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Salafi movement | Wiktorowicz's typology has largely been discarded by recent scholarship due to its simplistic assumptions regarding religion, in addition to other limitations, such as its neglect of the changing social, political and cultural realities occurring across the Muslim World. Several researchers have criticised the classification for being unobservant regarding the dynamism of the Salafiyya, such it's evolving relations with Islamic politics; as well as for its rigid compartmentalisation of Salafi Muslims. According to Samir Amghar and Francesco Cavatorta: "studies question fundamentally the theoretical and scientific relevance of the typology between quietists, politicians and revolutionaries and argue that it is crucial to refine this typology by affirming that it is no longer apt in explaining Salafism in the contemporary age... If Wiktorowicz’s categorisation has the merit of shedding light on the plural and contradictory character of a movement that is too often caricatured, it prevents us from thinking about its dynamic and evolving character. The changing reality on the ground across the Arab world and beyond demands that traditional categories be revisited."
By making a case study of Egyptian Salafis and the "quietist" Al-Nour party, one scholar Laurence Deschamps-Laporte, demonstrates that Wiktorowicz's "non-dynamic typology" merely denotes "time-bounded pragmatic political strategies" rather than any solid identity. Laurence proposes re-defining the triple classification of "Quietist, Activist and Jihadist" into "proselytizing, politico and revolutionary"; and re-conceptualise these categories as "temporal strategies" instead of a solid spiritual identity. She further calls for a holistic approach that accounts for the "fluidity, diversity, and evolution of Salafi groups" and focus more on the strategic adaptation of Salafi Muslims in their respective environments rather than creedal issues. Based on his study of European Salafi movements, Samir Amghar asserts that Jihadism no longer can be classified as part of proper Salafism since, according to Amghar, both movements have diverged significantly over the course of decades and have no "shared doctrinal background".
Wiktorowicz's proposition that all self-professed Salafi groups have the same "Aqidah" (creed) has also been challenged. According to scholar Massimo Ramaioli: "Salafis do not vary, as Wiktorowicz claimed, only at the level of reading social reality and its attendant socio-political manifestations (their manhaj), while retaining sameness and coherence at the theoretical level. From a philosophy of praxis perspective, we can account for the variations of ‘aqīdah that we witness. On issues such as imān (faith), kufr (unbelief) and takfīr (excommunication), al-wala’ wa al-bara’, and of course violence and jihād, Salafis clearly do not hold the same views precisely because they read social reality, and consequently behave, so differently... Negotiating the constraints and opportunities of the political prods Salafis to engage in thorough and at times painful ideological (re)positioning... the political affects Salafism on both levels: ideational and methodological/practical." | https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Salafi_movement |
Malacca | Malacca has an estimated population of 931,210 as of 2016 with an average annual population growth of 2%. As of 2016, 27% of the population were below 15 years old and 8% were above 60 years old. The ethnic composition of Malacca as of 2015 is 66.8% Malays (552,700), 1.4% other Bumiputras (11,500), 26.0% Chinese (215,000), 6.2% Indians and Chitty (51,400) and 0.6% others (4,800). Malacca has small communities of Kristang, Dutch Eurasian and Temuan people.
The Malay population of Malacca is generally divided into two cultural groups: those practicing Adat Temenggong and the other who are ethnically of Minangkabau origin practicing Adat Perpatih in Naning northside (absorbed from Negeri Sembilan following the Naning War). The remaining traditional Malay village in Malacca City is the Morten Village.
Jonker Walk is the Chinatown area of Malacca. It was once known for its antique shops but have since turned into a well-known tourist destination that features clothes, food and crafts. The Peranakan people in Malacca show unique features, such as furniture, porcelain, crockery, style and food. Their culture is showcased at the Baba Nyonya Heritage Museum.
Indians in Malacca are predominantly Tamils, many of whom used to work at the rubber plantation. However, many of them now work in the jewellery, fabric, retail, merchant and money lending sectors. Many of them reside in Little India. There is also Chitty Village for the minority Chitty people which houses the Chitty Museum.
A small number of Malayalees who speak Malayalam and Telugus who speak Telugu exist among the Indians in Malacca. Malacca Kerala Samajam is an association that represents the Malayalam speaking community in Malacca. A branch of Telugu Association Malaysia is situated in Ayer Keroh to represent the Telugu speaking community in Malacca.
A sizeable number of Punjabi Sikhs residing in Malacca, and Sikhs from Malacca and abroad congregate in the gurdwara (Sikh temple) situated in Jalan Temenggong. They celebrate the Guru Nanak's birthday and Vasakhi new year annually.
A population of Portuguese descent, who speak a Portuguese creole, are the descendants of colonists from the 16th and 17th centuries. To this day, many of the traditions originating with the Portuguese occupation are still practised, i.e. "Intrudu" from Portuguese word "Entrudo" (a water festival that marks the beginning of Lent, the Catholic fasting period), "branyu" (traditional dance), "Santa Cruz" (a yearly Festival of street celebrations). Many of them settled down around the Portuguese Settlement area, which has a population of about 1,200 residents.
The indigenous population, mostly ethnic Temuan is relatively small. They generally reside in rural settlements, the edge of the woods and along the coast facing the Strait of Malacca. Malacca houses the Aborigines Museum in Ayer Keroh. | https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Malacca |
Edom | The Edomites' original country, according to the Hebrew Bible, stretched from the Sinai peninsula as far as Kadesh Barnea. It reached as far south as Eilat, which was the seaport of Edom. On the north of Edom was the territory of Moab. The boundary between Moab and Edom was the brook of Zered. The ancient capital of Edom was Bozrah. According to Genesis, Esau's descendants settled in the land after they had displaced the Horites. It was also called the land of Seir; Mount Seir appears to have been strongly identified with them and may have been a cultic site. According to biblical narrative, at the time of Amaziah (838 BC), Selah was its principal stronghold, Eilat and Ezion-geber its seaports.
Genesis 36:31-43 lists the kings of Edom "before any Israelite king reigned":
These are the kings who ruled in the land of Edom before a king ruled the children of Israel. And Bela ben Beor ruled in Edom, and the name of his city was Dinhabah. And Bela died, and Jobab ben Zerah from Bozrah ruled in his place. And Jobab died, and Husham of the land of Temani ruled in his place. And Husham died, and Hadad ben Bedad, who struck Midian in the field of Moab, ruled in his place, and the name of his city was Avith. And Hadad died, and Samlah of Masrekah ruled in his place. And Samlah died, and Saul of Rehoboth on the river ruled in his place. And Saul died, and Baal-hanan ben Achbor ruled in his place. And Baal-hanan ben Achbor died, and Hadar ruled in his place, and the name of his city was Pau, and his wife's name was Mehetabel bat Matred bat Mezahab. And these are the names of the clans of Esau by their families, by their places, by their names: clan Timnah, clan Alvah, clan Jetheth, clan Aholibamah, clan Elah, clan Pinon, clan Kenaz, clan Teman, clan Mibzar, clan Magdiel, clan Iram.
The Hebrew word translated as leader of a clan is aluf, used solely to describe the Dukes of Edom and Moab, in the first five books of Moses. However beginning in the books of the later prophets the word is used to describe Judean generals, for example, in the prophecies of Zachariah twice (9:7, 12:5–6) it had evolved to describe Jewish captains, the word also is used multiple times as a general term for teacher or guide for example in Psalm 55:13. Aluph as it is used to denote teach or guide from the Edomite word for Duke is used 69 times in the Tanakh.
If the account may be taken at face value, the kingship of Edom was, at least in early times, not hereditary, perhaps elective. The first book of Chronicles mentions both a king and chieftains. Moses and the Israelite people twice appealed to their common ancestry and asked the king of Edom for passage through his land, along the "King's Highway", on their way to Canaan, but the king refused permission. Accordingly, they detoured around the country because of his show of force or because God ordered them to do so rather than wage war (Deuteronomy 2:4–6). The King of Edom did not attack the Israelites, though he prepared to resist aggression.
Nothing further is recorded of the Edomites in the Tanakh until their defeat by King Saul of Israel in the late 11th century BC (1 Samuel 14:47). Forty years later King David and his general Joab defeated the Edomites in the "Valley of Salt" (probably near the Dead Sea; 2 Samuel 8:13–14; 1 Kings 9:15–16). An Edomite prince named Hadad escaped and fled to Egypt, and after David's death returned and tried to start a rebellion, but failed and went to Syria (Aramea). From that time Edom remained a vassal of Israel. David placed over the Edomites Israelite governors or prefects, and this form of government seems to have continued under Solomon. When Israel divided into two kingdoms Edom became a dependency of the Kingdom of Judah. In the time of Jehoshaphat (c. 870 – 849 BC) the Tanakh mentions a king of Edom, who was probably an Israelite deputy appointed by the King of Judah. It also states that the inhabitants of Mount Seir invaded Judea in conjunction with Ammon and Moab, and that the invaders turned against one another and were all destroyed (2 Chronicles 20:10–23). Edom revolted against Jehoram and elected a king of its own (2 Kings 8:20–22; 2 Chronicles 21:8). Amaziah attacked and defeated the Edomites, seizing Selah, but the Israelites never subdued Edom completely (2 Kings 14:7; 2 Chronicles 25:11–12).
In the time of Nebuchadnezzar II the Edomites may have helped plunder Jerusalem and slaughter the Judaeans in 587 or 586 BCE (Psalms 137:7; Obadiah 1:11–14). Some believe that it is for this reason the prophets denounced Edom (Isaiah 34:5–8; Jeremiah 49:7–22; Obadiah passim). Evidence also suggests that at that time Edom may have engaged in a treaty betrayal of Judah. The people of Edom would be dealt with during the Messiah's rulership, according to the prophets. Despite this, many Edomites peacefully migrated to southern Judea, which continued even during the reign of Nabonidus.Regarding the territory of Edom, the book of Jeremiah states that "no one will live there, nor will anyone of mankind reside in it".
Although the Idumaeans controlled the lands to the east and south of the Dead Sea, their peoples were held in contempt by the Israelites. Hence the Book of Psalms says "Moab is my washpot: over Edom will I cast out my shoe". According to the Torah, the congregation could not receive descendants of a marriage between an Israelite and an Edomite until the fourth generation. This law was a subject of controversy between Shimon ben Yohai, who said it applied only to male descendants, and other Tannaim, who said female descendants were also excluded for four generations. From these, some early conversion laws in halacha were derived. | https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Edom |
Cultural Muslims | Bella Hadid: She shared during an interview with Porter that she is "proud to be a Muslim", but also stated that she lives a spiritual lifestyle, and although her family was not religious, she grew up learning about Judaism and is interested in Islam. "I'm very spiritual, and I find that I connect with every religion," she explained. "There's that my-way-is-the-right-way thing in human nature, but for me it's not about my god or your god. I kind of just call on whoever is willing to be there for me."
Cenk Uygur: Although he is agnostic, he still identifies as a cultural Muslim.
Dua Lipa: She was born in an Albanian Muslim household. She stated that she is a non-practicing Muslim, but has great respect for the faith.
Fatima Bhutto: Said in an interview that she is a cultural Muslim, and describes herself as a secularist.
Kia Abdullah: In 2020, she stated that she identifies as an agnostic and a cultural Muslim.
Marat Safin: While he does not really believe in a personal God, he identifies as an "ethnic Muslim".
Mehmet Oz: He identifies as a "secular Muslim".
Laila Rouass: She was raised Muslim but is now non-practising, although she calls the Islamic faith an important part of her identity.
Mohamed Hadid: He does not consider himself a devout Muslim.
Mustafa Suleyman: co-founder of Google's deepmind, now being a CEO of Microsoft AI talks about being a secular Muslim on Sam Harris' podcast
Naseeruddin Shah: Said he and Javed Akhtar are non-practicing Muslims.
Orhan Pamuk: He describes himself as a cultural Muslim who associates the historical and cultural identification with the religion, while not believing in a personal connection to God.
Sajid Javid: While his family's heritage is Muslim, Javid himself is non-practicing, but has remarked that he was 'the first Muslim Home Secretary to be invited (to the iftar)', whereas his wife is a practicing Christian.
Salman Khan: Khan identifies as both Muslim and Hindu, commenting that, "I'm Hindu and Muslim both. I'm Bharatiya (an Indian)". He explained, "My father is Muslim and my mother is Hindu".
Sohail Ahmed: He describes himself as a cultural Muslim.
Fareed Zakaria: Zakaria is a self-described secular and non-practicing Muslim. He added: "My views on faith are complicated – somewhere between deism and agnosticism. I am completely secular in my outlook." His ex-wife is a Christian, and his three children have not been raised as Muslims.
Hasan Piker: the nephew of Cenk Uygur Is a self-described, non-practicing Muslim. He has openly admitted to eating pork, drinking alcohol, and not observing religious practices, yet still identifies with Islam and calls himself a Muslim.
Kylie Padilla: Converted to Islam aged five years old, she self-describes as a practicing but not devout Muslim, unlike her father and fellow actor Robin (who converted prior while in his time in jail) and her sister Queenie (who left showbiz to focus seriously on her Islamic belief). She got engaged to a non-Muslim and fellow actor Aljur Abrenica for three years and has a son with him, yet still identifies with Islam and calls herself a Muslim, making it clear that she is staying with the religion.
Nuseir "Nas Daily" Yasin: stated that he is both an agnostic and non-religious Muslim.
Shohreh Aghdashloo: despite being born a Muslim, she has stated that she has never practiced it.
T-Pain: he was raised in a Muslim household, but he lacked interest in the religion. His wife is a Christian, but his three children follow both religions.
Zinédine Zidane: he has described himself as a "non-practising Muslim".
O'Shea "Ice Cube" Jackson: he converted to Islam in the early 1990s after being introduced to Nation of Islam though he denied membership to the group. Listening to his own conscience, he self-described as a "natural Muslim, 'cause it's just me and God. You know, going to the mosque, the ritual and the tradition, it's just not in me to do. So I don't do it." He has also said that he thinks "religion is stupid" in part and explained, "I'm gonna live a long life, and I might change religions three or four times before I die. I'm on the Islam tip – but I'm on the Christian tip, too. I'm on the Buddhist tip as well. Everyone has something to offer to the world."
Ali A. Rizvi: He has identified himself as an Cultural Muslim in his book The Atheist Muslim.
Meša Selimović | https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Cultural_Muslims |
History of Syria | Ottoman Sultan Selim I conquered most of Syria in 1516 after defeating the Mamlukes at the Battle of Marj Dabiq near Aleppo. Syria was part of the Ottoman Empire from 1516 to 1918, although with 2 brief captures by the Iranian Safavids, notably under Shah Ismail I and Shah Abbas. Ottoman rule was not burdensome to the Syrians because the Turks, as Muslims, respected Arabic as the language of the Koran, and accepted the mantle of defenders of the faith. Damascus became the major entrepot for Mecca, and as such it acquired a holy character to Muslims, because of the barakah (spiritual force or blessing) of the countless pilgrims who passed through on the hadj, the pilgrimage to Mecca.
The Ottoman Turks reorganized Syria into one large province or eyalet. The eyalet was subdivided into several districts or sanjaks. In 1549, Syria was reorganized into two eyalets; the Eyalet of Damascus and the new Eyalet of Aleppo. In 1579, the Eyalet of Tripoli which included Latakia, Hama and Homs was established. In 1586, the Eyalet of Raqqa was established in eastern Syria. Ottoman administration did not foster a peaceful co-existence amongst the different sections of Syrian society but Each religious minority – Shia Muslim, Greek Orthodox, Maronite, Armenian, and Jewish – constituted a millet. The religious heads of each community administered all personal status law and performed certain civil functions as well.
As part of the Tanzimat reforms, an Ottoman law passed in 1864 provided for a standard provincial administration throughout the empire with the Eyalets becoming smaller Vilayets governed by a Wali, or governor, still appointed by the Sultan but with new provincial assemblies participating in administration. The territory of Greater Syria in the final period of Ottoman rule included modern Syria, Lebanon, Israel, Jordan, Palestine, and parts of Turkey and Iraq.
During World War I, French diplomat François Georges-Picot and British diplomat Mark Sykes secretly agreed on the post war division of the Ottoman Empire into respective zones of influence in the Sykes-Picot Agreement of 1916. In October 1918, Arab and British troops advanced into Syria and captured Damascus and Aleppo. In line with the Sykes-Picot agreement, Syria became a League of Nations mandate under French control in 1920.
The demographics of this area underwent a huge shift in the early part of the 20th century when Ottoman troops along with Kurdish detachments conducted ethnic cleansing of its Christian populations. Some Circassian, Kurdish and Chechens tribes cooperated with the Ottoman authorities in the massacres of Armenian and Assyrian Christians in Upper Mesopotamia, in southeastern Turkey, between 1914 and 1920, with further attacks on unarmed fleeing civilians conducted by local Arab militias. Many Assyrians fled to northeastern Syria during the Simele massacre in the early 1930s in Iraq and settled mainly in the Al-Hasakah Governorate governate in the Jazira Region. and burned the town. The town was destroyed and the Christian population, about 300 families, fled to the towns of Qamishli and Hasakah. During the great war, Kurdish tribes attacked and sacked and villages in Albaq District immediately to the north of Hakkari mountains. According to lieutenant Ronald Sempill Stafford, a large numbers of Assyrians and Armenians were killed.
In 1941, the Assyrian community of al-Malikiyah was subjected to a vicious assault. Even though the assault failed, Assyrians were terrorized and left in large numbers, and the immigration of Kurds from Turkey to the area have resulted in a Kurdish majority in Amuda, al-Malikiyah, and al-Darbasiyah. The historically important Christian city of Nusaybin had a similar fate when its Christian population left after it was ceded to Turkey through the Franco-Turkish Agreement of Ankara in October 1921. The Christian population of the city crossed the border into Syria and settled in Qamishli, which was separated by the railway (new border) from Nusaybin. Nusaybin became Kurdish and Qamishli became a Syriac Christian city. Things soon changed, however, with the immigration of Kurds beginning in 1926 following the failure of the rebellion of Saeed Ali Naqshbandi against the Turkish authorities. During the 1920s, waves of Kurds fled their homes in Turkey and settled in northeastern Syria where they were granted citizenship by the French mandate authorities. | https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/History_of_Syria |
Shebaa Farms | The United Nations certified Israel's pullout under Resolution 425 as conforming to the "withdrawal line" it had laid down in accordance with the maps at its disposal "for the practical purpose of confirming the Israeli withdrawal". At the same time the UN noted that its decision was "without prejudice to future border agreements between the Member States concerned," referring to Israel, Syria, and Lebanon. The UN stated:
"On May 15, 2000, the United Nations received a map, dated 1966, from the Government of Lebanon which reflected the Government's position that these farmlands were located in Lebanon. The United Nations is in possession of ten other maps issued after 1966 by various Lebanese government institutions, including the Ministry of Defense and the army, all of which place the farmlands inside the Syrian Arab Republic. The United Nations has also examined six maps issued by the Government of the Syrian Arab Republic, including three maps since 1966, which place the farmlands inside the Syrian Arab Republic."
In April 2002, UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan, said:
"With reference to the disturbances along the Blue Line emanating from Lebanese territory, I call on the Government of Lebanon and all relevant parties to condemn and prevent such violations. The Security Council itself confirmed in June 2000 that Israel had withdrawn from southern Lebanon in compliance with UN Security Council resolutions 425 and 426. Attacks at any point along the Blue Line, including in the Shebaa Farms area in the occupied Golan Heights, are violations of Security Council resolutions. Respect for decisions of the Security Council is the most basic requirement of international legitimacy."
On 20 January 2005, UN Secretary-General's report on Lebanon stated:
"The continually asserted position of the Government of Lebanon that the Blue Line is not valid in the Shab'a farms area is not compatible with Security Council resolutions. The Council has recognized the Blue Line as valid for purposes of confirming Israel’s withdrawal pursuant to resolution 425 (1978). The Government of Lebanon should heed the Council’s repeated calls for the parties to respect the Blue Line in its entirety."
The BBC quoted Timur Goksel, then spokesman for the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL) as saying that "no-one disputed that the village of Shebaa itself was in Lebanon, but most of the farms fell into an undefined area that may be either in Lebanon or Syria" and although the UN was not a "boundary marking authority [...] on all maps the UN has been able to find, the farms are seen on the Syrian side [of the border]."
In 2006, Terje Rød-Larsen, the UN special envoy on implementation of Resolution 1559, declared that "the Shaba Farms area is not part of Lebanon. Therefore, any Lebanese 'resistance' to 'liberate' the area from continued Israeli occupation cannot be considered legitimate."
Following the Israeli war against Hezbollah in 2006, U.N. Security Council Resolution 1701 called for the "Delineation of the international borders of Lebanon, especially in those areas where the border is disputed or uncertain, including in the Shebaa Farms area." | https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Shebaa_Farms |
Abbas the Great | Born in 27 January 1571 in Herat, Abbas was the third son of Mohammad Khodabanda and his wife, Khayr al-Nisa Begum. His father was the first-born son of Tahmasp I, the second Shah of Safavid Iran. He chose the name Abbas for the infant. Abbas' father, Mohammad Khodabanda, was the governor of Herat, the capital city of the major province of Khorasan. Mohammad Khodanbanda was disqualified from succeeding his father because an eye disease had left him almost completely blind. The Safavid court chronicler, Iskandar Beg Monshi, describes Mohammad Khodabanda as ‘a pious, ascetic and gentle soul’. Abbas' mother, Khayr al-Nisa Begum, was the daughter of Mir Abdollah II, a local ruler in the province of Mazandaran from the Mar'ashi dynasty who claimed descent from the fourth Shi'ia imam, Ali ibn Husayn Zayn al-Abidin. She and Mohammad Khodabanda had already two children before Abbas, Hassan and Hamza, and she gave birth to two more sons later: Abu Taleb and Tahmasp.
When Abbas was barely eighteen months old, he was separated from his father and his mother, who were transferred by Tahmasp to govern the city of Shiraz. The nominal governorship of Herat was handed over to Abbas. At first, Tahmasp intended to make Hamza the governor of Herat, but Khayr al-Nisa Begum was unwilling to be separated from Hamza, who was her favourite son. So she persuaded the king to appoint Abbas instead. The fact that Abbas was still a baby was not considered an obstacle, as Tahmasp himself had been appointed titular governor of Khorasan at the age of two.
Shah Qoli Sultan Ustajlu, an amir from one of the Qizilbash tribes called the Ustajlu tribe, was appointed as the actual governor and as Abbas's lala (guardian). Abbas's Qizilbash guardians and their wives became substitute parents for him. He never saw his mother again and only saw his father fifteen years later. Abbas learnt the necessary skills of a soldier from his Qizilbash guardians. He played polo and went frequently on hunts. Like most of the Iranian kings, he developed a passion for hunting, which was regarded as a form of military training. Abbas was educated alongside household "slaves" (ghulams), who would have become his childhood companions. Some or perhaps most of them are likely to have been Georgians, Armenians or Circassians.
On 14 May 1576, Tahmasp I died without a designated heir, which led to the realm descending into civil war. The following day, Tahmasp I's favourite son, Haydar Mirza, proclaimed himself king with the support of the Ustajlu tribe and the powerful court Georgians. However, he was immediately overthrown and killed by the qurchis (the royal bodyguards). After his death, with the support of the majority of the Qizilbash tribes and the endorsement of Tahmasp's influential daughter, Pari Khan Khanum, Ismail Mirza, who had been imprisoned by his father for twenty years, was crowned king as Ismail II. The new king's reign turned out to be short and murderous. The long years of imprisonment had left him suffering from paranoia, with the result that he saw enemies everywhere who had to be eliminated. First and foremost, he began murdering most of the members of Ustajlu tribe regardless of whether or not they had supported Haydar Mirza. He also executed people whose only crime was having held a position during Tahmasp's reign. The young Abbas was directly affected by his uncle's purge when a group of horsemen rushed into his guardian's house, Shah Qoli Sultan, and killed him.
Ismail then turned on his family. He ordered the execution of many of his half-brothers, cousins and nephews. He spared Mohammad Khodabandae, possibly because they were full-brothers and perhaps because Mohammad Khodabanda was already blind and disqualified as a possible claimant to the throne. In November 1577, however, Ismail dispatched Ali-Qoli Khan from the Shamlu tribe to Herat to kill the young Abbas. Ali-Qoli delayed Abbas' execution, giving as a reason that it would be "inappropriate" to execute an "innocent" descendant of a seyed on holy days (Qadr Night and Eid al-Fitr). This dealy saved Abbas' life, for on 24 November 1577, Ismail II died from consuming poisoned opium, and Ali-Qoli Khan assumed the governorship of Herat and the role of guardian of Abbas.
On 11 or 13 February 1578, Mohammad Khodabanda was chosen by the Qizilbash as the new shah. The new shah appeared weak, indifferent and incompetent. In these circumstances power soon passed into other hands. Abbas' mother, Khayr al-Nisa Begum, was a strong-willed woman. She took complete charge of the administration and made all the decisions, even in military matters. The Qizilbash were not happy to see her taking power. The divisions in the Safavid court encouraged rebellions in various parts of the country and the old Qizilbash rivalries rose again, with the Ustajlu and Shamlu tribes immediately confronting each other. Mohammad Khodabanda and the queen asked Ali-Qoli Khan to bring Abbas to Qazvin, fearing that Ali-Qoli Khan was conspiring to enthrone Abbas, but the Qizilbash amirs of Khorasan argued that with the threat of the Uzbeks of Bukhara raiding near Herat, the presence of a prince in the city was necessary.
The weak state of the realm led to the Ottoman Empire declaring war against Iran in 1578. The Safavid armies suffered several defeats before Khayr al-Nisa Begum organised a counter-offensive. Together with her son, Hamza Mirza and the grand vizier, Mirza Salman Jaberi, she led an army north to confront the Ottoman and Tatar forces in Shirvan. But her attempt to dictate the campaign strategy angered the Qizilbash amirs. Eventually, on 26 July 1579, the Qizilbash stormed into the harem where the queen resided and strangled Khayr al-Nisa Begum. Although Abbas was still only a boy and barely knew his mother, her murder at the hands of the Qizilbash made a deep impression on him. That experience probably led to his belief that the power of the Qizilbash had to be broken. | https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Abbas_the_Great |
Astrology | The general consensus of astronomers and other natural scientists is that astrology is a pseudoscience which carries no predictive capability, with many philosophers of science considering it a "paradigm or prime example of pseudoscience." Some scholars in the social sciences have cautioned against categorizing astrology, especially ancient astrology, as "just" a pseudoscience or projecting the distinction backwards into the past. Thagard, while demarcating it as a pseudoscience, notes that astrology "should be judged as not pseudoscientific in classical or Renaissance times...Only when the historical and social aspects of science are neglected does it become plausible that pseudoscience is an unchanging category." Historians of science such as Tamsyn Barton, Roger Beck, Francesca Rochberg, and Wouter J. Hanegraaff argue that such a wholesale description is anachronistic when applied to historical contexts, stressing that astrology was not pseudoscience before the 18th century and the importance of the discipline to the development of medieval science. R. J. Hakinson writes in the context of Hellenistic astrology that "the belief in the possibility of [astrology] was, at least some of the time, the result of careful reflection on the nature and structure of the universe."
Nicholas Campion, both an astrologer and academic historian of astrology, argues that Indigenous astronomy is largely used as a synonym for astrology in academia, and that modern Indian and Western astrology are better understood as modes of cultural astronomy or ethnoastronomy. Roy Willis and Patrick Curry draw a distinction between propositional episteme and metaphoric metis in the ancient world, identifying astrology with the latter and noting that the central concern of astrology "is not knowledge (factual, let alone scientific) but wisdom (ethical, spiritual and pragmatic)". Similarly, historian of science Justin Niermeier-Dohoney writes that astrology was "more than simply a science of prediction using the stars and comprised a vast body of beliefs, knowledge, and practices with the overarching theme of understanding the relationship between humanity and the rest of the cosmos through an interpretation of stellar, solar, lunar, and planetary movement." Scholars such as Assyriologist Matthew Rutz have begun using the term "astral knowledge" rather than astrology "to better describe a category of beliefs and practices much broader than the term 'astrology' can capture." | https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Astrology |
Muhammad Ali's rise to power | In the meantime, the fortunes of Al-Alfi's main Mamluk opponent, Al-Bardisi, began to decline. In order to satisfy the Albanian troops' demands for pay, he gave orders to levy heavy contributions from the citizens of Cairo. That roused the citizenry to open rebellion. The Albanians, alarmed for their safety, assured the populace that they would not allow the public order to collapse, and Muhammad Ali issued a proclamation to that effect and offered other concessions to calm the public.
Although their demands for pay had been the cause for Al-Bardisi's onerous levies that led to the public disturbances, Muhammad Ali Pasha's proclamation and concessions resulted in the Albanian forces gaining in popularity amongst the citizens, at the expense of the Mamluks. They soon took advantage of the opportunity. Three days later (March 12, 1804) the Albanians attacked the houses of al-Bardisi, as well as that of the aged Mamluk leader Ibrahim Bey. Both barely managed to escape. Upon hearing of the attack on their leaders' houses, the Mamluks in the Cairo citadel opened an artillery bombardment on the houses of the Albanians which were situated in the Azbakeya; but, on hearing of the flight of their chiefs, they evacuated the citadel.
Muhammad Ali Pasha, on gaining possession of the Cairo citadel, proclaimed Mahommed Khosrev Pasha governor of Egypt. For one day and a half Khosrev enjoyed the title; then the friends of the late Tahir Pasha succeeded in killing him. Cairo immediately descended into violent chaos at the hands of the triumphant Albanians, who ransacked and looted the houses of the Mamluk chiefs, whose harems where met with no mercy at their hands.
The Albanians then invited Hurshid Ahmed Pasha to assume the reins of government, and he without delay proceeded from Alexandria to Cairo.
In the meantime, the forces of the partisans of al-Bardisi were ravaging the countryside a few miles south of the capital and intercepting the river borne corn supplies. Soon thereafter, they advanced to the north of Cairo and successively took Bilbeis and Kalyub, plundering both, destroying the crops, and slaughtering the livestock.
Cairo was in a state of tumult, suffering severely from a scarcity of grain, as well as from the heavy exactions of the pasha to meet the demands of his troops, whose numbers had been augmented by a Turkish detachment. The shops were closed, and the unfortunate people assembled in great crowds, crying Y Latif! Y Latif! (O Gracious ).
Events were then further complicated by the reappearance of al-Alfi, who joined forces with Osman Bey Hasan. Both Al-Alfi and Hasan had professed allegiance to the pasha, but they soon turned against him and advanced upon the capital from the south. Their forces clashed with those of Muhammad Ali Pasha, and managed to seize from him the two fortresses of Tur.
Muhammad Ali managed to speedily retake the fortresses in a night assault utilizing 4,000 infantry and cavalry. However, he was then forced to turn his attention northward, where the other Mamluks on that side of Cairo attacked and penetrated into the capital's suburbs. They in turn were defeated a few days later in a battle fought at Shubra, with heavy loss on both sides. This double reverse temporarily united the two Mamluk parties of al-Bardisi and al-Alfi, although the two chiefs remained personally antagonistic.
Al-Bardisi shifted his forces to the south of Cairo, and the Mamluks gradually retreated towards Upper Egypt. There, the governor sent against them three successive expeditions (one of which was commanded by Muhammad Ali Pasha), and many inconclusive battles were fought without decisive result.
During this period another calamity befell Egypt; about 3,000 Kurdish deli light cavalry arrived in Cairo from Syria. These troops had been sent for by Hurshid Ahmed Pasha in order to strengthen himself against the Albanians, but their arrival resulted in the immediate return of Muhammad Ali and his Albanians from their campaign against the Mamluks in the south.
The Delis, rather than aid Hurshid Ahmed Pasha, were the proximate cause of his overthrow. Cairo was ripe for revolt; Hurshid Ahmed Pasha was hated for his tyranny and extortion, and reviled for the misconduct of his troops, especially the Delis. The sheikhs enjoined the people to close their shops, and the soldiers clamored for pay. At this juncture a firman arrived from Constantinople conferring on Muhammad Ali the governorship of Jedda. Within a few days, however, he managed to seize Egypt instead. | https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Muhammad_Ali%27s_rise_to_power |
Ottoman architecture | Glazed tile decoration in the cuerda seca technique was used in other early Ottoman monuments, particularly in the Green Mosque and the associated Green Tomb in Bursa. The tiles of the Green Mosque complex generally have a deep green ground mixed with combinations of blue, white, and yellow forming arabesque motifs. A large portion of the tiles are cut into hexagonal and triangular shapes that were then fitted together to form murals. Some of the tiles are further enhanced with arabesque motifs applied in gilt gold glazing over these colours. The artistic style of these tiles – and of other Ottoman art – was influenced by an "International Timurid" taste that emerged from the intense artistic patronage of the Timurids, who controlled a large empire across the region.
The same kind of tilework is found in the mihrab of the Murad II Mosque in Edirne, completed in 1435. However, this mosque also contains the first examples of a new technique and style of tiles with underglaze blue on a white background, with touches of turquoise. The motifs on these tiles include lotuses and camellia-like flowers on spiral stems. These chinoiserie-like motifs, along with the focus on blue and white colours, most likely reflect an influence from contemporary Chinese porcelain – although the evidence for Chinese porcelain reaching Edirne at this time is unclear. The evidence from this tilework in Bursa and Edirne indicates the existence of a group or a school of craftsmen, the "Masters of Tabriz", who worked for imperial workshops in the first half of the 15th century and were familiar with both cuerda seca and underglaze techniques.
Another stage in Ottoman tiles is evident in the surviving tiles of the Fatih Mosque (1463–70) and in the Selim I Mosque (1520–22). In these mosques the windows are topped by lunettes filled with cuerda seca tiles with motifs in green, turquoise, cobalt blue, and yellow. Chinese motifs such as dragons and clouds also appear for the first time on similar tiles in Selim I's tomb, built behind his mosque in 1523. A more extravagant example of this type of tilework can be found inside the tomb of Şehzade Mehmed in the cemetery of the Şehzade Mosque (1548).
In the late 15th century, in the 1470s or 1480s, the ceramic industry in the city of İznik was growing and began producing a new "blue-and-white" fritware which adapted and incorporated Chinese motifs in its decoration. The most extraordinary tile panels from this stage of Ottoman ceramic art are a series of panels on the exterior of Circumcision Pavilion (Sünnet Odası) in Topkapı Palace. At least some of these tiles are believed to date from the 1520s and feature large floral motifs in blue, white, and turquoise. Both the Topkapı tiles and the mosque tiles from this early-16th-century period are traditionally attributed to Iznik, but they may have been produced in Istanbul itself in ceramic workshops located at Tekfursaray. Even if they come from Tekfursaray, their style is related to the style of ceramics being made in Iznik around the same time. This includes the saz style: a motif in which a variety of flowers are attached to gracefully curving stems with serrated leaves, appearing in the 16th century. This continued to reflect earlier influences of the "International Timurid" style, but it also demonstrates the development of an increasingly distinct Ottoman artistic style at this time.
The architect Mimar Sinan generally used tile decoration in a fairly restrained manner and seems to have preferred focusing on the architecture as a whole rather than on overwhelming decoration. An exception to this austerity is the extensive tilework in the Rüstem Pasha Mosque (1561–62), which also marks the beginning of the artistic peak of Iznik ceramic art from the 1560s onward. Blue colours predominate, but the important "tomato red" colour began to make an appearance. The repertoire of motifs includes tulips, hyacinths, carnations, roses, pomegranates, artichoke leaves, narcissus, and Chinese "cloud" motifs.
In the early 17th century, some features of 16th-century Iznik art began to fade, such as the use of embossed tomato red. At the same time, some motifs became more rigidly geometric and stylized. The enormous Sultan Ahmed Mosque (or "Blue Mosque"), begun in 1609 and inaugurated in 1617, contains the richest collection of tilework of any Ottoman mosque. According to official Ottoman documents it contained as many as 20,000 tiles. The massive undertaking of decorating such a large building strained the tile industry in Iznik. While the craftsmen at Iznik were still capable of producing rich and colourful tiles throughout the 17th century, there was an overall decline in quality, caused in part by the devastation of the Celali revolts and by an overall decline in commissions.
Some of the production continued in the city of Kütahya instead of Iznik. Kütahya, unlike Iznik, had not become solely reliant on imperial commissions and was thus better able to weather the changes of this century. Many of its artisans were Armenians who continued to produce tiles for churches and other buildings. Tile manufacture declined still further in the second half of the 17th century. By this period, blue and turquoise colours increasingly predominated, and many commissioned works limited their patterns to single tiles instead of creating larger patterns across multiple tiles.
Tile production in Iznik came to an end in the 18th century. Ahmet III and his grand vizier attempted to revive the tile industry by establishing a new workshop between 1719 and 1724 at Tekfursaray in Istanbul. Production continued here for a while but the tiles from this period are not comparable in quality to earlier Iznik tiles. Pottery production also continued and even increased at Kütahya, where new styles developed alongside imitations of older classical Ottoman designs. The colours of tiles in this period were mostly turquoise and dark cobalt blue, while a brownish-red, yellow, and a deep green also appearing. The background was often discoloured, colours often ran together slightly, and the patterns were again typically limited to single tiles. After the Patrona Halil rebellion in 1730, which deposed Ahmet III and executed his grand vizier, the Tekfursaray kilns were left without a patron and quickly ceased to function. The shortage of quality tiles in the 18th century also caused Iznik tiles from older buildings to be reused and moved to new ones on multiple occasions. Ultimately, tilework decoration in Ottoman architecture lost its significance during this century. | https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ottoman_architecture |
Casualties of the Iraq War | A top U.S. Army psychiatrist, Colonel Charles Hoge, said in March 2008 that nearly 30% of troops on their third deployment suffered from serious mental-health problems, and that one year was not enough time between combat tours.
A March 12, 2007, Time article reported on a study published in the Archives of Internal Medicine. About one third of the 103,788 veterans returning from the Iraq and Afghanistan wars seen at U.S. Department of Veterans Affairs facilities between September 30, 2001, and September 30, 2005, were diagnosed with mental illness or a psycho-social disorder, such as homelessness and marital problems, including domestic violence. More than half of those diagnosed, 56 percent, were suffering from more than one disorder. The most common combination was post-traumatic stress disorder and depression.
In January 2008, the U.S. Army reported that the rate of suicide among soldiers in 2007 was the highest since the Army started counting in 1980. There were 121 suicides in 2007, a 20-percent jump over the prior year. Also, there were around 2100 attempted suicides and self-injuries in 2007. Other sources reveal higher estimates.
Time magazine reported on June 5, 2008:
Data contained in the Army's fifth Mental Health Advisory Team report indicate that, according to an anonymous survey of U.S. troops taken last fall, about 12% of combat troops in Iraq and 17% of those in Afghanistan are taking prescription antidepressants or sleeping pills to help them cope. ... About a third of soldiers in Afghanistan and Iraq say they can't see a mental-health professional when they need to. When the number of troops in Iraq surged by 30,000 last year, the number of Army mental-health workers remained the same – about 200 – making counseling and care even tougher to get.
In the same article Time also reported on some of the reasons for the prescription drug use:
That imbalance between seeing the price of war up close and yet not feeling able to do much about it, the survey suggests, contributes to feelings of "intense fear, helplessness or horror" that plant the seeds of mental distress. "A friend was liquefied in the driver's position on a tank, and I saw everything", was a typical comment. Another: "A huge f______ bomb blew my friend's head off like 50 meters from me." Such indelible scenes – and wondering when and where the next one will happen – are driving thousands of soldiers to take antidepressants, military psychiatrists say. It's not hard to imagine why.
Concern has been expressed by mental health professionals about the effects on the emotional health and development of returning veterans' infants and children, due to the increased rates of interpersonal violence, posttraumatic stress, depression, and substance abuse that have been reported among these veterans. Moreover, the stressful effects of physical casualties and loss pose enormous stress for the primary caregiver that can adversely affect her or his parenting, as well as the couple's children directly. The mental health needs of military families in the aftermath of combat exposure and other war-related trauma have been thought likely to be inadequately addressed by the military health system that separates mental health care of the returning soldier from his or her family's care, the latter of whom is generally covered under a contracted, civilian managed-care system. | https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Casualties_of_the_Iraq_War |
Al-Radi | The contemporary historian al-Masudi describes him as pleasing in appearance, using scents in large amounts, and of a generous nature, being notable for the lavish gifts he gave his courtiers. According to al-Masudi, the caliph "enjoyed talking of the men and things of the past and sought out scholars and men of letters and frequently summoned them to his presence and lavished marks of his liberality upon them". Unlike the forceful al-Qahir, he quickly became a figurehead ruler, while ambitious men seized authority in the state.
