text stringlengths 100 9.93M | category stringclasses 11
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ATT&CK ID:G0136
ATT&CK Technique Name:IndigoZebra
IndigoZebra has downloaded additional files and tools from its C2 server.[75] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:T0802
ATT&CK Technique Name:Automated Collection
Adversaries may automate collection of industrial environment information using tools or scripts. This automated collection may leverage native control protocols and tools available in the control systems environment. For example, the OPC protocol may be used t... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:C0001
ATT&CK Technique Name:Frankenstein
During Frankenstein, the threat actors used PowerShell to run a series of Base64-encoded commands that acted as a stager and enumerated hosts.[103] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0687
ATT&CK Technique Name:Cyclops Blink
Cyclops Blink can use the Linux API statvfs to enumerate the current working directory.[93][94] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:C0020
ATT&CK Technique Name:Maroochy Water Breach
In the Maroochy Water Breach, the adversary used a two-way radio to communicate with and set the frequencies of Maroochy Shire's repeater stations.[6] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0079
ATT&CK Technique Name:MobileOrder
MobileOrder has a command to upload to its C2 server information about files on the victim mobile device, including SD card size, installed app list, SMS content, contacts, and calling history.[200] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0562
ATT&CK Technique Name:SUNSPOT
SUNSPOT only replaces SolarWinds Orion source code if the MD5 checksums of both the original source code file and backdoored replacement source code match hardcoded values.[10] | secon |
title:blackhat:eu-20 IAM Concerned: OAuth Token Hijacking in Google Cloud (GCP)
Imagine you've protected your production Google Cloud environment from compromised credentials, using MFA and a hardware security key. However, you find that your GCP environment has been breached through hijacking of OAuth session tokens c... | secon |
title:blackhat:us-18 GOD MODE UNLOCKED - Hardware Backdoors in x86 CPUs
Complexity is increasing. Trust eroding. In the wake of Spectre and Meltdown, when it seems that things cannot get any darker for processor security, the last light goes out. This talk will demonstrate what everyone has long feared but never proven... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0046
ATT&CK Technique Name:FIN7
FIN7 has harvested valid administrative credentials for lateral movement.[32] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M1052
ATT&CK Technique Name:User Account Control
Turn off UAC's privilege elevation for standard users [HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Policies\System] to automatically deny elevation requests, add: "ConsentPromptBehaviorUser"=dword:00000000. Consider enabling installer detection... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M1047
ATT&CK Technique Name:Audit
Enable advanced auditing on AD FS. Check the success and failure audit options in the AD FS Management snap-in. Enable Audit Application Generated events on the AD FS farm via Group Policy Object.[9] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:T1547.003
ATT&CK Technique Name:Time Providers
Adversaries may abuse time providers to execute DLLs when the system boots. The Windows Time service (W32Time) enables time synchronization across and within domains. W32Time time providers are responsible for retrieving time stamps from hardware/network resource... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0583
ATT&CK Technique Name:Pysa
Pysa can perform network reconnaissance using the Advanced IP Scanner tool.[185] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0601
ATT&CK Technique Name:Hildegard
Hildegard was executed through an unsecure kubelet that allowed anonymous access to the victim environment.[4] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0471
ATT&CK Technique Name:build_downer
build_downer has the ability to send system volume information to C2.[36] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0586
ATT&CK Technique Name:TAINTEDSCRIBE
TAINTEDSCRIBE can copy itself into the current user’s Startup folder as "Narrator.exe" for persistence.[256] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0531
ATT&CK Technique Name:Grandoreiro
Grandoreiro can use a DGA for hiding C2 addresses, including use of an algorithm with a user-specific key that changes daily.[19][20] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0019
ATT&CK Technique Name:Naikon
Naikon has modified a victim's Windows Run registry to establish persistence.[174] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:T1620
ATT&CK Technique Name:Reflective Code Loading
Adversaries may reflectively load code into a process in order to conceal the execution of malicious payloads. Reflective loading involves allocating then executing payloads directly within the memory of the process, vice creating a thread or process backed ... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0402
ATT&CK Technique Name:OSX/Shlayer
OSX/Shlayer has used a resource fork to hide a compressed binary file of itself from the terminal, Finder, and potentially evade traditional scanners.[5][4] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0612
ATT&CK Technique Name:WastedLocker
WastedLocker can perform a UAC bypass if it is not executed with administrator rights or if the infected host runs Windows Vista or later.[63] | secon |
titleblackhat:us-20 My Cloud is APT's Cloud: Investigating and Defending Office 365
