text stringlengths 100 9.93M | category stringclasses 11
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ATT&CK ID:M1031
ATT&CK Technique Name:Network Intrusion Prevention
Network intrusion detection and prevention systems that use network signatures to identify traffic for specific adversary malware can be used to mitigate activity at the network level. | secon |
ATT&CK ID:T1546.013
ATT&CK Technique Name:PowerShell Profile
Adversaries may gain persistence and elevate privileges by executing malicious content triggered by PowerShell profiles. A PowerShell profile (profile.ps1) is a script that runs when PowerShell starts and can be used as a logon script to customize user envir... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:C0014
ATT&CK Technique Name:Operation Wocao
During Operation Wocao, threat actors used PowerShell to add and delete rules in the Windows firewall.[31] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0102
ATT&CK Technique Name:Wizard Spider
Wizard Spider has used the Invoke-Inveigh PowerShell cmdlets, likely for name service poisoning.[14] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0376
ATT&CK Technique Name:HOPLIGHT
HOPLIGHT has been observed enumerating system drives and partitions.[142] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0114
ATT&CK Technique Name:BOOTRASH
BOOTRASH has used unallocated disk space between partitions for a hidden file system that stores components of the Nemesis bootkit.[2] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0239
ATT&CK Technique Name:Bankshot
Bankshot deletes all artifacts associated with the malware from the infected machine.[1] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M1032
ATT&CK Technique Name:Multi-factor Authentication
Integrating multi-factor authentication (MFA) as part of organizational policy can greatly reduce the risk of an adversary gaining control of valid credentials that may be used for additional tactics such as initial access, lateral movement, and collecti... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:T1190
ATT&CK Technique Name:Exploit Public-Facing Application
Adversaries may attempt to exploit a weakness in an Internet-facing host or system to initially access a network. The weakness in the system can be a software bug, a temporary glitch, or a misconfiguration. | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0045
ATT&CK Technique Name:menuPass
menuPass has used several tools to scan for open NetBIOS nameservers and enumerate NetBIOS sessions.[141] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0657
ATT&CK Technique Name:BLUELIGHT
BLUELIGHT has collected the computer name and OS version from victim machines.[65] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:T1629.002
ATT&CK Technique Name:Device Lockout
An adversary may seek to inhibit user interaction by locking the legitimate user out of the device. This is typically accomplished by requesting device administrator permissions and then locking the screen using DevicePolicyManager.lockNow(). Other novel techniqu... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0108
ATT&CK Technique Name:Blue Mockingbird
Blue Mockingbird has used wmic.exe to set environment variables.[18] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S1015
ATT&CK Technique Name:Milan
Milan can use the API DnsQuery_A for DNS resolution.[102] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0087
ATT&CK Technique Name:APT39
APT39 has utilized tools to aggregate data prior to exfiltration.[6] | secon |
title:botconf2015 Practical Experiences of Building an IPFIX Based Open Source Botnet Detector
The academic study of flow-based malware detection has primarily focused on NetFlow v5 and v9. In 2013 IPFIX was ratified as the flow export standard. As part of a larger project to develop protection methods for Cloud Servic... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0051
ATT&CK Technique Name:FIN10
FIN10 has used stolen credentials to connect remotely to victim networks using VPNs protected with only a single factor.[23] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0664
ATT&CK Technique Name:Pandora
Pandora can use CVE-2017-15303 to bypass Windows Driver Signature Enforcement (DSE) protection and load its driver.[26] | secon |
title:blackhat:us-18 Beating the Blockchain by Mapping Out Decentralized Namecoin and Emercoin Infrastructure
The Namecoin and Emercoin blockchains were designed to provide decentralized and takedown-resistant domain names to users with the reported goal of promoting free speech. By leveraging unofficial Top-Level Doma... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0096
ATT&CK Technique Name:APT41
APT41 leveraged sticky keys to establish persistence.[8] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0035
ATT&CK Technique Name:Dragonfly
Dragonfly has added the registry value ntdll to the Registry Run key to establish persistence.[76] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M1047
ATT&CK Technique Name:Audit
Regularly check installed IIS components to verify the integrity of the web server and identify if unexpected changes have been made. | secon |
ATT&CK ID:T1430
ATT&CK Technique Name:Location Tracking
Adversaries may track a device’s physical location through use of standard operating system APIs via malicious or exploited applications on the compromised device. | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S1058
ATT&CK Technique Name:Prestige
Prestige can traverse the file system to discover files to encrypt by identifying specific extensions defined in a hardcoded list.[236] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0607
ATT&CK Technique Name:KillDisk