After the distinguished former vizier Ali ibn Isa al-Jarrah declined to be reappointed to the office on account of his advanced age, Ibn Muqla, who had led the conspiracy against al-Qahir, received the post. However, for the first months of the reign, Muhammad ibn Yaqut continued to be the most powerful member of the court until his downfall in April 935; only then did Ibn Muqla truly gain control of the administration. In 935, the government was forced to take measures to confront the turmoil in Baghdad because of the behaviour of some Hanbali fanatics. Supported by popular sentiment, they accosted people in the streets, forced their way into private dwellings, emptied vessels of wine wherever found, broke musical instruments and mistreated female singers, pried into the details of trade, beat up their Ash'ari rivals, and generally acted in an arbitrary manner against anyone who transgressed against their strict interpretation of Islamic law and custom.
By this time, the greatest threat faced by the Caliphate was the increasing independence of the regional governors, who had taken advantage of the internal quarrels in the Abbasid court to strengthen their own control over their provinces and withheld the taxes due to Baghdad, leaving the central government crippled. Ibn Muqla resolved to reassert his control over the neighbouring provinces by military force, and chose the Hamdanid-controlled Jazira as his first target: in 935 he launched a campaign that took the Hamdanid capital, Mosul, but he was forced to return to Baghdad. Another attempt in 936 to launch a campaign against the rebellious governor of Wasit, Muhammad ibn Ra'iq, failed to even get started. Coupled with his failure to counter the mounting financial crisis, this last disaster led to Ibn Muqla's downfall. In April 936, Ibn Muqla was arrested by Muhammad ibn Yaqut's brother, al-Muzaffar, who forced al-Radi to dismiss him as vizier.
Ibn Muqla's dismissal marked the end of the independence of the Abbasid caliphs, for, shortly thereafter, al-Radi appointed Ibn Ra'iq to the new post of amir al-umara ("commander of commanders"), a military office that became the de facto ruler of what remained of the Caliphate. The caliph retained only control of Baghdad and its immediate environs, while all government affairs passed into the hands of Ibn Ra'iq and his secretary. The name of the amir al-umara was even commemorated in the khutba of the Friday prayer, alongside that of the caliph.
Al-Radi is commonly spoken of as the last of the real Caliphs: the last to deliver orations at the Friday service, to hold assemblies with philosophers to discuss the questions of the day, or to take counsel on the affairs of State; the last to distribute largess among the needy, or to interpose to temper the severity of cruel officers.
And yet, with all this he was the mere dependent of another. Beyond the Wasir's shadow, there was little left at home. And abroad, even less: the rich East was gone, Berber Africa and Egypt also, along with the greater part of Syria and Mesopotamia; Mosul was independent; peninsular Arabia was held by Carmathians and native chieftains; even Basra and Wasit rose in revolt. The advance of the 'Greeks' (Byzantine Empire) was stayed only by the brave Hamdanid prince who was deservedly styled Sayf al-Daula 'Sword of the Nation'. | https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Al-Radi |
Latakia | The Mardaites controlled the region from Jebel Aqra to northern Palestine, including Latakia in 705. However, they later withdrew from the city after an agreement with the Umayyad caliph Al-Walid I. Afterwards, the Mardaites sacked it in 719, but it was rebuilt by Umar II. The city lost its importance due to its location on the border between the Byzantine Empire and the Abbasid Caliphate from 750 to 968. The famous poet Al-Mutanabbi led a millenarian revolt at Latakia in 930. The Byzantine Empire recaptured the city in 970 by John I Tzimiskes, but it was lost to the Fatimids in 980. The Banu Munqidh managed to control the city until they were succeeded by the Seljuks during the reign of Malik-Shah I in 1086, despite a brief Byzantine control in 1074. Later on, Guynemer of Boulogne raided the city on 19 August 1097, with 28 ships coming from Cyprus during the First Crusade. In 1098, Raymond of Saint-Gilles captured the city, with the Byzantine fleet presence; hence, the city became contested between the crusaders and the Byzantines who controlled Latakia and Baniyas in the meantime.
After failed efforts by Bohemond I of Antioch to capture Latakia from the Byzantine Empire in 1099, and a brief control of the Genoese fleet in 1101, the city was taken in 1103 by forces under the command of Tancred of Hauteville, a veteran of the First Crusade and acting regent of the Principality of Antioch. Following the defeat of Antiochene forces at the Battle of Harran in 1104, the city was reoccupied by the Byzantines led by Admiral Cantacuzenus, however they would again lose the city. Despite a treaty in 1108 with Bohemond promising to return Latakia to the Byzantine Empire by 1110 it was firmly under the control of the Principality of Antioch, as it was called "La Liche". In 1126, the cities of Latakia and Jabala were the dowry of Princess Alice, daughter of King Baldwin II of Jerusalem, who later donated a house in Latakia to the Knights Hospitaller, which became their main base in the region. In April 1136, the city was sacked by Emir Sawar ibn Aytakin, governor of Aleppo, then it was struck by the 1157 Hama earthquake and the 1170 Syria earthquake.
This situation remained the same with the city serving as the primary port for the Principality until it was captured following a siege by the Ayyubids, under the rule of Saladin on 23 July 1188. By 1260, the crusaders recaptured the city, until they were defeated by the Mamluks of Qalawun, on 20 April 1287.
In circa 1300, Arab geographer al-Dimashqi noted that Latakia had no running water and that trees were scarce, but the city's port was "a wonderful harbor... full of large ships". In 1332, the Moroccan traveller Ibn Battuta visited Latakia in his journeys.
During the late 14th and 15th century, Venetians had a consul in Latakia, due to the trade of cotton and silk from Persia. The city which was in despair was rebuilt after a visit by Qaitbay in 1477.
An Alawite community was first established in Latakia by the missionary Abu Sa'id al-Tabarani (d. 1034) in the early 11th century. From then on it spread northward and into the coastal mountain range. | https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Latakia |
Gao | There is clear archaeological evidence that Gao was firmly rooted in both its local hinterland and interregional economic networks. Pottery recovered from all levels in both mounds is generally quite similar to examples from sites throughout the region, indicating that Gao was part of a regional market sphere, if not a broader cultural substrate.
Gao thus represents a form of urbanism driven largely by local urban-rural dynamics, but in a way in which local elites capitalized on and, in fact, co-opted the opportunities offered by long-distance trade.
Midden deposits produced large quantities of household debris (animal bones, pottery shards, glass, glass beads, and a variety of copper and iron objects). Collectively, the local character of the ceramic, faunal, and botanical remains suggests that, culturally, Gao-Saney was part of a broader Niger River indigenous cultural complex. Additionally, fragments of North African enamel ware, Andalusian chandelier ware, and fragments of Islamic glass vessels were recovered throughout the excavations at Gao.
Archaeological digs in Gao-Saney show that the site was occupied by roughly 700CE, and was a center of manufacturing, iron smelting, and trade with areas as far away as Mesopotamia. It was the southern terminus of a trade route powered by chariots that linked it to the Mediterranean. At some point no later than the early 10th century the Songhay king based in Kukiya moved to the site of Gao Ancien, just north of the modern city on the bank of the Niger river and a few kilometers from Gao Saney further inland. The kings of this period were of a lineage known as Qanda.
The earliest written mention of Gao is by al-Khwārizmī, who wrote in the first half of the 9th century, when Gao was already an important regional power. Al-Yaqubi wrote in his Tarikh in around 872:
There is the kingdom of the Kawkaw, which is the greatest of the realms of the Sūdān, the most important and most powerful. All the kingdoms obey its king. Al-Kawkaw is the name of the town. Besides this there are a number of kingdoms of which the rulers pay allegiance to him and acknowledge his sovereignty, although they are kings in their own lands.
Ibn al-Faqih (writing c. 903) mentions a caravan route from Egypt to ancient Ghana via Kawkaw, but Ibn Hawqal (writing c. 988) states that the old route from Egypt to the Sudan was abandoned in the reign of the Egyptian ruler Ibn Tulun (ruled 868–884) as some of the caravans were attacked by bandits while others were overwhelmed by the wind-blown sand. The more direct route was replaced by one that went to Sijilmasa before heading south across the Sahara. In the 10th century, Gao was already Muslim and was described as consisting of two separate towns. Al-Muhallabi, who died in 990, wrote in a lost work quoted in the biographical dictionary compiled by Yaqut:
Their king pretends before his subject to be a Muslim and most of them pretend to be Muslims too. He has a town on the Nile [Niger], on the eastern bank, which is called Sarnāh, where there are markets and trading houses and to which there is continuous traffic from all parts. He has another town to the west of the Nile [Niger] where he and his men and those who have his confidence live. There is a mosque there where he prays but the communal prayer ground is between the two towns.
The archaeological evidence suggests that there were two settlements on the eastern bank of the Niger: Gao Ancien situated within the modern town, to the east of the Tomb of Askia, and the archaeological site of Gao-Saney (Sané in French) situated around 4 km to the east. The bed of the Wadi Gangaber passes to the south of the Gao-Saney occupation mound (tell) but to the north of Gao Ancien. The imported pottery and glass recovered from Gao-Saney suggest that the site was occupied between the 8th and 11th centuries. Gao-Saney corresponds to Sarnāh of al-Muhallabi. Al-Bakri writing in 1068 also records the existence of two towns, Both al-Muhallabi (see quote above) and al-Bakri situate Gao on the west (or right bank) of the Niger. The 17th century Tarikh al-fattash also states that in the 10th century Gao was situated on the Gourma side (i.e. the west bank) of the river. A large sand dune, La Dune Rose, lies on the west bank opposite Gao, but at Koima, on the edge of the dune at a site 4 km north of Gao, surface deposits indicate a pre 9th century settlement. This could be the west bank Gao mentioned by 10th and 11th-century authors. The site has not been excavated.
al-Idrisi, writing in around 1154, does not mention a second town, and archaeological excavations in Gao-Saney indicate the site may have beena abandoned by this time.
Al-Sadi in his Tarikh al-Sudan gives lists 32 rulers of the Zuwa dynasty and states that in 1009–1010 A.D. the 15th ruler, Zuwa Kusoy, was the first to convert to Islam. He does not actually specify where they lived except for the legendary founder of the dynasty, Zuwa Alayman who he claims came from the Yemen to Kukiya.
John Hunwick, among others, speculates that the first version of Islam was Ibadism. In c.1079-1082, a Sanhaja Berber group, inspired by the Sunni Almoravids, took control of the area, leaving behind royal epitaphs at a cemetery in Gao-Saney. Whether or not these kings feature on the kings lists of the Za dynasty recorded in the Tarikhs is debated. Dierk Lange posits that these upstarts, whether they were longstanding residents or newcomers, represent the founding of the Sonni dynasty. | https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Gao |
Nureddin al-Atassi | After completing his education, Atassi served his mandatory duty, during which he observed the tripartite invasion of Egypt in 1956. He stood with the Syrian army when they relocated to Jordan in a show of unity.
Upon fulfilling his obligatory service, Atassi offered his assistance to the Algerian revolution, rendering medical aid to revolutionaries in close proximity to the Tunisian-Algerian border. After returning to Syria, Atassi focused on general surgery at Damascus Hospital. Afterwards, he took jobs at other hospitals in Damascus. Following that, he went back to his native city of Homs, where he persisted in his medical profession, working at the National Hospital and managing his own private clinic.
Following the coup on March 8, 1963, Atassi was designated as the Minister of the Interior in Salah al-Din al-Bitar's third government. This government served from August 4, 1963, until November 12, 1963. Afterwards, he assumed the position of Minister of the Interior in the first government of Amin al-Hafiz, which was established on November 12, 1963, and held the position until May 14, 1964. In October 1964, he took on the position of Deputy Prime Minister in the second administration of Amin Al-Hafiz. This government began on October 3, 1964, and ended on May 23, 1965. In addition, he was designated as a member of the National Revolutionary Council on December 23, 1965. Shortly after the coup on February 23, 1966, Atassi assumed the role of head of state and Secretary-General of the Baath Party.
Throughout his time in office, Atassi implemented substantial projects and participated in important domestic and international activities. Significantly, he entered into a partnership with the Soviet Union to build the Euphrates Dam and issued other decrees targeting economic and social change. These initiatives encompassed the formation of the Land Bank, the implementation of the Economic Penal Code, and the foundation of the People's Army, which was affiliated with the Ministry of Defense. In November 1967, Atassi took the lead in establishing the Central Financial Supervision Organization and the People's Legislative Council. This happened after the revolution, which resulted in the suspension of parliament. In addition, he founded the Supreme State Security Court and streamlined travel for people to Arab Economic Unity countries by allowing them to use ID cards instead of visas.
Atassi became the first Syrian president to address the United Nations General Assembly after the June 1967 War. Atassi additionally assembled numerous conferences and presented speeches, such as the urgent assembly of the Central Council of the Arab Workers Union to express solidarity with the fight against the Jewish state (May 1967), the inaugural gathering of the Committee for Defending the Homeland and Protecting the Revolution in Hasakah (November 1967), and the Arab Lawyers Conference in Damascus (September 1967).
Atassi adopted a strong stance towards specific Arab nations, aligning with Salah Jadid in this regard. Significantly, he supported the dismantling of oil pipelines owned by the Iraq Petroleum Company that traverse Syrian land. In addition, Atassi suspended the transportation of oil across Syrian territory until the corporation complied with Syrian requests.
Furthermore, Atassi provided support to a range of movements and causes, including giving his full backing to the Eritrean campaign for independence. Upon Eritrea's declaration of war on Ethiopia and its pursuit of independence, Atassi promptly recognized and endorsed their cause. He rendered support by sending insurgent groups, providing instruction, monetary assistance, and weaponry. The help provided by Atassi played a crucial role in Eritrea's final accomplishment of independence, resulting in lasting gratitude from the Eritrean population.
Additionally, Atassi's government demonstrated unity with Lebanon in its demands for the removal of King Hussein bin Talal and offered assistance to Palestinian combatants. Atassi intervened to advocate for the Palestinian cause during the "Black September" period, issuing a public threat to invade Jordan in response to ongoing violence against Palestinians. He commanded the Syrian army to progress, ensuring the safety of the Jordanian border and seizing Irbid in order to protect Palestinian interests.
On November 16, 1970, Defense Minister Hafez al-Assad orchestrated a coup d'état known as the Corrective Movement, resulting in the ousting of Nureddin al-Atassi from power. | https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Nureddin_al-Atassi |
Saddam Hussein | Saddam developed a reputation for liking expensive goods, such as his diamond-coated Rolex wristwatch, and sent copies of them to his friends around the world. To his ally Kenneth Kaunda Saddam once sent a Boeing 747 full of presents—rugs, televisions, ornaments. Saddam enjoyed a close relationship with Russian intelligence agent Yevgeny Primakov that dated back to the 1960s; Primakov may have helped Saddam to stay in power in 1991.
Saddam visited only two Western countries. The first visit took place in December 1974, when the Caudillo of Spain, Francisco Franco, invited him to Madrid and he visited Granada, Córdoba and Toledo. In September 1975 he met with Prime Minister Jacques Chirac in Paris, France.
Several Iraqi leaders, Lebanese arms merchant Sarkis Soghanalian and others have claimed that Saddam financed Chirac's party. In 1991 Saddam threatened to expose those who had taken largesse from him: "From Mr. Chirac to Mr. Chevènement, politicians and economic leaders were in open competition to spend time with us and flatter us. We have now grasped the reality of the situation. If the trickery continues, we will be forced to unmask them, all of them, before the French public." France armed Saddam and it was Iraq's largest trade partner throughout Saddam's rule. Seized documents show how French officials and businessmen close to Chirac, including Charles Pasqua, his former interior minister, personally benefitted from the deals with Saddam.
Because Saddam Hussein rarely left Iraq, Tariq Aziz, one of Saddam's aides, traveled abroad extensively and represented Iraq at many diplomatic meetings. In foreign affairs, Saddam sought to have Iraq play a leading role in the Middle East. Iraq signed an aid pact with the Soviet Union in 1972, and arms were sent along with several thousand advisers. The 1978 crackdown on Iraqi Communists and a shift of trade toward the West strained Iraqi relations with the Soviet Union; Iraq then took on a more Western orientation until the Gulf War in 1991.
After the oil crisis of 1973, France had changed to a more pro-Arab policy and was accordingly rewarded by Saddam with closer ties. He made a state visit to France in 1975, cementing close ties with some French business and ruling political circles. In 1975 Saddam negotiated an accord with Iran that contained Iraqi concessions on border disputes. In return, Iran agreed to stop supporting opposition Kurds in Iraq. Saddam led Arab opposition to the Camp David Accords between Egypt and Israel (1979).Iraq's relations with the Arab world have been extremely varied. Relations between Iraq and Egypt violently ruptured in 1977, when the two nations broke relations with each other following Iraq's criticism of Egyptian President Anwar Sadat's peace initiatives with Israel. In 1978, Baghdad hosted an Arab League summit that condemned and ostracized Egypt for accepting the Camp David Accords. Egypt's strong material and diplomatic support for Iraq in the war with Iran led to warmer relations and numerous contacts between senior officials, despite the continued absence of ambassadorial-level representation. Since 1983, Iraq has repeatedly called for restoration of Egypt's "natural role" among Arab countries. Saddam initiated Iraq's nuclear enrichment project in the 1980s, with French assistance. The first Iraqi nuclear reactor was named by the French "Osirak". Osirak was destroyed on 7 June 1981 by an Israeli air strike (Operation Opera). Saddam Hussein was widely known for his commitment to the Palestinian cause and his anti-Israel stance. In May 2000, Saddam and his representatives had secret meetings with the Israeli government. He offered that Iraq will end its anti–Israel foreign policy, if Israel will resolve Palestinian refugees issue in Lebanon. In 2001, Saddam said on Iraqi television:
Palestine is Arab and must be liberated from the river to the sea and all the Zionists who emigrated to the land of Palestine must leave.
Nearly from its founding as a modern state in 1920, Iraq has had to deal with Kurdish separatists in the northern part of the country. Saddam did negotiate an agreement in 1970 with separatist Kurdish leaders, giving them autonomy, but the agreement broke down. The result was brutal fighting between the government and Kurdish groups and Iraqi bombing of Kurdish villages in Iran, which caused Iraqi relations with Iran to deteriorate. After Saddam negotiated the 1975 treaty with Iran, the Shah withdrew support for the Kurds, who were defeated. | https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Saddam_Hussein |
History of Persian domes | The Melik Gazi tomb in Turkey was built in 1200.
The Sultanate of Rum decorated their domes largely with patterns of interlocking bricks in the Persian tradition. Patterns included rotated bricks or whirling rosettes, which could include glazed bricks of black or turquoise color. The Ulu Mosque of Malatya (1247) used turquoise glazed bricks spaced between plain bricks to create a spiral pattern on the spherical surface, following 41 rhumb lines or loxodromes, that changes to a different alternating pattern near the top. The spherical dome of Karatay Madrasa (1251-1253) was decorated with a mosaic of glazed tiles in an intricate geometric pattern that may have been applied a section at a time in polyhedral panels. Other patterns, such as concentric 10-pointed stars, were created by alternating horizontally-oriented plain bricks with glazed bricks rotated 90 degrees. The dome of Taş (Alaaddin) Mosque (1258) in Çay, Afyon, used diamonds and a 16-pointed concentric star pattern. The domes of Ince Minaret Madrasa (1264-1265) and Eşrefoğlu Mosque (1297-1301) used small spiral segments to create patterned motifs. The patterned dome at Sâhip 'Ata Külliyesi was built between 1279 and 1280. Döner Kümbet was a cylindrical mausoleum with two shells: a dome and a conical roof.
The Tomb of Turabek Khanum (1369) used a discontinuous double-shell dome.
After the Timurid period, dome architecture was developed in local styles of the Shaybanids of Central Asia and the Mughals of India. The Shaybanid Tilya Kori Madrasa was built between 1646 and 1660. The Kalan Mosque (c. 1514) and Mir-i Arab Madrassah (1535-1536) are other Shaybanid examples. The Uzbek architecture of the region around Transoxiana maintained the Timurid style of dome-building. Where dome chambers were surrounded by axial iwans and corner rooms on an octagonal plan, as at the Khwaja Abu Nasr Parsa shrine (ca. 1598), they provided the model for Indian mausoleums such as Humayun's Tomb in Delhi or the Taj Mahal. Some of the earliest surviving domed markets, called tīmcās, can be found in Shaybanid-era Bukhara. Safavid domes were also influential on those of other Islamic styles, such as the Mughal architecture of India. The influence of Persian architecture in India, particularly in mosques, increased during the Delhi Sultanate and reached a peak during the Mughal Empire. Persian dome chambers and use of double-shelled domes had a significant influence. | https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/History_of_Persian_domes |
Uruk period | The Uruk period saw some settlements achieve a new importance and population density, as well as the development of monumental civic architecture. They reached a level where they can properly be called cities. This was accompanied by a number of social changes resulting in what can fairly be called an 'urban' society as distinct from the 'rural' society which provided food for the growing portion of the population that did not feed itself, although the relationship between the two groups and the views of the people of the time about this distinction remain difficult to discern. This phenomenon was characterised by Gordon Childe at the beginning of the 1950s as an 'urban revolution', linked to the Neolithic Revolution and inseparable from the appearance of the first states. This model, which is based on material evidence, has been heavily debated ever since. The causes of the appearance of cities have been discussed a great deal. Some scholars explain the development of the first cities by their role as ceremonial religious centres, others by their role as hubs for long-distance trade, but the most widespread theory is that developed largely by Robert McCormick Adams which considers the appearance of cities to be a result of the appearance of the state and its institutions, which attracted wealth and people to central settlements, and encouraged residents to become increasingly specialised. This theory thus leads the problem of the origin of cities back to the problem of origin of the state and of inequality.
In the Late Uruk period, the urban site of Uruk far exceeded all others. Its surface area, the scale of its monuments and the importance of the administrative tools unearthed there indicate that it was a key centre of power. It is often therefore referred to as the 'first city', but it was the outcome of a process that began many centuries earlier and is largely attested outside Lower Mesopotamia (aside from the monumental aspect of Eridu). The emergence of important proto-urban centres began at the beginning of the 4th millennium BC in southwest Iran (Chogha Mish, Susa), and especially in the Jazirah (Tell Brak, Hamoukar, Tell al-Hawa, Grai Resh). Excavations in the latter region tend to contradict the idea that urbanisation began in Mesopotamia and then spread to neighbouring regions; the appearance of an urban centre at Tell Brak appears to have resulted from a local process with the progressive aggregation of village communities that had previously lived separately, and without the influence of any strong central power (unlike what seems to have been the case at Uruk). Early urbanisation should therefore be thought of as a phenomenon which took place simultaneously in several regions of the Near East in the 4th millennium BC, though further research and excavation is still required in order to make this process clearer to us.
Examples of urbanism in this period are still rare, and in Lower Mesopotamia, the only residential area which has been excavated is at Abu Salabikh, a settlement of limited size. It is necessary to turn to Syria and the neighbouring sites of Habuba Kabira and Jebel Aruda for an example of urbanism that is relatively well-known. Habuba Kabira consisted of 22 hectares, surrounded by a wall and organised around some important buildings, major streets and narrow alleys, and a group of residences of similar shape organised around a courtyard. It was clearly a planned city created ex nihilo and not an agglomeration that developed passively from village to city. The planners of this period were thus capable of creating a complete urban plan and thus had an idea of what a city was, including its internal organisation and principal monuments. Urbanisation is not found everywhere in the sphere of influence of the Uruk culture; at its extreme northern edge, the site of Arslantepe had a palace of notable size but it was not surrounded by any kind of urban area.
The study of houses at the sites of Habuba Kabira and Jebel Aruda has revealed the social evolution which accompanied the appearance of urban society. The former site, which is the better known, has houses of different sizes, which cover an average area of 400 m2, while the largest have a footprint of more than 1000 m2. The 'temples' of the monumental group of Tell Qanas may have been residences for the leaders of the city. These are thus very hierarchical habitats, indicating the social differentiation that existed in the urban centres of the Late Uruk period (much more than in the preceding period). Another trait of the nascent urban society is revealed by the organisation of domestic space. The houses seem to fold in on themselves, with a new floor plan developed from the tripartite plan current in the Ubayd period, but augmented by a reception area and by a central space (perhaps open to the sky), around which the other rooms were arranged. These houses thus had a private space separated from a public space where guests could be received. In an urban society with a community so much larger than village societies, the relations with people outside the household became more distant, leading to this separation of the house. Thus the old rural house was adapted to the realities of urban society. This model of a house with a central space remained very widespread in the cities of Mesopotamia in the following periods, although it must be kept in mind that the floor plans of residences were very diverse and depended on the development of urbanism in different sites. | https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Uruk_period |
History of Libya under Muammar Gaddafi | On 21 July 1977, there were first gun battles between troops on the border, followed by land and air strikes. Relations between the Libyan and Egyptian governments had been deteriorating ever since the end of the Yom Kippur War from October 1973, due to Libyan opposition to President Anwar Sadat's peace policy as well as the breakdown of unification talks between the two governments. There is some proof that the Egyptian government was considering a war against Libya as early as 1974. On 28 February 1974, during Henry Kissinger's visit to Egypt, President Sadat told him about such intentions and requested that pressure be put on the Israeli government not to launch an attack on Egypt in the event of its forces being occupied in war with Libya. In addition, the Egyptian government had broken its military ties with Moscow, while the Libyan government kept that cooperation going. The Egyptian government also gave assistance to former RCC members Major Abd al Munim al Huni and Omar Muhayshi, who unsuccessfully tried to overthrow Gaddafi in 1975, and allowed them to reside in Egypt. During 1976 relations were ebbing, as the Egyptian government claimed to have discovered a Libyan plot to overthrow the government in Cairo. On 26 January 1976, Egyptian Vice President Hosni Mubarak indicated in a talk with the US Ambassador Hermann Eilts that the Egyptian government intended to exploit internal problems in Libya to promote actions against Libya, but did not elaborate. On 22 July 1976, the Libyan government made a public threat to break diplomatic relations with Cairo if Egyptian subversive actions continued. On 8 August 1976, an explosion occurred in the bathroom of a government office in Tahrir Square in Cairo, injuring 14, and the Egyptian government and media claimed this was done by Libyan agents. The Egyptian government also claimed to have arrested two Egyptian citizens trained by Libyan intelligence to perform sabotage within Egypt. On 23 August, an Egyptian passenger plane was hijacked by persons who reportedly worked with Libyan intelligence. They were captured by Egyptian authorities in an operation that ended without any casualties. In retaliation for accusations by the Egyptian government of Libyan complicity in the hijacking, the Libyan government ordered the closure of the Egyptian Consulate in Benghazi. On 24 July, the combatants agreed to a ceasefire under the mediation of the President of Algeria Houari Boumediène and the Palestine Liberation Organization Chairman Yasser Arafat. | https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/History_of_Libya_under_Muammar_Gaddafi |
Aramaic | It is generally believed by Christian scholars that in the first century, Jews in Judea primarily spoke Aramaic with a decreasing number using Hebrew as their first language, though many learned Hebrew as a liturgical language. Additionally, Koine Greek was the lingua franca of the Near East in trade, among the Hellenized classes (much like French in the 18th, 19th, and 20th centuries in Europe), and in the Roman administration. Latin, the language of the Roman army and higher levels of administration, had almost no impact on the linguistic landscape.
In addition to the formal, literary dialects of Aramaic based on Hasmonean and Babylonian, there were a number of colloquial Aramaic dialects. Seven Western Aramaic varieties were spoken in the vicinity of Judea in Jesus' time. They were probably distinctive yet mutually intelligible. Old Judean was the prominent dialect of Jerusalem and Judaea. The region of Ein Gedi spoke the Southeast Judaean dialect. Samaria had its distinctive Samaritan Aramaic, where the consonants "he", "heth", and "'ayin" all became pronounced as "aleph". Galilean Aramaic, the dialect of Jesus' home region, is only known from a few place names, the influences on Galilean Targumic, some rabbinic literature and a few private letters. It seems to have a number of distinctive features: diphthongs are never simplified into monophthongs. East of the Jordan, the various dialects of East Jordanian were spoken. In the region of Damascus and the Anti-Lebanon Mountains, Damascene Aramaic was spoken (deduced mostly from Modern Western Aramaic). Finally, as far north as Aleppo, the western dialect of Orontes Aramaic was spoken.
The three languages, especially Hebrew and Aramaic, influenced one another through loanwords and semantic loans. Hebrew words entered Jewish Aramaic. Most were mostly technical religious words, but a few were everyday words like עץ ʿēṣ "wood". Conversely, Aramaic words, such as māmmôn "wealth", were borrowed into Hebrew, and Hebrew words acquired additional senses from Aramaic. For instance, Hebrew ראוי rā'ûi "seen" borrowed the sense "worthy, seemly" from the Aramaic ḥzî meaning "seen" and "worthy".
The Greek of the New Testament preserves some semiticisms, including transliterations of Semitic words. Some are Aramaic, like talitha (ταλιθα), which represents the noun טליתא ṭalīṯā, and others may be either Hebrew or Aramaic like רבוני Rabbounei (Ραββουνει), which means "my master/great one/teacher" in both languages. Other examples:
"Talitha kumi" (טליתא קומי)
"Ephphatha" (אתפתח)
"Eloi, Eloi, lama sabachthani?" (?אלי, אלי, למה שבקתני)
The 2004 film The Passion of the Christ used Aramaic for much of its dialogue, specially reconstructed by a scholar, William Fulco, S.J. Where the appropriate words (in first-century Aramaic) were no longer known, he used the Aramaic of Daniel and fourth-century Syriac and Hebrew as the basis for his work. | https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Aramaic |
Petroleum industry in Syria | The Syrian Civil War broke out in 2011 and is ongoing. In the same year, Syria's major trading partners imposed international sanctions on Syrian oil and financial system, devastating the Syrian oil industry, adding to the devastation of the civil war. Local exporters of oil in Syria include the Altoun Group in Maaraba, Rif Dimashq, Syria, formed in 1968, which it is owned by Salim Altoun, has been on an EU sanctions list since May 2012.
During the civil war, the self-declared state of Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL/ISIS) controlled most oil fields in eastern Syria starting from 2013, in which they smuggled the oil located in Deir ez-Zor province outside Syria by producing 34,000–40,000 barrels per day (bpd). Quality of Petroleum determined price of each barrel sold at the wellhead 25 to 45 dollars.
Following the American control of eastern Syria, American President Donald Trump claimed on 28 October 2019 that $45 million a month could be earned from the Syrian oil. In November 2019 Trump said to the press that “We’re keeping the oil, we have the oil, the oil is secure, we left troops behind only for the oil.” In November 2019, Syrian President Bashar al-Assad stated that ISIS terrorists have two partners in stealing the Syrian oil since 2014, Recep Tayyip Erdoğan and the Americans. A CNN News report has showed that a company known as Delta Crescent Energy Company, which was formed by James Cain, a former US ambassador to Denmark, James Reese, a retired Delta Force Army officer, and John Dorrier, a veteran oil executive, was formed for the purpose of securing an oil contract in Syria and had worked with the U.S. State Department. In April 2020, the company received a license from the Treasury Department exempting it from the sanctions the US has placed on Syria in order to isolate the Syrian government. On 28 May 2021, the Biden administration decided not to renew Delta Crescent’s license, and gave them 30 days to cease operations in Syria; the company no longer operates there. China has alleged the U.S. steals Syrian oil at the UN.
However, Syria produced 406,000 barrels per day (bpd) in 2008, but the oil production dropped to 353,000 bpd in 2011 and had plunged to just 24,000 bpd by 2018, a reduction of more than 90%, according to the BP Statistical Review of World Energy.
In January 2020, militants sent divers to plant explosives on the underwater pipelines at an oil facility of Syria. On January 27, the bombs exploded off the Mediterranean coast, leaving the Baniyas oil refinery damaged. The facility at the time was recorded to have capacity to process over 13,000 barrels of crude oil per day. | https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Petroleum_industry_in_Syria |
Athena | She was the daughter of Zeus, produced without a mother, and emerged full-grown from his forehead. There was an alternate story that Zeus swallowed Metis, the goddess of counsel, while she was pregnant with Athena and when she was fully grown she emerged from Zeus' forehead. Being the favorite child of Zeus, she had great power.
In the classical Olympian pantheon, Athena was regarded as the favorite child of Zeus, born fully armed from his forehead. The story of her birth comes in several versions. The earliest mention is in Book V of the Iliad, when Ares accuses Zeus of being biased in favor of Athena because "autos egeinao" (literally "you fathered her", but probably intended as "you gave birth to her").
She was essentially urban and civilized, the antithesis in many respects of Artemis, goddess of the outdoors. Athena was probably a pre-Hellenic goddess and was later taken over by the Greeks.
In the version recounted by Hesiod in his Theogony, Zeus married the goddess Metis, who is described as the "wisest among gods and mortal men", and engaged in sexual intercourse with her. After learning that Metis was pregnant, however, he became afraid that the unborn offspring would try to overthrow him, because Gaia and Ouranos had prophesied that Metis would bear children wiser than their father. In order to prevent this, Zeus tricked Metis into letting him swallow her, but it was too late because Metis had already conceived. A later account of the story from the Bibliotheca of Pseudo-Apollodorus, written in the second century AD, makes Metis Zeus's unwilling sexual partner, rather than his wife. According to this version of the story, Metis transformed into many different shapes in effort to escape Zeus, but Zeus successfully raped her and swallowed her.
After swallowing Metis, Zeus took six more wives in succession until he married his seventh and present wife, Hera. Then Zeus experienced an enormous headache. He was in such pain that he ordered someone (either Prometheus, Hephaestus, Hermes, Ares, or Palaemon, depending on the sources examined) to cleave his head open with the labrys, the double-headed Minoan axe. Athena leaped from Zeus's head, fully grown and armed. The "First Homeric Hymn to Athena" states in lines 9–16 that the gods were awestruck by Athena's appearance and even Helios, the god of the sun, stopped his chariot in the sky. Pindar, in his "Seventh Olympian Ode", states that she "cried aloud with a mighty shout" and that "the Sky and mother Earth shuddered before her."
Hesiod states that Hera was so annoyed at Zeus for having given birth to a child on his own that she conceived and bore Hephaestus by herself, but in Imagines 2. 27 (trans. Fairbanks), the third-century AD Greek rhetorician Philostratus the Elder writes that Hera "rejoices" at Athena's birth "as though Athena were her daughter also." The second-century AD Christian apologist Justin Martyr takes issue with those pagans who erect at springs images of Kore, whom he interprets as Athena: "They said that Athena was the daughter of Zeus not from intercourse, but when the god had in mind the making of a world through a word (logos) his first thought was Athena." According to a version of the story in a scholium on the Iliad (found nowhere else), when Zeus swallowed Metis, she was pregnant with Athena by the Cyclops Brontes. The Etymologicum Magnum instead deems Athena the daughter of the Daktyl Itonos. Fragments attributed by the Christian Eusebius of Caesarea to the semi-legendary Phoenician historian Sanchuniathon, which Eusebius thought had been written before the Trojan war, make Athena instead the daughter of Cronus, a king of Byblos who visited "the inhabitable world" and bequeathed Attica to Athena. | https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Athena |
Tigray People's Liberation Front | In February 1974, the Marxists within TUSA welcomed the Ethiopian Revolution but opposed the Derg (a military junta that ruled Ethiopia from 1974 to 1991), as they were convinced that it would neither lead a genuine socialist revolution nor correctly resolve the Ethiopian nationality question. Two days after the Derg took power, on 14 September 1974, seven leaders of this trend established the Association of Progressives of the Tigray Nation (Tigrinya: ማሕበር ገስገስቲ ብሔረ ትግራይ, Maḥbär Gäsgästi Bəḥer Təgray), also known as the Tigrayan National Organization (TNO). The founders were: Alemseged Mengesha (nom de guerre: Haylu), Ammaha Tsehay (Abbay), Aregawi Berhe (Berhu), Embay Mesfin (Seyoum), Fentahun Zere'atsion (Gidey), Mulugeta Hagos (Asfeha), and Zeru Gesese (Agazi). The TNO was to prepare the ground for the future armed movement in Tigray.
It secretly approached both the Eritrean Liberation Front (ELF) and the Eritrean People's Liberation Front (EPLF) for support, but the ELF already had relations with the TLF. In November 1974, the EPLF agreed to train TNO members and allowed EPLF fighters from the Tigrayan community in Eritrea, including Mehari Tekle (Mussie), to join the TPLF. The first group of trainees was sent to the EPLF in January 1975.
On the night of 18 February 1975, eleven men, including Gesese Ayyele (Sehul), Gidey, Asfeha, Seyoum, Agazi, and Berhu, left Enda Selassie for Sehul's home area of Dedebit, where they founded the TPLF (original name Tigrinya: ተጋድሎ ሓርነት ሕዝቢ ትግራይ, Tägadlo Ḥarənnät Ḥəzbi Təgray, "The Popular Struggle for the Freedom of Tigray"). Welde Selassie Nega (Sebhat), Legese Zenawi (Meles), and others soon joined the original group, and, after the arrival of the trainees from Eritrea in June 1975, the TPLF had about 50 fighters. It then elected a formal leadership consisting of Sehul (the chairman), Muse (the military commander), and the seven TNO founders. Berhu was appointed political commissar. Sehul played a crucial role in helping the nascent TPLF establish itself among the local peasantry.
Although a few successful raids bolstered its military credibility, the TPLF grew to only about 120 fighters in early 1976, but a rapidly growing clandestine network of supporters in the cities and a support base among the peasants provided vital supplies and information. On February 18, 1976, a conference of fighters elected a new leadership: Berhu (chairman), Muse (military committee), Abbay (political committee), Agazi (socioeconomic committee), Seyoum (foreign relations), Gidey, and Sebhat. Meles became head of the political cadre school.
The first three years of its existence were marked by a constant struggle for survival, unstable cooperation with Eritrean forces, and power struggles against the other Tigrayan fronts: in 1975, the TPLF liquidated the TLF; in 1976–78, it fought the Ethiopian Democratic Union (EDU) in Shire; and in 1978, the Ethiopian People's Revolutionary Party (EPRP) in East Tigray. The front also suffered heavy losses from Derg offensives in the region.
Although the TPLF, the ELF, and the EPLF cooperated during the 1976 and 1978 Derg offensives in Tigray and Eritrea, no stable alliance emerged. The ELF resented the liquidation of the TLF and considered the relationship between the EPLF and the TPLF a serious threat. Since 1977, there had been conflict between ELF and the TPLF over the issue of Eritrean settlers in western Tigray, who were organized at ELF and rejected the TPLF's land reform.
Relations with the EPLF also did not develop smoothly. Its material support was much less than the TPLF had anticipated. Politically, the EPLF favored the multinational EPRP over the ethno regionalist TPLF with its separatist agenda at the time. | https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Tigray_People%27s_Liberation_Front |
Edward William Lane | Since Lane had trouble publishing his Description of Egypt, at the suggestion of John Murray he expanded a chapter of the original project into a separate book. The result was his Manners and Customs of the Modern Egyptians (1836), published by the Society for the Diffusion of Useful Knowledge. The work was partly modelled on Alexander Russell's The Natural History of Aleppo (1756). Lane visited Egypt again in 1833 in order to collect materials to expand and revise the work, after the Society had accepted the publication. The book became a bestseller (still in print), and Lane earned his reputation in the field of Orientalism.
Lane left detailed accounts of everyday life in Egypt in the 19th century, which would prove useful to later researchers. Arthur John Arberry visited Egypt a century after Lane and said that it was like visiting another planet - none of the things Lane had written about were present.
