text stringlengths 100 9.93M | category stringclasses 11
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ATT&CK ID:M0930
ATT&CK Technique Name:Network Segmentation
Segment operational assets and their management devices based on their functional role within the process. Enabling more strict isolation to more critical control and operational information within the control environment. [4] [5] [3] [6] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S1034
ATT&CK Technique Name:StrifeWater
StrifeWater can encrypt C2 traffic using XOR with a hard coded key.[128] | secon |
titleblackhat:eu-20 Locknote: Conclusions and Key Takeaways from Day 1
<span style="font-size: 10pt;" data-mce-style="font-size:
10pt;">Join members of the Black Hat Review Board for an insightful conversation on the most pressing issues facing the InfoSec community. This Locknote will feature a candid discussion on th... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M0945
ATT&CK Technique Name:Code Signing
Digital signatures may be used to ensure application DLLs are authentic prior to execution. | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0354
ATT&CK Technique Name:Denis
Denis replaces the nonexistent Windows DLL "msfte.dll" with its own malicious version, which is loaded by the SearchIndexer.exe and SearchProtocolHost.exe.[2] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0428
ATT&CK Technique Name:PoetRAT
PoetRAT has the ability to compress files with zip.[58] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0088
ATT&CK Technique Name:TEMP.Veles
TEMP.Veles has renamed files to look like legitimate files, such as Windows update files or Schneider Electric application files.[166] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0501
ATT&CK Technique Name:PipeMon
PipeMon installer can use UAC bypass techniques to install the payload.[46] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0330
ATT&CK Technique Name:Zeus Panda
Zeus Panda hooks processes by leveraging its own IAT hooked functions.[16] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0531
ATT&CK Technique Name:Grandoreiro
Grandoreiro can use run keys and create link files in the startup folder for persistence.[108][109] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:T1621
ATT&CK Technique Name:Multi-Factor Authentication Request Generation
Adversaries may attempt to bypass multi-factor authentication (MFA) mechanisms and gain access to accounts by generating MFA requests sent to users. | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0221
ATT&CK Technique Name:Umbreon
Umbreon provides access to the system via SSH or any other protocol that uses PAM to authenticate.[70] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0600
ATT&CK Technique Name:Doki
Doki has resolved the path of a process PID to use as a script argument.[105] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0123
ATT&CK Technique Name:xCmd
xCmd can be used to execute binaries on remote systems by creating and starting a service.[69] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0176
ATT&CK Technique Name:Wingbird
Wingbird deletes its payload along with the payload's parent process after it finishes copying files.[253] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M1030
ATT&CK Technique Name:Network Segmentation
Ensure proper system isolation for critical network systems through use of firewalls. | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M1052
ATT&CK Technique Name:User Account Control
Turn off UAC's privilege elevation for standard users [HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Policies\System] to automatically deny elevation requests, add: "ConsentPromptBehaviorUser"=dword:00000000. Consider enabling installer detection... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0360
ATT&CK Technique Name:BONDUPDATER
BONDUPDATER can read batch commands in a file sent from its C2 server and execute them with cmd.exe.[53] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0034
ATT&CK Technique Name:Sandworm Team
Sandworm Team has sent system information to its C2 server using HTTP.[110] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0137
ATT&CK Technique Name:CORESHELL
CORESHELL obfuscates strings using a custom stream cipher.[88] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0010
ATT&CK Technique Name:Turla
Turla has compromised internal network systems to act as a proxy to forward traffic to C2.[25] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0622
ATT&CK Technique Name:AppleSeed
AppleSeed can collect data on a compromised host.[5][6] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0447
ATT&CK Technique Name:Lokibot
Lokibot has demonstrated the ability to steal credentials from multiple applications and data sources including Safari and the Chromium and Mozilla Firefox-based web browsers.[47] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0106
ATT&CK Technique Name:Rocke
Rocke has used SSH private keys on the infected machine to spread its coinminer throughout a network.[18] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S1065
ATT&CK Technique Name:Woody RAT
Woody RAT has the ability to take a screenshot of the infected host desktop using Windows GDI+.[178] | secon |
title:blackhat:us-18 Compression Oracle Attacks on VPN Networks
Security researchers have done a good amount of practical attacks in the past using chosen plain-text attacks on compressed traffic to steal sensitive data. In spite of how popular CRIME and BREACH were, little was talked about how this class of attacks wa... | secon |
titleblackhat:us-19 Command Injection in F5 iRules