KillDisk attempts to reboot the machine by terminating specific processes.[11] | secon |
titleblackhat:us-21 The Devil is in the GAN: Defending Deep Generative Models Against Adversarial Attacks
Generative Adversarial Networks (GANs) are an emerging AI technology with vast potential for disrupting science and industry. GANs are able to synthesize data from complex, high-dimensional manifolds, e.g., images,... | secon |
title:blackhat:us-21 Wibbly Wobbly, Timey Wimey – What's Really Inside Apple's U1 Chip
Apple introduced an Ultra Wideband (UWB) chip in the iPhone 11. Its cryptographically secured spatial measurement capabilities are accessible via the Nearby Interaction framework since iOS 14. As of now, it only supports interaction ... | secon |
titleblackhat:asia-20 Win the 0-Day Racing Game Against Botnet in Public Cloud
Botnet appears to be one of the significant threats to public cloud. They exploit new vulnerabilities(0-days) to take down a large part of the internet. As a cloud service provider, we built an automated 0-day monitoring solution to block th... | secon |
title:blackhat:us-20 IMP4GT: IMPersonation Attacks in 4G NeTworks
Long Term Evolution (LTE/4G) establishes mutual authentication with a provably secure AKA protocol on protocol layer three. But missing integrity protection of user traffic still allows an adversary to manipulate IP packets. In this talk, we present the ... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M1022
ATT&CK Technique Name:Restrict File and Directory Permissions
Set group policies to restrict file permissions to the ~/launchagents folder.[28] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S1006
ATT&CK Technique Name:PLC-Blaster
PLC-Blaster copies itself to various Program Organization Units (POU) on the target device. The POUs include the Data Block, Function, and Function Block. [2] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0117
ATT&CK Technique Name:Fox Kitten
Fox Kitten has used Google Chrome bookmarks to identify internal resources and assets.[10] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0598
ATT&CK Technique Name:P.A.S. Webshell
P.A.S. Webshell can use predefined users and passwords to execute brute force attacks against SSH, FTP, POP3, MySQL, MSSQL, and PostgreSQL services.[16] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M1018
ATT&CK Technique Name:User Account Management
An adversary must already have administrator level access on the local system to make full use of this technique; be sure to restrict users and accounts to the least privileges they require. | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0061
ATT&CK Technique Name:FIN8
FIN8 has used valid accounts for persistence and lateral movement.[33] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0128
ATT&CK Technique Name:ZIRCONIUM
ZIRCONIUM has used web beacons in e-mails to track hits to attacker-controlled URL's.[30] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S1054
ATT&CK Technique Name:Drinik
Drinik has C2 commands that can move the malware in and out of the foreground. [5] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0121
ATT&CK Technique Name:Sidewinder
Sidewinder has used the Windows service winmgmts:\.\root\SecurityCenter2 to check installed antivirus products.[91] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0697
ATT&CK Technique Name:HermeticWiper
HermeticWiper has the ability to use scheduled tasks for execution.[78] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0027
ATT&CK Technique Name:Threat Group-3390
Threat Group-3390 has detached network shares after exfiltrating files, likely to evade detection.[4] | secon |
titleblackhat:us-20 Repurposing Neural Networks to Generate Synthetic Media for Information Operations
Deep neural networks routinely achieve near human-level performances on a variety of tasks, but each new breakthrough demands massive volumes of quality data, access to expensive GPU clusters, and weeks or even months... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:T1537
ATT&CK Technique Name:Transfer Data to Cloud Account
Adversaries may exfiltrate data by transferring the data, including backups of cloud environments, to another cloud account they control on the same service to avoid typical file transfers/downloads and network-based exfiltration detection. | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0448
ATT&CK Technique Name:Rising Sun
Rising Sun can enumerate all running processes and process information on an infected machine.[216] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M1018
ATT&CK Technique Name:User Account Management
Periodically review user accounts and remove those that are inactive or unnecessary. Limit the ability for user accounts to create additional accounts. | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G1001
ATT&CK Technique Name:HEXANE
HEXANE has used netstat to monitor connections to specific ports.[39] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:C0015
ATT&CK Technique Name:C0015
During C0015, the threat actors executed the PowerView ShareFinder module to identify open shares.[18] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:C0004
ATT&CK Technique Name:CostaRicto
During CostaRicto, the threat actors used a layer of proxies to manage C2 communications.[6] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0470
ATT&CK Technique Name:BBK
BBK has the ability to use the CreatePipe API to add a sub-process for execution via cmd.[34] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0484
ATT&CK Technique Name:Carberp
Carberp can download and execute new plugins from the C2 server. [93][94] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S1058
ATT&CK Technique Name:Prestige
