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ATT&CK ID:G0027
ATT&CK Technique Name:Threat Group-3390
Threat Group-3390 has exploited MS17-010 to move laterally to other systems on the network.[33] | secon |
title:blackhat:asia-20 Attacking and Defending Machine Learning Applications of Public Cloud
In recent years, Machine Learning (ML) techniques have been extensively deployed for computer vision tasks, particularly visual classification problems, where new algorithms reported to achieve or even surpass the human perform... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0120
ATT&CK Technique Name:Evilnum
Evilnum has used a component called TerraLoader to check certain hardware and file information to detect sandboxed environments. [19] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0087
ATT&CK Technique Name:APT39
APT39 has sent spearphishing emails in an attempt to lure users to click on a malicious link.[12][13] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0327
ATT&CK Technique Name:Skygofree
Skygofree has a capability to obtain files from other installed applications.[15] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0603
ATT&CK Technique Name:Stuxnet
Stuxnet checks for specific operating systems on 32-bit machines, Registry keys, and dates for vulnerabilities, and will exit execution if the values are not met.[9] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0083
ATT&CK Technique Name:Misdat
Misdat is capable of providing shell functionality to the attacker to execute commands.[221] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0006
ATT&CK Technique Name:APT1
APT1 has sent spearphishing emails containing hyperlinks to malicious files.[6] | secon |
title:botconf2018 Mirai: Beyond the Aftermath
Two years have passed since Mirai unleashed its wrath to the world by targeting high profile victims. Many things have happened since then, the good, the author responsible has already been convicted, the bad, source code was released to the public, and the not so bad, orga... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0603
ATT&CK Technique Name:Stuxnet
Stuxnet uses a thread to monitor a data block DB890 of sequence A or B. This thread is constantly running and probing this block (every 5 minutes). On an infected PLC, if block DB890 is found and contains a special magic value (used by Stuxnet to identify his own block DB89... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0632
ATT&CK Technique Name:GrimAgent
GrimAgent has the ability to use HTTP for C2 communications.[148] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M1047
ATT&CK Technique Name:Audit
Periodically review the hybrid identity solution in use for any discrepancies. For example, review all PTA agents in the Azure Management Portal to identify any unwanted or unapproved ones.[5] If ADFS is in use, review DLLs and executable files in the AD FS and Global Assembl... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:C0002
ATT&CK Technique Name:Night Dragon
During Night Dragon, threat actors used a DLL that included an XOR-encoded section.[229] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0182
ATT&CK Technique Name:FinFisher
FinFisher obtains the hardware device list and checks if the MD5 of the vendor ID is equal to a predefined list in order to check for sandbox/virtualized environments.[21] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0635
ATT&CK Technique Name:BoomBox
BoomBox can establish persistence by writing the Registry value MicroNativeCacheSvc to HKCU\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run.[48] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:T1406.002
ATT&CK Technique Name:Software Packing
Adversaries may perform software packing to conceal their code. Software packing is a method of compressing or encrypting an executable. Packing an executable changes the file signature in an attempt to avoid signature-based detection. Most decompression techni... | secon |
titleblackhat:asia-22 Cooper Knows the Shortest Stave: Finding 134 Bugs in the Binding Code of Scripting Languages with Cooperative Mutation
Scripting languages like JavaScript are being integrated into commercial software to provide unified interfaces. For example, Adobe Acrobat accepts JavaScript to dynamically manip... | secon |
titleblackhat:eu-22 Practically-exploitable Cryptographic Vulnerabilities in Matrix
We report several practically-exploitable cryptographic vulnerabilities in the Matrix standard for federated realtime communication and its flagship client and prototype implementation, Element. These, together, invalidate the confidenti... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S1016
ATT&CK Technique Name:MacMa
MacMa can collect IP addresses from a compromised host.[136] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0502
ATT&CK Technique Name:Drovorub
Drovorub can execute arbitrary commands as root on a compromised system.[15] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0660
ATT&CK Technique Name:Clambling
Clambling has the ability to capture and store clipboard data.[16][17] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0154
ATT&CK Technique Name:Cobalt Strike
Cobalt Strike can steal access tokens from exiting processes.[4][5] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0631
ATT&CK Technique Name:Chaes
Chaes has used search order hijacking to load a malicious DLL.[15] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M0948
ATT&CK Technique Name:Application Isolation and Sandboxing
