text stringlengths 100 9.93M | category stringclasses 11
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ATT&CK ID:G0060
ATT&CK Technique Name:BRONZE BUTLER
BRONZE BUTLER has used a batch script that adds a Registry Run key to establish malware persistence.[50] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M1046
ATT&CK Technique Name:Boot Integrity
Check the integrity of the existing BIOS and device firmware to determine if it is vulnerable to modification. | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M1045
ATT&CK Technique Name:Code Signing
Several cloud service providers support content trust models that require container images be signed by trusted sources.[3][4] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0007
ATT&CK Technique Name:APT28
APT28 has exploited Microsoft Office vulnerability CVE-2017-0262 for execution.[9] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:T1078.002
ATT&CK Technique Name:Domain Accounts
Adversaries may obtain and abuse credentials of a domain account as a means of gaining Initial Access, Persistence, Privilege Escalation, or Defense Evasion. Domain accounts are those managed by Active Directory Domain Services where access and permissions are c... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0006
ATT&CK Technique Name:APT1
APT1 has registered hundreds of domains for use in operations.[13] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0140
ATT&CK Technique Name:LazyScripter
LazyScripter has used GitHub to host its payloads to operate spam campaigns.[24] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0022
ATT&CK Technique Name:APT3
APT3 has used a tool to dump credentials by injecting itself into lsass.exe and triggering with the argument "dig."[10] | secon |
titleblackhat:us-18 Identity Theft: Attacks on SSO Systems
SAML is often the trust anchor for Single Sign-On (SSO) in most modern day organizations. This presentation will discuss a new vulnerability discovered which has affected multiple independent SAML implementations, and more generally, can affect any systems reli... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M1042
ATT&CK Technique Name:Disable or Remove Feature or Program
Disable LLMNR and NetBIOS in local computer security settings or by group policy if they are not needed within an environment. [15] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0094
ATT&CK Technique Name:Kimsuky
Kimsuky has added accounts to specific groups with net localgroup.[7] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:C0025
ATT&CK Technique Name:2016 Ukraine Electric Power Attack
During the 2016 Ukraine Electric Power Attack, Sandworm Team used an arbitrary system service to load at system boot for persistence for Industroyer. They also replaced the ImagePath registry value of a Windows service with a new backdoor binary. ... | secon |
title:blackhat:us-19 Death to the IOC: What's Next in Threat Intelligence
Humans cannot scale to the amount of Threat Intelligence being generated. While the Security Community has mastered the use of machine readable feeds from OSINT systems or third party vendors, these usually provide IOCs or IOAs without contex... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0189
ATT&CK Technique Name:ISMInjector
ISMInjector creates scheduled tasks to establish persistence.[86] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0065
ATT&CK Technique Name:Leviathan
Leviathan has exploited multiple Microsoft Office and .NET vulnerabilities for execution, including CVE-2017-0199, CVE-2017-8759, and CVE-2017-11882.[57][58][59][60] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0152
ATT&CK Technique Name:EvilGrab
EvilGrab has the capability to capture video from a victim machine.[15] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0094
ATT&CK Technique Name:Kimsuky
Kimsuky has signed files with the name EGIS CO,. Ltd..[45] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0040
ATT&CK Technique Name:Patchwork
Patchwork has used spearphishing with links to deliver files with exploits to initial victims.[84][85][86] | secon |
titleblackhat:us-20 Room for Escape: Scribbling Outside the Lines of Template Security
Now more than ever, digital communication and collaboration are essential to the modern human experience. People around the globe work together online as they share information, create documents, send emails, and collaborate on sprea... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0004
ATT&CK Technique Name:Ke3chang
Ke3chang has used credential dumpers or stealers to obtain legitimate credentials, which they used to gain access to victim accounts.[37] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M1018
ATT&CK Technique Name:User Account Management
Ensure that proper policies are implemented to dictate the secure enrollment and deactivation of MFA for user accounts. | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0608
ATT&CK Technique Name:Conficker
Conficker copies itself into the %systemroot%\system32 directory and registers as a service.[36] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M1026
ATT&CK Technique Name:Privileged Account Management
Do not put user or admin domain accounts in the local administrator groups across systems unless they are tightly controlled, as this is often equivalent to having a local administrator account with the same password on all systems. Follow best practic... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0216
ATT&CK Technique Name:POORAIM
