text stringlengths 100 9.93M | category stringclasses 11
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ATT&CK ID:G0114
ATT&CK Technique Name:Chimera
Chimera has exfiltrated stolen data to OneDrive accounts.[4] | secon |
title:botconf2022 Detecting and Disrupting Compromised Devices based on Their Communication Patterns to Legitimate Web Services
Data breaches of enterprises have been one of the most destructive and prominent security threats that enterprises have been facing in recent years. Some well-known APT groups as well as cyber... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0498
ATT&CK Technique Name:Cryptoistic
Cryptoistic can gather data on the user of a compromised host.[44] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0375
ATT&CK Technique Name:Remexi
Remexi utilizes Run Registry keys in the HKLM hive as a persistence mechanism.[222] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M1025
ATT&CK Technique Name:Privileged Process Integrity
On Windows 8.1 and Windows Server 2012 R2, enable Protected Process Light for LSA.[27] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0038
ATT&CK Technique Name:Duqu
Adversaries can instruct Duqu to spread laterally by copying itself to shares it has enumerated and for which it has obtained legitimate credentials (via keylogging or other means). The remote host is then infected by using the compromised credentials to schedule a task on rem... | secon |
titleblackhat:us-18 Lessons from Virginia - A Comparative Forensic Analysis of WinVote Voting Machines
The WinVote voting machine was used extensively in Virginia elections during 2004 and 2015. It has been dubbed the worst voting machine ever and that for good reasons. It runs Windows XP, service pack 0. It has by def... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M1017
ATT&CK Technique Name:User Training
Train users to identify social engineering techniques and spearphishing emails that could be used to deliver malicious documents. | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0022
ATT&CK Technique Name:APT3
APT3 has a tool that creates a new service for persistence.[10] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M0810
ATT&CK Technique Name:Out-of-Band Communications Channel
Utilize out-of-band communication to validate the integrity of data from the primary channel. | secon |
title:botconf2020 APKatche Me If You Can Uncovering Obfuscation-as-a-Service for Malicious Android Applications
Hide away! A well-obfuscated malicious application can run on a device for a long time without detection, avoiding the-cat-and-mouse race between attackers and defenders. Still, how easy is it to protect an a... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0366
ATT&CK Technique Name:WannaCry
WannaCry uses Tor for command and control traffic and routes a custom cryptographic protocol over the Tor circuit.[64] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:T1639
ATT&CK Technique Name:Exfiltration Over Alternative Protocol
Adversaries may steal data by exfiltrating it over a different protocol than that of the existing command and control channel. The data may also be sent to an alternate network location from the main command and control server. | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0348
ATT&CK Technique Name:Cardinal RAT
Cardinal RAT injects into a newly spawned process created from a native Windows executable.[12] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0169
ATT&CK Technique Name:RawPOS
RawPOS dumps memory from specific processes on a victim system, parses the dumped files, and scrapes them for credit card data.[155][156][157] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0256
ATT&CK Technique Name:Mosquito
Mosquito uses COM hijacking as a method of persistence.[11] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0059
ATT&CK Technique Name:Magic Hound
Magic Hound has used Ping for discovery on targeted networks.[55] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0444
ATT&CK Technique Name:ShimRat
ShimRat has installed a registry based start-up key HKCU\Software\microsoft\windows\CurrentVersion\Run to maintain persistence should other methods fail.[240] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0168
ATT&CK Technique Name:Gazer
Gazer can establish persistence by creating a scheduled task.[71][72] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0115
ATT&CK Technique Name:Crimson
Crimson has the ability to execute commands with the COMSPEC environment variable.[91] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0266
ATT&CK Technique Name:TrickBot
TrickBot can use secondary C2 servers for communication after establishing connectivity and relaying victim information to primary C2 servers.[1] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0655
ATT&CK Technique Name:BusyGasper
BusyGasper can utilize the device’s sensors to determine when the device is in use and subsequently hide malicious activity. When active, it attempts to hide its malicious activity by turning the screen’s brightness as low as possible and muting the device.[1] | secon |
title:blackhat:us-22 Leveraging the Apple ESF for Behavioral Detections
Since its 2019 introduction in macOS Catalina, we have used the Apple Endpoint Security Framework (ESF) as an event source to fuel behavioral-based detections. In this talk, we will focus on the difference between the old and new ways of detecting ... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:C0014
ATT&CK Technique Name:Operation Wocao
During Operation Wocao, threat actors' backdoors were written in Python and compiled with py2exe.[31] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0086
ATT&CK Technique Name:ZLib
ZLib has the ability to enumerate system information.[232] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M0937
