text stringlengths 100 9.93M | category stringclasses 11
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ATT&CK ID:S0038
ATT&CK Technique Name:Duqu
Adversaries can instruct Duqu to spread laterally by copying itself to shares it has enumerated and for which it has obtained legitimate credentials (via keylogging or other means). The remote host is then infected by using the compromised credentials to schedule a task on rem... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0230
ATT&CK Technique Name:ZeroT
ZeroT gathers the victim's IP address and domain information, and then sends it to its C2 server.[255] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M1022
ATT&CK Technique Name:Restrict File and Directory Permissions
Ensure proper process and file permissions are in place to prevent adversaries from disabling or interfering with security services. | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0058
ATT&CK Technique Name:SslMM
To establish persistence, SslMM identifies the Start Menu Startup directory and drops a link to its own executable disguised as an "Office Start," "Yahoo Talk," "MSN Gaming Z0ne," or "MSN Talk" shortcut.[250] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0442
ATT&CK Technique Name:VBShower
VBShower used HKCU\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run\[a-f0-9A-F]{8} to maintain persistence.[274] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0260
ATT&CK Technique Name:InvisiMole
InvisiMole has installed legitimate but vulnerable Total Video Player software and wdigest.dll library drivers on compromised hosts to exploit stack overflow and input validation vulnerabilities for code execution.[56] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0655
ATT&CK Technique Name:BusyGasper
BusyGasper can collect every user screen tap and compare the input to a hardcoded list of coordinates to translate the input to a character.[3] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M1049
ATT&CK Technique Name:Antivirus/Antimalware
Anti-virus can be used to automatically quarantine suspicious files. | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0526
ATT&CK Technique Name:KGH_SPY
KGH_SPY has the ability to download and execute code from remote servers.[130] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0065
ATT&CK Technique Name:Leviathan
Leviathan has compromised email accounts to conduct social engineering attacks.[11] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0093
ATT&CK Technique Name:GALLIUM
GALLIUM used DLL side-loading to covertly load PoisonIvy into memory on the victim machine.[24] | secon |
title:botconf2018 Code Cartographer’s Diary
At last year’s Botconf, we have launched Malpedia [1], our community-driven approach to create a free and independent resource for rapid identification and actionable context when investigating malware. While only touching the surface of analysis possibilities last time (most... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S1062
ATT&CK Technique Name:S.O.V.A.
S.O.V.A. can resist removal by going to the home screen during uninstall.[4] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0570
ATT&CK Technique Name:BitPaymer
BitPaymer can set values in the Registry to help in execution.[21] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0109
ATT&CK Technique Name:WEBC2
Variants of WEBC2 achieve persistence by using DLL search order hijacking, usually by copying the DLL file to %SYSTEMROOT% (C:\WINDOWS\ntshrui.dll).[38] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S1065
ATT&CK Technique Name:Woody RAT
Woody RAT can call NtQuerySystemProcessInformation with SystemProcessInformation to enumerate all running processes, including associated information such as PID, parent PID, image name, and owner.[275] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0020
ATT&CK Technique Name:Equation
Equation has been observed utilizing environmental keying in payload delivery.[2][9] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S1061
ATT&CK Technique Name:AbstractEmu
AbstractEmu can collect device information such as manufacturer, model, version, serial number, and telephone number.[2] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M1047
ATT&CK Technique Name:Audit
Enterprise email solutions have monitoring mechanisms that may include the ability to audit auto-forwarding rules on a regular basis.In an Exchange environment, Administrators can use Get-InboxRule to discover and remove potentially malicious auto-forwarding rules.[3] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0114
ATT&CK Technique Name:Chimera
Chimera has dumped password hashes for use in pass the hash authentication attacks.[5] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:C0024
ATT&CK Technique Name:SolarWinds Compromise
During the SolarWinds Compromise, APT29 stole Chrome browser cookies by copying the Chrome profile directories of targeted users.[15] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M1025
ATT&CK Technique Name:Privileged Process Integrity
On Windows 8.1 and Server 2012 R2, enable LSA Protection by setting the Registry key HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Control\Lsa\RunAsPPL to dword:00000001. [7] LSA Protection ensures that LSA plug-ins and drivers are only loaded if they are... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0399
ATT&CK Technique Name:Pallas
Pallas retrieves messages and decryption keys for popular messaging applications and other accounts stored on the device.[9] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G1012
