text stringlengths 100 9.93M | category stringclasses 11
values |
|---|---|
ATT&CK ID:S0012
ATT&CK Technique Name:PoisonIvy
PoisonIvy creates run key Registry entries pointing to a malicious executable dropped to disk.[197] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0137
ATT&CK Technique Name:CORESHELL
CORESHELL can communicate over SMTP and POP3 for C2.[4][12] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0012
ATT&CK Technique Name:Darkhotel
Darkhotel has exploited Adobe Flash vulnerability CVE-2015-8651 for execution.[42] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0378
ATT&CK Technique Name:PoshC2
PoshC2 has a number of modules that leverage pass the hash for lateral movement.[16] | secon |
title:blackhat:eu-21 "We Wait, Because We Know You" - Inside the Ransomware Negotiation Economics
Organizations worldwide continue to face waves of digital extortion in the form of targeted ransomware. Digital extortion is therefore now classified as the most prominent form of cybercrime and the most devastatin... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0034
ATT&CK Technique Name:Sandworm Team
Sandworm Team has used intercepter-NG to sniff passwords in network traffic.[27] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0646
ATT&CK Technique Name:SpicyOmelette
SpicyOmelette can download malicious files from threat actor controlled AWS URL's.[424] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0476
ATT&CK Technique Name:Valak
Valak has downloaded a variety of modules and payloads to the compromised host, including IcedID and NetSupport Manager RAT-based malware.[459][460] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0363
ATT&CK Technique Name:Empire
Empire can enumerate antivirus software on the target.[32] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0032
ATT&CK Technique Name:Lazarus Group
Lazarus Group has used a VBA Macro to set its file attributes to System and Hidden and has named files with a dot prefix to hide them from the Finder application.[25][16][17][26] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0625
ATT&CK Technique Name:Cuba
Cuba logs keystrokes via polling by using GetKeyState and VkKeyScan functions.[48] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:T1539
ATT&CK Technique Name:Steal Web Session Cookie
An adversary may steal web application or service session cookies and use them to gain access to web applications or Internet services as an authenticated user without needing credentials. Web applications and services often use session cookies as an authen... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0230
ATT&CK Technique Name:ZeroT
ZeroT shellcode decrypts and decompresses its RC4-encrypted payload.[265] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0601
ATT&CK Technique Name:Hildegard
Hildegard has used masscan to look for kubelets in the internal Kubernetes network.[32] | secon |
title:blackhat:asia-20 ZombieLoad: Leaking Data on Intel CPUs
The publication of Meltdown in January 2018 was the first instance of a hardware vulnerability which broke the security guarantees of modern CPUs. Meltdown allowed attackers to leak arbitrary memory by exploiting that Intel CPUs use lazy fault handling and c... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0045
ATT&CK Technique Name:menuPass
menuPass has used a modified version of pentesting tools wmiexec.vbs and secretsdump.py to dump credentials.[19][20] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0646
ATT&CK Technique Name:SpicyOmelette
SpicyOmelette has been signed with valid digital certificates.[65] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0142
ATT&CK Technique Name:StreamEx
StreamEx has the ability to scan for security tools such as firewalls and antivirus tools.[96] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M1031
ATT&CK Technique Name:Network Intrusion Prevention
Network intrusion prevention systems and systems designed to scan and remove malicious email attachments can be used to block activity. | secon |
titleblackhat:us-21 Timeless Timing Attacks
25 years ago, the first timing attacks against well-known cryptosystems such as RSA and Diffie-Hellman were introduced. By carefully measuring the execution time of crypto operations, an attacker could infer the bits of the secret. Ever since, timing attacks have frequently r... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0027
ATT&CK Technique Name:Threat Group-3390
Threat Group-3390 has used net user to conduct internal discovery of systems.[45] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0117
ATT&CK Technique Name:Fox Kitten
Fox Kitten has accessed ntuser.dat and UserClass.dat on compromised hosts.[16] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0069
ATT&CK Technique Name:MuddyWater
MuddyWater has used malware that leveraged WMI for execution and querying host information.[83][84][85][86] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S1061
ATT&CK Technique Name:AbstractEmu
AbstractEmu can grant itself microphone permissions.[4] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0038
ATT&CK Technique Name:Duqu
When the Duqu command and control is operating over HTTP or HTTPS, Duqu uploads data to its controller by appending it to a blank JPG file.[3] | secon |
title:blackhat:us-22 Demystifying Key Stretching and PAKEs
Key stretching can make the difference between recovering a secret nearly instant to nearly impossible, but it has had a fun history with bugs, footguns, and "features". This talk will answer many common questions and myths on key stretching and PAKEs. What to ... | secon |