ATT&CK Technique Name:Filter Network Traffic
Filter application-layer protocol messages for remote services to block any unauthorized activity. | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0094
ATT&CK Technique Name:Kimsuky
Kimsuky has collected victim organization information including but not limited to organization hierarchy, functions, press releases, and others.[3] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0024
ATT&CK Technique Name:Putter Panda
An executable dropped onto victims by Putter Panda aims to inject the specified DLL into a process that would normally be accessing the network, including Outlook Express (msinm.exe), Outlook (outlook.exe), Internet Explorer (iexplore.exe), and Firefox (firefox.exe).[5... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0561
ATT&CK Technique Name:GuLoader
GuLoader has the ability to perform anti-VM and anti-sandbox checks using string hashing, the API call EnumWindows, and checking for Qemu guest agent.[27] | secon |
title:blackhat:eu-19 BitLeaker: Subverting BitLocker with One Vulnerability
Trusted Platform Module (TPM) is a tamper-resistant security module. It has been widely deployed in commercial devices to protect secret data and ensure the trustworthiness of a system. There are two typical types of TPMs, hardware-based discre... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M1047
ATT&CK Technique Name:Audit
Check for common UAC bypass weaknesses on Windows systems to be aware of the risk posture and address issues where appropriate.[1] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0038
ATT&CK Technique Name:Stealth Falcon
After data is collected by Stealth Falcon malware, it is exfiltrated over the existing C2 channel.[122] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0087
ATT&CK Technique Name:APT39
APT39 has used the post exploitation tool CrackMapExec to enumerate network shares.[6] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0665
ATT&CK Technique Name:ThreatNeedle
ThreatNeedle relies on a victim to click on a malicious document for initial execution.[127] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0443
ATT&CK Technique Name:MESSAGETAP
MESSAGETAP stored targeted SMS messages that matched its target list in CSV files on the compromised system.[58] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:T1406
ATT&CK Technique Name:Obfuscated Files or Information
Adversaries may attempt to make a payload or file difficult to discover or analyze by encrypting, encoding, or otherwise obfuscating its contents on the device or in transit. This is common behavior that can be used across different platforms and the... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0029
ATT&CK Technique Name:PsExec
PsExec has the ability to remotely create accounts on target systems.[7] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0521
ATT&CK Technique Name:BloodHound
BloodHound can collect information on user sessions.[25] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0092
ATT&CK Technique Name:TA505
TA505 has deployed payloads that use Windows API calls on a compromised host.[168] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0496
ATT&CK Technique Name:REvil
REvil can encrypt files on victim systems and demands a ransom to decrypt the files.[69][70][71][72][73][74][75][76] | secon |
titleblackhat:eu-21 Windows Defender - Demystifying and Bypassing ASR by Understanding the AV's Signatures
Windows Defender is the Windows' built-in antivirus software, giving it a place in most information systems. But still, its signature format is yet undocumented.This talk tries to rectify this situation. This ... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0126
ATT&CK Technique Name:Higaisa
Higaisa discovered system proxy settings and used them if available.[11] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0095
ATT&CK Technique Name:ftp
ftp may be abused by adversaries to transfer tools or files from an external system into a compromised environment.[186][187] | secon |
titleblackhat:us-20 Industrial Protocol Gateways Under Analysis
With the development of the Industry 4.0, legacy devices like serial control servers or PLCs are often needed to be interconnected to modern IT networks, or to the Internet (e.g. cloud providers). To address this need, protocol gateways enable the conversi... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0067
ATT&CK Technique Name:APT37
APT37 leverages social networking sites and cloud platforms (AOL, Twitter, Yandex, Mediafire, pCloud, Dropbox, and Box) for C2.[3][4] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0067
ATT&CK Technique Name:pngdowner
pngdowner deletes content from C2 communications that was saved to the user's temporary directory.[177] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S1045
ATT&CK Technique Name:INCONTROLLER
INCONTROLLER can login to Omron PLCs using hardcoded credentials, which is documented in CVE-2022-34151.[1] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M1026
ATT&CK Technique Name:Privileged Account Management
Prevent credential overlap across systems of administrator and privileged accounts. [2] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0054
ATT&CK Technique Name:Sowbug
Sowbug listed remote shared drives that were accessible from a victim.[53] | secon |
title:blackhat:eu-19 New Exploit Technique In Java Deserialization Attack
Java deserialization attack has been proposed around 2015 by Foxglove Security Team. Afterward, another attack surface named Marshalsec Attack has been developed. It allows an attacker to gain Remote Command Execution, which affects a number of a... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M1010