POORAIM has been delivered through compromised sites acting as watering holes.[10] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:T1552.004
ATT&CK Technique Name:Private Keys
Adversaries may search for private key certificate files on compromised systems for insecurely stored credentials. Private cryptographic keys and certificates are used for authentication, encryption/decryption, and digital signatures. Common key and certificate fil... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:C0012
ATT&CK Technique Name:Operation CuckooBees
During Operation CuckooBees, the threat actors enabled HTTP and HTTPS listeners.[236] | secon |
title:blackhat:us-18 Decompiler Internals: Microcode
This talk sheds some light into the intermediate language that is used inside the Hex-Rays Decompiler. The microcode is simple yet powerful to represent real world programs. With the microcode details publicly available, now it is possible to build more intelligent b... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M1056
ATT&CK Technique Name:Pre-compromise
This technique cannot be easily mitigated with preventive controls since it is based on behaviors performed outside of the scope of enterprise defenses and controls. | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M1042
ATT&CK Technique Name:Disable or Remove Feature or Program
Turn off or restrict access to unneeded scripting components. | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M1003
ATT&CK Technique Name:Lock Bootloader
A locked bootloader could prevent unauthorized modifications of protected operating system files. | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M0811
ATT&CK Technique Name:Redundancy of Service
Retain cold-standby or replacement hardware of similar models to ensure continued operations of critical functions if the primary system is compromised or unavailable. [4] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0064
ATT&CK Technique Name:APT33
APT33 has used SniffPass to collect credentials by sniffing network traffic.[11] | secon |
titleblackhat:eu-19 Money Doesn't Stink - Cybercriminal Business Insight of A New Android Botnet
In mid 2018, we discovered one of the largest reported Android banking botnets known to date, that we named Geost. It was discovered when we saw one of their botmasters logging in into one of their C&C servers while usi... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0518
ATT&CK Technique Name:PolyglotDuke
PolyglotDuke can retrieve payloads from the C2 server.[263] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M1040
ATT&CK Technique Name:Behavior Prevention on Endpoint
On Windows 10, enable Attack Surface Reduction (ASR) rules to block processes created by WMI commands from running. Note: many legitimate tools and applications utilize WMI for command execution. [138] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0537
ATT&CK Technique Name:HyperStack
HyperStack can enumerate all account names on a remote share.[18] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M0801
ATT&CK Technique Name:Access Management
Ensure embedded controls and network devices are protected through access management, as these devices often have unknown default accounts which could be used to gain unauthorized access. | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0094
ATT&CK Technique Name:Kimsuky
Kimsuky has the ability to enumerate all files and directories on an infected system.[166][167][168] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0269
ATT&CK Technique Name:QUADAGENT
QUADAGENT uses HTTPS and HTTP for C2 communications.[263] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S1053
ATT&CK Technique Name:AvosLocker
AvosLocker’s Linux variant has terminated ESXi virtual machines.[7] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0604
ATT&CK Technique Name:Industroyer
The Industroyer IEC 61850 payload component has the ability to discover relevant devices in the infected host's network subnet by attempting to connect on port 102.[6]Industroyer contains an OPC DA module that enumerates all OPC servers using the ICatInformation::EnumCl... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0020
ATT&CK Technique Name:China Chopper
China Chopper's server component can spider authentication portals.[16] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0449
ATT&CK Technique Name:Maze
Maze operators have used VirtualBox and a Windows 7 virtual machine to run the ransomware; the virtual machine's configuration file mapped the shared network drives of the target company, presumably so Maze can encrypt files on the shared drives as well as the local machine.[4... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0047
ATT&CK Technique Name:Gamaredon Group
Gamaredon Group has used HTTP and HTTPS for C2 communications.[132][133][134][135][136][137] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0320
ATT&CK Technique Name:DroidJack
DroidJack is capable of recording device phone calls.[12] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0509
ATT&CK Technique Name:FakeSpy
FakeSpy can collect the device’s network information.[2] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0376
ATT&CK Technique Name:HOPLIGHT
HOPLIGHT has been observed collecting system time from victim machines.[45] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0342
ATT&CK Technique Name:GreyEnergy
GreyEnergy has a module to harvest pressed keystrokes.[75] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0395