title:blackhat:asia-21 Apple Neural Engine Internal: From ML Algorithm to HW Registers
I am curious why the SEP (Secure Enclave Processor) firmware decryption key of the iPhone XR has been leaked for more than a year and no one has disclosed the machine learning model of FaceID. After I reverse engineered SEP, I found ... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0230
ATT&CK Technique Name:ZeroT
ZeroT has obfuscated DLLs and functions using dummy API calls inserted between real instructions.[40] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0372
ATT&CK Technique Name:LockerGoga
LockerGoga installation has been immediately preceded by a "task kill" command in order to disable anti-virus.[53] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0021
ATT&CK Technique Name:Derusbi
Derusbi collects current and parent process IDs.[76][77] | secon |
titleblackhat:eu-21 Is This My Domain Controller? A New Class of Active Directory Protocol Injection Attacks
When analyzing the security of cryptographic systems, a critical part is resiliency against eavesdroppers as well as machine-in-the-middle (MiTM) attacks. Over the years, researchers were able to break many secu... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:C0017
ATT&CK Technique Name:C0017
During C0017, APT41 deployed JScript web shells on compromised systems.[19] | secon |
title:blackhat:us-20 A Decade After Stuxnet's Printer Vulnerability: Printing is Still the Stairway to Heaven
In 2010, Stuxnet, the most powerful malware in the world revealed itself, causing physical damage to Iranian nuclear enrichment centrifuges. In order to reach Iran's centrifuges, it exploited a vulnerabilit... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0192
ATT&CK Technique Name:Pupy
Pupy can walk through directories and recursively search for strings in files.[239] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0257
ATT&CK Technique Name:VERMIN
VERMIN saves each collected file with the automatically generated format {0:dd-MM-yyyy}.txt .[50] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0351
ATT&CK Technique Name:Cannon
Cannon exfiltrates collected data over email via SMTP/S and POP3/S C2 channels.[22] | secon |
title:blackhat:eu-20 Finding Bugs Compiler Knows but Doesn't Tell You: Dissecting Undefined Behavior Optimizations in LLVM
"Undefined Behavior", like signed integer overflow or accessing null pointer, is an erroneous action that makes programs unpredictable. There are no rules on how to generate code for "Undefined... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M1013
ATT&CK Technique Name:Application Developer Guidance
When possible, include hash values in manifest files to help prevent side-loading of malicious libraries.[5] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0034
ATT&CK Technique Name:Sandworm Team
In the Ukraine 2015 Incident, Sandworm Team issued unauthorized commands to substation breakers after gaining control of operator workstations and accessing a distribution management system (DMS) client application. [9] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M0951
ATT&CK Technique Name:Update Software
Update software regularly by employing patch management for internal enterprise endpoints and servers. | secon |
ATT&CK ID:T1565.001
ATT&CK Technique Name:Stored Data Manipulation
Adversaries may insert, delete, or manipulate data at rest in order to influence external outcomes or hide activity, thus threatening the integrity of the data. By manipulating stored data, adversaries may attempt to affect a business process, organizat... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S1073
ATT&CK Technique Name:Royal
Royal can scan the network interfaces of targeted systems.[56] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:T1027.004
ATT&CK Technique Name:Compile After Delivery
Adversaries may attempt to make payloads difficult to discover and analyze by delivering files to victims as uncompiled code. Text-based source code files may subvert analysis and scrutiny from protections targeting executables/binaries. These payloads wi... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0604
ATT&CK Technique Name:Industroyer
Industroyer decrypts code to connect to a remote C2 server.[116] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0231
ATT&CK Technique Name:Invoke-PSImage
Invoke-PSImage can be used to embed payload data within a new image file.[3] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0669
ATT&CK Technique Name:KOCTOPUS
KOCTOPUS has relied on victims clicking on a malicious link delivered via email.[47] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S1009
ATT&CK Technique Name:Triton
Triton's injector, inject.bin, changes the function pointer of the 'get main processor diagnostic data' TriStation command to the address of imain.bin so that it is executed prior to the normal handler. [3] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0691
ATT&CK Technique Name:Neoichor
Neoichor can identify the system language on a compromised host.[14] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0136
ATT&CK Technique Name:USBStealer
USBStealer sets the timestamps of its dropper files to the last-access and last-write timestamps of a standard Windows library chosen on the system.[54] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0356
ATT&CK Technique Name:KONNI