Lane was conscious that his research was handicapped by the fact that gender segregation prevented him from getting a close-up view of Egyptian women - an aspect of Egyptian life that was of particular interest to his readers. He was forced to rely on information passed on by Egyptian men, as he explains:Many husbands of the middle classes, and some of the higher orders, freely talk of the affairs of the ḥareem with one who professes to agree with them in their general moral sentiments, if they have not to converse through the medium of an interpreter. However, in order to gain further information, he would later send for his sister, Sophia Lane Poole, so that she could gain access to women-only areas such as hareems and bathhouses and report on what she found. The result was The Englishwoman in Egypt: Letters from Cairo, written during a residence there in 1842, 3 & 4, with E.W. Lane Esq., Author of "The Modern Egyptians" By His Sister. (Poole's own name does not appear within the publication.) The Englishwoman in Egypt contains large sections of Lane's own unpublished work, altered so that it appears to be from Poole's perspective (for example "my brother" being substituted for "I"). However, it also relates Poole's own experiences in visiting the hareems that were closed to male visitors. | https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Edward_William_Lane |
Alawites | Yaron Friedman and many researchers of Alawi doctrine write that the founder of the religion, Ibn Nusayr, did not necessarily believe he was representative of a splinter, rebel group of the Shias, but rather believed he held the true doctrine of the Shias, and most of the aspects that are similar to Christianity are considered more a coincidence and not a direct influence from it, as well as other external doctrines that were actually popular among Shia esoteric groups in Basra in the 8th century. According to Friedman and other scholars, the Alawi movement started as many other mystical ghulat sects with an explicit concentration on an allegorical and esoteric meaning of the Quran and other mystical practices, and not as a pure syncretic sect, though later, they embraced some other practices as they believed all religions had the same Batin core.
Journalist Robert F. Worth argues that the idea that the Alawi religion as a branch of Islam is a rewriting of history made necessary by the French colonialists' abandonment of the Alawi and departure from Syria. Worth describes the "first ... authentic source for outsiders about the religion" (written by Soleyman of Adana – a 19th-century Alawi convert to Christianity who broke his oath of secrecy on the religion) explaining that the Alawi (according to Soleyman) deified Ali, venerated Christ, Muhammad, Plato, Socrates, and Aristotle, and held themselves apart from Muslims and Christians, whom they considered heretics. According to Tom Heneghan:"Alawite religion is often called “an offshoot of Shi’ism,” Islam’s largest minority sect, but that is something like referring to Christianity as “an offshoot of Judaism.” Alawites broke away from Shi’ism over 1,000 years ago."
According to a disputed letter, in 1936, six Alawi notables petitioned the French colonialists not to merge their Alawi enclave with the rest of Syria, insisting that "the spirit of hatred and fanaticism embedded in the hearts of the Arab Muslims against everything that is non-Muslim has been perpetually nurtured by the Islamic religion." However, according to associate professor Stefan Winter, this letter is a forgery. According to Worth, later fatwas declaring Alawi to be part of the Shia community were by Shia clerics "eager for Syrian patronage" from Syria's Alawi president Hafez al-Assad, who was eager for Islamic legitimacy in the face of the hostility of Syria's Muslim majority.
Yaron Friedman does not suggest that Alawi did not consider themselves Muslims, but does state that:
The modern period has witnessed tremendous changes in the definition of the ʿAlawīs and the attitude towards them in the Muslim world. ... In order to end their long isolation, the name of the sect was changed in the 1920s from Nusạyriyya to ʿAlawiyya'. By taking this step, leaders of the sect expressed not only their link to Shīʿism, but to Islam in general.
According to Peter Theo Curtis, the Alawi religion underwent a process of "Sunnification" during the years under Hafez al-Assad's rule, so that Alawites became not Shia, but effectively Sunni. Public manifestation or "even mentioning of any Alawite religious activities" was banned, as were any Alawite religious organizations or "any formation of a unified religious council" or a higher Alawite religious authority. "Sunni-style" mosques were built in every Alawite village, and Alawis were encouraged to perform Hajj. It's also worth noting that the grand mosque in Qerdaha , the hometown of the Assad family, being dedicated to Abu Bakr Al-Siddiq who is venerated by Sunnis but not Shi'ites. | https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Alawites |
Bur-Suen | The titles “shepherd who makes Nippur content,” "mighty farmer of Ur," “who restores the designs for Eridu” and “en priest for the mes, for Uruk” were used by Būr-Sîn in his standard brick inscriptions in Nippur and Isin, although it seems unlikely that his rule stretched to Ur or Eridu at this time as the only inscriptions with an archaeological provenance come from the two northerly cities. A solitary tablet from Ur is dated to his first year, but this is thought to correspond to Abē-sarē’s year 11, for which several tablets attest to his reign over Ur.
He was contemporary with the tail end of the reign of Abī-sarē, ca, 1841 to 1830 BC (short) and that of Sūmú-El, c. 1830 to 1801 BC (short), the kings of Larsa. This latter king’s year-names record victories over Akusum, Kazallu, Uruk (which had seceded from Isin), Lugal-Sîn, Ka-ida, Sabum, Kiš, and village of Nanna-isa, relentlessly edging north and feverish activity digging canals or filling them in, possibly to counter the measures taken by Būr-Sîn to contain him. Only nine of Būr-Sîn's own year-names are known and the sequence is uncertain. He seized control of Kisurra for a time as two year-names are found among tablets from this city, possibly following the departure of Sumu-abum the king of Babylon who “returned to his city.” The occupation was brief, however, as Sumu-El was to conquer it during his fourth year. Other year-names record Būr-Sîn's construction of fortifications, walls on the bank of the Eurphrates and a canal. A year-name of Sumu-El records “Year after the year Sumu-El has opened the palace (?) of Nippur,” whose place in this king’s sequence is unknown.
A red-brown agate statuette was dedicated to goddess Inanna and an agate plate was dedicated by the lukur priestess and his “traveling companion,” i.e. concubine, Nanāia Ibsa. A certain individual by the name of Enlil-ennam dedicated a dog figurine to the goddess Ninisina for the life of the king. There are around five extant seals and seal impressions of his servants and scribes, three of which were excavated in Ur suggesting a fleeting late reoccupancy of this city at the end of his reign and the beginning of his successor's as coincidentally no texts from Ur bear Sumu-El's years 19 to 22 which correspond with this period. | https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Bur-Suen |
Energy in Tunisia | The International Energy Agency reports for 2014 an electricity production of 19 TWh, compared to 10.5 TWh in the year 2000. The Tunisian Company of Electricity and Gas (STEG), a public company, ensures the three quarters of production. The network operates at 50 Hertz and the voltage at the domestic level is 230 Volts.
Virtually all Tunisian electricity (18 TWh) is produced by thermal power plants burning natural gas, the largest of which is in Sousse. Wind energy is the second largest source of electricity in the country; a capacity of 305 MW has been installed in a few years.
STEG has been subsidizing consumer electricity prices since 2004 (due to 2000s energy crisis and weak national currency). As of 2012, average retail prices were almost twice lower than average production costs, and state energy subsidies totalled to 20% of public budget and 9% of the GDP. Starting from 2014, government had to decrease the amount of subsidies.
The British company TuNur Ltd proposed a major project in solar energy in 2010s, which would consist in building in stages 4,500 MW of thermodynamic solar power plants in southern Tunisia, and export electricity to Malta first, then Italy and finally France. First utility-scale photovoltaic plant (10 MW, in Tozeur) was commissioned in 2019 on German money.
Tunisia aims to generate 30% of its electricity from renewable sources by 2030. The country currently gets only 3% to 6% of its electricity from renewable sources, mostly from wind and hydro. Solar energy capacity is at 35 megawatts (MW).
In addition to wind and hydro, the Tunisian government plans to use biogas to produce renewable energy. Biogas are the mixture of gases produced by the breakdown of organic matter anaerobically. The production of biogas comes from raw materials like cow waste (manure), sewage, and other sources of biological wastes. Like many developing countries, Tunisia had a problem with their disposal of solid wastes. This is in terms of efficiently transporting it, disposing it, or potentially using it. Based on studies completed between 2015 and 2020 in twenty-four provinces, Tunisia has issues with efficient energy use and total energy production. This creates the overlap for biogas to take on some level of energy production in Tunisia's continued green wave of energy production.
In 2016, Tunisia emitted 29 Mega tons of carbon dioxide equivalent (MtCO₂e) in greenhouse gasses. The country aims to reduce its carbon intensity by 13% in 2030, compared to 2010 levels.
The Tunisian government has looked at the economic impact of renewable energies and found that different analyses with different partners across the globe show an increasing job growth with the continued adoption of renewable energy sources. One of these analyses presented relationships down to a unit of power, MWh versus unemployment/employment.
Another study corroborated by Tunisian sources shows the benefits of further community outreach by way of CSSs (Civil society), civil society stakeholders. These organizations would be able to function through schools to teach students about renewable energies resulting in their widespread adoption in the future. The Tunisian government also plans to educate adults about renewable energy by way of a CSS particularly in rural areas where educational standards may be behind their urban counterparts. | https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Energy_in_Tunisia |
Harar | In 1875 Muhammad Rauf Pasha led an Egyptian force from Zeila into the interior of southeast Ethiopia, pretending to be a scientific expedition.
He occupied Harar on 11 October 1875.
Rauf Pasha initially suspended Harari coins from circulation and sent some samples to Cairo for analysis, hoping to replace them with Egyptian currency. However, the Egyptian government was unable to provide enough money to do this and advised him to keep Harari currency in use. However, the value of the Harari mahallak was reassessed from 33 to the Maria Theresa thaler before to 300 to the dollar after. Once the analysis of the coins' silver content was completed, this was further changed to 311 to the thaler.
During the period of Egyptian rule (1875–1884), Arthur Rimbaud lived in the city as the local functionary of several different commercial companies based in Aden; he returned in 1888 to resume trading in coffee, musk, and skins until a fatal disease forced him to return to France. A house said to have been his residence is now a museum.
In 1885, Harar regained its independence under Amir Abdullahi, but this lasted only two years. Abyssinian forces of Shewa would invade the Emirate of Harar in 1886 but suffer a defeat at the hands of the emir's troops during the Battle of Hirna. A few months later on 9 January 1887 during Battle of Chelenqo, the Shewan king Menelik II would lead the conquest of Harar.
Harar was the place where the modern Ethiopian state minted its first coins under Menelik II, bearing the date of 1885 E.C. (1892 CE).
Harar lost some of its commercial importance with the creation of the French-built Addis Ababa–Djibouti Railway, initially intended to run via the city but diverted north of the mountains between Harar and the Awash River to save money. As a result of this, Dire Dawa was founded in 1902 as New Harar. The British planned to revitalise the historic Harar-Berbera trade route by connecting the two cities via rail as a means to bolster trade. However, the initiative was vetoed by parliament on the grounds that it would harm the Entente Cordiale between France and Britain.
All the trade routes linking Harar to the Somali coast passed through the Somali and Oromo territories where the Gadabuursi and Issa subclans of the Dir clan family held the monopoly of trade as is mentioned in the History of Harar and the Hararis:
"In the 19th century the jurisdiction of the Amirs was limited to Harar and its close environs, while the whole trade routes to the coast passed through Oromo and the Somali territories. There were only two practicable routes: one was the Jaldeissa, through Somali Issa and Nole Oromo territories, the other of Darmy through the Gadaboursi. The Somali, who held a monopoly as transporters, took full advantage of the prevailing conditions and the merchants were the victim of all forms of abuse and extortion... Under the supervision of these agents the caravan would be entrusted to abbans (caravan protector), who usually belonged to the Issa or Gadaboursi when destined to the coast and to Jarso when destined for the interior." | https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Harar |
Madinat al-Zahra | The Upper Garden (Jardín Alto in Spanish) stretches out in front of the Salón Rico and occupies an elevated terrace that is 10 meters higher than the surrounding areas on the east, south, and west. The terrace is artificial, though the builders probably used an existing spur of the hills to start. Its walls are reinforced with rectangular buttresses at regular intervals. On its east side was the Lower Garden and on its west side was the congregational mosque. The latter was reached via a covered path along the terrace wall, and to the south is another large unexcavated garden. The eastern wall of the terrace is aligned with the portico of Bab al-Sudda while its north and south borders are aligned with those of the older Lower Garden to the east. Although it may have been initially intended to have a perfectly square layout, which would have measured 133 by 133 meters, the western side of the garden was extended on top of the Lower Garden, giving it a final width of 153.5 meters instead. The final width corresponds to the base of an equilateral triangle whose summit could be placed at the center of the Salón Rico's façade, similar to the proportions found inside the caliph's reception hall. Felix Arnold suggests that these dimensions are therefore a deliberate part of the design.
The garden itself was for purely aesthetic purposes. Along with the Lower Garden, it is among the earliest examples of the traditional four-part Islamic garden, also known as chahar bagh in the Persian tradition. Around its edge ran a walkway 4 meters wide. Two other walkways split the garden into four quadrants of slightly unequal size (the northern ones being larger). This evidence suggests that the original garden was divided into perfectly equal quadrants but that the east-west path was moved south to its current position in order to accommodate the creation of the Central Pavilion. This change would also explain why the east-west path of the garden is not aligned with the east-west path of the Lower Garden to the east or with the location of a possible pavilion on that side of the garden. The gardens were sunken about 50 to 70 centimeters below the level of the walkways so that the low-growing plants did not impede views. The area has been replanted in modern times, which has impeded archaeobotanical studies, but there is evidence that herbs and shrubs were originally planted, including: myrtle, lavender, hackberry, oleander, basil, alexanders, jujube, and heather.
At the middle of the garden's northern side is a large water basin measuring 19 by 19 meters and 2 meters deep. The gardens slope gently from north to south so that this water basin could be used to irrigate them. Water channels ran along the walkways to distribute water. To the south of this basin, near the middle of the gardens, was the large "Central Pavilion" whose construction has been dated to 956 or 957. Very little of its remains have been preserved in comparison to other structures like the Salón Rico and as a result it is still being investigated (as of 2018). It consisted of a rectangular building divided into three naves or parallel halls, aligned roughly north-to-south, with its main entrance facing the Salón Rico. The building stood on a platform one meter higher than the surrounding walkways, and on all four sides was a small water basin which rose to the same height as the platform. The water basins may have been designed and placed so that any observer looking out from inside the pavilion would have seen the reflection of the sky in the water, while an observer from outside would have seen the pavilion reflected in the water. Likewise, the placement of the pavilion in relation to the Salón Rico meant that both buildings would have been reflected in the larger northern water basin. These pools of water would have also reflected light into both buildings through their front archways. They might also have given the impression to observers inside them, when looking out, that the buildings were "floating" on water, since every main entrance was fronted by water. | https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Madinat_al-Zahra |
African studies | The early anthropological foundations for much of the knowledge about Africa in modern academic fields, including African studies, are the European exploration of Africa and the Atlantic slave trade by explorers and missionaries as well as the colonial Scramble for Africa by European imperialists. With the start of decolonization of Africa, the Cold War, international development agendas, and Area Studies, which had increasing policy relevance in this emerging environment, this resulted in the mass development of African Studies organizations (e.g., centers, institutes) throughout continental Africa after 1945. Following African independence, many colonial staff in Europe and Africa became the staff of the emergent African Studies organizations.
Following African independence and the end of World War II, colonial methods of producing knowledge underwent challenges and changes. Due to World War II occurring and Africa not being directly partaking in it, the African world was viewed by many Africans as a distinct option apart from the Eastern world and Western world, and African leaders (e.g., Nnamdi Azikiwe, Kwame Nkrumah, Leopold Senghor) refused to accept the presumptions of European imperialism and advocated for Africans to have a knowledge of themselves due to this being essential to the political and economic wellness of their citizenry. Consequently, the dialectics of African independence made way for European scholars, such as Basil Davidson and Thomas Hodgkin, to begin to contest colonial ideas and standards (e.g., requirements of documentary evidence like what was used for the history of Europe) that resulted in the history of Africa being dismissed. The inherent dynamics of Africa and the value and use of African orature as a form of evidence was underscored by African scholar, Kenneth Dike. In 1964, the General History of Africa was developed by various African scholars (e.g., Jacob Ajayi, Adu Boahen, Ali Mazrui, Djibril Tamsir Niane, Bethwell Allan Ogot, Ki-Zerbo).
After the period of colonialism had ceased, African intellectuals constructed and organized the African higher education system in Africa, and in response to this development, during the 1950s and 1960s, Europeans in the United Kingdom created African studies institutions. The shortcomings of Western disciplinary approaches to the study of Africa resulted in the development of an interdisciplinary configuration of African studies. With some degree of interaction (e.g., collaboration, debate) with their African counterparts, by 1963, the African Studies Association of the United Kingdom (ASAUK) was founded, and by 1964, its first yearly conference was organized and attended.
With the spread of nationalism, once the African higher education system began to undergo Africanization and its effects began to set in, question and criticism of the fundamental ideas of African studies began to occur as well as improvement of scientific theories and research methods, which developed an African studies that studied African affairs and phenomena, and was undertaken and driven by Africans; the African intellectuals that drove this nationalist historiography drew from local epistemic communities while partaking in the international academic community.
With an increasing realization of the lasting impacts of enslavement and colonialism that were still present during the middle of the 1970s, Walter Rodney theorized about and authored, How Europe Underdeveloped Africa. African scholars added to this theorization in highlighting the patterns of domination and inequality between Europeans and Africans. Deconstructionist methods contributed to the increasing realization that European imperialistic ideas and conceptualizations of evidence, data, and truth interfered with the ability of researchers to engage with the ideas and conceptualizations that were held by and lived out by Africans in their daily lives.
While research focus on Africa decreased in the United Kingdom during the 1980s, this was counterbalanced by an increasing research focus on Africa in the United States. After the Civil Rights movement, there was increased collaboration between African and African American scholars. African scholars played a valuable role, via their research and direct cultural connections to/in Africa, in the development of Africana studies. In addition to the Royal African Society collaborating with ASAUK to keep it viable, various African scholars (e.g., Reginald Cline-Cole, Raufu Mustapha, Ola Uduku, Tunde Zack-Williams) in the United Kingdom steered development of African studies in the newer direction of accountability of African leaders and in including the African diaspora in the scope of its research focus.
As African countries experienced economic turmoil in the middle of the 1980s, the African higher education system and African studies also experienced turmoil (e.g., book famine, brain drain, collapse of the culture of research, collapse of local/epistemic communities and professional associations, decline in the ability of scholars to travel locally, infrastructure decay). The nationalist historiography that had spread earlier began to contract, even as neoliberal analyses and criticisms expanded, which sought to frame the condition of Africa in terms of pathology and power as it relates to principles of good governance and market efficiency. Under the guise of African development, African systems of higher education (e.g., university missions, visions, curriculums, conceptual tools and theoretical foundations of social research) were subsequently revised to conform to the vision and principles of neoliberalism.
Development studies became increasingly interconnected with African studies, as it had undergone growth as a discipline and was enriched by other fields (e.g., humanities, social sciences, natural sciences). A considerable number of African studies organizations, which have been financed or financially influenced by foreign government aid provided from North America, Europe, and Asia, have undergone volatility as the pattern of foreign government aid has become volatile; consequently, trends in Africanist scholarship has tended to reflect general optimism or pessimism (e.g., Afro-pessimism in African studies during the 1990s). With the factor of non-governmental organizations in Africa, and their use of scholarship from African studies, this has resulted in funders of non-governmental organizations also influencing the focus and development of the scholarship of renowned Africanists; the scholarship then becomes used in future development policies of funders and renowned Africanists may even serve as policy consultants to the European countries providing the funding (e.g., neopatrimonialist analysis of African policy economy and society, the international institutions informed by these analyzes, and the conditional policies employed to induce neo-liberal market reforms in Africa).
Given increasing indications that a post-Cold War world did not lead to increasing peace, Africa became a greater focal point of study for North America and Europe by the early 2000s. Reasons for increased study range from the restoration of civil and democratic institutions and government in Africa, to the third wave of African literature in Africa and the next up-and-coming scholars inspired by the literature, to Africa being projected to have the largest youth demographic in the world by 2050, to increasing investment by Asian countries, including China, to the United Kingdom seeking to reposition itself after Brexit. The increasing interest in the study of Africa has contributed to the growth of African Studies Associations, including ASAUK and the Africa-Europe Group for Interdisciplinary Studies (AEGIS), as well as increased research focus on Africa by African studies organizations in Africa.
The marketization of African higher education has resulted in the funding of grants rather than posts, as well as a transition toward contract-based (e.g., fixed term, part-time) hiring of academic professionals. Due to these market forces, long-term academic relationships (e.g., networks, collaborations) became increasingly temporary, which subsequently stifled the ability for innovative studies to be undertaken. Additionally, research focuses became increasingly narrowed to what would be the most likely to attract grant money. With the transition of academic publications from print to Internet media, colonial and racial hierarchies were generally reinforced as online Anglophone media publications mediated international/non-African academic discourses and print-based media publications mediated African academic discourses. Further, African scholars continue to experience racism, bias, and discrimination as well as continue to be underrepresented in the higher education system of the United Kingdom. Furthermore, the exclusivity and predominance of European-American epistemologies and methodologies contribute to perceptions of European scholars being experts and bearers of universal truth and African scholars and other scholars of color as bearing only a limited expertise in their cultural heritage and identity. The imperialistic power dynamics between non-Africans and Africans in shaping the narrative in African studies about Africa remains an ongoing problem.
While the Council for the Development of Social Science Research in Africa (CODESRIA) contributes considerable funding to African studies research to various countries (e.g., Ghana, Kenya, Nigeria, Senegal, South Africa) in Africa, much of the funding sources for research originate from sources abroad. Non-African Africanists tend to operate in the role as perceived experts of the field, who shape the image and view of Africa to countries abroad, whereas African researchers tend to operate in the role of consultants/assistants. Consequently, the narrative in African studies tends to reflect non-African interests and views rather than African interests and views.
Since African independence, the long-term effects and persisting elements of enslavement and colonialism (e.g., racist fantasies and projections, silencing of the past) continue to affect Africans on the continent and in the diaspora. After roughly 40 years, Africanization of the curriculums (e.g., theory, method, evidence) in Africa remains ongoing. | https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/African_studies |
Ya'rubids | When Sultan bin Saif II died in 1718 a struggle began between rival contenders for the Imamate.
One faction supported the young boy Saif bin Sultan II while another supported Muhanna bin Sultan, whom they felt was better qualified to become Imam.
In 1719 Muhanna bin Sultan was brought into Rustaq Fort by stealth and proclaimed Imam.
He was unpopular, and the next year was deposed and killed by his cousin Ya'arub bin Bal'arab.
Ya'arub bin Bal'arab set up Saif bin Sultan II as the Imam and proclaimed himself Custodian.
In May 1722 Ya'Arab took the next step and proclaimed himself Imam.
This caused an uprising led by Bel'arab bin Nasir, a relative by marriage of the deposed Imam.
In 1723 Ya'arub bin Bal'arab was deposed and Bal'arab bin Nasir became the Custodian.
A civil war commenced in which Muhammad bin Nasir seized power and was elected Imam in October 1724.
His rival, Khalf bin Mubarak, stirred up trouble among the northern tribes. In an engagement at Sohar in 1728 both Khalf bin Mubarak and Muhammad bin Nasir were killed.
The garrison of Sohar recognized Saif bin Sultan II as Imam, and he was re-installed at Nizwa.
However, some of the inhabitants of Az Zahirah elected Saif's cousin Bal'arab bin Himyar as Imam.
After early clashes, the rival Imams remained armed but avoided hostilities for a few years. Belarab controlled most of the interior, and gradually gained the ascendancy on land. Saif was only supported by the Beni Hina and a few allied tribes, but had the navy and the main seaports of Muscat, Burka and Sohar.
With his power dwindling, Saif bin Sultan II eventually asked for help against his rival from Nader Shah of Persia.
A Persian force arrived in March 1737.
Saif bin Sultan joined the Persians. They marched to Az Zahirah where they met and routed the forces of Bal'arab bin Himyar.
The Persians advanced through the interior, capturing towns, killing, looting and taking slaves.
They then reembarked for Persia, taking their loot with them.
For a few years after this Saif bin Sultan II was undisputed ruler, but he led a self-indulgent life, which turned the tribes against him.
In February 1742 another member of the Yaruba family was proclaimed Imam, Sultan bin Murshid.
Sultan bin Murshid was installed at Nakhal and began to hound Saif bin Sultan, who again appealed to the Persians for help and promised to cede Sohar to them.
A Persian expedition arrived at Julfar around October 1742.
They besieged Sohar and sent forces to Muscat, but were unable to take either place.
In 1743 Saif was tricked into letting the Persians take the last forts in Muscat.
He died soon after.
The Persians took Muscat and again attacked Sohar.
The Imam Sultan bin Murshid was mortally wounded under the walls of Sohar in mid-1743. Bal'arab bin Himyar was elected Imam in his place.
After enduring nine months of siege in Sohar, the governor Ahmad bin Said al-Busaidi negotiated an honorable surrender and was confirmed as governor of Sohar and Barka in return for payment of tribute. In 1744 he was elected Imam.
In 1747, the Afsharid king of Persia, Nadir Shah was assassinated in Khurasan. Chaos fallowed his death. The Persian forces in Oman, as everywhere else in Persian Empire, faced the hierarchical and disciplinary vacuum, leading to massive desertion. Taking advantage of the situation, Ahmad invited the remaining Persian garrison to a banquet at his fort in Barka, where he massacred them.
At first some towns in the interior still adhered to Ya'ariba or other local leaders.
On the coast of East Africa, Ahmad bin Said was recognized as Imam only by the governor of Zanzibar.
Ahmad bin Said only became undisputed ruler of Oman when Bal'arab bin Himyar died in 1749.
The Yaruba family retained some independence.
It was not until 1869 that their last stronghold, the fort of al-Hayam in the Al Batinah Region, was taken by Azzan bin Qais. | https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ya%27rubids |
Mesaieed | Mesaieed was established in 1949 as a tanker terminal by QatarEnergy on a previously uninhabited site along the coast. It was chosen by the company because of its proximity to the working population in Doha and Al Wakrah and because of the depth of its waters. It was the only deepwater port in Qatar for more than 20 years.
According to field work done by anthropologist Henry Field in 1950, a local sheikh, Mansur bin Khalil, stated that the Bedouin Al Hibab tribe were the primary tribe present in the Mesaieed region, and had an estimated 100 tents in the area.
In May 1960, the workers of Qatar Petroleum in Mesaieed went on strike following the redundancy of six Qatari employees and the firing of one resulting from a fight with an Indian employee. Sheikh Khalifa bin Hamad Al Thani, in his correspondence with the British, stated he believed the redundancies to be justified and thus did not support the workers' right to strike. Despite one or two incidents involving confrontations between strikers and senior staff of Qatar Petroleum, the strike largely remained peaceful. Fearful that the strike would spread to Qatar's other industrial city of Dukhan, Sheikh Khalifa sent a force of 40 policemen to Mesaieed that month.
The development of Mesaieed faced some limitations in its early years: the encroaching industrial area to the south, sand dunes and an energy corridor to the west, and a sabkha (salt flats) to the east. This configuration directed expansion primarily towards the north, with major roads on the north and west facilitating connections to the Saudi border, Al Wakrah and Doha.
The initial structure plan for Mesaieed envisioned five distinct neighborhoods, each with its own center, delineated by primary and secondary roads. These neighborhoods were designed to feature unique identities and local centers to meet daily needs, promoting both automobile and pedestrian movement. The local centers were intended to offer various facilities, including commercial spaces, local mosques, parking, and recreational opportunities, while the town center provided similar but larger-scale amenities.
A pedestrian network was planned to traverse the town, linking the local centers and incorporating recreational facilities. Residential areas were planned with varying densities: high density near the town center, medium density to the east, and low density to the west. By the mid-1970s, it became clear that there was a pressing need for more residential accommodation to support the rapidly growing Mesaieed Industrial Area. In response, the government initiated several projects to provide the necessary housing and associated facilities. Housing for senior staff mainly consisted of villas, while intermediate staff housing for expatriates was designed by Greek-French architect Georges Candilis and followed a similar design to that used near the newly-created West Bay district of Doha, which was also designed by Candilis. This housing included over 200 units.
By 1976, Mesaieed had approximately 700 residential units, mainly in dormitory-style buildings with some villas. Projections for 1983 estimated a resident population of about 6,400. At that time, Mesaieed was equipped with essential services and amenities, including a health center, police and fire stations, a post office, two banks, a bakery, a cold store, two primary schools, an international school, staff clubs, mosques, a cinema, and a golf course. | https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Mesaieed |
Aristotle | Aristotle suggested that the reason for anything coming about can be attributed to four different types of simultaneously active factors. His term aitia is traditionally translated as "cause", but it does not always refer to temporal sequence; it might be better translated as "explanation", but the traditional rendering will be employed here.
Material cause describes the material out of which something is composed. Thus the material cause of a table is wood. It is not about action. It does not mean that one domino knocks over another domino.
The formal cause is its form, i.e., the arrangement of that matter. It tells one what a thing is, that a thing is determined by the definition, form, pattern, essence, whole, synthesis or archetype. It embraces the account of causes in terms of fundamental principles or general laws, as the whole (i.e., macrostructure) is the cause of its parts, a relationship known as the whole-part causation. Plainly put, the formal cause is the idea in the mind of the sculptor that brings the sculpture into being. A simple example of the formal cause is the mental image or idea that allows an artist, architect, or engineer to create a drawing.
The efficient cause is "the primary source", or that from which the change under consideration proceeds. It identifies 'what makes of what is made and what causes change of what is changed' and so suggests all sorts of agents, non-living or living, acting as the sources of change or movement or rest. Representing the current understanding of causality as the relation of cause and effect, this covers the modern definitions of "cause" as either the agent or agency or particular events or states of affairs. In the case of two dominoes, when the first is knocked over it causes the second also to fall over. In the case of animals, this agency is a combination of how it develops from the egg, and how its body functions.
The final cause (telos) is its purpose, the reason why a thing exists or is done, including both purposeful and instrumental actions and activities. The final cause is the purpose or function that something is supposed to serve. This covers modern ideas of motivating causes, such as volition. In the case of living things, it implies adaptation to a particular way of life. | https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Aristotle |
French Algeria | On 1 December 1830, King Louis-Philippe named the Duc de Rovigo as head of military staff in Algeria. De Rovigo took control of Bône and initiated colonisation of the land. He was recalled in 1833 due to the overtly violent nature of the repression. Wishing to avoid a conflict with Morocco, Louis-Philippe sent an extraordinary mission to the sultan, mixed with displays of military might, sending war ships to the Bay of Tangier. An ambassador was sent to Sultan Moulay Abderrahmane in February 1832, headed by the Count Charles-Edgar de Mornay and including the painter Eugène Delacroix. However the sultan refused French demands that he evacuate Tlemcen.
In 1834, France annexed as a colony the occupied areas of Algeria, which had an estimated Muslim population of about two million. Colonial administration in the occupied areas — the so-called régime du sabre (government of the sword) — was placed under a governor-general, a high-ranking army officer invested with civil and military jurisdiction, who was responsible to the minister of war. Marshal Bugeaud, who became the first governor-general, headed the conquest.
Soon after the conquest of Algiers, the soldier-politician Bertrand Clauzel and others formed a company to acquire agricultural land and, despite official discouragement, to subsidize its settlement by European farmers, triggering a land rush. Clauzel recognized the farming potential of the Mitidja Plain and envisioned the large-scale production there of cotton. As governor-general (1835–36), he used his office to make private investments in land and encouraged army officers and bureaucrats in his administration to do the same. This development created a vested interest among government officials in greater French involvement in Algeria. Commercial interests with influence in the government also began to recognize the prospects for profitable land speculation in expanding the French zone of occupation. They created large agricultural tracts, built factories and businesses, and hired local labor.
Among others testimonies, Lieutenant-colonel Lucien de Montagnac wrote on 15 March 1843, in a letter to a friend:
All populations who do not accept our conditions must be despoiled. Everything must be seized, devastated, without age or sex distinction: grass must not grow any more where the French army has set foot. Who wants the end wants the means, whatever may say our philanthropists. I personally warn all good soldiers whom I have the honour to lead that if they happen to bring me a living Arab, they will receive a beating with the flat of the saber.... This is how, my dear friend, we must make war against Arabs: kill all men over the age of fifteen, take all their women and children, load them onto naval vessels, send them to the Marquesas Islands or elsewhere. In one word, annihilate everything that will not crawl beneath our feet like dogs.
Whatever initial misgivings Louis Philippe's government may have had about occupying Algeria, the geopolitical realities of the situation created by the 1830 intervention argued strongly for reinforcing French presence there. France had reason for concern that Britain, which was pledged to maintain the territorial integrity of the Ottoman Empire, would move to fill the vacuum left by a French withdrawal. The French devised elaborate plans for settling the hinterland left by Ottoman provincial authorities in 1830, but their efforts at state-building were unsuccessful on account of lengthy armed resistance.
The most successful local opposition immediately after the fall of Algiers was led by Ahmad ibn Muhammad, bey of Constantine. He initiated a radical overhaul of the Ottoman administration in his beylik by replacing Turkish officials with local leaders, making Arabic the official language, and attempting to reform finances according to the precepts of Islam. After the French failed in several attempts to gain some of the bey's territories through negotiation, an ill-fated invasion force, led by Bertrand Clauzel, had to retreat from Constantine in 1836 in humiliation and defeat. However, the French captured Constantine under Sylvain Charles Valée the following year, on 13 October 1837.
Historians generally set the indigenous population of Algeria at 3 million in 1830. Although the Algerian population decreased at some point under French rule, most certainly between 1866 and 1872, the French military was not fully responsible for the extent of this decrease, as some of these deaths could be explained by the locust plagues of 1866 and 1868, as well as by a rigorous winter in 1867–68, which caused a famine followed by an epidemic of cholera. | https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/French_Algeria |
Al Jazeera controversies and criticism | Al Jazeera TV covered welcome-home festivities for Samir Kuntar, a Lebanese terrorist imprisoned in Israel for killing several people in a Palestine Liberation Front raid from Lebanon into that country, when Kuntar was released from prison on 19 July 2008. On the program, Al Jazeera Beirut office head Ghassan bin Jiddo called Kuntar a "pan-Arab hero" and organized a birthday party for him. Israel's Government Press Office (GPO) announced a boycott of the channel, including a refusal by Israeli officials to be interviewed and a ban of its correspondents entering government offices in Jerusalem. Several days later, Al Jazeera director-general Wadah Khanfar issued a letter admitting that the program violated the channel's code of ethics and saying that he ordered its programming director to take steps to ensure that such an incident would not recur.
The channel was also criticized for allegedly-biased coverage of events in the Israeli–Palestinian conflict, including the 2002 Bat Mitzvah massacre where the network omitted the facts that the victims were attending a bat mitzvah at a crowded banquet hall. When Palestinian militant Raed Karmi was killed by the Israeli Army, Al Jazeera was criticized for failing to provide sufficient context in its story.
Israel again accused Al Jazeera of bias in 2008. Deputy Foreign Minister Majalli Wahabi accused the organization of focusing on Palestinian suffering and downplaying that of Israel, referring to Israeli residents of the western Negev who had been the target of rocket attacks from the Gaza Strip. "We have seen that Al-Jazeera has become part of Hamas ... taking sides and cooperating with people who are enemies of the state of Israel," said Wahabi, a Druze. "The moment a station like Al-Jazeera gives unreliable reports, represents only one side, and doesn't present the positions of the other side, why should we cooperate?" According to Israeli officials, Al Jazeera covered the Gaza incursion but not Palestinian rocket attacks on the Israeli city of Ashkelon. Wahabi said that the Israeli Foreign Ministry would send letters of complaint to the government of Qatar and Al Jazeera.
In February 2015, Al Jazeera posted an article on its online edition alleging that the Israeli government had opened dams in its southern region to intentionally flood parts of the Gaza Strip. The article was replaced on 25 February with a statement that there were no dams in southern Israel and the original article was false. During the June 2017 Jerusalem attack, Israeli media accused Al-Jazeera of not identifying it as a terrorist attack and ignoring an attack by three Palestinians on the Temple Mount in Old Jerusalem (focusing instead on the killing of a Palestinian by Israeli forces during Friday prayers).
During the 2023 Israel–Hamas war, Al Jazeera Arabic has used the Hamas codename, "Al-Aqsa Flood" in its articles to refer to the conflict. On 1 April, 2024, Israel's parliament approved a law that would allow Israel to shut down Al Jazeera broadcasts from inside the country. Prime Minister of Israel, Benjamim Netanyahu, accused Al-Jazeera of "actively participating in the October 7 massacre and inciting against IDF soldiers". Israeli authorities also cited Al Jazeera's alleged links to Hamas.
On 5 May 2024, the Israeli government shut down Al Jazeera in Israel and authorized the seizure of its equipment. An Israeli court deemed following the presentation of evidence in June 2024 that “Al Jazeera is perceived by the terrorist organization Hamas as its propaganda and intelligence arm.” and raised concern on the influence of Al Jazeera content in encouring violent acts within Israel. | https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Al_Jazeera_controversies_and_criticism |
Battle of al-Mazraa | France established its Mandate in Syria in 1920 following the Allied victory over the Ottoman Empire during World War I; from which France gained the territory of modern-day Syria. French authority over the area was finalized after their decisive victory over Emir Faisal's forces in the Battle of Maysalun on 24 July 1920. The French authorities divided the territory of Syria into separate autonomous entities based on the different sects in the country, including the Jabal al-Druze area of Hauran with its Druze majority of 90%. While the Druze, unlike their Arab Christian and Arab Sunni counterparts, were not as active in the Syrian nationalist movement during the early years of the Mandate, they feared the consequences of French rule. Because of their conflict with the Maronites of Lebanon who maintained close ties with the French before World War I, the Druze leadership worried about faring poorly under French authority.
In the beginning years, the Druze under the leadership of the al-Atrash family were satisfied with the idea of autonomous rule, but disagreements with the authorities arose relating to the extent of Druze independence, the powers of the al-Atrash over Jabal al-Druze and the overriding power of the mandate authorities. Conflicts between the French authorities and the Druze of Hauran arose in July 1922 after the latter agreed to protect the Lebanese rebel Adham Khanjar who allegedly attempted to assassinate High Commissioner Henri Gouraud. When Khanjar was apprehended near Sultan Pasha al-Atrash's home in al-Qurayya, Druze fighters attacked the arresting authorities, killing a lieutenant. After the French appointed army officer Captain Carillet as governor of Jabal al-Druze in violation of the 1921 French-Druze Agreement which stipulated that a Druze be in charge, tensions between al-Atrash and the authorities increased, particularly after October 1924. General tensions relating to the success of French taxation and attempts to instill the values of French society through the building of secular schools, courts and roads led to resentment by the Druze inhabitants.
After the high commissioner, General Maurice Sarrail arrested and banished three Druze sheikhs to Palmyra on 11 July 1925, Sultan al-Atrash launched a rebellion which became known as the Great Syrian Revolt. After shooting down a French military aircraft, al-Atrash's forces destroyed a French Army reinforcement column, killing 111 soldiers out of 174, in the Battle of al-Kafr on 22 July. | https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Battle_of_al-Mazraa |
Islamic terrorism | France had its first occurrences with religious extremism in the 1980s due to French involvement in the Lebanese Civil War. In the 1990s, a series of attacks on French soil were executed by the Armed Islamic Group of Algeria (GIA).
In the 1990–2010 time span, France experienced repeated attacks linked to international jihadist movements. Le Monde reported on 26 July 2016 that "Islamist Terrorism" had caused 236 dead in France in the preceding 18-month period.
In the 2015–2018 timespan in France, 249 people were killed and 928 wounded in a total of 22 terrorist attacks.
The deadly attacks in 2015 in France changed the issue of Islamist radicalization from a security threat to also constitute a social problem. Prime minister François Hollande and prime minister Manuel Valls saw the fundamental values of the French republic being challenged and called them attacks against secular, enlightenment and democratic values along with "what makes us who we are".
