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title:blackhat:us-22 Scaling the Security Researcher to Eliminate OSS Vulnerabilities Once and For All
Imagine a world where a security researcher becomes aware of a security vulnerability, impacting thousands of Open Source Software (OSS) projects, and is enabled to both identify and fix them all at once. Now imagine ... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0583
ATT&CK Technique Name:Pysa
Pysa has modified the registry key "SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Policies\System" and added the ransom note.[124] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0581
ATT&CK Technique Name:IronNetInjector
IronNetInjector can identify processes via C# methods such as GetProcessesByName and running Tasklist with the Python os.popen function.[133] | secon |
titleblackhat:eu-19 Tackling Privilege Escalation with Offense and Defense
Over the past couple of years, various JavaScript APIs have been closely examined by security researchers. They've been audited and fuzzed thoroughly for classic memory corruption issues like buffer overflows, use-after-frees, and type confusion... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0340
ATT&CK Technique Name:Octopus
Octopus can download additional files and tools onto the victim’s machine.[322][323][321] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0663
ATT&CK Technique Name:SysUpdate
SysUpdate can collect the username from a compromised host.[187] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0502
ATT&CK Technique Name:Drovorub
Drovorub can use the WebSocket protocol and has initiated communication with C2 servers with an HTTP Upgrade request.[105] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M1006
ATT&CK Technique Name:Use Recent OS Version
OS feature updates often enhance security and privacy around permissions. | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S1065
ATT&CK Technique Name:Woody RAT
Woody RAT has the ability to delete itself from disk by creating a suspended notepad process and writing shellcode to delete a file into the suspended process using NtWriteVirtualMemory.[256] | secon |
title:botconf2015 DGA clustering and analysis: mastering modern, evolving threats
Conficker was the first to introduce Domain Generation Algorithms to the malware world. Today’s modern malware practically use it as a basic building block.Malware researchers have tackled this problem with various tools and techniques wi... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M1051
ATT&CK Technique Name:Update Software
For the Outlook methods, blocking macros may be ineffective as the Visual Basic engine used for these features is separate from the macro scripting engine.[5] Microsoft has released patches to try to address each issue. Ensure KB3191938 which blocks Outlook Visual B... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0051
ATT&CK Technique Name:MiniDuke
MiniDuke can can use a named pipe to forward communications from one compromised machine with internet access to other compromised machines.[10] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M1047
ATT&CK Technique Name:Audit
Periodically check the integrity of system image to ensure it has not been modified. [3] [4] [5] | secon |
title:blackhat:eu-22 Searching for RPC Functions to Coerce Authentications in Microsoft Protocols
Although they have been used for several decades, Microsoft's Remote Procedure Calls have always lacked a serious security analysis. They always were the source of many security weaknesses, with coerced authentications, Lo... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:T1055.009
ATT&CK Technique Name:Proc Memory
Adversaries may inject malicious code into processes via the /proc filesystem in order to evade process-based defenses as well as possibly elevate privileges. Proc memory injection is a method of executing arbitrary code in the address space of a separate live proce... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0028
ATT&CK Technique Name:Threat Group-1314
Threat Group-1314 actors used compromised domain credentials for the victim's endpoint management platform, Altiris, to move laterally.[24] | secon |
title:blackhat:eu-21 Skeletons in the App Sandbox: 5+ Ways to Escape
The safety and trust promised by the App Store is in large part due to mandatory sandboxing requirements. The required App Sandbox lets users install apps with abandon and without worry, keeping malicious ones contained. This talk will deep dive into ... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0004
ATT&CK Technique Name:TinyZBot
TinyZBot contains functionality to collect information from the clipboard.[45] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0520
ATT&CK Technique Name:BLINDINGCAN
BLINDINGCAN has been packed with the UPX packer.[20] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0491
ATT&CK Technique Name:StrongPity
StrongPity can use the HKCU\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run Registry key for persistence.[205] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0067
ATT&CK Technique Name:APT37
APT37 has used Windows DDE for execution of commands and a malicious VBS.[14] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S1065
ATT&CK Technique Name:Woody RAT
Woody RAT can inject code into a targeted process by writing to the remote memory of an infected system and then create a remote thread.[70] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S1035
ATT&CK Technique Name:Small Sieve