Make it difficult for adversaries to advance their operation through exploitation of undiscovered or unpatched vulnerabilities by using sandboxing. Other types of virtualization and application microsegmentation may also mitigate the impact of s... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0487
ATT&CK Technique Name:Kessel
Kessel has collected the DNS address of the infected host.[41] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0513
ATT&CK Technique Name:LiteDuke
LiteDuke has used image files to hide its loader component.[14] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0325
ATT&CK Technique Name:Judy
Judy uses infected devices to generate fraudulent clicks on advertisements to generate revenue.[8] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0640
ATT&CK Technique Name:Avaddon
Avaddon has collected information about running processes.[16] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0447
ATT&CK Technique Name:Lokibot
Lokibot embedded the commands schtasks /Run /TN \Microsoft\Windows\DiskCleanup\SilentCleanup /I inside a batch script.[95] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0634
ATT&CK Technique Name:EnvyScout
EnvyScout can use hidden directories and files to hide malicious executables.[18] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0683
ATT&CK Technique Name:Peirates
Peirates can gain a reverse shell on a host node by mounting the Kubernetes hostPath.[10] | secon |
titleblackhat:eu-19 How to Break PDF Encryption
PDF is among the most widely used document formats worldwide. To ensure confidentiality, PDF supports document encryption. In this talk, we analyze PDF encryption and show two novel techniques for breaking the confidentiality of encrypted documents. First, we abuse the PD... | secon |
titleblackhat:us-21 A New Class of DNS Vulnerabilities Affecting Many DNS-as-Service Platforms
We present a novel class of DNS vulnerabilities that affect multiple DNS-as-a-Service (DNSaaS) providers. The vulnerabilities have been proven and successfully exploited on three major cloud providers including AWS Route 53 a... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S1066
ATT&CK Technique Name:DarkTortilla
DarkTortilla can use cmd.exe to add registry keys for persistence.[98] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0062
ATT&CK Technique Name:TA459
TA459 has targeted victims using spearphishing emails with malicious Microsoft Word attachments.[212] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0570
ATT&CK Technique Name:BitPaymer
BitPaymer can enumerate existing Windows services on the host that are configured to run as LocalSystem.[6] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0049
ATT&CK Technique Name:OilRig
OilRig communicated with its command and control using HTTP requests. [3] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0182
ATT&CK Technique Name:FinFisher
FinFisher has used the KernelCallbackTable to hijack the execution flow of a process by replacing the __fnDWORD function with the address of a created Asynchronous Procedure Call stub routine.[2] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0102
ATT&CK Technique Name:Wizard Spider
Wizard Spider has used cmd.exe to execute commands on a victim's machine.[352] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:T1037.005
ATT&CK Technique Name:Startup Items
Adversaries may use startup items automatically executed at boot initialization to establish persistence. Startup items execute during the final phase of the boot process and contain shell scripts or other executable files along with configuration information used... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G1003
ATT&CK Technique Name:Ember Bear
Ember Bear has sent spearphishing emails containing malicious attachments in the form of PDFs, Word documents, JavaScript files, and Control Panel File (CPL) executables.[78] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0198
ATT&CK Technique Name:NETWIRE
NETWIRE has been spread via e-mail campaigns utilizing malicious links.[56] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0397
ATT&CK Technique Name:LoJax
LoJax is a UEFI BIOS rootkit deployed to persist remote access software on some targeted systems.[5] | secon |
titleblackhat:us-20 The Dark Side of the Cloud - How a Lack of EMR Security Controls Helped Amplify the Opioid Crisis
The Opioid crisis has caused mass addiction of prescription painkillers. Tens of thousands have died from this. Families have been broken apart. Children have been born addicted. It has stretched the so... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0525
ATT&CK Technique Name:Android/AdDisplay.Ashas
Android/AdDisplay.Ashas can collect information about the device including device type, OS version, language, free storage space, battery status, device root, and if developer mode is enabled.[3] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0625
ATT&CK Technique Name:Cuba
Cuba can discover shared resources using the NetShareEnum API call.[26] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0641
ATT&CK Technique Name:Kobalos
Kobalos's post-authentication communication channel uses a 32-byte-long password with RC4 for inbound and outbound traffic.[74][75] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0034
ATT&CK Technique Name:Sandworm Team
Sandworm Team has established social media accounts to disseminate victim internal-only documents and other sensitive data.[16] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0223
ATT&CK Technique Name:POWERSTATS
POWERSTATS has established persistence through a scheduled task using the command "C:\Windows\system32\schtasks.exe" /Create /F /SC DAILY /ST 12:00 /TN MicrosoftEdge /TR "c:\Windows\system32\wscript.exe C:\Windows\temp\Windows.vbe".[131] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:T1547.001