As organizations increase their adoption of cloud services, we see attackers following them to the cloud. Microsoft Office 365 is becoming the most common email platform in enterprises across the world and it is also becoming an inc... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0027
ATT&CK Technique Name:Threat Group-3390
Threat Group-3390 has used DLL side-loading, including by using legitimate Kaspersky antivirus variants as well as rc.exe, a legitimate Microsoft Resource Compiler.[27][61][62][28][63] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0368
ATT&CK Technique Name:NotPetya
NotPetya uses rundll32.exe to install itself on remote systems when accessed via PsExec or wmic.[71] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0439
ATT&CK Technique Name:Okrum
Okrum was seen using MimikatzLite to perform credential dumping.[68] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0661
ATT&CK Technique Name:FoggyWeb
FoggyWeb can be decrypted in memory using a Lightweight Encryption Algorithm (LEA)-128 key and decoded using a XOR key.[93] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0044
ATT&CK Technique Name:Winnti Group
Winnti Group has registered domains for C2 that mimicked sites of their intended targets.[70] | secon |
title:blackhat:eu-18 Evolving Security Experts Among Teenagers
By 2020, the estimated shortfall in the security workforce will reach 1.5 million people (https://bit.ly/2GO6Ov0). Moreover, in today's world, there are so many security challenges facing us due to the evolving computers era, startups, and large companies n... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0693
ATT&CK Technique Name:CaddyWiper
CaddyWiper can modify ACL entries to take ownership of files.[7] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0442
ATT&CK Technique Name:VBShower
VBShower has the ability to execute VBScript files.[163] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0059
ATT&CK Technique Name:Magic Hound
Magic Hound has disabled antivirus services on targeted systems in order to upload malicious payloads.[55] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G1011
ATT&CK Technique Name:EXOTIC LILY
EXOTIC LILY has established social media profiles to mimic employees of targeted companies.[6] | secon |
title:blackhat:asia-23 Insider Threats Packing Their Bags With Corporate Data
What if your organization could discover which of your employees are exfiltrating data prior to leaving? The 2020 Securonix Insider Threat Report found that 60% of Insider Threats involve "Flight Risk" employees planning to leave. While we kn... | secon |
title:blackhat:us-21 Symbexcel: Bringing the Power of Symbolic Execution to the Fight Against Malicious Excel 4 Macros
Excel 4.0 (XL4) macros are a popular attack vector for threat actors, as security vendors struggle to play catchup and detect malicious macros properly. These macros provide attackers with a simple and... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0536
ATT&CK Technique Name:GPlayed
GPlayed can collect the device’s model, country, and Android version.[22] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0342
ATT&CK Technique Name:GreyEnergy
GreyEnergy encrypts communications using AES256.[57] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:C0007
ATT&CK Technique Name:FunnyDream
For FunnyDream, the threat actors used a modified version of the open source PcShare remote administration tool.[52] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0447
ATT&CK Technique Name:Lokibot
Lokibot has the ability to initiate contact with command and control (C2) to exfiltrate stolen data.[78] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0045
ATT&CK Technique Name:menuPass
menuPass has used a script (atexec.py) to execute a command on a target machine via Task Scheduler.[107] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:T0804
ATT&CK Technique Name:Block Reporting Message
Adversaries may block or prevent a reporting message from reaching its intended target. In control systems, reporting messages contain telemetry data (e.g., I/O values) pertaining to the current state of equipment and the industrial process. By blocking thes... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0045
ATT&CK Technique Name:menuPass
menuPass has used RDP connections to move across the victim network.[38][39] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:T1087.004
ATT&CK Technique Name:Cloud Account
Adversaries may attempt to get a listing of cloud accounts. Cloud accounts are those created and configured by an organization for use by users, remote support, services, or for administration of resources within a cloud service provider or SaaS application. | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M1018
ATT&CK Technique Name:User Account Management
Limit the privileges of user accounts so that only authorized administrators can edit system environment variables. | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0045
ATT&CK Technique Name:menuPass
menuPass has used certutil in a macro to decode base64-encoded content contained in a dropper document attached to an email. The group has also used certutil -decode to decode files on the victim’s machine when dropping UPPERCUT.[143][144] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0052
ATT&CK Technique Name:CopyKittens
CopyKittens has used -w hidden and -windowstyle hidden to conceal PowerShell windows. [13] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0266
ATT&CK Technique Name:TrickBot
TrickBot can implant malicious code into a compromised device's firmware.[12] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0281
ATT&CK Technique Name:Dok
