text stringlengths 100 9.93M | category stringclasses 11
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ATT&CK ID:S0409
ATT&CK Technique Name:Machete
Machete's collected data is exfiltrated over the same channel used for C2.[80] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0117
ATT&CK Technique Name:Fox Kitten
Fox Kitten has used the open source reverse proxy tools including FRPC and Go Proxy to establish connections from C2 to local servers.[14][15][16] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0625
ATT&CK Technique Name:Cuba
Cuba has used SeDebugPrivilege and AdjustTokenPrivileges to elevate privileges.[7] | secon |
title:blackhat:us-21 Legal Pitfalls to Avoid in Security Incidents
Privilege, two-track investigations, OFAC, insurance coverage, and preserving evidence... Lawyers think about this stuff from the jump in a security incident, and you should be aware of them too. Often, attorneys are brought into a security incident aft... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0032
ATT&CK Technique Name:Lazarus Group
Lazarus Group has used schtasks for persistence including through the periodic execution of a remote XSL script or a dropped VBS payload.[92][93] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0044
ATT&CK Technique Name:JHUHUGIT
JHUHUGIT has registered a Windows shell script under the Registry key HKCU\Environment\UserInitMprLogonScript to establish persistence.[6][7] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0073
ATT&CK Technique Name:APT19
APT19 used an HTTP malware variant and a Port 22 malware variant to collect the victim’s username.[9] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G1006
ATT&CK Technique Name:Earth Lusca
Earth Lusca has used PowerShell to execute commands.[79] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M0947
ATT&CK Technique Name:Audit
Provide the ability to verify the integrity of control logic or programs loaded on a controller. While techniques like CRCs and checksums are commonly used, they are not cryptographically strong and can be vulnerable to collisions. Preferably cryptographic hash functions (e.g... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0032
ATT&CK Technique Name:Lazarus Group
Lazarus Group malware IndiaIndia obtains and sends to its C2 server information about the first network interface card’s configuration, including IP address, gateways, subnet mask, DHCP information, and whether WINS is available.[127][128] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0396
ATT&CK Technique Name:EvilBunny
EvilBunny has used the API calls NtQuerySystemTime, GetSystemTimeAsFileTime, and GetTickCount to gather time metrics as part of its checks to see if the malware is running in a sandbox.[35] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:C0017
ATT&CK Technique Name:C0017
During C0017, APT41 used the Cloudflare services for C2 communications.[7] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M1033
ATT&CK Technique Name:Limit Software Installation
Restrict software installation to trusted repositories only and be cautious of orphaned software packages. | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S1055
ATT&CK Technique Name:SharkBot
SharkBot can use input injection via Accessibility Services to simulate user touch inputs, prevent applications from opening, change device settings, and bypass MFA protections.[11] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0106
ATT&CK Technique Name:Rocke
Rocke has used shell scripts which download mining executables and saves them with the filename "java".[142] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S1041
ATT&CK Technique Name:Chinoxy
The Chinoxy dropping function can initiate decryption of its config file.[51] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:T1556.004
ATT&CK Technique Name:Network Device Authentication
Adversaries may use Patch System Image to hard code a password in the operating system, thus bypassing of native authentication mechanisms for local accounts on network devices. | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0658
ATT&CK Technique Name:XCSSET
XCSSET uses AppleScript to check the host's language and location with the command user locale of (get system info).[21] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G1003
ATT&CK Technique Name:Ember Bear
Ember Bear has packed malware to help avoid detection.[38] | secon |
titleblackhat:asia-20 Kr00k: How KRACKing Amazon Echo Exposed a Billion+ Vulnerable Wi-Fi Devices
We have identified serious security weaknesses in chipsets used by a significant number of Wi-Fi capable devices. Specifically, we discovered that FullMAC Wi-Fi chipsets by Broadcom/Cypress – and possibly other manufacture... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S1028
ATT&CK Technique Name:Action RAT
Action RAT has the ability to collect the hostname, OS version, and OS architecture of an infected host.[8] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M1018
ATT&CK Technique Name:User Account Management
Limit user accounts that can load or unload device drivers by disabling SeLoadDriverPrivilege. | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M0949
ATT&CK Technique Name:Antivirus/Antimalware
Deploy anti-virus on all systems that support external email. | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0343
ATT&CK Technique Name:Exaramel for Windows
Exaramel for Windows has a command to launch a remote shell and executes commands on the victim’s machine.[118] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0430
ATT&CK Technique Name:Winnti for Linux
