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Ibn Khaldun | Ibn Khaldun's epistemology attempted to reconcile mysticism with theology by dividing science into two different categories, the religious science that regards the sciences of the Qur'an and the non-religious science. He further classified the non-religious sciences into intellectual sciences such as logic, arithmetic, geometry, astronomy, etc. and auxiliary sciences such as language, literature, poetry, etc. He also suggested that possibly more divisions will appear in the future with different societies. He tried to adapt to all possible societies’ cultural behavior and influence in education, economics and politics. Nonetheless, he didn't think that laws were chosen by just one leader or a small group of individual but mostly by the majority of the individuals of a society.
To Ibn Khaldun, the state was a necessity of human society to restrain injustice within the society, but the state means is force, thus itself an injustice. All societies must have a state governing them in order to establish a society. He attempted to standardize the history of societies by identifying ubiquitous phenomena present in all societies. To him, civilization was a phenomenon that will be present as long as humans exist. He characterized the fulfillment of basic needs as the beginning of civilization. At the beginning, people will look for different ways of increasing productivity of basic needs and expansion will occur. Later the society starts becoming more sedentary and focuses more on crafting, arts and the more refined characteristics. By the end of a society, it will weaken, allowing another small group of individuals to come into control. The conquering group is described as an unsatisfied group within the society itself or a group of desert bandits that constantly attack other weaker or weakened societies.
In the Muqaddimah, his most important work, he discusses an introduction of philosophy to history in a general manner, based on observable patterns within a theoretical framework of known historical events of his time. He described the beginnings, development, cultural trends and the fall of all societies, leading to the rise of a new society which would then follow the same trends in a continuous cycle. Also, he recommended the best political approaches to develop a society according to his knowledge of history. He heavily emphasized that a good society would be one in which a tradition of education is deeply rooted in its culture.
Ibn Khaldun (1987) introduced the word asabiya (solidarity, group feeling, or group consciousness), to explain tribalism. The concept of asabiya has been translated as "social cohesion," "group solidarity," or "tribalism." This social cohesion arises spontaneously in tribes and other small kinship groups (Rashed,2017).
Ibn Khaldun believed that too much bureaucracy, such as taxes and legislations, would lead to the decline of a society, since it would constrain the development of more specialized labor (increase in scholars and development of different services). He believed that bureaucrats cannot understand the world of commerce and do not possess the same motivation as a businessman.
In his work the Muqaddimah, Ibn Khaldun emphasizes human beings' faculty to think (fikr) as what determines human behavior and ubiquitous patterns. This faculty is also what inspires human beings to form into a social structure to co-operate in division of labor and organization. According to Zaid Ahmand in Epistemology and the Human Dimension in Urban Studies, the fikr faculty is the supporting pillar for all philosophical aspects of Ibn Khaldun's theory related to human beings’ spiritual, intellectual, physical, social and political tendencies.
Another important concept he emphasizes in his work is the mastery of crafts, habits and skills. This takes place after a society is established and according to Ibn Khaldun the level of achievement of a society can be determined by just analyzing these three concepts. A society in its earliest stages is nomadic and primarily concerned with survival, while a society at a later stage is sedentary, with greater achievement in crafts. A society with a sedentary culture and stable politics would be expected to have greater achievements in crafts and technology.
Ibn Khaldun also emphasized in his epistemology the important aspect that educational tradition plays to ensure the new generations of a civilization continuously improve in the sciences and develop culture. Ibn Khaldun argued that without the strong establishment of an educational tradition, it would be very difficult for the new generations to maintain the achievements of the earlier generations, let alone improve them.
Another way to distinguish the achievement of a society would be the language of a society, since for him the most important element of a society would not be land, but the language spoken. He was surprised that many non-Arabs were really successful in the Arabic society, had good jobs and were well received by the community. "These people were non-Arab by descent, but they grew up among the Arabs who possessed the habit of Arabic," Ibn Khaldun once recalled, "[b]ecause of this, they were able to master Arabic so well that they cannot be surpassed." He believed that the reason why non-Arabs were accepted as part of Arab society was due to their mastery of the Arabic language.
Advancements in literary works such as poems and prose were another way to distinguish the achievement of a civilization, but Ibn Khaldun believed that whenever the literary facet of a society reaches its highest levels it ceases to indicate societal achievements anymore, but is an embellishment of life. For logical sciences he established knowledge at its highest level as an increase of scholars and the quality of knowledge. For him the highest level of literary productions would be the manifestation of prose, poems and the artistic enrichment of a society. | https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ibn_Khaldun |
Harar | Known as gey gar ("city house", plural: gey garach), Harari houses form a distinct archetype that differs from other Muslim regions and from other parts of Ethiopia. The traditional Harari house design is still widely in use today, with only minor changes, and Hararis who have moved to other cities try to adhere to a similar style. Hararis take great pride in their houses, and they form an important part of Harari culture.
