text stringlengths 100 9.93M | category stringclasses 11
values |
|---|---|
ATT&CK ID:S0606
ATT&CK Technique Name:Bad Rabbit
Bad Rabbit has encrypted files and disks using AES-128-CBC and RSA-2048.[19] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0190
ATT&CK Technique Name:BITSAdmin
BITSAdmin can be used to create BITS Jobs to launch a malicious process.[12] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:TA0007
ATT&CK Technique Name:Discovery
The adversary is trying to figure out your environment. | secon |
titleblackhat:us-20 You have No Idea Who Sent that Email: 18 Attacks on Email Sender Authentication
Our study demonstrates an unfortunate fact that even a conscientious security professional using a state-of-the-art email provider service like Gmail cannot with confidence readily determine, when receiving an email, whe... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M1051
ATT&CK Technique Name:Update Software
Keep system images and software updated and migrate to SNMPv3.[2] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0488
ATT&CK Technique Name:CrackMapExec
CrackMapExec can dump usernames and hashed passwords from the SAM.[6] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0192
ATT&CK Technique Name:Pupy
Pupy can list local and remote shared drives and folders over SMB.[44] | secon |
title:blackhat:us-20 The Dark Side of the Cloud - How a Lack of EMR Security Controls Helped Amplify the Opioid Crisis
The Opioid crisis has caused mass addiction of prescription painkillers. Tens of thousands have died from this. Families have been broken apart. Children have been born addicted. It has stretched the s... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:C0015
ATT&CK Technique Name:C0015
During C0015, the threat actors used a DLL named D8B3.dll that was injected into the Winlogon process.[10] | secon |
titleblackhat:us-22 New Memory Forensics Techniques to Defeat Device Monitoring Malware
Malware that is capable of monitoring hardware devices poses a significant threat to the privacy and security of users and organizations. Common capabilities of such malware include keystroke logging, clipboard monitoring, sampling ... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0356
ATT&CK Technique Name:KONNI
KONNI has registered itself as a service using its export function.[73] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0350
ATT&CK Technique Name:zwShell
zwShell has established persistence by adding itself as a new service.[142] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0433
ATT&CK Technique Name:Rifdoor
Rifdoor has the ability to identify the username on the compromised host.[82] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M1018
ATT&CK Technique Name:User Account Management
Regularly audit user accounts for activity and deactivate or remove any that are no longer needed. | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0234
ATT&CK Technique Name:Bandook
Bandook can collect information about the drives available on the system.[48] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0094
ATT&CK Technique Name:Kimsuky
Kimsuky has created social media accounts to monitor news and security trends as well as potential targets.[9] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0088
ATT&CK Technique Name:TEMP.Veles
TEMP.Veles utilized RDP throughout an operation.[53] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0248
ATT&CK Technique Name:yty
yty establishes persistence by creating a scheduled task with the command SchTasks /Create /SC DAILY /TN BigData /TR " + path_file + "/ST 09:30".[182] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G1009
ATT&CK Technique Name:Moses Staff
Moses Staff has exploited known vulnerabilities in public-facing infrastructure such as Microsoft Exchange Servers.[46] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0618
ATT&CK Technique Name:FIVEHANDS
FIVEHANDS has the ability to enumerate files on a compromised host in order to encrypt files with specific extensions.[126][127] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0140
ATT&CK Technique Name:LazyScripter
LazyScripter has used PowerShell scripts to execute malicious code.[130] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0072
ATT&CK Technique Name:OwaAuth
OwaAuth has a command to list its directory and logical drives.[144] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0451
ATT&CK Technique Name:LoudMiner
LoudMiner has used QEMU and VirtualBox to run a Tiny Core Linux virtual machine, which runs XMRig and makes connections to the C2 server for updates.[3] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0278
ATT&CK Technique Name:iKitten
iKitten saves itself with a leading "." so that it's hidden from users by default.[20] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M1010
ATT&CK Technique Name:Deploy Compromised Device Detection Method
Mobile security products can take appropriate action when jailbroken devices are detected, potentially limiting the adversary’s access to password stores. | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0693
ATT&CK Technique Name:CaddyWiper
CaddyWiper can work alphabetically through drives on a compromised system to take ownership of and overwrite all files.[12][13] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0353
ATT&CK Technique Name:NOKKI
NOKKI can gather information on drives and the operating system on the victim’s machine.[253] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0058
ATT&CK Technique Name:SslMM
SslMM has a hard-coded primary and backup C2 string.[44] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0334
ATT&CK Technique Name:DarkComet
DarkComet can execute various types of scripts on the victim’s machine.[13] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0159