BigIP F5 products are used by large corporations and governments all around the world. Its performance and load sharing capabilities has made it a preferred choice as reverse proxy to route web traffic in complex high performance projects. The F5 product contains a sub... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0622
ATT&CK Technique Name:AppleSeed
AppleSeed has used UPX packers for its payload DLL.[6] | secon |
titleblackhat:us-19 All the 4G Modules Could be Hacked
Nowadays more and more 4G modules are built into IoT devices around the world, such as vending machines, car entertainment systems, laptops, advertising screens, urban cameras etc. But no one has conducted comprehensive security research on the 4G modules. We carri... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0038
ATT&CK Technique Name:Stealth Falcon
Stealth Falcon malware uses WMI to script data collection and command execution on the victim.[42] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0332
ATT&CK Technique Name:Remcos
Remcos uses the infected hosts as SOCKS5 proxies to allow for tunneling and proxying.[40] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0534
ATT&CK Technique Name:Bazar
Bazar has the ability to identify domain administrator accounts.[7][8] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0172
ATT&CK Technique Name:Reaver
Reaver creates a shortcut file and saves it in a Startup folder to establish persistence.[219] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0230
ATT&CK Technique Name:ZeroT
Many ZeroT samples can perform UAC bypass by using eventvwr.exe to execute a malicious file.[65] | secon |
titleblackhat:us-18 ARTist - A Novel Instrumentation Framework for Reversing and Analyzing Android Apps and the Middleware
The Android Runtime (ART), even though introduced in Android 5 already, has not received much attention in the security community. However, its on-device compiler dex2oat, which mostly deprecated t... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0251
ATT&CK Technique Name:Zebrocy
Zebrocy performs persistence with a logon script via adding to the Registry key HKCU\Environment\UserInitMprLogonScript.[9] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0131
ATT&CK Technique Name:Tonto Team
Tonto Team has exploited CVE-2019-0803 and MS16-032 to escalate privileges.[35] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0484
ATT&CK Technique Name:Carberp
Carberp has used XOR-based encryption to mask C2 server locations within the trojan.[70] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:T1612
ATT&CK Technique Name:Build Image on Host
Adversaries may build a container image directly on a host to bypass defenses that monitor for the retrieval of malicious images from a public registry. A remote build request may be sent to the Docker API that includes a Dockerfile that pulls a vanilla base ima... | secon |
title:blackhat:us-19 Firmware Cartography: Charting the Course for Modern Server Compromise
The modern server is the Matryoshka doll of computers, computers inside computers, a giant, undocumented mess. Undocumented devices have made homes at undocumented addresses, on buses, and in protocols most server owners don't k... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0163
ATT&CK Technique Name:Janicab
Janicab used a valid AppleDeveloperID to sign the code to get past security restrictions.[44] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M1041
ATT&CK Technique Name:Encrypt Sensitive Information
Ensure Domain Controller backups are properly secured. | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0432
ATT&CK Technique Name:Bread
Bread payloads have used several commercially available packers.[1] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0446
ATT&CK Technique Name:Ryuk
Ryuk has enumerated files and folders on all mounted drives.[268] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:T1048.002
ATT&CK Technique Name:Exfiltration Over Asymmetric Encrypted Non-C2 Protocol
Adversaries may steal data by exfiltrating it over an asymmetrically encrypted network protocol other than that of the existing command and control channel. The data may also be sent to an alternate network location from th... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0182
ATT&CK Technique Name:FinFisher
A FinFisher variant uses DLL search order hijacking.[20][21] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0598
ATT&CK Technique Name:P.A.S. Webshell
P.A.S. Webshell has the ability to list and extract data from SQL databases.[5] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0050
ATT&CK Technique Name:APT32
APT32 ran legitimately-signed executables from Symantec and McAfee which load a malicious DLL. The group also side-loads its backdoor by dropping a library and a legitimate, signed executable (AcroTranscoder).[5][6][7] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:T1546.005
ATT&CK Technique Name:Trap
Adversaries may establish persistence by executing malicious content triggered by an interrupt signal. The trap command allows programs and shells to specify commands that will be executed upon receiving interrupt signals. A common situation is a script allowing for gracef... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M1034
ATT&CK Technique Name:Limit Hardware Installation
Limit the use of USB devices and removable media within a network. | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S1063
ATT&CK Technique Name:Brute Ratel C4
Brute Ratel C4 has the ability to use TCP for external C2.[12] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0484
ATT&CK Technique Name:Carberp