ATT&CK Technique Name:CURIUM
CURIUM has used social media to deliver malicious files to victims.[3] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0669
ATT&CK Technique Name:KOCTOPUS
KOCTOPUS has added and deleted keys from the Registry.[81] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0431
ATT&CK Technique Name:HotCroissant
HotCroissant has the ability to determine if the current user is an administrator, Windows product name, processor name, screen resolution, and physical RAM of the infected host.[167] | secon |
titleblackhat:us-23 Physical Attacks Against Smartphones
Android devices are constantly improving their security to protect against attackers with physical access, with new protection techniques being added year-by-year. This talk aims to demonstrate vulnerabilities in modern Android smartphones that are still viable, ... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0004
ATT&CK Technique Name:Ke3chang
Ke3chang has used compromised credentials to sign into victims’ Microsoft 365 accounts.[7] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:T0851
ATT&CK Technique Name:Rootkit
Adversaries may deploy rootkits to hide the presence of programs, files, network connections, services, drivers, and other system components. Rootkits are programs that hide the existence of malware by intercepting and modifying operating-system API calls that supply system... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0482
ATT&CK Technique Name:Bundlore
Bundlore has been spread through malicious advertisements on websites.[18] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M0807
ATT&CK Technique Name:Network Allowlists
Use host-based allowlists to prevent devices from accepting connections from unauthorized systems. For example, allowlists can be used to ensure devices can only connect with master stations or known management/engineering workstations. [7] | secon |
title:botconf2022 See ya Sharp: A Loader’s Tale
Simply distributing malware is not a viable strategy anymore for criminal actors. To combat the ever increasing defense mechanisms, malicious loaders are used. These loaders are meant to conceal the final payload from the prying eyes of anti-virus and anti-malware scanner... | secon |
titleblackhat:asia-19 How to Survive the Hardware Assisted Control-Flow Integrity Enforcement
Control-flow hijacking is a crucial step of modern vulnerability exploitation, which helps to convert a memory safety vulnerability into arbitrary code execution. The security industry has put in great efforts in combating the... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0093
ATT&CK Technique Name:Backdoor.Oldrea
Some Backdoor.Oldrea samples contain a publicly available Web browser password recovery tool.[13] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0363
ATT&CK Technique Name:Empire
Empire can capture webcam data on Windows and macOS systems.[14] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0038
ATT&CK Technique Name:Duqu
Adversaries can instruct Duqu to spread laterally by copying itself to shares it has enumerated and for which it has obtained legitimate credentials (via keylogging or other means). The remote host is then infected by using the compromised credentials to schedule a task on rem... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0052
ATT&CK Technique Name:CopyKittens
CopyKittens has used the AirVPN service for operational activity.[10] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0663
ATT&CK Technique Name:SysUpdate
SysUpdate has used DNS TXT requests as for its C2 communication.[67] | secon |
titleblackhat:us-22 Browser-Powered Desync Attacks: A New Frontier in HTTP Request Smuggling
The recent rise of HTTP Request Smuggling has seen a flood of critical findings enabling near-complete compromise of numerous major websites. However, the threat has been confined to attacker-accessible systems with a reverse p... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0040
ATT&CK Technique Name:Patchwork
Patchwork has used embedded image tags (known as web bugs) with unique, per-recipient tracking links in their emails for the purpose of identifying which recipients opened messages.[20] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0010
ATT&CK Technique Name:Turla
Turla and its RPC backdoors have used APIs calls for various tasks related to subverting AMSI and accessing then executing commands through RPC and/or named pipes.[177] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0098
ATT&CK Technique Name:BlackTech
BlackTech has used e-mails with malicious documents to lure victims into installing malware.[42][43] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0333
ATT&CK Technique Name:UBoatRAT
UBoatRAT takes advantage of the /SetNotifyCmdLine option in BITSAdmin to ensure it stays running on a system to maintain persistence.[7] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0425
ATT&CK Technique Name:Corona Updates
Corona Updates can take pictures using the camera and can record MP4 files.[3] | secon |
titleblackhat:eu-21 Practical HTTP Header Smuggling: Sneaking Past Reverse Proxies to Attack AWS and Beyond
Web applications commonly rely on proxy servers adding, modifying, or filtering HTTP headers to pass information to back-end servers. Research in recent years has shown how flawed implementations of these actions... | secon |
titleblackhat:us-19 How Do Cyber Insurers View The World?
