text stringlengths 100 9.93M | category stringclasses 11
values |
|---|---|
ATT&CK ID:M1030
ATT&CK Technique Name:Network Segmentation
Deny direct remote access to internal systems through the use of network proxies, gateways, and firewalls. | secon |
title:blackhat:us-18 Applied Self-Driving Car Security
In the not too distant future, we'll live in a world where computers are driving our cars. Soon, cars may not even have steering wheels or brake pedals. But, in this scenario, should we be worried about cyber attack of these vehicles? In this talk, two researche... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M0930
ATT&CK Technique Name:Network Segmentation
Segment operational assets and their management devices based on their functional role within the process. Enabling more strict isolation to more critical control and operational information within the control environment. [3] [4] [5] [6] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0606
ATT&CK Technique Name:Bad Rabbit
Bad Rabbit’s infpub.dat file uses NTLM login credentials to brute force Windows machines.[10] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S1069
ATT&CK Technique Name:TangleBot
TangleBot can record video from the device camera.[20] | secon |
titleblackhat:us-22 Invisible Finger: Practical Electromagnetic Interference Attack on Touchscreen-based Electronic Devices
Touchscreen-based electronic devices such as smart phones and smart tablets are widely used in our daily life. While the security of electronic devices has been heavily investigated recently, the ... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0123
ATT&CK Technique Name:Volatile Cedar
Volatile Cedar has used DirBuster and GoBuster to brute force web directories and DNS subdomains.[1] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:C0022
ATT&CK Technique Name:Operation Dream Job
During Operation Dream Job, Lazarus Group used WMIC to executed a remote XSL script.[97] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0650
ATT&CK Technique Name:QakBot
QakBot has used Rundll32.exe to drop malicious DLLs including Brute Ratel C4 and to enable C2 communication.[80][81][82][83][32] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M1045
ATT&CK Technique Name:Code Signing
Ensure IIS DLLs and binaries are signed by the correct application developers. | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0588
ATT&CK Technique Name:GoldMax
The GoldMax Linux variant has used a crontab entry with a @reboot line to gain persistence.[6] | secon |
titleblackhat:us-18 Screaming Channels: When Electromagnetic Side Channels Meet Radio Transceivers
The drive for ever smaller and cheaper components in microelectronics has popularized so-called "mixed-signal circuits," in which analog and digital circuitry are residing on the same silicon die. A typical example is WiF... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S1009
ATT&CK Technique Name:Triton
Triton leverages a previously-unknown vulnerability affecting Tricon MP3008 firmware versions 10.010.4 allows an insecurely-written system call to be exploited to achieve an arbitrary 2-byte write primitive, which is then used to gain supervisor privileges. [3] | secon |
titleblackhat:asia-22 AMSI Unchained: Review of Known AMSI Bypass Techniques and Introducing a New One
AMSI (Antimalware Scan Interface) is a built-in API in Windows that allows security products to scan and therefore allow or restrict several types of content sent by applications and services (AMSI consumers) which im... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0049
ATT&CK Technique Name:OilRig
OilRig has created scheduled tasks that run a VBScript to execute a payload on victim machines.[119][120][121][122] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0635
ATT&CK Technique Name:BoomBox
BoomBox can check its current working directory and for the presence of a specific file and terminate if specific values are not found.[5] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0117
ATT&CK Technique Name:Fox Kitten
Fox Kitten has base64 encoded payloads to avoid detection.[131] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0045
ATT&CK Technique Name:menuPass
menuPass has used DLL side-loading to launch versions of Mimikatz and PwDump6 as well as UPPERCUT.[36][37][38] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0081
ATT&CK Technique Name:Tropic Trooper
Tropic Trooper used letmein to scan for saved usernames on the target system.[191] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0046
ATT&CK Technique Name:FIN7
FIN7 malware has created Registry Run and RunOnce keys to establish persistence, and has also added items to the Startup folder.[92][93] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0040
ATT&CK Technique Name:Patchwork
A Patchwork .dll that contains BADNEWS is loaded and executed using DLL side-loading.[50] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0501