KONNI has duplicated the token of a high integrity process to spawn an instance of cmd.exe under an impersonated user.[6][7] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0677
ATT&CK Technique Name:AADInternals
AADInternals can steal users’ access tokens via phishing emails containing malicious links.[10] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0632
ATT&CK Technique Name:GrimAgent
GrimAgent can pad C2 messages with random generated values.[5] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0132
ATT&CK Technique Name:H1N1
H1N1 kills and disables services for Windows Firewall.[13] | secon |
titleblackhat:asia-22 Using Zero to Attack Zero-Knowledge Proof (ZKP) PLONK
We will show how to use zero to attack zero-knowledge proof (ZKP). In particular, we'll discuss a *critical* issue in a cutting-edge ZKP PLONK C++ implementation which allows an attacker to create a *forged* proof that all verifiers will accept... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0114
ATT&CK Technique Name:Chimera
Chimera has obtained and used tools such as BloodHound, Cobalt Strike, Mimikatz, and PsExec.[34][35] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:T1195.003
ATT&CK Technique Name:Compromise Hardware Supply Chain
Adversaries may manipulate hardware components in products prior to receipt by a final consumer for the purpose of data or system compromise. By modifying hardware or firmware in the supply chain, adversaries can insert a backdoor into consumer ... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0515
ATT&CK Technique Name:WellMail
WellMail can identify the current username on the victim system.[197] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0028
ATT&CK Technique Name:Threat Group-1314
Threat Group-1314 actors used compromised domain credentials for the victim's endpoint management platform, Altiris, to move laterally.[24] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S1024
ATT&CK Technique Name:CreepySnail
CreepySnail can execute getUsername on compromised systems.[40] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0129
ATT&CK Technique Name:Mustang Panda
Mustang Panda's custom ORat tool uses a WMI event consumer to maintain persistence.[13] | secon |
title:blackhat:eu-18 DeepPhish: Simulating Malicious AI
91% of cybercrimes and attacks start with a phishing email. This means that cyber security researchers must focus on detecting phishing in all of its settings and uses. However, they face many challenges as they go up against sophisticated and intelligent attacker... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:T1543
ATT&CK Technique Name:Create or Modify System Process
Adversaries may create or modify system-level processes to repeatedly execute malicious payloads as part of persistence. When operating systems boot up, they can start processes that perform background system functions. On Windows and Linux, these sy... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:T1213.003
ATT&CK Technique Name:Code Repositories
Adversaries may leverage code repositories to collect valuable information. Code repositories are tools/services that store source code and automate software builds. They may be hosted internally or privately on third party sites such as Github, GitLab, Source... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0032
ATT&CK Technique Name:Lazarus Group
Lazarus Group malware IndiaIndia saves information gathered about the victim to a file that is saved in the %TEMP% directory, then compressed, encrypted, and uploaded to a C2 server.[47][48] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0362
ATT&CK Technique Name:Linux Rabbit
Linux Rabbit maintains persistence on an infected machine through rc.local and .bashrc files. [14] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S1009
ATT&CK Technique Name:Triton
Triton leveraged the TriStation protocol to download programs onto Triconex Safety Instrumented System. [5] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S1037
ATT&CK Technique Name:STARWHALE
STARWHALE has the ability to contact actor-controlled C2 servers via HTTP.[318][215] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:T0872
ATT&CK Technique Name:Indicator Removal on Host
Adversaries may attempt to remove indicators of their presence on a system in an effort to cover their tracks. In cases where an adversary may feel detection is imminent, they may try to overwrite, delete, or cover up changes they have made to the device. | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M0930
ATT&CK Technique Name:Network Segmentation
Segment networks and systems appropriately to reduce access to critical system and services communications. | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M1038
ATT&CK Technique Name:Execution Prevention
Identify and block potentially malicious and unknown .cpl files by using application control [7] tools, like Windows Defender Application Control[8], AppLocker, [9] [10] or Software Restriction Policies [11] where appropriate. [12] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0064
ATT&CK Technique Name:APT33
APT33 has used WinRAR to compress data prior to exfil.[9] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0601
ATT&CK Technique Name:Hildegard
Hildegard has collected the host's OS, CPU, and memory information.[165] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0007
ATT&CK Technique Name:APT28
APT28 encrypted a .dll payload using RTL and a custom encryption algorithm. APT28 has also obfuscated payloads with base64, XOR, and RC4.[10][20][21][22][23] | secon |