ATT&CK Technique Name:Registry Run Keys / Startup Folder
Adversaries may achieve persistence by adding a program to a startup folder or referencing it with a Registry run key. Adding an entry to the "run keys" in the Registry or startup folder will cause the program referenced to be executed when a ... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M0947
ATT&CK Technique Name:Audit
Audit the integrity of PLC system and application code functionality, such as the manipulation of standard function blocks (e.g., Organizational Blocks) that manage the execution of application logic programs. [3] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G1001
ATT&CK Technique Name:HEXANE
HEXANE has registered and operated domains for campaigns, often using a security or web technology theme or impersonating the targeted organization.[30][31][32] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0091
ATT&CK Technique Name:Silence
Silence has injected a DLL library containing a Trojan into the fwmain32.exe process.[56] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0046
ATT&CK Technique Name:FIN7
FIN7 has exfiltrated stolen data to the MEGA file sharing site.[12] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0038
ATT&CK Technique Name:Duqu
The discovery modules used with Duqu can collect information on process details.[84] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0363
ATT&CK Technique Name:Empire
Empire contains an implementation of Mimikatz to gather credentials from memory.[28] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:C0005
ATT&CK Technique Name:Operation Spalax
During Operation Spalax, the threat actors used droppers that would run anti-analysis checks before executing malware on a compromised host.[18] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0094
ATT&CK Technique Name:Kimsuky
Kimsuky has set auto-forward rules on victim's e-mail accounts.[6] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0380
ATT&CK Technique Name:StoneDrill
StoneDrill has looked in the registry to find the default browser path.[87] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0117
ATT&CK Technique Name:Fox Kitten
Fox Kitten has used valid credentials with various services during lateral movement.[34] | secon |
title:blackhat:asia-19 How to Survive the Hardware Assisted Control-Flow Integrity Enforcement
Control-flow hijacking is a crucial step of modern vulnerability exploitation, which helps to convert a memory safety vulnerability into arbitrary code execution. The security industry has put in great efforts in combating th... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:T1406.001
ATT&CK Technique Name:Steganography
Adversaries may use steganography techniques in order to prevent the detection of hidden information. Steganographic techniques can be used to hide data in digital media such as images, audio tracks, video clips, or text files. | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0455
ATT&CK Technique Name:Metamorfo
Metamorfo has a command to launch a keylogger and capture keystrokes on the victim’s machine.[115][116] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0016
ATT&CK Technique Name:APT29
APT29 has gained access to a global administrator account in Azure AD.[5] | secon |
title:blackhat:us-18 I, for One, Welcome Our New Power Analysis Overlords
Despite high-profile failures, there can be no doubt that embedded security is improving. Yet, several dark clouds loom on the horizon – including side channel attacks and fault attacks. For many, they remain vague and undefined, with complicated... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0148
ATT&CK Technique Name:RTM
RTM can record keystrokes from both the keyboard and virtual keyboard.[160][161] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0035
ATT&CK Technique Name:Dragonfly
Dragonfly has dropped and executed SecretsDump to dump password hashes.[7] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0452
ATT&CK Technique Name:USBferry
USBferry can use net user to gather information about local accounts.[50] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0386
ATT&CK Technique Name:Ursnif
Ursnif has copied itself to and infected removable drives for propagation.[28][29] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0379
ATT&CK Technique Name:Revenge RAT
Revenge RAT collects the IP address and MAC address from the system.[197] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:C0006
ATT&CK Technique Name:Operation Honeybee
During Operation Honeybee, the threat actors used a malicious DLL to search for files with specific keywords.[217] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0274
ATT&CK Technique Name:Calisto
Calisto adds a .plist file to the /Library/LaunchAgents folder to maintain persistence.[10] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0126
ATT&CK Technique Name:ComRAT
ComRAT has used a scheduled task to launch its PowerShell loader.[41][42] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M1032
ATT&CK Technique Name:Multi-factor Authentication
Require MFA for all delegated administrator accounts.[17] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:C0022
ATT&CK Technique Name:Operation Dream Job
During Operation Dream Job, Lazarus Group targeted specific individuals within an organization with tailored job vacancy announcements.[5][6] | secon |
titleblackhat:us-21 The Kitten that Charmed Me: The 9 Lives of a Nation State Attacker
When our intel team talks about human error, we usually focus on the victim of a security incident. But in the investigation we ran in the past year, we flipped the script to highlight how the continued operational security errors of... | secon |