ATT&CK Technique Name:PipeMon
PipeMon modules are stored on disk with seemingly benign names including use of a file extension associated with a popular word processor.[122] | secon |
titleblackhat:eu-20 The Subtle Art of Chaining Headers - IKEv2 Attack Surface Case Study
Internet Key Exchange (IKE) is a significant component of IP Security (IPsec), a suite of protocols used extensively for creating Virtual Private Networks. IKE is used for performing mutual authentication, establishing and maintai... | secon |
titleblackhat:eu-22 Bridging the Gap Between Research and Practice in Intelligently Bypassing WAF
AI-enabled cyber attack is fast becoming a prevalent topic. One of the representative topics is to utilize AI to learn how to bypass web application firewalls (WAFs). The general workflow includes three steps. First, build... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0148
ATT&CK Technique Name:RTM
RTM strings, network data, configuration, and modules are encrypted with a modified RC4 algorithm. RTM has also been delivered to targets as various archive files including ZIP, 7-ZIP, and RAR.[283][284] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0435
ATT&CK Technique Name:PLEAD
PLEAD samples were found to be highly obfuscated with junk code.[10][11] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0363
ATT&CK Technique Name:Empire
Empire can acquire network configuration information like DNS servers, public IP, and network proxies used by a host.[81][82] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M1052
ATT&CK Technique Name:User Account Control
Although UAC bypass techniques exist, it is still prudent to use the highest enforcement level for UAC when possible and mitigate bypass opportunities that exist with techniques such as DLL Search Order Hijacking. | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M1056
ATT&CK Technique Name:Pre-compromise
This technique cannot be easily mitigated with preventive controls since it is based on behaviors performed outside of the scope of enterprise defenses and controls. | secon |
ATT&CK ID:T1003
ATT&CK Technique Name:OS Credential Dumping
Adversaries may attempt to dump credentials to obtain account login and credential material, normally in the form of a hash or a clear text password, from the operating system and software. Credentials can then be used to perform Lateral Movement and access re... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:C0022
ATT&CK Technique Name:Operation Dream Job
During Operation Dream Job, Lazarus Group used code signing certificates issued by Sectigo RSA for some of its malware and tools.[5] | secon |
titleblackhat:us-23 Civil Cyber Defense: Use Your Resources to Defend Non-Profits as They Combat Human Trafficking and Subvert Authoritarian Regimes
Civil Cyber Defense volunteers and students challenge high-risk adversaries and threats such as human traffickers, authoritarian regimes, and surveillance being conducted ... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0491
ATT&CK Technique Name:StrongPity
StrongPity can delete previously exfiltrated files from the compromised host.[227][228] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0601
ATT&CK Technique Name:Hildegard
Hildegard has modified /etc/ld.so.preload to intercept shared library import functions.[15] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0069
ATT&CK Technique Name:MuddyWater
MuddyWater has used a custom tool for creating reverse shells.[227] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:C0025
ATT&CK Technique Name:2016 Ukraine Electric Power Attack
During the 2016 Ukraine Electric Power Attack, Sandworm Team created two new accounts, "admin" and "система" (System). The accounts were then assigned to a domain matching local operation and were delegated new privileges.[1] | secon |
titleblackhat:asia-21 A Mirage of Safety: Bug Finding and Exploit Techniques of Top Android Vendor's Privacy Protection Apps
We all want to keep our privacy and our secrets hidden and safe. So nearly all top vendors develop and provide us some privacy protection apps such as Secure Folder, PrivateSpace, Safe, App L... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0368
ATT&CK Technique Name:NotPetya
NotPetya can use PsExec, which interacts with the ADMIN$ network share to execute commands on remote systems.[39][40][41] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M1040
ATT&CK Technique Name:Behavior Prevention on Endpoint
Some endpoint security solutions can be configured to block some types of process injection based on common sequences of behavior that occur during the injection process. For example, on Windows 10, Attack Surface Reduction (ASR) rules may prevent Of... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S1012
ATT&CK Technique Name:PowerLess
PowerLess has a browser info stealer module that can read Chrome and Edge browser database files.[16] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0016