With the rise of data breaches there have been many discussions, presentations and articles written about cyber insurance, with many of them not being so flattered. Unfortunately there is a lot of misinformation and questions still remain. This session provides... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:C0006
ATT&CK Technique Name:Operation Honeybee
During Operation Honeybee, the threat actors collected the computer name, OS, and other system information using cmd /c systeminfo > %temp%\ temp.ini.[264] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0171
ATT&CK Technique Name:Felismus
Some Felismus samples use a custom method for C2 traffic that utilizes Base64.[35] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:C0015
ATT&CK Technique Name:C0015
During C0015, the threat actors obtained files and data from the compromised network.[33] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M0947
ATT&CK Technique Name:Audit
Consider periodic reviews of accounts and privileges for critical and sensitive repositories. | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0001
ATT&CK Technique Name:Axiom
Axiom has compressed and encrypted data prior to exfiltration.[7] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0093
ATT&CK Technique Name:Backdoor.Oldrea
Using OPC, a component of Backdoor.Oldrea gathers any details about connected devices and sends them back to the C2 for the attackers to analyze. [1] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M1032
ATT&CK Technique Name:Multi-factor Authentication
Require multi-factor authentication to register devices in Azure AD.[7] Configure multi-factor authentication systems to disallow enrolling new devices for inactive accounts.[1] When first enrolling MFA, use conditional access policies to restrict device... | secon |
titleblackhat:eu-21 The Art of Exploiting UAF by Ret2bpf in Android Kernel
In early 2021, an external researcher reported to Google three lines of code indicating the xt_qtaguid kernel module, used for monitoring network socket status, had a Use-After-Free vulnerability (CVE-2021-0399) for 10 years. Unfortunately, the ... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0060
ATT&CK Technique Name:BRONZE BUTLER
BRONZE BUTLER has exfiltrated files stolen from file shares.[3] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0140
ATT&CK Technique Name:LazyScripter
LazyScripter has used mshta.exe to execute Koadic stagers.[22] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:T1561.001
ATT&CK Technique Name:Disk Content Wipe
Adversaries may erase the contents of storage devices on specific systems or in large numbers in a network to interrupt availability to system and network resources. | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M1027
ATT&CK Technique Name:Password Policies
Ensure that root accounts have complex, unique passwords across all systems on the network. | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M1026
ATT&CK Technique Name:Privileged Account Management
Ensure critical system files as well as those known to be abused by adversaries have restrictive permissions and are owned by an appropriately privileged account, especially if access is not required by users nor will inhibit system functionality. | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S1060
ATT&CK Technique Name:Mafalda
Mafalda can use the GetAdaptersInfo function to retrieve information about network adapters and the GetIpNetTable function to retrieve the IPv4 to physical network address mapping table.[137] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G1001
ATT&CK Technique Name:HEXANE
HEXANE has relied on victim's executing malicious file attachments delivered via email or embedded within actor-controlled websites to deliver malware.[65][107][66][73] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0485
ATT&CK Technique Name:Mandrake
Mandrake abuses the accessibility service to prevent removing administrator permissions, accessibility permissions, and to set itself as the default SMS handler.[8] | secon |
titleblackhat:us-18 Reconstruct the World from Vanished Shadow: Recovering Deleted VSS Snapshots
Volume Shadow Copy Service (VSS) is a backup feature for recent Windows OSes. You can create storage snapshots by using VSS. If users refer to snapshots, they can recover its contents. VSS is one of the most important thing... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0125
ATT&CK Technique Name:HAFNIUM
HAFNIUM has stolen copies of the Active Directory database (NTDS.DIT).[14] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0531
ATT&CK Technique Name:Grandoreiro
Grandoreiro can modify the Registry to store its configuration at HKCU\Software\ under frequently changing names including %USERNAME% and ToolTech-RM.[65] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M1026
ATT&CK Technique Name:Privileged Account Management
Ensure critical system files as well as those known to be abused by adversaries have restrictive permissions and are owned by an appropriately privileged account, especially if access is not required by users nor will inhibit system functionality. | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0531
ATT&CK Technique Name:Grandoreiro
Grandoreiro can use malicious browser extensions to steal cookies and other user information.[12] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G1001
ATT&CK Technique Name:HEXANE
HEXANE has used Ping and tracert for network discovery.[100] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0530
ATT&CK Technique Name:Melcoz
Melcoz has gained execution through victims opening malicious links.[45] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0390
ATT&CK Technique Name:SQLRat
SQLRat has used PowerShell to create a Meterpreter session.[215] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0128
ATT&CK Technique Name:ZIRCONIUM
ZIRCONIUM has used AES encrypted communications in C2.[153] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0477
ATT&CK Technique Name:Goopy
Goopy has impersonated the legitimate goopdate.dll, which was dropped on the target system with a legitimate GoogleUpdate.exe.[10] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0444