Small Sieve has the ability to download files.[416] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0140
ATT&CK Technique Name:LazyScripter
LazyScripter has lured users to open malicious email attachments.[124] | secon |
titleblackhat:us-19 Deconstructing the Phishing Campaigns that Target Gmail Users
With over 1.4 billion active users and million of companies entrusting it to handle their email, Gmail has a unique vantage point on how phishing groups operate. In this talk we look into Gmail telemetry to illuminate the differences betw... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0194
ATT&CK Technique Name:PowerSploit
PowerSploit reflectively loads a Windows PE file into a process.[19][20] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0692
ATT&CK Technique Name:SILENTTRINITY
SILENTTRINITY can create a backdoor in KeePass using a malicious config file and in TortoiseSVN using a registry hook.[3] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S1009
ATT&CK Technique Name:Triton
Triton calls the SafeAppendProgramMod to transfer its payloads to the Tricon. Part of this call includes preforming a program upload. [3] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0008
ATT&CK Technique Name:gsecdump
gsecdump can dump Windows password hashes from the SAM.[10] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0064
ATT&CK Technique Name:APT33
APT33 has used a variety of publicly available tools like LaZagne to gather credentials.[2][3] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M0931
ATT&CK Technique Name:Network Intrusion Prevention
Network intrusion prevention systems and systems designed to scan and remove malicious email attachments can be used to block activity. | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0439
ATT&CK Technique Name:Okrum
Okrum was seen using a keylogger tool to capture keystrokes. [131] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0496
ATT&CK Technique Name:REvil
REvil has used HTTP and HTTPS in communication with C2.[280][281][282][283][284] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0471
ATT&CK Technique Name:build_downer
build_downer has the ability to use the WinExec API to execute malware on a compromised host.[34] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0117
ATT&CK Technique Name:Fox Kitten
Fox Kitten has used RDP to log in and move laterally in the target environment.[26][27] | secon |
titleblackhat:eu-22 Unwinding the Stack for Fun and Profit
Stack-based buffer overflows are the holy grail of software exploitation. Unfortunately, it's not 2005 anymore: mitigations (such as stack cookies) have spoiled all the fun! Nowadays, you have to resort to complicated heap feng shui or other exploitation wizard... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0016
ATT&CK Technique Name:APT29
APT29 has compromised email accounts to further enable phishing campaigns and taken control of dormant accounts.[4][5] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S1069
ATT&CK Technique Name:TangleBot
TangleBot can use overlays to cover legitimate applications or screens.[29] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0128
ATT&CK Technique Name:BADNEWS
BADNEWS monitors USB devices and copies files with certain extensions to a predefined directory.[5] | secon |
title:blackhat:us-20 I calc'd Calc - Exploiting Excel Online
The Microsoft Security Response Center has a unique position in monitoring exploits in the wild. While we have seen several cases in the past years of exploits targeting Office applications, often PowerPoint or Word, exploits targeting online applications are... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0027
ATT&CK Technique Name:Threat Group-3390
Threat Group-3390's malware can add a Registry key to Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run for persistence.[258][259] | secon |
title:blackhat:eu-21 Hardware Security Module - Executing Unsigned Code in HSM TEE
Trusted Execution Environment, or TEE, defines an isolation between trusted and untrusted environment. In terms of TEE environment executing the code, the protected area is guaranteed to execute only authenticated code and reject any ins... | secon |
title:blackhat:asia-19 iOS Dual Booting Demystified
In this talk, we will investigate and present on the ways in which to boot a custom firmware image on an iOS device. In order to show this, we will detail how the secure iOS boot process functions, including many of the details of how the low level component verifica... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0365
ATT&CK Technique Name:Olympic Destroyer
Olympic Destroyer will attempt to clear the System and Security event logs using wevtutil.[26] | secon |
titleblackhat:us-21 Small Wonder: Uncovering Planned Obsolescence Practices in Robotics and What This Means for Cybersecurity
Security in robotics is nothing really new if one considers modern OT and IT approaches, and most security practices translate directly to robots. However, there's almost no security culture amo... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:C0012
ATT&CK Technique Name:Operation CuckooBees
During Operation CuckooBees, the threat actors used the tasklist command as part of their advanced reconnaissance.[186] | secon |
titleblackhat:eu-22 Thresholds Are for Old Threats: Demystifying AI and Machine Learning to Enhance SOC Detection
SOCs aim at detecting threats. Credit Agricole's SOC collects more than 10TB of data, including logs and PCAPs on a daily basis.Legacy detection systems are shaped by static rules and thresholds which canno... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M0944
