text stringlengths 100 9.93M | category stringclasses 11
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|---|---|
ATT&CK ID:S0666
ATT&CK Technique Name:Gelsemium
Gelsemium can use custom shellcode to map embedded DLLs into memory.[13] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0526
ATT&CK Technique Name:KGH_SPY
KGH_SPY can collect drive information from a compromised host.[190] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0092
ATT&CK Technique Name:Agent.btz
Agent.btz attempts to download an encrypted binary from a specified domain.[7] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0204
ATT&CK Technique Name:Briba
Briba creates run key Registry entries pointing to malicious DLLs dropped to disk.[49] | secon |
titleblackhat:eu-18 Secure Boot Under Attack: Simulation to Enhance Fault Attacks & Defenses
Secure Boot is widely deployed in modern embedded systems and an essential part of the security model. Even when no (easy to exploit) logical vulnerabilities remain, attackers are surprisingly often still able to compromise... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:T1557.003
ATT&CK Technique Name:DHCP Spoofing
Adversaries may redirect network traffic to adversary-owned systems by spoofing Dynamic Host Configuration Protocol (DHCP) traffic and acting as a malicious DHCP server on the victim network. By achieving the adversary-in-the-middle (AiTM) position, adversaries ma... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0117
ATT&CK Technique Name:Fox Kitten
Fox Kitten has named binaries and configuration files svhost and dllhost respectively to appear legitimate.[60] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:T1630.003
ATT&CK Technique Name:Disguise Root/Jailbreak Indicators
An adversary could use knowledge of the techniques used by security software to evade detection. For example, some mobile security products perform compromised device detection by searching for particular artifacts such as an installed "su" bi... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0468
ATT&CK Technique Name:Skidmap
Skidmap has used pm.sh to download and install its main payload.[39] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0239
ATT&CK Technique Name:Bankshot
Bankshot identifies processes and collects the process ids.[28] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0087
ATT&CK Technique Name:APT39
APT39 has used tools capable of stealing contents of the clipboard.[11] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0114
ATT&CK Technique Name:Chimera
Chimera has collected data of interest from network shares.[5] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:C0022
ATT&CK Technique Name:Operation Dream Job
During Operation Dream Job, Lazarus Group lured victims into executing malicious documents that contained "dream job" descriptions from defense, aerospace, and other sectors.[175][176] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0439
ATT&CK Technique Name:Okrum
Okrum's loader can detect presence of an emulator by using two calls to GetTickCount API, and checking whether the time has been accelerated.[31] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S1018
ATT&CK Technique Name:Saint Bot
The Saint Bot loader has used API calls to spawn MSBuild.exe in a suspended state before injecting the decrypted Saint Bot binary into it.[34] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0007
ATT&CK Technique Name:APT28
APT28 has mapped network drives using Net and administrator credentials.[6] | secon |
titleblackhat:us-18 SDL That Won't Break the Bank
Over the last fifteen years, many large software development organizations have adopted Security Development Lifecycle (SDL) processes as effective approaches to delivering secure software. Motivation for SDL comes from the realization that software vulnerabilities can ... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0434
ATT&CK Technique Name:Imminent Monitor
Imminent Monitor has deleted files related to its dynamic debugger feature.[109] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:T1437
ATT&CK Technique Name:Application Layer Protocol
Adversaries may communicate using application layer protocols to avoid detection/network filtering by blending in with existing traffic. Commands to the mobile device, and often the results of those commands, will be embedded within the protocol traffic b... | secon |
title:blackhat:us-18 A Dive in to Hyper-V Architecture & Vulnerabilities
Virtualization technology is an increasingly common foundation on which platform security is built and clouds are secured. However, virtualization stacks are ultimately software, all software has vulnerabilities, and few things are more beautiful ... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0136
ATT&CK Technique Name:IndigoZebra
IndigoZebra sent spearphishing emails containing malicious password-protected RAR attachments.[119][120] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0085
ATT&CK Technique Name:S-Type
S-Type may create a .lnk file to itself that is saved in the Start menu folder. It may also create the Registry key HKCU\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run\ IMJPMIJ8.1{3 characters of Unique Identifier}.[231] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0369
ATT&CK Technique Name:CoinTicker
CoinTicker downloads the following hidden files to evade detection and maintain persistence: /private/tmp/.info.enc, /private/tmp/.info.py, /private/tmp/.server.sh, ~/Library/LaunchAgents/.espl.plist, ~/Library/Containers/.[random string]/[random string].[15] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0476
ATT&CK Technique Name:Valak
