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titleblackhat:us-21 Hacking a Capsule Hotel - Ghost in the Bedrooms
IOT devices are widely deployed. Some hotels are now allowing their guests to control their room from their smartphone or other devices.While traveling in a foreign country, a few nights were booked in a capsule hotel that was using various modern tech... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M1011
ATT&CK Technique Name:User Guidance
Users should be wary of granting applications dangerous or privacy-intrusive permissions, such as access to notifications. | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0079
ATT&CK Technique Name:MobileOrder
MobileOrder exfiltrates data collected from the victim mobile device.[122] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S1044
ATT&CK Technique Name:FunnyDream
The FunnyDream FilepakMonitor component can inject into the Bka.exe process using the VirtualAllocEx, WriteProcessMemory and CreateRemoteThread APIs to load the DLL component.[31] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M1018
ATT&CK Technique Name:User Account Management
Proactively reset accounts that are known to be part of breached credentials either immediately, or after detecting bruteforce attempts. | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0050
ATT&CK Technique Name:APT32
APT32 used Net to use Windows' hidden network shares to copy their tools to remote machines for execution.[8] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0260
ATT&CK Technique Name:InvisiMole
InvisiMole can record sound using input audio devices.[16][17] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0406
ATT&CK Technique Name:Gustuff
Gustuff uses WebView overlays to prompt the user for their device unlock code, as well as banking and cryptocurrency application credentials. Gustuff can also send push notifications pretending to be from a bank, triggering a phishing overlay.[20][3] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0089
ATT&CK Technique Name:BlackEnergy
The BlackEnergy 3 variant drops its main DLL component and then creates a .lnk shortcut to that file in the startup folder.[8] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0604
ATT&CK Technique Name:Industroyer
Industroyer collects the victim machine’s Windows GUID.[172] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M1041
ATT&CK Technique Name:Encrypt Sensitive Information
Obfuscate/encrypt event files locally and in transit to avoid giving feedback to an adversary. | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0046
ATT&CK Technique Name:CozyCar
One persistence mechanism used by CozyCar is to register itself as a Windows service.[38] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0584
ATT&CK Technique Name:AppleJeus
AppleJeus has required user execution of a malicious MSI installer.[7] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0086
ATT&CK Technique Name:ZLib
ZLib mimics the resource version information of legitimate Realtek Semiconductor, Nvidia, or Synaptics modules.[100] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0496
ATT&CK Technique Name:REvil
REvil has the ability to identify specific files and directories that are not to be encrypted.[253][254][255][256][257][258] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0019
ATT&CK Technique Name:Naikon
Naikon has used a netbios scanner for remote machine identification.[59] | secon |
title:blackhat:us-21 The Unbelievable Insecurity of the Big Data Stack: An Offensive Approach to Analyzing Huge and Complex Big Data Infrastructures
Honoring the term, the variety of technologies in the Big Data stack is hugely BIG. Many complex components in charge of transport, storing, and processing millions of rec... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0066
ATT&CK Technique Name:Elderwood
Elderwood has leveraged multiple types of spearphishing in order to attempt to get a user to open attachments.[77][78] | secon |
title:blackhat:asia-19 Who Left Open the Cookie Jar?