ATT&CK Technique Name:Restrict Library Loading
Restrict the use of untrusted or unknown libraries, such as remote or unknown DLLs. | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0386
ATT&CK Technique Name:Ursnif
Ursnif has hooked APIs to perform a wide variety of information theft, such as monitoring traffic from browsers.[14] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0380
ATT&CK Technique Name:StoneDrill
StoneDrill can obtain the current date and time of the victim machine.[70] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0332
ATT&CK Technique Name:Remcos
Remcos uses RC4 and base64 to obfuscate data, including Registry entries and file paths.[269] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0096
ATT&CK Technique Name:APT41
APT41 leveraged the follow exploits in their operations: CVE-2012-0158, CVE-2015-1641, CVE-2017-0199, CVE-2017-11882, and CVE-2019-3396.[22] | secon |
title:blackhat:us-20 OTRazor: Static Code Analysis for Vulnerability Discovery in Industrial Automation Scripts
In this talk, we delve into industrial robot programming, focusing on the security issues arising from the design and implementation choices of these platforms.Industrial robot manufacturers provide proprieta... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M1041
ATT&CK Technique Name:Encrypt Sensitive Information
File encryption should be enforced across email communications containing sensitive information that may be obtained through access to email services. | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M1031
ATT&CK Technique Name:Network Intrusion Prevention
Network intrusion detection and prevention systems that use network signatures to identify traffic for specific adversary malware can be used to mitigate activity at the network level. | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0062
ATT&CK Technique Name:DustySky
The DustySky dropper uses a function to obfuscate the name of functions and other parts of the malware.[106] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0473
ATT&CK Technique Name:Avenger
Avenger has the ability to decrypt files downloaded from C2.[4] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0095
ATT&CK Technique Name:Machete
Machete's Machete MSI installer has masqueraded as a legitimate Adobe Acrobat Reader installer.[91] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0502
ATT&CK Technique Name:Drovorub
Drovorub has de-obsfuscated XOR encrypted payloads in WebSocket messages.[75] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0645
ATT&CK Technique Name:Wevtutil
Wevtutil can be used to disable specific event logs on the system.[15] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S1060
ATT&CK Technique Name:Mafalda
Mafalda can place retrieved files into a destination directory.[55] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0330
ATT&CK Technique Name:Zeus Panda
Zeus Panda can hook GetClipboardData function to watch for clipboard pastes to collect.[47] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0584
ATT&CK Technique Name:AppleJeus
AppleJeus has waited a specified time before downloading a second stage payload.[7] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0189
ATT&CK Technique Name:ISMInjector
ISMInjector creates scheduled tasks to establish persistence.[86] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0638
ATT&CK Technique Name:Babuk
Babuk has the ability to delete shadow volumes using vssadmin.exe delete shadows /all /quiet.[9][10] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M1040
ATT&CK Technique Name:Behavior Prevention on Endpoint
On Windows 10, enable Attack Surface Reduction (ASR) rules to prevent Office applications from creating child processes and from writing potentially malicious executable content to disk. [3] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0234
ATT&CK Technique Name:Bandook
Bandook can support commands to execute Java-based payloads.[9] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G1007
ATT&CK Technique Name:Aoqin Dragon
Aoqin Dragon has used fake icons including antivirus and external drives to disguise malicious payloads.[3] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0154
ATT&CK Technique Name:Cobalt Strike
Cobalt Strike can use known credentials to run commands and spawn processes as a domain user account.[5][6][7] | secon |
titleblackhat:eu-21 Owfuzz: WiFi Nightmare
WiFi, which uses unprotected air as a medium, faces unique challenges in ensuring the security and availability of communication. Throughout the development process of WiFi protocol, it is also the evolution process of WiFi security protocol. Even with the popularization of WI... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0090
ATT&CK Technique Name:Rover
Rover automatically collects files from the local system and removable drives based on a predefined list of file extensions on a regular timeframe.[38] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M0953
ATT&CK Technique Name:Data Backup
Utilize central storage servers for critical operations where possible (e.g., historians) and keep remote backups. For outstations, use local redundant storage for event recorders. Have backup control system platforms, preferably as hot-standbys to respond immediately t... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M1038
ATT&CK Technique Name:Execution Prevention
Identify and block potentially malicious software executed that may be executed through this technique by using application control [191] tools, like Windows Defender Application Control[192], AppLocker, [193] [194] or Software Restriction Policies [195] where ... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0517
