text stringlengths 100 9.93M | category stringclasses 11
values |
|---|---|
ATT&CK ID:S0612
ATT&CK Technique Name:WastedLocker
WastedLocker can enumerate removable drives prior to the encryption process.[51] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M1027
ATT&CK Technique Name:Password Policies
Refer to NIST guidelines when creating password policies. [5] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0082
ATT&CK Technique Name:APT38
APT38 has used cron to create pre-scheduled and periodic background jobs on a Linux system.[3] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0533
ATT&CK Technique Name:SLOTHFULMEDIA
SLOTHFULMEDIA can inject into running processes on a compromised host.[60] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0051
ATT&CK Technique Name:FIN10
FIN10 has executed malicious .bat files containing PowerShell commands.[122] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0650
ATT&CK Technique Name:QakBot
QakBot can capture keystrokes on a compromised host.[143][144][145] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0131
ATT&CK Technique Name:Tonto Team
Tonto Team has used Python-based tools for execution.[43] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:C0014
ATT&CK Technique Name:Operation Wocao
During Operation Wocao, threat actors used scripts to detect security software.[75] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0130
ATT&CK Technique Name:Unknown Logger
Unknown Logger is capable of spreading to USB devices.[27] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M1030
ATT&CK Technique Name:Network Segmentation
Enable firewall rules to block unnecessary traffic between network security zones within a network. | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M1011
ATT&CK Technique Name:User Guidance
Users should be wary of granting applications dangerous or privacy-intrusive permissions, such as keyboard registration or accessibility service access. | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0342
ATT&CK Technique Name:GreyEnergy
GreyEnergy encrypts communications using RSA-2048.[25] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0112
ATT&CK Technique Name:Windshift
Windshift has used tools that communicate with C2 over HTTP.[366] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0603
ATT&CK Technique Name:Stuxnet
Stuxnet executes malicious SQL commands in the WinCC database server to propagate to remote systems. The malicious SQL commands include xp_cmdshell, sp_dumpdbilog, and sp_addextendedproc. [3] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:T1564.004
ATT&CK Technique Name:NTFS File Attributes
Adversaries may use NTFS file attributes to hide their malicious data in order to evade detection. Every New Technology File System (NTFS) formatted partition contains a Master File Table (MFT) that maintains a record for every file/directory on the partiti... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0013
ATT&CK Technique Name:APT30
APT30 has used spearphishing emails with malicious DOC attachments.[24] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0262
ATT&CK Technique Name:QuasarRAT
QuasarRAT has a module for performing remote desktop access.[46][47] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:T1001
ATT&CK Technique Name:Data Obfuscation
Adversaries may obfuscate command and control traffic to make it more difficult to detect. Command and control (C2) communications are hidden (but not necessarily encrypted) in an attempt to make the content more difficult to discover or decipher and to make the co... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0458
ATT&CK Technique Name:Ramsay
Ramsay has been delivered using OLE objects in malicious documents.[28] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0032
ATT&CK Technique Name:gh0st RAT
gh0st RAT can download files to the victim’s machine.[196][197] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M1045
ATT&CK Technique Name:Code Signing
Where possible, only permit execution of signed scripts. | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M1054
ATT&CK Technique Name:Software Configuration
Allowlist MIB objects and implement SNMP views.[3] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0373
ATT&CK Technique Name:Astaroth
Astaroth uses an external software known as NetPass to recover passwords. [5] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0049
ATT&CK Technique Name:OilRig
OilRig has sent spearphising emails with malicious links to potential victims.[79] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0265
ATT&CK Technique Name:Kazuar
Kazuar obtains a list of running processes through WMI querying and the ps command.[141] | secon |
titleblackhat:eu-20 The Hunt for Major League IoT-ICS Threats: A Deep Dive into IoT Threat Terrain
Because the Internet of Things is a major part of modern life, security threats are everywhere. Security incidents as well as the results of our many threat hunts have shown us that hundreds of millions of devices have be... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:C0001
ATT&CK Technique Name:Frankenstein
During Frankenstein, the threat actors used trojanized documents that retrieved remote templates from an adversary-controlled website.[15] | secon |
titleblackhat:eu-20 Manufacturing Hardware Implants from Idea to Mass Production: A Hacker's Journey