Nowadays, cookies are the most prominent mechanism to identify and authenticate users on the Internet. Although protected by the Same-Origin Policy, popular browsers include cookies in all requests, even when these are cross-site. Unfortunately, these third-party coo... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0137
ATT&CK Technique Name:CORESHELL
CORESHELL downloads another dropper from its C2 server.[123] | secon |
titleblackhat:us-21 Use & Abuse of Personal Information
Virtually any meaningful interaction occurring across the Internet requires the establishment of a user profile, which in turn requires entry of Personally Identifiable Information (PII) as a way for service providers to verify and support/track user activity. Suc... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:C0004
ATT&CK Technique Name:CostaRicto
During CostaRicto, the threat actors used scheduled tasks to download backdoor tools.[45] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0046
ATT&CK Technique Name:FIN7
FIN7 malware has created scheduled tasks to establish persistence.[59][60][61][62] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0094
ATT&CK Technique Name:Kimsuky
Kimsuky has executed Windows commands by using cmd and running batch scripts.[178][179] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0010
ATT&CK Technique Name:Turla
Turla RPC backdoors have included local UPnP RPC proxies.[46] | secon |
title:blackhat:eu-20 Story of Jailbreaking iOS 13
Jailbreaking refers to obtaining the kernel privilege of iOS, by means of the development of vulnerabilities. Usually, at least one kernel vulnerability is used. By overwriting the sensitive data structure in the kernel, the jailbreaker could run unauthorized code on th... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0092
ATT&CK Technique Name:TA505
TA505 has used malware to disable Windows Defender through modification of the Registry.[157] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0128
ATT&CK Technique Name:ZIRCONIUM
ZIRCONIUM has used GitHub to host malware linked in spearphishing e-mails.[21][22] | secon |
titleblackhat:eu-21 Resting on Feet of Clay: Securely Bootstrapping OPC UA Deployments
While most protocols in industrial control systems (ICS) rarely implement security features, the OPC Foundation's Unified Architecture (OPC UA) promises security features such as authentication, authorization, integrity, and confiden... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:T1055.013
ATT&CK Technique Name:Process Doppelgänging
Adversaries may inject malicious code into process via process doppelgänging in order to evade process-based defenses as well as possibly elevate privileges. Process doppelgänging is a method of executing arbitrary code in the address space of a separate l... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0575
ATT&CK Technique Name:Conti
Conti can use CreateIoCompletionPort(), PostQueuedCompletionStatus(), and GetQueuedCompletionPort() to rapidly encrypt files, excluding those with the extensions of .exe, .dll, and .lnk. It has used a different AES-256 encryption key per file with a bundled RAS-4096 public en... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0092
ATT&CK Technique Name:TA505
TA505 has used stolen domain admin accounts to compromise additional hosts.[23] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0050
ATT&CK Technique Name:APT32
APT32 ran legitimately-signed executables from Symantec and McAfee which load a malicious DLL. The group also side-loads its backdoor by dropping a library and a legitimate, signed executable (AcroTranscoder).[5][6][7] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M0813
ATT&CK Technique Name:Software Process and Device Authentication
Authenticate connections fromsoftware and devices to prevent unauthorized systems from accessing protected management functions. | secon |
title:blackhat:asia-22 The Little Seal Bug: Optical Sound Recovery from Lightweight Reflective Objects
In this talk we will introduce "the little seal bug" attack, an optical side-channel attack used to recover sound from lightweight reflective objects; such objects are commonly seen in home offices, which became a pri... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M1051
ATT&CK Technique Name:Update Software
A patch management process should be implemented to check unused dependencies, unmaintained and/or previously vulnerable dependencies, unnecessary features, components, files, and documentation. | secon |
title:blackhat:us-22 Morning Break
Morning Coffee Break will be served in the following areas for Briefings pass holders.Bay View Court North Corridor (North Convention Center)Bay View Court South Corridor (North Convention Center)Breakers Registration Corridor, Lagoon Corridor (Level 2)South Seas Foyer North, Jasmine ... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S1019
ATT&CK Technique Name:Shark
Shark has the ability to use CMD to execute commands.[94][301] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0049
ATT&CK Technique Name:OilRig
OilRig has used LinkedIn to send spearphishing links.[11] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0543
ATT&CK Technique Name:Spark
Spark has used a splash screen to check whether an user actively clicks on the screen before running malicious code.[7] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M0926
ATT&CK Technique Name:Privileged Account Management
Minimize permissions and access for service accounts to limit the information that may be impacted by malicious users or software. [7] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0060
ATT&CK Technique Name:BRONZE BUTLER
BRONZE BUTLER has created forged Kerberos Ticket Granting Ticket (TGT) and Ticket Granting Service (TGS) tickets to maintain administrative access.[7] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M1054
ATT&CK Technique Name:Software Configuration
Allowlist MIB objects and implement SNMP views. Disable Smart Install (SMI) if not used.[4][1] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0418
