text stringlengths 100 9.93M | category stringclasses 11
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ATT&CK ID:S0539
ATT&CK Technique Name:Red Alert 2.0
Red Alert 2.0 can request device administrator permissions.[6] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0672
ATT&CK Technique Name:Zox
Zox has the ability to upload files from a targeted system.[18] | secon |
titleblackhat:us-22 Industroyer2: Sandworm's Cyberwarfare Targets Ukraine's Power Grid Again
Industroyer2 – a new version of the only malware to ever trigger electricity blackouts – was deployed in Ukraine amidst the ongoing Russian invasion. Like in 2016 with the original Industroyer, the aim of this recent cy... | secon |
titleblackhat:us-21 Symbexcel: Bringing the Power of Symbolic Execution to the Fight Against Malicious Excel 4 Macros
Excel 4.0 (XL4) macros are a popular attack vector for threat actors, as security vendors struggle to play catchup and detect malicious macros properly. These macros provide attackers with a simple and ... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M1050
ATT&CK Technique Name:Exploit Protection
Use utilities that detect or mitigate common features used in exploitation, such as the Microsoft Enhanced Mitigation Experience Toolkit (EMET). | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0445
ATT&CK Technique Name:ShimRatReporter
ShimRatReporter gathered information automatically, without instruction from a C2, related to the user and host machine that is compiled into a report and sent to the operators.[41] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M1047
ATT&CK Technique Name:Audit
Enterprise email solutions may have monitoring mechanisms that may include the ability to audit inbox rules on a regular basis. In an Exchange environment, Administrators can use Get-InboxRule / Remove-InboxRule and Get-TransportRule / Remove-TransportRule to discover and rem... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0265
ATT&CK Technique Name:Kazuar
Kazuar uses cmd.exe to execute commands on the victim’s machine.[171] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0094
ATT&CK Technique Name:Kimsuky
Kimsuky has registered domains to spoof targeted organizations and trusted third parties.[34][35][36][37][38][39] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M1042
ATT&CK Technique Name:Disable or Remove Feature or Program
Mshta.exe may not be necessary within a given environment since its functionality is tied to older versions of Internet Explorer that have reached end of life. | secon |
title:blackhat:asia-23 A Run a Day Won't Keep the Hacker Away: Inference Attacks on Endpoint Privacy Zones in Fitness Tracking Social Networks
Fitness tracking social networks such as Strava allow users to record sports activities and share them publicly. Sharing encourages peer interaction but also constitutes a risk,... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S1070
ATT&CK Technique Name:Black Basta
Black Basta has been downloaded and executed from malicious Excel files.[40][41] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0069
ATT&CK Technique Name:MuddyWater
MuddyWater can disable the system's local proxy settings.[62] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0154
ATT&CK Technique Name:Cobalt Strike
Cobalt Strike's Beacon payload is capable of running shell commands without cmd.exe and PowerShell commands without powershell.exe[56][57][58] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0106
ATT&CK Technique Name:Rocke
Rocke has cleared log files within the /var/log/ folder.[4] | secon |
title:blackhat:us-19 Reverse Engineering WhatsApp Encryption for Chat Manipulation and More
As of early 2018, the Facebook-owned messaging application, WhatsApp, has over 1.5 billion users with over one billion groups and 65 billion messages sent every day. WhatsApp end-to-end encryption ensures only you and the person... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0088
ATT&CK Technique Name:TEMP.Veles
TEMP.Veles has used port-protocol mismatches on ports such as 443, 4444, 8531, and 50501 during C2.[38] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0223
ATT&CK Technique Name:POWERSTATS
POWERSTATS can retrieve OS name/architecture and computer/domain name information from compromised hosts.[284][285] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0411
ATT&CK Technique Name:Rotexy
Rotexy collects information about running processes.[6] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M1026
ATT&CK Technique Name:Privileged Account Management
Restrict execution of particularly vulnerable binaries to privileged accounts or groups that need to use it to lessen the opportunities for malicious usage. | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0139
ATT&CK Technique Name:TeamTNT
TeamTNT has established persistence through the creation of a cryptocurrency mining system service using systemctl.[12][13] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M1054
ATT&CK Technique Name:Software Configuration
Consider disabling embedded files in Office programs, such as OneNote, that do not work with Protected View.[7][10] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M1002
ATT&CK Technique Name:Attestation
Device attestation could detect devices with unauthorized or unsafe modifications. | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0267
ATT&CK Technique Name:FELIXROOT
FELIXROOT queries the Registry for specific keys for potential privilege escalation and proxy information. FELIXROOT has also used WMI to query the Windows Registry.[39][40] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0081
ATT&CK Technique Name:Tropic Trooper
Tropic Trooper can search for anti-virus software running on the system.[108] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M1027