This presentation wants to be a motivational talk for all those hackers out there that always wanted to share some cool hacking devices with the community but didn't know how to deal with R&D, Quality Assurance, and... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:T1134.004
ATT&CK Technique Name:Parent PID Spoofing
Adversaries may spoof the parent process identifier (PPID) of a new process to evade process-monitoring defenses or to elevate privileges. New processes are typically spawned directly from their parent, or calling, process unless explicitly specified. One wa... | secon |
titleblackhat:us-18 Don't @ Me: Hunting Twitter Bots at Scale
Automated Twitter accounts have been making headlines for their ability to spread spam and malware as well as significantly influence online discussion and sentiment. In this talk, we explore the economy around Twitter bots, as well as demonstrate how attend... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M1038
ATT&CK Technique Name:Execution Prevention
Use application control configured to block execution of verclsid.exe if it is not required for a given system or network to prevent potential misuse by adversaries. | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0143
ATT&CK Technique Name:Aquatic Panda
Aquatic Panda has attempted to stop endpoint detection and response (EDR) tools on compromised systems.[12] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G1005
ATT&CK Technique Name:POLONIUM
POLONIUM has used valid compromised credentials to gain access to victim environments.[53] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M1045
ATT&CK Technique Name:Code Signing
Enforce that all binaries be signed by the correct Apple Developer IDs. | secon |
title:blackhat:us-20 Discovering Hidden Properties to Attack the Node.js Ecosystem
Node.js is widely used for developing both server-side and desktop applications. It provides a cross-platform execution environment for JavaScript programs. Due to the increasing popularity, the security of Node.js is critical to web ser... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0270
ATT&CK Technique Name:RogueRobin
RogueRobin gathers BIOS versions and manufacturers, the number of CPU cores, the total physical memory, and the computer name.[313] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0347
ATT&CK Technique Name:AuditCred
AuditCred can search through folders and files on the system.[22] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0096
ATT&CK Technique Name:APT41
APT41 used a compromised account to create a scheduled task on a system.[21][22] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S1024
ATT&CK Technique Name:CreepySnail
CreepySnail can use stolen credentials to authenticate on target networks.[8] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0386
ATT&CK Technique Name:Ursnif
Ursnif droppers have used PowerShell in download cradles to download and execute the malware's full executable payload.[234] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0032
ATT&CK Technique Name:Lazarus Group
Lazarus Group has used administrator credentials to gain access to restricted network segments.[40] | secon |
titleblackhat:asia-20 From an URGENT/11 Vulnerability to a Full Take-Down of a Factory, Using a Single Packet
Industrial Controllers are the basic building blocks for any automated factory. Our talk will demonstrate how an attacker can take over an entire factory by transmitting a single packet that will exploit one of... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0022
ATT&CK Technique Name:APT3
APT3 has exploited the Adobe Flash Player vulnerability CVE-2015-3113 and Internet Explorer vulnerability CVE-2014-1776.[13][14] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0007
ATT&CK Technique Name:APT28
APT28 has used several malicious applications that abused OAuth access tokens to gain access to target email accounts, including Gmail and Yahoo Mail.[9] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0147
ATT&CK Technique Name:Pteranodon
Pteranodon can decrypt encrypted data strings prior to using them.[178] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0059
ATT&CK Technique Name:Magic Hound
Magic Hound malware has used base64-encoded files and has also encrypted embedded strings with AES.[202][203] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0045
ATT&CK Technique Name:menuPass
menuPass has used esentutl to change file extensions to their true type that were masquerading as .txt files.[19] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0049
ATT&CK Technique Name:OilRig
OilRig has used various types of scripting for execution.[33][34][35][36][37] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0129
ATT&CK Technique Name:Mustang Panda
Mustang Panda has used names like adobeupdate.dat and PotPlayerDB.dat to disguise PlugX, and a file named OneDrive.exe to load a Cobalt Strike payload.[105] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0412
ATT&CK Technique Name:ZxShell
ZxShell hooks several API functions to spawn system threads.[17] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0010
ATT&CK Technique Name:Turla
Turla surveys a system upon check-in to discover running processes using the tasklist /v command.[96] Turla RPC backdoors have also enumerated processes associated with specific open ports or named pipes.[206] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0044