ATT&CK Technique Name:Deploy Compromised Device Detection Method
Mobile security software can typically detect if a device has been rooted or jailbroken and can inform the user, who can then take appropriate action. | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M1006
ATT&CK Technique Name:Use Recent OS Version
New OS releases frequently contain additional limitations or controls around device location access. | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0176
ATT&CK Technique Name:Wingbird
Wingbird side loads a malicious file, sspisrv.dll, in part of a spoofed lssas.exe service.[66][67] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0049
ATT&CK Technique Name:OilRig
OilRig has used macros to verify if a mouse is connected to a compromised machine.[34] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0141
ATT&CK Technique Name:Winnti for Windows
A Winnti for Windows implant file was named ASPNET_FILTER.DLL, mimicking the legitimate ASP.NET ISAPI filter DLL with the same name.[176] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:T1113
ATT&CK Technique Name:Screen Capture
Adversaries may attempt to take screen captures of the desktop to gather information over the course of an operation. Screen capturing functionality may be included as a feature of a remote access tool used in post-compromise operations. Taking a screenshot is also t... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0170
ATT&CK Technique Name:Helminth
The executable version of Helminth has a module to log keystrokes.[77] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0049
ATT&CK Technique Name:OilRig
OilRig has used keylogging tools called KEYPUNCH and LONGWATCH.[129][130] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0096
ATT&CK Technique Name:APT41
APT41 used legitimate executables to perform DLL side-loading of their malware.[8] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0040
ATT&CK Technique Name:Patchwork
Patchwork hides base64-encoded and encrypted C2 server locations in comments on legitimate websites.[15] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0448
ATT&CK Technique Name:Rising Sun
Rising Sun can delete files and artifacts it creates.[202] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0268
ATT&CK Technique Name:Bisonal
Bisonal's dropper creates VBS scripts on the victim’s machine.[18][19] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M1032
ATT&CK Technique Name:Multi-factor Authentication
Use strong two-factor or multi-factor authentication for remote service accounts to mitigate an adversary's ability to leverage stolen credentials, but be aware of Multi-Factor Authentication Interception techniques for some two-factor authentication imp... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G1000
ATT&CK Technique Name:ALLANITE
ALLANITE has been identified to collect and distribute screenshots of ICS systems such as HMIs. [2] [1] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G1002
ATT&CK Technique Name:BITTER
BITTER has sent spearphishing emails with a malicious RTF document or Excel spreadsheet.[43][44] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0496
ATT&CK Technique Name:REvil
REvil has encrypted C2 communications with the ECIES algorithm.[45] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0318
ATT&CK Technique Name:XLoader for Android
XLoader for Android collects SMS messages.[54] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0530
ATT&CK Technique Name:Melcoz
Melcoz can monitor the victim's browser for online banking sessions and display an overlay window to manipulate the session in the background.[11] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0150
ATT&CK Technique Name:POSHSPY
POSHSPY uses a WMI event subscription to establish persistence.[16] | secon |
titleblackhat:us-20 Spectra: Breaking Separation Between Wireless Chips
Nowadays wireless technologies are increasingly sharing spectrum. This is the case for Wi-Fi and Bluetooth, but also some LTE bands and harmonics. Operating on the same frequency means that these different technologies need to coordinate wireless s... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S1061
ATT&CK Technique Name:AbstractEmu
AbstractEmu has used code abstraction and anti-emulation checks to potentially avoid running while under analysis.[1] | secon |
title:blackhat:us-20 Stealthily Access Your Android Phones: Bypass the Bluetooth Authentication
Every Android phone loves Bluetooth, a short-range wireless communication technology. We can find a large number of Bluetooth devices in any public place. Many of their security issues have been exposed before, such as BlueB... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0001
ATT&CK Technique Name:Axiom
Axiom has used watering hole attacks to gain access.[14] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0213
ATT&CK Technique Name:DOGCALL
DOGCALL is capable of leveraging cloud storage APIs such as Cloud, Box, Dropbox, and Yandex for C2.[3][25] | secon |
title:blackhat:us-20 Heroku Abuse Operations: Hunting Wolves in Sheep's Clothing
Black Hat attendees 'get' security - but strategically speaking, where does abuse management fit?Abuse Operations - at its core - is detection of and response to malicious activity when everything is working "as designed." Classical se... | secon |
titleblackhat:eu-20 Jack-in-the-Cache: A New Code injection Technique through Modifying X86-to-ARM Translation Cache
Recently, the adoption of ARM processors for laptop computers is becoming popular due to its high energy efficiency. Windows 10 on ARM is a new OS for such ARM-based computers. Several laptop computers w... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0073
ATT&CK Technique Name:APT19