ATT&CK Technique Name:LightNeuron
LightNeuron collects Exchange emails matching rules specified in its configuration.[15] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0660
ATT&CK Technique Name:Clambling
Clambling can enumerate processes on a targeted system.[59] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0368
ATT&CK Technique Name:NotPetya
NotPetya can use two exploits in SMBv1, EternalBlue and EternalRomance, to spread itself to other remote systems on the network.[27][28][29] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0316
ATT&CK Technique Name:Pegasus for Android
Pegasus for Android has the ability to record device audio.[22] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0565
ATT&CK Technique Name:Raindrop
Raindrop encrypted its payload using a simple XOR algorithm with a single-byte key.[263][264] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0263
ATT&CK Technique Name:TYPEFRAME
TYPEFRAME has used a malicious Word document for delivery with VBA macros for execution.[161] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0342
ATT&CK Technique Name:GreyEnergy
GreyEnergy can securely delete a file by hooking into the DeleteFileA and DeleteFileW functions in the Windows API.[91] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S1065
ATT&CK Technique Name:Woody RAT
Woody RAT has been delivered via malicious Word documents and archive files.[244] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M1035
ATT&CK Technique Name:Limit Access to Resource Over Network
Limit access to remote services through centrally managed concentrators such as VPNs and other managed remote access systems. | secon |
title:botconf2017 A Silver Path: Ideas for Improving Lawful Sharing of Botnet Evidence with Law Enforcement
Business, organizations, and individuals can largely contribute to a better collective response to botnets. Apart from the power of thwarting attacks as they occur, multistakeholders play a meaningful role in han... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0567
ATT&CK Technique Name:Dtrack
One of Dtrack can replace the normal flow of a program execution with malicious code.[3] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0427
ATT&CK Technique Name:TrickMo
TrickMo can collect device information such as network operator, model, brand, and OS version.[38] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0135
ATT&CK Technique Name:HIDEDRV
HIDEDRV is a rootkit that hides certain operating system artifacts.[15] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0024
ATT&CK Technique Name:Dyre
Dyre has the ability to identify installed programs on a compromised host.[9] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0409
ATT&CK Technique Name:Machete
Machete captures audio from the computer’s microphone.[21][22][23] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M1022
ATT&CK Technique Name:Restrict File and Directory Permissions
Set directory access controls to prevent file writes to the search paths for applications, both in the folders where applications are run from and the standard dylib folders. | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0578
ATT&CK Technique Name:SUPERNOVA
SUPERNOVA was installed via exploitation of a SolarWinds Orion API authentication bypass vulnerability (CVE-2020-10148).[79][80] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0534
ATT&CK Technique Name:Bazar
Bazar can establish persistence by writing shortcuts to the Windows Startup folder.[6][7] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:T1550.004
ATT&CK Technique Name:Web Session Cookie
Adversaries can use stolen session cookies to authenticate to web applications and services. This technique bypasses some multi-factor authentication protocols since the session is already authenticated. | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0062
ATT&CK Technique Name:DustySky
DustySky can compress files via RAR while staging data to be exfiltrated.[26] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0184
ATT&CK Technique Name:POWRUNER
POWRUNER may query the Registry by running reg query on a victim.[72] | secon |
title:botconf2022 A fresh look into the underground card shop ecosystem
Law enforcement has seized multiple card shops during recent years. However, every time there is a gap in the card shop business due to law enforcement countermeasures, exit scam from the market operators, or simply closure, new threat actors come ... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0034
ATT&CK Technique Name:NETEAGLE
NETEAGLE will attempt to detect if the infected host is configured to a proxy. If so, NETEAGLE will send beacons via an HTTP POST request. NETEAGLE will also use HTTP to download resources that contain an IP address and Port Number pair to connect to for further C2.[29] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0060
ATT&CK Technique Name:BRONZE BUTLER
BRONZE BUTLER has obtained and used open-source tools such as Mimikatz, gsecdump, and Windows Credential Editor.[25] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:T1021.006
ATT&CK Technique Name:Windows Remote Management
Adversaries may use Valid Accounts to interact with remote systems using Windows Remote Management (WinRM). The adversary may then perform actions as the logged-on user. | secon |
titleblackhat:eu-22 Exploring a New Class of Kernel Exploit Primitive