Winnti for Linux has used a passive listener, capable of identifying a specific magic value before executing tasking, as a secondary command and control (C2) mechanism.[14] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0149
ATT&CK Technique Name:MoonWind
MoonWind completes network communication via raw sockets.[39] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:C0014
ATT&CK Technique Name:Operation Wocao
During Operation Wocao, threat actors' proxy implementation "Agent" upgraded the socket in use to a TLS socket.[38] | secon |
title:blackhat:asia-19 Using the JIT Vulnerability to Pwn Microsoft Edge
To speed up the javascript code, the modern browser introduces the Just-In-Time(JIT) compiler to javascript engine, which is also used by the Microsoft Edge javascript engine chakra. Because the javascript is a dynamic, untyped language before JI... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:C0024
ATT&CK Technique Name:SolarWinds Compromise
During the SolarWinds Compromise, APT29 used a compromised O365 administrator account to create a new Service Principal.[11] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G1004
ATT&CK Technique Name:LAPSUS$
LAPSUS$ has targeted various collaboration tools like Slack, Teams, JIRA, Confluence, and others to hunt for exposed credentials to support privilege escalation and lateral movement.[2] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:T1120
ATT&CK Technique Name:Peripheral Device Discovery
Adversaries may attempt to gather information about attached peripheral devices and components connected to a computer system. Peripheral devices could include auxiliary resources that support a variety of functionalities such as keyboards, printers, cam... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0393
ATT&CK Technique Name:PowerStallion
PowerStallion uses PowerShell loops to iteratively check for available commands in its OneDrive C2 server.[184] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0087
ATT&CK Technique Name:APT39
APT39 has used stolen credentials to compromise Outlook Web Access (OWA).[12] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0603
ATT&CK Technique Name:Stuxnet
Stuxnet uses a driver registered as a boot start service as the main load-point.[116] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M0927
ATT&CK Technique Name:Password Policies
Review vendor documents and security alerts for potentially unknown or overlooked default credentials within existing devices | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0660
ATT&CK Technique Name:Clambling
The Clambling executable has been obfuscated when dropped on a compromised host.[78] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0650
ATT&CK Technique Name:QakBot
QakBot can modify the Registry to store its configuration information in a randomly named subkey under HKCU\Software\Microsoft.[125][126] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0013
ATT&CK Technique Name:PlugX
PlugX can be configured to use HTTP for command and control.[159][247] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:C0002
ATT&CK Technique Name:Night Dragon
During Night Dragon, threat actors used Trojans from underground hacker websites.[13] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0494
ATT&CK Technique Name:Zen
Zen can simulate user clicks on ads and system prompts to create new Google accounts.[14] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0007
ATT&CK Technique Name:APT28
APT28 has used CVE-2015-1701 to access the SYSTEM token and copy it into the current process as part of privilege escalation.[1] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S1047
ATT&CK Technique Name:Mori
Mori can use Base64 encoded JSON libraries used in C2.[57] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0468
ATT&CK Technique Name:Skidmap
Skidmap has encrypted it's main payload using 3DES.[300] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0612
ATT&CK Technique Name:WastedLocker
WastedLocker has performed DLL hijacking before execution.[37] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0128
ATT&CK Technique Name:ZIRCONIUM
ZIRCONIUM has exfiltrated files via the Dropbox API C2.[149] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0236
ATT&CK Technique Name:Kwampirs
Kwampirs creates a new service named WmiApSrvEx to establish persistence.[74] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0662
ATT&CK Technique Name:RCSession
RCSession can collect data from a compromised host.[158][44] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0530
ATT&CK Technique Name:Melcoz
Melcoz can use DLL hijacking to bypass security controls.[11] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0023
ATT&CK Technique Name:CHOPSTICK
CHOPSTICK checks for antivirus and forensics software.[18] | secon |
titleblackhat:asia-19 Attacking Browser Sandbox: Live Persistently and Prosperously
The Sandbox technique has been widely adopted in almost all web browsers and is proven effective for attack mitigation. With the consistent increase of new features in sandbox policy, it has become almost too much of an effort for attac... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0455
ATT&CK Technique Name:Metamorfo
Metamorfo has used VMProtect to pack and protect files.[58] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:T1102.002
ATT&CK Technique Name:Bidirectional Communication
Adversaries may use an existing, legitimate external Web service as a means for sending commands to and receiving output from a compromised system over the Web service channel. Compromised systems may leverage popular websites and social media to hos... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0047
