text stringlengths 100 9.93M | category stringclasses 11
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|---|---|
ATT&CK ID:S0180
ATT&CK Technique Name:Volgmer
Volgmer stores an encoded configuration file in HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Control\WMI\Security.[40][41] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0476
ATT&CK Technique Name:Valak
Valak can download additional modules and malware capable of using separate C2 channels.[10] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0344
ATT&CK Technique Name:Azorult
Azorult uses an XOR key to decrypt content and uses Base64 to decode the C2 address.[20][21] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:C0023
ATT&CK Technique Name:Operation Ghost
During Operation Ghost, APT29 used steganography to hide payloads inside valid images.[14] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0334
ATT&CK Technique Name:DarkComet
DarkComet adds a Registry value for its installation routine to the Registry Key HKEY_CURRENT_USER\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Policies\System Enable LUA="0" and HKEY_CURRENT_USER\Software\DC3_FEXEC.[46][47] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0487
ATT&CK Technique Name:Kessel
Kessel can exfiltrate credentials and other information via HTTP POST request, TCP, and DNS.[22] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0047
ATT&CK Technique Name:Gamaredon Group
Gamaredon Group has deployed scripts on compromised systems that automatically scan for interesting documents.[16] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0428
ATT&CK Technique Name:PoetRAT
PoetRAT has used a Python tool named Browdec.exe to steal browser credentials.[70] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0385
ATT&CK Technique Name:njRAT
njRAT has used the ShellExecute() function within a script.[129] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M1047
ATT&CK Technique Name:Audit
Regularly check component software on critical services that adversaries may target for persistence to verify the integrity of the systems and identify if unexpected changes have been made. | secon |
ATT&CK ID:T1053.006
ATT&CK Technique Name:Systemd Timers
Adversaries may abuse systemd timers to perform task scheduling for initial or recurring execution of malicious code. Systemd timers are unit files with file extension .timer that control services. Timers can be set to run on a calendar event or after a time span... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0064
ATT&CK Technique Name:APT33
APT33 has downloaded additional files and programs from its C2 server.[25][26] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0340
ATT&CK Technique Name:Octopus
Octopus can capture screenshots of the victims’ machine.[116][117][118] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:T1430.001
ATT&CK Technique Name:Remote Device Management Services
An adversary may use access to cloud services (e.g. Google's Android Device Manager or Apple iCloud's Find my iPhone) or to an enterprise mobility management (EMM)/mobile device management (MDM) server console to track the location of mobile de... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0266
ATT&CK Technique Name:TrickBot
TrickBot has retrieved PuTTY credentials by querying the Software\SimonTatham\Putty\Sessions registry key [6] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M1022
ATT&CK Technique Name:Restrict File and Directory Permissions
Making PowerShell profiles immutable and only changeable by certain administrators will limit the ability for adversaries to easily create user level persistence. | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0234
ATT&CK Technique Name:Bandook
Bandook has used the ShellExecuteW() function call.[31] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0047
ATT&CK Technique Name:Gamaredon Group
Gamaredon Group malware has used CreateProcess to launch additional malicious components.[81] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0112
ATT&CK Technique Name:Windshift
Windshift has used malware to identify installed software.[38] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:T1559.003
ATT&CK Technique Name:XPC Services
Adversaries can provide malicious content to an XPC service daemon for local code execution. macOS uses XPC services for basic inter-process communication between various processes, such as between the XPC Service daemon and third-party application privileged helpe... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0007
ATT&CK Technique Name:APT28
An APT28 loader Trojan adds the Registry key HKCU\Environment\UserInitMprLogonScript to establish persistence.[3] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0430
ATT&CK Technique Name:Winnti for Linux
Winnti for Linux has the ability to deploy modules directly from command and control (C2) servers, possibly for remote command execution, file exfiltration, and socks5 proxying on the infected host. [479] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0481
ATT&CK Technique Name:Ragnar Locker
Ragnar Locker has used rundll32.exe to execute components of VirtualBox.[84] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0539
ATT&CK Technique Name:Red Alert 2.0
Red Alert 2.0 can obtain the running application.[23] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:T1417.001
ATT&CK Technique Name:Keylogging
Adversaries may log user keystrokes to intercept credentials or other information from the user as the user types them. | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0148
