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titleblackhat:asia-19 Intel VISA: Through the Rabbit Hole
The complexity of x86-based systems has become so great that not even specialists can know everything. The recently discovered Meltdown/Spectre vulnerabilities, as well as numerous issues in Intel Management Engine, underscore the platform's mindboggling intrica... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0050
ATT&CK Technique Name:APT32
APT32 has used hidden or non-printing characters to help masquerade service names, such as appending a Unicode no-break space character to a legitimate service name. APT32 has also impersonated the legitimate Flash installer file name "install_flashplayer.exe".[6] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0117
ATT&CK Technique Name:Fox Kitten
Fox Kitten has used PowerShell scripts to access credential data.[102] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0122
ATT&CK Technique Name:Silent Librarian
Silent Librarian has set up auto forwarding rules on compromised e-mail accounts.[8] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0352
ATT&CK Technique Name:OSX_OCEANLOTUS.D
OSX_OCEANLOTUS.D uses a shell script as the main executable inside an app bundle and drops an embedded base64-encoded payload to the /tmp folder.[34][35] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M1038
ATT&CK Technique Name:Execution Prevention
Consider using application control configured to block execution of CMSTP.exe if it is not required for a given system or network to prevent potential misuse by adversaries. | secon |
title:blackhat:us-21 How To Tame Your Unicorn - Exploring and Exploiting Zero-Click Remote Interfaces of Modern Huawei Smartphones
The exploration of baseband security has come a long way in the past decade. Published research has exposed privacy issues in 3GPP protocols from GSM to LTE and traditional memory safety vu... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M1047
ATT&CK Technique Name:Audit
Routinely check account role permissions to ensure only expected users and roles have permission to modify cloud firewalls. | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M0802
ATT&CK Technique Name:Communication Authenticity
Protocols used for device management should authenticate all network messages to prevent unauthorized system changes. | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0043
ATT&CK Technique Name:BUBBLEWRAP
BUBBLEWRAP collects system information, including the operating system version and hostname.[9] | secon |
title:blackhat:us-19 0-days & Mitigations: Roadways to Exploit and Secure Connected BMW Cars
Cyber security for connected cars has become a widespread concern over the past years. In years 2016 and 2017, Keen Security Lab has demonstrated two remote attacks against Tesla Model S/X; In March 2018, Keen Security Lab succ... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M1056
ATT&CK Technique Name:Pre-compromise
This technique cannot be easily mitigated with preventive controls since it is based on behaviors performed outside of the scope of enterprise defenses and controls. | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0125
ATT&CK Technique Name:Remsec
Remsec harvests plain-text credentials as a password filter registered on domain controllers.[2] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S1042
ATT&CK Technique Name:SUGARDUMP
SUGARDUMP can search for and collect data from specific Chrome, Opera, Microsoft Edge, and Firefox files, including any folders that have the string Profile in its name.[290] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0532
ATT&CK Technique Name:Lucifer
Lucifer can scan for open ports including TCP ports 135 and 1433.[38] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M1042
ATT&CK Technique Name:Disable or Remove Feature or Program
Disable Autoruns if it is unnecessary.[5] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0078
ATT&CK Technique Name:Psylo
Psylo exfiltrates data to its C2 server over the same protocol as C2 communications.[21] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:T1112
ATT&CK Technique Name:Modify Registry
Adversaries may interact with the Windows Registry to hide configuration information within Registry keys, remove information as part of cleaning up, or as part of other techniques to aid in persistence and execution. | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0180
ATT&CK Technique Name:Volgmer
Volgmer uses a simple XOR cipher to encrypt traffic and files.[141] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0669
ATT&CK Technique Name:KOCTOPUS
KOCTOPUS can delete created registry keys used for persistence as part of its cleanup procedure.[5] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0211
ATT&CK Technique Name:Linfo
Linfo creates a backdoor through which remote attackers can obtain data from local systems.[107] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0366
ATT&CK Technique Name:WannaCry
WannaCry contains a thread that will attempt to scan for new attached drives every few seconds. If one is identified, it will encrypt the files on the attached device.[50] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0646
ATT&CK Technique Name:SpicyOmelette
SpicyOmelette has collected data and other information from a compromised host.[173] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:T1589
ATT&CK Technique Name:Gather Victim Identity Information