ATT&CK Technique Name:SNUGRIDE
SNUGRIDE encrypts C2 traffic using AES with a static key.[124] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:T1556.007
ATT&CK Technique Name:Hybrid Identity
Adversaries may patch, modify, or otherwise backdoor cloud authentication processes that are tied to on-premises user identities in order to bypass typical authentication mechanisms, access credentials, and enable persistent access to accounts. | secon |
title:botconf2015 Building a better botnet DGA mousetrap: separating mice, rats and cheese in DNS data
Botnets and other malware are getting better and better at evading blacklisting in enterprise networks. This draft paper is about an approach for detecting such botnets or other entities, using Domain Name Service (DN... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:T1115
ATT&CK Technique Name:Clipboard Data
Adversaries may collect data stored in the clipboard from users copying information within or between applications. | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0136
ATT&CK Technique Name:USBStealer
USBStealer automatically exfiltrates collected files via removable media when an infected device connects to an air-gapped victim machine after initially being connected to an internet-enabled victim machine. [21] | secon |
title:blackhat:us-19 Selling 0-Days to Governments and Offensive Security Companies
Selling 0-days is a fascinating process that not a lot of people are familiar with. This talk will discuss a vulnerability brokerage company called Q-recon and provide a glimpse of how this market works. In the presentation the followin... | secon |
title:blackhat:eu-19 How to Break PDF Encryption
PDF is among the most widely used document formats worldwide. To ensure confidentiality, PDF supports document encryption. In this talk, we analyze PDF encryption and show two novel techniques for breaking the confidentiality of encrypted documents. First, we abuse the P... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M1047
ATT&CK Technique Name:Audit
Periodically review for new and unknown network provider DLLs within the Registry (HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Services\<NetworkProviderName>\NetworkProvider\ProviderPath).Ensure only valid network provider DLLs are registered. The name of these can be found i... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M1018
ATT&CK Technique Name:User Account Management
Use MDM to disable user's ability to install or approve kernel extensions, and ensure all approved kernel extensions are in alignment with policies specified in com.apple.syspolicy.kernel-extension-policy.[23][24] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0457
ATT&CK Technique Name:Netwalker
Netwalker's PowerShell script has been obfuscated with multiple layers including base64 and hexadecimal encoding and XOR-encryption, as well as obfuscated PowerShell functions and variables.[62][63] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0127
ATT&CK Technique Name:TA551
TA551 has hidden encoded data for malware DLLs in a PNG.[24] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0148
ATT&CK Technique Name:RTM
RTM has named the scheduled task it creates "Windows Update".[63] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M1047
ATT&CK Technique Name:Audit
Identify and correct GPO permissions abuse opportunities (ex: GPO modification privileges) using auditing tools such as BloodHound (version 1.5.1 and later)[5]. | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0582
ATT&CK Technique Name:LookBack
LookBack side loads its communications module as a DLL into the libcurl.dll loader.[33] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0612
ATT&CK Technique Name:WastedLocker
WastedLocker created and established a service that runs until the encryption process is complete.[135] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0081
ATT&CK Technique Name:Tropic Trooper
Tropic Trooper delivered malicious documents with the XLSX extension, typically used by OpenXML documents, but the file itself was actually an OLE (XLS) document.[25] | secon |
title:blackhat:us-21 Do You Speak My Language? Make Static Analysis Engines Understand Each Other
With the widespread usage of service-oriented architectures[1][2][3][4][5], detecting security issues becomes a harder task as vulnerabilities span multiple services, codebases, and programming languages.At Facebook, produ... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0078
ATT&CK Technique Name:Gorgon Group
Gorgon Group malware can use process hollowing to inject one of its trojans into another process.[21] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0534
ATT&CK Technique Name:Bazar
Bazar can inject into a target process including Svchost, Explorer, and cmd using process hollowing.[12][13] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M1032
ATT&CK Technique Name:Multi-factor Authentication
Ensure that MFA and MFA policies and requirements are properly implemented for existing and deactivated or dormant accounts and devices. If possible, consider configuring MFA solutions to "fail closed" rather than grant access in case of serious errors. | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0203
ATT&CK Technique Name:Hydraq
Hydraq uses svchost.exe to execute a malicious DLL included in a new service group.[28] | secon |
title:blackhat:us-19 Hacking for the Greater Good: Empowering Technologists to Strengthen Digital Society
We’re at a critical juncture right now where the benefits from technological advances are increasingly counterbalanced by harmful applications and perilous consequences. Cyberattacks are crippling hospitals and thr... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0007