Carberp has hooked several Windows API functions to steal credentials.[7] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0185
ATT&CK Technique Name:SEASHARPEE
SEASHARPEE can timestomp files on victims using a Web shell.[47] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0341
ATT&CK Technique Name:Xbash
Xbash can download additional malicious files from its C2 server.[484] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0016
ATT&CK Technique Name:APT29
APT29 has compromised IT, cloud services, and managed services providers to gain broad access to multiple customers for subsequent operations.[4] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:C0024
ATT&CK Technique Name:SolarWinds Compromise
During the SolarWinds Compromise, APT29 used stolen cookies to access cloud resources and a forged duo-sid cookie to bypass MFA set on an email account.[3][4] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0040
ATT&CK Technique Name:Patchwork
Patchwork has created self-signed certificates from fictitious and spoofed legitimate software companies that were later used to sign malware.[3] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0139
ATT&CK Technique Name:PowerDuke
PowerDuke uses steganography to hide backdoors in PNG files, which are also encrypted using the Tiny Encryption Algorithm (TEA).[19] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0434
ATT&CK Technique Name:Imminent Monitor
Imminent Monitor has a dynamic debugging feature to set the file attribute to hidden.[22] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0491
ATT&CK Technique Name:StrongPity
StrongPity can use multiple layers of proxy servers to hide terminal nodes in its infrastructure.[20] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S1018
ATT&CK Technique Name:Saint Bot
The Saint Bot loader has used API calls to spawn MSBuild.exe in a suspended state before injecting the decrypted Saint Bot binary into it.[34] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0062
ATT&CK Technique Name:DustySky
DustySky created folders in temp directories to host collected files before exfiltration.[29] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0665
ATT&CK Technique Name:ThreatNeedle
ThreatNeedle can run in memory and register its payload as a Windows service.[124] | secon |
title:blackhat:eu-18 Thermanator and the Thermal Residue Attack
As warm-blooded mammals, humans routinely leave thermal residue on various objects with which they come in contact. This includes common input devices, such as keyboards, that are used for entering (among other things) secret information: passwords and PIN... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M1021
ATT&CK Technique Name:Restrict Web-Based Content
Script blocking extensions can help prevent the execution of scripts and HTA files that may commonly be used during the exploitation process. For malicious code served up through ads, adblockers can help prevent that code from executing in the first place... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:C0022
ATT&CK Technique Name:Operation Dream Job
During Operation Dream Job, Lazarus Group launched malicious DLL files, created new folders, and renamed folders with the use of the Windows command shell.[249][250] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0124
ATT&CK Technique Name:Pisloader
Responses from the Pisloader C2 server are base32-encoded.[66] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M1048
ATT&CK Technique Name:Application Isolation and Sandboxing
Consider utilizing seccomp, seccomp-bpf, or a similar solution that restricts certain system calls such as mount. In Kubernetes environments, consider defining Pod Security Standards that limit container access to host process namespaces, the ho... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0535
ATT&CK Technique Name:Golden Cup
Golden Cup can collect a directory listing of external storage.[4] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M0807
ATT&CK Technique Name:Network Allowlists
Use host-based allowlists to prevent devices from accepting connections from unauthorized systems. For example, allowlists can be used to ensure devices can only connect with master stations or known management/engineering workstations. [3] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0455
ATT&CK Technique Name:Metamorfo
Metamorfo has used MsiExec.exe to automatically execute files.[16][17] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0054
ATT&CK Technique Name:Sowbug
Sowbug has used command line during its intrusions.[313] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0289
ATT&CK Technique Name:Pegasus for iOS
Pegasus for iOS has the ability to record audio.[23] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0067
ATT&CK Technique Name:APT37
APT37 has a function in the initial dropper to bypass Windows UAC in order to execute the next payload with higher privileges.[11] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0281
ATT&CK Technique Name:Dok
Dok adds admin ALL=(ALL) NOPASSWD: ALL to the /etc/sudoers file.[5] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S1052
ATT&CK Technique Name:DEADEYE
DEADEYE can use msiexec.exe for execution of malicious DLL.[8] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0559
ATT&CK Technique Name:SUNBURST
SUNBURST also removed the firewall rules it created during execution.[6] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:C0025
ATT&CK Technique Name:2016 Ukraine Electric Power Attack
During the 2016 Ukraine Electric Power Attack, Sandworm Team used MS-SQL access to a pivot machine, allowing code execution throughout the ICS network.[5] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0032
