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title:blackhat:us-19 Breaking Through Another Side: Bypassing Firmware Security Boundaries from Embedded Controller
Hardware security boundaries are really difficult to support and correctly design. On modern x86 platforms exist a lot of different hardware components. It's clear they should be included in the usual thr... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M1032
ATT&CK Technique Name:Multi-factor Authentication
Integrating multi-factor authentication (MFA) as part of organizational policy can greatly reduce the risk of an adversary gaining control of valid credentials that may be used for additional tactics such as initial access, lateral movement, and collecti... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M0813
ATT&CK Technique Name:Software Process and Device Authentication
Authenticate connections fromsoftware and devices to prevent unauthorized systems from accessing protected management functions. | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0016
ATT&CK Technique Name:APT29
APT29 has used spearphishing emails with an attachment to deliver files with exploits to initial victims.[20][21][22][23] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S1069
ATT&CK Technique Name:TangleBot
TangleBot can use overlays to cover legitimate applications or screens.[29] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M1028
ATT&CK Technique Name:Operating System Configuration
Ensuring that the tty_tickets setting is enabled will prevent this leakage across tty sessions. | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0004
ATT&CK Technique Name:Ke3chang
Ke3chang transferred compressed and encrypted RAR files containing exfiltration through the established backdoor command and control channel during operations.[63] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0113
ATT&CK Technique Name:Prikormka
Prikormka creates a directory, %USERPROFILE%\AppData\Local\SKC\, which is used to store collected log files.[77] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0651
ATT&CK Technique Name:BoxCaon
BoxCaon has created a working folder for collected files that it sends to the C2 server.[14] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0072
ATT&CK Technique Name:OwaAuth
OwaAuth captures and DES-encrypts credentials before writing the username and password to a log file, C:\log.txt.[80] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0059
ATT&CK Technique Name:Magic Hound
Magic Hound has captured the IP addresses of visitors to their phishing sites.[6] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M1047
ATT&CK Technique Name:Audit
Use auditing tools capable of detecting DLL search order hijacking opportunities on systems within an enterprise and correct them. Toolkits like the PowerSploit framework contain PowerUp modules that can be used to explore systems for DLL hijacking weaknesses.[40]Use the prog... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S1040
ATT&CK Technique Name:Rclone
The Rclone "chunker" overlay supports splitting large files in smaller chunks during upload to circumvent size limits.[14][3] | secon |
title:blackhat:us-20 Ruling StarCraft Game Spitefully -- Exploiting the Blind Spot of AI-Powered Game Bots
With recent breakthroughs of deep neural networks in problems like computer vision, machine translation, and time series prediction, we have witnessed a great advance in the area of reinforcement learning. By inte... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0365
ATT&CK Technique Name:Olympic Destroyer
Olympic Destroyer will shut down the compromised system after it is done modifying system configuration settings.[4][16] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0117
ATT&CK Technique Name:Fox Kitten
Fox Kitten has used tools including NMAP to conduct broad scanning to identify open ports.[28][29] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0456
ATT&CK Technique Name:Aria-body
Aria-body has the ability to launch files using ShellExecute.[20] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M1014
ATT&CK Technique Name:Interconnection Filtering
Filtering requests by checking request origin information may provide some defense against spurious operators.[40] | secon |
title:blackhat:us-19 Going Beyond Coverage-Guided Fuzzing with Structured Fuzzing
Coverage-guided fuzzers like AFL and libFuzzer have led to a "fuzzing renaissance". This is because they made it possible for security researchers to write effective fuzzers for formats without knowing about the format's structure. Howeve... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S1065
ATT&CK Technique Name:Woody RAT
Woody RAT can deobfuscate Base64-encoded strings and scripts.[260] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0021
ATT&CK Technique Name:Molerats
Molerats has created scheduled tasks to persistently run VBScripts.[111] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0194
ATT&CK Technique Name:PowerSploit
PowerSploit contains a collection of Privesc-PowerUp modules that can discover and exploit search order hijacking vulnerabilities.[6][7] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0007
ATT&CK Technique Name:APT28
APT28 added "junk data" to each encoded string, preventing trivial decoding without knowledge of the junk removal algorithm. Each implant was given a "junk length" value when created, tracked by the controller software to allow seamless communication but prevent analysis of t... | secon |
title:blackhat:us-23 Decompiling x86 Deep Neural Network Executables
Due to their widespread use on heterogeneous hardware devices, deep learning (DL) models are compiled into executables by DL compilers to fully leverage low-level hardware primitives. This approach allows DL computations to be undertaken at low cost a... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0096
ATT&CK Technique Name:APT41