ATT&CK Technique Name:Password Policies
Ensure that local administrator accounts have complex, unique passwords across all systems on the network. | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M1027
ATT&CK Technique Name:Password Policies
Ensure only valid password filters are registered. Filter DLLs must be present in Windows installation directory (C:\Windows\System32\ by default) of a domain controller and/or local computer with a corresponding entry in HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSe... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0342
ATT&CK Technique Name:GreyEnergy
GreyEnergy modifies conditions in the Registry and adds keys.[66] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0439
ATT&CK Technique Name:Okrum
Okrum can collect computer name, locale information, and information about the OS and architecture.[261] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0531
ATT&CK Technique Name:Grandoreiro
Grandoreiro can send data it retrieves to the C2 server.[54] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0106
ATT&CK Technique Name:Rocke
Rocke's miner, "TermsHost.exe", evaded defenses by injecting itself into Windows processes, including Notepad.exe.[7] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0331
ATT&CK Technique Name:Agent Tesla
Agent Tesla has dropped RegAsm.exe onto systems for performing malicious activity.[5] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0569
ATT&CK Technique Name:Explosive
Explosive can scan all .exe files located in the USB drive.[10] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0131
ATT&CK Technique Name:Tonto Team
Tonto Team has used tools such as NBTscan to enumerate network shares.[55] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0171
ATT&CK Technique Name:Felismus
Felismus collects the victim LAN IP address and sends it to the C2 server.[87] | secon |
titleblackhat:us-23 Apple PAC, Four Years Later: Reverse Engineering the Customized Pointer Authentication Hardware Implementation on Apple M1
Since 2018, Apple has deployed PA on all Apple-silicon-based products to improve the security of the system. There have been many incredible security researchers who have conduc... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0336
ATT&CK Technique Name:NanoCore
NanoCore has the capability to download and activate additional modules for execution.[309][310] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M1037
ATT&CK Technique Name:Filter Network Traffic
When flood volumes exceed the capacity of the network connection being targeted, it is typically necessary to intercept the incoming traffic upstream to filter out the attack traffic from the legitimate traffic. Such defenses can be provided by the hosting In... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0628
ATT&CK Technique Name:FYAnti
FYAnti has used ConfuserEx to pack its .NET module.[43] | secon |
title:blackhat:us-20 Detecting Access Token Manipulation
Windows access token manipulation attacks are well known and abused from an offensive perspective, but rely on an extensive body of arcane Windows security internals: logon sessions, access tokens, UAC, and network authentication protocols, such as Kerberos and N... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0138
ATT&CK Technique Name:Andariel
Andariel has collected large numbers of files from compromised network systems for later extraction.[4] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M0816
ATT&CK Technique Name:Mitigation Limited or Not Effective
Network connection enumeration is likely obtained by using common system tools (e.g., netstat, ipconfig). | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0049
ATT&CK Technique Name:OilRig
OilRig has used .doc file extensions to mask malicious executables.[24] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0155
ATT&CK Technique Name:WINDSHIELD
WINDSHIELD is capable of file deletion along with other file system interaction.[251] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:T1547.013
ATT&CK Technique Name:XDG Autostart Entries
Adversaries may modify XDG autostart entries to execute programs or commands during system boot. Linux desktop environments that are XDG compliant implement functionality for XDG autostart entries. These entries will allow an application to automatically s... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0117
ATT&CK Technique Name:Fox Kitten
Fox Kitten has base64 encoded scripts to avoid detection.[40] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M1028
ATT&CK Technique Name:Operating System Configuration
Ensure only valid password filters are registered. Filter DLLs must be present in Windows installation directory (C:\Windows\System32\ by default) of a domain controller and/or local computer with a corresponding entry in HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SYSTEM\Cur... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M1040
ATT&CK Technique Name:Behavior Prevention on Endpoint
On Windows 10, enable Attack Surface Reduction (ASR) rules to prevent Visual Basic scripts from executing potentially malicious downloaded content [169]. | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0030
ATT&CK Technique Name:Carbanak
Carbanak has a plugin for VNC and Ammyy Admin Tool.[7] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0094
ATT&CK Technique Name:Kimsuky
Kimsuky has used pass the hash for authentication to remote access software used in C2.[11] | secon |
titleblackhat:us-21 A Hole in the Tube: Uncovering Vulnerabilities in Critical Infrastructure of Healthcare Facilities
A hidden infrastructure that transports critical care items within all modern hospitals, lies in plain sight - the pneumatic tube system (PTS). This critical infrastructure is responsible for deliverin... | secon |
