text stringlengths 100 9.93M | category stringclasses 11
values |
|---|---|
ATT&CK ID:G0082
ATT&CK Technique Name:APT38
APT38 has used a custom MBR wiper named BOOTWRECK to render systems inoperable.[9] | secon |
title:blackhat:asia-19 NetSpectre: A Truly Remote Spectre Variant
Modern processors use branch prediction and speculative execution to increase their performance. Since January 2018, with the publication of Spectre attacks, we have seen that speculative execution can be abused to leak confidential information. By induc... | secon |
title:blackhat:us-20 Remote Timing Attacks on TPMs, AKA TPM-Fail
Trusted Platform Module (TPM) serves as a hardware-based root of trust that protects cryptographic keys from privileged systems and physical adversaries. These devices are generally based on a cryptographic coprocessor such as Arm SecurCore and can be fou... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0012
ATT&CK Technique Name:Darkhotel
Darkhotel used embedded iframes on hotel login portals to redirect selected victims to download malware.[21] | secon |
title:blackhat:eu-22 Cross-Contract Ricochet Attacks & Off-Chain-On-Chain Manipulation of Billion Dollar NFT Collections
The enticing narrative promised by the Ethereum blockchain is to be a decentralized world-computer within which utility based NFTs are an integral piece of the story. In this presentation, we will lo... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0583
ATT&CK Technique Name:Pysa
Pysa can perform OS credential dumping using Mimikatz.[77] | secon |
title:blackhat:us-22 Breakfast
Breakfast will be served in Shoreline (South Convention Center, Level 2) at 8:00 AM - 9:00 AM. Please wear your badge. Open to Briefings pass holders. | secon |
title:blackhat:us-20 Locknote: Conclusions and Key Takeaways from Day 1
At the end of day one of this year's virtual conference, join Black Hat Review Board members Chris Eng, Daniel Cuthbert, Marina Krotofil, and Natalie Silvanovich for an insightful conversation on the most pressing issues facing the InfoSec communit... | secon |
title:botconf2017 Malware Uncertainty Principle: an Alteration of Malware Behavior by Close Observation
During the last couple of years there has been an important surge on the use of HTTPs by malware. The exact reason for this increase is not completely understood yet, but it is hypothesized that it was forced by orga... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:C0001
ATT&CK Technique Name:Frankenstein
During Frankenstein, the threat actors used Empire to automatically gather the username, domain name, machine name, and other system information.[12] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0559
ATT&CK Technique Name:SUNBURST
SUNBURST collected the username from a compromised host.[183][184] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0365
ATT&CK Technique Name:Olympic Destroyer
Olympic Destroyer overwrites files locally and on remote shares.[6][23] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0480
ATT&CK Technique Name:Cerberus
Cerberus can obtain a list of installed applications.[6] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0673
ATT&CK Technique Name:DarkWatchman
DarkWatchman has collected the username from a victim machine.[46] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0001
ATT&CK Technique Name:Trojan.Mebromi
Trojan.Mebromi performs BIOS modification and can download and execute a file as well as protect itself from removal.[6] | secon |
titleblackhat:eu-18 RustZone: Writing Trusted Applications in Rust
Trusted Execution Environments (TEEs) are present in many devices today, and are used to perform security critical computation in an isolated environment. ARM's TrustZone is one of the most widely used TEEs in the world today, present in nearly every mo... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M1018
ATT&CK Technique Name:User Account Management
Ensure that user accounts with administrative rights follow best practices, including use of privileged access workstations, Just in Time/Just Enough Administration (JIT/JEA), and strong authentication. Reduce the number of users that are members of highly p... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M1032
ATT&CK Technique Name:Multi-factor Authentication
Ensure that MFA and MFA policies and requirements are properly implemented for existing and deactivated or dormant accounts and devices. If possible, consider configuring MFA solutions to "fail closed" rather than grant access in case of serious errors. | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0236
ATT&CK Technique Name:Kwampirs
Kwampirs decrypts and extracts a copy of its main DLL payload when executing.[130] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0154
ATT&CK Technique Name:Cobalt Strike
Cobalt Strike has the ability to load DLLs via reflective injection.[13][14] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M1042
ATT&CK Technique Name:Disable or Remove Feature or Program
This feature can be disabled entirely with the following terminal command: defaults write -g ApplePersistence -bool no. | secon |
title:blackhat:eu-18 PASTA: Portable Automotive Security Testbed with Adaptability
For accelerating the development of sophisticated driving-assist technologies such as automated driving, securing vehicles against cyberattacks is challenging. To promote the development of security-measurement methods, a company's elect... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0129