APT19 used HTTP for C2 communications. APT19 also used an HTTP malware variant to communicate over HTTP for C2.[15][16] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0631
ATT&CK Technique Name:Chaes
Chaes has used .MSI files as an initial way to start the infection chain.[6] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0316
ATT&CK Technique Name:Pegasus for Android
Pegasus for Android attempts to exploit well-known Android OS vulnerabilities to escalate privileges.[11] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:T1608
ATT&CK Technique Name:Stage Capabilities
Adversaries may upload, install, or otherwise set up capabilities that can be used during targeting. To support their operations, an adversary may need to take capabilities they developed (Develop Capabilities) or obtained (Obtain Capabilities) and stage them on ... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M1047
ATT&CK Technique Name:Audit
Identify and correct GPO permissions abuse opportunities (ex: GPO modification privileges) using auditing tools such as BloodHound (version 1.5.1 and later).[15] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0268
ATT&CK Technique Name:Bisonal
Bisonal can execute ipconfig on the victim’s machine.[34][35][36] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M1056
ATT&CK Technique Name:Pre-compromise
This technique cannot be easily mitigated with preventive controls since it is based on behaviors performed outside of the scope of enterprise defenses and controls. | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0027
ATT&CK Technique Name:Threat Group-3390
Threat Group-3390 has used CVE-2014-6324 and CVE-2017-0213 to escalate privileges.[33][34] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:T1632
ATT&CK Technique Name:Subvert Trust Controls
Adversaries may undermine security controls that will either warn users of untrusted activity or prevent execution of untrusted applications. Operating systems and security products may contain mechanisms to identify programs or websites as possessing some le... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M1045
ATT&CK Technique Name:Code Signing
Enforce registration and execution of only legitimately signed service drivers where possible. | secon |
titleblackhat:us-21 ERROR: BadAlloc! - Broken Memory Allocators Led to Millions of Vulnerable IoT and Embedded Devices
"BadAlloc" is our code name for a class of integer-overflow related security issues found in popular memory allocators' core functions such as malloc and calloc. BadAlloc vulnerabilities affect 17 diff... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:T1546.009
ATT&CK Technique Name:AppCert DLLs
Adversaries may establish persistence and/or elevate privileges by executing malicious content triggered by AppCert DLLs loaded into processes. Dynamic-link libraries (DLLs) that are specified in the AppCertDLLs Registry key under HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\System\CurrentC... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G1014
ATT&CK Technique Name:LuminousMoth
LuminousMoth has created a link to a Dropbox file that has been used in their spear-phishing operations.[7] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0352
ATT&CK Technique Name:OSX_OCEANLOTUS.D
OSX_OCEANLOTUS.D can use HTTP POST and GET requests to send and receive C2 information.[240] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:T1048.003
ATT&CK Technique Name:Exfiltration Over Unencrypted Non-C2 Protocol
Adversaries may steal data by exfiltrating it over an un-encrypted network protocol other than that of the existing command and control channel. The data may also be sent to an alternate network location from the main command and co... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0010
ATT&CK Technique Name:Turla
Turla has abused local accounts that have the same password across the victim’s network.[14] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M1031
ATT&CK Technique Name:Network Intrusion Prevention
Network intrusion detection and prevention systems that use network signatures to identify traffic for specific adversary malware can be used to mitigate activity at the network level. Signatures are often for unique indicators within protocols and may ... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S1035
ATT&CK Technique Name:Small Sieve
Small Sieve can use cmd.exe to execute commands on a victim's system.[310] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0601
ATT&CK Technique Name:Hildegard
Hildegard has packed ELF files into other binaries.[48] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0258
ATT&CK Technique Name:RGDoor
RGDoor uses cmd.exe to execute commands on the victim’s machine.[286] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M1030
ATT&CK Technique Name:Network Segmentation
Follow best practices for network firewall configurations to allow only necessary ports and traffic to enter and exit the network.[10] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:T1562.002
ATT&CK Technique Name:Disable Windows Event Logging
Adversaries may disable Windows event logging to limit data that can be leveraged for detections and audits. Windows event logs record user and system activity such as login attempts, process creation, and much more. This data is used by security t... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0627
ATT&CK Technique Name:SodaMaster
SodaMaster can use a hardcoded RSA key to encrypt some of its C2 traffic.[52] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:C0020
ATT&CK Technique Name:Maroochy Water Breach
In the Maroochy Water Breach, the adversary temporarily shut an investigator out of the network, preventing them from viewing the state of the system.[5] | secon |
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