APT41 modified legitimate Windows services to install malware backdoors.[15][16] APT41 created the StorSyncSvc service to provide persistence for Cobalt Strike.[17] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0081
ATT&CK Technique Name:Tropic Trooper
Tropic Trooper has used HTTP in communication with the C2.[345][346] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0354
ATT&CK Technique Name:Denis
Denis ran multiple system checks, looking for processor and register characteristics, to evade emulation and analysis.[15] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0264
ATT&CK Technique Name:OopsIE
OopsIE compresses collected files with a simple character replacement scheme before sending them to its C2 server.[27] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M1047
ATT&CK Technique Name:Audit
Administrators should audit all cloud and container accounts to ensure that they are necessary and that the permissions granted to them are appropriate. Where possible, the ability to request temporary account tokens on behalf of another accounts should be disabled. Additiona... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M1040
ATT&CK Technique Name:Behavior Prevention on Endpoint
On Windows 10, enable Attack Surface Reduction (ASR) rules to prevent an application from writing a signed vulnerable driver to the system.[144] On Windows 10 and 11, enable Microsoft Vulnerable Driver Blocklist to assist in hardening against third p... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S1055
ATT&CK Technique Name:SharkBot
SharkBot can hide and send SMS messages. SharkBot can also change which application is the device’s default SMS handler.[22] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0662
ATT&CK Technique Name:RCSession
RCSession can compress and obfuscate its strings to evade detection on a compromised host.[78] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0568
ATT&CK Technique Name:EVILNUM
EVILNUM can execute commands and scripts through rundll32.[42] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M0931
ATT&CK Technique Name:Network Intrusion Prevention
If a link is being visited by a user, network intrusion prevention systems and systems designed to scan and remove malicious downloads can be used to block activity. | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0059
ATT&CK Technique Name:Magic Hound
Magic Hound has used Remote Desktop Services to copy tools on targeted systems.[36][37] | secon |
titleblackhat:us-19 The Most Secure Browser? Pwning Chrome from 2016 to 2019
Browser security is always a prevalent topic in security research. Due to the great design and long-term effort, browsers have been more and more secure. The last time Chrome was pwned in Pwn2Own dates back to Mobile Pwn2Own 2016. In that cont... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0475
ATT&CK Technique Name:BackConfig
BackConfig has the ability to use HTTPS for C2 communiations.[28] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0484
ATT&CK Technique Name:Carberp
Carberp has installed a bootkit on the system to maintain persistence.[7] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0090
ATT&CK Technique Name:WIRTE
WIRTE has attempted to lure users into opening malicious MS Word and Excel files to execute malicious payloads.[254] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0284
ATT&CK Technique Name:More_eggs
More_eggs has used HTTP GET requests to check internet connectivity.[7] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0114
ATT&CK Technique Name:Chimera
Chimera has used credential stuffing against victim's remote services to obtain valid accounts.[2] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0181
ATT&CK Technique Name:FALLCHILL
FALLCHILL can delete malware and associated artifacts from the victim.[67] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0081
ATT&CK Technique Name:Tropic Trooper
Tropic Trooper has used known administrator account credentials to execute the backdoor directly.[13] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0476
ATT&CK Technique Name:Valak
Valak can collect sensitive mailing information from Exchange servers, including credentials and the domain certificate of an enterprise.[22] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S1018
ATT&CK Technique Name:Saint Bot
Saint Bot has been packed using a dark market crypter.[74] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0379
ATT&CK Technique Name:Revenge RAT
Revenge RAT creates a Registry key at HKCU\Software\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\Winlogon\Shell to survive a system reboot.[223] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M1022
ATT&CK Technique Name:Restrict File and Directory Permissions
Set directory access controls to prevent file writes to the search paths for applications, both in the folders where applications are run from and the standard dylib folders. | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0335
ATT&CK Technique Name:Carbon
Carbon creates several tasks for later execution to continue persistence on the victim’s machine.[36] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S1066
ATT&CK Technique Name:DarkTortilla
DarkTortilla can use a .NET-based DLL named RunPe6 for process injection.[19] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S1018
ATT&CK Technique Name:Saint Bot
Saint Bot has written its payload into a newly-created EhStorAuthn.exe process using ZwWriteVirtualMemory and executed it using NtQueueApcThread and ZwAlertResumeThread.[12] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0651
ATT&CK Technique Name:BoxCaon
BoxCaon has used Windows API calls to obtain information about the compromised host.[44] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0015
ATT&CK Technique Name:Ixeshe
Ixeshe sets its own executable file's attributes to hidden.[24] | secon |
titleblackhat:asia-23 Trends and Top Takeaways from Black Hat Asia