ATT&CK Technique Name:ViceLeaker
ViceLeaker includes code to hide its icon, but the function does not appear to be called in an analyzed version of the software.[24] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0367
ATT&CK Technique Name:Emotet
Emotet can brute force a local admin password, then use it to facilitate lateral movement.[4] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0501
ATT&CK Technique Name:PipeMon
PipeMon installer can use UAC bypass techniques to install the payload.[46] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0088
ATT&CK Technique Name:TEMP.Veles
TEMP.Veles has used a VPN to persist in the victim environment.[41] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0007
ATT&CK Technique Name:APT28
APT28 used weaponized Microsoft Word documents abusing the remote template function to retrieve a malicious macro. [10] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0261
ATT&CK Technique Name:Catchamas
Catchamas adds a new service named NetAdapter to establish persistence.[32] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0604
ATT&CK Technique Name:Industroyer
Industroyer automatically collects protocol object data to learn about control devices in the environment. [2] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0260
ATT&CK Technique Name:InvisiMole
InvisiMole can enumerate Registry values, keys, and data.[51] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0066
ATT&CK Technique Name:Elderwood
Elderwood has delivered zero-day exploits and malware to victims via targeted emails containing malicious attachments.[76][77] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0593
ATT&CK Technique Name:ECCENTRICBANDWAGON
ECCENTRICBANDWAGON has stored keystrokes and screenshots within the %temp%\GoogleChrome, %temp%\Downloads, and %temp%\TrendMicroUpdate directories.[31] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0585
ATT&CK Technique Name:Kerrdown
Kerrdown can use a VBS base64 decoder function published by Motobit.[71] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0114
ATT&CK Technique Name:Chimera
Chimera has staged stolen data on designated servers in the target environment.[4] | secon |
title:botconf2013 APT1: Technical Backstage
Earlier this year Mandiant published a report about a hacking group called APT1. Paul’s presentation focuses on his own in-depth analysis of this group, based on the information provided by Mandiant. Paul discovered numerous C&C (Command & Control) servers located in China ru... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0069
ATT&CK Technique Name:MuddyWater
MuddyWater has used the .NET csc.exe tool to compile executables from downloaded C# code.[1] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0065
ATT&CK Technique Name:Leviathan
Leviathan has archived victim's data prior to exfiltration.[32] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0051
ATT&CK Technique Name:MiniDuke
Some MiniDuke components use Twitter to initially obtain the address of a C2 server or as a backup if no hard-coded C2 server responds.[12][13][14] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0034
ATT&CK Technique Name:Sandworm Team
Sandworm Team has used Dropbear SSH with a hardcoded backdoor password to maintain persistence within the target network. Sandworm Team has also used VPN tunnels established in legitimate software company infrastructure to gain access to internal networks of that soft... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0261
ATT&CK Technique Name:Catchamas
Catchamas stores the gathered data from the machine in .db files and .bmp files under four separate locations.[20] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0053
ATT&CK Technique Name:SeaDuke
SeaDuke is capable of uploading and downloading files.[398] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S1022
ATT&CK Technique Name:IceApple
IceApple can delete files and directories from targeted systems.[108] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S1018
ATT&CK Technique Name:Saint Bot
Saint Bot has written its payload into a newly-created EhStorAuthn.exe process using ZwWriteVirtualMemory and executed it using NtQueueApcThread and ZwAlertResumeThread.[12] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0554
ATT&CK Technique Name:Egregor
Egregor has disabled Windows Defender to evade protections.[31] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0128
ATT&CK Technique Name:BADNEWS
When it first starts, BADNEWS spawns a new thread to log keystrokes.[25][26][27] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:C0001
ATT&CK Technique Name:Frankenstein
During Frankenstein, the threat actors used Empire to enumerate hosts and gather username, machine name, and administrative permissions information.[57] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0438
ATT&CK Technique Name:Attor
Attor can obtain application window titles and then determines which windows to perform Screen Capture on.[4] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0114
ATT&CK Technique Name:Chimera
Chimera has copied tools between compromised hosts using SMB.[10] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:T1599.001
ATT&CK Technique Name:Network Address Translation Traversal
Adversaries may bridge network boundaries by modifying a network device’s Network Address Translation (NAT) configuration. Malicious modifications to NAT may enable an adversary to bypass restrictions on traffic routing that otherwise separ... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0199
ATT&CK Technique Name:TURNEDUP
TURNEDUP is capable of gathering system information.[381] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0070
ATT&CK Technique Name:Dark Caracal
Dark Caracal controls implants using standard HTTP communication.[9] | secon |
title:blackhat:us-21 Deepfake Social Engineering: Creating a Framework for Synthetic Media Social Engineering
How do you know that you are actually talking to the person you think you are talking to? Deepfake and related synthetic media technologies represent the greatest revolution in social engineering capabilities o... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0096