ATT&CK Technique Name:APT28
APT28 used other victims as proxies to relay command traffic, for instance using a compromised Georgian military email server as a hop point to NATO victims. The group has also used a tool that acts as a proxy to allow C2 even if the victim is behind a router. APT28 has also ... | secon |
titleblackhat:asia-20 WIFI-Important Remote Attack Surface: Threat is Expanding
Wi-Fi technology is one of the most important infrastructures of today. A large amount of devices, such as cellphones, laptops, IoT devices, cars, and infrastructure of smart city are heavily depending on Wi-Fi. As a consequence, Wi-Fi has ... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0108
ATT&CK Technique Name:Blue Mockingbird
Blue Mockingbird has used mofcomp.exe to establish WMI Event Subscription persistence mechanisms configured from a *.mof file.[9] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0021
ATT&CK Technique Name:Molerats
Molerats has sent malicious files via email that tricked users into clicking Enable Content to run an embedded macro and to download malicious archives.[147][148][149] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0011
ATT&CK Technique Name:Taidoor
Taidoor has the ability to use native APIs for execution including GetProcessHeap, GetProcAddress, and LoadLibrary.[169][170] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0520
ATT&CK Technique Name:BLINDINGCAN
BLINDINGCAN has attempted to hide its payload by using legitimate file names such as "iconcache.db".[26] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0092
ATT&CK Technique Name:TA505
TA505 has sent spearphishing emails containing malicious links.[99][100][101][102] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0483
ATT&CK Technique Name:IcedID
IcedID has used ZwQueueApcThread to inject itself into remote processes.[9] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0538
ATT&CK Technique Name:Crutch
Crutch can persist via DLL search order hijacking on Google Chrome, Mozilla Firefox, or Microsoft OneDrive.[16] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0559
ATT&CK Technique Name:SUNBURST
SUNBURST C2 data attempted to appear as benign XML related to .NET assemblies or as a faux JSON blob.[9][10][11] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0167
ATT&CK Technique Name:Matryoshka
Matryoshka is capable of providing Meterpreter shell access.[31] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0192
ATT&CK Technique Name:Pupy
Pupy can bypass Windows UAC through either DLL hijacking, eventvwr, or appPaths.[49] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M0947
ATT&CK Technique Name:Audit
Routinely audit source code, application configuration files, open repositories, and public cloud storage for insecure use and storage of credentials. | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0045
ATT&CK Technique Name:ADVSTORESHELL
ADVSTORESHELL collects, compresses, encrypts, and exfiltrates data to the C2 server every 10 minutes.[1] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S1017
ATT&CK Technique Name:OutSteel
OutSteel can delete itself following the successful execution of a follow-on payload.[171] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0022
ATT&CK Technique Name:APT3
APT3 leverages valid accounts after gaining credentials for use within the victim domain.[3] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0053
ATT&CK Technique Name:FIN5
FIN5 has used legitimate VPN, RDP, Citrix, or VNC credentials to maintain access to a victim environment.[26][27][28] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0373
ATT&CK Technique Name:Astaroth
Astaroth can check for Windows product ID's used by sandboxes and usernames and disk serial numbers associated with analyst environments.[4] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0290
ATT&CK Technique Name:Gooligan
Gooligan steals authentication tokens that can be used to access data from multiple Google applications.[18] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0264
ATT&CK Technique Name:OopsIE
OopsIE uses the SmartAssembly obfuscator to pack an embedded .Net Framework assembly used for C2.[62] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0256
ATT&CK Technique Name:Mosquito
Mosquito uses COM hijacking as a method of persistence.[11] | secon |
titleblackhat:eu-19 Alexa, Hack My Server(less) Please
When adopting serverless technology, we eliminate the need to manage a server for our application. By doing so, we also pass some of the security threats to the cloud provider. We do not need to care about OS patching and configuration any more. It's all in the saf... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0356
ATT&CK Technique Name:KONNI
KONNI has hardcoded API calls within its functions to use on the victim's machine.[105] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M1018
ATT&CK Technique Name:User Account Management
In cloud environments, ensure that only users who explicitly require the permissions to update instance metadata or configurations can do so. | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S1047
ATT&CK Technique Name:Mori
Mori can read data from the Registry including from HKLM\Software\NFC\IPA andHKLM\Software\NFC\.[61] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0010
ATT&CK Technique Name:Turla
Turla has used VBS scripts throughout its operations.[160] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M1031
ATT&CK Technique Name:Network Intrusion Prevention
Use network intrusion detection/prevention systems to detect and prevent remote service scans. | secon |
titleblackhat:asia-21 Threat Hunting in Active Directory Environment
