text stringlengths 100 9.93M | category stringclasses 11
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ATT&CK ID:S0385
ATT&CK Technique Name:njRAT
njRAT can be configured to spread via removable drives.[20][21] | secon |
title:blackhat:us-20 Emulating Samsung's Baseband for Security Testing
The most crucial interface between modern mobile phones and cellular networks are baseband processors. Basebands are responsible for processing the complicated 2G thru 5G protocols, which gives them a large attack surface. Unfortunately, explori... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0441
ATT&CK Technique Name:PowerShower
PowerShower has added a registry key so future powershell.exe instances are spawned with coordinates for a window position off-screen by default.[33] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0040
ATT&CK Technique Name:Patchwork
Patchwork encrypted the collected files' path with AES and then encoded them with base64.[41] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0354
ATT&CK Technique Name:Denis
Denis performed process hollowing through the API calls CreateRemoteThread, ResumeThread, and Wow64SetThreadContext.[18] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0483
ATT&CK Technique Name:IcedID
IcedID has used ZwQueueApcThread to inject itself into remote processes.[9] | secon |
titleblackhat:us-21 How To Tame Your Unicorn - Exploring and Exploiting Zero-Click Remote Interfaces of Modern Huawei Smartphones
The exploration of baseband security has come a long way in the past decade. Published research has exposed privacy issues in 3GPP protocols from GSM to LTE and traditional memory safety vul... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M1027
ATT&CK Technique Name:Password Policies
Refer to NIST guidelines when creating password policies. [6] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S1060
ATT&CK Technique Name:Mafalda
Mafalda can delete Windows Event logs by invoking the OpenEventLogW and ClearEventLogW functions.[22] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M1015
ATT&CK Technique Name:Active Directory Configuration
For containing the impact of a previously generated golden ticket, reset the built-in KRBTGT account password twice, which will invalidate any existing golden tickets that have been created with the KRBTGT hash and other Kerberos tickets derived from ... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S1045
ATT&CK Technique Name:INCONTROLLER
INCONTROLLER can deploy Tcpdump to sniff network traffic and collect PCAP files.[2] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0094
ATT&CK Technique Name:Trojan.Karagany
Trojan.Karagany can capture information regarding the victim's OS, security, and hardware configuration.[375] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0260
ATT&CK Technique Name:InvisiMole
InvisiMole can inject itself into another process to avoid detection including use of a technique called ListPlanting that customizes the sorting algorithm in a ListView structure.[30] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0496
ATT&CK Technique Name:REvil
REvil utilizes JavaScript, WScript, and PowerShell scripts to execute. The malicious JavaScript attachment has an obfuscated PowerShell script that executes the malware. [5] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0021
ATT&CK Technique Name:Molerats
Molerats used various implants, including those built with JS, on target machines.[51] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M1024
ATT&CK Technique Name:Restrict Registry Permissions
Consider using Group Policy to configure and block modifications to W32Time parameters in the Registry. [4] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M1046
ATT&CK Technique Name:Boot Integrity
Some vendors of embedded network devices provide cryptographic signing to ensure the integrity of operating system images at boot time. Implement where available, following vendor guidelines. [8] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:T1606.001
ATT&CK Technique Name:Web Cookies
Adversaries may forge web cookies that can be used to gain access to web applications or Internet services. Web applications and services (hosted in cloud SaaS environments or on-premise servers) often use session cookies to authenticate and authorize user access. | secon |
title:blackhat:us-22 sOfT7: Revealing the Secrets of Siemens S7 PLCs
The programmable logic controller (PLC) is a reliable hardware device implementing complex monitoring and control logic for industrial control systems. The pursuit of new advanced features has driven the ICS vendors to come up with new-generation PLCs... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G1000
ATT&CK Technique Name:ALLANITE
ALLANITE leverages watering hole attacks to gain access into electric utilities. [2] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0053
ATT&CK Technique Name:SeaDuke
SeaDuke is capable of persisting via a .lnk file stored in the Startup directory.[32] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0692
ATT&CK Technique Name:SILENTTRINITY
SILENTTRINITY has the ability to leverage API including GetProcAddress and LoadLibrary.[158] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0408
ATT&CK Technique Name:FlexiSpy
FlexiSpy can intercept SMS and MMS messages as well as monitor messages for keywords.[20][21] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0500
ATT&CK Technique Name:MCMD
MCMD can use HTTPS in communication with C2 web servers.[203] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:T1409