Prestige has been executed on a target system through a scheduled task created by Sandworm Team using Impacket.[133] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0024
ATT&CK Technique Name:Dyre
Dyre decrypts resources needed for targeting the victim.[77][78] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0367
ATT&CK Technique Name:Emotet
Emotet has been delivered by phishing emails containing links. [40][41][42][43][44][45][46][46][47] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0196
ATT&CK Technique Name:PUNCHBUGGY
PUNCHBUGGY can load a DLL using the LoadLibrary API.[16] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0673
ATT&CK Technique Name:DarkWatchman
DarkWatchman encodes data using hexadecimal representation before sending it to the C2 server.[28] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S1063
ATT&CK Technique Name:Brute Ratel C4
Brute Ratel C4 has used search order hijacking to load a malicious payload DLL as a dependency to a benign application packaged in the same ISO.[14] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M0937
ATT&CK Technique Name:Filter Network Traffic
Filter for protocols and payloads associated with firmware activation or updating activity. | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0251
ATT&CK Technique Name:Zebrocy
Zebrocy has exfiltrated data to the designated C2 server using HTTP POST requests.[147][148] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0084
ATT&CK Technique Name:Mis-Type
Mis-Type may create a temporary user on the system named Lost_{Unique Identifier}.[19] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0089
ATT&CK Technique Name:The White Company
The White Company has obfuscated their payloads through packing.[83] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0166
ATT&CK Technique Name:RemoteCMD
RemoteCMD can execute commands remotely by creating a new schedule task on the remote system[149] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0649
ATT&CK Technique Name:SMOKEDHAM
SMOKEDHAM has used reg.exe to create a Registry Run key.[248] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M1011
ATT&CK Technique Name:User Guidance
iOS users should be instructed to not download applications from unofficial sources, as applications distributed via the Apple App Store cannot list installed applications on a device. | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0155
ATT&CK Technique Name:WINDSHIELD
WINDSHIELD can gather the victim computer name.[196] | secon |
titleblackhat:us-21 Locknote: Conclusions and Key Takeaways from Day 1
At the end of day one, join Black Hat Founder Jeff Moss and Review Board members Stephanie Domas, Alex Ionescu, Kymberlee Price, and Chris Rohlf for an insightful conversation on the most pressing issues facing the InfoSec community. This Locknote w... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0631
ATT&CK Technique Name:Chaes
Some versions of Chaes stored its instructions (otherwise in a instructions.ini file) in the Registry.[4] | secon |
titleblackhat:asia-19 ACSploit: Exploit Algorithmic Complexity Vulnerabilities
Algorithmic Complexity (AC) vulnerabilities arise when a program uses an algorithm with a particularly inefficient worst-case computational complexity, and allows a user to provide input that will trigger it. Determining whether a program is... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0034
ATT&CK Technique Name:Sandworm Team
In the 2015 attack on the Ukrainian power grid, the Sandworm Team scheduled disconnects of uninterruptable power supply (UPS) systems so that when power was disconnected from the substations, the devices would shut down and service could not be recovered. [2] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M1056
ATT&CK Technique Name:Pre-compromise
This technique cannot be easily mitigated with preventive controls since it is based on behaviors performed outside of the scope of enterprise defenses and controls. Efforts should focus on minimizing the amount and sensitivity of data available to external parties. | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0604
ATT&CK Technique Name:Industroyer
Industroyer can use supplied user credentials to execute processes and stop services.[36] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M1018
ATT&CK Technique Name:User Account Management
Limit privileges of user accounts and groups so that only authorized administrators can interact with system-level process changes and service configurations. | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M0928
ATT&CK Technique Name:Operating System Configuration
Harden the system through operating system controls to prevent the known or unknown use of malicious removable media. | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S1016
ATT&CK Technique Name:MacMa
MacMa can clear possible malware traces such as application logs.[2] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M0804
ATT&CK Technique Name:Human User Authentication
All field controllers should require users to authenticate for all remote or local management sessions. The authentication mechanisms should also support Account Use Policies, Password Policies, and User Account Management. | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0673
ATT&CK Technique Name:DarkWatchman
DarkWatchman can stage local data in the Windows Registry.[1] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0635
ATT&CK Technique Name:BoomBox
BoomBox can search for specific files and directories on a machine.[61] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0412
ATT&CK Technique Name:ZxShell
ZxShell has a feature to capture a remote computer's keystrokes using a keylogger.[21][184] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0658