ATT&CK Technique Name:Mustang Panda
Mustang Panda has downloaded additional executables following the initial infection stage.[308] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0069
ATT&CK Technique Name:MuddyWater
MuddyWater has used malware that leveraged rundll32.exe in a Registry Run key to execute a .dll.[68] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0094
ATT&CK Technique Name:Kimsuky
Kimsuky has staged collected data files under C:\Program Files\Common Files\System\Ole DB\.[45][46] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0032
ATT&CK Technique Name:Lazarus Group
Lazarus Group has used a custom secure delete function to overwrite file contents with data from heap memory.[21] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0633
ATT&CK Technique Name:Sliver
Sliver can support C2 communications over DNS.[60][61][62] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0037
ATT&CK Technique Name:FIN6
FIN6 has used Registry Run keys to establish persistence for its downloader tools known as HARDTACK and SHIPBREAD.[91] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:T1603
ATT&CK Technique Name:Scheduled Task/Job
Adversaries may abuse task scheduling functionality to facilitate initial or recurring execution of malicious code. On Android and iOS, APIs and libraries exist to facilitate scheduling tasks to execute at a specified date, time, or interval. | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0093
ATT&CK Technique Name:Backdoor.Oldrea
Backdoor.Oldrea can download additional modules from C2.[49] | secon |
title:blackhat:us-19 Securing Apps in the Open-By-Default Cloud
Services created in cloud environments like GCP or AWS are open to the internet by default. This is a problem that compounds in a workplace where developers are empowered to create new microservices faster than a security team can review them. Even if all ... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0073
ATT&CK Technique Name:APT19
APT19 collected system architecture information. APT19 used an HTTP malware variant and a Port 22 malware variant to gather the hostname and CPU information from the victim’s machine.[21][22] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0164
ATT&CK Technique Name:TDTESS
After creating a new service for persistence, TDTESS sets the file creation time for the service to the creation time of the victim's legitimate svchost.exe file.[52] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0634
ATT&CK Technique Name:EnvyScout
EnvyScout has been distributed via spearphishing as an email attachment.[88] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0044
ATT&CK Technique Name:JHUHUGIT
The JHUHUGIT dropper can delete itself from the victim. Another JHUHUGIT variant has the capability to delete specified files.[114][115] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S1018
ATT&CK Technique Name:Saint Bot
Saint Bot has used regsvr32 to execute scripts.[37][38] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0351
ATT&CK Technique Name:Cannon
Cannon can obtain a list of processes running on the system.[49][50] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0692
ATT&CK Technique Name:SILENTTRINITY
SILENTTRINITY can enumerate processes, including properties to determine if they have the Common Language Runtime (CLR) loaded.[229] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0464
ATT&CK Technique Name:SYSCON
SYSCON has been executed by luring victims to open malicious e-mail attachments.[224] | secon |
titleblackhat:us-20 OTRazor: Static Code Analysis for Vulnerability Discovery in Industrial Automation Scripts
In this talk, we delve into industrial robot programming, focusing on the security issues arising from the design and implementation choices of these platforms.Industrial robot manufacturers provide proprietar... | secon |
titleblackhat:asia-23 You Can Run, but You Can't Hide - Finding the Footprints of Hidden Shellcode
Memory scanning is a defensive necessity on Windows systems. Microsoft has not provided executable memory manager kernel callbacks and user-mode hooks are fragile, so defenders have deployed periodic memory scanning t... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0022
ATT&CK Technique Name:APT3
APT3 has sent spearphishing emails containing malicious links.[14] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M1041
ATT&CK Technique Name:Encrypt Sensitive Information
Ensure that all wired and/or wireless traffic is encrypted appropriately. Use best practices for authentication protocols, such as Kerberos, and ensure web traffic that may contain credentials is protected by SSL/TLS. | secon |
title:blackhat:eu-21 ChaosDB: How We Hacked Databases of Thousands of Azure Customers
In August 2021, the Wiz Research Team uncovered ChaosDB - a critical cross-tenant vulnerability in Azure Cosmos DB, Azure's flagship managed database solution which is used by countless organizations. This vulnerability is every comp... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S1039
ATT&CK Technique Name:Bumblebee
Bumblebee can create a Visual Basic script to enable persistence.[22][23] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0011
ATT&CK Technique Name:PittyTiger
PittyTiger attempts to obtain legitimate credentials during operations.[52] | secon |
titleblackhat:us-18 Stop that Release, There's a Vulnerability!