Although jihadists in the 2015-onward timeframe legitimized their attacks with a narrative of reprisal for France's participation in the international coalition fighting the Islamic State, Islamic terrorism in France has other, deeper and older causes. The main reasons France suffers frequent attacks are, in no particular order:
France's secular domestic policies (Laïcité) which jihadists perceive to be hostile towards Islam. Also, France's status as an officially secular nation and jihadists label France as "the flagship of disbelief".
France has a strong cultural tradition in comics, which in the context of Muhammad cartoons is a question of freedom of expression.
France has a large Muslim minority
France's foreign policy towards Muslim countries and jihadist fronts. France is seen as the spearhead directed against jihadist groups in Africa, just as the United States is seen as the main force opposing jihadist groups elsewhere. France's former foreign policies such as that as its colonization of Muslim countries is also brought up in jihadist propaganda, for example, that the influence of French education, culture and political institutions had served to erase the Muslim identity of those colonies and their inhabitants.
Jihadists consider France as a strong proponent of disbelief. For instance, Marianne, the national emblem of France, is considered as "a false idol" by jihadists and the French to be "idol worshippers". France also has no law against blasphemy and an anticlerical satirical press which is less respectful towards religion than that of the US or the United Kingdom. The French nation state is also perceived as an obstacle towards establishing a caliphate.
In 2020 two Islamic terrorist attacks were foiled by authorities, bringing the total to 33 since 2017 according to Laurent Nuñez, the director of CNRLT, who declared that Sunni Islamist terrorism was a prioritised threat. Nuñez drew parallels between the three attacks of 2020 which all were attacks on "blasphemy and the will to avenge their prophet". | https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Islamic_terrorism |
Sargonid dynasty | After ascending the Assyrian throne and attending the inauguration of his brother Shamash-shum-ukin as the King of Babylon, Ashurbanipal had to immediately deal with Egypt, which had rebelled against Assyrian rule shortly before Esarhaddon's death. The rebellion, led by the same Pharaoh Taharqa that Esarhaddon had defeated in 671 BC was only stopped after Ashurbanipal invaded Egypt c. 667 BC, marching his army as far south as Thebes, sacking several cities in his path and eventually defeating the revolt and appointing Necho I, the former king of Sais, as Egyptian vassal ruler. In 665 BC, Ashurbanipal was forced to war in Egypt again, this time as the country was invaded by Taharqa's designated successor, Tantamani. Although Egypt would be aligned with Assyria for the rest of Assyria's existence, direct control slowly slipped away over the course of Ashurbanipal's reign and by the time of his death, Egypt would be a fully independent kingdom once more, without the need for another revolt.
During the years that followed his Egyptian campaign, Ashurbanipal was kept busy elsewhere. Perhaps the most famous of his many military campaigns were his two wars against Elam, which had long been a thorn in Assyria's side. Though he had successfully defeated Elam in his first campaign in 653 BC, the Elamites rose against Assyria again in 647 BC. Elam's second attack was punished severely by Ashurbanipal, who invaded the country in 647–646 BC, a campaign which saw the brutal plunder and razing of numerous Elamite cities, including the capital Susa. The campaign was thorough; statues of Elamite gods were destroyed, royal tombs were desecrated and the ground was sowed with salt. Ashurbanipal's inscriptions suggest that he had intended to wipe out the Elamites as a distinct cultural group.
Hostility had been building up between Ashurbanipal and his brother Shamash-shum-ukin throughout their reigns, probably mainly because Ashurbanipal exercised significant control over Shamash-shum-ukin's actions, despite Esarhaddon possibly having intended the two to be equals. When Shamash-shum-ukin openly declared war on his brother in 652 BC, much of southern Mesopotamia followed him in his rebellion. Although Shamash-shum-ukin seemed to initially have the upper hand, successfully securing many allies, his imminent defeat was apparent by 650 BC, when Babylon and many other prominent southern cities were besieged by Ashurbanipal. When Babylon fell to Ashurbanipal's troops in 648 BC, Shamash-shum-ukin is traditionally believed to have committed suicide by setting himself on fire in the palace, but contemporary texts only say that he "met a cruel death" and that the gods "consigned him to a fire and destroyed his life". In addition to suicide though self-immolation or other means, it is possible that he was executed, died accidentally or was killed in some other way.
The end of Ashurbanipal's reign and the beginning of the reign of his son and successor, Ashur-etil-ilani, is shrouded in mystery because of a lack of available sources, but it appears that Ashurbanipal died a natural death in 631 BC. Although his military activities were impressive, Ashurbanipal is today chiefly remembered because of the Library of Ashurbanipal, the first systematically organized library in the world. The library, composed of more than 30,000 clay tablets containing stories, poems, scientific texts and other writings, was considered by Ashurbanipal himself as his greatest accomplishment. When Assyria fell two decades after Ashurbanipal's death, the library was buried beneath the ruins of Nineveh where many tablets survived undamaged, this being the main reason why many ancient Mesopotamian texts survive to this day. | https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Sargonid_dynasty |
Palestinian Authority | Since the Hamas-Fatah split in 2007, the Fatah-dominated Palestinian Authority based in areas of the West Bank had stabilized, though no significant economic growth had been achieved. Until 2012, there had also been no progress in promotion of PNA status in the UN, as well in negotiations with Israel. Ramallah-based Palestinian Authority stayed out of the Gaza War in 2008–2009, which followed the six-month truce, between Hamas and Israel which ended on 19 December 2008. Hamas claimed that Israel broke the truce on 4 November 2008, though Israel blamed Hamas for an increasing rocket fire directed at southern Israeli towns and cities. The 2008–2009 Israel–Gaza conflict began on 27 December 2008 (11:30 a.m. local time; 09:30 UTC). Though condemning Israel over attacks on Gaza, the Palestinian Authority erected no actions during the conflict of Israel with Hamas.
The reconciliation process between Fatah and Hamas reached intermediate results by the two governments, most notably the agreement in Cairo on 27 April 2011, but with no final solution. Though the two agreed to form a unity government, and to hold elections in both territories within 12 months of the establishment of such a government, it had not been implemented. The 2011 deal also promised the entry of Hamas into the Palestine Liberation Organization and holding of elections to its Palestine National Council decision-making body, which was not implemented as well. The deal was further ratified in the 2012 Hamas–Fatah Doha agreement, which was made with the background of Hamas relocation from Damascus, due to the simmering Syrian civil war.
Since late August 2012, Palestinian National Authority has been swept with social protests aiming against the cost of living. The protesters targeted the Palestinian Prime Minister Salam Fayyad, calling for his resignation. Some anti-government protests turned violent. On 11 September, Palestinian Prime Minister issued a decree on lowering the fuel prices and cutting salaries of top officials.
In July 2012, it was reported that Hamas Government in Gaza was considering to declare the independence of the Gaza Strip with the help of Egypt.
On 23 April 2014 Ismail Haniyeh, the prime minister of Hamas, and a senior Palestine Liberation Organisation delegation dispatched by Palestinian President Mahmoud Abbas signed the Fatah–Hamas Gaza Agreement at Gaza City in an attempt to create reconciliation in the Fatah–Hamas conflict. It stated that a unity government should be formed within five weeks, ahead of a presidential and parliamentary election within six months. The Palestinian unity government of 2014 formed on 2 June 2014 as a national and political union under Palestinian president Mahmoud Abbas. The European Union, the United Nations, the United States, China, India, Russia and Turkey all agreed to work with it. The Israeli government condemned the unity government because it views Hamas as a terrorist organization. The Palestinian unity government first convened in Gaza on 9 October 2014 to discuss the reconstruction of the Gaza Strip following the 2014 Israel–Gaza conflict. On 30 November 2014, Hamas declared that the unity government had ended with the expiration of the six-month term. But Fatah subsequently denied the claim, and said that the government is still in force.
On 7–8 February 2016, Fatah and Hamas held talks in Doha, Qatar in an attempt to implement the 2014 agreements. Hamas official told Al-Monitor on 8 March, that the talks did not succeed and that discussions continued between the two movements. He also said that the foreign pressures on the Palestinian Authority to not implement the reconciliation terms is the main obstacle in the talks. In a 25 Feb statement to local newspaper Felesteen, Hamas foreign relations chief Osama Hamdan accused the United States and Israel of blocking Palestinian reconciliation. The United States is putting pressure on the PA to not reconcile with Hamas until the latter recognizes the Quartet on the Middle East's conditions, including the recognition of Israel, which Hamas rejects. After the 2014 agreement, US President Barack Obama said in April 2014 that President Mahmoud Abbas' decision to form a national unity government with Hamas was "unhelpful" and undermined the negotiations with Israel. Amin Maqboul, secretary-general of Fatah's Revolutionary Council, told Al-Monitor, "Hamas did not stick to the 2014 agreement, as it has yet to hand over the reins of power over Gaza to the national consensus government and continues to control the crossings. Should Hamas continue down this path, we have to go to the polls immediately and let the people choose who they want to rule". | https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Palestinian_Authority |
Mohamed Bouazizi | Bouazizi's actions triggered a number of self-immolations, in protests emulating his own, in several other countries in the Greater Middle East and Europe. In Algeria in particular, protests against rising food prices and spreading unemployment have resulted in many self-immolations. The first reported case following Bouazizi's death was that of Mohsen Bouterfif, a 37-year-old father of two, who set himself on fire when the mayor of Boukhadra, Tébessa Province refused to meet with him and others regarding employment and housing requests on 13 January 2011. According to a report in El-Watan, the mayor challenged him, saying if he had courage he would immolate himself by fire as Bouazizi had done. He died on 24 January. In nearby El Oued Province, Maamir Lotfi, a 36-year-old unemployed father of six, also denied a meeting with the governor, burned himself in front of the town hall of El Oued on 17 January, dying on 12 February. Abdelhafid Boudechicha, a 29-year-old day laborer who lived with his parents and five siblings, burned himself in Medjana on 28 January over employment and housing issues. He died the following day.
In the six months immediately after Mohamed Bouazizi's death on 4 January 2011, at least 107 Tunisians set themselves on fire. The men who self-immolated were mostly young unmarried men from poor, rural areas, and had only basic education. Amenallah Messaadi, who collated the figures and is head of the Burns Centre, said that people "should stop adding fuel to the fire".
In Egypt, Abdou Abdel-Moneim Jaafar, a 49-year-old restaurant owner, set himself alight in front of the Egyptian Parliament. His act of protest helped instigate weeks of protest and, later, the resignation of Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak on 11 February 2011. In Saudi Arabia, an unidentified 65-year-old man died on 21 January 2011 after setting himself on fire in the town of Samtah, Jizan. This was apparently the kingdom's first known case of self-immolation.
Although these cases, with the exception of Egypt, did not garner the same kind of popular reaction that Bouazizi's case did in Tunisia, the Algerian, Yemeni, and Jordanian governments experienced significant protests and made major concessions in response to them. As such, these men and Bouazizi were hailed by some as "heroic martyrs of a new Middle Eastern revolution".
On 11 February 2011, in a case very similar to Bouazizi's, Noureddine Adnane, a 27-year-old Moroccan street vendor, set himself on fire in Palermo, Sicily, Italy in protest of the confiscation of his wares and the harassment that was inflicted on him by municipal officials. He died five days later. In Amsterdam, the Netherlands, Kambiz Roustay, a 36-year-old asylum seeker from Iran, set himself on fire on Dam Square in protest of being refused asylum. Roustay had fled the country for publishing works undermining the regime, and feared being tortured by the Iranian government upon his return. | https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Mohamed_Bouazizi |
Marinid Sultanate | In many respects, the Marinids reproduced or continued the social and political structures that existed under the Almohads, ruling a primarily tribal state that relied on the loyalty of their own tribe and allies to maintain order and that imposed very little official civil administrative structures in the provinces beyond the capital. They also maintained the Berber traditions of democratic or consultative government, particularly through the existence of a council of Marinid tribal chiefs whom the sultan consulted when necessary, primarily on military matters. To maintain their control over the provinces beyond the capital of Fez, the Marinids mostly relied on appointing their family members to governorships or on securing local alliances through marriage. These local governors were in charge of both the administration and the military. After Abu Yusuf Ya'qub captured Marrakesh in 1269, for example, he appointed his ally Muhammad ibn 'Ali, to whom he was related by marriage, as his khalifa (deputy or governor) in Marrakesh, a position that would continue to exist for a long time. In some areas, like the mountainous Atlas and Rif regions, this resulted in indirect rule and a very limited presence of the central government.
The Marinid sultan was the head of the state and wielded the title of amīr al-muslimīn ("Commander of the Muslims"). In later periods the Marinid sultans sometimes also granted themselves the title of amīr al-mu'minīn ("Commander of the Faithful"). The involvement of the sultan in state affairs varied depending on the personality of each; some, like Abu al-Hassan, were directly involved in the bureaucracy, while others less so. Under the sultan, the heir-apparent usually held a large amount of power and often served as the head of the army on behalf of the sultan. Aside from these dynastic positions, the vizier was the official with the most executive power and oversaw most of the day-to-day operations of government. Several families of viziers became particularly powerful during the Marinid period and competed with each other for influence, with the Wattasids being the most significant example in their later history. After the vizier, the most important officials were the public treasurer, in charge of taxes and expenditures, who reported to either the vizier or the sultan. Other important officials included the sultan's chamberlain, the secretaries of his chancery, and the sahib al-shurta or "chief of police", who also oversaw judiciary matters. On some occasions the chamberlain was more important and the vizier reported to him instead. | https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Marinid_Sultanate |
Peasants' revolt in Palestine | While there are no known records of military planning, in early May the notables of Nablus, Jerusalem and Hebron coordinated an assault against Jerusalem. On 8 May armed peasants from Nablus, Jerusalem, Hebron and Gaza besieged the city and about 10,000 fighters attempted to breach the walls. They were initially repulsed by the Egyptian garrison. An earthquake occurred in the city on 13 May and fighting ceased for several days.
On 19 May, some residents of Jerusalem's Silwan neighborhood informed rebel leaders that they could use a sewer tunnel that ran from the Dung Gate to a mill in the Jewish Quarter, to clandestinely enter Jerusalem. The next day, 36 rebels (peasants and Jerusalemites) under the leadership of Sheikh Subh Shawkah, chief of the Bethlehem-area Fawaghirah tribe, entered the city via the tunnel and then opened the Dung Gate to allow thousands of rebels inside the walled city. The Egyptian commander of the city, Rashad Bey, subsequently withdrew his garrison into Jerusalem's citadel to take up positions against the incoming rebels.
The rebels, who were joined by some of the city's poorer Muslim residents, began to loot the homes of Egyptian officers. In response, some 500 Egyptian troops left the citadel to pursue the rebels, but began to loot homes in the city in revenge before Rashad Bey ordered them to cease. Fifty rebels, sixteen residents and five soldiers were killed in the confrontations of 20 May. The following day, the rebels attacked the city and after a brief counterattack, Rashad Bey and his men returned to the citadel. Afterward, residents sympathetic to the revolt opened the Damascus Gate and 2,000 peasant irregulars from Nablus entered to reinforce the rebels, whose numbers in Jerusalem then reached some 20,000. On that same day, but before the rebels' entry, Rashad Bey's troops had arrested Jerusalem's leading notables, including the mufti (leading Islamic scholar) Tahir Effendi al-Husayni, the leading ashraf (locally honored descendants of the Islamic prophet Muhammad) Umar Effendi al-Husayni, and Muhammad al-Khalidi, and others. When the reinforcements from Nablus arrived, Egyptian troops withdrew further into the citadel, and Jerusalem was all but captured.
The rebels besieged and fired at the citadel and a wave of mass looting followed for the next three days. Virtually every Muslim, Jewish and Christian-owned shop was raided and damaged. Because the Muslim shops were the last to be plundered, their owners were able to salvage most of their valuable merchandise. A Greek monk named Spyridon who resided in the city wrote that once the homes of Egyptian officers were looted, the rebels "began to loot the shops of the Jews, the Christians, the Franks, and then the Muslims. The grocers, the shoemakers and every other dealer suffered alike. Within two or three days there was not one shop intact in the market". Protests by some citizens against the looting went unheeded as they were outnumbered by rebels. After the market areas were plundered, rebels began to loot the homes of Christians, which had been abandoned during the chaos, despite prohibitions by rebel leaders and local sheikhs. The rebel leadership warned that such actions would provoke the protestations of Ottoman Sultan Mahmud II, who was at war with Muhammad Ali. On 23 May, all state-owned supply warehouses and granaries were looted. | https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Peasants%27_revolt_in_Palestine |
History of Syria | The ruins of Ebla, near Idlib in northern Syria, were discovered and excavated in 1975. Ebla appears to have been an East Semitic speaking city-state founded around 3000 BCE. At its zenith, from about 2500 to 2400 BCE, it may have controlled an empire reaching north to Anatolia, east to Mesopotamia and south to Damascus. Ebla traded with the Mesopotamian states of Sumer, Akkad and Assyria, as well as with peoples to the northwest. Gifts from Pharaohs, found during excavations, confirm Ebla's contact with Egypt. Scholars believe the language of Ebla was closely related to the fellow East Semitic Akkadian language of Mesopotamia and to be among the oldest known written languages.
From the third millennium BCE, Syria was occupied and fought over successively by Sumerians, Eblaites, Akkadians, Assyrians, Egyptians, Hittites, Hurrians, Mitanni, Amorites and Babylonians.
Ebla was probably conquered into the Mesopotamian Akkadian Empire (2335–2154 BCE) by Sargon of Akkad around 2330 BCE. The city re-emerged, as the part of the nation of the Northwest Semitic speaking Amorites, a few centuries later, and flourished through the early second millennium BCE until conquered by the Indo-European Hittites. The Sumerians, Akkadians and Assyrians of Mesopotamia referred to the region as Mar.Tu or The land of the Amurru (Amorites) from as early as the 24th century BCE.
Parts of Syria were controlled by the Neo-Sumerian Empire, Old Assyrian Empire and Babylonian Empire between the 22nd and 18th centuries BCE.
The region was fought over by the rival empires of the Hittites, Egyptians, Assyrians and Mitanni between the 15th and 13th centuries BCE, with the Middle Assyrian Empire (1365–1050 BCE) eventually left controlling Syria.
When the Middle Assyrian Empire began to deteriorate in the late 11th century BCE, Canaanites and Phoenicians came to the fore and occupied the coast, and Arameans and Suteans supplanted the Amorites in the interior, as part of the general disruptions and exchanges associated with the Bronze Age Collapse and the Sea Peoples. During this period the bulk of Syria became known as Eber Nari and Aramea.
From the 10th century BCE the Neo-Assyrian Empire (935–605 BCE) arose, and Syria was ruled by Assyria for the next three centuries, until the late 7th century BCE, and was still known as Eber-Nari and Aram throughout the period. It is from this period that the name Syria first emerges, but not in relation to modern Syria, but as an Indo-European corruption of Assyria, which in fact encompassed the modern regions of northern Iraq, north east Syria, south east Turkey and the northwestern fringe of Iran. (see Etymology of Syria)
After this empire finally collapsed, Mesopotamian dominance continued for a time with the short lived Neo-Babylonian Empire (612–539 BCE), which ruled the region for almost 75 years. | https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/History_of_Syria |
History of Egypt under the Muhammad Ali dynasty | Muhammad Ali was fully conscious that the empire which he had so laboriously built up might at any time have to be defended by force of arms against his master Sultan Mahmud II, whose whole policy had been directed to curbing the power of his too ambitious vassals, and who was under the influence of the personal enemies of the pasha of Egypt, notably of Hüsrev Pasha, the Grand Vizier, who had never forgiven his humiliation in Egypt in 1803.
Mahmud also was already planning reforms borrowed from the West, and Muhammad Ali, who had plenty of opportunity of observing the superiority of European methods of warfare, was determined to anticipate the sultan in the creation of a fleet and an army on European lines, partly as a measure of precaution, partly as an instrument for the realization of yet wider schemes of ambition. Before the outbreak of the War of Greek Independence in 1821, he had already expended much time and energy in organizing a fleet and in training, under the supervision of French instructors, native officers and artificers; though it was not till 1829 that the opening of a dockyard and arsenal at Alexandria enabled him to build and equip his own vessels. By 1823, moreover, he had succeeded in carrying out the reorganization of his army on European lines, the turbulent Turkish and Albanian elements being replaced by Sudanese and fellahin. The effectiveness of the new force was demonstrated in the suppression of an 1823 revolt of the Albanians in Cairo by six disciplined Sudanese regiments; after which Mehemet Ali was no more troubled with military mutinies.
His foresight was rewarded by the invitation of the sultan to help him in the task of subduing the Greek insurgents, offering as reward the pashaliks of the Morea and of Syria. Mehemet Ali had already, in 1821, been appointed by him governor of Crete, which he had occupied with a small Egyptian force. In the autumn of 1824 a fleet of 60 Egyptian warships carrying a large force of 17,000 disciplined troops concentrated in Suda Bay, and, in the following March, with Ibrahin as commander-in-chief landed in the Morea.
His naval superiority wrested from the Greeks the command of a great deal of the sea, on which the fate of the insurrection ultimately depended, while on land the Greek irregular bands, having largely soundly beaten the Porte's troops, had finally met a worthy foe in Ibrahim's disciplined troops. The history of the events that led up to the battle of Navarino and the liberation of Greece is told elsewhere; the withdrawal of the Egyptians from the Morea was ultimately due to the action of Admiral Sir Edward Codrington, who early in August 1828 appeared before Alexandria and induced the pasha, by no means sorry to have a reasonable excuse, by a threat of bombardment, to sign a convention undertaking to recall Ibrahim and his army. | https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/History_of_Egypt_under_the_Muhammad_Ali_dynasty |
White Paper of 1939 | These were the main points of the White Paper:
Section I. The Constitution: It stated that with over 450,000 Jews having now settled in the mandate, the Balfour Declaration about "a national home for the Jewish people" had been met, and it also called for an independent Palestine to be established within 10 years and to be governed jointly by Arabs and Jews:
His Majesty's Government believe that the framers of the Mandate in which the Balfour Declaration was embodied could not have intended that Palestine should be converted into a Jewish State against the will of the Arab population of the country. [ ... ] His Majesty's Government therefore now declare unequivocally that it is not part of their policy that Palestine should become a Jewish State. They would indeed regard it as contrary to their obligations to the Arabs under the Mandate, as well as to the assurances which have been given to the Arab people in the past, that the Arab population of Palestine should be made the subjects of a Jewish State against their will.
The objective of His Majesty's Government is the establishment within 10 years of an independent Palestine State in such treaty relations with the United Kingdom as will provide satisfactorily for the commercial and strategic requirements of both countries in the future. [..] The independent State should be one in which Arabs and Jews share government in such a way as to ensure that the essential interests of each community are safeguarded.
Section II. Immigration: Jewish immigration to Palestine under the British Mandate was to be limited to 75,000 over the next five years and then would depend on Arab consent:
His Majesty's Government do not [..] find anything in the Mandate or in subsequent Statements of Policy to support the view that the establishment of a Jewish National Home in Palestine cannot be effected unless immigration is allowed to continue indefinitely. If immigration has an adverse effect on the economic position in the country, it should clearly be restricted; and equally, if it has a seriously damaging effect on the political position in the country, that is a factor that should not be ignored. Although it is not difficult to contend that the large number of Jewish immigrants who have been admitted so far have been absorbed economically, the fear of the Arabs that this influx will continue indefinitely until the Jewish population is in a position to dominate them has produced consequences which are extremely grave for Jews and Arabs alike and for the peace and prosperity of Palestine. The lamentable disturbances of the past three years are only the latest and most sustained manifestation of this intense Arab apprehension [ ... ] it cannot be denied that fear of indefinite Jewish immigration is widespread amongst the Arab population and that this fear has made possible disturbances which have given a serious setback to economic progress, depleted the Palestine exchequer, rendered life and property insecure, and produced a bitterness between the Arab and Jewish populations which is deplorable between citizens of the same country. If in these circumstances immigration is continued up to the economic absorptive capacity of the country, regardless of all other considerations, a fatal enmity between the two peoples will be perpetuated, and the situation in Palestine may become a permanent source of friction amongst all peoples in the Near and Middle East.
Jewish immigration during the next five years will be at a rate which, if economic absorptive capacity permits, will bring the Jewish population up to approximately one third of the total population of the country. Taking into account the expected natural increase of the Arab and Jewish populations, and the number of illegal Jewish immigrants now in the country, this would allow of the admission, as from the beginning of April this year, of some 75,000 immigrants over the next four years. These immigrants would, subject to the criterion of economic absorptive capacity, be admitted as follows: For each of the next five years a quota of 10,000 Jewish immigrants will be allowed on the understanding that a shortage one year may be added to the quotas for subsequent years, within the five-year period, if economic absorptive capacity permits. In addition, as a contribution towards the solution of the Jewish refugee problem, 25,000 refugees will be admitted as soon as the High Commissioner is satisfied that adequate provision for their maintenance is ensured, special consideration being given to refugee children and dependents. The existing machinery for ascertaining economic absorptive capacity will be retained, and the High Commissioner will have the ultimate responsibility for deciding the limits of economic capacity. Before each periodic decision is taken, Jewish and Arab representatives will be consulted. After the period of five years, no further Jewish immigration will be permitted unless the Arabs of Palestine are prepared to acquiesce in it.
Section III. Land: No restriction had been imposed on the transfer of land from Arabs to Jews, but the White Paper now stated:
The Reports of several expert Commissions have indicated that, owing to the natural growth of the Arab population and the steady sale in recent years of Arab land to Jews, there is now in certain areas no room for further transfers of Arab land, whilst in some other areas such transfers of land must be restricted if Arab cultivators are to maintain their existing standard of life and a considerable landless Arab population is not soon to be created. In these circumstances, the High Commissioner will be given general powers to prohibit and regulate transfers of land. | https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/White_Paper_of_1939 |
Sargon of Akkad | A group of four Babylonian texts, summarized as "Sargon Epos" or Res Gestae Sargonis, shows Sargon as a military commander asking the advice of many subordinates before going on campaigns.
The narrative of Sargon, the Conquering Hero, is set at Sargon's court, in a situation of crisis. Sargon addresses his warriors, praising the virtue of heroism, and a lecture by a courtier on the glory achieved by a champion of the army, a narrative relating a campaign of Sargon's into the far land of Uta-raspashtim, including an account of a "darkening of the Sun" and the conquest of the land of Simurrum,
and a concluding oration by Sargon listing his conquests.
The narrative of King of Battle relates Sargon's campaign against the Anatolian city of Purushanda in order to protect his merchants.
Versions of this narrative in both Hittite and Akkadian have been found.
The Hittite version is extant in six fragments, the Akkadian version is known from several manuscripts
found at Amarna, Assur, and Nineveh.
The narrative is anachronistic, portraying Sargon in a 19th-century milieu. The same text mentions that Sargon crossed the Sea of the West (Mediterranean Sea) and ended up in Kuppara, which some authors have interpreted as the Akkadian word for Keftiu, an ancient locale usually associated with Crete or Cyprus.
Famine and war threatened Sargon's empire during the latter years of his reign. The Chronicle of Early Kings reports that revolts broke out throughout the area under the last years of his overlordship:
Afterward in his [Sargon's] old age all the lands revolted against him, and they besieged him in Akkad; and Sargon went onward to battle and defeated them; he accomplished their overthrow, and their widespreading host he destroyed. Afterward he attacked the land of Subartu in his might, and they submitted to his arms, and Sargon settled that revolt, and defeated them; he accomplished their overthrow, and their widespreading host he destroyed, and he brought their possessions into Akkad. The soil from the trenches of Babylon he removed, and the boundaries of Akkad he made like those of Babylon. But because of the evil which he had committed, the great lord Marduk was angry, and he destroyed his people by famine. From the rising of the sun unto the setting of the sun they opposed him and gave him no rest.
A. Leo Oppenheim translates the last sentence as "From the East to the West he [i.e. Marduk] alienated (them) from him and inflicted upon (him as punishment) that he could not rest (in his grave)." | https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Sargon_of_Akkad |
Bimaristan | During the Islamic Golden Age, there was a translation movement to convert Greek medical texts into Arabic. Some of the books that impacted the field were Tarkib-Al-Advieh about mixtures of drugs, Al-Advieh Al-Mofradeh which was written about single drugs, Ghova-Al-Aghzieh which concerned the potency of food for medicine, Al-Advieh Ao Al-dava, Al-Oram which concerned swellings of the body, and Al-Teriagh or The Book of Theriac. Through readings, Islamic doctors were able to find drugs that they could use to help treat patients.
One of the most notable contributors to pharmacology was Galen, a physician in the Roman Empire, wrote on theories of drug action. Galen's theories were later recorded, simplified, and translated by Arabic scholars, notably Hunayn ibn Ishak. Because of the need for the works to be translated from Greek to Arabic, there is a lot of documentation available regarding the naming of drugs. Authors such as Abulcasis and Maimonides, went into detail on this aspect and discussed the naming of drugs including the linguistics, as well as the synonyms and explanations behind the name given to the drug. Avicenna also contributed to the naming and categorization of drugs. In his Cannon of Medicine, he explained medicine types such as antiseptics and narcotics as well as explained the forms such as tablets, powders, and syrups.
After learning from the different books and coming to their own conclusions, Arabic physicians made numerous contributions when it came to determining dosage for patients depending on their condition. Multiple scholars, including the Arabic scholar and physician al-Kindi, determined the geometric progression of dosage. They found there was an arithmetic increase in the drug's sensation as the dosage was increased.
Some of the main areas of study when it came to pharmacology involved Toxicology and the science behind sedative and analgesic drugs. Many physicians, Arabic and not alike, were fascinated with poisons. They sought out knowledge on how to make them and remediate them. Similarly, the science of sedative and analgesic drugs also fascinated Arabic physicians. Substances such as Cannabis sativa (Hashish), Hyoscyamus Niger (narcotic), and Papaver somniferum (opium) were well studied and used in their medicine. | https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Bimaristan |
Alawites | In older sources, Alawis are often called "Ansaris." According to Samuel Lyde, who lived among the Alawites during the mid-19th century, this was a term they used among themselves. Other sources indicate that "Ansari" is simply a Western error in the transliteration of "Nusayri." Alawites historically self-identified as Nusayrites, after their religious founder Ibn Nusayr al-Numayri. However, the term "Nusayri" had fallen out of currency by the 1920s, as a movement led by intellectuals within the community during the French Mandate sought to replace it with the modern term "Alawi."
They characterised the older name (which implied "a separate ethnic and religious identity") as an "invention of the sect's enemies", ostensibly favouring an emphasis on "connection with mainstream Islam"—particularly the Shia branch. The French also popularised the new term by officially categorising them as "Alawites." As such, "Nusayri" is now generally regarded as antiquated, and has even come to have insulting and abusive connotations. The term is frequently employed as hate speech by Sunni fundamentalists fighting against Bashar al-Assad's government in the Syrian civil war, who use its emphasis on Ibn Nusayr in order to insinuate that Alawi beliefs are "man-made" and not divinely inspired.
Nekati Alkan argued in an article that the "Alawi" appellation was used in an 11th century Nusayri book and was not a 20th century invention. The following quote from the same article illustrates his point: "As to the change from "Nuṣayrī" to "ʿAlawī": most studies agree that the term "ʿAlawī" was not used until after WWI and probably coined and circulated by Muḥammad Amīn Ghālib al-Ṭawīl, an Ottoman official and writer of the famous Taʾrīkh al-ʿAlawiyyīn (1924). In actual fact, the name 'Alawī' appears as early as in an 11th century Nuṣayrī tract as one the names of the believer (…). Moreover, the term 'Alawī' was already used at the beginning of the 20th century. In 1903 the Belgian-born Jesuit and Orientalist Henri Lammens (d. 1937) visited a certain Ḥaydarī-Nuṣayrī sheikh Abdullah in a village near Antakya and mentions that the latter preferred the name 'Alawī' for his people. Lastly, it is interesting to note that in the above-mentioned petitions of 1892 and 1909 the Nuṣayrīs called themselves the 'Arab Alawī people' (ʿArab ʿAlevī ṭāʾifesi) 'our ʿAlawī Nuṣayrī people' (ṭāʾifatunā al-Nuṣayriyya al-ʿAlawiyya) or 'signed with Alawī people' (ʿAlevī ṭāʾifesi imżāsıyla). This early self-designation is, in my opinion, of triple importance. Firstly, it shows that the word 'Alawī' was always used by these people, as ʿAlawī authors emphasize; secondly, it hints at the reformation of the Nuṣayrīs, launched by some of their sheikhs in the 19th century and their attempt to be accepted as part of Islam; and thirdly, it challenges the claims that the change of the identity and name from 'Nuṣayrī' to 'ʿAlawī' took place around 1920, in the beginning of the French mandate in Syria (1919–1938)."
The Alawites are distinct from the Alevi religious sect in Turkey, although the terms share a common etymology and pronunciation. | https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Alawites |
Palestinian People's Party | The original Palestine Communist Party was founded in 1919. After the foundation of the state of Israel and the Jordanian annexation of the West Bank, the West Bank communists joined as the Jordanian Communist Party, which gained considerable support among Palestinian Arabs. It established a strong position in the Palestinian trade union movement and retained considerable popularity in the West Bank during the 1970s, but its support subsequently declined. In the Egyptian-occupied Gaza strip a separate Palestinian communist organization was established.
In February 1982, prominent Palestinian communists held a conference and re-established a Palestinian Communist Party. The new party established relations with the Palestine Liberation Organization, and joined the PLO in 1987. A PCP member was included in the Executive Committee of the PLO in April that year. PCP was the sole PLO member not based amongst the fedayeen organizations.
The PCP was one of the four components of the Unified National Leadership of the First Palestinian Intifada, and played an important role in mobilizing grassroots support for the uprising.
The party, under the leadership of Bashir Barghouti, played an important role in reevaluating Marxism-Leninism as a political philosophy earlier than many other communist organisations in the region. It was renamed in 1991, after the collapse of the Soviet Union, to the Palestinian People's Party, arguing that the class struggle in Palestine should be postponed as the Palestinian people are still waging a struggle of national liberation in which elements of all classes should unite. The renaming also reflected a move by the party to distance itself from the image of communism, an ideology perceived as antagonistic to religion in the Muslim world; however, party members still identify with Marxism.
The party was an enthusiastic advocate of the Oslo Accords; however, it now criticizes the "failure" of the peace process, while still defending the goal of an independent Palestinian state in the West Bank and Gaza Strip.
In 2002, the party's then general secretary, Mustafa Barghouti left it with some supporters to found the Palestinian National Initiative.
In the January 2005 presidential election, the party's candidate Bassam as-Salhi received 2.67% of the vote.
At the 2006 Palestinian legislative election PPP formed a joint list called Al-badeel for the left wing parties with Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine, Palestine Democratic Union and independents. It received 2.8% of the popular vote and won two of the Council's 132 seats.
For the 2016 Palestinian local government elections that were initially scheduled for October 2016, the PPP was one of the five left-wing Palestinian factions that formed a joint list called the Democratic Alliance List. At the elections, which took place on 13 May 2017, the Alliance won 5 of the 3,253 contested seats, gaining 0.32% of the votes.
In the lead up to the 2021 Palestinian legislative election, the PPP took part in negotiations with the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine, Palestinian National Initiative, Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine, and the Palestinian Democratic Union, to form a joint leftist list for the elections, however differences between the PPP and the PFLP caused the negotiations to break down.
The PPP ultimately formed a joint list with the Palestinian Democratic Union called "United Left", led by Fadwa Khoder, a member of the PPP's Politburo. | https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Palestinian_People%27s_Party |
Umayyad Caliphate | Under al-Walid I the Umayyad Caliphate reached its greatest territorial extent. The war with the Byzantines had resumed under his father after the civil war, with the Umayyads defeating the Byzantines at the Battle of Sebastopolis in 692. The Umayyads frequently raided Byzantine Anatolia and Armenia in the following years. By 705, Armenia was annexed by the caliphate along with the principalities of Caucasian Albania and Iberia, which collectively became the province of Arminiya. In 695–698 the commander Hassan ibn al-Nu'man al-Ghassani restored Umayyad control over Ifriqiya after defeating the Byzantines and Berbers there. Carthage was captured and destroyed in 698, signaling "the final, irretrievable end of Roman power in Africa", according to Kennedy. Kairouan was firmly secured as a launchpad for later conquests, while the port town of Tunis was founded and equipped with an arsenal on Abd al-Malik's orders to establish a strong Arab fleet. Hassan ibn al-Nu'man continued the campaign against the Berbers, defeating them and killing their leader, the warrior queen al-Kahina, between 698 and 703. His successor in Ifriqiya, Musa ibn Nusayr, subjugated the Berbers of the Hawwara, Zenata and Kutama confederations and advanced into the Maghreb (western North Africa), conquering Tangier and Sus in 708/09. Musa's Berber mawla, Tariq ibn Ziyad, invaded the Visigothic Kingdom of Hispania (the Iberian Peninsula) in 711 and within five years most of Hispania was conquered.
Al-Hajjaj managed the eastern expansion from Iraq. His lieutenant governor of Khurasan, Qutayba ibn Muslim, launched numerous campaigns against Transoxiana (Central Asia), which had been a largely impenetrable region for earlier Muslim armies, between 705 and 715. Despite the distance from the Arab garrison towns of Khurasan, the unfavorable terrain and climate and his enemies' numerical superiority, Qutayba, through his persistent raids, gained the surrender of Bukhara in 706–709, Khwarazm and Samarkand in 711–712 and Farghana in 713. He established Arab garrisons and tax administrations in Samarkand and Bukhara and demolished their Zoroastrian fire temples. Both cities developed as future centers of Islamic and Arabic learning. Umayyad suzerainty was secured over the rest of conquered Transoxiana through tributary alliances with local rulers, whose power remained intact.
From 708/09, al-Hajjaj's kinsman Muhammad ibn al-Qasim conquered northwestern South Asia and established out of this new territory the province of Sind. The massive war spoils netted by the conquests of Transoxiana, Sind and Hispania were comparable to the amounts accrued in the early Muslim conquests during the reign of Caliph Umar.
Al-Walid I's successor, his brother Sulayman (r. 715–717), continued his predecessors' militarist policies, but expansion mostly ground to a halt during his reign. The deaths of al-Hajjaj in 714 and Qutayba in 715 left the Arab armies in Transoxiana in disarray. For the next twenty-five years, no further eastward conquests were undertaken and the Arabs lost territory. The Tang Chinese defeated the Arabs at the Battle of Aksu in 717, forcing their withdrawal to Tashkent. Meanwhile, in 716, the governor of Khurasan, Yazid ibn al-Muhallab, attempted to conquer the principalities of Jurjan and Tabaristan along the southern Caspian coast. His Khurasani and Iraqi troops were reinforced by Syrians, marking their first deployment to Khurasan, but the Arabs' initial successes were reversed by the local Iranian coalition of Farrukhan the Great. Afterward, the Arabs withdrew in return for a tributary agreement.
On the Byzantine front, Sulayman took up his predecessor's project to capture Constantinople with increased vigor. His brother Maslama besieged the Byzantine capital from the land, while Umar ibn Hubayra al-Fazari launched a naval campaign against the city. The Byzantines destroyed the Umayyad fleets and defeated Maslama's army, prompting his withdrawal to Syria in 718. The massive losses incurred during the campaign led to a partial retrenchment of Umayyad forces from the captured Byzantine frontier districts, but already in 720, Umayyad raids against Byzantium recommenced. Nevertheless, the goal of conquering Constantinople was effectively abandoned, and the frontier between the two empires stabilized along the line of the Taurus and Anti-Taurus Mountains, over which both sides continued to launch regular raids and counter-raids during the next centuries. | https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Umayyad_Caliphate |
Second Intifada | On 28 September, Israeli opposition leader Ariel Sharon and a Likud party delegation guarded by hundreds of Israeli riot police visited the Temple Mount, which is widely considered the third holiest site in Islam. Israel has claimed sovereignty over the Mount and the rest of East Jerusalem since 1980, and the compound is the holiest site in Judaism.
The Israeli Interior Minister Shlomo Ben-Ami, who permitted Sharon's visit, later claimed that he had telephoned the Palestinian Authority's security chief Jibril Rajoub before the visit and gotten his reassurances that as long as Sharon didn't enter the mosques his visit wouldn't cause any problems. Rajoub vociferously denied having given any such reassurances.