title:blackhat:eu-21 Greetings from the '90s: Exploiting the Design of Industrial Controllers in Modern Settings
Recent years have witnessed a growing volume of research on the security of embedded systems used in industrial process control applications, including Programmable Logic Controllers (PLC) and Remote Termina... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:T1003.006
ATT&CK Technique Name:DCSync
Adversaries may attempt to access credentials and other sensitive information by abusing a Windows Domain Controller's application programming interface (API) to simulate the replication process from a remote domain controller using a technique called DCSync. | secon |
ATT&CK ID:T1201
ATT&CK Technique Name:Password Policy Discovery
Adversaries may attempt to access detailed information about the password policy used within an enterprise network or cloud environment. Password policies are a way to enforce complex passwords that are difficult to guess or crack through Brute Force. This... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0692
ATT&CK Technique Name:SILENTTRINITY
SILENTTRINITY can inject shellcode directly into Excel.exe or a specific process.[57] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0050
ATT&CK Technique Name:CosmicDuke
CosmicDuke steals user files from network shared drives with file extensions and keywords that match a predefined list.[6] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0493
ATT&CK Technique Name:GoldenSpy
GoldenSpy can execute remote commands in the Windows command shell using the WinExec() API.[83] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0354
ATT&CK Technique Name:Denis
Denis exploits a security vulnerability to load a fake DLL and execute its code.[5] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0402
ATT&CK Technique Name:OSX/Shlayer
OSX/Shlayer can use the chmod utility to set a file as executable, such as chmod 777 or chmod +x.[3][8][9] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0622
ATT&CK Technique Name:AppleSeed
AppleSeed has automatically collected data from USB drives, keystrokes, and screen images before exfiltration.[1] | secon |
title:blackhat:eu-22 DataBinding2Shell: Novel Pathways to RCE Web Frameworks
DataBinding is a mechanism that allows request parameters to be bound to a domain object automatically. It makes development more efficient and code cleaner, and is widely implemented by best web frameworks written in trending programming lang... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0508
ATT&CK Technique Name:Ngrok
Ngrok has been used by threat actors to proxy C2 connections to ngrok service subdomains.[27] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0329
ATT&CK Technique Name:Tangelo
Tangelo contains functionality to gather call logs.[19] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0032
ATT&CK Technique Name:Lazarus Group
Lazarus Group has replaced win_fw.dll, an internal component that is executed during IDA Pro installation, with a malicious DLL to download and execute a payload.[32] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0047
ATT&CK Technique Name:Gamaredon Group
Gamaredon Group has created scheduled tasks to launch executables after a designated number of minutes have passed.[68][69][70] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S1073
ATT&CK Technique Name:Royal
Royal can use GetCurrentProcess to enumerate processes.[221] | secon |
titleblackhat:asia-21 The Rise of Potatoes: Privilege Escalations in Windows Services
Privilege escalation is a required step for an attacker in order to get full control of a system starting from a lower privileged access.In Windows there are many ways to reach this goal. This talk will be focused on showing all the r... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M1053
ATT&CK Technique Name:Data Backup
Consider implementing IT disaster recovery plans that contain procedures for taking regular data backups that can be used to restore organizational data.[1] Ensure backups are stored off system and is protected from common methods adversaries may use to gain access and ... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0049
ATT&CK Technique Name:OilRig
OilRig utilized stolen credentials to gain access to victim machines.[3] | secon |
titleblackhat:us-19 Messaging Layer Security: Towards a New Era of Secure Group Messaging
The world is moving towards end-to-end encryption (E2EE) for person-to-person messaging, as more services now wish to reduce the amount of sensitive data that they must store. However, the protocols used for encryption are still b... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0016
ATT&CK Technique Name:APT29
APT29 has exploited CVE-2019-19781 for Citrix, CVE-2019-11510 for Pulse Secure VPNs, CVE-2018-13379 for FortiGate VPNs, and CVE-2019-9670 in Zimbra software to gain access.[12][13] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M1051
ATT&CK Technique Name:Update Software
For the Outlook methods, blocking macros may be ineffective as the Visual Basic engine used for these features is separate from the macro scripting engine.[9] Microsoft has released patches to try to address each issue. Ensure KB3191938 which blocks Outlook Visual B... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G1006
ATT&CK Technique Name:Earth Lusca
Earth Lusca has acquired and used a variety of open source tools.[44] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0330
ATT&CK Technique Name:Zeus Panda
Zeus Panda has a command to delete a file. It also can uninstall scripts and delete files to cover its track.[261] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0091