ATT&CK Technique Name:Stored Application Data
Adversaries may try to access and collect application data resident on the device. Adversaries often target popular applications, such as Facebook, WeChat, and Gmail. | secon |
titleblackhat:asia-22 Start Arbitrary Activity App Components as the System User Vulnerability Affecting Samsung Android Devices
Samsung Android devices running Android versions 9, 10, 11, and 12 contain a vulnerability that allows any local app on the device (including third-party apps with zero permissions) to provid... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M0946
ATT&CK Technique Name:Boot Integrity
Check the integrity of the existing BIOS or EFI to determine if it is vulnerable to modification. Use Trusted Platform Module technology. [4] Move system's root of trust to hardware to prevent tampering with the SPI flash memory. [5] Technologies such as Intel Boot G... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M0930
ATT&CK Technique Name:Network Segmentation
Ensure proper network segmentation between higher level corporate resources and the control process environment. | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0559
ATT&CK Technique Name:SUNBURST
SUNBURST masqueraded its network traffic as the Orion Improvement Program (OIP) protocol.[17] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:C0022
ATT&CK Technique Name:Operation Dream Job
During Operation Dream Job, Lazarus Group used Windows API ObtainUserAgentString to obtain the victim's User-Agent and used the value to connect to their C2 server.[106] | secon |
title:blackhat:us-19 Flying a False Flag: Advanced C2, Trust Conflicts, and Domain Takeover
Command and Control (C2) is at the center of successful malware development. Given the importance of reliable C2 for stable malware, it is also a core focus for many defensive teams. What happens though, when malware authors tak... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S1018
ATT&CK Technique Name:Saint Bot
Saint Bot has attempted to bypass UAC using fodhelper.exe to escalate privileges.[55] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0650
ATT&CK Technique Name:QakBot
QakBot has been delivered in ZIP files via HTML smuggling.[7][8] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0117
ATT&CK Technique Name:Fox Kitten
Fox Kitten has used protocol tunneling for communication and RDP activity on compromised hosts through the use of open source tools such as Ngrok and custom tool SSHMinion.[16][17][18] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0579
ATT&CK Technique Name:Waterbear
Waterbear has used RC4 encrypted shellcode and encrypted functions.[350] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:C0022
ATT&CK Technique Name:Operation Dream Job
During Operation Dream Job, Lazarus Group packed malicious .db files with Themida to evade detection.[33][63][64] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0269
ATT&CK Technique Name:QUADAGENT
QUADAGENT was likely obfuscated using Invoke-Obfuscation.[74][12] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0011
ATT&CK Technique Name:Taidoor
Taidoor can upload data and files from a victim's machine.[181] | secon |
titleblackhat:asia-23 Prototype Pollution Leads to RCE: Gadgets Everywhere
Many have heard about Prototype Pollution vulnerabilities in JavaScript applications. This kind of vulnerability allows an attacker to inject properties into an object's root prototype that may lead to flow control alteration and unexpected prog... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:C0007
ATT&CK Technique Name:FunnyDream
During FunnyDream, the threat actors used Tasklist on targeted systems.[108] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0552
ATT&CK Technique Name:AdFind
AdFind has the ability to query Active Directory for computers.[4][5][6][7] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0126
ATT&CK Technique Name:ComRAT
ComRAT can use email attachments for command and control.[11] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0114
ATT&CK Technique Name:Chimera
Chimera has has used net user /dom and net user Administrator to enumerate domain accounts including administrator accounts.[15][16] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M0801
ATT&CK Technique Name:Access Management
Ensure embedded controls and network devices are protected through access management, as these devices often have unknown hardcoded accounts which could be used to gain unauthorized access. | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0260
ATT&CK Technique Name:InvisiMole
InvisiMole can deliver trojanized versions of software and documents, relying on user execution.[117] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0408
ATT&CK Technique Name:FlexiSpy
FlexiSpy can communicate with the command and control server over ports 12512 and 12514.[3] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0184
ATT&CK Technique Name:POWRUNER
POWRUNER may collect information about the currently logged in user by running whoami on a victim.[144] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0679
ATT&CK Technique Name:Ferocious
Ferocious can use COM hijacking to establish persistence.[8] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0516
ATT&CK Technique Name:SoreFang
SoreFang can enumerate domain accounts via net.exe user /domain.[45] | secon |
titleblackhat:us-20 How I Created My Clone Using AI - Next-Gen Social Engineering
This talk is inspired by an episode of Black Mirror. I will be demonstrating a live demo creating a bot who talks like me and can be used to impersonate me online and do social engineering. I will be showing a live demo of how to a create... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:C0024