title:blackhat:us-20 TiYunZong: An Exploit Chain to Remotely Root Modern Android Devices - Pwn Android Phones from 2015 to 2020
As more and more mitigations have been introduced into Android, modern Android devices become much more difficult to be rooted, in particular, remotely rooted. This is especially true for Pixe... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0640
ATT&CK Technique Name:Avaddon
Avaddon has searched for specific files prior to encryption.[24] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0067
ATT&CK Technique Name:APT37
APT37 has used a credential stealer known as ZUMKONG that can harvest usernames and passwords stored in browsers.[11] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S1013
ATT&CK Technique Name:ZxxZ
ZxxZ can collect the username from a compromised host.[209] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0383
ATT&CK Technique Name:FlawedGrace
FlawedGrace encrypts its C2 configuration files with AES in CBC mode.[129] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0354
ATT&CK Technique Name:Denis
Denis performed process hollowing through the API calls CreateRemoteThread, ResumeThread, and Wow64SetThreadContext.[18] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0050
ATT&CK Technique Name:APT32
APT32 has disguised a Cobalt Strike beacon as a Flash Installer.[4] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0460
ATT&CK Technique Name:Get2
Get2 has the ability to use HTTP to send information collected from an infected host to C2.[140] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0102
ATT&CK Technique Name:Wizard Spider
Wizard Spider has collected and staged credentials and network enumeration information, using the networkdll and psfin TrickBot modules.[6] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0112
ATT&CK Technique Name:Windshift
Windshift has installed malicious MDM profiles on iOS devices as part of Operation ROCK.[6] | secon |
titleblackhat:eu-21 Lost in the Loader: The Many Faces of the Windows PE File Format
This Briefing presents our research on parser differentials for the PE format. We defined a custom language to write "formal models" of various PE loaders, for different versions of Windows and reverse-engineering tools. We then built ... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0369
ATT&CK Technique Name:CoinTicker
CoinTicker executes a Python script to download its second stage.[13] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0512
ATT&CK Technique Name:FatDuke
FatDuke has been packed with junk code and strings.[15] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0059
ATT&CK Technique Name:WinMM
WinMM sets a WH_CBT Windows hook to collect information on process creation.[272] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0083
ATT&CK Technique Name:Misdat
Misdat network traffic communicates over a raw socket.[38] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0088
ATT&CK Technique Name:TEMP.Veles
TEMP.Veles has used scheduled task XML triggers.[170] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0673
ATT&CK Technique Name:DarkWatchman
DarkWatchman can track key presses with a keylogger module.[52] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0456
ATT&CK Technique Name:Aria-body
Aria-body has the ability to inject itself into another process such as rundll32.exe and dllhost.exe.[5] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M1050
ATT&CK Technique Name:Exploit Protection
Security applications that look for behavior used during exploitation such as Windows Defender Exploit Guard (WDEG) and the Enhanced Mitigation Experience Toolkit (EMET) can be used to mitigate some exploitation behavior. [4] Control flow integrity checking is an... | secon |
titleblackhat:us-21 Turing in a Box: Applying Artificial Intelligence as a Service to Targeted Phishing and Defending Against AI Generated Attacks
With recent advances in next-generation language models such as OpenAI's GPT-3, AI generated text has reached a level of sophistication that matches or even exceeds human ge... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0060
ATT&CK Technique Name:BRONZE BUTLER
BRONZE BUTLER has used a Windows 10 specific tool and xxmm to bypass UAC for privilege escalation.[18][19] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S1026
ATT&CK Technique Name:Mongall
Mongall can upload files and information from a compromised host to its C2 server.[88] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0551
ATT&CK Technique Name:GoldenEagle
GoldenEagle has recorded calls and environment audio in .amr format.[8] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M1030
ATT&CK Technique Name:Network Segmentation
Do not leave RDP accessible from the internet. Enable firewall rules to block RDP traffic between network security zones within a network. | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0441
ATT&CK Technique Name:PowerShower
PowerShower has the ability to remove all files created during the dropper process.[181] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S1049
ATT&CK Technique Name:SUGARUSH
SUGARUSH has created a service named Service1 for persistence.[117] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0514
ATT&CK Technique Name:WellMess
WellMess can identify the IP address and user domain on the target machine.[248][249] | secon |
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