ATT&CK Technique Name:RTM
RTM can use the FindNextUrlCacheEntryA and FindFirstUrlCacheEntryA functions to search for specific strings within browser history.[149] | secon |
titleblackhat:us-22 In Need of 'Pair' Review: Vulnerable Code Contributions by GitHub Copilot
On June 29 in 2021 GitHub announced and released their newest tool, 'Copilot' - an 'AI-based Pair Programmer', a deep learning model trained over vast quantities of open-source GitHub code. However, we humans wrote mo... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0038
ATT&CK Technique Name:Stealth Falcon
Stealth Falcon malware gathers passwords from multiple sources, including Internet Explorer, Firefox, and Chrome.[84] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0527
ATT&CK Technique Name:CSPY Downloader
CSPY Downloader has come signed with revoked certificates.[23] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0093
ATT&CK Technique Name:Backdoor.Oldrea
Backdoor.Oldrea collects address book information from Outlook.[5] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0260
ATT&CK Technique Name:InvisiMole
InvisiMole can collect jpeg files from connected MTP devices.[16] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0198
ATT&CK Technique Name:NETWIRE
NETWIRE can capture session logon details from a compromised host.[58] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0070
ATT&CK Technique Name:Dark Caracal
Dark Caracal's version of Bandook adds a registry key to HKEY_USERS\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run for persistence.[69] | secon |
title:botconf2017 Knock Knock… Who’s there? admin admin, Get In! An Overview of the CMS Brute-Forcing Malware Landscape
With more than 18M websites on the internet using WordPress [1] and hundreds of known vulnerabilities reported [2], this and other well-known Content Management Systems (CMS) have been systematically ... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0108
ATT&CK Technique Name:Blue Mockingbird
Blue Mockingbird has used wmic.exe and Windows Registry modifications to set the COR_PROFILER environment variable to execute a malicious DLL whenever a process loads the .NET CLR.[3] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0419
ATT&CK Technique Name:SimBad
SimBad generates fraudulent advertising revenue by displaying ads in the background and by opening the browser and displaying ads.[12] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S1030
ATT&CK Technique Name:Squirrelwaffle
Squirrelwaffle can collect the user name from a compromised host.[177] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0534
ATT&CK Technique Name:Bazar
The Bazar loader has used dual-extension executable files such as PreviewReport.DOC.exe.[3] | secon |
titleblackhat:eu-19 Fatal Fury on ESP32: Time to Release Hardware Exploits
Released on January 1st 2016, the ESP32, the System-on-Chip (SoC) from Espressif Systems, becomes quickly popular among the IoT industry and electronic hobbyists, due to its wireless connectivity, a low-power consumption and a free development f... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0363
ATT&CK Technique Name:Empire
Empire contains modules that can discover and exploit path interception opportunities in the PATH environment variable.[1] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0311
ATT&CK Technique Name:YiSpecter
YiSpecter has hidden the app icon from iOS springboard.[25] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0689
ATT&CK Technique Name:WhisperGate
WhisperGate can stop its execution when it recognizes the presence of certain monitoring tools.[61] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0045
ATT&CK Technique Name:ADVSTORESHELL
ADVSTORESHELL has used rundll32.exe in a Registry value to establish persistence.[6] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0027
ATT&CK Technique Name:Threat Group-3390
A Threat Group-3390 tool can spawn svchost.exe and inject the payload into that process.[37][38] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0356
ATT&CK Technique Name:KONNI
KONNI had a feature to steal data from the clipboard.[29] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0094
ATT&CK Technique Name:Kimsuky
Kimsuky has used the Nirsoft SniffPass network sniffer to obtain passwords sent over non-secure protocols.[17][18] | secon |
title:blackhat:eu-22 Event-based Fuzzing, Patch-based Research, and Comment Police: Finding Bugs Through a Bug
Learning from known vulnerabilities is a must for every security researcher, and subscribing to the major vendors' monthly public bulletins and security patch updates is the first thing security researchers do... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0555
ATT&CK Technique Name:CHEMISTGAMES
CHEMISTGAMES has collected the device’s location.[15] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0082
ATT&CK Technique Name:Emissary
Emissary has the capability to execute ver and systeminfo commands.[124] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0050
ATT&CK Technique Name:APT32
APT32's backdoor has stored its configuration in a registry key.[3] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:T0885
ATT&CK Technique Name:Commonly Used Port
Adversaries may communicate over a commonly used port to bypass firewalls or network detection systems and to blend in with normal network activity, to avoid more detailed inspection. They may use the protocol associated with the port, or a completely different p... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M1042