Mandiant conducted multiple investigations and observed techniques that attackers preferred as they conducted privilege escalation to move laterally, persist in the environment, and blend in. Backdoors and misconfigurations on Active directory systems... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0373
ATT&CK Technique Name:Astaroth
Astaroth can check for Windows product ID's used by sandboxes and usernames and disk serial numbers associated with analyst environments.[4] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0377
ATT&CK Technique Name:Ebury
Ebury has used a DGA to generate a domain name for C2.[17][18] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0032
ATT&CK Technique Name:Lazarus Group
Lazarus Group executed Responder using the command [Responder file path] -i [IP address] -rPv on a compromised host to harvest credentials and move laterally.[11] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M1031
ATT&CK Technique Name:Network Intrusion Prevention
Network intrusion detection and prevention systems that use network signatures to identify traffic for specific adversary malware can be used to mitigate activity at the network level. Signatures are often for unique indicators within protocols and may ... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S1053
ATT&CK Technique Name:AvosLocker
AvosLocker has checked the system time before and after encryption.[9] | secon |
title:blackhat:us-18 ARTist - A Novel Instrumentation Framework for Reversing and Analyzing Android Apps and the Middleware
The Android Runtime (ART), even though introduced in Android 5 already, has not received much attention in the security community. However, its on-device compiler dex2oat, which mostly deprecated ... | secon |
titleblackhat:asia-23 A New Attack Interface in Java Applications
It is known to us that Java language has an integrated ecosystem. With the development of cloud computing, more and more cloud-native systems increasingly consist of Java applications. In the meanwhile, the potential new attack surface for Java applicati... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0044
ATT&CK Technique Name:JHUHUGIT
JHUHUGIT has used COM hijacking to establish persistence by hijacking a class named MMDeviceEnumerator and also by registering the payload as a Shell Icon Overlay handler COM object ({3543619C-D563-43f7-95EA-4DA7E1CC396A}).[4][9] | secon |
titleblackhat:us-19 Death to the IOC: What's Next in Threat Intelligence
Humans cannot scale to the amount of Threat Intelligence being generated. While the Security Community has mastered the use of machine readable feeds from OSINT systems or third party vendors, these usually provide IOCs or IOAs without context... | secon |
titleblackhat:asia-22 Codema Attack: Controlling Your Smart Home Through Dangling Management Channels
An IoT device today can be managed through different channels, e.g., by its device manufacturer's app, or third-party channels such as Apple's iOS Home app, or a smart speaker. Supporting each channel is a management f... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:T1205.002
ATT&CK Technique Name:Socket Filters
Adversaries may attach filters to a network socket to monitor then activate backdoors used for persistence or command and control. With elevated permissions, adversaries can use features such as the libpcap library to open sockets and install filters to allow or ... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0283
ATT&CK Technique Name:jRAT
jRAT can capture passwords from common chat applications such as MSN Messenger, AOL, Instant Messenger, and and Google Talk.[18] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0680
ATT&CK Technique Name:LitePower
LitePower can use HTTP and HTTPS for C2 communications.[188] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M1049
ATT&CK Technique Name:Antivirus/Antimalware
Anti-virus can also automatically quarantine suspicious files. | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0406
ATT&CK Technique Name:Gustuff
Gustuff abuses accessibility features to intercept all interactions between a user and the device.[9] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:T1556
ATT&CK Technique Name:Modify Authentication Process
Adversaries may modify authentication mechanisms and processes to access user credentials or enable otherwise unwarranted access to accounts. The authentication process is handled by mechanisms, such as the Local Security Authentication Server (LSASS) ... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0658
ATT&CK Technique Name:XCSSET
XCSSET uses scp to access the ~/Library/Cookies/Cookies.binarycookies file.[16] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0121
ATT&CK Technique Name:Sidewinder
Sidewinder has used the ActiveXObject utility to create OLE objects to obtain execution through Internet Explorer.[30][31] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0331
ATT&CK Technique Name:Agent Tesla
Agent Tesla has used ProcessWindowStyle.Hidden to hide windows.[3] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0140
ATT&CK Technique Name:Shamoon
Shamoon attempts to overwrite operating system files and disk structures with image files.[1][2][3] In a later variant, randomly generated data was used for data overwrites.[5][35] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:T1586.001
ATT&CK Technique Name:Social Media Accounts
Adversaries may compromise social media accounts that can be used during targeting. For operations incorporating social engineering, the utilization of an online persona may be important. Rather than creating and cultivating social media profiles (i.e. Soc... | secon |
Subsets and Splits
No community queries yet
The top public SQL queries from the community will appear here once available.