Dok exfiltrates logs of its execution stored in the /tmp folder over FTP using the curl command.[17] | secon |
title:blackhat:us-18 IoT Malware: Comprehensive Survey, Analysis Framework and Case Studies
Computer malware in all its forms is nearly as old as the first PCs running commodity OSes, dating back at least 30 years. However, the number and the variety of "computing devices" dramatically increased during the last several... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0198
ATT&CK Technique Name:NETWIRE
NETWIRE has been executed through convincing victims into clicking malicious links.[64][43] | secon |
titleblackhat:eu-21 Is This My Domain Controller? A New Class of Active Directory Protocol Injection Attacks
When analyzing the security of cryptographic systems, a critical part is resiliency against eavesdroppers as well as machine-in-the-middle (MiTM) attacks. Over the years, researchers were able to break many secu... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0039
ATT&CK Technique Name:Net
Commands such as net view can be used in Net to gather information about available remote systems.[62] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0406
ATT&CK Technique Name:Gustuff
Gustuff abuses accessibility features to intercept all interactions between a user and the device.[9] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0629
ATT&CK Technique Name:RainyDay
RainyDay can use scheduled tasks to achieve persistence.[116] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0134
ATT&CK Technique Name:Transparent Tribe
Transparent Tribe has compromised domains for use in targeted malicious campaigns.[17] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0099
ATT&CK Technique Name:APT-C-36
APT-C-36 has used port 4050 for C2 communications.[4] | secon |
titleblackhat:eu-22 CSI:Rowhammer: Closing the Case of Half-Double and Beyond
Rowhammer is a severe security problem in DRAM, allowing an unprivileged adversary to gain kernel privileges by inducing electrical disturbance errors. Today, mitigations against Rowhammer, most notably Targeted Row Refresh (TRR), are widely ... | secon |
titleblackhat:asia-23 Nakatomi Space: Lateral Movement as L1 Post-exploitation in OT
In OT networks, it is common knowledge that Purdue Reference Model Level 1 (L1) devices such as PLCs and RTUs are notoriously insecure. Regardless, L1 devices that sit at the intersection of multiple, mixed networks (Ethernet, Industri... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:T1584.003
ATT&CK Technique Name:Virtual Private Server
Adversaries may compromise third-party Virtual Private Servers (VPSs) that can be used during targeting. There exist a variety of cloud service providers that will sell virtual machines/containers as a service. Adversaries may compromise VPSs purchased by... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0399
ATT&CK Technique Name:Pallas
Pallas tracks the latitude and longitude coordinates of the infected device.[20] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:C0014
ATT&CK Technique Name:Operation Wocao
During Operation Wocao, threat actors encrypted IP addresses used for "Agent" proxy hops with RC4.[3] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0027
ATT&CK Technique Name:Threat Group-3390
Threat Group-3390 has downloaded additional malware and tools, including through the use of certutil, onto a compromised host .[218][442] | secon |
titleblackhat:us-19 Moving from Hacking IoT Gadgets to Breaking into One of Europe's Highest Hotel Suites
We're taking Bluetooth LE hacking from toys and padlocks to the real world. Improving the tools and methods we used in previous research to break the AES cryptography of the NOKE Padlock, we went to do the one ... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0335
ATT&CK Technique Name:Carbon
Carbon uses the command net time \127.0.0.1 to get information the system’s time.[21] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:T1574.006
ATT&CK Technique Name:Dynamic Linker Hijacking
Adversaries may execute their own malicious payloads by hijacking environment variables the dynamic linker uses to load shared libraries. During the execution preparation phase of a program, the dynamic linker loads specified absolute paths of shared li... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0479
ATT&CK Technique Name:DEFENSOR ID
DEFENSOR ID abuses the accessibility service to auto-start the malware on device boot. This is accomplished by receiving the android.accessibilityservice.AccessibilityService intent.[4] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0084
ATT&CK Technique Name:Mis-Type
Mis-Type has been injected directly into a running process, including explorer.exe.[38] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0004
ATT&CK Technique Name:Ke3chang
Several Ke3chang backdoors achieved persistence by adding a Run key.[131] | secon |
titleblackhat:us-22 Breakfast
Breakfast will be served in Shoreline (South Convention Center, Level 2) at 8:00 AM - 9:00 AM. Please wear your badge. Open to Briefings pass holders. | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0662
ATT&CK Technique Name:RCSession
RCSession can use an encrypted beacon to check in with C2.[13] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0258
ATT&CK Technique Name:RGDoor
RGDoor decodes Base64 strings and decrypts strings using a custom XOR algorithm.[197] | secon |
titleblackhat:eu-19 Implementing the Lessons Learned From a Major Cyber Attack
In June 2017, Maersk suffered a major notpetya cyber-attack, this session explains lessons learned and how they are now being applied within Maersk. | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0391