Adversaries may gather information about the victim's identity that can be used during targeting. Information about identities may include a variety of details, including personal data (ex: employee names, email addresses, etc.) as well as sensiti... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S1018
ATT&CK Technique Name:Saint Bot
Saint Bot can collect the username from a compromised host.[163] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S1068
ATT&CK Technique Name:BlackCat
BlackCat can delete shadow copies using vssadmin.exe delete shadows /all /quiet and wmic.exe Shadowcopy Delete; it can also modify the boot loader using bcdedit /set {default} recoveryenabled No.[21] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0402
ATT&CK Technique Name:OSX/Shlayer
OSX/Shlayer can install malicious Safari browser extensions to serve ads.[15][16] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0521
ATT&CK Technique Name:BloodHound
BloodHound can collect information about local groups and members.[2] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S1015
ATT&CK Technique Name:Milan
Milan can encode files containing information about the targeted system.[215][181] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0117
ATT&CK Technique Name:Fox Kitten
Fox Kitten has obtained files from the victim's cloud storage instances.[12] | secon |
title:blackhat:us-18 Over-the-Air: How we Remotely Compromised the Gateway, BCM, and Autopilot ECUs of Tesla Cars
We, Keen Security Lab of Tencent, have successfully implemented two remote attacks on the Tesla Model S/X in year 2016 and 2017. Last year, at Black Hat USA, we presented the details of our first attack cha... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0010
ATT&CK Technique Name:Turla
Turla RPC backdoors can collect files from USB thumb drives.[25][26] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0139
ATT&CK Technique Name:TeamTNT
TeamTNT has run netstat -anp to search for rival malware connections.[84] TeamTNT has also used libprocesshider to modify /etc/ld.so.preload.[85] | secon |
titleblackhat:asia-23 A Run a Day Won't Keep the Hacker Away: Inference Attacks on Endpoint Privacy Zones in Fitness Tracking Social Networks
Fitness tracking social networks such as Strava allow users to record sports activities and share them publicly. Sharing encourages peer interaction but also constitutes a risk, ... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0650
ATT&CK Technique Name:QakBot
QakBot can check the compromised host for the presence of multiple executables associated with analysis tools and halt execution if any are found.[43][44] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S1060
ATT&CK Technique Name:Mafalda
Mafalda can execute PowerShell commands on a compromised machine.[140] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0395
ATT&CK Technique Name:LightNeuron
LightNeuron is capable of starting a process using CreateProcess.[109] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0318
ATT&CK Technique Name:XLoader for Android
XLoader for Android collects the device’s Android ID and serial number.[42] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0661
ATT&CK Technique Name:FoggyWeb
FoggyWeb can retrieve configuration data from a compromised AD FS server.[74] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0323
ATT&CK Technique Name:Charger
Charger encodes strings into binary arrays to make it difficult to inspect them. It also loads code from encrypted resources dynamically and includes meaningless commands that mask the actual commands passing through.[10] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0445
ATT&CK Technique Name:ShimRatReporter
ShimRatReporter sent generated reports to the C2 via HTTP POST requests.[112] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M1021
ATT&CK Technique Name:Restrict Web-Based Content
In some cases a local DNS sinkhole may be used to help prevent behaviors associated with dynamic resolution. | secon |
ATT&CK ID:C0022
ATT&CK Technique Name:Operation Dream Job
During Operation Dream Job, Lazarus Group sent malicious OneDrive links with fictitious job offer advertisements via email.[80][81] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0342
ATT&CK Technique Name:GreyEnergy
GreyEnergy has a module to harvest pressed keystrokes.[75] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0144
ATT&CK Technique Name:ChChes
ChChes steals credentials stored inside Internet Explorer.[19] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:T1574
ATT&CK Technique Name:Hijack Execution Flow
Adversaries may execute their own malicious payloads by hijacking the way operating systems run programs. Hijacking execution flow can be for the purposes of persistence, since this hijacked execution may reoccur over time. Adversaries may also use these mecha... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0228
ATT&CK Technique Name:NanHaiShu
NanHaiShu modifies the %regrun% Registry to point itself to an autostart mechanism.[175] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0253
ATT&CK Technique Name:RunningRAT
RunningRAT uses a batch file to kill a security program task and then attempts to remove itself.[139] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0249
ATT&CK Technique Name:Gold Dragon
Gold Dragon enumerates registry keys with the command regkeyenum and obtains information for the Registry key HKEY_CURRENT_USER\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run.[16] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M1026
ATT&CK Technique Name:Privileged Account Management