ATT&CK Technique Name:APT29
APT29 has used various forms of spearphishing attempting to get a user to open attachments, including, but not limited to, malicious Microsoft Word documents, .pdf, and .lnk files. [16][17][18] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0034
ATT&CK Technique Name:NETEAGLE
NETEAGLE can use HTTP to download resources that contain an IP address and port number pair to connect to for C2.[9] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0105
ATT&CK Technique Name:DarkVishnya
DarkVishnya used network sniffing to obtain login data. [12] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0136
ATT&CK Technique Name:USBStealer
USBStealer drops itself onto removable media and relies on Autorun to execute the malicious file when a user opens the removable media on another system.[30] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0154
ATT&CK Technique Name:Cobalt Strike
Cobalt Strike can be configured to have commands relayed over a peer-to-peer network of infected hosts. This can be used to limit the number of egress points, or provide access to a host without direct internet access.[6][7] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S1058
ATT&CK Technique Name:Prestige
Prestige has been deployed using the Default Domain Group Policy Object from an Active Directory Domain Controller.[14] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0237
ATT&CK Technique Name:GravityRAT
The author of GravityRAT submitted samples to VirusTotal for testing, showing that the author modified the code to try to hide the DDE object in a different part of the document.[7] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0037
ATT&CK Technique Name:FIN6
FIN6 has used WMI to automate the remote execution of PowerShell scripts.[44] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:T1552.003
ATT&CK Technique Name:Bash History
Adversaries may search the bash command history on compromised systems for insecurely stored credentials. Bash keeps track of the commands users type on the command-line with the "history" utility. Once a user logs out, the history is flushed to the user’s .bash_hi... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0260
ATT&CK Technique Name:InvisiMole
InvisiMole can spread within a network via the BlueKeep (CVE-2019-0708) and EternalBlue (CVE-2017-0144) vulnerabilities in RDP and SMB respectively.[23] | secon |
title:blackhat:us-22 Catch Me If You Can: Deterministic Discovery of Race Conditions with Fuzzing
Finding concurrency bugs has presented a challenge for security and development teams. Race condition-based vulnerabilities are a growing category of bugs reported to vendors and have been observed in in-the-wild exploits.... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0516
ATT&CK Technique Name:SoreFang
SoreFang can gain persistence through use of scheduled tasks.[165] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0113
ATT&CK Technique Name:Prikormka
Prikormka contains a module that captures screenshots of the victim's desktop.[128] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M1038
ATT&CK Technique Name:Execution Prevention
Adversaries will likely need to place new binaries in locations to be executed through this weakness. Identify and block potentially malicious software executed path interception by using application control tools, like Windows Defender Application Control, App... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0328
ATT&CK Technique Name:Stealth Mango
Stealth Mango collected and exfiltrated data from the device, including sensitive letters/documents, stored photos, and stored audio files.[27] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M1022
ATT&CK Technique Name:Restrict File and Directory Permissions
Limit privileges of user accounts so only authorized users can edit the rc.common file. | secon |
titleblackhat:us-21 Cloudy with a Chance of APT: Novel Microsoft 365 Attacks in the Wild
This past year has proved the point that advanced nation-state backed threat actors are increasingly investing their time and money to develop novel ways to access the cloud. These actors are especially interested in Microsoft 365,... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0479
ATT&CK Technique Name:DEFENSOR ID
DEFENSOR ID can retrieve a list of installed applications.[7] | secon |
title:blackhat:eu-20 This is for the Pwners : Exploiting a WebKit 0-day in PlayStation 4
Despite an active console hacking community, only few public PlayStation 4 exploits have been released. The exposed WebKit-based browser is usually the entrypoint of a fullchain attack: from browser exploitation to kernel exploitat... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0356
ATT&CK Technique Name:KONNI
A version of KONNI searches for filenames created with a previous version of the malware, suggesting different versions targeted the same victims and the versions may work together.[172] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M1026