Valak can use a .NET compiled module named exchgrabber to enumerate credentials from the Credential Manager.[18] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:C0024
ATT&CK Technique Name:SolarWinds Compromise
During the SolarWinds Compromise, APT29 gained initial network access to some victims via a trojanized update of SolarWinds Orion software.[16][17][18][19] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0612
ATT&CK Technique Name:WastedLocker
WastedLocker has performed DLL hijacking before execution.[37] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0394
ATT&CK Technique Name:HiddenWasp
HiddenWasp uses an RC4-like algorithm with an already computed PRGA generated key-stream for network communication.[63] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0690
ATT&CK Technique Name:Green Lambert
Green Lambert has been disguised as a Growl help file.[69][70] | secon |
title:blackhat:eu-21 ReCertifying Active Directory Certificate Services
Microsoft's Active Directory Public Key Infrastructure (PKI) implementation, known as Active Directory Certificate Services (AD CS), has unfortunately flown under the radar of the defensive industry. AD CS is widely deployed and provides attackers ... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0640
ATT&CK Technique Name:Avaddon
Avaddon bypasses UAC using the CMSTPLUA COM interface.[13] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:T1132.001
ATT&CK Technique Name:Standard Encoding
Adversaries may encode data with a standard data encoding system to make the content of command and control traffic more difficult to detect. Command and control (C2) information can be encoded using a standard data encoding system that adheres to existing pro... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M1045
ATT&CK Technique Name:Code Signing
Many vendors provide digitally signed operating system images to validate the integrity of the software used on their platform. Make use of this feature where possible in order to prevent and/or detect attempts by adversaries to compromise the system image. [9] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0652
ATT&CK Technique Name:MarkiRAT
MarkiRAT can download additional files and tools from its C2 server, including through the use of BITSAdmin.[280] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0448
ATT&CK Technique Name:Rising Sun
Rising Sun can modify file attributes to hide files.[42] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M1011
ATT&CK Technique Name:User Guidance
Users should be warned against granting access to accessibility features, and to carefully scrutinize applications that request this dangerous permission. | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0363
ATT&CK Technique Name:Empire
Empire can use modules like Invoke-SessionGopher to extract private key and session information.[9] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0406
ATT&CK Technique Name:Gustuff
Gustuff obfuscated command information using a custom base85-based encoding.[21] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G1014
ATT&CK Technique Name:LuminousMoth
LuminousMoth has used a malicious DLL to collect the username from compromised hosts.[105] | secon |
title:blackhat:eu-21 The Bad Guys Win – Analysis of 10,000 Magecart Vulnerabilities
"Magecart" is the common name for an attack in which hackers compromise 3rd party Javascript code to steal information from web-applications or websites that incorporate the code.Over the last two years, we monitored the web for vulnera... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S1020
ATT&CK Technique Name:Kevin
Kevin can exfiltrate data to the C2 server in 27-character chunks.[8] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0652
ATT&CK Technique Name:MarkiRAT
MarkiRAT can store collected data locally in a created .nfo file.[56] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S1063
ATT&CK Technique Name:Brute Ratel C4
Brute Ratel C4 can conduct port scanning against targeted systems.[12] | secon |
title:blackhat:eu-21 AIModel-Mutator: Finding Vulnerabilities in TensorFlow
Like other software, machine learning frameworks could contain vulnerabilities. Various advanced machine learning frameworks, such as Tensorflow, Pytorch, PaddlePaddle, etc. keep in active development to catch up with increasing demand. The rap... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0603
ATT&CK Technique Name:Stuxnet
Stuxnet enumerates the directories of a network resource.[54] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0157
ATT&CK Technique Name:SOUNDBITE
SOUNDBITE is capable of gathering system information.[196] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0178
ATT&CK Technique Name:Truvasys
To establish persistence, Truvasys adds a Registry Run key with a value "TaskMgr" in an attempt to masquerade as the legitimate Windows Task Manager.[74] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:T0851
ATT&CK Technique Name:Rootkit
Adversaries may deploy rootkits to hide the presence of programs, files, network connections, services, drivers, and other system components. Rootkits are programs that hide the existence of malware by intercepting and modifying operating-system API calls that supply system... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0094
ATT&CK Technique Name:Kimsuky
Kimsuky has compromised legitimate sites and used them to distribute malware.[8] | secon |
title:blackhat:us-18 Mental Health Hacks: Fighting Burnout, Depression and Suicide in the Hacker Community
It's not easy to miss the gunshot wound in the trauma bay, or the cough of a rip-roaring pneumonia. But as anyone who has struggled with mental illness can attest- psychic wounds run just as deep, yet are often sh... | secon |
title:botconf2015 Building a hybrid experimental platform for mobile botnet research