ATT&CK Technique Name:SolarWinds Compromise
During the SolarWinds Compromise, APT29 used netsh to configure firewall rules that limited certain UDP outbound packets.[34] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0419
ATT&CK Technique Name:SimBad
SimBad hides its icon from the application launcher.[21] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0114
ATT&CK Technique Name:Chimera
Chimera has used side loading to place malicious DLLs in memory.[15] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0045
ATT&CK Technique Name:menuPass
menuPass has collected various files from the compromised computers.[117][118] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0177
ATT&CK Technique Name:Power Loader
Power Loader overwrites Explorer’s Shell_TrayWnd extra window memory to redirect execution to a NTDLL function that is abused to assemble and execute a return-oriented programming (ROP) chain and create a malicious thread within Explorer.exe.[5][6] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0356
ATT&CK Technique Name:KONNI
KONNI has bypassed UAC by performing token impersonation as well as an RPC-based method, this included bypassing UAC set to "AlwaysNotify".[40][41] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S1025
ATT&CK Technique Name:Amadey
Amadey can collect information from a compromised host.[3] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0250
ATT&CK Technique Name:Koadic
Koadic can run a command on another machine using PsExec.[33] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0121
ATT&CK Technique Name:Sidewinder
Sidewinder has used DLL side-loading to drop and execute malicious payloads including the hijacking of the legitimate Windows application file rekeywiz.exe.[59] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0085
ATT&CK Technique Name:S-Type
S-Type has used Windows APIs, including GetKeyboardType, NetUserAdd, and NetUserDel.[124] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M1011
ATT&CK Technique Name:User Guidance
Users should be wary of granting applications dangerous or privacy-intrusive permissions, such as keyboard registration or accessibility service access. | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M1013
ATT&CK Technique Name:Application Developer Guidance
When possible, include hash values in manifest files to help prevent side-loading of malicious libraries.[1] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M1032
ATT&CK Technique Name:Multi-factor Authentication
Use multi-factor authentication for user and privileged accounts. Most embedded network devices support TACACS+ and/or RADIUS. Follow vendor prescribed best practices for hardening access control.[3] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0226
ATT&CK Technique Name:Smoke Loader
Smoke Loader spawns a new copy of c:\windows\syswow64\explorer.exe and then replaces the executable code in memory with malware.[35][36] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0538
ATT&CK Technique Name:Crutch
Crutch has staged stolen files in the C:\AMD\Temp directory.[24] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0312
ATT&CK Technique Name:WireLurker
WireLurker monitors for iOS devices connected via USB to an infected OSX computer and installs downloaded third-party applications or automatically generated malicious applications onto the device.[7] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0396
ATT&CK Technique Name:EvilBunny
EvilBunny has created Registry keys for persistence in [HKLM|HKCU]\…\CurrentVersion\Run.[85] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:T1546.002
ATT&CK Technique Name:Screensaver
Adversaries may establish persistence by executing malicious content triggered by user inactivity. Screensavers are programs that execute after a configurable time of user inactivity and consist of Portable Executable (PE) files with a .scr file extension. The Windo... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0561
ATT&CK Technique Name:GuLoader
GuLoader can use a number of different APIs for discovery and execution.[87] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0482
ATT&CK Technique Name:Bundlore
Bundlore can install malicious browser extensions that are used to hijack user searches.[11] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0512
ATT&CK Technique Name:FatDuke
FatDuke can turn itself on or off at random intervals.[23] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M1052
ATT&CK Technique Name:User Account Control
Enable pass the hash mitigations to apply UAC restrictions to local accounts on network logon. The associated Registry key is located HKLM\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Policies\System\LocalAccountTokenFilterPolicy.Through GPO: Computer Configuratio... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0696
ATT&CK Technique Name:Flagpro
Flagpro has been distributed via spearphishing as an email attachment.[46] | secon |
title:blackhat:us-19 The Most Secure Browser? Pwning Chrome from 2016 to 2019
Browser security is always a prevalent topic in security research. Due to the great design and long-term effort, browsers have been more and more secure. The last time Chrome was pwned in Pwn2Own dates back to Mobile Pwn2Own 2016. In that con... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M1027
ATT&CK Technique Name:Password Policies