ATT&CK Technique Name:Gamaredon Group
Gamaredon Group macros can scan for Microsoft Word and Excel files to inject with additional malicious macros. Gamaredon Group has also used its backdoors to automatically list interesting files (such as Office documents) found on a system.[133][134] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:C0024
ATT&CK Technique Name:SolarWinds Compromise
During the SolarWinds Compromise, APT29 used privileged accounts to replicate directory service data with domain controllers.[17][18][19] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0695
ATT&CK Technique Name:Donut
Donut can generate encrypted, compressed/encoded, or otherwise obfuscated code modules.[102] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:T1114.001
ATT&CK Technique Name:Local Email Collection
Adversaries may target user email on local systems to collect sensitive information. Files containing email data can be acquired from a user’s local system, such as Outlook storage or cache files. | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0451
ATT&CK Technique Name:LoudMiner
LoudMiner used the ps command to monitor the running processes on the system.[161] | secon |
title:blackhat:asia-23 Cloudy With a Chance of Exploits: Compromising Critical Infrastructure Through IIoT Cloud Solutions
The adoption of Industry 4.0 and IoT (IIoT) technologies into industrial business operations has brought great operational and economic benefits, but also introduced new risks and challenges. One o... | secon |
title:blackhat:asia-20 Kr00k: How KRACKing Amazon Echo Exposed a Billion+ Vulnerable Wi-Fi Devices
We have identified serious security weaknesses in chipsets used by a significant number of Wi-Fi capable devices. Specifically, we discovered that FullMAC Wi-Fi chipsets by Broadcom/Cypress – and possibly other manufactur... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0084
ATT&CK Technique Name:Gallmaker
Gallmaker obfuscated shellcode used during execution.[134] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0124
ATT&CK Technique Name:Pisloader
Pisloader obfuscates files by splitting strings into smaller sub-strings and including "garbage" strings that are never used. The malware also uses return-oriented programming (ROP) technique and single-byte XOR to obfuscate data.[251] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0036
ATT&CK Technique Name:FLASHFLOOD
FLASHFLOOD searches for interesting files (either a default or customized set of file extensions) on removable media and copies them to a staging area. The default file types copied would include data copied to the drive by SPACESHIP.[11] | secon |
title:blackhat:asia-20 3d Red Pill: A Guest-to-Host Escape on QEMU/KVM Virtio Device
As a critical para-virtualized driver platform for the hypervisor, virtio has been widely adopted in qemu/kvm virtual machine for better I/O performance. Vulnerabilities that have been explored so far fail to carry out guest-to-host e... | secon |
titleblackhat:us-20 A Decade After Stuxnet's Printer Vulnerability: Printing is Still the Stairway to Heaven
In 2010, Stuxnet, the most powerful malware in the world revealed itself, causing physical damage to Iranian nuclear enrichment centrifuges. In order to reach Iran's centrifuges, it exploited a vulnerability... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0039
ATT&CK Technique Name:Suckfly
Suckfly used legitimate account credentials that they dumped to navigate the internal victim network as though they were the legitimate account owner.[61] | secon |
title:botconf2018 Internals of a Spam Distribution Botnet
Cybercriminals use different methods to distribute malware like malicious advertisements, Exploit Kits, loaders or spam campaigns. Unless an attack is really targeted the bad guys will try to infect as many computers as possible and they need some automation for... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0002
ATT&CK Technique Name:Mimikatz
The Mimikatz credential dumper has been extended to include Skeleton Key domain controller authentication bypass functionality. The LSADUMP::ChangeNTLM and LSADUMP::SetNTLM modules can also manipulate the password hash of an account without knowing the clear text value.[11... | secon |
title:botconf2017 PWS, Common, Ugly but Effective
PassWord Stealer (PWS) are around since more than a decade now. They are legions. Some like Pony, aka FareIT are well known. But nobody takes really time to explain what is around, what it is capable of and how this little industry works. However, they are still a commo... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0458
ATT&CK Technique Name:Ramsay
Ramsay has been distributed through spearphishing emails with malicious attachments.[189] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0027
ATT&CK Technique Name:Threat Group-3390
Threat Group-3390 obtained a KeePass database from a compromised host.[9] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0132
ATT&CK Technique Name:H1N1
H1N1 bypasses user access control by using a DLL hijacking vulnerability in the Windows Update Standalone Installer (wusa.exe).[35] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0060
ATT&CK Technique Name:BRONZE BUTLER
BRONZE BUTLER has used VBS and VBE scripts for execution.[20][21] | secon |
title:blackhat:us-20 Mind Games: Using Data to Solve for the Human Element
The security industry's traditional approach to mitigating human risk is predicated on the assumption that individuals will make the right security decisions if they have enough training and fear of the consequences. Years of security research i... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0085