ATT&CK Technique Name:Pillowmint
Pillowmint has been compressed and stored within a registry key. Pillowmint has also obfuscated the AES key used for encryption.[249] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0625
ATT&CK Technique Name:Cuba
Cuba can query service status using QueryServiceStatusEx function.[13] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0094
ATT&CK Technique Name:Trojan.Karagany
Trojan.Karagany can monitor the titles of open windows to identify specific keywords.[32] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0520
ATT&CK Technique Name:BLINDINGCAN
BLINDINGCAN has encrypted its C2 traffic with RC4.[18] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0260
ATT&CK Technique Name:InvisiMole
InvisiMole has used rundll32.exe for execution.[54] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0681
ATT&CK Technique Name:Lizar
Lizar can retrieve browser history and database files.[11][12] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S1063
ATT&CK Technique Name:Brute Ratel C4
Brute Ratel C4 has used encrypted payload files and maintains an encrypted configuration structure in memory.[61][62] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0081
ATT&CK Technique Name:Tropic Trooper
Tropic Trooper's backdoor has communicated to the C2 over the DNS protocol.[68] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0606
ATT&CK Technique Name:Bad Rabbit
Bad Rabbit enumerates open SMB shares on internal victim networks.[13] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0379
ATT&CK Technique Name:Revenge RAT
Revenge RAT has the ability to access the webcam.[39][40] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0458
ATT&CK Technique Name:Ramsay
Ramsay can hijack outdated Windows application dependencies with malicious versions of its own DLL payload.[32] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0434
ATT&CK Technique Name:Imminent Monitor
Imminent Monitor has a feature to disable Windows Task Manager.[43] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0138
ATT&CK Technique Name:Andariel
Andariel has used a variety of publicly-available remote access Trojans (RATs) for its operations.[1] | secon |
titleblackhat:asia-21 The Price of Compatibility: Defeating macOS Kernel Using Extended File Attributes
Filesystem is one of the infrastructures of OS, and any flaws in it may cause serious impacts.When I studied filesystem's implementation on macOS, I found that the old msdos FAT filesystem supports advanced features ... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0031
ATT&CK Technique Name:BACKSPACE
BACKSPACE achieves persistence by creating a shortcut to itself in the CSIDL_STARTUP directory.[5] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:T1053.005
ATT&CK Technique Name:Scheduled Task
Adversaries may abuse the Windows Task Scheduler to perform task scheduling for initial or recurring execution of malicious code. There are multiple ways to access the Task Scheduler in Windows. The schtasks utility can be run directly on the command line, or the... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0032
ATT&CK Technique Name:Lazarus Group
Lazarus Group has conducted C2 over HTTP and HTTPS.[184][88][89][185][186][187] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0096
ATT&CK Technique Name:APT41
APT41 malware TIDYELF loaded the main WINTERLOVE component by injecting it into the iexplore.exe process.[5] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0520
ATT&CK Technique Name:BLINDINGCAN
BLINDINGCAN has collected the victim machine's local IP address information and MAC address.[39] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0653
ATT&CK Technique Name:xCaon
xCaon has leveraged native OS function calls to retrieve victim's network adapter's information using GetAdapterInfo() API.[44] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0363
ATT&CK Technique Name:Empire
Empire has the ability to gather browser data such as bookmarks and visited sites.[9] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0608
ATT&CK Technique Name:Conficker
Conficker has used a DGA that seeds with the current UTC victim system date to generate domains.[13][14] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0513
ATT&CK Technique Name:LiteDuke
LiteDuke has the ability to discover the proxy configuration of Firefox and/or Opera.[86] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0230
ATT&CK Technique Name:ZeroT
ZeroT has used DLL side-loading to load malicious payloads.[68][69] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0409
ATT&CK Technique Name:Machete
Machete can find, encrypt, and upload files from fixed and removable drives.[17][18] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:T1070.001
ATT&CK Technique Name:Clear Windows Event Logs
Adversaries may clear Windows Event Logs to hide the activity of an intrusion. Windows Event Logs are a record of a computer's alerts and notifications. There are three system-defined sources of events: System, Application, and Security, with five event... | secon |
title:blackhat:us-22 Better Privacy Through Offense: How To Build a Privacy Red Team
Red teams are an important component of a holistic cyber security program because they test how well the program stands up to threats from real adversaries. In 2021, Meta created a privacy red team to help improve our privacy posture a... | secon |
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