ATT&CK Technique Name:Privileged Account Management
Do not allow domain administrator accounts to be used for day-to-day operations that may expose them to potential adversaries on unprivileged systems. | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0475
ATT&CK Technique Name:BackConfig
BackConfig has used compressed and decimal encoded VBS scripts.[16] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M1046
ATT&CK Technique Name:Boot Integrity
Some vendors of embedded network devices provide cryptographic signing to ensure the integrity of operating system images at boot time. Implement where available, following vendor guidelines. [2] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0631
ATT&CK Technique Name:Chaes
Chaes has been delivered by sending victims a phishing email containing a malicious .docx file.[56] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M0919
ATT&CK Technique Name:Threat Intelligence Program
Develop a robust cyber threat intelligence capability to determine what types and levels of threat may use software exploits and 0-days against a particular organization. | secon |
title:blackhat:us-19 Responding to a Cyber Attack with Missiles
The lines between real and virtual worlds are blurring fast. Several governments have publicly stated that they reserve the right to respond to cyber attacks with kinetic force. Now we are seeing that happening for real. What are the rules of engagement in... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0502
ATT&CK Technique Name:Drovorub
Drovorub can use TCP to communicate between its agent and client modules.[23] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M1027
ATT&CK Technique Name:Password Policies
Ensure strong password length (ideally 25+ characters) and complexity for service accounts and that these passwords periodically expire. Also consider using Group Managed Service Accounts or another third party product such as password vaulting. [9] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:T1548.002
ATT&CK Technique Name:Bypass User Account Control
Adversaries may bypass UAC mechanisms to elevate process privileges on system. Windows User Account Control (UAC) allows a program to elevate its privileges (tracked as integrity levels ranging from low to high) to perform a task under administrator-... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0622
ATT&CK Technique Name:AppleSeed
AppleSeed can enumerate the current process on a compromised host.[7] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0661
ATT&CK Technique Name:FoggyWeb
FoggyWeb can receive additional malicious components from an actor controlled C2 server and execute them on a compromised AD FS server.[183] | secon |
titleblackhat:eu-21 Re-route Your Intent for Privilege Escalation: A Universal Way to Exploit Android PendingIntents in High-profile and System Apps
PendingIntent, the advanced version of normal Android Intent, provides powerful inter-component communication on Android. A PendingIntent holds a base Intent that can be e... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0697
ATT&CK Technique Name:HermeticWiper
HermeticWiper can disable the VSS service on a compromised host using the service control manager.[32][33][34] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0611
ATT&CK Technique Name:Clop
Clop can encrypt files using AES, RSA, and RC4 and will add the ".clop" extension to encrypted files.[33][34][35] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0125
ATT&CK Technique Name:HAFNIUM
HAFNIUM has interacted with Office 365 tenants to gather details regarding target's environments.[2] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:T1574.005
ATT&CK Technique Name:Executable Installer File Permissions Weakness
Adversaries may execute their own malicious payloads by hijacking the binaries used by an installer. These processes may automatically execute specific binaries as part of their functionality or to perform other actions. If the per... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0415
ATT&CK Technique Name:BOOSTWRITE
BOOSTWRITE has exploited the loading of the legitimate Dwrite.dll file by actually loading the gdi library, which then loads the gdiplus library and ultimately loads the local Dwrite dll.[13] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0075
ATT&CK Technique Name:Rancor
Rancor has used VBS scripts as well as embedded macros for execution.[132] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S1039
ATT&CK Technique Name:Bumblebee
Bumblebee can capture and compress stolen credentials from the Registry and volume shadow copies.[32] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0472
ATT&CK Technique Name:down_new
down_new has the ability to identify the MAC address of a compromised host.[25] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:T1574
ATT&CK Technique Name:Hijack Execution Flow