ATT&CK Technique Name:JHUHUGIT
JHUHUGIT variants have communicated with C2 servers over HTTP and HTTPS.[170][171][172] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:TA0042
ATT&CK Technique Name:Resource Development
The adversary is trying to establish resources they can use to support operations. | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M0810
ATT&CK Technique Name:Out-of-Band Communications Channel
Provide operators with redundant, out-of-band communication to support monitoring and control of the operational processes, especially when recovering from a network outage [7]. Out-of-band communication should utilize diverse systems and technol... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:C0024
ATT&CK Technique Name:SolarWinds Compromise
During the SolarWinds Compromise, APT29 used compromised local accounts to access victims' networks.[12] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0506
ATT&CK Technique Name:ViperRAT
ViperRAT has been installed in two stages and can secretly install new applications.[28] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0584
ATT&CK Technique Name:AppleJeus
AppleJeus has placed a plist file within the LaunchDaemons folder and launched it manually.[8][9] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0092
ATT&CK Technique Name:TA505
TA505 has used a wide variety of ransomware, such as Clop, Locky, Jaff, Bart, Philadelphia, and GlobeImposter, to encrypt victim files and demand a ransom payment.[86] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0249
ATT&CK Technique Name:Gold Dragon
Gold Dragon checks for anti-malware products and processes.[48] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0687
ATT&CK Technique Name:Cyclops Blink
Cyclops Blink can use DNS over HTTPS (DoH) to resolve C2 nodes.[12] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0102
ATT&CK Technique Name:Wizard Spider
Wizard Spider has used Window Remote Management to move laterally through a victim network.[11] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0668
ATT&CK Technique Name:TinyTurla
TinyTurla has the ability to encrypt C2 traffic with SSL/TLS.[58] | secon |
titleblackhat:us-18 The Unbearable Lightness of BMC's
Welcome to a data center! A place where the air conditioner never stops and the long line of tiny, red and blue LEDs dance chaotically over the sounds of the never-ending fans, playing in unison.One thing is certain, everyone avoids data centers like the plague. And... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0505
ATT&CK Technique Name:Desert Scorpion
Desert Scorpion can collect account information stored on the device.[4] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M0918
ATT&CK Technique Name:User Account Management
Limit the accounts that may use remote services. Limit the permissions for accounts that are at higher risk of compromise; for example, configure SSH so users can only run specific programs. | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0236
ATT&CK Technique Name:Kwampirs
Kwampirs collects OS version information such as registered owner details, manufacturer details, processor type, available storage, installed patches, hostname, version info, system date, and other system information by using the commands systeminfo, net config workstation... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0375
ATT&CK Technique Name:Remexi
Remexi has a command to capture active windows on the machine and retrieve window titles.[28] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0265
ATT&CK Technique Name:Kazuar
Kazuar has used internal nodes on the compromised network for C2 communications.[14] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0037
ATT&CK Technique Name:FIN6
FIN6 has extracted password hashes from ntds.dit to crack offline.[7] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0568
ATT&CK Technique Name:EVILNUM
EVILNUM can search for anti-virus products on the system.[35] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0264
ATT&CK Technique Name:OopsIE
OopsIE uses the command prompt to execute commands on the victim's machine.[243][247] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M1047
ATT&CK Technique Name:Audit
Consider periodic review of common fileless storage locations (such as the Registry or WMI repository) to potentially identify abnormal and malicious data. | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0034
ATT&CK Technique Name:Sandworm Team
Sandworm Team has created email accounts that mimic legitimate organizations for its spearphishing operations.[16] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M1053
ATT&CK Technique Name:Data Backup
Consider implementing IT disaster recovery plans that contain procedures for taking regular data backups that can be used to restore organizational data.[13] Ensure backups are stored off system and is protected from common methods adversaries may use to gain access and... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0378
ATT&CK Technique Name:PoshC2
PoshC2 can use Get-PassPol to enumerate the domain password policy.[12] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0471
ATT&CK Technique Name:build_downer