Software companies can have hundreds of software products in-market at any one time, all requiring support and security fixes with tight release timelines or no releases planned at all. At the same time, the velocity of open source vulnerabilities that rap... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0253
ATT&CK Technique Name:RunningRAT
RunningRAT contains code to delete files from the victim’s machine.[86] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0028
ATT&CK Technique Name:SHIPSHAPE
SHIPSHAPE achieves persistence by creating a shortcut in the Startup folder.[39] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0174
ATT&CK Technique Name:Responder
Responder captures hashes and credentials that are sent to the system after the name services have been poisoned.[26] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0641
ATT&CK Technique Name:Kobalos
Kobalos can modify timestamps of replaced files, such as ssh with the added credential stealer or sshd used to deploy Kobalos.[31] | secon |
titleblackhat:us-21 HTTP/2: The Sequel is Always Worse
HTTP/2 is easily mistaken for a transport-layer protocol that can be swapped in with zero security implications for the website behind it. Two years ago, I presented HTTP Desync Attacks and kicked off a wave of request smuggling, but HTTP/2 escaped serious analysis... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S1017
ATT&CK Technique Name:OutSteel
OutSteel can collect information from a compromised host.[134] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G1007
ATT&CK Technique Name:Aoqin Dragon
Aoqin Dragon has lured victims into opening weaponized documents, fake external drives, and fake antivirus to execute malicious payloads.[6] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0113
ATT&CK Technique Name:Prikormka
Prikormka adds itself to a Registry Run key with the name guidVGA or guidVSA.[204] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0534
ATT&CK Technique Name:Bazar
Bazar can decrypt downloaded payloads. Bazar also resolves strings and other artifacts at runtime.[29][30] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0012
ATT&CK Technique Name:PoisonIvy
PoisonIvy creates a Registry subkey that registers a new service. PoisonIvy also creates a Registry entry modifying the Logical Disk Manager service to point to a malicious DLL dropped to disk.[94] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:T1564.005
ATT&CK Technique Name:Hidden File System
Adversaries may use a hidden file system to conceal malicious activity from users and security tools. File systems provide a structure to store and access data from physical storage. Typically, a user engages with a file system through applications that allow... | secon |
title:blackhat:eu-21 Exploiting CSP in WebKit to Break Authentication and Authorization
When it comes to modern web applications, browsers are the first line of defense. While built-in security features that come compiled with browsers are responsible for preventing a wide array of attacks, any seemingly trivial mistak... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0263
ATT&CK Technique Name:TYPEFRAME
One TYPEFRAME variant decrypts an archive using an RC4 key, then decompresses and installs the decrypted malicious DLL module. Another variant decodes the embedded file by XORing it with the value "0x35".[241] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:T1596.001
ATT&CK Technique Name:DNS/Passive DNS
Adversaries may search DNS data for information about victims that can be used during targeting. DNS information may include a variety of details, including registered name servers as well as records that outline addressing for a target’s subdomains, mail server... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0027
ATT&CK Technique Name:Threat Group-3390
Threat Group-3390 has compromised third party service providers to gain access to victim's environments.[16] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0663
ATT&CK Technique Name:SysUpdate
SysUpdate can deobfuscate packed binaries in memory.[113] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0484
ATT&CK Technique Name:Carberp
Carberp's passw.plug plugin can gather account information from multiple instant messaging, email, and social media services, as well as FTP, VNC, and VPN clients.[6] | secon |
titleblackhat:us-19 Backdooring Hardware Devices by Injecting Malicious Payloads on Microcontrollers
Throughout the years, many studies have been published addressing different ways of backdooring devices by leveraging on their own hardware components. However, most of the existing work focuses on backdooring devices b... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0114
ATT&CK Technique Name:Chimera
Chimera has used net start and net use for system service discovery.[10] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0344
ATT&CK Technique Name:Azorult
Azorult can collect the machine information, system architecture, the OS version, computer name, Windows product name, the number of CPU cores, video card information, and the system language.[37][38] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0680
ATT&CK Technique Name:LitePower
LitePower can determine if the current user has admin privileges.[101] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0013
ATT&CK Technique Name:PlugX
PlugX has a module for capturing keystrokes per process including window titles.[133] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0241
ATT&CK Technique Name:RATANKBA
RATANKBA gathers the victim’s IP address via the ipconfig -all command.[193][194] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S1065
ATT&CK Technique Name:Woody RAT
Woody RAT has suppressed all error reporting by calling SetErrorMode with 0x8007 as a parameter.[13] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0363
ATT&CK Technique Name:Empire
Empire has a dylib hijacker module that generates a malicious dylib given the path to a legitimate dylib of a vulnerable application.[8] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0079
ATT&CK Technique Name:DarkHydrus
DarkHydrus has obtained and used tools such as Mimikatz, Empire, and Cobalt Strike.[41] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0034