ATT&CK Technique Name:Disable or Remove Feature or Program
Disable the SSH daemon on systems that do not require it. For macOS ensure Remote Login is disabled under Sharing Preferences.[18] | secon |
titleblackhat:eu-21 Vulnerability Intelligence
Attend a talk to learn tips to navigate the jungle of the vulnerabilities scene. Most likely the oldest task of a security specialist and still high on the agenda of any security organisation is prioritizing and mitigating weaknesses.What are the different standards and s... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0186
ATT&CK Technique Name:DownPaper
DownPaper uses PowerShell to add a Registry Run key in order to establish persistence.[75] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G1013
ATT&CK Technique Name:Metador
Metador has used unique malware in their operations, including metaMain and Mafalda.[12] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0007
ATT&CK Technique Name:APT28
APT28 exploited a Windows SMB Remote Code Execution Vulnerability to conduct lateral movement.[5][6][7] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0133
ATT&CK Technique Name:Nomadic Octopus
Nomadic Octopus used cmd.exe /c within a malicious macro.[239] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0046
ATT&CK Technique Name:FIN7
FIN7 has registered look-alike domains for use in phishing campaigns.[26] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0143
ATT&CK Technique Name:Aquatic Panda
Aquatic Panda has encoded PowerShell commands in Base64.[14] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0058
ATT&CK Technique Name:SslMM
SslMM creates a new thread implementing a keylogging facility using Windows Keyboard Accelerators.[169] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:C0013
ATT&CK Technique Name:Operation Sharpshooter
During Operation Sharpshooter, threat actors installed Rising Sun in the Startup folder and disguised it as mssync.exe.[114] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0567
ATT&CK Technique Name:Dtrack
Dtrack used hard-coded credentials to gain access to a network share.[21] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0612
ATT&CK Technique Name:WastedLocker
WastedLocker contains junk code to increase its entropy and hide the actual code.[37] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0354
ATT&CK Technique Name:Denis
Denis enumerates and collects the username from the victim’s machine.[47][13] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:C0025
ATT&CK Technique Name:2016 Ukraine Electric Power Attack
During the 2016 Ukraine Electric Power Attack, Sandworm Team transferred executable files as .txt and then renamed them to .exe, likely to avoid detection through extension tracking.[1] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0162
ATT&CK Technique Name:Komplex
The Komplex payload is stored in a hidden directory at /Users/Shared/.local/kextd.[1] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M1026
ATT&CK Technique Name:Privileged Account Management
Remove users from the local administrator group on systems. | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0262
ATT&CK Technique Name:QuasarRAT
If the QuasarRAT client process does not have administrator privileges it will add a registry key to HKCU\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run for persistence.[215][216] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:T1027.002
ATT&CK Technique Name:Software Packing
Adversaries may perform software packing or virtual machine software protection to conceal their code. Software packing is a method of compressing or encrypting an executable. Packing an executable changes the file signature in an attempt to avoid signature-bas... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:C0017
ATT&CK Technique Name:C0017
During C0017, APT41 frequently configured the URL endpoints of their stealthy passive backdoor LOWKEY.PASSIVE to masquerade as normal web application traffic on an infected server.[3] | secon |
titleblackhat:us-20 HTTP Request Smuggling in 2020 – New Variants, New Defenses and New Challenges
HTTP Request Smuggling (AKA HTTP Desyncing) is an attack technique invented in 2005 that exploits different interpretations of a stream non-standard HTTP requests among various HTTP devices between the client (attacker) a... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0663
ATT&CK Technique Name:SysUpdate
SysUpdate can use a Registry Run key to establish persistence.[254] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0010
ATT&CK Technique Name:Turla
Turla surveys a system upon check-in to discover remote systems on a local network using the net view and net view /DOMAIN commands. Turla has also used net group "Domain Computers" /domain, net group "Domain Controllers" /domain, and net group "Exchange Servers" /domain to e... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0094
ATT&CK Technique Name:Kimsuky
Kimsuky has hosted content used for targeting efforts via web services such as Blogspot.[11] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0575
ATT&CK Technique Name:Conti
Conti can spread via SMB and encrypts files on different hosts, potentially compromising an entire network.[21][22] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0010
ATT&CK Technique Name:Turla
Turla RPC backdoors can be used to transfer files to/from victim machines on the local network.[29][30] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0059
ATT&CK Technique Name:Magic Hound
