text stringlengths 100 9.93M | category stringclasses 11
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|---|---|
ATT&CK ID:S0536
ATT&CK Technique Name:GPlayed
GPlayed has used timers to enable Wi-Fi, ping the C2 server, register the device with the C2, and register wake locks on the system.[3] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0482
ATT&CK Technique Name:Bundlore
Bundlore has used Python scripts to execute payloads.[7] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0433
ATT&CK Technique Name:Rifdoor
Rifdoor has been executed from malicious Excel or Word documents containing macros.[204] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0396
ATT&CK Technique Name:EvilBunny
EvilBunny has deleted the initial dropper after running through the environment checks.[64] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0018
ATT&CK Technique Name:Sykipot
Sykipot is known to contain functionality that enables targeting of smart card technologies to proxy authentication for connections to restricted network resources using detected hardware tokens.[8] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0558
ATT&CK Technique Name:Tiktok Pro
Tiktok Pro can capture audio from the device’s microphone and can record phone calls.[31] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0641
ATT&CK Technique Name:Kobalos
Kobalos can write captured SSH connection credentials to a file under the /var/run directory with a .pid extension for exfiltration.[4] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S1058
ATT&CK Technique Name:Prestige
Prestige has been deployed using the Default Domain Group Policy Object from an Active Directory Domain Controller.[14] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0093
ATT&CK Technique Name:GALLIUM
GALLIUM leveraged valid accounts to maintain access to a victim network.[35] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0069
ATT&CK Technique Name:MuddyWater
MuddyWater uses various techniques to bypass UAC.[43] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M1017
ATT&CK Technique Name:User Training
Applications may send push notifications to verify a login as a form of multi-factor authentication (MFA). Train users to only accept valid push notifications and to report suspicious push notifications. | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0047
ATT&CK Technique Name:Gamaredon Group
Gamaredon Group has used an Outlook VBA module on infected systems to send phishing emails with malicious attachments to other employees within the organization.[3] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0381
ATT&CK Technique Name:FlawedAmmyy
FlawedAmmyy enumerates the privilege level of the victim during the initial infection.[10][11] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M1033
ATT&CK Technique Name:Limit Software Installation
Restrict software installation to trusted repositories only and be cautious of orphaned software packages. | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0467
ATT&CK Technique Name:TajMahal
TajMahal has the ability to steal web session cookies from Internet Explorer, Netscape Navigator, FireFox and RealNetworks applications.[2] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0082
ATT&CK Technique Name:APT38
APT38 has attempted to lure victims into enabling malicious macros within email attachments.[27] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G1005
ATT&CK Technique Name:POLONIUM
POLONIUM has exfiltrated stolen data to POLONIUM-owned OneDrive and Dropbox accounts.[8] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:T1505.003
ATT&CK Technique Name:Web Shell
Adversaries may backdoor web servers with web shells to establish persistent access to systems. A Web shell is a Web script that is placed on an openly accessible Web server to allow an adversary to use the Web server as a gateway into a network. A Web shell may provi... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0087
ATT&CK Technique Name:APT39
APT39 has used remote access tools that leverage DNS in communications with C2.[6] | secon |
title:blackhat:us-22 Another Way to Talk with Browser: Exploiting Chrome at Network Layer
Networking is a critical and complex task for browsers. It ranges from high level JavaScript APIs, all the way down to managing every socket connection. Services on remote servers can control every single byte sent to the browser ... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0649
ATT&CK Technique Name:SMOKEDHAM
SMOKEDHAM has used Google Drive and Dropbox to host files downloaded by victims via malicious links.[32] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0681
ATT&CK Technique Name:Lizar
Lizar can retrieve network information from a compromised host.[130] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S1030
ATT&CK Technique Name:Squirrelwaffle
Squirrelwaffle has been packed with a custom packer to hide payloads.[79][80] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0650
ATT&CK Technique Name:QakBot
QakBot can use net share to identify network shares for use in lateral movement.[45][46] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0596
ATT&CK Technique Name:ShadowPad
ShadowPad has collected the username of the victim system.[166] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0112
ATT&CK Technique Name:Windshift
Windshift has used Visual Basic 6 (VB6) payloads.[166] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:T1205.001
ATT&CK Technique Name:Port Knocking
Adversaries may use port knocking to hide open ports used for persistence or command and control. To enable a port, an adversary sends a series of attempted connections to a predefined sequence of closed ports. After the sequence is completed, opening a port is of... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0432
ATT&CK Technique Name:Bread
Bread collects the device’s IMEI, carrier, mobile country code, and mobile network code.[6] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:T1055.001
ATT&CK Technique Name:Dynamic-link Library Injection