ATT&CK Technique Name:HAWKBALL
HAWKBALL can collect the user name of the system.[80] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0598
ATT&CK Technique Name:P.A.S. Webshell
P.A.S. Webshell can upload and download files to and from compromised hosts.[172] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M1038
ATT&CK Technique Name:Execution Prevention
Ensure that input sanitization is performed and that files are validated properly before execution; furthermore, implement a strict allow list to ensure that only authorized file types are processed.[9] Restrict and/or block execution of files where headers and... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M0916
ATT&CK Technique Name:Vulnerability Scanning
Regularly scan the internal network for available services to identify new and potentially vulnerable services. | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S1028
ATT&CK Technique Name:Action RAT
Action RAT can use HTTP to communicate with C2 servers.[4] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0439
ATT&CK Technique Name:Okrum
Okrum's installer can attempt to achieve persistence by creating a scheduled task.[123] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0082
ATT&CK Technique Name:APT38
APT38 have enumerated files and directories, or searched in specific locations within a compromised host.[17] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0121
ATT&CK Technique Name:Sidewinder
Sidewinder has sent e-mails with malicious attachments often crafted for specific targets.[206] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M1032
ATT&CK Technique Name:Multi-factor Authentication
Ensure proper system and access isolation for critical network systems through use of multi-factor authentication. | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S1006
ATT&CK Technique Name:PLC-Blaster
PLC-Blaster utilizes the PLC communication and management API to load executable Program Organization Units. [3] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:C0022
ATT&CK Technique Name:Operation Dream Job
During Operation Dream Job, Lazarus Group conducted word searches within documents on a compromised host in search of security and financial matters.[216] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0052
ATT&CK Technique Name:CopyKittens
CopyKittens uses ZPP, a .NET console program, to compress files with ZIP.[22] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:C0007
ATT&CK Technique Name:FunnyDream
For FunnyDream, the threat actors registered a variety of domains.[27] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0472
ATT&CK Technique Name:down_new
down_new has the ability to download files to the compromised host.[3] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0069
ATT&CK Technique Name:MuddyWater
MuddyWater has disguised malicious executables and used filenames and Registry key names associated with Windows Defender.[102][103][104] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M1024
ATT&CK Technique Name:Restrict Registry Permissions
Ensure proper permissions are set for Registry hives to prevent users from modifying keys for logon scripts that may lead to persistence. | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0019
ATT&CK Technique Name:Regin
Regin has used a hidden file system to store some of its components.[5] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0069
ATT&CK Technique Name:MuddyWater
MuddyWater has used CMSTP.exe and a malicious INF to execute its POWERSTATS payload.[10] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S1015
ATT&CK Technique Name:Milan
Milan can use a COM component to generate scheduled tasks.[11] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:C0025
ATT&CK Technique Name:2016 Ukraine Electric Power Attack
During the 2016 Ukraine Electric Power Attack, Sandworm Team used PowerShell scripts to run a credential harvesting tool in memory to evade defenses.[6] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M1018
ATT&CK Technique Name:User Account Management
Ensure that proper policies are implemented to dictate the the secure enrollment and deactivation of authentication mechanisms, such as MFA, for user accounts. | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0143
ATT&CK Technique Name:Flame
Flame has built-in modules to gather information from compromised computers. [3] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M1022
ATT&CK Technique Name:Restrict File and Directory Permissions
Restrict file shares to specific directories with access only to necessary users. | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0154
ATT&CK Technique Name:Cobalt Strike
Cobalt Strike's Beacon payload can collect information on process details.[61][62][63] | secon |
title:blackhat:us-21 The Ripple Effect: Building a Diverse Security Research Team
Achieving a diverse, inclusive team which is a dream to work in was not a short journey. It took time and was well worth the effort. While the industry numbers paint a gloomy picture for gender equality and representation, we successfully... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0021
ATT&CK Technique Name:Derusbi
Derusbi binds to a raw socket on a random source port between 31800 and 31900 for C2.[22] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0211
ATT&CK Technique Name:Linfo
Linfo creates a backdoor through which remote attackers can change C2 servers.[29] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0391
ATT&CK Technique Name:HAWKBALL
HAWKBALL has exploited Microsoft Office vulnerabilities CVE-2017-11882 and CVE-2018-0802 to deliver the payload.[50] | secon |
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