Join Black Hat Founder Jeff Moss and Black Hat Asia Review Board members Sudhanshu Chauhan, Ty Miller and Asuka Nakajima for an insightful conversation on the most pressing issues facing the InfoSec community. This panel session will feature a candid di... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:C0014
ATT&CK Technique Name:Operation Wocao
During Operation Wocao, threat actors used a Visual Basic script that checked for internet connectivity.[9] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0663
ATT&CK Technique Name:SysUpdate
SysUpdate can use a Registry Run key to establish persistence.[254] | secon |
title:botconf2017 Automation Attacks at Scale
Automation attacks are currently plaguing organizations in industries ranging from financial to retail, to gaming & entertainment. These attacks exploit stolen credential leaks, black market & custom attack toolkits, and massively scalable infrastructure to launch widely di... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0108
ATT&CK Technique Name:Blue Mockingbird
Blue Mockingbird has obfuscated the wallet address in the payload binary.[56] | secon |
titleblackhat:us-22 Blasting Event-Driven Cornucopia: WMI-based User-Space Attacks Blind SIEMs and EDRs
Security solutions engineers always find new ways to monitor OS events to mitigate threats on endpoints. These approaches typically reuse different built-in Windows mechanisms that were never designed with security f... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M0802
ATT&CK Technique Name:Communication Authenticity
Protocols used for device management should authenticate all network messages to prevent unauthorized system changes. | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0585
ATT&CK Technique Name:Kerrdown
Kerrdown can use DLL side-loading to load malicious DLLs.[31] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M1056
ATT&CK Technique Name:Pre-compromise
This technique cannot be easily mitigated with preventive controls since it is based on behaviors performed outside of the scope of enterprise defenses and controls. Efforts should focus on minimizing the amount and sensitivity of data available to external parties. | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M0953
ATT&CK Technique Name:Data Backup
Take and store data backups from end user systems and critical servers. Ensure backup and storage systems are hardened and kept separate from the corporate network to prevent compromise. Maintain and exercise incident response plans [6], including the management of go... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0661
ATT&CK Technique Name:FoggyWeb
FoggyWeb can compile and execute source code sent to the compromised AD FS server via a specific HTTP POST.[5] | secon |
title:botconf2020 The fall of Domino – a preinstalled hostile downloader
Android is an open-source operating system which allows OEMs and their subcontractors certain flexibility in adding components to the system. These add-ons may contain new and exciting features, but sometimes they also hide complex malware. This t... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:C0024
ATT&CK Technique Name:SolarWinds Compromise
During the SolarWinds Compromise, APT29 exploited CVE-2020-0688 against the Microsoft Exchange Control Panel to regain access to a network.[54][12] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0522
ATT&CK Technique Name:Exobot
Exobot has used web injects to capture users’ credentials.[7] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S1046
ATT&CK Technique Name:PowGoop
PowGoop can side-load Goopdate.dll into GoogleUpdate.exe.[43][54] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0093
ATT&CK Technique Name:GALLIUM
GALLIUM used DLL side-loading to covertly load PoisonIvy into memory on the victim machine.[24] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S1020
ATT&CK Technique Name:Kevin
Kevin can create directories to store logs and other collected data.[3] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M1040
ATT&CK Technique Name:Behavior Prevention on Endpoint
Some endpoint security solutions can be configured to block some types of process injection based on common sequences of behavior that occur during the injection process. | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G1004
ATT&CK Technique Name:LAPSUS$
LAPSUS$ has deleted the target's systems and resources both on-premises and in the cloud.[20] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0033
ATT&CK Technique Name:Poseidon Group
Poseidon Group obtains and saves information about victim network interfaces and addresses.[64] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0170
ATT&CK Technique Name:Helminth
Helminth has checked the local administrators group.[12] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0031
ATT&CK Technique Name:BACKSPACE
BACKSPACE uses HTTP as a transport to communicate with its command server.[29] | secon |
title:blackhat:eu-21 They Hacked Thousands of Cloud Accounts Then Sent Us Weird GIFs
As organizations migrate their computing resources to cloud and container environments, attackers are taking notice -- and following. In August 2020, we discovered the first crypto-mining worm stealing AWS credentials. The attackers ar... | secon |
titleblackhat:eu-21 APTs Go Teleworking: The Rise of VPN Exploits
Since the COVID-19 pandemic, workforces rely even more on VPN technologies for remote access into private networks.Pulse Secure by Ivanti is a leading VPN technology. Enterprise VPN devices often are deployed at the intersection between trusted and untru... | secon |
titleblackhat:eu-22 Real-World Detection Evasion Techniques in the Cloud
Recent cloud-focused malware campaigns have shown adversary groups possess an advanced knowledge of cloud technologies and their security mechanisms, with this knowledge being used to their advantage in a range of attacks. These attacks are no lon... | secon |
titleblackhat:us-19 Lessons and Lulz: The 5th Annual Black Hat USA NOC Report