Adversaries may inject dynamic-link libraries (DLLs) into processes in order to evade process-based defenses as well as possibly elevate privileges. DLL injection is a method of executing arbitrary code in the address space of a separate live proc... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M1022
ATT&CK Technique Name:Restrict File and Directory Permissions
Install software in write-protected locations. Set directory access controls to prevent file writes to the search paths for applications, both in the folders where applications are run from and the standard library folders. | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G1008
ATT&CK Technique Name:SideCopy
SideCopy has compromised domains for some of their infrastructure, including for C2 and staging malware.[15] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M0804
ATT&CK Technique Name:Human User Authentication
All remote services should require strong authentication before providing user access. | secon |
ATT&CK ID:C0024
ATT&CK Technique Name:SolarWinds Compromise
During the SolarWinds Compromise, APT29 used RDP sessions from public-facing systems to internal servers.[52] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0342
ATT&CK Technique Name:GreyEnergy
GreyEnergy has a module for Mimikatz to collect Windows credentials from the victim’s machine.[35] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0250
ATT&CK Technique Name:Koadic
Koadic has added persistence to the HKEY_CURRENT_USER\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run Registry key.[136] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0115
ATT&CK Technique Name:Crimson
Crimson can collect information from a compromised host.[51] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0093
ATT&CK Technique Name:GALLIUM
GALLIUM used reg commands to dump specific hives from the Windows Registry, such as the SAM hive, and obtain password hashes.[9] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0115
ATT&CK Technique Name:Crimson
Crimson contains a command to collect the victim PC name, disk drive information, and operating system.[98][99][100] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0531
ATT&CK Technique Name:Grandoreiro
Grandoreiro has named malicious browser extensions and update files to appear legitimate.[67][68] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0422
ATT&CK Technique Name:Anubis
Anubis exfiltrates data encrypted (with RC4) by its ransomware module.[1] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M1024
ATT&CK Technique Name:Restrict Registry Permissions
Protect generated event files and logs that are stored locally with proper permissions and authentication and limit opportunities for adversaries to increase privileges by preventing Privilege Escalation opportunities. | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0098
ATT&CK Technique Name:BlackTech
BlackTech has used spearphishing e-mails with links to cloud services to deliver malware.[27] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0373
ATT&CK Technique Name:Astaroth
Astaroth can create a new process in a suspended state from a targeted legitimate process in order to unmap its memory and replace it with malicious code.[4][5] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M1026
ATT&CK Technique Name:Privileged Account Management
Ensure proper permissions are in place to help prevent adversary access to privileged accounts necessary to perform these actions | secon |
ATT&CK ID:T1205.001
ATT&CK Technique Name:Port Knocking
Adversaries may use port knocking to hide open ports used for persistence or command and control. To enable a port, an adversary sends a series of attempted connections to a predefined sequence of closed ports. After the sequence is completed, opening a port is of... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0030
ATT&CK Technique Name:Carbanak
Carbanak exfiltrates data in compressed chunks if a message is larger than 4096 bytes .[4] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0027
ATT&CK Technique Name:Threat Group-3390
Threat Group-3390 has staged tools, including gsecdump and WCE, on previously compromised websites.[1] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0692
ATT&CK Technique Name:SILENTTRINITY
SILENTTRINITY can use PowerShell to execute commands.[210] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0045
ATT&CK Technique Name:ADVSTORESHELL
ADVSTORESHELL stores output from command execution in a .dat file in the %TEMP% directory.[2] | secon |
titleblackhat:us-18 IoT Malware: Comprehensive Survey, Analysis Framework and Case Studies
Computer malware in all its forms is nearly as old as the first PCs running commodity OSes, dating back at least 30 years. However, the number and the variety of "computing devices" dramatically increased during the last several ... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0678
ATT&CK Technique Name:Torisma
Torisma has been Base64 encoded and AES encrypted.[241] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0651
ATT&CK Technique Name:BoxCaon
BoxCaon can execute arbitrary commands and utilize the "ComSpec" environment variable.[54] | secon |
title:blackhat:us-20 Carrying our Insecurities with Us: The Risks of Implanted Medical Devices in Secure Spaces
This talk explores the contradiction of allowing increasingly smart Implanted Medical Devices (IMD) in secure spaces through the combination of policy amendments and technical mitigations. The number of IMDs ... | secon |
titleblackhat:asia-21 Vibe Check: IDK About This…. Why Students May Shy Away From Cyber in a Surveillance State
Are you a threat researcher? Interested in ethical hacking, but worry you might wind up on a “list”? Surveillance is nothing new to the Asia Pacific region. Facial recognition is ubiquitous. But how does the ... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0414
ATT&CK Technique Name:BabyShark
BabyShark has encoded data using certutil before exfiltration.[8] | secon |
titleblackhat:eu-22 The Aftermath of a Social Engineering Pentest - Are We Being Ethically Responsible?