build_downer has the ability to add itself to the Registry Run key for persistence.[51] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M1022
ATT&CK Technique Name:Restrict File and Directory Permissions
Ensure that proper permissions and directory access control are set to deny users the ability to write files to the top-level directory C: and system directories, such as C:\Windows\, to reduce places where malicious files could be placed for... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0685
ATT&CK Technique Name:PowerPunch
PowerPunch has the ability to execute through PowerShell.[106] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0396
ATT&CK Technique Name:EvilBunny
EvilBunny has executed commands via scheduled tasks.[56] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0094
ATT&CK Technique Name:Trojan.Karagany
Trojan.Karagany can secure C2 communications with SSL and TLS.[60] | secon |
titleblackhat:eu-21 Message in a Broken Bottle: Exploring the Linux IPC Attack Surface
There might be some truth to the joke that "Linux" is what the systemd operating system used to be called. Systemd is one of several system services that run in userspace and communicate via IPC. You could almost imagine it as a micr... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0431
ATT&CK Technique Name:HotCroissant
HotCroissant has the ability to stop services on the infected host.[20] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M1026
ATT&CK Technique Name:Privileged Account Management
Limit domain admin account permissions to domain controllers and limited servers. Delegate other admin functions to separate accounts.[1] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S1013
ATT&CK Technique Name:ZxxZ
ZxxZ has been disguised as a Windows security update service.[11] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0080
ATT&CK Technique Name:Cobalt Group
Cobalt Group has used the command cmstp.exe /s /ns C:\Users\ADMINI~W\AppData\Local\Temp\XKNqbpzl.txt to bypass AppLocker and launch a malicious script.[7][8][9] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S1015
ATT&CK Technique Name:Milan
Milan has used an executable named companycatalogue to appear benign.[20] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S1009
ATT&CK Technique Name:Triton
Triton's injector, inject.bin, changes the function pointer of the 'get main processor diagnostic data' TriStation command to the address of imain.bin so that it is executed prior to the normal handler. [3] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0114
ATT&CK Technique Name:Chimera
Chimera has used Windows admin shares to move laterally.[16][17] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0520
ATT&CK Technique Name:BLINDINGCAN
BLINDINGCAN has encoded its C2 traffic with Base64.[14] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M1018
ATT&CK Technique Name:User Account Management
Consider implementing WMI and security filtering to further tailor which users and computers a GPO will apply to.[3][16][17] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0495
ATT&CK Technique Name:RDAT
RDAT can communicate with the C2 via subdomains that utilize base64 with character substitutions.[9] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M1012
ATT&CK Technique Name:Enterprise Policy
When using Samsung Knox, third-party keyboards must be explicitly added to an allow list in order to be available to the end-user.[14] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0098
ATT&CK Technique Name:T9000
If a victim meets certain criteria, T9000 uses the AppInit_DLL functionality to achieve persistence by ensuring that every user mode process that is spawned will load its malicious DLL, ResN32.dll. It does this by creating the following Registry keys: HKLM\Software\Microsoft\... | secon |
title:blackhat:us-20 Operation Chimera - APT Operation Targets Semiconductor Vendors
This presentation provides an analysis of the advanced persistent threat (APT) attacks that have occurred during the past two years on the semiconductor industry. Our research shows that the majority of these attacks were concentrated ... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0567
ATT&CK Technique Name:Dtrack
Dtrack can collect a variety of information from victim machines.[63] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0472
ATT&CK Technique Name:down_new
down_new has the ability to list the directories on a compromised host.[25] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0049
ATT&CK Technique Name:OilRig
OilRig has used sc query on a victim to gather information about services.[38] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0664
ATT&CK Technique Name:Pandora
Pandora can identify if incoming HTTP traffic contains a token and if so it will intercept the traffic and process the received command.[10] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:C0012
ATT&CK Technique Name:Operation CuckooBees
During Operation CuckooBees, the threat actors collected data, files, and other information from compromised networks.[128] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0376
ATT&CK Technique Name:HOPLIGHT
HOPLIGHT has been observed collecting victim machine information like OS version, volume information, and more.[166] | secon |
Subsets and Splits
No community queries yet
The top public SQL queries from the community will appear here once available.