ATT&CK Technique Name:Lazarus Group
Some Lazarus Group malware uses a list of ordered port numbers to choose a port for C2 traffic, creating port-protocol mismatches.[19][20] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0127
ATT&CK Technique Name:BBSRAT
BBSRAT has been seen persisting via COM hijacking through replacement of the COM object for MruPidlList {42aedc87-2188-41fd-b9a3-0c966feabec1} or Microsoft WBEM New Event Subsystem {F3130CDB-AA52-4C3A-AB32-85FFC23AF9C1} depending on the system's CPU architecture.[6] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S1039
ATT&CK Technique Name:Bumblebee
Bumblebee has been downloaded to victim's machines from OneDrive.[6] | secon |
titleblackhat:us-19 The Future of Securing Intelligent Electronic Devices Using the IEC 62351-7 Standard for Monitoring
Until recently, passive monitoring has been the standard approach for OT networks because of the critical processes these networks support. However, as industrial organizations embrace Industry 4.0 an... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M1052
ATT&CK Technique Name:User Account Control
Turn off UAC's privilege elevation for standard users [HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Policies\System] to automatically deny elevation requests, add: "ConsentPromptBehaviorUser"=dword:00000000. Consider enabling installer detection... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M1032
ATT&CK Technique Name:Multi-factor Authentication
Integrating multi-factor authentication (MFA) as part of organizational policy can greatly reduce the risk of an adversary gaining control of valid credentials that may be used for additional tactics such as initial access, lateral movement, and collecti... | secon |
title:blackhat:eu-21 Lost in the Loader: The Many Faces of the Windows PE File Format
This Briefing presents our research on parser differentials for the PE format. We defined a custom language to write "formal models" of various PE loaders, for different versions of Windows and reverse-engineering tools. We then built... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0035
ATT&CK Technique Name:Dragonfly
Dragonfly has used various types of scripting to perform operations, including batch scripts.[105] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M1037
ATT&CK Technique Name:Filter Network Traffic
Consider filtering DHCP traffic on ports 67 and 68 to/from unknown or untrusted DHCP servers. Additionally, port security may also be enabled on layer switches. Furthermore, consider enabling DHCP snooping on layer 2 switches as it will prevent DHCP spoofing ... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0684
ATT&CK Technique Name:ROADTools
ROADTools leverages valid cloud credentials to perform enumeration operations using the internal Azure AD Graph API.[10] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M0813
ATT&CK Technique Name:Software Process and Device Authentication
Authenticate connections from software and devices to prevent unauthorized systems from accessing protected management functions. | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0687
ATT&CK Technique Name:Cyclops Blink
Cyclops Blink has the ability to execute on device startup, using a modified RC script named S51armled.[8] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S1042
ATT&CK Technique Name:SUGARDUMP
SUGARDUMP has created scheduled tasks called MicrosoftInternetExplorerCrashRepoeterTaskMachineUA and MicrosoftEdgeCrashRepoeterTaskMachineUA, which were configured to execute CrashReporter.exe during user logon.[168] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0651
ATT&CK Technique Name:BoxCaon
BoxCaon has the capability to download folders' contents on the system and upload the results back to its Dropbox drive.[2] | secon |
title:botconf2020 Hunting MageCart Skimmers
Unsuspecting online shoppers risk credit card fraud by shopping on legitimate websites due to online credit card skimming. The COVID-19 pandemic forced many to shop online, unwillingly helping the criminals behind the online credit card skimmer operations. Aside from covering... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0345
ATT&CK Technique Name:Seasalt
Seasalt has a command to delete a specified file.[212] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0265
ATT&CK Technique Name:Kazuar
Kazuar finds a specified directory, lists the files and metadata about those files.[159] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:C0012
ATT&CK Technique Name:Operation CuckooBees
During Operation CuckooBees, the threat actors used the legitimate Windows services IKEEXT and PrintNotify to side-load malicious DLLs.[49] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0650
ATT&CK Technique Name:QakBot
QakBot can inject itself into processes including explore.exe, Iexplore.exe, Mobsync.exe., and wermgr.exe.[46][47][48][49][50] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:C0024
ATT&CK Technique Name:SolarWinds Compromise
During the SolarWinds Compromise, APT29 was able to get SUNBURST signed by SolarWinds code signing certificates by injecting the malware into the SolarWinds Orion software lifecycle.[64] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0509
ATT&CK Technique Name:FakeSpy
FakeSpy can collect account information stored on the device, as well as data in external storage.[5] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0535
ATT&CK Technique Name:Golden Cup
Golden Cup can collect the device’s contact list.[19] | secon |
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