Shortly after Sharon left the site, angry demonstrations by Palestinian Jerusalemites outside erupted into rioting. The person in charge of the waqf at the time, Abu Qteish, was later indicted by Israel for using a loud-speaker to call on Palestinians to defend Al-Aqsa, which action Israeli authorities claimed was responsible for the subsequent stone-throwing in the direction of the Wailing Wall. Israeli police responded with tear gas and rubber bullets, while protesters hurled stones and other projectiles, injuring 25 policemen, of whom one was seriously injured and had to be taken to hospital. At least three Palestinians were wounded by rubber bullets.
The stated purpose for Sharon's visit of the compound was to assert the right of all Israelis to visit the Temple Mount; however, according to Likud spokesman Ofir Akunis, the actual purpose was to "show that under a Likud government [the Temple Mount] will remain under Israeli sovereignty." Ehud Barak in the Camp David negotiations had insisted that East Jerusalem, where the Haram was located, would remain under complete Israeli sovereignty. In response to accusations by Ariel Sharon of government readiness to concede the site to the Palestinians, the Israeli government gave Sharon permission to visit the area. When alerted of his intentions, senior Palestinian figures, such as Yasser Arafat, Saeb Erekat, and Faisal Husseini, all asked Sharon to call off his visit.
Ten days earlier the Palestinians had observed their annual memorial day for the Sabra and Shatila massacre, where thousands of Lebanese and Palestinian Muslims were massacred by Lebanese Forces supported by the Israeli military. The Israeli Kahan Commission had concluded that Ariel Sharon, who was the Israeli Defense Minister during the Sabra and Shatila massacre, was found to bear personal responsibility "for ignoring the danger of bloodshed and revenge" and "not taking appropriate measures to prevent bloodshed." Sharon's negligence in protecting the civilian population of Beirut, which had come under Israeli control, amounted to a non-fulfillment of a duty with which the Defence Minister was charged, and it was recommended that Sharon be dismissed as Defence Minister. Sharon initially refused to resign, but after the death of an Israeli after a peace march, Sharon did resign as Defense minister, but remained in the Israeli cabinet.
The Palestinians condemned Sharon's visit to the Temple Mount as a provocation and an incursion, as were his armed bodyguards that arrived on the scene with him. Critics claim that Sharon knew that the visit could trigger violence, and that the purpose of his visit was political. According to one observer, Sharon, in walking on the Temple Mount, was "skating on the thinnest ice in the Arab-Israeli conflict."
According to The New York Times, many in the Arab world, including Egyptians, Palestinians, Lebanese and Jordanians, point to Sharon's visit as the beginning of the Second Intifada and derailment of the peace process. According to Juliana Ochs, Sharon's visit 'symbolically instigated' the second intifada. Marwan Barghouti said that although Sharon's provocative actions were a rallying point for Palestinians, the Second Intifada would have erupted even had he not visited the Temple Mount. | https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Second_Intifada |
Israel–Syria Mixed Armistice Commission | As part of its dispute with Syria over use of the Demilitarized Zone created by the Israel-Syria Armistice Agreement, Israel from 1951 refused to attend meetings of the Israel–Syria Mixed Armistice Commission. The U.N. Security Council, in its resolution of 18 May 1951, noted that refusal to participate in Mixed Armistice Commission meetings was "inconsistent with the objectives and intent of the Armistice Agreement".
On 20 June 1951 Israel informed the UNTSO that it would no longer attend meetings of the Syrian/Israeli MAC as long as complaints involving the DMZs were on the agenda. Israel argued that Israel alone had sovereignty over the DMZs and that Syria had no rights and therefore, no standing to discuss the zones. Israel immobilized the MAC working within the DMZ. Israel also refused to allow UN observers to carry out a cadastral demarcation of the line of the DMZs and thereby no one was ever sure exactly where the line lay.
The Israel position concerning the competence of the MAC to deal with questions connected with the DMZ was a direct contradiction of the Syrian position on the same subject. The Israel position was set out in the following extracts from the memorandum from the Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs of 27 December 1954:
"…The absence of any Syrian locus standi in the zone is demonstrated conclusively in the limitation of the competence of the Mixed Armistice Commission with regard to matters of the DMZ. According to paragraph 5 (c) of article V, it is the Chairman of the Commission (or the Chief of Staff), and not the Commission, of which Syria is a member, that is responsible for ensuring the implementation of article V, governing the DMZ.
"...
"It is evident ... that no distinction can be deduced between the Chairman's jurisdiction over civilian matters and his competence with regard to the military aspects of article V. Indeed, paragraph 5 (c) of that article defines the Chairman's responsibility as ensuring the full implementation of the article without any difference whatever between its civilian life clauses and its military provisions.
The principle of the personal responsibility of the ISMAC Chairman was followed in practice by the Israeli delegation throughout the years of the ISMAC existence, except when otherwise agreed to by Israel (as for instance in a number of MAC discussions held before 1951). The chairmen of the ISMAC had taken up and settled numerous questions concerning the DMZ directly with the Israeli representatives. From July 1954 to January 1955 at least, 15 such matters, regarding civilian as well as military questions of the zone, had been brought by the MAC Chairman before the Israel authorities.
Syria, however, persisted in Israel's opinion, to attempt to create for itself a position that would entitle it to intervene in a territory that lay outside its State boundaries, and in several instances questions concerning the DMZ had appeared at Syria's insistence on the agenda of the MAC. It was evident that Israel could not acquiesce in attempts by Syria to gain rights Israel felt it was not entitled to, and remained consistent in upholding what they felt was the basic tenet of the GAA: exclusion of Syria from any rights within the DMZ, even if this sometimes meant the Israeli delegation absenting itself from MAC meetings when Syria sought to intervene in questions affecting the zone.
The Syrian position on this matter was contained in the first part of the aide-memoire of the Syrian Ministry of Foreign Affairs. This aide-memoire also refers to the note verbale of the Syrian Ministry of Foreign Affairs to the Chief of Staff dated 17 June 1954 [S/3230]. The Syrian position may be summarized as follows: the MAC being competent to supervise the execution of the provisions of the GAA, including article V, relating to the DMZ, was empowered to deal with complaints submitted by the parties relating to the implementation of article V. Paragraph 5 (c) of article V of the armistice agreement refers to the responsibility of the Chairman of the MAC and UN observers for ensuring the full implementation of the article, whereas the first paragraph of article VII provides that the MAC shall supervise the execution of the provisions of the agreement.
Such conflicting views as to the competence of the MAC in relation to the DMZ resulted in the failure of the MAC to hold regular meetings since 20 June 1951, the Syrian delegation refusing to withdraw complaints relating to the DMZ from the list of complaints pending before the MAC, while the Israel delegation insists that such complaints be deleted.
"There are differences of opinion between the parties to the Armistice Agreement on the meaning of various provisions of article V, including those which relate to the Chairman's powers, but neither party requested an interpretation by the MAC in the manner established by Article VII of the agreement, and the Chairman has had to rely on his own interpretation, knowing that in many cases it would probably be found unacceptable by one party or by both and that the requests of the Chairman of the ISMAC were likely to be met with refusal on the ground that the Chairman of the ISMAC was exceeding his powers or acting in some other manner contrary to the provisions of the Armistice Agreement." | https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Israel%E2%80%93Syria_Mixed_Armistice_Commission |
Qatar diplomatic crisis | On 7 June 2017, the Turkish parliament passed, with 240 votes in favour and 98 against, a legislative act first drafted in May allowing Turkish troops to be deployed to a Turkish military base in Qatar. During a speech on 13 June 2017, the President of Turkey, Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, condemned the boycott of Qatar as "inhumane and against Islamic values" and stated that "victimising Qatar through smear campaigns serves no purpose". On 23 June 2017, Turkey rejected demands to shut down its military base in Qatar.
Qatar hosts about 10,000 US troops at Al Udeid Air Base, which houses the forward operating base of United States Central Command that is strategically located for US airstrikes in Syria, Iraq, and Afghanistan. A Pentagon spokesperson claimed the diplomatic crisis would not affect the US military missions in Qatar.
On 30 January 2018 an inaugural United States-Qatar Strategic Dialogue meeting was held, co-chaired by U.S. Secretary of State Rex Tillerson, U.S. Secretary of Defense Jim Mattis, Qatari Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of State for Defence Affairs Khalid al-Attiyah and Qatari Deputy Prime Minister and Foreign Minister Mohammed bin Abdulrahman Al Thani. The meeting expressed the need for an immediate resolution of the crisis which respects Qatar's sovereignty. In a Joint Declaration on Security Cooperation, the United States expressed its readiness to deter and quell any external threat to Qatar's territorial integrity. Qatar offered to help fund the expansion of facilities at US bases in Qatar.
On 25 March 2018, the United States Central Command (CENTCOM) officially quashed rumours that the Incirlik Air Base in Turkey and the Al Udeid Air Base in Qatar will be closed despite the ongoing regional conflict.
In January 2018, Qatar's ambassador communicated with Russia with the intent to purchase S-400 surface-to-air missiles. Both countries signed an agreement on military and technical cooperation in 2017. In May 2018, the French daily newspaper Le Monde reported that King Salman of Saudi Arabia would take military action if Qatar installed the Russian air defence system. However, a senior Russian official remarked the system would still be delivered even against the will of Saudi Arabia. The Saudis were themselves approaching Russia to improve economic and military ties in 2017, but bargaining relating to the arms deal was hindered by concerns the United States and Saudi Arabia had with regard to the Russian position towards Iran's military and strategic involvement in the Middle East.
In June 2018, Qatar expressed its wish to join NATO. However, NATO declined Qatar's membership proposal, stating that only additional European countries could join according to Article 10 of NATO's founding treaty. Qatar and NATO have previously signed a security agreement together in January 2018. | https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Qatar_diplomatic_crisis |
Somali language | Somali loanwords can be divided into those derived from other Afroasiatic languages (mainly Arabic), and those of Indo-European extraction (mainly Italian).
Somali's main lexical borrowings come from Arabic, and are estimated to constitute about 20% of the language's vocabulary. This is a legacy of the Somali people's extensive social, cultural, commercial and religious links and contacts with nearby populations in the Arabian peninsula. Arabic loanwords are most commonly used in religious, administrative and education-related speech (e.g. aamiin for "faith in God"), though they are also present in other areas (e.g. kubbad-da, "ball"). Soravia (1994) noted a total of 1,436 Arabic loanwords in Agostini a.o. 1985, a prominent 40,000-entry Somali dictionary. Most of the terms consisted of commonly used nouns. These lexical borrowings may have been more extensive in the past since a few words that Zaborski (1967:122) observed in the older literature were absent in Agostini's later work. In addition, the majority of personal names are derived from Arabic.
The Somali language also contains a few Indo-European loanwords that were retained from the colonial period. Most of these lexical borrowings come from English and Italian and are used to describe modern concepts (e.g. telefishen-ka, "the television"; raadia-ha, "the radio"). There are 300 loan words from Italian, such as garawati for "tie" (from Italian cravatta), dimuqraadi from democratico (democratic), mikroskoob from microscopio, and so on.
Additionally, Somali contains lexical terms from Persian, Urdu and Hindi that were acquired through historical trade with communities in the Near East and South Asia (e.g. khiyaar "cucumber" from Persian: خيار khiyār ). Other loan words have also displaced their native synonyms in some dialects (e.g. jabaati "a type of flat bread" from Hindi: चपाती chapāti displacing sabaayad). Some of these words were also borrowed indirectly via Arabic.
As part of a broader governmental effort of linguistic purism in the Somali language, the past few decades have seen a push in Somalia toward replacement of loanwords in general with their Somali equivalents or neologisms. To this end, the Supreme Revolutionary Council during its tenure officially prohibited the borrowing and use of English and Italian terms. | https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Somali_language |
Emirate of Fujairah | The Emirate of Fujairah, dominated by the Sharqiyin tribe, sits at the mouth of the important trade route, the Wadi Ham (which is guarded by the Sharqiyin Al Bithnah Fort), through the mountains to the interior and the Persian Gulf Coast. Known as the Shamaliyah, the east coast of what is now the UAE was subject to Muscat until 1850, when it was annexed by Al Qasimi of Sharjah, in an agreement made between Sheikh Sultan bin Saqr Al Qasimi and the Sultan of Muscat. The Shamaliyah was governed by Al-Qasimi Wali at Kalba although frequently seceded and in 1901 Sheikh Hamad bin Abdullah Al Sharqi, chief of the Sharqiyin, declared independence from Sharjah. This was recognized by a number of the Trucial Sheikhs and also by Muscat, but not the British, who were frequently provoked by the independently minded Ruler. At this time, The Emirate of Fujairah consisted of some 150 houses and 3,000 date palms and its people lived mainly through pearling and date cultivation. Since the absorption of Kalba by Sharjah in 1952, the Shamaliyah is shared by the emirates of Fujairah and Sharjah.
In 1952, the Emirate of Fujairah entered into treaty relations with Britain, becoming the last of the emirates to join the Trucial States. Having withheld this recognition for over fifty years, the British government only granted it because the oil exploration company Petroleum Concessions Limited (PCL) needed to sign a concession with a recognized ruler. On 2 December 1971, The Emirate of Fujairah joined the United Arab Emirates.
Archaeological finds in the Emirate of Fujairah point to a history of human occupation and trading links stretching back at least 4,000 years, with Wadi Suq (2,000 to 1,300 BC) burials located at Bithnah and the Qidfa' Oasis. A third millennium BCE tower was used to construct the Portuguese fort at Bidiyah, identified with the Portuguese 'Libedia', a fortress recorded in de Resende's 1646 map - the fortress itself has been carbon dated to 1450–1670.
The Emirate of Fujairah is also rich in late Islamic fortresses, as well as being home to the oldest mosque in use in the United Arab Emirates, Al Badiyah Mosque, which was built in 1446 of mud and bricks. It is similar to other mosques found in Yemen, eastern Oman, and Qatar. Al Badiyah Mosque has four domes (unlike the other similar mosques which have between seven and twelve) and lacks a minaret. | https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Emirate_of_Fujairah |
White Africans of European ancestry | The Namibia National Rugby team is largely white.
Many European sports have become popular in Africa after the arrival of Europeans on the continent. Football was first introduced in the 19th century by British colonists in South Africa in 1862. The sport was quickly spread throughout the continent by missionaries, explorers, and other Europeans on the continent. French colonists in Algeria were the first to introduce formalized clubs on the continent beginning with Club Athlétique d'Oran in 1897. The sport continues to be popular amongst Portuguese South Africans who founded the Vasco de Gama Football Club.
Cricket was introduced by British serviceman shortly after the takeover of the Cape Colony from the Dutch. The first known match in South Africa took place in 1808. The sport continues to be popular amongst White Africans of British descent. Since the end of apartheid the sport has seen increased popularity with Afrikaners. Cricket was also played by Europeans in other countries on that are members of the commonwealth. The first recorded match of cricket in Zimbabwe took place in 1890. Following from this point the sport continued to grow with the arrival of more European colonists. The sport continued to be dominated by Europeans throughout much of the 20th century, and in 1983 they successfully defeated Australia in a stunning victory.
Field hockey is also popular amongst White Africans. In South Africa the majority of players at the Olympic level are of European descent. Similarly the Zimbabwean field hockey team famous for its 1980 gold medal match was historically dominated by white Africans. The sport has a long history on the continent, and its modern iteration was first introduced by European colonists.
Similarly to cricket, football, and field hockey; rugby was first introduced to the continent by the British. The sport was initially played in 1861 at Diocesan College but it quickly spread to the local population. The sport became popular among White Afrikaners after the first club outside of Cape Town had been created being in Stellenbosch. The expansion of European colonisation on the Cape towards the interior continued to increase the sports popularity.
Competitive swimming is also popular amongst white Africans. Such swimmers include Kirsty Coventry of Zimbabwe, and Jason Dunford of Kenya. | https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/White_Africans_of_European_ancestry |
International propagation of Salafism and Wahhabism by region | Sudan, a poor country with a majority Muslim Arab population whose coastline lies just across the Red Sea from the Hijaz province of Saudi Arabia, has had close relations with the kingdom since the Arab Oil Embargo. However, the dominant interpretation of Islam in Sudan was very different from that of Saudis or Muslim Brotherhood. Popular local Islam of the Sufi or mystical brotherhoods (the Ansar and the Khatmiya) who were each attached to a political party, had great influence among the masses of Muslims. Saudi funding, investment, and labor migration from Sudan has all worked over time to change that.
Saudi provided funding for the Muslim Brotherhood whose local leader, Hassan al-Turabi, enjoyed "close relations" with "some of the more conservative members of the Saudi royal family".
In the fall of 1977, an Islamic bank with 60% of its start up capital coming from Saudi Arabia opened a branch in Sudan. By the mid-1980s this bank (Faisal Islamic Bank of Sudan) was second biggest in Sudan in terms of money held on deposit. Shortly after another similar bank (Al Baraka Bank) was founded. Both provided rewards for whose affiliated with Hassan al-Turabi's Islamist National Islamic Front—employment and wealth as a reward for young militant college graduates and low interest loans for investors and businessmen unable to find loans elsewhere.
In 1983 Saudis persuaded then-President Gaafar Nimeiry to institute sharia law including interest-free Islamic banking. The traditional Sudanese banking system was abolished and afterwards
any enterprise that needed capital had to be part of Turabi's network to gain access to financial markets. Over time, this has concentrated economic power in the old families from the "Three Tribes" who were loyal to the new regime"and who have "transformed themselves into Islamists."
The influx of Sudanese labor migrants to Saudi as truck drivers, electricians, factory workers and sales clerks, was also significant. By 1985, according to one source, about 2/3 of the professional and skilled Sudanese workers were employed outside the Sudan, many in the Gulf States. (As of 2013 there were 900,000 Sudanese migrant workers in Saudi Arabia.)
Looking at the change in religious practices of a village in northern Sudan over a five-year period from 1982 to 1988, anthropology researcher Victoria Bernal found labor migration of villagers to Saudi Arabia "were catalysts for change, stimulating the rise of `fundamentalist` Islam in the village". Returning migrants "boldly" critiqued the Islamic authenticity of local practices such as "mourning rituals, wedding customs and reverence for holy men in particular." More well-to-do villagers were "building high brick or cement walls around their homes", women began wearing ankle-length robes. Traditional wedding rituals with singing and mixing of genders were called into question.
According to Victoria Bernel, "Adopting fundamentalist practices" had become a "way to assert one's sophistication, urbanity and material success." Migrant workers also formed connections with, and helped finance, the Muslim Brotherhood affiliated National Islamic Front political party which could remit their salaries back home to families in Sudan evading taxation in exchange for a percentage (that was less than the taxation). Saudi helped found the African Islamic Center (later the International University of Africa) to help train African Muslim preachers and missionaries "with the Salafist view of Islam."
As Hassan al-Turabi and his National Islamic Front grew in influence and in 1989 a coup d'état by Omar al-Bashir against an elected government negotiating to end the war with the animist and Christian South established Sudan as the first Sunni Islamist state. Al-Turabi became the "power behind the throne" of the al-Bashir government from 1989 to 1999. The revivalist tenure in power was not as successful as its influence on banking or migrant workers. International organizations alleged war crimes, ethnic cleansing, a revival of slavery, torture of opponents, an unprecedented number of refugees fleeing country, and Turabi and allies were expelled from power in 1999. The jihad in the south ended unsuccessfully with the south seceding from Sudan (forming South Sudan) taking with it nearly all of Sudan's oil fields. Turabi himself reversed earlier Islamist positions on marriage and inequality in favor of liberal positions, leading some conservatives to call him an apostate. Al Jazeera estimates that as of 2012 10% of Sudanese are tied to Salafi groups, (more than 60% of Sudanese are affiliated with Sufism), but that number is growing. | https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/International_propagation_of_Salafism_and_Wahhabism_by_region |
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Baháʼu'lláh | Declining to dispute with Yahya or do anything to "endanger the unity and survival of the already demoralized Bábí community", Bahá’u’lláh entrusted his family to the care of his brother Mirza Musa and without notice left Baghdad on 10 April 1854 for mountains in the north near Sulaymaniyyih in Kurdistan. He later wrote that he withdrew to avoid becoming a source of disagreement within the Bábí community.
Initially living as a hermit in those mountains, Bahá’u’lláh dressed as a dervish and used the name Darvish Muhammad-i-Irani. In Sulaymaniyyih the head of a noted theological seminary happened to meet Bahá’u’lláh and invited him to visit. There a student noticed Bahá’u’lláh’s exquisite penmanship, which raised the curiosity of leading instructors. As he responded to their queries on complex religious themes, Bahá’u’lláh quickly gained admiration for his learning and wisdom. Shaykh ʻUthmán, Shaykh ʻAbdu'r-Rahmán, and Shaykh Ismáʼíl, leaders of the Naqshbandíyyih, Qádiríyyih, and Khálidíyyih Orders respectively, began to seek his advice. It was to the second of these that Bahá’u’lláh’s book the Four Valleys was written.
During Bahá’u’lláh’s absence from the Baghdad Bábí community, Mirza Yahya’s true nature became increasingly clear. The public respect and morale of Bábís soon disintegrated as Yahya failed to give spiritual guidance or to demonstrate in daily living the lofty standards taught by the Báb. His actions to discredit Bahá’u’lláh, and any who admired him, grew. At the same time Yahya used the Bábí Faith to benefit himself materially and to try to augment his delusory standing, employing means towards those ends which shamefully contradicted statements by the Báb. He also engaged in criminal activities, including persuading several followers to murder other Bábís whom Yahya viewed as potential adversaries, or as supporters of such imagined rivals. Yahya even took steps to initiate another attempt to assassinate the Shah of Persia. Yahya’s utter failings as a religious leader led most Bábís to reject his claims.
When rumors of a ‘saint’ living in Sulaymaniyyih reached Bábí friends in Baghdad they suspected it was Bahá’u’lláh and asked one of his relatives to locate and beg him to return to help the community. Acceding to their urgent requests, to which Yahya even added an appeal, Bahá’u’lláh returned to Baghdad on 19 March 1856. | https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Bah%C3%A1%CA%BCu%27ll%C3%A1h |
Piracy | The classic era of piracy in the Caribbean lasted from circa 1650 until the mid-1720s. By 1650, France, England and the United Provinces began to develop their colonial empires. This involved considerable seaborne trade, and a general economic improvement: there was money to be made – or stolen – and much of it traveled by ship.
French buccaneers were established on northern Hispaniola as early as 1625, but lived at first mostly as hunters rather than robbers; their transition to full-time piracy was gradual and motivated in part by Spanish efforts to wipe out both the buccaneers and the prey animals on which they depended. The buccaneers' migration from Hispaniola's mainland to the more defensible offshore island of Tortuga limited their resources and accelerated their piratical raids. According to Alexandre Exquemelin, a buccaneer and historian who remains a major source on this period, the Tortuga buccaneer Pierre Le Grand pioneered the settlers' attacks on galleons making the return voyage to Spain.
The growth of buccaneering on Tortuga was augmented by the English capture of Jamaica from Spain in 1655. The early English governors of Jamaica freely granted letters of marque to Tortuga buccaneers and to their own countrymen, while the growth of Port Royal provided these raiders with a far more profitable and enjoyable place to sell their booty. In the 1660s, the new French governor of Tortuga, Bertrand d'Ogeron, similarly provided privateering commissions both to his own colonists and to English cutthroats from Port Royal. These conditions brought Caribbean buccaneering to its zenith.
A new phase of piracy began in the 1690s as English pirates began to look beyond the Caribbean for treasure. The fall of Britain's Stuart kings had restored the traditional enmity between Britain and France, thus ending the profitable collaboration between English Jamaica and French Tortuga. The devastation of Port Royal by an earthquake in 1692 further reduced the Caribbean's attractions by destroying the pirates' chief market for fenced plunder. Caribbean colonial governors began to discard the traditional policy of "no peace beyond the Line," under which it was understood that war would continue (and thus letters of marque would be granted) in the Caribbean regardless of peace treaties signed in Europe; henceforth, commissions would be granted only in wartime, and their limitations would be strictly enforced. Furthermore, much of the Spanish Main had simply been exhausted; Maracaibo alone had been sacked three times between 1667 and 1678, while Río de la Hacha had been raided five times and Tolú eight.
At the same time, England's less favored colonies, including Bermuda, New York, and Rhode Island, had become cash-starved by the Navigation Acts, which restricted trade with foreign ships. Merchants and governors eager for coin were willing to overlook and even underwrite pirate voyages; one colonial official defended a pirate because he thought it "very harsh to hang people that brings in gold to these provinces." Although some of these pirates operating out of New England and the Middle Colonies targeted Spain's remoter Pacific coast colonies well into the 1690s and beyond, the Indian Ocean was a richer and more tempting target. India's economic output was large during this time, especially in high-value luxury goods like silk and calico which made ideal pirate booty; at the same time, no powerful navies plied the Indian Ocean, leaving both local shipping and the various East India companies' vessels vulnerable to attack. This set the stage for the famous pirates, Thomas Tew, Henry Every, Robert Culliford and (although his guilt remains controversial) William Kidd.
In 1713 and 1714, a series of peace treaties ended the War of the Spanish Succession. As a result, thousands of seamen, including European privateers who had operated in the West Indies, were relieved of military duty, at a time when cross-Atlantic colonial shipping trade was beginning to boom. In addition, European sailors who had been pushed by unemployment to work onboard merchantmen (including slave ships) were often enthusiastic to abandon that profession and turn to pirating, giving pirate captains a steady pool of recruits from various coasts across the Atlantic.
In 1715, pirates launched a major raid on Spanish divers trying to recover gold from a sunken treasure galleon near Florida. The nucleus of the pirate force was a group of English ex-privateers, all of whom would soon be enshrined in infamy: Henry Jennings, Charles Vane, Samuel Bellamy, and Edward England. The attack was successful, but contrary to their expectations, the governor of Jamaica refused to allow Jennings and their cohorts to spend their loot on his island. With Kingston and the declining Port Royal closed to them, Jennings and his comrades founded a new pirate base at Nassau, on the island of New Providence in the Bahamas, which had been abandoned during the war. Until the arrival of governor Woodes Rogers three years later, Nassau would be home for these pirates and their many recruits.
Shipping traffic between Africa, the Caribbean, and Europe began to soar in the 18th century, a model that was known as triangular trade, and was a rich target for piracy. Trade ships sailed from Europe to the African coast, trading manufactured goods and weapons in exchange for slaves. The traders would then sail to the Caribbean to sell the slaves, and return to Europe with goods such as sugar, tobacco and cocoa. Another triangular trade saw ships carry raw materials, preserved cod, and rum to Europe, where a portion of the cargo would be sold for manufactured goods, which (along with the remainder of the original load) were transported to the Caribbean, where they were exchanged for sugar and molasses, which (with some manufactured articles) were borne to New England. Ships in the triangular trade made money at each stop.
As part of the peace settlement of the War of the Spanish succession, Britain obtained the asiento, a Spanish government contract, to supply slaves to Spain's new world colonies, providing British traders and smugglers more access to the traditionally closed Spanish markets in America. This arrangement also contributed heavily to the spread of piracy across the western Atlantic at this time. Shipping to the colonies boomed simultaneously with the flood of skilled mariners after the war. Merchant shippers used the surplus of sailors' labor to drive wages down, cutting corners to maximize their profits, and creating unsavory conditions aboard their vessels. Merchant sailors suffered from mortality rates as high or higher than the slaves being transported (Rediker, 2004). Living conditions were so poor that many sailors began to prefer a freer existence as a pirate. The increased volume of shipping traffic also could sustain a large body of brigands preying upon it. Among the most infamous Caribbean pirates of the time were Edward Teach or Blackbeard, Calico Jack Rackham, and Bartholomew Roberts. Most of these pirates were eventually hunted down by the Royal Navy and killed or captured; several battles were fought between the brigands and the colonial powers on both land and sea.
Piracy in the Caribbean declined for the next several decades after 1730, but by the 1810s many pirates roamed the waters though they were not as bold or successful as their predecessors. The most successful pirates of the era were Jean Lafitte and Roberto Cofresi. Lafitte is considered by many to be the last buccaneer due to his army of pirates and fleet of pirate ships which held bases in and around the Gulf of Mexico. Lafitte and his men participated in the War of 1812 battle of New Orleans. Cofresi's base was in Mona Island, Puerto Rico, from where he disrupted the commerce throughout the region. He became the last major target of the international anti-piracy operations.
The elimination of piracy from European waters expanded to the Caribbean in the 18th century, West Africa and North America by the 1710s and by the 1720s even the Indian Ocean was a difficult location for pirates to operate.
England began to strongly turn against piracy at the turn of the 18th century, as it was increasingly damaging to the country's economic and commercial prospects in the region. The Piracy Act 1698 for the "more effectual suppression of Piracy" made it easier to capture, try and convict pirates by lawfully enabling acts of piracy to be "examined, inquired of, tried, heard and determined, and adjudged in any place at sea, or upon the land, in any of his Majesty's islands, plantations, colonies, dominions, forts, or factories." This effectively enabled admirals to hold a court session to hear the trials of pirates in any place they deemed necessary, rather than requiring that the trial be held in England. Commissioners of these vice-admiralty courts were also vested with "full power and authority" to issue warrants, summon the necessary witnesses, and "to do all thing necessary for the hearing and final determination of any case of piracy, robbery, or felony." These new and faster trials provided no legal representation for the pirates; and ultimately led in this era to the execution of 600 pirates, which represented approximately 10 percent of the pirates active at the time in the Caribbean region. Being an accessory to piracy was also criminalised under the statute.
Piracy saw a brief resurgence between the end of the War of the Spanish Succession in 1713 and around 1720, as many unemployed seafarers took to piracy as a way to make ends meet when a surplus of sailors after the war led to a decline in wages and working conditions. At the same time, one of the terms of the Treaty of Utrecht that ended the war gave to Great Britain's Royal African Company and other British slavers a thirty-year asiento, or contract, to furnish African slaves to the Spanish colonies, providing British merchants and smugglers potential inroads into the traditionally closed Spanish markets in America and leading to an economic revival for the whole region. This revived Caribbean trade provided rich new pickings for a wave of piracy. Also contributing to the increase of Caribbean piracy at this time was Spain's breakup of the English logwood settlement at Campeche and the attractions of a freshly sunken silver fleet off the southern Bahamas in 1715. Fears over the rising levels of crime and piracy, political discontent, concern over crowd behaviour at public punishments, and an increased determination by parliament to suppress piracy, resulted in the Piracy Act of 1717 and of 1721. These established a seven-year penal transportation to North America as a possible punishment for those convicted of lesser felonies, or as a possible sentence that capital punishment might be commuted to by royal pardon. In 1717, a pardon was offered to pirates who surrendered to British authorities.
After 1720, piracy in the classic sense became extremely rare as increasingly effective anti-piracy measures were taken by the Royal Navy, making it impossible for any pirate to pursue an effective career for long. By 1718, the British Royal Navy had approximately 124 vessels and 214 by 1815; a big increase from the two vessels England had possessed in 1670. British Royal Navy warships tirelessly hunted down pirate vessels, and almost always won these engagements.
Many pirates did not surrender and were killed at the point of capture; notorious pirate Edward Teach, or "Blackbeard", was hunted down by Lieutenant Robert Maynard at Ocracoke Inlet off the coast of North Carolina on November 22, 1718, and killed. His flagship was a captured French slave ship known originally as La Concorde, he renamed the frigate Queen Anne's Revenge. Captain Chaloner Ogle of HMS Swallow cornered Bartholomew Roberts in 1722 at Cape Lopez, and a fatal broadside from the Swallow killed the pirate captain instantly. Roberts' death shocked the pirate world, as well as the Royal Navy. The local merchants and civilians had thought him invincible, and some considered him a hero. Roberts' death was seen by many historians as the end of the Golden Age of Piracy. Also crucial to the end of this era of piracy was the loss of the pirates' last Caribbean safe haven at Nassau.
In the early 19th century, piracy along the East and Gulf Coasts of North America as well as in the Caribbean increased again. Jean Lafitte was just one of hundreds of pirates operating in American and Caribbean waters between the years of 1820 and 1835. The United States Navy repeatedly engaged pirates in the Caribbean, Gulf of Mexico and in the Mediterranean. Cofresí's El Mosquito was disabled in a collaboration between Spain and the United States. After fleeing for hours, he was ambushed and captured inland. The United States landed shore parties on several islands in the Caribbean in pursuit of pirates; Cuba was a major haven. By the 1830s piracy had died out again, and the navies of the region focused on the slave trade.
About the time of the Mexican–American War in 1846, the United States Navy had grown strong and numerous enough to eliminate the pirate threat in the West Indies. By the 1830s, ships had begun to convert to steam propulsion, so the Age of Sail and the classical idea of pirates in the Caribbean ended. Privateering, similar to piracy, continued as an asset in war for a few more decades and proved to be of some importance during the naval campaigns of the American Civil War.
Privateering would remain a tool of European states until the mid-19th century's Declaration of Paris. But letters of marque were given out much more sparingly by governments and were terminated as soon as conflicts ended. The idea of "no peace beyond the Line" was a relic that had no meaning by the more settled late 18th and early 19th centuries. | https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Piracy |
Fatimid Caliphate | As the military viziers effectively became heads of state, the Caliph himself was reduced to the role of a figurehead. The reliance on the Iqta system also ate into Fatimid central authority, as more and more the military officers at the further ends of the empire became semi-independent.
Badr al-Jamali died in 1094 (along with Caliph al-Mustansir that same year) and his son Al-Afdal Shahanshah succeeded him in power as vizier. After al-Mustansir, the Caliphate passed on to al-Musta'li, and after his death in 1101 it passed to the 5-year-old al-Amir. Another of al-Mustansir's sons, Nizar, attempted to take the throne after his father's death and organized a rebellion in 1095, but he was defeated and executed that same year. Al-Afdal arranged for his sister to marry al-Musta'li and later for his daughter to marry al-Amir, hoping in this way to merge his family with that of the caliphs. He also attempted to secure the succession of his son to the vizierate as well, but this ultimately failed.
During al-Afdal's tenure (1094–1121) the Fatimids faced a new external threat: the First Crusade. Although initially both sides intended to reach an agreement and an alliance against the Seljuk Turks, these negotiations would eventually break down. First contact seems to have been established by the crusaders who sent in May or June 1097, on suggestion of Byzantine Emperor Alexios Komnenos, an embassy to al-Afdal. In return the Fatimids dispatched an embassy to the crusading forces which arrived in February 1098 during their siege of Antioch, witnessing and congratulating the crusaders on their victory against the Seljuk emirs Ridwan of Aleppo and Sökmen of Jerusalem as well as stressing their friendly attitude towards Christians. The Fatimid embassy stayed for a month with the crusading forces before returning via the harbour of Latakia with gifts as well as Frankish ambassadors. It is uncertain whether an agreement was reached but it seems that the parties expected to reach a conclusion in Cairo. Al-Afdal took then advantage of the crusader victory at Antioch to reconquer Jerusalem in August 1098, possibly to be in a better position in the negotiations with the crusaders. The next time both parties met was at Arqah in April 1099 where an impasse was reached in regard to the question of ownership over Jerusalem. Following this, the crusaders crossed into Fatimid territory and captured Jerusalem in July 1099 while al-Afdal was leading a relief army trying to reach the city. The two forces finally clashed in the Battle of Ascalon in which al-Afdal was defeated. Nevertheless, the initial negotiations were held against the Fatimids and Ibn al-Athir wrote that it was said that the Fatimids had invited the crusaders to invade Syria.
This defeat established the Kingdom of Jerusalem as a new regional rival and although many crusaders returned to Europe, having fulfilled their vows, the remaining forces, often aided by the Italian maritime republics, overran much of the coastal Levant, with Tripoli, Beirut, and Sidon falling to them between 1109 and 1110. The Fatimids retained Tyre, Ascalon, and Gaza with the help of their fleet. After 1107, a new rising star rose through the ranks of the regime in the form of Muḥammad ʿAlī bin Fatik, better known as al-Maʾmūn al-Baṭā'iḥī. He managed to carry out various administrative reforms and infrastructural projects in the later years of al-Afdal's term, including the construction of an astronomical observatory in 1119. Al-Afdal's was assassinated in 1121, an act blamed on the Nizaris or Assassins, though the truth of this is unconfirmed.
Al-Baṭā'iḥī took al-Afdal's place as vizier, but unlike his predecessors he had less support in the army and was ultimately reliant on the caliph for power. In 1124 he lost Tyre to the Crusaders. He was also responsible for constructing a small but notable mosque in Cairo, the Al-Aqmar Mosque, which was completed in 1125 and has largely survived to the present day. That same year, however, Caliph al-Amir had him arrested, probably due to his failure to resist the Crusaders or due to the caliph's resentment of his wealth and power. Three years later he was executed. Al-Amir then ruled the Caliphate personally, briefly interrupting the long period of de facto rule by the caliph's viziers. Al-Amir himself was assassinated in 1130, probably by the Nizari Assassins.
Al-Amir apparently had a son born shortly before his death, known as al-Ṭayyib. One of Al-Amir's cousins (a grandson of al-Mustansir), Abd al-Majid, had himself appointed regent. Under pressure from the army, one of al-Afdal's sons, Abu Ali Ahmad (known as Kutayfāt), was appointed vizier with titles similar to al-Adal and Badr al-Jamali. Kutayfāt attempted to depose the Fatimid dynasty by imprisoning Abd al-Majid and by declaring himself to be the representative of Muhammad al-Muntazar, the "hidden" Imam awaited by Twelver Shi'as. The coup did not last long, as Kutayfāt was assassinated in 1131 by al-Amir's followers in the Fatimid establishment. Abd al-Majid was released and resumed his role as regent. In 1132, however, he declared himself to be the new Imam-Caliph, taking the title of al-Hafiz, sidelining the infant al-Ṭayyib and breaking with the tradition of the succession passing directly from father to son. Most of the Fatimid lands acknowledged his succession, but the Sulayhids in Yemen did not and broke away from the Caliphate in Cairo, recognizing al-Ṭayyib as the true Imam. This caused another schism between the Hafizi and Tayyibi branches of the Musta'li Isma'ilis.
In 1135 al-Hafiz was pressured by the Fatimid Armenian troops into appointing Bahram, a Christian Armenian, to the office of vizier. Opposition from Muslim troops forced him to leave in 1137, when Ridwan, a Sunni Muslim, was appointed vizier. When Ridwan began to plot the deposition of al-Hafiz, he was expelled from Cairo and later defeated in battle. He accepted a pardon from the caliph and remained at the palace. Al-Hafiz chose not to appoint another vizier, and instead took direct control of the state until his death in 1149. During this time, the fervor of the Isma'ili religious cause in Egypt had significantly faded, and political challenges to the caliph became more common. Sunni Muslims were also increasingly appointed to high posts. The Fatimid dynasty largely continued to survive due to the established common interests that many factions and elites had in maintaining the current system of government.
Al-Hafiz was the last Fatimid caliph to rule directly and the last one to ascend to the throne as an adult. The last three caliphs, al-Zafir (r. 1149–1154), al-Fa'iz (r. 1154–1160), and al-Adid (r. 1160–1171), were all children when they came to the throne. Under al-Zafir, an elderly Berber named Ibn Masal was initially vizier, per the instructions left by Al-Hafiz. The army, however, supported a Sunni named Ibn Sallar instead, whose supporters managed to defeat and kill Ibn Masal in battle. After negotiating with the women of the palace, Ibn Sallar was installed as vizier in 1150. In January 1153, the Crusader king Baldwin III of Jerusalem besieged Ascalon, the last remaining Fatimid foothold in the Levant. In April, Ibn Sallar was murdered in a plot organized by Abbas, his stepson, and Abbas's son, Nasr. As no relieving force arrived, Ascalon surrendered in August, on the condition that the inhabitants could leave safely for Egypt. It was on this occasion that the head of Husayn was allegedly brought from Ascalon to Cairo, where it was housed in what is now the al-Hussein Mosque. The next year (1154), Nasr murdered al-Zafir, and Abbas, now vizier, declared his 5-year-old son 'Isa (al-Fa'iz) the new caliph. The women of the palace intervened, calling on Ṭalā'i' ibn Ruzzīk, a Muslim Armenian governor in Upper Egypt, to help. Tala'i drove out Abbas and Nasr from Cairo and became vizier that same year. Afterwards he also conducted renewed operations against the Crusaders, but he could do little more than harass them by sea. Al-Fa'iz died in 1160 and Tala'i was assassinated in 1161 by Sitt al-Qusur, a sister of al-Zafir. Tala'i's son, Ruzzīk ibn Ṭalā'i', held the office of vizier until 1163, when he was overthrown and killed by Shawar, the governor of Qus.