In 2020, GoDaddy launched a phishing exercise targeting 500 employees, using a Christmas bonus as a lure. Those who failed the test were punished with an extra workload. This caught international media attention and ... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0108
ATT&CK Technique Name:Blue Mockingbird
Blue Mockingbird has used Windows Explorer to manually copy malicious files to remote hosts over SMB.[12] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:C0017
ATT&CK Technique Name:C0017
During C0017, APT41 used whoami to gather information from victim machines.[30] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0067
ATT&CK Technique Name:APT37
APT37's Freenki malware lists running processes using the Microsoft Windows API.[12] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0161
ATT&CK Technique Name:XAgentOSX
XAgentOSX contains the getInstalledAPP function to run ls -la /Applications to gather what applications are installed.[401] | secon |
title:botconf2015 Ponmocup, the full story: A giant hiding in the shadows
Ponmocup is one of the most successful and longest running botnets of the past decade. First detected in 2006, as Vundo or Virtumonde, and detected as Ponmocup starting in 2011, we believe this is one of the most underestimated botnets still unde... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0666
ATT&CK Technique Name:Gelsemium
Gelsemium can set persistence with a Registry run key.[103] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0659
ATT&CK Technique Name:Diavol
Diavol can collect the username from a compromised host.[49] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0127
ATT&CK Technique Name:BBSRAT
BBSRAT has been seen loaded into msiexec.exe through process hollowing to hide its execution.[14] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0455
ATT&CK Technique Name:Metamorfo
Metamorfo has performed process name checks and has monitored applications.[171] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0049
ATT&CK Technique Name:OilRig
OilRig has embedded a macro within spearphishing attachments that has been made up of both a VBScript and a PowerShell script.[4] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:T1204.001
ATT&CK Technique Name:Malicious Link
An adversary may rely upon a user clicking a malicious link in order to gain execution. Users may be subjected to social engineering to get them to click on a link that will lead to code execution. This user action will typically be observed as follow-on behavior... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0253
ATT&CK Technique Name:RunningRAT
RunningRAT captures keystrokes and sends them back to the C2 server.[162] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0064
ATT&CK Technique Name:APT33
APT33 has created a scheduled task to execute a .vbe file multiple times a day.[15] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:T1199
ATT&CK Technique Name:Trusted Relationship
Adversaries may breach or otherwise leverage organizations who have access to intended victims. Access through trusted third party relationship abuses an existing connection that may not be protected or receives less scrutiny than standard mechanisms of gaining... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0572
ATT&CK Technique Name:Caterpillar WebShell
Caterpillar WebShell has a module to use a port scanner on a system.[14] | secon |
titleblackhat:us-18 Legal Liability for IOT Cybersecurity Vulnerabilities
There has been much discussion of "software liability," and whether new laws are needed to encourage or require safer software. My presentation will discuss how -- regardless of whether new laws are passed -- a tidal wave of litigation over defec... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M1032
ATT&CK Technique Name:Multi-factor Authentication
Use multi-factor authentication for user and privileged accounts. | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0012
ATT&CK Technique Name:Darkhotel
Darkhotel has searched for anti-malware strings and anti-virus processes running on the system.[27][28] | secon |
title:blackhat:asia-22 Unix Domain Socket: A Hidden Door Leading to Privilege Escalation in the Android Ecosystem
Unix domain socket (UDS) is an important inter-process communication (IPC) mechanism in the Android ecosystem. It can transfer IPC data safely with its access control strategies. In general, third-party app... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0260
ATT&CK Technique Name:InvisiMole
InvisiMole can capture keystrokes on a compromised host.[82] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G1012
ATT&CK Technique Name:CURIUM
CURIUM has lured users into opening malicious files delivered via social media.[64] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0169
ATT&CK Technique Name:RawPOS
RawPOS installs itself as a service to maintain persistence.[101][102][103] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0128
ATT&CK Technique Name:ZIRCONIUM