ATT&CK Technique Name:ShimRat
ShimRat can be issued a command shell function from the C2.[302] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0356
ATT&CK Technique Name:KONNI
KONNI has used Rundll32 to execute its loader for privilege escalation purposes.[59][60] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S1030
ATT&CK Technique Name:Squirrelwaffle
Squirrelwaffle has been executed using rundll32.exe.[93][94] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0640
ATT&CK Technique Name:Avaddon
Avaddon has enumerated shared folders and mapped volumes.[9] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S1066
ATT&CK Technique Name:DarkTortilla
DarkTortilla can search a compromised system's running processes and services to detect Hyper-V, QEMU, Virtual PC, Virtual Box, and VMware, as well as Sandboxie.[14] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S1034
ATT&CK Technique Name:StrifeWater
StrifeWater can modify its sleep time responses from the default of 20-22 seconds.[38] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M1011
ATT&CK Technique Name:User Guidance
Users should be shown what a synthetic activity looks like so they can scrutinize them in the future. | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0062
ATT&CK Technique Name:DustySky
The DustySky dropper uses Windows Management Instrumentation to extract information about the operating system and whether an anti-virus is active.[36] | secon |
title:blackhat:us-21 Keynote: Hacking the Cybersecurity Puzzle
Jen Easterly, the new Director for the Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA), lays out her vision for how hackers, the government, and private sector can work together to confront cyber threats and solve tomorrow’s cyber puzzles before the... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M1032
ATT&CK Technique Name:Multi-factor Authentication
Integrating multi-factor authentication (MFA) as part of organizational policy can greatly reduce the risk of an adversary gaining control of valid credentials that may be used for additional tactics such as initial access, lateral movement, and collecti... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:C0024
ATT&CK Technique Name:SolarWinds Compromise
During the SolarWinds Compromise, APT29 used compromised local accounts to access victims' networks.[12] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0379
ATT&CK Technique Name:Revenge RAT
Revenge RAT uses cmd.exe to execute commands and run scripts on the victim's machine.[281] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0150
ATT&CK Technique Name:POSHSPY
POSHSPY downloads and executes additional PowerShell code and Windows binaries.[353] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0128
ATT&CK Technique Name:BADNEWS
BADNEWS typically loads its DLL file into a legitimate signed Java or VMware executable.[9][10] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:T1098.002
ATT&CK Technique Name:Additional Email Delegate Permissions
Adversaries may grant additional permission levels to maintain persistent access to an adversary-controlled email account. | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0698
ATT&CK Technique Name:HermeticWizard
HermeticWizard can use OpenRemoteServiceManager to create a service.[26] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0102
ATT&CK Technique Name:Wizard Spider
Wizard Spider has installed TrickBot as a service named ControlServiceA in order to establish persistence.[140] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0650
ATT&CK Technique Name:QakBot
QakBot can identify remote systems through the net view command.[70][71][72] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0004
ATT&CK Technique Name:Ke3chang
Ke3chang has deobfuscated Base64-encoded shellcode strings prior to loading them.[121] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0031
ATT&CK Technique Name:BACKSPACE
BACKSPACE achieves persistence by creating a shortcut to itself in the CSIDL_STARTUP directory.[39] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:T1055.005
ATT&CK Technique Name:Thread Local Storage
Adversaries may inject malicious code into processes via thread local storage (TLS) callbacks in order to evade process-based defenses as well as possibly elevate privileges. TLS callback injection is a method of executing arbitrary code in the address spac... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0662
ATT&CK Technique Name:RCSession
RCSession can store its obfuscated configuration file in the Registry under HKLM\SOFTWARE\Plus or HKCU\SOFTWARE\Plus.[21][22] | secon |
titleblackhat:us-18 Edge Side Include Injection: Abusing Caching Servers into SSRF and Transparent Session Hijacking
When caching servers and load balancers became an integral part of the Internet's infrastructure, vendors introduced what is called "Edge Side Includes" (ESI), a technology allowing malleability in cachi... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0385
ATT&CK Technique Name:njRAT
njRAT can capture screenshots of the victim’s machines.[114] | secon |
titleblackhat:asia-22 SideWinder Uncoils to Strike
SideWinder threat actor also known as RattleSnake and T-APT-04, has been one of the most aggressive threat actors in the past couple of years. Some of the main characteristics of this threat actor that make it stand out among the others, are the sheer number, high fre... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0595
ATT&CK Technique Name:ThiefQuest
ThiefQuest uses the CGEventTap functions to perform keylogging.[172] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0444
ATT&CK Technique Name:ShimRat
ShimRat has installed shim databases in the AppPatch folder.[6] | secon |
title:blackhat:us-22 Attack on Titan M, Reloaded: Vulnerability Research on a Modern Security Chip
The Titan M chip was introduced by Google in their Pixel 3 devices, and in a previous study, we analyzed this chip and presented its internals and protections. Based on this acquired background, in this new talk we will f... | secon |
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