As vizier, Shawar came into conflict with his rival, the Arab general Dirgham. The internal disorder of the Caliphate attracted the attention and meddling of the Sunni Zengid ruler Nūr ad-Dīn, who was now in control of Damascus and a large part of Syria, and of the King of Jerusalem, Amalric I. The Crusaders had already forced Tala'i ibn Ruzzik to pay them a tribute in 1161 and had made an attempt to invade Egypt in 1162. When Shawar was driven out of Cairo by Dirgham in 1163, he sought refuge and help with Nur al-Din. Nur al-Din sent his general, Asad al-Din Shirkuh, to seize Egypt and reinstall Shawar as vizier. The accomplished this task in the summer of 1164, when Dirgham was defeated and killed.
Shawar's remaining years continued in chaos as he made shifting alliances with either the King of Jerusalem or with Nur al-Din, depending on circumstances. In 1167 the Crusaders pursued Shirkuh's forces in to Upper Egypt. In 1168 Shawar, worried about the possible Crusader capture of Cairo, infamously set fire to Fustat in an attempt to deny the Crusaders a base from which to besiege the capital. After forcing the Crusaders to leave Egypt again, Shirkuh finally had Shawar murdered in 1169, with the agreement of Caliph al-Adid. Shirkuh himself was appointed as al-Adid's vizier, but he died unexpectedly two months later. The position passed to his nephew, Salah ad-Din Yusuf ibn Ayyub (known in the West as Saladin). Salah ad-Din was openly pro-Sunni and suppressed the Shi'a call to prayer, ended the Isma'ili doctrinal lectures (the majālis al-ḥikma), and installed Sunni judges. He finally and officially deposed al-Adid, the last Fatimid caliph, in September 1171. This ended the Fatimid dynasty and began the Ayyubid Sultanate of Egypt and Syria. | https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Fatimid_Caliphate |
History of the Jews in Algeria | Jean-Pierre Barda, singer, actor, make up artist
José Aboulker, member of the anti-Nazi resistance
Alon Abutbul, an actor
Franck Amsallem, jazz pianist and composer
Françoise Atlan, French singer
Yvan Attal, film director, actor (Algerian born parents)
Jacques Attali, economist, writer
Danny Ayalon, politician
Jean-Pierre Bacri, actor
Myriam Ben, activist and novelist
Baruj Benacerraf, immunologist, Nobel prize (1980) (Algerian Jewish mother)
Paul Benacerraf, philosopher (Algerian Jewish mother)
Maurice Benayoun, artist
Jean Benguigui, actor
Éric Benhamou, businessman, CEO of 3Com, venture capitalist, philanthropist
Michel Benita, double bass player
Daniel Bensaïd, philosopher and trotskyist (Jewish Algerian father)
Richard Berry, actor
Lili Boniche, musician
Eliyahu Zini, Algerian-born rabbi and head of a Hesder Yeshiva in the Israeli town of Haifa and doctor of mathematics from the Technion.
Patrick Bruel, singer, actor
Alain Chabat, actor
André Chouraqui, writer
Élie Chouraqui, French film director and scriptwriter
Hélène Cixous, feminist writer
Robert Cohen, boxer: World Bantamweight Champion
Annie Cohen-Solal, academic and biographer of Jean-Paul Sartre
Claude Cohen-Tannoudji, physicist, Nobel prize (1997)
Jean-François Copé, (Algerian Jew mother), President of the Union for a Popular Movement (UMP) Group in the French National Assembly
Abraham Daninos, author, wrote the first theatre play in Arabic (1847)
Gérard Darmon, actor
Jacques Derrida, post-structuralist philosopher
Pascal Elbé, actor
Jean-Pierre Elkabbach, journalist
David Foenkinos, French born author and screenwriter.
Eva Green, actress (mother was of Algerian Jewish descent)
Alphonse Halimi, boxer: World Bantamweight Champion
Roger Hanin, film actor & director
Marlène Jobert, actress
Judah Kalaẓ, cabalist and moralist
Oded Kattash, Israeli basketball player, a superstar in Israel and Greece, currently head coach of Israel's national team and Panathinaikos
Haim Korsia, Chief Rabbi of France (Algerian parents)
Claude Lelouch, film director (Algerian Jew father)
Bernard-Henri Lévy, philosopher
Reinette L'Oranaise, singer
Enrico Macias, singer
Elissa Rhaïs, novelist
Martial Solal, jazz pianist and composer
Benjamin Stora, historian
Avraham Tal, Israeli singer
Patrick Timsit, humorist, actor
Shmuel Trigano, sociologist and philosopher
Éric Zemmour, journalist
Claude Zidi, film director | https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/History_of_the_Jews_in_Algeria |
Emirate of Ras Al Khaimah | The annual Ras Al Khaimah Half Marathon, first held in 2007, resulted in a world record from Samuel Wanjiru in 2007 and the second fastest run of all time from Patrick Makau Musyoki in 2009. Kenya's 19-year-old Stephen Kiprop won the 2019 edition of the half marathon in a course record-equaling 58 minutes and 42 seconds, the fastest time ever recorded by a teenager.
In the 2020 iteration, Ethiopia's Ababel Yeshaneh broke the women's half marathon world record by 20 seconds with a time of 1:04:31, eclipsing the previous record of 1:04:51 set by Kenyan Joyciline Jepkosgei in Valencia in 2017.
The UAE Awafi Festival is an annual cultural and heritage festival held in the Ras Al Khaimah desert. It is a three-week event, held in December or January, one attraction being a sand dune race. There is a heritage village with traditional food and dance, as well as shops for food and souvenirs.
The Terry Fox Run RAK is a yearly charity run organized in Ras Al Khaimah to support cancer research in the UAE. The first event was organized in 2010. Participation in this event has grown from hundreds to thousands since its inception, averaging about 5,000 participants in recent years.
Ras Al Khaimah Art is an annual event that has taken place since 2013, organised by the Al Qasimi Foundation for Policy Research. It started with just 26 artists but by 2018 that number had grown to 84. The not-for-profit festival takes place every February–March and since 2019 has taken place at the redeveloped Al Jazirah Al Hamra Heritage Village.
Each year, a number of events are lined up in Ras Al Khaimah to mark the United Arab Emirates' National Day, usually involving an air show by the Fursan Al Emarat aerobatics team and a free concert featuring some of the best singers in the Arab world.
In 2018, Ras Al Khaimah became the new host for the season-ending tournament on the Challenge Tour, the second tier of European Tour golf. The "Road to Ras Al Khaimah" ends with the Ras Al Khaimah Challenge Tour Grand Final played at Al Hamra Golf Course.
2022 marked the start of the Ras Al Khaimah Championship golf event, a top-tier European Tour event bringing the top players on the tour to Al Hamra Golf Club each February. | https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Emirate_of_Ras_Al_Khaimah |
Marinid Sultanate | The minbars (pulpits) of the Marinid era were also following in the same tradition as earlier Almoravid and Almohad wooden minbars. The minbar of the Great Mosque of Taza dates to the mosque's expansion by Abu Yaqub Yusuf in the 1290s, much like the mosque's chandelier. Like other minbars, it takes the shape of a mobile staircase with an archway at the bottom of the stairs and a canopy at the top and it is composed of many pieces of wood assembled together. In spite of later restorations which modified its character, it still preserves much of its original Marinid woodwork. Its two flanks are covered with an example of the elaborate geometric decoration found in the artisan tradition dating back to the 12th-century Almoravid minbar of the Kutubiyya Mosque (in Marrakesh). This geometric motif is based on eight-pointed stars from which interlacing bands spread outward and repeat the motif across the whole surface. Contrary to the famous Almoravid minbar in Marrakesh, however, the empty spaces between the bands are not occupied by a mix of pieces with carved floral reliefs but are rather occupied entirely by pieces of marquetry mosaic decoration inlaid with ivory and precious woods.
The original minbar of the Bou Inania Madrasa, which is housed today at the Dar Batha museum, dates from 1350 to 1355 when the madrasa was being built. It is notable as one of the best Marinid examples of its kind. The Bou Inania minbar, made of wood – including ebony and other expensive woods – is decorated via a mix of marquetry and inlaid carved decoration. The main decorative pattern along its major surfaces on either side is centered around eight-pointed stars, from which bands decorated with ivory inlay then interweave and repeat the same pattern across the rest of the surface. The spaces between these bands form other geometric shapes which are filled with wood panels of intricately carved arabesques. This motif is similar to that found on the Kutubiyya minbar, and even more so to that of the slightly later Almohad minbar of the Kasbah Mosque in Marrakesh (commissioned between 1189 and 1195). The arch above the first step of the minbar contains an inscription, now partly disappeared, which refers to Abu Inan and his titles. | https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Marinid_Sultanate |
Fula people | The Fulani are traditionally a nomadic, pastoralist trading people. They herd cattle, goats and sheep across the vast dry hinterlands of their domain, keeping somewhat separate from the local agricultural populations. They are the largest nomadic ethnic group in the world and inhabit several territories over an area larger in size than the continental United States. The pastoral lifestyle of the herders' tribe makes it complicated for a non-member to date or marry a Fulani woman.
The Fulani follow a code of behaviour known as pulaaku, which consists of the qualities of patience, self-control, discipline, prudence, modesty, respect for others (including foes), wisdom, forethought, personal responsibility, hospitality, courage, and hard work. Among the nomadic Fulani, women in their spare time make handicrafts including engraved gourds, weavings, knitting, beautifully made covers for calabashes known as mbeedu, and baskets. The Fulani men are less involved in the production of crafts such as pottery, iron-working, and dyeing, unlike males from neighbouring ethnic groups around them.
In virtually every area of West Africa, where the nomadic Fulɓe reside, there has been an increasing trend of conflicts between farmers (sedentary) and grazier (pastoral nomadic). There have been numerous such cases on the Jos Plateau, the Western High Plateau, the Central/Middle Belt regions of Nigeria, Northern Burkina Faso, and Southern Chad. The rearing of cattle is a principal activity in four of Cameroon's ten administrative regions as well as three other provinces with herding on a lesser scale, throughout the North and Central regions of Nigeria, as well as the entire Sahel and Sudan region.
For decades there have been intermittent skirmishes between the Woɗaaɓe Bororo (graziers) and sedentary farmers such as the Jukun, Tiv, Chamba, Bamileke, Wurkum, Bachama, Jenjo, Mbula, Berom, Mumuye, Kare Kare, and sometimes even the Hausa. Such conflicts usually begin when cattle have strayed into farmlands and destroyed crops. Thousands of Fulani have been forced to migrate from their traditional homelands in the Sahel, to areas further south, because of increasing encroachment of Saharan desertification. Nigeria alone loses 2,168 square kilometres (837 sq mi) of cattle rangeland and cropland every year to desertification, posing serious threats to the livelihoods of about 20 million people.
Recurrent droughts have meant that a lot of traditional herding families have been forced to give up their nomadic way of life, losing a sense of their identity in the process. Increasing urbanization has also meant that a lot of traditional Fulani grazing lands have been taken for developmental purposes, or forcefully converted into farmlands. These actions often result in violent attacks and reprisal counterattacks being exchanged between the Fulani, who feel their way of life and survival are being threatened, and other populations who often feel aggrieved from loss of farm produce even if the lands they farm on were initially barren and uncultivated.
Fulani in Nigeria have often requested for the development of exclusive grazing reserves, to curb conflicts. All the leading presidential aspirants of previous elections seeking Fulɓe votes have made several of such failed promises in their campaigns. Discussions among government officials, traditional rulers, and Fulani leaders on the welfare of the pastoralists have always centred on requests and pledges for protecting grazing spaces and cattle passages. The growing pressure from Ardo'en (the Fulani community leaders) for the salvation of what is left of the customary grazing land has caused some state governments with large populations of herders (such as Gombe, Bauchi, Adamawa, Taraba, Plateau, and Kaduna) to include in their development plans the reactivation and preservation of grazing reserves. Quick to grasp the desperation of cattle-keepers for land, the administrators have instituted a Grazing Reserve Committee to find a lasting solution to the rapid depletion of grazing land resources in Nigeria.
The Fulani believe that the expansion of the grazing reserves will boost livestock population, lessen the difficulty of herding, reduce seasonal migration, and enhance the interaction among farmers, pastoralists, and rural dwellers. Despite these expectations, grazing reserves are not within the reach of about three-quarters of the nomadic Fulani in Nigeria, who number in the millions, and about sixty per cent of migrant pastoralists who use the existing grazing reserves keep to the same reserves every year. The number and the distribution of the grazing reserves in Nigeria range from insufficient to severely insufficient for Fulani livestock. In countries like Nigeria, Cameroon, and Burkina Faso where meat supplies are entirely dependent on the Fulani, such conflicts lead to scarcity and hikes in animal protein prices. In recent times, the Nigerian senate and other lawmakers have been bitterly divided in attempts to pass bills on grazing lands and migration "corridors" for Fulani herdsmen. This was mainly due to Southern and Central Nigerian lawmakers opposing the proposal, and Northern Lawmakers being in support. Fulani extremists are involved in herder-farmer conflicts in Nigeria. According to the Global Terrorism Index, a continuous sequence of Fulani attacks across West Africa have occurred in Mali, Central African Republic, Democratic Republic of Congo, and Cameroon. The cumulative fatalities in these attacks is in the thousands. | https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Fula_people |
History of Lebanon | The discontent grew to open rebellion, fed by both Ottoman and British money and support: Bashir II fled, the Ottoman Empire reasserted control and Mehmed Hüsrev Pasha, whose sole term as Grand Vizier ran from 1839 to 1841, appointed another member of the Shihab family, who styled himself Bashir III. Bashir III, coming on the heels of a man who by guile, force and diplomacy had dominated Mt Lebanon and the Biqa for 52 years, did not last long. In 1841 conflicts between the impoverished Druze and the Maronite Christians exploded: There was a massacre of Christians by the Druze at Deir al Qamar, and the fleeing survivors were slaughtered by Ottoman regulars. The Ottomans attempted to create peace by dividing Mt Lebanon into a Christian district and a Druze district, but this would merely create geographic powerbases for the warring parties, and it plunged the region back into civil conflict which included not only the sectarian warfare but a Maronite revolt against the Feudal class, which ended in 1858 with the overthrow of the old feudal system of taxes and levies. The situation was unstable: the Maronites lived in the large towns, but these were often surrounded by Druze villages living as perioikoi.
The relationship between the Druze and Christians has been characterized by harmony and peaceful coexistence, with amicable relations between the two groups prevailing throughout history, with the exception of some periods, including 1860 Mount Lebanon civil war. In 1860, this would boil back into full scale sectarian war, when the Maronites began openly opposing the power of the Ottoman Empire. Another destabilizing factor was France's support for the Maronite Christians against the Druze which in turn led the British to back the Druze, exacerbating religious and economic tensions between the two communities. The Druze took advantage of this and began burning Maronite villages. The Druze had grown increasingly resentful of the favoring of the Maronites by Bashir II, and were backed by the Ottoman Empire and the wali of Damascus in an attempt to gain greater control over Lebanon; the Maronites were backed by the French, out of both economic and political expediency. The Druze began a military campaign that included the burning of villages and massacres, while Maronite irregulars retaliated with attacks of their own. However, the Maronites were gradually pushed into a few strongholds and were on the verge of military defeat when the Concert of Europe intervened and established a commission to determine the outcome. The French forces deployed there were then used to enforce the final decision. The French accepted the Druze as having established control and the Maronites were reduced to a semi-autonomous region around Mount Lebanon, without even direct control over Beirut itself. The Province of Lebanon would be controlled by the Maronites, but the entire area was placed under direct rule of the governor of Damascus, and carefully watched by the Ottoman Empire.
The long siege of Deir al-Qamar found a Maronite garrison holding out against Druze forces backed by Ottoman soldiers; the area in every direction was despoiled by the besiegers. In July 1860, with European intervention threatening, the Turkish government tried to quiet the strife, but Napoleon III of France sent 7,000 troops to Beirut and helped impose a partition: The Druze control of the territory was recognized as the fact on the ground, and the Maronites were forced into an enclave, arrangements ratified by the Concert of Europe in 1861. They were confined to a mountainous district, cut off from both the Biqa and Beirut, and faced with the prospect of ever-growing poverty. Resentments and fears would brood, ones which would resurface in the coming decades.
Youssef Bey Karam, a Lebanese nationalist played an influential role in Lebanon's independence during this era. | https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/History_of_Lebanon |
Acre, Israel | Following the defeat of the Byzantine army of Heraclius by the Rashidun army of Khalid ibn al-Walid in the Battle of Yarmouk, and the capitulation of the Christian city of Jerusalem to the Caliph Umar, Acre came under the rule of the Rashidun Caliphate beginning in 638. According to the early Muslim chronicler al-Baladhuri, the actual conquest of Acre was led by Shurahbil ibn Hasana, and it likely surrendered without resistance. The Arab conquest brought a revival to the town of Acre, and it served as the main port of Palestine through the Umayyad and Abbasid Caliphates that followed, and through Crusader rule into the 13th century.
The first Umayyad caliph, Muawiyah I (r. 661–680), regarded the coastal towns of the Levant as strategically important. Thus, he strengthened Acre's fortifications and settled Persians from other parts of Muslim Syria to inhabit the city. From Acre, which became one of the region's most important dockyards along with Tyre, Mu'awiyah launched an attack against Byzantine-held Cyprus. The Byzantines assaulted the coastal cities in 669, prompting Mu'awiyah to assemble and send shipbuilders and carpenters to Acre. The city would continue to serve as the principal naval base of Jund al-Urdunn ("Military District of Jordan") until the reign of Caliph Hisham ibn Abd al-Malik (723–743), who moved the bulk of the shipyards north to Tyre. Nonetheless, Acre remained militarily significant through the early Abbasid period, with Caliph al-Mutawakkil issuing an order to make Acre into a major naval base in 861, equipping the city with battleships and combat troops.
During the 10th century, Acre was still part of Jund al-Urdunn. Local Arab geographer al-Muqaddasi visited Acre during the early Fatimid Caliphate in 985, describing it as a fortified coastal city with a large mosque possessing a substantial olive grove. Fortifications had been previously built by the autonomous Emir Ibn Tulun of Egypt, who annexed the city in the 870s, and provided relative safety for merchant ships arriving at the city's port. When Persian traveller Nasir Khusraw visited Acre in 1047, he noted that the large Jama Masjid was built of marble, located in the centre of the city and just south of it lay the "tomb of the Prophet Salih." Khusraw provided a description of the city's size, which roughly translated as having a length of 1.24 kilometres (0.77 miles) and a width of 300 metres (984 feet). This figure indicates that Acre at that time was larger than its current Old City area, most of which was built between the 18th and 19th centuries. | https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Acre,_Israel |
Siddiq Hasan Khan | Once in power, Siddiq Hasan Khan began enforcing his reformist ideas through the authority of the state. Under his wife's reign, the doctrines of the Ahl-i Hadith began to be enforced as the state religion. Various royal ceremonies and folk rituals which Khan regarded as bid'at (religious innovations) were banned. Apart from this, a comprehensive religious educational programme was also implemented by the Bhopal State. Numerous madrasahs teaching Ahl-i Hadith doctrines were set up, hundreds of religious treatises of Khan were published and mass distributed across South Asia through the state-run printing press.
With the help of Yemeni Islamic scholars in Bhopal, Khan also attacked folk Islam as well as the practices of both Sufism and Shi'a Islam. As the de facto ruler of Bhopal, Khan banned celebrations for the Islamic prophet Muhammad's birthday (Mawlid) as heretical practices without basis in Islam, something which upset Sufis greatly. Additionally, his reformist ideas in regard to Islamic jurisprudence upset the predominant Hanafi school of Islamic law. Khan's humble beginnings and working-class background also caused him to become the object of scorn, condescension yet also jealousy on the part of Bhopal's gentry. Khan was still described as a prototypical Indo-Persian gentleman, multilingual, educated and with wide-reaching international ties.
Khan's socio-political efforts proved to be his undoing; just as quickly as he rose to become Bhopal's most influential Islamic leader, so did he lose this status. Siddiq Hasan's enemies in Bhopal State and other Muslim religious circles had often accused him of being a "Wahhabi", a label commonly employed by the colonial authorities to denote "anti-British" rebels, "fanatic", "puritan" etc.; with the intention to eradicate his influence in Bhopal. Initially, the British ignored accusations of his Muslim opponents that Khan was a proponent of "Wahhabism". "Wahhabi" label was detested within both the British and Ottoman Empires due to the political challenge posed by the Arabian reformer Ibn 'Abd al-Wahhab's Muwahhidun movement to the dominance of the two states in the Middle East. Later, the British authorities began to inspect Siddiq Hasan's books closely and discovered his treatises which elaborated his doctrines on Jihad. Furthermore, when they detected that 17 Wahhabi scholars from Najd had come to study in Bhopal under Khan's tutelage, the British suspected him of being part of a pan-Islamic anti-British conspiracy; extending across India, Egypt, Istanbul, and Mahdist Sudan. | https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Siddiq_Hasan_Khan |
Egyptian language | Allen, James P. (2000). Middle Egyptian: An Introduction to the Language and Culture of Hieroglyphs. Cambridge University Press. ISBN 978-0-521-65312-1.
Allen, James P. (2013). The Ancient Egyptian Language: An Historical Study. Cambridge University Press. ISBN 978-1-107-66467-8.
Christidēs, Anastasios-Phoivos; Arapopoulou, Maria; Chritē, Maria (2007). A History of Ancient Greek: From the Beginnings to Late Antiquity. Cambridge University Press. ISBN 978-0-521-83307-3.
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Rubin, Aaron D. (2013). "Egyptian and Hebrew". In Khan, Geoffrey; Bolozky, Shmuel; Fassberg, Steven; Rendsburg, Gary A.; Rubin, Aaron D.; Schwarzwald, Ora R.; Zewi, Tamar (eds.). Encyclopedia of Hebrew Language and Linguistics. Leiden and Boston: Brill Publishers. doi:10.1163/2212-4241_ehll_EHLL_COM_00000721. ISBN 978-90-04-17642-3.
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Archaeology of Ancient Egypt | The tomb of Nefertari, QV66, was discovered by Ernesto Schiaparelli in 1904. A flight of steps cut out of the rock gives access to the antechamber, which is decorated with paintings based on chapter seventeen of the Book of the Dead. The astronomical ceiling represents the heavens and is painted in dark blue, with a myriad of golden five-pointed stars. The east wall of the antechamber is interrupted by a large opening flanked by the representation of Osiris to the left and Anubis on the right; this, in turn, leads to the side chamber, decorated with offering-scenes, preceded by a vestibule in which paintings portray Nefertari presented to the deities, who welcome her. On the north wall of the antechamber is the stairway down to the burial-chamber, a vast quadrangular room covering a surface area of about 90 square metres (970 sq ft), its astronomical ceiling supported by four pillars, entirely decorated.
The entrance to KV55 was uncovered by Edward R. Ayrton on 6 January 1907. Its discovery was brought to the attention of Theodore M. Davis the following day. The tomb was first entered on 9 January by Ayrton, Davis, Joseph Lindon Smith, and (as the representative of the antiquities service) Arthur Weigall. On 11 January 1907, the findings were photographed. Ayrton then began clearing the tomb. On 25 January 1907, the coffin and mummy were investigated in situ.
In 1921, while excavating south of the tomb, Howard Carter discovered several items that seem to have originated in KV55. These included a jasper burnisher and some fragments of copper rosettes from a funerary pall.
After a systematic search, beginning in 1915, Carter discovered the actual tomb of Tutankhamun (KV62) in November 1922. By February 1923, the antechamber had been cleared of everything but two sentinel statues. A day and time were selected to unseal the tomb with about twenty appointed witnesses that included Lord Carnarvon, several Egyptian officials, museum representatives and the staff of the Government Press Bureau. On 17 February 1923, at just after two o'clock, the seal was broken. There were 5,398 items found in the tomb, including a solid gold coffin, face mask, thrones, archery bows, trumpets, a lotus chalice, two Imiut fetishes, gold toe stalls, furniture, food, wine, sandals, and fresh linen underwear. Howard Carter spent ten years cataloging the items.
In 1954, Egyptian archaeologist Kamal el-Mallakh discovered a ship buried in pieces right beside the Great Pyramid of Khufu. It was largely built of Lebanon cedar planking in the "shell-first" construction technique, using unpegged tenons of Christ's thorn. The ship was built with a flat bottom composed of several planks, but no actual keel, with the planks and frames lashed together with Halfah grass and has been reconstructed from 1,224 pieces which had been laid in a logical, disassembled order in the pit beside the pyramid.
Though KV5 was partially excavated as early as 1825, its true extent was discovered in 1995 by Kent R. Weeks and his exploration team. It has proven to be the largest tomb in the Valley of the Kings, and originally contained the mummified remains of some of this king's estimated 52 sons. Approximately 150 corridors and tomb chambers have been located in this tomb as of 2006, and the tomb may contain as many as 200 corridors and chambers. | https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Archaeology_of_Ancient_Egypt |
Mount Lebanon Mutasarrifate | Most of the residents of the Mutasarrifate were farmers who practiced agriculture using traditional methods and with a characteristic specific to Mount Lebanon, in harmony with the nature of the mountainous land and its surface, its soil and the seasons of the year. The olive groves spread widely on the coasts and foothills of the West Lebanon mountain range, providing work for workers and a decent income for their owners. Olive is an important component of the mountain people's diet and a raw material for oil production and soap industry. The largest part of olive production and its derivatives was consumed in Lebanon, while the surplus was exported abroad, generating an important financial profit for the country. The Lebanese considered the olive tree a sacred tree and its oil sacred, due to its frequent mention in the Bible and in the Qur’an, they also produced different types of the olive tree, most notably: Al-Ṣūrī (lit. 'Of Tyre'), Al-Baladī (lit. 'Of the country'), Al-Shatawī (lit. 'Of the winter'), and Al-Bustānī (lit. 'Of the garden').
In the spring days, the majority of the Lebanese were devoted to raising silkworms, which feed on the leaves of mulberry trees. The cultivation of mulberry was spread all over Lebanon, the coast and the mountains. Several factories were established in Mount Lebanon to extract silk threads from the silkworms, and housewives worked on looms and turned some of these threads into valuable silk textiles suitable for making clothes and furnishings. But the bulk of the silk threads were exported to European countries, especially to France, which was buying most of the Lebanese production.
In addition, grapes and what was extracted from them were among the main produce on which a large part of the villagers depended. The wine industry of Lebanon is among the most ancient in the world. Lebanon's wines were mentioned in the Old Testament, and some ancient inscriptions stated that it was made as tribute which the Lebanese population gave to the conquerors, and the quality of Lebanese aged wine in monasteries is famous. Most of the grape production was from wine, 'araq, raisins, and vinegar for local consumption, as was the case with the fig, which was a well-known and desirable tree.
Some mountain peasants raised pine trees, as these trees had a great economic benefit, and the richest mountain peasants were the ones who owned the pine forests, in addition to the fact that its fruit is expensive, it provides the farmer with firewood and timber for the roof of his house, and wooden panels for his furniture and seats, and other things necessary for his life. Most of the pine was consumed locally, and very little of it was exported.
As for wheat, spelt, and grains, their production was very weak in the lands of the Mutasarrifate, due to the narrowness of the lands and the harsh climate, after the 1861 Protocol separated from Mount Lebanon the plains of Akkar, the Bekaa and the south, the mountain's production of wheat has become so small that it only fills a very small part of the people's need for this basic material in their daily diet. Therefore, they had to buy wheat from Houran, Dara'a and other areas to secure their essential sustenance. Dr. Anis Freiha, one of the Lebanese historians who lived through the era of the Mutasarrifate, talks about the necessity of wheat in the Mount Lebanon Mutasarrifate, he mentions the presence of wheat sellers coming from the Bekaa, Hauran and Jabal al-Druze to Lebanon: "Bread is the basic food item... So the first thing the villager took care of was the wheat supply... In every Lebanese village, few people produce their own wheat. But most of them buy wheat from abroad... Those who do not produce their own wheat are accepted [by the wheat sellers] and buy what is sufficient for them for at least half a year. And some of them do not have their heart reassured until they buy for a whole year. But some of them can't." | https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Mount_Lebanon_Mutasarrifate |
Novel | James Joyce's Ulysses (1922) had a major influence on modern novelists, in the way that it replaced the 18th- and 19th-century narrator with a text that attempted to record inner thoughts, or a "stream of consciousness". This term was first used by William James in 1890 and, along with the related term interior monologue, is used by modernists like Dorothy Richardson, Marcel Proust, Virginia Woolf, and William Faulkner. Also in the 1920s expressionist Alfred Döblin went in a different direction with Berlin Alexanderplatz (1929), where interspersed non-fictional text fragments exist alongside the fictional material to create another new form of realism, which differs from that of stream-of-consciousness.
Later works like Samuel Beckett's trilogy Molloy (1951), Malone Dies (1951) and The Unnamable (1953), as well as Julio Cortázar's Rayuela (1963) and Thomas Pynchon's Gravity's Rainbow (1973) all make use of the stream-of-consciousness technique. On the other hand, Robert Coover is an example of those authors who, in the 1960s, fragmented their stories and challenged time and sequentiality as fundamental structural concepts.
The 20th century novel deals with a wide range of subject matter. Erich Maria Remarque's All Quiet on the Western Front (1928) focusses on a young German's experiences of World War I. The Jazz Age is explored by American F. Scott Fitzgerald, and the Great Depression by fellow American John Steinbeck. Totalitarianism is the subject of British writer George Orwell's most famous novels. Existentialism is the focus of two writers from France: Jean-Paul Sartre with Nausea (1938) and Albert Camus with The Stranger (1942). The counterculture of the 1960s, with its exploration of altered states of consciousness, led to revived interest in the mystical works of Hermann Hesse, such as Steppenwolf (1927), and produced iconic works of its own, for example Ken Kesey's One Flew Over the Cuckoo's Nest and Thomas Pynchon's Gravity's Rainbow. Novelists have also been interested in the subject of racial and gender identity in recent decades. Jesse Kavadlo of Maryville University of St. Louis has described Chuck Palahniuk's Fight Club (1996) as "a closeted feminist critique". Virginia Woolf, Simone de Beauvoir, Doris Lessing, Elfriede Jelinek were feminist voices during this period.
Furthermore, the major political and military confrontations of the 20th and 21st centuries have also influenced novelists. The events of World War II, from a German perspective, are dealt with by Günter Grass' The Tin Drum (1959) and an American by Joseph Heller's Catch-22 (1961). The subsequent Cold War influenced popular spy novels. Latin American self-awareness in the wake of the leftist revolutions of the 1960s and 1970s resulted in a "Latin American Boom", linked to the names of novelists Julio Cortázar, Mario Vargas Llosa, Carlos Fuentes and Gabriel García Márquez, along with the invention of a special brand of postmodern magic realism.
Another major 20th-century social event, the so-called sexual revolution is reflected in the modern novel. D.H. Lawrence's Lady Chatterley's Lover had to be published in Italy in 1928 with British censorship only lifting its ban as late as 1960. Henry Miller's Tropic of Cancer (1934) created a comparable US scandal. Transgressive fiction from Vladimir Nabokov's Lolita (1955) to Michel Houellebecq's Les Particules élémentaires (1998) pushed the boundaries, leading to the mainstream publication of explicitly erotic works such as Anne Desclos' Story of O (1954) and Anaïs Nin's Delta of Venus (1978).
In the second half of the 20th century, Postmodern authors subverted serious debate with playfulness, claiming that art could never be original, that it always plays with existing materials. The idea that language is self-referential was already an accepted truth in the world of pulp fiction. A postmodernist re-reads popular literature as an essential cultural production. Novels from Thomas Pynchon's The Crying of Lot 49 (1966), to Umberto Eco's The Name of the Rose (1980) and Foucault's Pendulum (1989) made use of intertextual references. | https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Novel |
Karbala | Like Najaf, the city suffered from severe water shortages that were only resolved in the early 18th century by building a dam at the head of the Husayniyya Canal. In 1737, the city replaced Isfahan in Iran as the main centre of Shia scholarship. In the mid-eighteenth century it was dominated by the dean of scholarship, Yusuf Al Bahrani, a key proponent of the Akhbari tradition of Shia thought, until his death in 1772, after which the more state-centric Usuli school became more influential.
The Wahhabi sack of Karbala occurred on 21 April 1802 (1216 Hijri) (1801), under the rule of Abdul-Aziz bin Muhammad the second ruler of the First Saudi State, when 12,000 Wahhabi Muslims from Najd attacked the city of Karbala. The attack was coincident with the anniversary of Ghadir Khum event, or 10 Muharram. This fight left 3,000–5,000 deaths and the dome of the tomb of Husayn ibn Ali, was destroyed. The fight lasted for 8 hours.After the First Saudi State invasion, the city enjoyed semi-autonomy during Ottoman rule, governed by a group of gangs and mafia variously allied with members of the 'ulama. In order to reassert their authority, the Ottoman army laid siege to the city. On January 13, 1843, Ottoman troops entered the city. Many of the city leaders fled leaving defense of the city largely to tradespeople. About 3,000 Arabs were killed in the city, and another 2,000 outside the walls (this represented about 15% of the city's normal population). The Turks lost 400 men. This prompted many students and scholars to move to Najaf, which became the main Shia religious centre. Between 1850 and 1903, Karbala enjoyed a generous influx of money through the Oudh Bequest. The Shia-ruled Indian Province of Awadh, known by the British as Oudh, had always sent money and pilgrims to the holy city. The Oudh money, 10 million rupees, originated in 1825 from the Awadh Nawab Ghazi-ud-Din Haider. One third was to go to his wives, and the other two-thirds went to holy cities of Karbala and Najaf. When his wives died in 1850, the money piled up with interest in the hands of the British East India Company. The EIC sent the money to Karbala and Najaf per the wives' wishes, in the hopes of influencing the Ulama in Britain's favor. This effort to curry favor is generally considered to have been a failure.
In 1915, Karbala was the scene of an uprising against the Ottoman Empire.
In 1928, an important drainage project was carried out to relieve the city of unhealthy swamps, formed between Hussainiya and the Bani Hassan Canals on the Euphrates.
Defense of the City Hall in Karbala – a series of skirmishes fought from April 3 to April 6, 2004, between the Iraqi rebels of the Mahdi Army trying to conquer the city hall and the defending Polish and Bulgarian soldiers from the Multinational Division Central-South
In 2003 following the American invasion, the Karbala town council attempted to elect United States Marine Corps Lieutenant Colonel Matthew Lopez as mayor. Ostensibly so that his Marines, contractors, and funds could not leave.
On April 14, 2007, a car bomb exploded about 600 ft (180 m) from the shrine to Husayn, killing 47 and wounding over 150.
On January 19, 2008, 2 million Iraqi Shia pilgrims marched through Karbala city, Iraq to commemorate Ashura. 20,000 Iraqi troops and police guarded the event amid tensions due to clashes between Iraqi troops and Shia which left 263 people dead (in Basra and Nasiriya). | https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Karbala |
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Nous | In early Greek uses, Homer used nous to signify mental activities of both mortals and immortals, for example what they really have on their mind as opposed to what they say aloud. It was one of several words related to thought, thinking, and perceiving with the mind. In pre-Socratic philosophy, it became increasingly distinguished as a source of knowledge and reasoning opposed to mere sense perception or thinking influenced by the body such as emotion. For example, Heraclitus complained that "much learning does not teach nous".
Among some Greek authors, a faculty of intelligence known as a "higher mind" came to be considered as a property of the cosmos as a whole. The work of Parmenides set the scene for Greek philosophy to come, and the concept of nous was central to his radical proposals. He claimed that reality as perceived by the senses alone is not a world of truth at all, because sense perception is so unreliable, and what is perceived is so uncertain and changeable. Instead he argued for a dualism wherein nous and related words (the verb for thinking which describes its mental perceiving activity, noein, and the unchanging and eternal objects of this perception, noēta) describe another form of perception which is not physical, but intellectual only, distinct from sense perception and the objects of sense perception.
Anaxagoras, born about 500 BC, is the first person who is definitely known to have explained the concept of a nous (mind), which arranged all other things in the cosmos in their proper order, started them in a rotating motion, and continuing to control them to some extent, having an especially strong connection with living things. (However Aristotle reports an earlier philosopher, Hermotimus of Clazomenae, who had taken a similar position.) Amongst the pre-Socratic philosophers before Anaxagoras, other philosophers had proposed a similar ordering human-like principle causing life and the rotation of the heavens. For example, Empedocles, like Hesiod much earlier, described cosmic order and living things as caused by a cosmic version of love, and Pythagoras and Heraclitus, attributed the cosmos with "reason" (logos).
According to Anaxagoras the cosmos is made of infinitely divisible matter, every bit of which can inherently become anything, except Mind (nous), which is also matter, but which can only be found separated from this general mixture, or else mixed into living things, or in other words in the Greek terminology of the time, things with a soul (psychē). Anaxagoras wrote:
All other things partake in a portion of everything, while nous is infinite and self-ruled, and is mixed with nothing, but is alone, itself by itself. For if it were not by itself, but were mixed with anything else, it would partake in all things if it were mixed with any; for in everything there is a portion of everything, as has been said by me in what goes before, and the things mixed with it would hinder it, so that it would have power over nothing in the same way that it has now being alone by itself. For it is the thinnest of all things and the purest, and it has all knowledge about everything and the greatest strength; and nous has power over all things, both greater and smaller, that have soul [psychē].
Concerning cosmology, Anaxagoras, like some Greek philosophers already before him, believed the cosmos was revolving, and had formed into its visible order as a result of such revolving causing a separating and mixing of different types of chemical elements. Nous, in his system, originally caused this revolving motion to start, but it does not necessarily continue to play a role once the mechanical motion has started. His description was in other words (shockingly for the time) corporeal or mechanical, with the moon made of earth, the sun and stars made of red hot metal (beliefs Socrates was later accused of holding during his trial) and nous itself being a physically fine type of matter which also gathered and concentrated with the development of the cosmos. This nous (mind) is not incorporeal; it is the thinnest of all things. The distinction between nous and other things nevertheless causes his scheme to sometimes be described as a peculiar kind of dualism.
Anaxagoras' concept of nous was distinct from later platonic and neoplatonic cosmologies in many ways, which were also influenced by Eleatic, Pythagorean and other pre-Socratic ideas, as well as the Socratics themselves. | https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Nous |
Babylonia | Babylon remained a minor town in a small state until the reign of its sixth Amorite ruler, Hammurabi, during 1792–1750 BC (or c. 1728–1686 BC in the short chronology). He conducted major building work in Babylon, expanding it from a small town into a great city worthy of kingship. A very efficient ruler, he established a bureaucracy, with taxation and centralized government. Hammurabi freed Babylon from Elamite dominance, and indeed drove the Elamites from southern Mesopotamia entirely, invading Elam itself. He then systematically conquered southern Mesopotamia, including the cities of Isin, Larsa, Eshnunna, Kish, Lagash, Nippur, Borsippa, Ur, Uruk, Umma, Adab, Sippar, Rapiqum, and Eridu. His conquests gave the region stability after turbulent times, and coalesced the patchwork of small states into a single nation; it is only from the time of Hammurabi that southern Mesopotamia acquired the name Babylonia.
Hammurabi turned his disciplined armies eastwards and invaded the region which a thousand years later became Iran, conquering Elam, Gutium, Lullubi, Turukku and Kassites. To the west, he conquered the Amorite states of the Levant (modern Syria and Jordan) including the powerful kingdoms of Mari and Yamhad.