Mobile botnets are an emerging security threat that aims at exploiting the wide penetration of mobile devices and systems and their vulnerabilities in the same spirit of traditional botnets. Mobile botmasters take advantage of infected... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S1012
ATT&CK Technique Name:PowerLess
PowerLess can use an encrypted channel for C2 communications.[11] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0059
ATT&CK Technique Name:Magic Hound
Magic Hound has used scheduled tasks to establish persistence and execution.[101][102] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0512
ATT&CK Technique Name:FatDuke
FatDuke has attempted to mimic a compromised user's traffic by using the same user agent as the installed browser.[14] | secon |
titleblackhat:us-19 Worm Charming: Harvesting Malware Lures for Fun and Profit
It's no secret that client-side attacks are a common source of compromise for many organizations. Web browser and e-mail borne malware campaigns target users by way of phishing, social engineering, and exploitation. Office suites from vendor... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0357
ATT&CK Technique Name:Impacket
Impacket modules like ntlmrelayx and smbrelayx can be used in conjunction with Network Sniffing and LLMNR/NBT-NS Poisoning and SMB Relay to gather NetNTLM credentials for Brute Force or relay attacks that can gain code execution.[10] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0117
ATT&CK Technique Name:Fox Kitten
Fox Kitten has accessed files to gain valid credentials.[17] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0098
ATT&CK Technique Name:T9000
During the T9000 installation process, it drops a copy of the legitimate Microsoft binary igfxtray.exe. The executable contains a side-loading weakness which is used to load a portion of the malware.[60] | secon |
title:botconf2018 Let’s Go with a Go RAT!
The Go language (GoLang) is an open source programming language developed by Google Inc. in 2009, and it can be run on various platforms such as Linux, Mac, Windows, Android.Speaking of malware using Golang, Mirai is one of the famous one (they use it for the C2 program), but m... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0455
ATT&CK Technique Name:Metamorfo
Metamorfo has used MSI files to download additional files to execute.[286][287][288][289] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0673
ATT&CK Technique Name:DarkWatchman
DarkWatchman can collect the OS version, system architecture, uptime, and computer name.[108] | secon |
title:blackhat:us-18 Unpacking the Packed Unpacker: Reverse Engineering an Android Anti-Analysis Native Library
Malware authors implement many different techniques to frustrate analysis and make reverse engineering malware more difficult. Many of these anti-analysis and anti-reverse engineering techniques attempt to se... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0148
ATT&CK Technique Name:RTM
RTM tries to add a Registry Run key under the name "Windows Update" to establish persistence.[228] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:T0827
ATT&CK Technique Name:Loss of Control
Adversaries may seek to achieve a sustained loss of control or a runaway condition in which operators cannot issue any commands even if the malicious interference has subsided. | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0138
ATT&CK Technique Name:Andariel
Andariel has inserted a malicious script within compromised websites to collect potential victim information such as browser type, system language, Flash Player version, and other data.[2] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0274
ATT&CK Technique Name:Calisto
Calisto uses a hidden directory named .calisto to store data from the victim’s machine before exfiltration.[17][18] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:C0017
ATT&CK Technique Name:C0017
During C0017, APT41 used SCHTASKS /Change to modify legitimate scheduled tasks to run malicious code.[16] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:C0024
ATT&CK Technique Name:SolarWinds Compromise
During the SolarWinds Compromise, APT29 modified timestamps of backdoors to match legitimate Windows files.[49] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0527
ATT&CK Technique Name:CSPY Downloader
CSPY Downloader has the ability to self delete.[49] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S1053
ATT&CK Technique Name:AvosLocker
AvosLocker has encrypted files and network resources using AES-256 and added an .avos, .avos2, or .AvosLinux extension to filenames.[11][12][13][14] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0586
ATT&CK Technique Name:TAINTEDSCRIBE
TAINTEDSCRIBE can copy itself into the current user’s Startup folder as "Narrator.exe" for persistence.[256] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0041
ATT&CK Technique Name:Strider
Strider has registered its persistence module on domain controllers as a Windows LSA (Local System Authority) password filter to acquire credentials any time a domain, local user, or administrator logs in or changes a password.[2] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0098
ATT&CK Technique Name:T9000
T9000 gathers and beacons the operating system build number and CPU Architecture (32-bit/64-bit) during installation.[364] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0035
ATT&CK Technique Name:Dragonfly
Dragonfly has conducted SQL injection attacks, exploited vulnerabilities CVE-2019-19781 and CVE-2020-0688 for Citrix and MS Exchange, and CVE-2018-13379 for Fortinet VPNs.[23] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0669
ATT&CK Technique Name:KOCTOPUS