ATT&CK Technique Name:FIN4
FIN4 has presented victims with spoofed Windows Authentication prompts to collect their credentials.[9][10] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S1037
ATT&CK Technique Name:STARWHALE
STARWHALE has the ability to create the following Windows service to establish persistence on an infected host: sc create Windowscarpstss binpath= "cmd.exe /c cscript.exe c:\\windows\\system32\\w7_1.wsf humpback_whale" start= "auto" obj= "LocalSystem".[113] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0311
ATT&CK Technique Name:YiSpecter
YiSpecter has collected compromised device MAC addresses.[34] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0073
ATT&CK Technique Name:APT19
APT19 has obtained and used publicly-available tools like Empire.[5][6] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0206
ATT&CK Technique Name:Wiarp
Wiarp creates a backdoor through which remote attackers can create a service.[136] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M1047
ATT&CK Technique Name:Audit
Map the trusts within existing domains/forests and keep trust relationships to a minimum. | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S1035
ATT&CK Technique Name:Small Sieve
Small Sieve can obtain the id of a logged in user.[170] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0331
ATT&CK Technique Name:Agent Tesla
Agent Tesla can encrypt data with 3DES before sending it over to a C2 server.[2] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:T0877
ATT&CK Technique Name:I/O Image
Adversaries may seek to capture process values related to the inputs and outputs of a PLC. During the scan cycle, a PLC reads the status of all inputs and stores them in an image table. The image table is the PLCs internal storage location where values of inputs/outputs ... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0082
ATT&CK Technique Name:APT38
APT38 used a Trojan called KEYLIME to capture keystrokes from the victim’s machine.[18] | secon |
title:blackhat:us-21 hAFL1: Our Journey of Fuzzing Hyper-V and Discovering a 0-Day
Fuzzers are tremendously important in the realm of vulnerability research, as they automate the process of bug discovery by rapidly feeding a target with numerous inputs. Several factors make up an efficient fuzzer. One of them is struct... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0034
ATT&CK Technique Name:Sandworm Team
Sandworm Team has used backdoors that can delete files used in an attack from an infected system.[121][209] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0081
ATT&CK Technique Name:Tropic Trooper
Tropic Trooper has been known to side-load DLLs using a valid version of a Windows Address Book and Windows Defender executable with one of their tools.[64][65] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0632
ATT&CK Technique Name:GrimAgent
GrimAgent has sent data related to a compromise host over its C2 channel.[55] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0581
ATT&CK Technique Name:IronNetInjector
IronNetInjector has used a task XML file named mssch.xml to run an IronPython script when a user logs in or when specific system events are created.[85] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0259
ATT&CK Technique Name:InnaputRAT
InnaputRAT uses an 8-byte XOR key to obfuscate API names and other strings contained in the payload.[167] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S1031
ATT&CK Technique Name:PingPull
PingPull has the ability to install itself as a service.[87] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0194
ATT&CK Technique Name:PowerSploit
PowerSploit contains a collection of Privesc-PowerUp modules that can discover and exploit search order hijacking vulnerabilities.[6][7] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0096
ATT&CK Technique Name:APT41
APT41 used the net share command as part of network reconnaissance.[7][8] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0512
ATT&CK Technique Name:FatDuke
FatDuke can use base64 encoding, string stacking, and opaque predicates for obfuscation.[120] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0368
ATT&CK Technique Name:NotPetya
NotPetya can move laterally through industrial networks by means of the SMB service. [3] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0439
ATT&CK Technique Name:Okrum
Okrum has built-in commands for uploading, downloading, and executing files to the system.[325] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M1026
ATT&CK Technique Name:Privileged Account Management
Limit domain admin account permissions to domain controllers and limited servers. Delegate other admin functions to separate accounts.[1] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0603
ATT&CK Technique Name:Stuxnet
Stuxnet infects PLCs with different code depending on the characteristics of the target system. An infection sequence consists of code blocks and data blocks that will be downloaded to the PLC to alter its behavior. [3] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0670
ATT&CK Technique Name:WarzoneRAT
WarzoneRAT can collect data from a compromised host.[190] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0119
ATT&CK Technique Name:Indrik Spider
Indrik Spider has collected credentials from infected systems, including domain accounts.[9] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G1003
ATT&CK Technique Name:Ember Bear
Ember Bear has used Discord's content delivery network (CDN) to deliver malware and malicious scripts to a compromised host.[14] | secon |
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