Configure the Increase Scheduling Priority option to only allow the Administrators group the rights to schedule a priority process. This can be configured through GPO: Computer Configuration > [Policies] > Windows Settings > Security Settings > Local P... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0147
ATT&CK Technique Name:Pteranodon
Pteranodon can use mshta.exe to execute an HTA file hosted on a remote server.[16] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:C0024
ATT&CK Technique Name:SolarWinds Compromise
During the SolarWinds Compromise, APT29 routinely removed their tools, including custom backdoors, once remote access was achieved.[221] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0069
ATT&CK Technique Name:MuddyWater
MuddyWater has used malware to collect the victim’s IP address and domain name.[148] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0414
ATT&CK Technique Name:BabyShark
BabyShark has executed the reg query command for HKEY_CURRENT_USER\Software\Microsoft\Terminal Server Client\Default.[8] | secon |
title:blackhat:us-18 Your Voice is My Passport
Financial institutions, home automation products, and hi-tech offices have increasingly used voice fingerprinting as a method for authentication. Recent advances in machine learning have shown that text-to-speech systems can generate synthetic, high-quality audio of subjec... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0047
ATT&CK Technique Name:Gamaredon Group
Gamaredon Group has used VNC tools, including UltraVNC, to remotely interact with compromised hosts.[14][15][16] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:C0025
ATT&CK Technique Name:2016 Ukraine Electric Power Attack
During the 2016 Ukraine Electric Power Attack, Sandworm Team supplied the name of the payload DLL to Industroyer via a command line parameter.[2] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M1021
ATT&CK Technique Name:Restrict Web-Based Content
Consider blocking download/transfer and execution of potentially uncommon file types known to be used in adversary campaigns, such as CHM files | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0081
ATT&CK Technique Name:Tropic Trooper
Tropic Trooper has attempted to transfer USBferry from an infected USB device by copying an Autorun function to the target machine.[26] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M1018
ATT&CK Technique Name:User Account Management
Limit which user accounts are allowed to login via SSH. | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0625
ATT&CK Technique Name:Cuba
Cuba can use the command cmd.exe /c del to delete its artifacts from the system.[50] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0576
ATT&CK Technique Name:MegaCortex
MegaCortex can wipe deleted data from all drives using cipher.exe.[8] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0690
ATT&CK Technique Name:Green Lambert
Green Lambert can establish persistence on a compromised host through modifying the profile, login, and run command (rc) files associated with the bash, csh, and tcsh shells. [12][13] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0060
ATT&CK Technique Name:BRONZE BUTLER
BRONZE BUTLER has used net user /domain to identify account information.[12] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0344
ATT&CK Technique Name:Azorult
Azorult can capture screenshots of the victim’s machines.[18] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0080
ATT&CK Technique Name:Cobalt Group
Cobalt Group has used the Plink utility to create SSH tunnels.[6][7][8] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0241
ATT&CK Technique Name:RATANKBA
RATANKBA uploads and downloads information.[372][373] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0666
ATT&CK Technique Name:Gelsemium
Gelsemium has the ability to distinguish between a standard user and an administrator on a compromised host.[37] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0355
ATT&CK Technique Name:Final1stspy
Final1stspy obtains victim Microsoft Windows version information and CPU architecture.[136] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0597
ATT&CK Technique Name:GoldFinder
GoldFinder performed HTTP GET requests to check internet connectivity and identify HTTP proxy servers and other redirectors that an HTTP request traveled through.[3] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0046
ATT&CK Technique Name:FIN7
FIN7 created new Windows services and added them to the startup directories for persistence.[52] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S1059
ATT&CK Technique Name:metaMain
metaMain has authenticated itself to a different implant, Cryshell, through a port knocking and handshake procedure.[2] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0398
ATT&CK Technique Name:HyperBro
HyperBro has used a legitimate application to sideload a DLL to decrypt, decompress, and run a payload.[28][29] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0534
ATT&CK Technique Name:Bazar
Bazar can perform a check to ensure that the operating system's keyboard and language settings are not set to Russian.[7] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:C0012
ATT&CK Technique Name:Operation CuckooBees
During Operation CuckooBees, the threat actors used the net session, net use, and netstat commands as part of their advanced reconnaissance.[61] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0096
ATT&CK Technique Name:APT41
APT41 exploited CVE-2020-10189 against Zoho ManageEngine Desktop Central, and CVE-2019-19781 to compromise Citrix Application Delivery Controllers (ADC) and gateway devices.[15] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M1028