title:blackhat:eu-20 Hacking Government Cybersecurity
This session delivered by Pete Cooper, the Deputy Director for Cyber Defence at the Cabinet Office will focus on his perspectives and the latest developments in cyber security across government and beyond. From understanding and managing risk at government scale, to... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0111
ATT&CK Technique Name:schtasks
schtasks is used to schedule tasks on a Windows system to run at a specific date and time.[155] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0250
ATT&CK Technique Name:Koadic
Koadic has 2 methods for elevating integrity. It can bypass UAC through eventvwr.exe and sdclt.exe.[38] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0663
ATT&CK Technique Name:SysUpdate
SysUpdate has exfiltrated data over its C2 channel.[129] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0032
ATT&CK Technique Name:Lazarus Group
Lazarus Group keylogger KiloAlfa obtains user tokens from interactive sessions to execute itself with API call CreateProcessAsUserA under that user's context.[8][9] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S1015
ATT&CK Technique Name:Milan
Milan has used an executable named companycatalog.exe.config to appear benign.[4] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0448
ATT&CK Technique Name:Rising Sun
Rising Sun can detect the username of the infected host.[159] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M1047
ATT&CK Technique Name:Audit
Periodically review for new and unknown network provider DLLs within the Registry (HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Services\<NetworkProviderName>\NetworkProvider\ProviderPath).Ensure only valid network provider DLLs are registered. The name of these can be found i... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S1037
ATT&CK Technique Name:STARWHALE
STARWHALE can gather the username from an infected host.[179][180] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:T1053.007
ATT&CK Technique Name:Container Orchestration Job
Adversaries may abuse task scheduling functionality provided by container orchestration tools such as Kubernetes to schedule deployment of containers configured to execute malicious code. Container orchestration jobs run these automated tasks at a sp... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0194
ATT&CK Technique Name:PowerSploit
PowerSploit contains a collection of Exfiltration modules that can harvest credentials from Windows vault credential objects.[11][12] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0492
ATT&CK Technique Name:CookieMiner
CookieMiner has used python scripts on the user’s system, as well as the Python variant of the Empire agent, EmPyre.[14] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:T1556.003
ATT&CK Technique Name:Pluggable Authentication Modules
Adversaries may modify pluggable authentication modules (PAM) to access user credentials or enable otherwise unwarranted access to accounts. PAM is a modular system of configuration files, libraries, and executable files which guide authenticati... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0082
ATT&CK Technique Name:Emissary
Emissary has the capability to execute the command net start to interact with services.[18] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M1046
ATT&CK Technique Name:Boot Integrity
Enable secure boot features to validate the digital signature of the boot environment and system image using a special purpose hardware device. If the validation check fails, the device will fail to boot preventing loading of unauthorized software. [5] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0223
ATT&CK Technique Name:POWERSTATS
POWERSTATS has used get_tasklist to discover processes on the compromised host.[207] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:T1106
ATT&CK Technique Name:Native API
Adversaries may interact with the native OS application programming interface (API) to execute behaviors. Native APIs provide a controlled means of calling low-level OS services within the kernel, such as those involving hardware/devices, memory, and processes. These nat... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0579
ATT&CK Technique Name:Waterbear
Waterbear can inject decrypted shellcode into the LanmanServer service.[67] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0607
ATT&CK Technique Name:KillDisk
KillDisk deletes Application, Security, Setup, and System Windows Event Logs.[8] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0690
ATT&CK Technique Name:Green Lambert
Green Lambert can add init.d and rc.d files in the /etc folder to establish persistence.[9][10] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:C0005
ATT&CK Technique Name:Operation Spalax
During Operation Spalax, the threat actors used droppers that would run anti-analysis checks before executing malware on a compromised host.[18] | secon |
title:blackhat:us-22 Lunch Break
Lunch will be served in Shoreline (South Convention Center, Level 2) at 12:00 PM - 1:30 PM.Please wear your badge. Open to Briefings pass holders. | secon |
ATT&CK ID:C0022
ATT&CK Technique Name:Operation Dream Job
For Operation Dream Job, Lazarus Group conducted extensive reconnaissance research on potential targets.[14] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0106
ATT&CK Technique Name:Rocke
Rocke has modified /etc/ld.so.preload to hook libc functions in order to hide the installed dropper and mining software in process lists.[22] | secon |
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