Magic Hound has conducted a network call out to a specific website as part of their initial discovery activity.[6] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0074
ATT&CK Technique Name:Sakula
Sakula uses DLL side-loading, typically using a digitally signed sample of Kaspersky Anti-Virus (AV) 6.0 for Windows Workstations or McAfee's Outlook Scan About Box to load malicious DLL files.[57] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0049
ATT&CK Technique Name:OilRig
OilRig has used the Plink utility and other tools to create tunnels to C2 servers.[30][31][32] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0331
ATT&CK Technique Name:Agent Tesla
Agent Tesla has used process hollowing to create and manipulate processes through sections of unmapped memory by reallocating that space with its malicious code.[3] | secon |
title:blackhat:us-18 An Attacker Looks at Docker: Approaching Multi-Container Applications
Containerization, such as that provided by Docker, is becoming very popular among developers of large-scale applications. This is likely to make life a lot easier for attackers.While exploitation and manipulation of traditional m... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0370
ATT&CK Technique Name:SamSam
SamSam has been seen using AES or DES to encrypt payloads and payload components.[286][287] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0501
ATT&CK Technique Name:PipeMon
PipeMon can collect and send the local IP address, RDP information, and the network adapter physical address as a part of its C2 beacon.[173] | secon |
titleblackhat:us-20 Lamphone: Real-Time Passive Reconstruction of Speech Using Light Emitted from Lamps
Recent studies have suggested various side-channel attacks for eavesdropping sound by analyzing the side effects of sound waves on nearby objects (e.g., a bag of chips and window) and devices (e.g., motion sensors). ... | secon |
title:blackhat:us-23 Civil Cyber Defense: Use Your Resources to Defend Non-Profits as They Combat Human Trafficking and Subvert Authoritarian Regimes
Civil Cyber Defense volunteers and students challenge high-risk adversaries and threats such as human traffickers, authoritarian regimes, and surveillance being conducted... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0610
ATT&CK Technique Name:SideTwist
SideTwist has the ability to search for specific files.[273] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0106
ATT&CK Technique Name:Rocke
Rocke used scripts which detected and uninstalled antivirus software.[86][87] | secon |
titleblackhat:asia-20 ZombieLoad: Leaking Data on Intel CPUs
The publication of Meltdown in January 2018 was the first instance of a hardware vulnerability which broke the security guarantees of modern CPUs. Meltdown allowed attackers to leak arbitrary memory by exploiting that Intel CPUs use lazy fault handling and co... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0368
ATT&CK Technique Name:NotPetya
NotPetya can use valid credentials with PsExec or wmic to spread itself to remote systems.[8][9] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0567
ATT&CK Technique Name:Dtrack
Dtrack can add a service called WBService to establish persistence.[42] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0149
ATT&CK Technique Name:MoonWind
MoonWind installs itself as a new service with automatic startup to establish persistence. The service checks every 60 seconds to determine if the malware is running; if not, it will spawn a new instance.[78] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0135
ATT&CK Technique Name:BackdoorDiplomacy
BackdoorDiplomacy has obtained a variety of open-source reconnaissance and red team tools for discovery and lateral movement.[21] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0615
ATT&CK Technique Name:SombRAT
SombRAT can use the getprocesslist command to enumerate processes on a compromised host.[236][121][237] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0332
ATT&CK Technique Name:Remcos
Remcos can search for files on the infected machine.[247] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0043
ATT&CK Technique Name:Group5
Malware used by Group5 is capable of remotely deleting files from victims.[93] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0615
ATT&CK Technique Name:SombRAT
SombRAT can store harvested data in a custom database under the %TEMP% directory.[88] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0409
ATT&CK Technique Name:Machete
Machete has the capability to exfiltrate stolen data to a hidden folder on a removable drive.[30] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0457
ATT&CK Technique Name:Netwalker
Netwalker's DLL has been embedded within the PowerShell script in hex format.[13] | secon |
titleblackhat:us-18 Follow the White Rabbit: Simplifying Fuzz Testing Using FuzzExMachina
Setting up a fuzzing pipeline takes time and manual effort for identifying fuzzable programs and configuring the fuzzer.Usually only large software projects with dedicated testing teams at their disposal are equipped to use fuzz t... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:T1542.005
ATT&CK Technique Name:TFTP Boot
Adversaries may abuse netbooting to load an unauthorized network device operating system from a Trivial File Transfer Protocol (TFTP) server. TFTP boot (netbooting) is commonly used by network administrators to load configuration-controlled network device images from ... | secon |
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