ATT&CK Technique Name:APT41
APT41 used compromised credentials to log on to other systems.[13][14] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0441
ATT&CK Technique Name:PowerShower
PowerShower is a backdoor written in PowerShell.[118] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0033
ATT&CK Technique Name:Poseidon Group
The Poseidon Group's Information Gathering Tool (IGT) includes PowerShell components.[177] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0067
ATT&CK Technique Name:APT37
APT37 has created scheduled tasks to run malicious scripts on a compromised host.[16] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0065
ATT&CK Technique Name:Leviathan
Leviathan has obtained valid accounts to gain initial access.[41][42] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0108
ATT&CK Technique Name:Blue Mockingbird
Blue Mockingbird has used Windows Scheduled Tasks to establish persistence on local and remote hosts.[30] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0605
ATT&CK Technique Name:EKANS
EKANS uses encoded strings in its process kill list.[111] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0233
ATT&CK Technique Name:MURKYTOP
MURKYTOP has the capability to retrieve information about shares on remote hosts.[37] | secon |
title:blackhat:asia-23 Security Advocacy Shouldn't Be for Security Professionals: An Analysis of How the Industry Misses the Mark and How We Can Improve
Call it what you will, security advocacy/evangelism/devrel content such as documentation, talks, demos, videos, etc. is usually targeted at other security professional... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:T1008
ATT&CK Technique Name:Fallback Channels
Adversaries may use fallback or alternate communication channels if the primary channel is compromised or inaccessible in order to maintain reliable command and control and to avoid data transfer thresholds. | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0125
ATT&CK Technique Name:Remsec
Remsec can add or remove applications or ports on the Windows firewall or disable it entirely.[32] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M1032
ATT&CK Technique Name:Multi-factor Authentication
Use multi-factor authentication wherever possible. | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0601
ATT&CK Technique Name:Hildegard
Hildegard has queried the Cloud Instance Metadata API for cloud credentials.[4] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0139
ATT&CK Technique Name:TeamTNT
TeamTNT has searched for system version, architecture, disk partition, logical volume, and hostname information.[367][368] | secon |
titleblackhat:us-21 I'm a Hacker Get Me Out of Here! Breaking Network Segregation Using Esoteric Command & Control Channels
This talk will explore the weaponization of esoteric internal command and control (C2) channels and their use for lateral movement. James, an attack simulation consultant with F-Secure Con... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0568
ATT&CK Technique Name:EVILNUM
EVILNUM can achieve persistence through the Registry Run key.[86][87] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0050
ATT&CK Technique Name:APT32
APT32 has infected victims by tricking them into visiting compromised watering hole websites.[7][8] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0407
ATT&CK Technique Name:Monokle
Monokle can record the screen as the user unlocks the device and can take screenshots of any application in the foreground. Monokle can also abuse accessibility features to read the screen to capture data from a large number of popular applications.[3] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0129
ATT&CK Technique Name:Mustang Panda
Mustang Panda's PlugX variant has created a hidden folder on USB drives named RECYCLE.BIN to store malicious executables and collected data.[33] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0154
ATT&CK Technique Name:Cobalt Strike
Cobalt Strike can use self signed Java applets to execute signed applet attacks.[20][21] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0633
ATT&CK Technique Name:Sliver
Sliver can use standard encoding techniques like gzip and hex to ASCII to encode the C2 communication payload.[83] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0457
ATT&CK Technique Name:Netwalker
Netwalker can detect and terminate active security software-related processes on infected systems.[73] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0276
ATT&CK Technique Name:Keydnap
Keydnap uses the keychaindump project to read securityd memory.[4] | secon |
title:botconf2014 Botnets of *NIX Web Servers
In the last several years malware writers have clearly understood that getting access to web servers can bring more benefits than infecting users’ PCs. Nowadays there are millions of completely unprotected web-sites and web servers with different kinds of vulnerabilities, s... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0018
ATT&CK Technique Name:admin@338
admin@338 actors used the following commands after exploiting a machine with LOWBALL malware to obtain information about the OS: ver >> %temp%\download systeminfo >> %temp%\download[9] | secon |
title:blackhat:eu-20 Precursor: Towards Evidence-Based Trust in Hardware
In hardware, the status quo is that we may have faith in our wares, but we have no direct, evidence-based reason to trust it. Even the best microscopes can only reveal partial information about the way a chip is constructed, and typically only in ... | secon |
title:blackhat:us-22 Keynote: Black Hat at 25: Where Do We Go from Here?
For twenty-five years, the InfoSec community and industry have been gathering here in the desert. For twenty-five years, we have chipped away at underlying insecurities in the technologies we use every day with new vulnerability research and adve... | secon |
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