ATT&CK Technique Name:Sandworm Team
Sandworm Team has used Dropbear SSH with a hardcoded backdoor password to maintain persistence within the target network. Sandworm Team has also used VPN tunnels established in legitimate software company infrastructure to gain access to internal networks of that soft... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S1055
ATT&CK Technique Name:SharkBot
SharkBot can use HTTP to send C2 messages to infected devices.[27] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0089
ATT&CK Technique Name:BlackEnergy
BlackEnergy attempts to bypass default User Access Control (UAC) settings by exploiting a backward-compatibility setting found in Windows 7 and later.[17] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:C0013
ATT&CK Technique Name:Operation Sharpshooter
For Operation Sharpshooter, the threat actors used the Rising Sun modular backdoor.[27] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0082
ATT&CK Technique Name:APT38
APT38 installed a port monitoring tool, MAPMAKER, to print the active TCP connections on the local system.[12] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G1001
ATT&CK Technique Name:HEXANE
HEXANE has used cloud services, including OneDrive, for data exfiltration.[8] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0491
ATT&CK Technique Name:StrongPity
StrongPity can download files to specified targets.[430] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0467
ATT&CK Technique Name:TajMahal
TajMahal has used an encrypted Virtual File System to store plugins.[325] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M1043
ATT&CK Technique Name:Credential Access Protection
Some embedded network devices are capable of storing passwords for local accounts in either plain-text or encrypted formats. Ensure that, where available, local passwords are always encrypted, per vendor recommendations. [10] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0599
ATT&CK Technique Name:Kinsing
Kinsing has used crontab to download and run shell scripts every minute to ensure persistence.[8] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M1031
ATT&CK Technique Name:Network Intrusion Prevention
Network intrusion detection and prevention systems that use network signatures to identify traffic for specific adversary malware can be used to mitigate activity at the network level. Signatures are often for unique indicators within protocols and may ... | secon |
titleblackhat:asia-22 AutoSpear: Towards Automatically Bypassing and Inspecting Web Application Firewalls
The web application firewall (WAF) is widely employed to protect web applications like websites from various web attacks like SQL injection (SQLi) and cross-site-scripting (XSS). In particular, the WAF-as-a-service... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:C0024
ATT&CK Technique Name:SolarWinds Compromise
During the SolarWinds Compromise, APT29 staged data and files in password-protected archives on a victim's OWA server.[11] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0486
ATT&CK Technique Name:Bonadan
Bonadan can use the ps command to discover other cryptocurrency miners active on the system.[40] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0087
ATT&CK Technique Name:APT39
APT39 has used PowerShell to execute malicious code.[24][25] | secon |
title:blackhat:asia-23 Two Bugs With One PoC: Rooting Pixel 6 From Android 12 to Android 13
Pixel 6 is the first phone to rock the new Tensor chip, fully designed and developed by Google. Shipping with Linux kernel 5.10, there are many new changes and challenges for rooting. However, there is little change in the attac... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0603
ATT&CK Technique Name:Stuxnet
Stuxnet attempts to access network resources with a domain account’s credentials.[22] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0659
ATT&CK Technique Name:Diavol
Diavol has Base64 encoded the RSA public key used for encrypting files.[100] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0125
ATT&CK Technique Name:HAFNIUM
HAFNIUM has collected e-mail addresses for users they intended to target.[10] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S1066
ATT&CK Technique Name:DarkTortilla
DarkTortilla has used the WshShortcut COM object to create a .lnk shortcut file in the Windows startup folder.[5] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0636
ATT&CK Technique Name:VaporRage
VaporRage has the ability to check for the presence of a specific DLL and terminate if it is not found.[5] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:T1484.002
ATT&CK Technique Name:Domain Trust Modification
Adversaries may add new domain trusts or modify the properties of existing domain trusts to evade defenses and/or elevate privileges. Domain trust details, such as whether or not a domain is federated, allow authentication and authorization properties ... | secon |
title:blackhat:asia-21 Mem2Img: Memory-Resident Malware Detection via Convolution Neural Network
Process injection is a widely used defensive evasion technique commonly used for malware and fileless adversary transactions and requires running custom code in the address space of another process. Process injection improv... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:C0014
ATT&CK Technique Name:Operation Wocao
During Operation Wocao, threat actors used a custom proxy tool called "Agent" which has support for multiple hops.[34] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0011
ATT&CK Technique Name:Taidoor
Taidoor can query the Registry on compromised hosts using RegQueryValueExA.[92] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0377
ATT&CK Technique Name:Ebury
Ebury can deactivate PAM modules to tamper with the sshd configuration.[6] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0316
ATT&CK Technique Name:Pegasus for Android
Pegasus for Android listens for the BOOT_COMPLETED broadcast intent in order to maintain persistence and activate its functionality at device boot time.[12] | secon |
Subsets and Splits
No community queries yet
The top public SQL queries from the community will appear here once available.