technique Name:Triton
Triton has the ability to halt or run a program through the TriStation protocol. TsHi.py contains instances of halt and run functions being executed. [8] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0261
ATT&CK Technique Name:Catchamas
Catchamas adds a new service named NetAdapter in an apparent attempt to masquerade as a legitimate service.[18] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M1024
ATT&CK Technique Name:Restrict Registry Permissions
Ensure proper permissions are set for Registry hives to prevent users from modifying keys for system components that may lead to privilege escalation. | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0140
ATT&CK Technique Name:LazyScripter
LazyScripter has achieved persistence via writing a PowerShell script to the autorun registry key.[136] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0274
ATT&CK Technique Name:Calisto
Calisto uses the zip -r command to compress the data collected on the local system.[15][16] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0167
ATT&CK Technique Name:Matryoshka
Matryoshka can establish persistence by adding Registry Run keys.[155][156] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0674
ATT&CK Technique Name:CharmPower
CharmPower can exfiltrate gathered data to a hardcoded C2 URL via HTTP POST.[26] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0154
ATT&CK Technique Name:Cobalt Strike
Cobalt Strike can use Base64, URL-safe Base64, or NetBIOS encoding in its C2 traffic.[24] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M1042
ATT&CK Technique Name:Disable or Remove Feature or Program
Consider disabling emond by removing the Launch Daemon plist file. | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0129
ATT&CK Technique Name:Mustang Panda
Mustang Panda has exploited CVE-2017-0199 in Microsoft Word to execute code.[62] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M1038
ATT&CK Technique Name:Execution Prevention
Adversaries may use new payloads to execute this technique. Identify and block potentially malicious software executed through hijacking by using application control solutions also capable of blocking libraries loaded by legitimate software. | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0022
ATT&CK Technique Name:APT3
APT3 has a tool that creates a new service for persistence.[10] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0650
ATT&CK Technique Name:QakBot
QakBot has placed its payload in hidden subdirectories.[40] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0601
ATT&CK Technique Name:Hildegard
Hildegard has modified /etc/ld.so.preload to intercept shared library import functions.[15] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0011
ATT&CK Technique Name:Taidoor
Taidoor can use GetCurrentProcessId for process discovery.[250] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0556
ATT&CK Technique Name:Pay2Key
Pay2Key has designated machines in the compromised network to serve as reverse proxy pivot points to channel communications with C2.[19][20] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0037
ATT&CK Technique Name:FIN6
FIN6 used publicly available tools (including Microsoft's built-in SQL querying tool, osql.exe) to map the internal network and conduct reconnaissance against Active Directory, Structured Query Language (SQL) servers, and NetBIOS.[27] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0143
ATT&CK Technique Name:Flame
Flame can take regular screenshots when certain applications are open that are sent to the command and control server.[63] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S1062
ATT&CK Technique Name:S.O.V.A.
S.O.V.A. has code to encrypt device data with AES.[2] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0585
ATT&CK Technique Name:Kerrdown
Kerrdown can use DLL side-loading to load malicious DLLs.[31] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M1022
ATT&CK Technique Name:Restrict File and Directory Permissions
Install software in write-protected locations. Set directory access controls to prevent file writes to the search paths for applications, both in the folders where applications are run from and the standard library folders. | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0505
ATT&CK Technique Name:Desert Scorpion
Desert Scorpion can collect device metadata and can check if the device is rooted.[13] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0182
ATT&CK Technique Name:FinFisher
FinFisher probes the system to check for antimalware processes.[40][41] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S1024
ATT&CK Technique Name:CreepySnail
CreepySnail can use PowerShell for execution, including the cmdlets Invoke-WebRequst and Invoke-Expression.[68] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0644
ATT&CK Technique Name:ObliqueRAT
ObliqueRAT can hide its payload in BMP images hosted on compromised websites.[16] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M0921
ATT&CK Technique Name:Restrict Web-Based Content
Consider restricting access to email within critical process environments. Additionally, downloads and attachments may be disabled if email is still necessary. | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0142
ATT&CK Technique Name:StreamEx
StreamEx has the ability to enumerate system information.[353] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:C0025
ATT&CK Technique Name:2016 Ukraine Electric Power Attack
During the 2016 Ukraine Electric Power Attack, Sandworm Team masqueraded executables as .txt files.[2] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:T1564.010
ATT&CK Technique Name:Process Argument Spoofing
Adversaries may attempt to hide process command-line arguments by overwriting process memory. Process command-line arguments are stored in the process environment block (PEB), a data structure used by Windows to store various information about/used by ... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:T1564
ATT&CK Technique Name:Hide Artifacts
Adversaries may attempt to hide artifacts associated with their behaviors to evade detection. Operating systems may have features to hide various artifacts, such as important system files and administrative task execution, to avoid disrupting user work environments a... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0070
ATT&CK Technique Name:Dark Caracal
Dark Caracal collected complete contents of the 'Pictures' folder from compromised Windows systems.[57] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M1042
ATT&CK Technique Name:Disable or Remove Feature or Program
Consider removing verclsid.exe if it is not necessary within a given environment. | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0596
ATT&CK Technique Name:ShadowPad
ShadowPad can modify the Registry to store and maintain a configuration block and virtual file system.[141][52] | secon |
title:blackhat:eu-19 Sneak into Your Room: Security Holes in the Integration and Management of Messaging Protocols on Commercial IoT Clouds
With the increasing popularity of the Internet of Things (IoT), many IoT clouds have emerged to help device manufacturers connect their devices to customers and offload the communi... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0629
ATT&CK Technique Name:RainyDay
RainyDay has named services and scheduled tasks to appear benign including "ChromeCheck" and "googleupdate."[49] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0032
ATT&CK Technique Name:Lazarus Group
Lazarus Group has maintained persistence by loading malicious code into a startup folder or by adding a Registry Run key.[138][139][140][141] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0093
ATT&CK Technique Name:Backdoor.Oldrea
Backdoor.Oldrea can enumerate and map ICS-specific systems in victim environments.[16] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:T1543.003
ATT&CK Technique Name:Windows Service
Adversaries may create or modify Windows services to repeatedly execute malicious payloads as part of persistence. When Windows boots up, it starts programs or applications called services that perform background system functions. Windows service configuration i... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0124
ATT&CK Technique Name:Windigo
Windigo has distributed Windows malware via drive-by downloads.[56] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:C0021
ATT&CK Technique Name:C0021
For C0021, the threat actors embedded a base64-encoded payload within a LNK file.[8] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S1020
ATT&CK Technique Name:Kevin
Kevin can Base32 encode chunks of output files during exfiltration.[48] | secon |
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