ZIRCONIUM has used Dropbox for C2 allowing upload and download of files as well as execution of arbitrary commands.[52][53] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0605
ATT&CK Technique Name:EKANS
EKANS performs a DNS lookup of an internal domain name associated with its target network to identify if it was deployed on the intended system. [3] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0386
ATT&CK Technique Name:Ursnif
Ursnif has used strings from legitimate system files and existing folders for its file, folder, and Registry entry names.[173] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0491
ATT&CK Technique Name:StrongPity
StrongPity has been bundled with legitimate software installation files for disguise.[127] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0501
ATT&CK Technique Name:PipeMon
PipeMon can attempt to gain administrative privileges using token impersonation.[10] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M1048
ATT&CK Technique Name:Application Isolation and Sandboxing
Ensure all COM alerts and Protected View are enabled.[20] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M1031
ATT&CK Technique Name:Network Intrusion Prevention
Network intrusion detection and prevention systems that can identify traffic patterns indicative of AiTM activity can be used to mitigate activity at the network level. | secon |
titleblackhat:us-22 Let's Dance in the Cache - Destabilizing Hash Table on Microsoft IIS
Hash Table, as the most fundamental Data Structure in Computer Science, is extensively applied in Software Architecture to store data in an associative manner. However, its architecture makes it prone to Collision Attacks. To d... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0087
ATT&CK Technique Name:Hi-Zor
Hi-Zor executes using regsvr32.exe called from the Registry Run Keys / Startup Folder persistence mechanism.[21] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M1053
ATT&CK Technique Name:Data Backup
Consider implementing IT disaster recovery plans that contain procedures for taking regular data backups that can be used to restore organizational data.[43] Ensure backups are stored off system and is protected from common methods adversaries may use to gain access and... | secon |
titleblackhat:us-23 Core Escalation: Unleashing the Power of Cross-Core Attacks on Heterogeneous System
As features of smartphones continue to advance, their SoCs become increasingly complex. In addition to the Application Processor (AP), the SoC also runs other cores such as baseband, camera, sensor hub and low power ... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0143
ATT&CK Technique Name:Flame
Flame can use MS10-061 to exploit a print spooler vulnerability in a remote system with a shared printer in order to move laterally.[18][19] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0105
ATT&CK Technique Name:DarkVishnya
DarkVishnya used DameWare Mini Remote Control for lateral movement.[12] | secon |
title:blackhat:asia-21 Hey, You, Get off My Private Data: Do Apps Respect Your Privacy as They Claim?
In recent years, we have witnessed many major companies being punished by regulators and legislations due to violation of personal data privacy. Some of the violations may be caused by misunderstandings or even complet... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0161
ATT&CK Technique Name:XAgentOSX
XAgentOSX contains the getProcessList function to run ps aux to get running processes.[276] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0078
ATT&CK Technique Name:Psylo
Psylo has a command to conduct timestomping by setting a specified file’s timestamps to match those of a system file in the System32 directory.[45] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0069
ATT&CK Technique Name:MuddyWater
MuddyWater has used scheduled tasks to establish persistence.[112] | secon |
title:blackhat:us-18 Back to the Future: A Radical Insecure Design of KVM on ARM
In ARM there are certain instructions that generates exception. Such instructions are typically executed to request a service from software that runs at a higher privilege level. From the OS kernel (EL1), software can call the Hypervisor (... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:C0017
ATT&CK Technique Name:C0017
During C0017, APT41 used a ConfuserEx obfuscated BADPOTATO exploit to abuse named-pipe impersonation for local NT AUTHORITY\SYSTEM privilege escalation.[6] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S1046
ATT&CK Technique Name:PowGoop
PowGoop has the ability to use PowerShell scripts to execute commands.[160] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0546
ATT&CK Technique Name:SharpStage
SharpStage has the ability to download and execute additional payloads via a DropBox API.[153][154] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G1004
ATT&CK Technique Name:LAPSUS$
LAPSUS$ has created global admin accounts in the targeted organization's cloud instances to gain persistence.[8] | secon |
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