ATT&CK Technique Name:Epic
Epic compresses the collected data with bzip2 before sending it to the C2 server.[8] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:C0002
ATT&CK Technique Name:Night Dragon
During Night Dragon, threat actors used SQL injection exploits against extranet web servers to gain access.[48] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0584
ATT&CK Technique Name:AppleJeus
AppleJeus has collected the victim host information after infection.[18] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0004
ATT&CK Technique Name:Ke3chang
Ke3chang has compromised networks by exploiting Internet-facing applications, including vulnerable Microsoft Exchange and SharePoint servers.[38] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M1018
ATT&CK Technique Name:User Account Management
Since browser pivoting requires a high integrity process to launch from, restricting user permissions and addressing Privilege Escalation and Bypass User Account Control opportunities can limit the exposure to this technique. | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0004
ATT&CK Technique Name:Ke3chang
Ke3chang has used the right-to-left override character in spearphishing attachment names to trick targets into executing .scr and .exe files.[7] | secon |
title:blackhat:us-21 Zerologon: From Zero to Domain Admin by Exploiting a Crypto Bug
In a Windows Active Directory environment, domain-joined computers need to regularly communicate with domain controllers to facilitate NTLM network authentication and a number of other tasks. This communication takes place via the Netl... | secon |
titleblackhat:us-21 Internal Affairs: Hacking File System Access from the Web
The File System Access API deployed to browsers this year is the current version of a W3C draft to give websites, with user approval, the ability to read, write, and edit files and folders the user selects on their devices, an outgrowth of an... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0603
ATT&CK Technique Name:Stuxnet
Stuxnet can propagate via removable media using an autorun.inf file or the CVE-2010-2568 LNK vulnerability.[25] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M1038
ATT&CK Technique Name:Execution Prevention
Use application control configured to block execution of mshta.exe if it is not required for a given system or network to prevent potential misuse by adversaries. For example, in Windows 10 and Windows Server 2016 and above, Windows Defender Application Control... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0568
ATT&CK Technique Name:EVILNUM
EVILNUM can download and upload files to the victim's computer.[169][170] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S1052
ATT&CK Technique Name:DEADEYE
DEADEYE can run cmd /c copy /y /b C:\Users\public\syslog_6-*.dat C:\Users\public\syslog.dll to combine separated sections of code into a single DLL prior to execution.[60] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0137
ATT&CK Technique Name:Ferocious Kitten
Ferocious Kitten has acquired domains imitating legitimate sites.[25] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0402
ATT&CK Technique Name:OSX/Shlayer
OSX/Shlayer has used the mktemp utility to make random and unique filenames for payloads, such as export tmpDir="$(mktemp -d /tmp/XXXXXXXXXXXX)" or mktemp -t Installer.[7][5][8] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0546
ATT&CK Technique Name:SharpStage
SharpStage has a persistence component to write a scheduled task for the payload.[159] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0384
ATT&CK Technique Name:Dridex
Dridex has collected a list of installed software on the system.[7] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M1031
ATT&CK Technique Name:Network Intrusion Prevention
Network intrusion detection and prevention systems that use network signatures to identify traffic for specific adversary malware can be used to mitigate activity at the network level. | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0329
ATT&CK Technique Name:Tangelo
Tangelo contains functionality to record calls as well as the victim device's environment.[29] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:C0017
ATT&CK Technique Name:C0017
During C0017, APT41 issued ping -n 1 ((cmd /c dir c:\|findstr Number).split()[-1]+ commands to find the volume serial number of compromised systems.[73] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0034
ATT&CK Technique Name:Sandworm Team
Sandworm Team's research of potential victim organizations included the identification and collection of employee information.[3] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0138
ATT&CK Technique Name:Andariel
Andariel has hidden malicious executables within PNG files.[4][5] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0081
ATT&CK Technique Name:Elise
Elise enumerates processes via the tasklist command.[91] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0337
ATT&CK Technique Name:BadPatch
BadPatch uses WMI to enumerate installed security products in the victim’s environment.[10] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0360
ATT&CK Technique Name:BONDUPDATER
BONDUPDATER can download or upload files from its C2 server.[73] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0061
ATT&CK Technique Name:FIN8
FIN8 has used scheduled tasks to maintain RDP backdoors.[63] | secon |
title:blackhat:us-19 Moving from Hacking IoT Gadgets to Breaking into One of Europe's Highest Hotel Suites
We're taking Bluetooth LE hacking from toys and padlocks to the real world. Improving the tools and methods we used in previous research to break the AES cryptography of the NOKE Padlock, we went to do the one... | secon |
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