Back with another year of soul crushing statistics, the Black Hat NOC team will be sharing all of the data that keeps us equally puzzled, and entertained, year after year. We'll let you know all the tools and techniques we're using to set up,... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0114
ATT&CK Technique Name:Chimera
Chimera has used the get -b -e -p command for network scanning as well as a custom Python tool packed into a Windows executable named Get.exe to scan IP ranges for HTTP.[15] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0539
ATT&CK Technique Name:Red Alert 2.0
Red Alert 2.0 has stored data embedded in the strings.xml resource file.[28] | secon |
title:blackhat:us-20 Dive into Apple IO80211FamilyV2
Starting from macOS Catalina Beta, Apple refactored the architecture of the 80211 Wi-Fi client drivers and renamed the new generation design to IO80211FamilyV2. Compared with IO80211Family (V1), modules such as Version 2 and AppleBCMWLANCore integrate the original Ai... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0034
ATT&CK Technique Name:NETEAGLE
NETEAGLE allows adversaries to enumerate and modify the infected host's file system. It supports searching for directories, creating directories, listing directory contents, reading and writing to files, retrieving file attributes, and retrieving volume information.[34] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M1032
ATT&CK Technique Name:Multi-factor Authentication
Integrating multi-factor authentication (MFA) as part of organizational policy can greatly reduce the risk of an adversary gaining control of valid credentials that may be used for additional tactics such as initial access, lateral movement, and collecti... | secon |
title:blackhat:us-21 Alcatraz: A Practical Hypervisor Sandbox to Prevent Escapes from the KVM/QEMU and KVM-Based MicroVMs
Since DevOps and serverless architecture emerged, cloud vendors have supported container services as well as traditional virtual machine (VM) services. A traditional VM is strongly isolated from a h... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0428
ATT&CK Technique Name:PoetRAT
PoetRAT checked the size of the hard drive to determine if it was being run in a sandbox environment. In the event of sandbox detection, it would delete itself by overwriting the malware scripts with the contents of "License.txt" and exiting.[41] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0080
ATT&CK Technique Name:Cobalt Group
Cobalt Group has created new services to establish persistence.[34] | secon |
title:blackhat:asia-21 Disappeared Coins: Steal Hashrate in Stratum Secretly
Most cryptocurrencies with high value are based on proof-of-work (PoW), including Bitcoin, Litecoin, and Ether. The process to "produce" them is usually called "mining", and the people involved are called "miners". The mining process is one of... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0262
ATT&CK Technique Name:QuasarRAT
QuasarRAT can download files to the victim’s machine and execute them.[369][370] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0010
ATT&CK Technique Name:Turla
Turla has used PowerShell to execute commands/scripts, in some cases via a custom executable or code from Empire's PSInject.[232][184][233] Turla has also used PowerShell scripts to load and execute malware in memory. | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S1043
ATT&CK Technique Name:ccf32
ccf32 can run on a daily basis using a scheduled task.[37] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0139
ATT&CK Technique Name:TeamTNT
TeamTNT has used an IRC bot for C2 communications.[13] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:T1518.001
ATT&CK Technique Name:Security Software Discovery
Adversaries may attempt to get a listing of security software, configurations, defensive tools, and sensors that are installed on a system or in a cloud environment. This may include things such as firewall rules and anti-virus. Adversaries may use t... | secon |
title:blackhat:eu-19 Blue to Red: Traversing the Spectrum
The rising demand for talent to fill thousands of open roles in the security industry has resulted in one significant consequence: overspecialization. This can hinder someone from thinking about the larger picture of security challenges they face and can sometim... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0049
ATT&CK Technique Name:OilRig
OilRig used spearphishing emails with malicious Microsoft Excel spreadsheet attachments. [10] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M0930
ATT&CK Technique Name:Network Segmentation
Segment operational assets and their management devices based on their functional role within the process. Enabling more strict isolation to more critical control and operational information within the control environment. [11] [12] [10] [13] | secon |
title:blackhat:asia-20 Adversary Detection Pipelines: Finally Making Your Threat Intel Useful
Security teams often feel like they're in a losing battle with threat intel. They don't know how to make threat intel useful or operationalize it within their organizations, especially if there isn't a dedicated full-time team... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0198
ATT&CK Technique Name:NETWIRE
NETWIRE can discover and close windows on controlled systems.[22] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:C0017
ATT&CK Technique Name:C0017
During C0017, APT41 used VMProtect to slow the reverse engineering of malicious binaries.[21] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0667
ATT&CK Technique Name:Chrommme
Chrommme can set itself to sleep before requesting a new command from C2.[2] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0274
ATT&CK Technique Name:Calisto
Calisto has the capability to use rm -rf to remove folders and files from the victim's machine.[35] | secon |
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