ATT&CK Technique Name:XCSSET
XCSSET uses a malicious browser application to replace the legitimate browser in order to continuously capture credentials, monitor web traffic, and download additional modules.[7] | secon |
titleblackhat:us-18 Dissecting Non-Malicious Artifacts: One IP at a Time
For years and years, anti-malware solutions, across many levels of the network, have been assisted by online anti-virus aggregation services and online sandboxes to extend their detection level and identify unknown threats. But, this power booster... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0071
ATT&CK Technique Name:Orangeworm
Orangeworm has copied its backdoor across open network shares, including ADMIN$, C$WINDOWS, D$WINDOWS, and E$WINDOWS.[32] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M1019
ATT&CK Technique Name:Threat Intelligence Program
Develop a robust cyber threat intelligence capability to determine what types and levels of threat may use software exploits and 0-days against a particular organization. | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0411
ATT&CK Technique Name:Rotexy
Starting in 2017, the Rotexy DEX file was packed with garbage strings and/or operations.[29] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M0927
ATT&CK Technique Name:Password Policies
Enforce strong password requirements to prevent password brute force methods for lateral movement. | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0496
ATT&CK Technique Name:REvil
The REvil malware gained access to an organizations network and encrypted sensitive files used by OT equipment. [10] | secon |
title:blackhat:us-19 SSO Wars: The Token Menace
It is the year 2019. Humanity has almost won its long-standing war against Single-Sign On (SSO) bugs. The last of them were discovered and eradicated some time ago and the world is now living in an era of prosperity while the Auth Federation enjoys peaceful CVE-free times... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0390
ATT&CK Technique Name:SQLRat
SQLRat has scripts that are responsible for deobfuscating additional scripts.[219] | secon |
titleblackhat:us-18 WebAssembly: A New World of Native Exploits on the Browser
WebAssembly (WASM) is a new technology being developed by the major browser vendors through the W3C. A direct descendent of NaCl and Asm.js, the idea is to allow web developers to run native (e.g. C/C++) code in a web page at near-native per... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:T1556.006
ATT&CK Technique Name:Multi-Factor Authentication
Adversaries may disable or modify multi-factor authentication (MFA) mechanisms to enable persistent access to compromised accounts. | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0358
ATT&CK Technique Name:Ruler
Ruler can be used to enumerate Exchange users and dump the GAL.[12] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M1006
ATT&CK Technique Name:Use Recent OS Version
Changes were introduced in Android 7 to make abuse of device administrator permissions more difficult.[8] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M1018
ATT&CK Technique Name:User Account Management
Consider limiting access to the BITS interface to specific users or groups.[6] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M0804
ATT&CK Technique Name:Human User Authentication
All field controllers should require users to authenticate for all remote or local management sessions. The authentication mechanisms should also support Account Use Policies, Password Policies, and User Account Management. | secon |
ATT&CK ID:T1560.003
ATT&CK Technique Name:Archive via Custom Method
An adversary may compress or encrypt data that is collected prior to exfiltration using a custom method. Adversaries may choose to use custom archival methods, such as encryption with XOR or stream ciphers implemented with no external library or utilit... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0251
ATT&CK Technique Name:Zebrocy
Zebrocy uses the tasklist and wmic process get Capture, ExecutablePath commands to gather the processes running on the system.[49][278][50][279][280] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M1046
ATT&CK Technique Name:Boot Integrity
Use Trusted Platform Module technology and a secure or trusted boot process to prevent system integrity from being compromised. [18] [19] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:C0022
ATT&CK Technique Name:Operation Dream Job
During Operation Dream Job, Lazarus Group downloaded multistage malware and tools onto a compromised host.[152][328][329] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0007
ATT&CK Technique Name:APT28
APT28 has used legitimate credentials to gain initial access, maintain access, and exfiltrate data from a victim network. The group has specifically used credentials stolen through a spearphishing email to login to the DCCC network. The group has also leveraged default manufa... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0361
ATT&CK Technique Name:Expand
Expand can be used to download or copy a file into an alternate data stream.[13] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0663
ATT&CK Technique Name:SysUpdate
SysUpdate can contact the DNS server operated by Google as part of its C2 establishment process.[14] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0157
ATT&CK Technique Name:SOUNDBITE
SOUNDBITE is capable of enumerating application windows.[31] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0049
ATT&CK Technique Name:OilRig
OilRig has used reg query "HKEY_CURRENT_USER\Software\Microsoft\Terminal Server Client\Default" on a victim to query the Registry.[63] | secon |
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