Applications and appliances that utilize default username and password should be changed immediately after the installation, and before deployment to a production environment. [8] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0631
ATT&CK Technique Name:Chaes
Chaes has decrypted an AES encrypted binary file to trigger the download of other files.[49] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0367
ATT&CK Technique Name:Emotet
Emotet has been observed dropping password grabber modules including Mimikatz. [27] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0168
ATT&CK Technique Name:Gazer
Gazer can establish persistence by creating a scheduled task.[71][72] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0045
ATT&CK Technique Name:menuPass
menuPass has used a modified version of pentesting script wmiexec.vbs, which logs into a remote machine using WMI.[75][76][77] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0660
ATT&CK Technique Name:Clambling
Clambling has the ability to bypass UAC using a passuac.dll file.[21][22] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0010
ATT&CK Technique Name:Turla
Turla has abused local accounts that have the same password across the victim’s network.[14] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0199
ATT&CK Technique Name:TURNEDUP
TURNEDUP is capable of downloading additional files.[453] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0121
ATT&CK Technique Name:Sidewinder
Sidewinder has used LNK files to download remote files to the victim's network.[409][410] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0416
ATT&CK Technique Name:RDFSNIFFER
RDFSNIFFER hooks several Win32 API functions to hijack elements of the remote system management user-interface.[12] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M1026
ATT&CK Technique Name:Privileged Account Management
Audit domain and local accounts as well as their permission levels routinely to look for situations that could allow an adversary to gain wide access by obtaining credentials of a privileged account. [3] [67] These audits should also include if default... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:C0006
ATT&CK Technique Name:Operation Honeybee
During Operation Honeybee, the threat actors used a legitimate Windows executable and secure directory for their payloads to bypass UAC.[113] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0032
ATT&CK Technique Name:gh0st RAT
gh0st RAT uses RC4 and XOR to encrypt C2 traffic.[56] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M1001
ATT&CK Technique Name:Security Updates
Security updates may contain patches that inhibit system software compromises. | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0368
ATT&CK Technique Name:NotPetya
NotPetya can use valid credentials with PsExec or wmic to spread itself to remote systems.[8][9] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0129
ATT&CK Technique Name:Mustang Panda
Mustang Panda has used an additional filename extension to hide the true file type.[5][6] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S1064
ATT&CK Technique Name:SVCReady
SVCReady has the ability to determine if its runtime environment is virtualized.[55] | secon |
titleblackhat:asia-20 Making an Impact from India to the Rest of the World by Building and Nurturing Women Infosec Community
India is one of the most diverse and fastest growing countries in the world and due to the fast growth, women often are left behind. The world average female literacy rate is 79.7%, while in Indi... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0059
ATT&CK Technique Name:Magic Hound
Magic Hound gathered credentials from two victims that they then attempted to validate across 75 different websites. Magic Hound has also collected credentials from over 900 Fortinet VPN servers in the US, Europe, and Israel.[14][15] | secon |
titleblackhat:eu-22 Scammers Who Scam Scammers, Hackers Who Hack Hackers: Exploring a Hidden Sub-economy on Cybercrime Forums and Marketplaces
It's no secret that criminal forums and marketplaces are crammed with nefarious activity. But behind all the initial access brokers, stolen data, and malware, there's a hidden, ... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M1037
ATT&CK Technique Name:Filter Network Traffic
Cloud service providers support IP-based restrictions when accessing cloud resources. Consider using IP allowlisting along with user account management to ensure that data access is restricted not only to valid users but only from expected IP ranges to mitiga... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0268
ATT&CK Technique Name:Bisonal
Bisonal has appended random binary data to the end of itself to generate a large binary.[6] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0468
ATT&CK Technique Name:Skidmap
Skidmap has the ability to add the public key of its handlers to the authorized_keys file to maintain persistence on an infected host.[10] | secon |
titleblackhat:eu-19 Chain of Fools: An Exploration of Certificate Chain Validation Mishaps
Typically, when software needs to perform cryptographic tasks, developers use libraries or APIs that abstract many details away from them. They don't need to fully understand how TLS handshakes work to create a TLS socket, nor do... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S1063
ATT&CK Technique Name:Brute Ratel C4
Brute Ratel C4 has the ability to upload files from a compromised system.[31] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0088
ATT&CK Technique Name:TEMP.Veles
TEMP.Veles has used scheduled task XML triggers.[170] | secon |
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