Hammurabi then entered into a protracted war with the Old Assyrian Empire for control of Mesopotamia and dominance of the Near East. Assyria had extended control over much of the Hurrian and Hattian parts of southeast Anatolia from the 21st century BC, and from the latter part of the 20th century BC had asserted itself over the northeast Levant and central Mesopotamia. After a protracted struggle over decades with the powerful Assyrian kings Shamshi-Adad I and Ishme-Dagan I, Hammurabi forced their successor Mut-Ashkur to pay tribute to Babylon c. 1751 BC, giving Babylonia control over Assyria's centuries-old Hattian and Hurrian colonies in Anatolia.
One of Hammurabi's most important and lasting works was the compilation of the Babylonian law code, which improved the much earlier codes of Sumer, Akkad and Assyria. This was made by order of Hammurabi after the expulsion of the Elamites and the settlement of his kingdom. In 1901, a copy of the Code of Hammurabi was discovered on a stele by Jacques de Morgan and Jean-Vincent Scheil at Susa in Elam, where it had later been taken as plunder. That copy is now in the Louvre.
From before 3000 BC until the reign of Hammurabi, the major cultural and religious center of southern Mesopotamia had been the ancient city of Nippur, where the god Enlil was supreme. Hammurabi transferred this dominance to Babylon, making Marduk supreme in the pantheon of southern Mesopotamia (with the god Ashur, and to some degree Ishtar, remaining the long-dominant deity in northern Mesopotamian Assyria). The city of Babylon became known as a "holy city" where any legitimate ruler of southern Mesopotamia had to be crowned, and the city was also revered by Assyria for these religious reasons. Hammurabi turned what had previously been a minor administrative town into a large, powerful and influential city, extended its rule over the entirety of southern Mesopotamia, and erected a number of buildings.
The Amorite-ruled Babylonians, like their predecessor states, engaged in regular trade with the Amorite and Canaanite city-states to the west, with Babylonian officials or troops sometimes passing to the Levant and Canaan, and Amorite merchants operating freely throughout Mesopotamia. The Babylonian monarchy's western connections remained strong for quite some time. Ammi-Ditana, great-grandson of Hammurabi, still titled himself "king of the land of the Amorites". Ammi-Ditana's father and son also bore Amorite names: Abi-Eshuh and Ammi-Saduqa. | https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Babylonia |
Graffiti | Many analysts and art critics ee artistic value in some graffiti and to recognize it as a form of public art. According to many art researchers, particularly in the Netherlands and in Los Angeles graffiti is effective tool of social emancipation, or in the achievement of a political goal.
In times of conflict graffiti has offered a means of communication and self-expression for members of these socially, ethnically, or racially divided communities, and has been an effective tool in establishing dialog. The Berlin Wall was extensively covered by graffiti reflecting social pressures relating to the oppressive Soviet rule over the GDR.
Graffiti often has a reputation as part of a subculture that rebels against authority, although the considerations of the practitioners often diverge and can relate to a wide range of attitudes. It can express a political practice and can form just one tool in an array of resistance techniques. One early example includes the anarcho-punk band Crass, who conducted a campaign of stenciling anti-war, anarchist, feminist, and anti-consumerist messages throughout the London Underground system during the late 1970s and early 1980s. In Amsterdam graffiti was a major part of the punk scene. The city was covered with names such as "De Zoot", "Vendex", and "Dr Rat". To document the graffiti a punk magazine was started that was called Gallery Anus. So when hip hop came to Europe in the early 1980s there was already a vibrant graffiti culture.
The student protests and general strike of May 1968 saw Paris bedecked in revolutionary, anarchistic, and situationist slogans such as L'ennui est contre-révolutionnaire ("Boredom is counterrevolutionary") and Lisez moins, vivez plus ("Read less, live more"). While not exhaustive, the graffiti gave a sense of the 'millenarian' and rebellious spirit, tempered with a good deal of verbal wit, of the strikers.
The developments of graffiti art which took place in art galleries and colleges as well as "on the street" or "underground", contributed to the resurfacing in the 1990s of a far more overtly politicized art form in the subvertising, culture jamming, or tactical media movements. These movements or styles tend to classify the artists by their relationship to their social and economic contexts, since, in most countries, graffiti art remains illegal in many forms except when using non-permanent paint. Since the 1990s with the rise of Street Art, a growing number of artists are switching to non-permanent paints and non-traditional forms of painting.
Contemporary practitioners, accordingly, have varied and often conflicting practices. Some individuals, such as Alexander Brener, have used the medium to politicize other art forms, and have used the prison sentences enforced on them as a means of further protest.
The practices of anonymous groups and individuals also vary widely, and practitioners by no means always agree with each other's practices. For example, the anti-capitalist art group the Space Hijackers did a piece in 2004 about the contradiction between the capitalistic elements of Banksy and his use of political imagery.
Berlin human rights activist Irmela Mensah-Schramm has received global media attention and numerous awards for her 35-year campaign of effacing neo-Nazi and other right-wing extremist graffiti throughout Germany, often by altering hate speech in humorous ways.
Political graffiti around the world | https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Graffiti |
Israeli disengagement from Gaza | The United Nations, international human rights organizations and many legal scholars regard the Gaza Strip to still be under military occupation by Israel. The International Court of Justice reaffirmed this position, stating that the occupation of the West Bank, East Jerusalem and Gaza Strip are unlawful and its discriminatory laws and policies against Palestinians violate the prohibition on racial segregation and apartheid. The ICJ rejected the claim that Gaza was no longer occupied following the 2005 disengagement, on the basis of Israel's continued control over the Gaza Strip.
In Jaber Al-Bassiouni Ahmed v. The Prime Minister, the Israeli Supreme Court assumed that occupation had ended with the disengagement but did not explain the theory or facts that led to this conclusion. After the disengagement, Israel claimed that its occupation of Gaza had ended, but also acknowledged that Gaza was not a sovereign state. It labeled Gaza as a "hostile entity," a status that neither grants Palestinians the right to self-governance and self-protection, nor obliges Israel to protect Gaza's civilian population. Israel uses this argument to deny Palestinians of full self-governance as well as the use of military force to suppress any resistance to Israeli control.
Following the withdrawal, Israel continued to maintain direct control over Gaza's air and maritime space, six of Gaza's seven land crossings, maintains a no-go buffer zone within the territory, controls the Palestinian population registry, and Gaza remains dependent on Israel for its water, electricity, telecommunications, and other utilities.
Some argue that Gaza is not occupied given that Israel does not have "boots on the ground" in the territory (permanently). The European Court of Human Rights made a similar argument in the case of Nagorno-Karabach. Cuyckens argues that such a requirement would allow the occupying power to "to easily escape the obligations otherwise imposed upon it under the law of occupation by avoiding placing troops on the ground while nevertheless controlling the territory concerned from the outside." However, she agrees that Gaza is no longer occupied – "Gaza is not technically occupied, given that there is no longer any effective control in the sense of Article 42 of the Hague Regulations." Yoram Dinstein argues that "the Occupying Power must deploy boots on the ground in or near the territory" but that the withdrawal from the Gaza Strip can be at most seen as a "partial withdrawal", since Israel continues to occupy the West Bank. Dinstein argues that the occupation of the Gaza Strip has not ended and that Israel's insistence on its liberty to retake any section of the Gaza Strip militarily is a testament to that fact. Yuval Shany argues that Israel is probably not an occupying power in Gaza under international law, writing that "it is difficult to continue and regard Israel as the occupying power in Gaza under the traditional law of occupation". In 2024, Shany reaffirmed that "Indeed, control for purposes of a determination of belligerent occupation does not require the continual presence of the army everywhere within the territory." Rubin argues that regardless of the conditions imposed by Israel after disengagement, the occupation ended after Israel withdrew from the Gaza Strip.” | https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Israeli_disengagement_from_Gaza |
Creed | Several creeds originated in Christianity.
1 Corinthians 15:3–7 includes an early creed about Jesus' death and resurrection which was probably received by Paul. The antiquity of the creed has been located by most biblical scholars to no more than five years after Jesus' death, probably originating from the Jerusalem apostolic community.
The Old Roman Creed is an earlier and shorter version of the Apostles' Creed. It was based on the 2nd century Rules of Faith and the interrogatory declaration of faith for those receiving baptism, which by the 4th century was everywhere tripartite in structure, following Matthew 28:19.
The Apostles' Creed is used in Western Christianity for both liturgical and catechetical purposes.
The Nicene Creed reflects the concerns of the First Council of Nicaea in 325 which had as their chief purpose to establish what Christians believed.
The Chalcedonian Creed was adopted at the Council of Chalcedon in 451 in Asia Minor. It defines that Christ is 'acknowledged in two natures', which 'come together into one person and hypostasis'.
The Athanasian Creed (Quicunque vult) is a Christian statement of belief focusing on Trinitarian doctrine and Christology. It is the first creed in which the equality of the three persons of the Trinity is explicitly stated and differs from the Nicene and Apostles' Creeds in the inclusion of anathemas, or condemnations of those who disagree with the Creed.
The Tridentine Creed was initially contained in the papal bull Iniunctum Nobis, issued by Pope Pius IV on 13 November 1565. The creed was intended to summarise the teaching of the Council of Trent (1545–1563).
The Maasai Creed is a creed composed in 1960 by the Maasai people of East Africa in collaboration with missionaries from the Congregation of the Holy Ghost. The creed attempts to express the essentials of the Christian faith within the Maasai culture.
The Credo of the People of God is a confession of faith that Pope Paul VI published with the motu proprio Solemni hac liturgia of 30 June 1968. Pope Paul VI spoke of it as "a creed which, without being strictly speaking a dogmatic definition, repeats in substance, with some developments called for by the spiritual condition of our time, the creed of Nicea, the creed of the immortal tradition of the holy Church of God." | https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Creed |
Marinid Sultanate | A number of manuscripts from the Marinid period have been preserved to the present-day. One outstanding example is a Qur'an manuscript commissioned by Sultan Abu Yaqub Yusuf and dated to 1306. It features an elaborately illuminated frontispiece and is written in a broad Maghrebi script using brown ink, with headings written in golden Kufic letters and new verses marked by small labels inside gold circles. Like most other manuscripts in this time and region, it was written on parchment.
Many of the sultans were themselves accomplished calligraphers. This tradition of sovereigns practicing calligraphy and copying the Qur'an themselves was well-established in many Islamic elite circles by the 13th century, with the oldest surviving example in this region dating from the Almohad caliph al-Murtada (d. 1266). According to Ibn Marzuq and various other Marinid chroniclers, Sultan Abu al-Hasan was particularly prolific and skilled, and is recorded to have copied four Qur'ans. The first one appears to have been started following several years of military successes and was finished in 1339, at which point it was sent to Chellah (where he was later buried). The next copy was sent to the Mosque of the Prophet in Medina in 1339–40 via the intermediary of Sultan Qalawun in Egypt, and a third one a couple of years later went to the Masjid al-Haram in Mecca. The fourth copy, one of the finest preserved Marinid manuscripts, is a thirty-volume Qur'an which he donated to the Al-Aqsa Mosque in Jerusalem in 1344–45 and is now kept at the Islamic Museum of the Haram al-Sharif. While in Bijaya (Bougie) he began a fifth copy intended for Al-Khalil (Hebron), but he was unable to finish it following his military defeats in the east and subsequent dethronement. It was instead finished by his son Abu Faris Abd al-Aziz and eventually brought to Tunis by Ibn Marzuq. Abu al-Hasan's son and immediate successor, Abu Inan, for his part, is known to have copied a collection of hadiths with letters written in a mix of blue and brown ink, with gold flourishes.
Aside from Qur'an manuscripts, many other religious and legal texts were copied by calligraphers of this time, especially works related to the Maliki school such as the Muwatta' by Malik ibn Anas. They range from volumes written in plain Maghrebi script to richly-illuminated manuscripts produced by the Marinid royal libraries. Preserved in various historic Moroccan libraries today, these manuscripts also show that, in addition to the capital of Fes, important workshops for production were also located in Salé and Marrakesh. | https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Marinid_Sultanate |
Culture of Africa | The various cuisines of Africa use a combination of locally available fruits, cereal grains and vegetables, as well as milk and meat products. In some parts of the continent, the traditional diet features a preponderance of milk, curd and whey products. In much of tropical Africa, however, cow's milk is rare and cannot be produced locally (owing to various diseases that affect livestock). The continent's diverse demographic makeup is reflected in the many different eating and drinking habits, dishes, and preparation techniques of its manifold populations. However it is important to consider the affordability of and access of these products on daily basis.
In Central Africa, the basic ingredients are plantains and cassava. Fufu-starchy foods (usually made from fermented cassava roots) are served with grilled meat and sauces. Many local ingredients are used while preparing other dishes like spinach stew, cooked with tomato, peppers, chillis, onions, and peanut butter. Cassava plants are also consumed as cooked greens. Groundnut (peanut) stew is also prepared, containing chicken, okra, ginger, and other spices. Another favorite is Bambara, a porridge of rice, peanut butter, and sugar. Beef and chicken are favorite meat dishes, but game meat preparations containing crocodile, monkey, antelope and warthog are also served occasionally.
The cuisine of the African Great Lakes region varies from area to area. In the inland savannah, the traditional cuisine of cattle-keeping peoples is distinctive in that meat products are generally absent. Cattle, sheep and goats were regarded as a form of currency and a store of wealth and are not generally consumed as food. In some areas, traditional peoples consume the milk and blood of cattle, but rarely the meat. Elsewhere, other peoples are farmers who grow a variety of grains and vegetables. Maize (corn) is the basis of ugali, the East African version of West Africa's fufu. Ugali is a starch dish eaten with meats or stews. In Uganda, steamed, green bananas called matoke provide the starch filler of many meals.
In the Horn of Africa, the main traditional dishes in Ethiopian cuisine and Eritrean cuisine are tsebhis (stews) served with injera (flatbread made from teff, wheat, or sorghum), and hilbet (paste made from legumes, mainly lentil, faba beans). Eritrean and Ethiopian cuisine (especially in the northern half) are very similar, given the shared history of the two countries. The related Somali cuisine consists of an exotic fusion of diverse culinary influences. Varieties of bariis (rice), the most popular probably being basmati, usually serve as the main dish. Xalwo (halwo) or halva is a popular confection served during special occasions such as Eid celebrations or wedding receptions. After meals, homes are traditionally perfumed using frankincense (lubaan) or incense (cuunsi), which is prepared inside an incense burner referred to as a dabqaad. All food is served halal.
The roots of North African cuisine can be traced back to the ancient empires of North Africa, particularly in Egypt, where many of the country's dishes and culinary traditions date back to ancient Egypt. Over several centuries traders, travelers, invaders, migrants and immigrants all have influenced the cuisine of North Africa. Most of the North African countries today have several similar dishes, sometimes almost the same dish with a different name (the Moroccan tangia and the Tunisian coach are both essentially the same dish: a meat stew prepared in an urn and cooked overnight in a public oven), sometimes with a slight change in ingredients and cooking style. To add to the confusion, two completely different dishes may also share the same name (for example, a "tajine" dish is a slow-cooked stew in Morocco, whereas the Tunisian "tajine" is a baked omelet/quiche-like dish). There are noticeable differences between the cooking styles of different nations – there's the sophisticated, full-bodied flavours of Moroccan palace cookery, the fiery dishes of Tunisian cuisine, and the humbler, simpler cuisines of Egypt and Algeria.
The cooking of Southern Africa is sometimes called 'rainbow cuisine', as the food in this region is a blend of many culinary traditions, including those of the Khoisan, Bantu, European and Asian populations. Basic ingredients include seafood, meat products (including wild game), poultry, as well as grains, fresh fruits and vegetables. Fruits include apples, grapes, mangoes, bananas and papayas, avocado, oranges, peaches and apricots. Desserts may simply be fruit. However, there are some more western style puddings, such as the Angolan Cocada amarela, which was inspired by Portuguese cuisine. Meat products include lamb, as well as game like venison, ostrich, and impala. The seafood includes a wide variety such as crayfish, prawns, tuna, mussels, oysters, calamari, mackerel, and lobster. There are also several types of traditional and modern alcoholic beverages including many European-style beers.
A typical West African meal is heavy with starchy items, meat, spices, and flavors. A wide array of staples are eaten across the region, including those of Fufu, Banku and Kenkey (originating from Ghana), Foutou, Couscous, Tô, and Garri, which are served alongside soups and stews. Fufu is often made from starchy root vegetables such as yams, cocoyams, or cassava, but also from cereal grains like millet, sorghum or plantains. The staple grain or starch varies from region to region and ethnic group to ethnic group. However, corn has gained significant ground as it is cheap, swells to greater volumes and creates a beautiful white final product that is greatly desired. Banku and Kenkey are maize dough staples, and Gari is made from dried grated cassavas. Rice dishes are also widely eaten in the region, especially in the dry Sahel belt inland. Examples of these include Benachin from The Gambia and Jollof rice, a pan-West African rice dish similar to Arab kabsah. | https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Culture_of_Africa |
Banu Kilab | The ambushing and killing of the Ja'far leader Urwa al-Rahhal as he escorted the Lakhmid caravan to Ukaz sparked a series of battles between the Hawazin, under Abu Bara, and the Quraysh. This conflict took place over four years, and is known as the Fijar Wars. Urwa's killer was an ally of the Qurayshite chief Harb ibn Umayya, but the Quraysh also had close relations with the Kilab. Both tribes belonged to the Hums, a socio-economic and religious pact including a number of tribes living in the Haram (the area around Mecca considered inviolable by the Arabs). The Kilab and the Ka'b did not live within the Haram and owed their membership to their maternal Qurayshite descent. Abu Bara's and the Kilab's participation in the Fijar Wars was restricted to the first battle, in which they pursued the Quraysh from Ukaz and bested them at Nakhla, on their retreat to Mecca. When the Quraysh crossed into the Haram, the Kilab halted their pursuit in fear of violating its sanctity.
Modern historians have generally assessed that the Fijar War was related to the Quraysh's attempts to close the caravan route between al-Hira and Yemen through Ta'if, a town which commercially rivaled Mecca, or to redirect the route through Mecca. This assessment was questioned by Ella Landau-Tasseron, who posited that the Banu Amir and the Quraysh had been mutually interested in gaining greater, joint control of the annual Lakhmid caravans to Yemen. Moreover, the Ja'far and the Quraysh were both seen as enemies by the Bakr ibn Abd Manat, the branch of the Kinana to which Urwa's killer belonged. The animosity of the Bakr ibn Abd Manat toward the Ja'far stemmed from the canceling of a protection covenant by Abu Bara's brother al-Tufayl; the Bakr ibn Abd Manat had entered al-Tufayl's protection in Najd after the Quraysh had expelled them from Mecca. In the years preceding the Fijar War the Bakr ibn Abd Manat attempted to obtain commissions from the Lakhmids to guard their caravans. Although the killing of Urwa had been against the interests of the Kilab and the Quraysh, the latter were compelled to fight due to the Kilab's intent on blood revenge against the Qurayshite confederates of Urwa's killer. The Kilab's limited participation in the ensuing war may have reflected their desire not to breach the Hums pact. | https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Banu_Kilab |
Basra | During World War II, Basra was an important port through which flowed much of the equipment and supplies sent to the Soviet Union by other Allies of World War II. At the end of the war, the city's population numbered approximately 93,000 people.
The population of Basra was 101,535 in 1947, and reached 219,167 in 1957. The University of Basrah was founded in 1964. By 1977, the population had risen to a peak population of some 1.5 million. The population declined during the Iran–Iraq War, being under 900,000 in the late 1980s, possibly reaching a low point of just over 400,000 during the worst of the war. The city was repeatedly shelled by Iran and was the site of many fierce battles, such as Operation Ramadan (1982) and the Siege of Basra (1987).
After the war, Saddam erected 99 memorial statues to Iraqi military officers killed during the war along the bank of the Shatt-al-Arab river, all pointing their fingers towards Iran. After the 1991 Gulf War a rebellion against Saddam erupted in Basra. The widespread revolt was against the Iraqi government who violently put down the rebellion, with much death and destruction inflicted on Basra.
As part of the Iraqi no-fly zones conflict, United States Air Force fighter jets carried out two airstrikes against Basra on 25 January 1999. The airstrikes resulted in missiles landing in the al-Jumhuriya neighborhood of Basra, killed 11 Iraqi civilians and wounding 59. General Anthony Zinni, then commander of U.S. forces in the Persian Gulf, acknowledged that it was possible that "a missile may have been errant." While such casualty numbers pale in comparison to later events, the bombing occurred one day after Arab foreign ministers, meeting in Egypt, refused to condemn four days of air strikes against Iraq in December 1998. This was described by Iraqi information minister Human Abdel-Khaliq as giving U.S.-led forces "an Arab green card" to continue their involvement in the conflict.
A second revolt in 1999 led to mass executions by the Iraqi government in and around Basra. Subsequently, the Iraqi government deliberately neglected the city, and much commerce was diverted to Umm Qasr. These alleged abuses are to feature amongst the charges against the former regime to be considered by the Iraq Special Tribunal set up by the Iraq Interim Government following the 2003 invasion.
Workers in Basra's oil industry have been involved in extensive organization and labour conflict. They held a two-day strike in August 2003, and formed the nucleus of the independent General Union of Oil Employees (GUOE) in June 2004. The union held a one-day strike in July 2005, and publicly opposes plans for privatizing the industry. | https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Basra |
Vassal state | The vassal states of the Neo-Assyrian Empire (911 BC – 609 BC) had a unique relationship with the empire they became a part of. While vassal states were necessary to the politics of the empire and connected by administrative and economic means, they are not considered to be ‘properly Assyrian’. Neo-Assyrian imperial ideology placed importance on unified diversity, and as such vassal states maintained a degree of cultural independence. While territorial expansion slowed in the 7th century BC, the amount of vassal states increased in number, suggesting a change in foreign policy.
Assyrian kings expressed their hold over vassal states through the collection of flora and fauna from these regions. The earliest records of this practice date back to Tiglath-Pileser I (1114 BC – 1076 BC) in the Middle Assyrian Period. It was revived by Ashurnasirpal in the Neo-Assyrian Period by creating a garden with specimens from across the empire. Later Neo-Assyrian rulers would expand on this practice; Sargon II created a garden that imitated the forests of Northern Syria, while Sennacherib created a swamp that reflected the landscape of Southern Babylonia. In artistic representations, subjects of vassal states are depicted bringing tribute to Assyria. These representatives are shown bowing or crouching before the king. The gifts offered range from horses and monkeys to wineskins. These scenes of tribute and audience with the king express how vassal states participated in the Neo-Assyrian Empire.
By the 8th century BC, the southern vassal states of the empire saw an increase in settlement. In comparison to the northern regions of the empire – which were previously devastated – these kingdoms become denser and the more prosperous parts of the empire. The kingdoms west of the Euphrates river were considered vassal states until the 7th century BC, when they were incorporated into the proper provincial system of the empire, though they still had various degrees of political control depending on location. In Judah, there was a further increase in settlement in the 7th century that was greater than the 8th. It was the same in Jordan, showing that Neo-Assyrian control over the region was a successful period for these kingdoms. | https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Vassal_state |
Kuwait | In the early 1990s, Kuwait deported nearly 400,000 Palestinians. Kuwait's policy was a response to alignment of the PLO with Saddam Hussein. It was a form of collective punishment. Kuwait also deported thousands of Iraqis and Yemenis after the Gulf War.
In addition, hundreds of thousands of stateless Bedoon were expelled from Kuwait in the early-to-mid 1990s. At the House of Commons of the United Kingdom in 1995, it was revealed that the Al Sabah ruling family deported 150,000 stateless Bedoon to refugee camps in the Kuwaiti desert near the Iraqi border with minimal water, insufficient food, and no basic shelter. Many of the stateless Bedoon fled to Iraq where they still remain stateless people even today.
In March 2003, Kuwait became the springboard for the US-led invasion of Iraq. In 2005, women won the right to vote and run in elections. Upon the death of the Emir Jaber in January 2006, Sheikh Saad Al-Sabah succeeded him but was removed nine days later due to his failing health. As a result, Sheikh Sabah Al-Ahmad Al-Jaber Al-Sabah was sworn in as Emir. From that point onwards, Kuwait suffered from chronic political deadlock between the government and parliament which resulted in multiple cabinet reshuffles and dissolutions. This significantly hampered investment and economic reforms in Kuwait, making the country's economy much more dependent on oil.
Despite the political instability, Kuwait had the highest Human Development Index ranking in the Arab world from 2006 to 2009. China awarded Kuwait Investment Authority an additional $700 million quota on top of $300 million awarded in March 2012. The quota is the highest to be granted by China to foreign investment entities.
In March 2014, David S. Cohen, who was then Secretary of the Treasury for Terrorism and Financial Intelligence, accused Kuwait of funding terrorism. Accusations of Kuwait funding terrorism have been very common and come from a wide variety of sources including intelligence reports, Western government officials, scholarly research, and renowned journalists. In 2014 and 2015, Kuwait was frequently described as the world's biggest source of terrorism funding, particularly for ISIS and Al-Qaeda.
On 26 June 2015, a suicide bombing took place at a Shia Muslim mosque in Kuwait. The Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant claimed responsibility for the attack. Twenty-seven people were killed and 227 people were wounded. It was the largest terror attack in Kuwait's history. In the aftermath, a lawsuit was filed accusing the Kuwaiti government of negligence and direct responsibility for the terror attack.
Due to declining oil prices in the mid-to-late 2010s, Kuwait faced one of the worst economic crunches in its history. Sabah Al Ahmad Sea City was inaugurated in mid-2016. Simultaneously, Kuwait invested significantly in its economic relations with China. China has been Kuwait's largest trade partner since 2016.
Under the Belt and Road Initiative, Kuwait and China have various cooperation projects including South al-Mutlaa which is currently under construction in northern Kuwait. The Sheikh Jaber Al-Ahmad Al-Sabah Causeway is part of the first phase of the Silk City project. The causeway was inaugurated in May 2019 as part of Kuwait Vision 2035, it connects Kuwait City to northern Kuwait.
The COVID-19 pandemic exacerbated Kuwait's economic crisis. Kuwait's economy faced a budget deficit of $46 billion in 2020. It was Kuwait's first fiscal deficit since 1995. In September 2020, Kuwait's Crown Prince Sheikh Nawaf Al-Ahmad Al-Jaber Al-Sabah became the 16th Emir of Kuwait and the successor to Emir Sheikh Sabah Al-Ahmad Al-Jaber Al-Sabah, who died at the age of 91. In October 2020, Sheikh Mishal Al-Ahmad Al-Jaber Al-Sabah was appointed as the Crown Prince. In December 2023, Kuwait’s Emir Sheikh Nawaf al-Ahmad al-Jaber al-Sabah died and was replaced by Mishal Al-Ahmad Al-Jaber Al-Sabah.
Kuwait currently has the largest US military presence in the entire Middle East region. There are over 14,000 US military personnel stationed in the country. Camp Arifjan is the largest US military base in Kuwait. The US uses bases in Kuwait as staging hubs, training ranges, and logistical support for its Middle East operations.
In recent years, Kuwait's infrastructure projects market has regularly underperformed due to political deadlock between the government and parliament. Kuwait is now the region's most oil-dependent country with the lowest share of economic diversification. According to the World Economic Forum, Kuwait has the weakest infrastructure quality in the GCC region. | https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Kuwait |
Fatah | Fatah has maintained a number of militant groups since its founding. Its mainstream military branch is al-'Asifah. Fatah is generally considered to have had a strong involvement in terrorism in the past, though unlike its rival Islamist faction Hamas, Fatah is no longer regarded as a terrorist organization by any government. Fatah used to be designated terrorist under Israeli law and was considered terrorist by the United States Department of State and United States Congress until it renounced terrorism in 1988.
Fatah has, since its inception, created, led or sponsored a number of armed groups and militias, some of which have had an official standing as the movement's armed wing, and some of which have not been publicly or even internally recognized as such. The group has also dominated various PLO and Palestinian Authority forces and security services which were/are not officially tied to Fatah, but in practice have served as wholly pro-Fatah armed units, and been staffed largely by members. The original name for Fatah's armed wing was al-'Asifah ("The Storm"), and this was also the name Fatah first used in its communiques, trying for some time to conceal its identity. This name has since been applied more generally to Fatah armed forces, and does not correspond to a single unit today. Other militant groups associated with Fatah include:
Force 17. Plays a role akin to the Presidential Guard for senior Fatah leaders. Created by Yasser Arafat.
Black September Organization. A group formed by leading Fatah members in 1971, following the events of the "Black September" in Jordan, to organize clandestine attacks with which Fatah did not want to be openly associated. These included strikes against leading Jordanian politicians as a means of exacting vengeance and raising the price for attacking the Palestinian movement; and also, most controversially, for "international operations" (e.g. the Munich Olympics massacre), intended to put pressure on the US, Europe and Israel, to raise the visibility of the Palestinian cause and to upstage radical rivals such as the PFLP. Fatah publicly disassociated itself from the group, but it is widely believed that it enjoyed Arafat's direct or tacit backing. It was discontinued in 1973–1974, as Fatah's political line shifted again, and the Black September operations and the strategy behind them were seen as having become a political liability, rather than an asset.
Fatah Hawks. An armed militia active mainly until the mid-1990s.
Tanzim. A branch of Fatah under the leadership of Marwan Barghouti, with roots in the activism of the First Intifada, which carried out armed attacks in the early days of the Second Intifada. It was later subsumed or sidelined by the al-Aqsa Martyrs' Brigades.
Al-Aqsa Martyrs' Brigades. Created during the Second Intifada to bolster the organization's militant standing vis-à-vis the rival Hamas movement, which had taken the lead in attacks on Israel after 1993, and was gaining rapidly in popularity with the advent of the Intifada. The Brigades are locally organized and have been said to suffer from poor cohesion and internal discipline, at times ignoring ceasefires and other initiatives announced by the central Fatah leadership. They are generally seen as tied to the "young guard" of Fatah politics, organizing young members on the street level, but it is not clear that they form a faction in themselves inside Fatah politics; rather, different Brigades units may be tied to different Fatah factional leaders.
During the Second Intifada, the group was a member of the Palestinian National and Islamic Forces. | https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Fatah |
Medicine in the medieval Islamic world | While the belief that carrying children and childbirth was very important and healing part of the Islamic culture, many medical scholars also recognize the importance of family planning, primarily through contraceptives and abortion. The use of contraceptives and abortion as opposed to abstinence was preferred due to the belief in the tremendous healing properties brought by sexual intercourse. The topic of contraceptives and abortion had been very controversial throughout the western world; however, in the Islamic culture, due to the ties between women's reproductive health and one's overall well-being, medieval Muslim physicians devoted time and research into recording and testing different theories in this field.
Prior to the development and research into safe contraceptives in order to prevent pregnancy, the concept of 'induced miscarriages' grew popular. This was the act of intentionally causing a miscarriage in the very early stages of pregnancy, though medical journals outlined a variety of methods, this was usually achieved through the consumption of plant derived substances. Medical journals and other literature from this time show an extensive and detailed list of a variety of different drugs and plant derived substances that supposedly have abortifacient qualities. Many of these substances were later laboratory tested and found to be correctly identified in their ability to induce a miscarriage. While some of these early texts did recommend a woman get an abortion during early stages, it was clear that it was a dangerous and potentially fatal procedure for the mother, causing a greater reliance on the safer alternative techniques and substances these texts also provided. Further development in this field led to the introduction of contraceptives that would prevent one's need to induce a miscarriage. Many religious scholars and medieval physicians of the time agreed on the importance of contraceptive alternatives due to the legal rights of women. This was due to the belief that "early withdrawal impinged upon [the woman's] rights ... to enjoy full satisfaction." Commencing more research into possible contraceptives. The data from this research made its way into the previously mentioned medical journals, already containing a list of abortifacients, providing a great variety of drugs and other prescribed substances for use as a contraceptive. The lists of drugs and other substances in these journals became widely accessible to be utilized by the public.
The great availability and accessibility of these medical texts and the depth of research shown by the data shows that contraceptives and abortions, surgical or not, were frequently sought after by women of this time. While there may be a variety of reasons women would require these resources, whether connected to population control or personal reasons, it is clear that the Islamic culture not only incorporated, but brought about positive connotations in regards to women's reproductive health. During a period in which men dominated medicine, the almost immediate inclusion of women's reproductive health in medical texts, along with a variety of different techniques and contraceptive substances, long before the development of 'the pill', reinforces the cultural belief that men and women were to be viewed as equals, in regards to sexual health. | https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Medicine_in_the_medieval_Islamic_world |
Sunni Islam | The seeds of metamorphosis of caliphate into kingship were sown, as the second caliph Umar had feared, as early as the regime of the third caliph Uthman, who appointed many of his kinsmen from his clan Banu Umayya, including Marwān and Walid bin Uqba on important government positions, becoming the main cause of turmoil resulting in his murder and the ensuing infighting during Ali's time and rebellion by Muāwiya, another of Uthman's kinsman. This ultimately resulted in the establishment of firm dynastic rule of Banu Umayya after Husain, the younger son of Ali from Fātima, was killed at the Battle of Karbalā. The rise to power of Banu Umayya, the Meccan tribe of elites who had vehemently opposed Muhammad under the leadership of Abu Sufyān, Muāwiya's father, right up to the conquest of Mecca by Muhammad, as his successors with the accession of Uthman to caliphate, replaced the egalitarian society formed as a result of Muhammad's revolution to a society stratified between haves and have-nots as a result of nepotism, and in the words of El-Hibri through "the use of religious charity revenues (zakāt) to subsidise family interests, which Uthman justified as 'al-sila' (pious filial support)". Ali, during his rather brief regime after Uthman maintained austere life style and tried hard to bring back the egalitarian system and supremacy of law over the ruler idealised in Muhammad's message, but faced continued opposition, and wars one after another by Aisha-Talhah-Zubair, by Muāwiya and finally by the Khārjites. After he was murdered, his followers immediately elected Hasan ibn Ali his elder son from Fātima to succeed him. Hasan shortly afterward signed a treaty with Muāwiya relinquishing power in favour of the latter, with a condition inter alia, that one of the two who will outlive the other will be the caliph, and that this caliph will not appoint a successor but will leave the matter of selection of the caliph to the public. Subsequently, Hasan was poisoned to death and Muawiya enjoyed unchallenged power. Dishonouring his treaty with Hasan, he nominated his son Yazid to succeed him. Upon Muāwiya's death, Yazid asked Husain, the younger brother of Hasan, Ali's son and Muhammad's grandson, to give his allegiance to Yazid, which he plainly refused. His caravan was cordoned by Yazid's army at Karbalā and he was killed with all his male companions – total 72 people, in a day long battle after which Yazid established himself as a sovereign, though strong public uprising erupted after his death against his dynasty to avenge the massacre of Karbalā, but Banu Umayya were able to quickly suppress them all and ruled the Muslim world, till they were finally overthrown by Banu Abbās. | https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Sunni_Islam |
Abu Simbel | With the passage of time, the temples fell into disuse and the Great Temple eventually became mostly covered by a sand dune. By the 6th century BC, the sand already covered the statues of the main temple up to their knees. The temple was forgotten by Europeans until March 1813, when the Swiss researcher Johann Ludwig Burckhardt found the small temple and top frieze of the main temple.
When we reached the top of the mountain, I left my guide, with the camels, and descended an almost perpendicular cleft, choaked with sand, to view the temple of Ebsambal, of which I had heard many magnificent descriptions. There is no road at present to this temple... It stands about twenty feet above the surface of the water, entirely cut out of the almost perpendicular rocky side of the mountain, and in complete preservation. In front of the entrance are six erect colossal figures, representing juvenile persons, three on each side, placed in narrow recesses, and looking towards the river; they are all of the same size, stand with one foot before the other, and are accompanied by smaller figures... Having, as I supposed, seen all the antiquities of Ebsambal, I was about to ascend the sandy side of the mountain by the same way I had descended; when having luckily turned more to the southward, I fell in with what is yet visible of four immense colossal statues cut out of the rock, at a distance of about two hundred yards from the temple; they stand in a deep recess, excavated in the mountain; but it is greatly to be regretted, that they are now almost entirely buried beneath the sands, which are blown down here in torrents. The entire head, and part of the breast and arms of one of the statues are yet above the surface; of the one next to it scarcely any part is visible, the head being broken off, and the body covered with sand to above the shoulders; of the other two, the bonnets only appear. It is difficult to determine, whether these statues are in a sitting or standing posture; their backs adhere to a portion of rock, which projects from the main body, and which may represent a part of a chair, or may be merely a column for support.
Burckhardt talked about his discovery with the Italian explorer Giovanni Belzoni, who travelled to the site, but was unable to dig out an entry to the temple. Belzoni returned in 1817, this time succeeding in his attempt to enter the complex. A detailed early description of the temples, together with contemporaneous line drawings, can be found in Edward William Lane's Description of Egypt (1825–1828). | https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Abu_Simbel |
Amr ibn al-As | From his base in southern Palestine, Amr launched the conquest of Byzantine Egypt. He had established trading interests there before his conversion to Islam, making him aware of its importance in international trade. The traditional Muslim sources generally hold that Amr undertook the campaign with Caliph Umar's reluctant approval, though a number of accounts hold that he entered the region without Umar's authorization. At the head of 4,000 cavalries and with no siege engines, Amr arrived at the frontier town of al-Arish along the northern Sinai coastline on 12 December 639. He captured the strategic Mediterranean port city of Pelusium (al-Farama) following a month-long siege and moved against Bilbeis, which also fell after a month-long siege.
Amr halted his campaign before the fortified Byzantine stronghold of Babylon, at the head of the Nile Delta, and requested reinforcements from Umar. The latter dispatched al-Zubayr ibn al-Awwam, a leading Qurayshite companion of Muhammad, with a 4,000-strong force, which joined Amr's camp in June 640. Amr retained the supreme command of Arab forces in Egypt. In the following month, his army decisively defeated the Byzantines at the Battle of Heliopolis. He captured Memphis soon after and besieged Babylon. During the siege, Amr entered truce negotiations with the Alexandria-based Byzantine governor Cyrus; Emperor Heraclius opposed the talks and recalled Cyrus to Constantinople. Though strong resistance was put up by Babylon's defenders, their morale was sapped after news of Heraclius' death in February 641. Amr made an agreement with the Byzantine garrison, allowing their peaceful withdrawal toward the provincial capital Alexandria on 9 April 641. Amr then sent his lieutenants to conquer different parts of the country. One of them, Kharija ibn Hudhafa, captured the Fayyum oasis, Oxyrhynchus (Bahnasa), Hermopolis (el-Ashmunein) and Akhmim, all in Middle Egypt, and an unspecified number of villages in Upper Egypt.
In late 641, Amr besieged Alexandria. It fell virtually without resistance after Cyrus, who had since been restored to office, and Amr finalized a treaty in Babylon guaranteeing the security of Egypt's inhabitants and imposing a poll tax on adult males. The date of the city's surrender was likely November 642. Taking advantage of the uncertain political situation in the wake of Umar's death in 644 and the meager Arab military presence in Alexandria, Emperor Constans II (r. 641–668) dispatched a naval expedition led by a certain Manuel which occupied the city and killed most of its Arab garrison in 645. Alexandria's elite and most of the inhabitants assisted the Byzantines; medieval Byzantine, Coptic and, to a lesser extent, Muslim sources indicate the city was not firmly in Arab hands during the preceding three years. Byzantine forces pushed deeper into the Nile Delta, but Amr forced them back at the Battle of Nikiou. He besieged and captured Alexandria in the summer of 646; most of the Byzantines, including Manuel, were slain, many of its inhabitants were killed and the city was burned until Amr ordered an end to the onslaught. Afterward, Muslim rule in Alexandria was gradually solidified.