KOCTOPUS will attempt to delete or disable all Registry keys and scheduled tasks related to Microsoft Security Defender and Security Essentials.[48] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0260
ATT&CK Technique Name:InvisiMole
InvisiMole has used scheduled tasks named MSST and \Microsoft\Windows\Autochk\Scheduled to establish persistence.[84] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0689
ATT&CK Technique Name:WhisperGate
WhisperGate has the ability to inject its fourth stage into a suspended process created by the legitimate Windows utility InstallUtil.exe.[44][45] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0022
ATT&CK Technique Name:APT3
APT3 has used PowerShell on victim systems to download and run payloads after exploitation.[17] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M1022
ATT&CK Technique Name:Restrict File and Directory Permissions
Protect shared folders by minimizing users who have write access. | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0409
ATT&CK Technique Name:Machete
Machete hijacks the clipboard data by creating an overlapped window that listens to keyboard events.[30][31] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:T1595.003
ATT&CK Technique Name:Wordlist Scanning
Adversaries may iteratively probe infrastructure using brute-forcing and crawling techniques. While this technique employs similar methods to Brute Force, its goal is the identification of content and infrastructure rather than the discovery of valid credentia... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0058
ATT&CK Technique Name:SslMM
SslMM creates a new thread implementing a keylogging facility using Windows Keyboard Accelerators.[169] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0674
ATT&CK Technique Name:CharmPower
CharmPower has the ability to list running processes through the use of tasklist.[56] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0552
ATT&CK Technique Name:AdFind
AdFind can extract subnet information from Active Directory.[4][5][6] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0045
ATT&CK Technique Name:menuPass
menuPass has attempted to get victims to open malicious files such as Windows Shortcuts (.lnk) and/or Microsoft Office documents, sent via email as part of spearphishing campaigns.[139][140][141][142][143] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0067
ATT&CK Technique Name:APT37
APT37 collects the computer name, the BIOS model, and execution path.[29] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S1069
ATT&CK Technique Name:TangleBot
TangleBot can request permission to view files and media.[28] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0094
ATT&CK Technique Name:Kimsuky
Kimsuky has used a modified TeamViewer client as a command and control channel.[18][19] | secon |
title:blackhat:us-23 Make KSMA Great Again: The Art of Rooting Android Devices by GPU MMU Features
With more and more hardware and software mitigations, rooting Android 13 devices now requires better bugs and more advanced exploitation techniques. Five years ago, I introduced the Kernel Space Mirroring Attack (KSMA) ex... | secon |
titleblackhat:us-20 Kr00k: Serious Vulnerability Affected Encryption of Billion+ Wi-Fi Devices
We identified Kr00k (CVE-2019-15126) – a previously unknown vulnerability in chips used by a significant proportion of all Wi-Fi capable devices. Specifically, we discovered that Wi-Fi chips by Broadcom and Cypress – and poss... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0023
ATT&CK Technique Name:CHOPSTICK
CHOPSTICK is capable of performing keylogging.[37][3][14] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0112
ATT&CK Technique Name:Windshift
Windshift has used compromised websites to register custom URL schemes on a remote system.[57] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0674
ATT&CK Technique Name:CharmPower
CharmPower can use netsh wlan show profiles to list specific Wi-Fi profile details.[21] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0069
ATT&CK Technique Name:MuddyWater
MuddyWater has used malware that can capture screenshots of the victim’s machine.[109] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0100
ATT&CK Technique Name:Inception
Inception has maintained persistence by modifying Registry run key value HKEY_CURRENT_USER\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run\.[122] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0182
ATT&CK Technique Name:FinFisher
FinFisher accesses and exfiltrates the call log.[10] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S1018
ATT&CK Technique Name:Saint Bot
Saint Bot has established persistence by being copied to the Startup directory or through the \Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run registry key.[232][233] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M1011
ATT&CK Technique Name:User Guidance
Contact list access is an uncommonly needed permission, so users should be instructed to use extra scrutiny when granting access to their contact list. | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0087
ATT&CK Technique Name:APT39
APT39 has used malware to delete files after they are deployed on a compromised host.[13] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0050
ATT&CK Technique Name:APT32
APT32 malware has used rundll32.exe to execute an initial infection process.[14] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:C0024
ATT&CK Technique Name:SolarWinds Compromise
During the SolarWinds Compromise, APT29 accessed victims' internal knowledge repositories (wikis) to view sensitive corporate information on products, services, and internal business operations.[6] | secon |
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