Adversaries may execute their own malicious payloads by hijacking the way operating systems run programs. Hijacking execution flow can be for the purposes of persistence, since this hijacked execution may reoccur over time. Adversaries may also use these mecha... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M0951
ATT&CK Technique Name:Update Software
Update software regularly by employing patch management for internal enterprise endpoints and servers. | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0102
ATT&CK Technique Name:Wizard Spider
Wizard Spider obtained a code signing certificate signed by Digicert for some of its malware.[7] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:C0013
ATT&CK Technique Name:Operation Sharpshooter
During Operation Sharpshooter, the first stage downloader resolved various Windows libraries and APIs, including LoadLibraryA(), GetProcAddress(), and CreateProcessA().[131] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0331
ATT&CK Technique Name:Agent Tesla
Agent Tesla has the ability to steal credentials from FTP clients and wireless profiles.[1] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0201
ATT&CK Technique Name:JPIN
A JPIN variant downloads the backdoor payload via the BITS service.[17] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0593
ATT&CK Technique Name:ECCENTRICBANDWAGON
ECCENTRICBANDWAGON can use cmd to execute commands on a victim’s machine.[109] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:T1082
ATT&CK Technique Name:System Information Discovery
An adversary may attempt to get detailed information about the operating system and hardware, including version, patches, hotfixes, service packs, and architecture. Adversaries may use the information from System Information Discovery during automated d... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M1025
ATT&CK Technique Name:Privileged Process Integrity
Windows 8.1, Windows Server 2012 R2, and later versions, may make LSA run as a Protected Process Light (PPL) by setting the Registry key HKLM\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Control\Lsa\RunAsPPL, which requires all DLLs loaded by LSA to be signed by Microsoft.... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0332
ATT&CK Technique Name:Remcos
Remcos has full control of the Registry, including the ability to modify it.[132] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0504
ATT&CK Technique Name:Anchor
Anchor has obfuscated code with stack strings and string encryption.[14] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0168
ATT&CK Technique Name:Gazer
Gazer can establish persistence by creating a .lnk file in the Start menu or by modifying existing .lnk files to execute the malware through cmd.exe.[12][13] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0424
ATT&CK Technique Name:Triada
Triada is able to modify code within the com.android.systemui application to gain access to GET_REAL_TASKS permissions. This permission enables access to information about applications currently on the foreground and other recently used apps.[31] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0034
ATT&CK Technique Name:Sandworm Team
Sandworm Team has conducted research against potential victim websites as part of its operational planning.[4] | secon |
titleblackhat:eu-18 AI Gone Rogue: Exterminating Deep Fakes Before They Cause Menace
The face: A crucial means of identity. But what if this crucial means of identity is stolen from you? Yes, this is happening and is termed as 'Deep fake.' Deep fake technology is an artificial intelligence based human image blending me... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0093
ATT&CK Technique Name:Backdoor.Oldrea
Some Backdoor.Oldrea samples use standard Base64 + bzip2, and some use standard Base64 + reverse XOR + RSA-2048 to decrypt data received from C2 servers.[9] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0067
ATT&CK Technique Name:APT37
APT37 has downloaded second stage malware from compromised websites.[27][28][29][30] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0276
ATT&CK Technique Name:Keydnap
Keydnap uses a resource fork to present a macOS JPEG or text file icon rather than the executable's icon assigned by the operating system.[6] | secon |
title:blackhat:asia-21 New Attack Surface in Safari: Using Just One Web Audio Vulnerability to Rule Safari
In the past, Safari vulnerability researchers often focused on the DOM or JS engine, but some system libraries used by Safari, such as audio, video, font, etc., haven't received enough attention. There are few suc... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0480
ATT&CK Technique Name:Cerberus
Cerberus disables Google Play Protect to prevent its discovery and deletion in the future.[3] | secon |
Subsets and Splits
No community queries yet
The top public SQL queries from the community will appear here once available.