ATT&CK Technique Name:Operating System Configuration
Consider technical controls to prevent the disabling of services or deletion of files involved in system recovery. Additionally, ensure that WinRE is enabled using the following command: reagentc /enable.[68] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0673
ATT&CK Technique Name:DarkWatchman
DarkWatchman has been observed deleting its original launcher after installation.[52] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0114
ATT&CK Technique Name:Chimera
Chimera has used a valid account to maintain persistence via scheduled task.[17] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0120
ATT&CK Technique Name:Evilnum
Evilnum has used the malware variant, TerraTV, to load a malicious DLL placed in the TeamViewer directory, instead of the original Windows DLL located in a system folder.[19] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:T1555.001
ATT&CK Technique Name:Keychain
Adversaries may acquire credentials from Keychain. Keychain (or Keychain Services) is the macOS credential management system that stores account names, passwords, private keys, certificates, sensitive application data, payment data, and secure notes. There are three ty... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0449
ATT&CK Technique Name:Maze
Maze operators have created scheduled tasks masquerading as "Windows Update Security", "Windows Update Security Patches", and "Google Chrome Security Update" designed to launch the ransomware.[47] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:C0022
ATT&CK Technique Name:Operation Dream Job
During Operation Dream Job, Lazarus Group used an AES key to communicate with their C2 server.[101] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0588
ATT&CK Technique Name:GoldMax
GoldMax has used scheduled tasks to maintain persistence.[73] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0626
ATT&CK Technique Name:P8RAT
P8RAT can check for specific processes associated with virtual environments.[191] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:C0012
ATT&CK Technique Name:Operation CuckooBees
During Operation CuckooBees, the threat actors exploited multiple vulnerabilities in externally facing servers.[49] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M1042
ATT&CK Technique Name:Disable or Remove Feature or Program
Disable SSH if it is not necessary on a host or restrict SSH access for specific users/groups using /etc/ssh/sshd_config. | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0090
ATT&CK Technique Name:Rover
Rover searches for files on local drives based on a predefined list of file extensions.[163] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M1056
ATT&CK Technique Name:Pre-compromise
This technique cannot be easily mitigated with preventive controls since it is based on behaviors performed outside of the scope of enterprise defenses and controls. | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0332
ATT&CK Technique Name:Remcos
Remcos takes automated screenshots of the infected machine.[139] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0385
ATT&CK Technique Name:njRAT
njRAT enumerates the victim operating system and computer name during the initial infection.[252] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0031
ATT&CK Technique Name:BACKSPACE
During its initial execution, BACKSPACE extracts operating system information from the infected host.[44] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0492
ATT&CK Technique Name:CookieMiner
CookieMiner has used Google Chrome's decryption and extraction operations.[63] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M1021
ATT&CK Technique Name:Restrict Web-Based Content
If a link is being visited by a user, block unknown or unused files in transit by default that should not be downloaded or by policy from suspicious sites as a best practice to prevent some vectors, such as .scr, .exe, .pif, .cpl, etc. Some download scann... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M0918
ATT&CK Technique Name:User Account Management
Ensure users and user groups have appropriate permissions for their roles through Identity and Access Management (IAM) controls. Implement strict IAM controls to prevent access to systems except for the applications, users, and services that require access. ... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0214
ATT&CK Technique Name:HAPPYWORK
can download and execute a second-stage payload.[27] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:T0873
ATT&CK Technique Name:Project File Infection
Adversaries may attempt to infect project files with malicious code. These project files may consist of objects, program organization units, variables such as tags, documentation, and other configurations needed for PLC programs to function. Using built in f... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M1049
ATT&CK Technique Name:Antivirus/Antimalware
Employ heuristic-based malware detection. Ensure updated virus definitions and create custom signatures for observed malware. | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S1034
ATT&CK Technique Name:StrifeWater
StrifeWater can collect the OS version, architecture, and machine name to create a unique token for the infected host.[354] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0592
ATT&CK Technique Name:RemoteUtilities
RemoteUtilities can take screenshots on a compromised host.[141] | secon |
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