Microsoft Security Response Center receives and examines many interesting bug classes. Often, the exploitability of those bugs is apparent, but this is not always the case. One interesting outlier is an arbitrary kernel pointer read primitive where t... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M1001
ATT&CK Technique Name:Security Updates
Security updates typically provide patches for vulnerabilities that enable device rooting. | secon |
ATT&CK ID:C0004
ATT&CK Technique Name:CostaRicto
During CostaRicto, the threat actors employed nmap and pscan to scan target environments.[24] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:C0002
ATT&CK Technique Name:Night Dragon
During Night Dragon, threat actors enticed users to click on links in spearphishing emails to download malware.[65] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0007
ATT&CK Technique Name:APT28
APT28 has cleared event logs, including by using the commands wevtutil cl System and wevtutil cl Security.[2][3] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0091
ATT&CK Technique Name:Epic
Epic uses the nbtstat -n and nbtstat -s commands on the victim’s machine.[83] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0344
ATT&CK Technique Name:Azorult
Azorult can call WTSQueryUserToken and CreateProcessAsUser to start a new process with local system privileges.[3] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:T0880
ATT&CK Technique Name:Loss of Safety
Adversaries may compromise safety system functions designed to maintain safe operation of a process when unacceptable or dangerous conditions occur. Safety systems are often composed of the same elements as control systems but have the sole purpose of ensuring the pr... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0264
ATT&CK Technique Name:OopsIE
OopsIE encodes data in hexadecimal format over the C2 channel.[63] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0007
ATT&CK Technique Name:APT28
APT28 has compromised targets via strategic web compromise utilizing custom exploit kits.[6] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0062
ATT&CK Technique Name:DustySky
DustySky achieves persistence by creating a Registry entry in HKCU\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run.[77] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M0813
ATT&CK Technique Name:Software Process and Device Authentication
Devices should authenticate all messages between master and outstation assets. | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M1040
ATT&CK Technique Name:Behavior Prevention on Endpoint
Some endpoint security solutions can be configured to block some types of process injection based on common sequences of behavior that occur during the injection process. | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0126
ATT&CK Technique Name:Higaisa
Higaisa has exploited CVE-2018-0798 for execution.[51] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0535
ATT&CK Technique Name:Golden Cup
Golden Cup has encrypted exfiltrated data using AES in ECB mode.[6] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M1032
ATT&CK Technique Name:Multi-factor Authentication
Use multi-factor authentication for user and privileged accounts. | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M1030
ATT&CK Technique Name:Network Segmentation
Enable Windows firewall, which prevents DCOM instantiation by default. | secon |
titleblackhat:eu-18 The Last Line of Defense: Understanding and Attacking Apple File System on iOS
With its rapid evolvement, Apple has deployed many mechanisms in iOS to defend against potential threats and risks. Among system components, filesystem is considered to be the last line of defense against attackers' attem... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0194
ATT&CK Technique Name:PowerSploit
PowerSploit contains a collection of CodeExecution modules that inject code (DLL, shellcode) into a process.[52][53] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0056
ATT&CK Technique Name:PROMETHIUM
PROMETHIUM has created self-signed certificates to sign malicious installers.[4] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0339
ATT&CK Technique Name:Micropsia
Micropsia creates a shortcut to maintain persistence.[24] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0215
ATT&CK Technique Name:KARAE
KARAE can use public cloud-based storage providers for command and control.[3] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M1013
ATT&CK Technique Name:Application Developer Guidance
Application developers could be encouraged to avoid placing sensitive data in notification text. | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0244
ATT&CK Technique Name:Comnie
Comnie achieves persistence by adding a shortcut of itself to the startup path in the Registry.[62] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0569
ATT&CK Technique Name:Explosive
Explosive has encrypted communications with the RC4 method.[46] | secon |
titleblackhat:eu-18 PASTA: Portable Automotive Security Testbed with Adaptability
For accelerating the development of sophisticated driving-assist technologies such as automated driving, securing vehicles against cyberattacks is challenging. To promote the development of security-measurement methods, a company's electr... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:C0001
ATT&CK Technique Name:Frankenstein
During Frankenstein, the threat actors used WMI queries to determine if analysis tools were running on a compromised system.[45] | secon |
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