In contrast to the disarray of the Byzantine defense, the Muslim forces under Amr's command were unified and organized; Amr frequently coordinated with Caliph Umar and his own troops for all major military decisions. According to the historian Vassilios Christides, Amr "cautiously counterbalanced the superiority in numbers and equipment of the Byzantine army by applying skillful military tactics" and despite the lack of "definite, prepared, long-term plans ... the Arab army moved with great flexibility as the occasion arose". In the absence of siege engines, Amr oversaw long sieges of heavily fortified Byzantine positions, most prominently Babylon, cut supply lines and engaged in long wars of attrition. He made advantageous use out of the nomads in his ranks, who were seasoned in hit-and-run tactics, and his settled troops, who were generally more acquainted with siege warfare. His cavalry-dominated army moved through Egypt's deserts and oases with relative ease. Moreover, political circumstances became more favorable to Amr with the death of the hawkish Heraclius and his short-term replacement with the more pacifist Heraklonas and Martina. | https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Amr_ibn_al-As |
Yom Kippur War | On 9 October, the Soviet cultural center in Damascus was damaged during an IAF airstrike, and two days later, the Soviet merchant ship Ilya Mechnikov was sunk by the Israeli Navy during a battle off Syria. The Soviets condemned Israeli actions, and there were calls within the government for military retaliation. The Soviets ultimately reacted by deploying two destroyers off the Syrian coast. Soviet warships in the Mediterranean were authorized to open fire on Israeli combatants approaching Soviet convoys and transports. There were several recorded instances of Soviet ships exchanging fire with Israeli forces. In particular, the Soviet minesweeper Rulevoi and the medium landing ship SDK-137, guarding Soviet transport ships at the Syrian port of Latakia, fired on approaching Israeli jets.
During the cease-fire, Henry Kissinger mediated a series of exchanges with the Egyptians, Israelis and the Soviets. On 24 October, Sadat publicly appealed for American and Soviet contingents to oversee the ceasefire; it was quickly rejected in a White House statement. Kissinger also met with Soviet Ambassador Dobrynin to discuss convening a peace conference with Geneva as the venue. Later in the evening (9:35 pm) of 24–25 October, Brezhnev sent Nixon a "very urgent" letter.
In that letter, Brezhnev began by noting that Israel was continuing to violate the ceasefire and it posed a challenge to both the U.S. and USSR. He stressed the need to "implement" the ceasefire resolution and "invited" the U.S. to join the Soviets "to compel observance of the cease-fire without delay". He then threatened "I will say it straight that if you find it impossible to act jointly with us in this matter, we should be faced with the necessity urgently to consider taking appropriate steps unilaterally. We cannot allow arbitrariness on the part of Israel." The Soviets were threatening to militarily intervene in the war on Egypt's side if they could not work together to enforce the ceasefire.
Kissinger immediately passed the message to White House Chief of Staff Alexander Haig, who met with Nixon for 20 minutes around 10:30 pm, and reportedly empowered Kissinger to take any necessary action. Kissinger immediately called a meeting of senior officials, including Haig, Defense Secretary James Schlesinger and CIA Director William Colby. The Watergate scandal had reached its apex, and Nixon was so agitated and discomposed that they decided to handle the matter without him:
When Kissinger asked Haig whether [Nixon] should be wakened, the White House chief of staff replied firmly 'No.' Haig clearly shared Kissinger's feelings that Nixon was in no shape to make weighty decisions.
The meeting produced a conciliatory response, which was sent (in Nixon's name) to Brezhnev. At the same time, it was decided to increase the DEFCON from four to three. Lastly, they approved a message to Sadat (again, in Nixon's name) asking him to drop his request for Soviet assistance, and threatening that if the Soviets were to intervene, so would the United States.
The Soviets placed seven airborne divisions on alert and airlift was marshaled to transport them to the Middle East. An airborne command post was set up in the southern Soviet Union, and several air force units were also alerted. "Reports also indicated that at least one of the divisions and a squadron of transport planes had been moved from the Soviet Union to an airbase in Yugoslavia". The Soviets also deployed seven amphibious warfare craft with some 40,000 naval infantry in the Mediterranean.
The Soviets quickly detected the increased American defense condition, and were astonished and bewildered at the response. "Who could have imagined the Americans would be so easily frightened," said Nikolai Podgorny. "It is not reasonable to become engaged in a war with the United States because of Egypt and Syria," said Premier Alexei Kosygin, while KGB chief Yuri Andropov added that "We shall not unleash the Third World War." The letter from the U.S. cabinet arrived during the meeting. Brezhnev decided that the Americans were too nervous, and that the best course of action would be to wait to reply. The next morning, the Egyptians agreed to the American suggestion, and dropped their request for assistance from the Soviets, bringing the crisis to an end. | https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Yom_Kippur_War |
Brunei | Brunei briefly rose to prominence in Southeast Asia when the Portuguese occupied Malacca and thereby forced the wealthy and powerful but displaced Muslim refugees there to relocate to nearby Sultanates such as Brunei. The Bruneian Sultan then intervened in a territorial conflict between Hindu Tondo and Muslim Manila in the Philippines by appointing the Bruneian descended Rajah Ache of Manila as admiral of the Bruneian navy in a rivalry against Tondo and as the enforcer of Bruneian interests in the Philippines. He subsequently encountered the Magellan expedition wherein Antonio Pigafetta noted that under orders from his grandfather the Sultan of Brunei, Ache had previously sacked the Buddhist city of Loue in Southwest Borneo for being faithful to the old religion and rebelling against the authority of Sultanate. However, European influence gradually brought an end to Brunei's regional power, as Brunei entered a period of decline compounded by internal strife over royal succession. In the face of these invasions by European Christian powers, the Ottoman Caliphate aided the beleaguered Southeast Asian Sultanates by making Aceh a protectorate and sending expeditions to reinforce, train and equip the local mujahideen. Turks were routinely migrating to Brunei as evidenced by the complaints of Manila Oidor Melchor Davalos who in his 1585 report, say that Turks were coming to Sumatra, Borneo and Ternate every year, including defeated veterans from the Battle of Lepanto.
Spain declared war in 1578, planning to attack and capture Kota Batu, Brunei's capital at the time. This was based in part on the assistance of two Bruneian noblemen, Pengiran Seri Lela and Pengiran Seri Ratna. The former had travelled to Manila, then the centre of the Spanish colony. Manila itself was captured from Brunei, Christianised and made a territory of the Viceroyalty of New Spain which was centered in Mexico City. Pengiran Seri Lela came to offer Brunei as a tributary to Spain for help to recover the throne usurped by his brother, Saiful Rijal. The Spanish agreed that if they succeeded in conquering Brunei, Pengiran Seri Lela would be appointed as the sultan, while Pengiran Seri Ratna would be the new Bendahara.
In March 1578, a fresh Spanish fleet had arrived from Mexico and settled at the Philippines. They were led by De Sande, acting as Capitán-General. He organized an expedition from Manila for Brunei, consisting of 400 Spaniards and Mexicans, 1,500 Filipino natives, and 300 Borneans. The campaign was one of many, which also included action in Mindanao and Sulu. The racial make-up of the Christian side was diverse since it were usually made up of Mestizos, Mulattoes and Amerindians (Aztecs, Mayans and Incans) who were gathered and sent from Mexico and were led by Spanish officers who had worked together with native Filipinos in military campaigns across the Southeast Asia. The Muslim side was also equally racially diverse. In addition to the native Malay warriors, the Ottomans had repeatedly sent military expeditions to nearby Aceh. The expeditions were composed mainly of Turks, Egyptians, Swahilis, Somalis, Sindhis, Gujaratis and Malabars. These expeditionary forces had also spread to other nearby Sultanates such as Brunei and had taught new fighting tactics and techniques on how to forge cannons.
Eventually, the Spanish captured the capital on 16 April 1578, with the help of Pengiran Seri Lela and Pengiran Seri Ratna. The Sultan Saiful Rijal and Paduka Seri Begawan Sultan Abdul Kahar were forced to flee to Meragang then to Jerudong. In Jerudong, they made plans to chase the conquering army away from Brunei. Suffering high fatalities due to a cholera or dysentery outbreak, the Spanish decided to abandon Brunei and returned to Manila on 26 June 1578, after 72 days.
Pengiran Seri Lela died in August or September 1578, probably from the same illness suffered by his Spanish allies. There was suspicion that the legitimist sultan could have been poisoned by the ruling sultan. Seri Lela's daughter, a Bruneian princess, "Putri", had left with the Spanish, she abandoned her claim to the crown and then she married a Christian Tagalog, named Agustín de Legazpi de Tondo. Agustin de Legaspi along with his family and associates were soon implicated in the Conspiracy of the Maharlikas, an attempt by Filipinos to link up with the Brunei Sultanate and Japanese Shogunate to expel the Spaniards from the Philippines. However, upon the Spanish suppression of the conspiracy, the Bruneian descended aristocracy of precolonial Manila were exiled to Guerrero, Mexico which consequently later became a center of the Mexican war of independence against Spain.
The local Brunei accounts of the Castilian War differ greatly from the generally accepted view of events. What was called the Castilian War was seen as a heroic episode, with the Spaniards being driven out by Bendahara Sakam, purportedly a brother of the ruling sultan, and a thousand native warriors. Most historians consider this to be a folk-hero account, which probably developed decades or centuries after.
Brunei eventually descended into anarchy. The country suffered a civil war from 1660 to 1673. | https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Brunei |
Iraqi Kurdish Civil War | Autonomy in Iraqi Kurdistan was originally established in 1970 as the Kurdish Autonomous Region following the agreement of an Autonomy Accord between the government of Iraq and leaders of the Iraqi Kurdish community. A Legislative Assembly was established in the city of Erbil with nominal authority over the Kurdish-populated governorates of Erbil, Duhok and Sulaymaniyah. As various battles between separatist Kurds and Iraqi government forces continued until the 1991 uprisings in Iraq, the safety of Kurdish refugees led to the adoption of United Nations Security Council Resolution 688 which was used as a justification to implement Operation Provide Comfort, a US-led multinational military operation that ensured the security of the Iraqi Kurdish region through the use of air power while simultaneously providing humanitarian aid to refugees fleeing persecution. While the no-fly zone covered Dahuk and Erbil, it left out Sulaymaniyah and Kirkuk. This led to a further series of bloody clashes between Iraqi government forces and Kurdish troops. Shortly thereafter, an uneasy balance of power was reached, and Iraq withdrew its military and government officials from the region in October 1991. From that point on, Iraqi Kurdistan had achieved de facto independence under the leadership of the region's two principal Kurdish parties – the Kurdish Democratic Party and the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan – free from the control of Baghdad. The region then adopted its own flag and national anthem.
Iraqi Kurdistan held parliamentary elections in 1992. The KDP gained an absolute majority of the votes in the governorates of Dohuk and Arbil, whereas the PUK garnered the broad support of the Sulaymaniyah governorate as well as the Kurdish portions of Diyala (specifically the Kifri and Khanaqin Districts). As a result of the election, the Kurdish parliament was split between Jalal Talabani's Patriotic Union of Kurdistan and Massoud Barzani's Kurdish Democratic Party.
After withdrawing its forces from Kurdistan in October 1991, the Iraqi government imposed an economic blockade over the region, restricting its oil and food supplies. The United Nations embargo on Iraq also significantly affected the Kurdish economy, preventing trade between the Kurds and other nations. As such, all economic dealings between Iraqi Kurdistan and the outside world were done through the black market.
In March 1994 Turkish Armed Forces began Operation Steel, a cross-border military incursion into northern Iraq against the PKK. On May 3 a delegation from the KDP agreed to not allow the PKK to have a base in northern Iraq. On May 4, Turkish Armed Forces left northern Iraq. | https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Iraqi_Kurdish_Civil_War |
Democratic Republic of Sudan | The origins of the civil war in the south date back to the 1950s. On August 18, 1955, the Equatoria Corps, a military unit composed of southerners, mutinied at Torit. Rather than surrender to Sudanese government authorities, many mutineers disappeared into hiding with their weapons, marking the beginning of the first war in southern Sudan. By the late 1960s, the war had resulted in the deaths of about 500,000 people. Several hundred thousand more southerners hid in the forests or escaped to refugee camps in neighboring countries.
By 1969 the rebels had developed foreign contacts to obtain weapons and supplies. Israel, for example, trained Anyanya recruits and shipped weapons via Ethiopia and Uganda to the rebels. The Anyanya also purchased arms from Congolese rebels and international arms dealers with monies collected in the south and from among southern Sudanese exile communities in the Middle East, Western Europe, and North America. The rebels also captured arms, equipment, and supplies from government troops.
Militarily, the Anyanya controlled much of the southern countryside while government forces occupied the region's major towns. The guerrillas operated at will from remote camps. However, rebel units were too small and scattered to be highly effective in any single area. Estimates of Anyanya personnel strength ranged from 5,000 to 10,000.
Government operations against the rebels declined after the 1969 coup. However, when negotiations failed to result in a settlement, Khartoum increased troop strength in the south to about 12,000 in 1969, and intensified military activity throughout the region. Although the Soviet Union had concluded a US$100 million to US$150 million arms agreement with Sudan in August 1968, which included T-55 tanks, armored personnel carriers, and aircraft, the nation failed to deliver any equipment to Khartoum by May 1969. During this period, Sudan obtained some Soviet-manufactured weapons from Egypt, most of which went to the Sudanese air force. By the end of 1969, however, the Soviet Union had shipped unknown quantities of 85mm antiaircraft guns, sixteen MiG-21s, and five AN-24 transport aircraft. Over the next two years, the Soviet Union delivered an impressive array of equipment to Sudan, including T-54 and T-55 tanks; and BTR-40 and BTR-152 light armored vehicles.
In 1971 Joseph Lagu, who had become the leader of southern forces opposed to Khartoum, proclaimed the creation of the Southern Sudan Liberation Movement (SSLM). Anyanya leaders united behind him, and nearly all exiled southern politicians supported the SSLM. Although the SSLM created a governing infrastructure throughout many areas of southern Sudan, real power remained with Anyanya, with Lagu at its head.
Despite his political problems, Nimeiri remained committed to ending the southern insurgency. He believed he could stop the fighting and stabilize the region by granting regional self-government and undertaking economic development in the south. By October 1971, Khartoum had established contact with the SSLM. After considerable consultation, a conference between SSLM and Sudanese government delegations convened at Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, in February 1972. Initially, the two sides were far apart, the southerners demanding a federal state with a separate southern government and an army that would come under the federal president's command only in response to an external threat to Sudan. Eventually, however, the two sides, with the help of Ethiopia's Emperor Haile Selassie, reached an agreement.
The Addis Ababa accords guaranteed autonomy for a southern region—composed of the three provinces of Equatoria (present-day Al Istiwai), Bahr al Ghazal, and Upper Nile (present-day Aali an Nil)--under a regional president appointed by the national president on the recommendation of an elected Southern Regional Assembly. The High Executive Council or cabinet named by the regional president would be responsible for all aspects of government in the region except such areas as defense, foreign affairs, currency and finance, economic and social planning, and interregional concerns, authority over which would be retained by the national government in which southerners would be represented. Southerners, including qualified Anyanya veterans, would be incorporated into a 12,000-man southern command of the Sudanese army under equal numbers of northern and southern officers. The accords also recognized Arabic as Sudan's official language, and English as the south's principal language, which would be used in administration and would be taught in the schools.
Although many SSLM leaders opposed the settlement, Lagu approved its terms and both sides agreed to a cease-fire. The national government issued a decree legalizing the agreement and creating an international armistice commission to ensure the well-being of returning southern refugees. Khartoum also announced an amnesty, retroactive to 1955. The two sides signed the Addis Ababa Agreement on March 27, 1972, which was thereafter celebrated as National Unity Day. | https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Democratic_Republic_of_Sudan |
Agha of the Janissaries | The Agha was chosen by the Ottoman Sultan, but was not necessarily himself a Janissary. To secure the often uncertain loyalty of the corps, Bayezid II (r. 1481–1512) stopped the practice of appointing the sekban-bashi (the commander of the sekban regiments) to the post, and instead nominated a member of his own household to the post. These were usually pages who had been recruited, like the Janissaries, via the devshirme system, but then had been educated in the palace school, then proven their ability in the inner, private palace service (Enderûn), before being appointed to senior posts in the palace's outer service (Birûn).
At the same time, Bayezid founded the Ağa Bölükleri (lit. 'Agha's Troops') regiments, initially as the Agha's personal retinue and a means of controlling the corps; eventually these became regular Janissary units, and by the end of the 16th century there were 61 Ağa Bölükleri regiments. While the devshirme system was employed, the Agha was responsible for checking the new recruited boys on arrival at Istanbul for falsifications or missing persons; his subordinates then examined the boys and allocated them either to the palace service or to the Janissary corps. As the Janissaries' political role increased in the early 17th century, from 1641 on the Aghas were once again appointed from among the Janissary corps.
Contrary to widespread modern perception of the Janissary corps as a monolithic and rigidly organized entity, the individual regiments (ortas) were not only the primary unit of organization, but also the focus of Janissary corps spirit and loyalty. Except for the commander ([çorbacı]] or bölük ağa), all officers within each orta were exclusively drawn from and selected by members of the same regiment based on seniority or merit. Thus, while the Janissary Aghas could and did appoint protégės and trusted aides to commands and thereby had a measure of influence within the individual regiments, their ability to exercise direct control was limited. In addition, the corps lacked a dedicated military staff, with the Agha assisted only by a few civilian officials. This was not a problem while the Janissaries were a small force of about 1,000 troops, but prohibited any effective operational control once the corps mushroomed to 15,000 and more in the course of the 16th and 17th centuries. The usually brief tenures of the Aghas further contributed to their lack of control over the corps.
As a senior member of the court, with the right of direct and private audience with the Sultan, the Agha was a very influential figure in Ottoman politics, and one of the closest advisors of the Sultan. The Agha was not a member of the Imperial Council, but could take part in extraordinary sessions, along with other military commanders. At his residence, the so-called "Agha's Gate" (ağa kapısı) next to the Süleymaniye Mosque, overlooking the Golden Horn, the Agha had his own council, which dealt with all matters pertaining to the Janissaries, but was obliged to inform the Grand Vizier, as the Sultan's unrestricted deputy, before forwarding any petitions to the Sultan.
Along with the Grand Vizier, the Agha of the Janissaries was also responsible for maintaining order in the Ottoman capital, Istanbul. The Agha also had prominent ceremonial and protocollary duties; for example, he accompanied the Sultan on his ceremonial visits to the mosques of the capital for the Friday prayer. When the Agha was absent on campaign, his duties were carried out by his deputy, the sekban-bashi, the commander of the 34 sekban regiments, which always remained behind as garrison in the capital. On campaign, the Agha was preceded by a white horse-tail standard (tugh), and his attendants had the tails of their robes tucked into their girdles. In the 16th century, the Agha of the Janissaries was one of the fifteen "Aghas of the Stirrup", leading officials from the Sultan's household which according to law qualified for subsequent appointment as provincial governors. | https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Agha_of_the_Janissaries |
Galilee | In the early Roman period, Galilee was predominantly Jewish. Archaeological evidence from multiple sites reveals Jewish customs, including the use of limestone vessels, ritual baths for purity, and secondary burial practices. A significant wave of Jewish settlement arrived in the region following the Roman conquest of 63 BCE. Large towns such as Kefar Hananya, Parod, Ravid, Mashkaneh, Sabban, and Tiberias were established by the end of the first century BCE or the start of the first century CE. By the end of the first century CE, the Galilee was dotted with small towns and villages. While Josephus writes there were 204 small towns, modern scholars consider this an exaggeration.
Galilee's economy under Roman rule thrived on a combination of agriculture, fishing, and specialized crafts. Excavations in villages like Nazareth have revealed extensive agricultural infrastructure, including numerous olive presses and granaries. Olive was extensively grown in parts of Upper Galilee. Many towns and villages, particularly those around the Sea of Galilee benefited from both fertile land and a thriving fishing industry. In Tarichaea (Magdala), salted, dried, and pickled fish were significant export goods. Galilee also boasted specialized production centers. Shihin, near Sepphoris, produced most of the region's storage jars, while Kefar Hananya in Upper Galilee manufactured various tableware forms, supplying markets across Galilee, the Golan Heights, the Decapolis, coastal areas, and the Beth Shean Valley.
Josephus describes the Jewish population of Galilee as being nationalist and hostile to Jewish city-dwellers, making them the first target for the Romans during the Jewish-Roman wars. Bargil Pixner believes they descended from a Davidic Jewish clan from Babylon. But according to archaeological and literary evidence, upper and lower Galilee were 'very much in constant touch with the gentile, Greek-speaking cities that surrounded them.' Many Galileans were bilingual and made daily contacts with Jerusalem and gentiles around the Roman territory. Markus Cromhout states that whilst Galileans, Judeans and diasporic Judeans were all Jewish, the Galileans had their unique social, political and economic matrix. In terms of ethnicity, Galileans were ethnic Judeans, which generally saw themselves also as Israelites, but could be also identified with localized characteristics, such as Sepphorean. But others argue that Galileans and Judeans were distinct people groups. Outsiders generally conflated them due to Hellenistic-Roman culture, which grouped all diverse groups in Palestine and their related diasporas as "Judean".In 4 BCE, a rebel named Judah plundered Galilee's largest city, Sepphoris. According to Josephus, the Syrian governor Publius Quinctilius Varus responded by sacking Sepphoris and selling the population into slavery, but the region's archaeology lacks evidence of such destruction. After the death of Herod the Great that same year, his son Herod Antipas was appointed as tetrarch of Galilee by the Roman emperor Augustus. Galilee remained a Roman client state and Antipas paid tribute to the Roman Empire in exchange for Roman protection. The Romans did not station troops in Galilee, but threatened to retaliate against anyone who attacked it. As long as he continued to pay tribute, Antipas was permitted to govern however he wished and was permitted to mint his own coinage. Antipas was relatively observant of Jewish laws and customs. Although his palace was decorated with animal carvings, which many Jews regarded as a transgression against the law prohibiting idols, his coins bore only agricultural designs, which his subjects deemed acceptable.
In general, Antipas was a capable ruler; Josephus does not record any instance of his use of force to put down an uprising and he had a long, prosperous reign. However, many Jews probably resented him as not sufficiently devout. Antipas rebuilt the city of Sepphoris, and in either 18 CE or 19 CE, he founded the new city of Tiberias. These two cities became Galilee's largest cultural centers. They were the main centers of Greco-Roman influence, but were still predominantly Jewish. A massive gap existed between the rich and poor, but lack of uprisings suggest that taxes were not exorbitantly high and that most Galileans did not feel their livelihoods were being threatened.
Late in his reign, Antipas married his half-niece Herodias, who was already married to one of her other uncles. His wife, whom he divorced, fled to her father Aretas, an Arab king, who invaded Galilee and defeated Antipas's troops before withdrawing. Both Josephus and the Gospel of Mark record that the itinerant preacher John the Baptist criticized Antipas over his marriage and Antipas consequently had him imprisoned and then beheaded. In around 39 CE, at the urging of Herodias, Antipas went to Rome to request that he be elevated from the status of tetrarch to the status of king. The Romans found him guilty of storing arms, so he was removed from power and exiled, ending his forty-three-year reign. During the Great Revolt (66–73 CE), a Jewish mob destroyed Herod Antipas's palace.
Overall, Galilee under Antipas's rule was marked by significant demographic instability. Diseases like malaria were rampant, internal migration between urban and rural areas were frequent and women generally gave birth at young ages whilst married to older men. Birth control, including infanticide, was not practiced. Many young men, especially marginal villagers, migrated to urban areas to find wives or alternatively, employment. Finding wives was presumed to be competitive since widows often refused to marry past the age of 30 compared to widowers. According to Jonathan L. Reed, this can provide insight on the tropes of New Testament literature, such as miraculous healings and the itinerant lifestyle of Jesus and his disciples.
In 66 CE, during the Great Jewish Revolt, Josephus was appointed by the Jerusalem provisional government to command Galilee. The region experienced internal conflicts among cities such as Sepphoris and Tiberias, with factions opposing Josephus's authority and warring for control. Sepphoris and other strong cities attempted to remain neutral by maintaining alliances with Rome. Despite opposition, Josephus managed to secure internal peace and fortified nineteen cities in preparation for the Roman invasion; nearly half of them were uncovered by archaeologists. In 67 CE, the Roman army, led by general Vespasian, arrived in Acre. Josephus's account, The Jewish War, details the Roman campaign in Galilee, starting with the siege and capture of Gabara, followed by Jotapata (where Josephus was captured), and continuing with Tiberias, Taricheae, Gamala, Tabor, and ending in Gischala. While not all of Galilee was devastated, the conquered cities were razed, and many inhabitants were sold into slavery. | https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Galilee |
Six-Day War | Syria largely stayed out of the conflict for the first four days.
False Egyptian reports of a crushing victory against the Israeli army and forecasts that Egyptian forces would soon be attacking Tel Aviv influenced Syria's decision to enter the war – in a sporadic manner – during this period. Syrian artillery began shelling northern Israel, and twelve Syrian jets attacked Israeli settlements in the Galilee. Israeli fighter jets intercepted the Syrian aircraft, shooting down three and driving off the rest. In addition, two Lebanese Hawker Hunter jets, two of the twelve Lebanon had, crossed into Israeli airspace and began strafing Israeli positions in the Galilee. They were intercepted by Israeli fighter jets, and one was shot down.
On the evening of 5 June, the Israeli Air Force attacked Syrian airfields. The Syrian Air Force lost some 32 MiG 21s, 23 MiG-15 and MiG-17 fighters, and two Ilyushin Il-28 bombers, two-thirds of its fighting strength. The Syrian aircraft that survived the attack retreated to distant bases and played no further role in the war. Following the attack, Syria realised that the news it had received from Egypt of the near-total destruction of the Israeli military could not have been true.
On 6 June, a minor Syrian force tried to capture the water plants at Tel Dan (the subject of a fierce escalation two years earlier), Dan, and She'ar Yashuv. These attacks were repulsed with the loss of twenty soldiers and seven tanks. An Israeli officer was also killed. But a broader Syrian offensive quickly failed. Syrian reserve units were broken up by Israeli air attacks, and several tanks were reported to have sunk in the Jordan River.
Other problems included tanks being too wide for bridges, lack of radio communications between tanks and infantry, and units ignoring orders to advance. A post-war Syrian army report concluded:
Our forces did not go on the offensive either because they did not arrive or were not wholly prepared or because they could not find shelter from the enemy's aircraft. The reserves could not withstand the air attacks; they dispersed after their morale plummeted.
The Syrians bombarded Israeli civilian settlements in the Galilee Panhandle with two battalions of M-46 130mm guns, four companies of heavy mortars, and dug-in Panzer IV tanks. The Syrian bombardment killed two civilians and hit 205 houses as well as farming installations. An inaccurate report from a Syrian officer, however, said that as a result of the bombardment that "the enemy appears to have suffered heavy losses and is retreating". | https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Six-Day_War |
Khosrow II | In 591, Khosrow moved to Constantia and prepared to invade Bahram Chobin's territories in Mesopotamia, while Vistahm and Vinduyih were raising an army in Adurbadagan under the observation of the Byzantine commander John Mystacon, who was also raising an army in Armenia. After some time, Khosrow, along with the Byzantine commander of the south, Comentiolus, invaded Mesopotamia. During this invasion, Nisibis and Martyropolis quickly defected to them, and Bahram Chobin's commander Zatsparham was defeated and killed. One of Bahram Chobin's other commanders, Bryzacius, was captured in Mosil and had his nose and ears cut off, and was thereafter sent to Khosrow, where he was killed. Khosrow II and the Byzantine general Narses then penetrated deeper into Bahram's territory, seizing Dara and then Mardin in February, where Khosrow was re-proclaimed king. Shortly after this, Khosrow sent one of his Iranian supporters, Mahbodh, to capture Ctesiphon, which he managed to accomplish.
At the same time a force of 8,000 Iranians under Vistahm and Vinduyih and 12,000 Armenians under Mushegh II Mamikonian invaded Adurbadagan. Bahram Chobin tried to disrupt the force by writing a letter to Mushegh II, the letter said: "As for you Armenians who demonstrate an unseasonable loyalty, did not the house of Sasan destroy your land and sovereignty? Why otherwise did your fathers rebel and extricate themselves from their service, fighting up until today for your country?" Bahram Chobin in his letter promised that the Armenians would become partners of the new Iranian empire ruled by a Parthian dynastic family if he accepted his proposal to betray Khosrow II. Mushegh, however, rejected the offer.
Bahram Chobin was then defeated at the Battle of Blarathon, forcing him to flee with 4,000 men eastwards. He marched towards Nishapur, where he defeated a pursuing army as well as an army led by a Karenid nobleman at Qumis. Constantly troubled, he crossed the Oxus river, where he was received honorably by the Khagan of the Turks, who was most likely Birmudha—the same Turkic prince that Bahram Chobin had defeated and captured a few years earlier during his wars against the Turks. Bahram Chobin entered his service, and was appointed as a commander in the army, achieving further military accomplishments there. Bahram Chobin became a highly popular figure after saving the Khagan from a conspiracy instigated by the latter's brother Byghu (conceivably an incorrect translation of yabghu). Khosrow II, however, could not feel safe as long as Bahram Chobin lived, and succeeded in having him assassinated. The assassination was reportedly achieved through distribution of presents and bribes between the members of the Turkic royal family, notably the queen. What remained of Bahram Chobin's supporters went back to northern Iran and joined the rebellion of Vistahm (590/1–596 or 594/5–600). | https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Khosrow_II |
Islam in Jordan | The 1980s witnessed a stronger and more visible adherence to Islamic customs and beliefs among significant segments of the population. The increased interest in incorporating Islam more fully into daily life was expressed in a variety of ways. Women wearing conservative Islamic dress and the headscarf were seen with greater frequency in the streets of urban as well as rural areas; men with beards also were more often seen. Attendance at Friday prayers rose, as did the number of people observing Ramadan.
Women in the 1980s, particularly university students, were actively involved in expressions of Islamic revival. Women wearing Islamic garb were a common sight at the country's universities. For example, the mosque at Yarmouk University had a large women's section. The section was usually full, and women there formed groups to study Islam. By and large, women and girls who adopted Islamic dress apparently did so of their own volition, although it was not unusual for men to insist that their sisters, wives, and daughters cover their hair in public.
The adoption of the Islamic form of dress did not signify a return to segregation of the sexes or female seclusion. Indeed, women who adopted Islamic clothing often were working women and students who interacted daily with men. They cited a lag in cultural attitudes as part of the reason for donning such dress. In other words, when dressed in Islamic garb they felt that they received more respect from and were taken more seriously by their fellow students and colleagues. Women also could move more readily in public if they were modestly attired. The increased religious observance also accounted for women's new style of dress. In the 1980s, Islamic dress did not indicate social status, particularly wealth, as it had in the past; Islamic dress was being worn by women of all classes, especially the lower and middle classes.
Several factors gave rise to increased adherence to Islamic practices. During the 1970s and 1980s, the Middle East region saw a rise of Islamism in response to the economic recession and to the failure of nationalist politics to solve regional problems. In this context, Islam was an idiom for expressing social discontent. In Jordan, opposition politics had long been forbidden, and since the 1950s the Muslim Brotherhood had been the only legal political party. These factors were exacerbated by King Hussein's public support for the shah of Iran in his confrontation with Ayatollah Khomeini and the forces of opposition, by continued relations with Egypt in the wake of the 1979 Treaty of Peace Between Egypt and Israel, and by the king's support for Iraq in the Iran–Iraq War.
Although Islamic opposition politics never became as widespread in Jordan as in Iran and Egypt, they were pervasive enough for the regime to act swiftly to bring them under its supervision. By the close of the 1970s and throughout the 1980s, government-controlled television regularly showed the king and his brother Hasan attending Friday prayers. The media granted more time to religious programs and broadcasts. Aware that the Islamic movement might become a vehicle for expressing opposition to the regime and its policies, and in a move to repair relations with Syria, in the mid-1980s the government began to promote a moderate form of Islam, denouncing fanatical and intolerant forms. | https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Islam_in_Jordan |
Babylonia | The Kassite dynasty was founded by Gandash of Mari. The Kassites, like the Amorite rulers who had preceded them, were not originally native to Mesopotamia. Rather, they had first appeared in the Zagros Mountains of what is today northwestern Iran.
The ethnic affiliation of the Kassites is unclear. Still, their language was not Semitic or Indo-European, and is thought to have been either a language isolate or possibly related to the Hurro-Urartian language family of Anatolia, although the evidence for its genetic affiliation is meager due to the scarcity of extant texts. That said, several Kassite leaders may have borne Indo-European names, and they may have had an Indo-European elite similar to the Mitanni elite that later ruled over the Hurrians of central and eastern Anatolia, while others had Semitic names.
The Kassites renamed Babylon Karduniaš and their rule lasted for 576 years, the longest dynasty in Babylonian history.
This new foreign dominion offers a striking analogy to the roughly contemporary rule of the Semitic Hyksos in ancient Egypt. Most divine attributes ascribed to the Amorite kings of Babylonia disappeared at this time; the title "god" was never given to a Kassite sovereign. Babylon continued to be the capital of the kingdom and one of the holy cities of western Asia, where the priests of the ancient Mesopotamian religion were all-powerful, and the only place where the right to inheritance of the short lived old Babylonian empire could be conferred.
Babylonia experienced short periods of relative power, but in general proved to be relatively weak under the long rule of the Kassites, and spent long periods under Assyrian and Elamite domination and interference.
It is not clear precisely when Kassite rule of Babylon began, but the Indo-European Hittites from Anatolia did not remain in Babylonia for long after the sacking of the city, and it is likely the Kassites moved in soon afterwards. Agum II took the throne for the Kassites in 1595 BC, and ruled a state that extended from Iran to the middle Euphrates; The new king retained peaceful relations with Erishum III, the native Mesopotamian king of Assyria, but successfully went to war with the Hittite Empire, and twenty-four years after, the Hittites took the sacred statue of Marduk, he recovered it and declared the god equal to the Kassite deity Shuqamuna.
Burnaburiash I succeeded him and drew up a peace treaty with the Assyrian king Puzur-Ashur III, and had a largely uneventful reign, as did his successor Kashtiliash III.
The Sealand Dynasty of southern Mesopotamia remained independent of Babylonia and like Assyria was in native Akkadian-speaking hands. Ulamburiash managed to attack it and conquered parts of the land from Ea-gamil, a king with a distinctly Sumerian name, around 1450 BC, whereupon Ea-Gamil fled to his allies in Elam. The Sealand Dynasty region still remained independent, and the Kassite king seems to have been unable to finally conquer it. Ulamburiash began making treaties with ancient Egypt, which then was ruling southern Canaan, and Assyria to the north. Agum III also campaigned against the Sealand Dynasty, finally wholly conquering the far south of Mesopotamia for Babylon, destroying its capital Dur-Enlil in the process. From there Agum III extended farther south still, invading what was many centuries later to be called the Arabian Peninsula or Arabia, and conquering the pre-Arab state of Dilmun (in modern Bahrain).
Karaindash built a bas-relief temple in Uruk and Kurigalzu I (1415–1390 BC) built a new capital Dur-Kurigalzu named after himself, transferring administrative rule from Babylon. Both of these kings continued to struggle unsuccessfully against the Sealand Dynasty. Karaindash also strengthened diplomatic ties with the Assyrian king Ashur-bel-nisheshu and the Egyptian Pharaoh Thutmose III and protected Babylonian borders with Elam.
Kadašman-Ḫarbe I succeeded Karaindash, and briefly invaded Elam before being eventually defeated and ejected by its king Tepti Ahar. He then had to contend with the Suteans, ancient Semitic-speaking peoples from the southeastern Levant who invaded Babylonia and sacked Uruk. He describes having "annihilated their extensive forces", then constructed fortresses in a mountain region called Ḫiḫi, in the desert to the west (modern Syria) as security outposts, and "he dug wells and settled people on fertile lands, to strengthen the guard".
Kurigalzu I succeeded the throne, and soon came into conflict with Elam, to the east. When Ḫur-batila, the successor of Tepti Ahar took the throne of Elam, he began raiding the Babylonia, taunting Kurigalzu to do battle with him at Dūr-Šulgi. Kurigalzu launched a campaign which resulted in the abject defeat and capture of Ḫur-batila, who appears in no other inscriptions. He went on to conquer the eastern lands of Elam. This took his army to the Elamite capital, the city of Susa, which was sacked. After this a puppet ruler was placed on the Elamite throne, subject to Babylonia. Kurigalzu I maintained friendly relations with Assyria, Egypt and the Hittites throughout his reign. Kadashman-Enlil I (1374–1360 BC) succeeded him, and continued his diplomatic policies.
Burna-Buriash II ascended to the throne in 1359 BC, he retained friendly relations with Egypt, but the resurgent Middle Assyrian Empire (1365–1050 BC) to the north was now encroaching into northern Babylonia, and as a symbol of peace, the Babylonian king took the daughter of the powerful Assyrian king Ashur-uballit I in marriage. He also maintained friendly relations with Suppiluliuma I, ruler of the Hittite Empire.
He was succeeded by Kara-ḫardaš (who was half Assyrian, and the grandson of the Assyrian king) in 1333 BC, a usurper named Nazi-Bugaš deposed him, enraging Ashur-uballit I, who invaded and sacked Babylon, slew Nazi-Bugaš, annexed Babylonian territory for the Middle Assyrian Empire, and installed Kurigalzu II (1345–1324 BC) as his vassal ruler of Babylonia.
Soon after Arik-den-ili succeeded the throne of Assyria in 1327 BC, Kurigalzu II attacked Assyria in an attempt to reassert Babylonian power. After some impressive initial successes he was ultimately defeated, and lost yet more territory to Assyria. Between 1307 BC and 1232 BC his successors, such as Nazi-Maruttash, Kadashman-Turgu, Kadashman-Enlil II, Kudur-Enlil and Shagarakti-Shuriash, allied with the empires of the Hittites and the Mitanni (who were both also losing swathes of territory to the resurgent Assyrians), in a failed attempt to stop Assyrian expansion. This expansion, nevertheless, continued unchecked.
Kashtiliash IV's (1242–1235 BC) reign ended catastrophically as the Assyrian king Tukulti-Ninurta I (1243–1207 BC) routed his armies, sacked and burned Babylon and set himself up as king, ironically becoming the first native Mesopotamian to rule the Mesopotamian populated state, its previous rulers having all been non-Mesopotamian Amorites and Kassites. Kashtiliash himself was taken to Ashur as a prisoner of war.
An Assyrian governor/king named Enlil-nadin-shumi was placed on the throne to rule as viceroy to Tukulti-Ninurta I, and Kadashman-Harbe II and Adad-shuma-iddina succeeded as Assyrian governor/kings,also subject to Tukulti-Ninurta I until 1216 BC.
Babylon did not begin to recover until late in the reign of Adad-shuma-usur (1216–1189 BC), as he too remained a vassal of Assyria until 1193 BC. However, he was able to prevent the Assyrian king Enlil-kudurri-usur from retaking Babylonia, which, apart from its northern reaches, had mostly shrugged off Assyrian domination during a short period of civil war in the Assyrian empire, in the years after the death of Tukulti-Ninurta.
Meli-Shipak II (1188–1172 BC) seems to have had a peaceful reign. Despite not being able to regain northern Babylonia from Assyria, no further territory was lost, Elam did not threaten, and the Late Bronze Age collapse now affecting the Levant, Canaan, Egypt, the Caucasus, Anatolia, Mediterranean, North Africa, northern Iran and Balkans seemed (initially) to have little impact on Babylonia (or indeed Assyria and Elam).
War resumed under subsequent kings such as Marduk-apla-iddina I (1171–1159 BC) and Zababa-shuma-iddin (1158 BC). The long reigning Assyrian king Ashur-dan I (1179–1133 BC) resumed expansionist policies and conquered further parts of northern Babylonia from both kings, and the Elamite ruler Shutruk-Nakhunte eventually conquered most of eastern Babylonia. Enlil-nadin-ahhe (1157–1155 BC) was finally overthrown and the Kassite dynasty ended after Ashur-dan I conquered yet more of northern and central Babylonia, and the equally powerful Shutruk-Nahhunte pushed deep into the heart of Babylonia itself, sacking the city and slaying the king. Poetical works have been found lamenting this disaster.
Despite the loss of territory, general military weakness, and evident reduction in literacy and culture, the Kassite dynasty was the longest-lived dynasty of Babylon, lasting until 1155 BC, when Babylon was conquered by Shutruk-Nakhunte of Elam, and reconquered a few years later by the Nebuchadnezzar I, part of the larger Late Bronze Age collapse. | https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Babylonia |
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