A walled compound (abāt) consists of several residences, which share the same walls but are not interconnected. They are arranged around a courtyard, with most of the windows facing the courtyard instead of the street. Doors to individual residences almost always point east or west; north- or south-facing doors are rare. According to Kabir Abdulmuheimen Abdulnassir, farmers and merchants often have east-facing doors so that they can rise early for work. The several families who live in the same compound share one or two kitchens, which are disconnected from the residences. The walls that surround the compounds are joined so that they are basically continuous. The outer gate facing the street is usually wooden but sometimes iron, and they are either painted or whitewashed. The walls form an architrave around them.
Sometimes several compounds are joined into a "block" of compounds, all surrounded by the same wall and then having their own walls around them. These "blocks" are set up so that a visitor passes the first compound before reaching the second, etc.
Building materials are local stone, while a mixture of pounded stones and clay are used as both mortar and plaster to cover the walls before they are whitewashed. This is the case in newer houses as well as older ones.
The floor plan of a typical Harari house is rectangular. The main room is the large living room called the gidīr gār or the gār ēqäd. The gidīr gār has several raised platforms, called nädäbas, which function as seats or beds. A typical house will have five nädäbas. At the back of the gidir gar, across from the front door, are two nädäbas: the "small" one, or tīt nädäba, and then behind it the "big" one, or gidīr nädäba, which is somewhat higher up. These are the two largest nädäbas. Shoes may be worn as far as the tīt nädäba, but then they must be removed. The tīt nädäba is where younger people or people with less seniority sit. Children also sleep on this nädäba. Historically, at the emir's court, it served as the seat for plaintiffs or defendants. The gidīr nädäba seats elders and people who are considered more senior. Historically, at the emir's court, dignitaries were seated here. When a person dies, their body is kept on the gidīr nädäba before being buried as a sign of respect. A basin is dug in the gidīr nädäba and filled with water and used to wash the body, and then the basin is filled in again.
The amīr nädäba, or nädäba of honor, is reserved for the master of the house and for honored guests; it can be on either the left or the right depending on the house. It is positioned so that the head of the family can see whoever enters the home and act accordingly. The "hidden" nädäba, or the sutri nädäba, can also be on either side but is always behind a protruding pillar or maxazu. Historically, this is known as the "malassay nädäba" because the guards of the emir would sit here during meetings or court cases. The sutri nädäba is used for sleeping. It is also used as a seat where the husband rests when he comes home. Finally, there is the gäbti äḥer näbäda, or the one behind the entrance door. Like the amīr and sutri nädäbas, this one can be on either the left or the right. At the back corners there are sometimes built-in cupboards or wardrobes called näbäda dēras. Cash and important documents are kept in a chest in the näbäda dēra. The upper part of the näbäda dēra is used to store clothes belonging to the master of the house.
The gidīr gār has built-in niches called ṭāqēts which are used to store and display personal possessions. They are fairly high up and there are typically 11 of them: five on the main wall opposite the door, and the rest on the other walls. The two rectangular niches in the middle of the main wall (called ēqäd ṭāqēt) are typically used to store books, especially the Qur'an. Their rectangular shape is supposed to be evocative of death and the grave. In addition to the 11 main niches, there are sometimes also niches in the nädäbas, which are used to hold shoes or an incense burner.
On either side of the entrance there is an open doorway leading to the kirtät, which is a side room with a low ceiling and its own nädäba. The wall between the kirtät and the gidīr gār sometimes has a window screen with decorative woodcarving. Women usually stay in the kirtät when men have a bärça (a meeting to chew khat and meditate). In the past, the kirtät was also where a young bride would live in seclusion for 8 months after her wedding. In that case the entryway to the kirtät, which does not otherwise have a door, would be covered with a bamboo screen and a curtain.
A second side room with a low ceiling, the dēra, is connected to the kirtät by a small door. It is used to store items which are not susceptible to attack by rats. Next to the door, the wall of the dēra has a special niche where the aflālas are kept. These are black pottery containers with long necks and covered by elongated basketry lids called aflāla uffas. They are used to store the family's jewelry and other valuables, as well as the umbilical cords of the family's children. According to Fethia Ahmed, curator of the Harari cultural museum, the lids being turned upside down indicates that the husband has died and that there is a widow living in the house.
The dēra is a private space, where a husband and wife may speak without their children listening. It is also used by children between the ages of 3 and 7 to eat during Ramadan out of public view, before they begin to fast all day long at age 7. The dēra is built with porous stone without cement to allow for better ventilation.
The ceiling above the gidīr gār rises to the full height of the house. Above the side rooms, though, there is an upper level called the qala. Originally, the qala was used mainly for storage and sometimes as a sleeping area, and it was not separated from the gidīr gār in any way. Since the late 19th century, though, there is usually a wooden screen separating the two, and the qala has basically become a distinct second floor, often with several rooms, although without nädäbas or other installations. The staircase to the qala usually consists of six to nine steps. In newer houses it has a carved wood banister but in older houses it did not.
House ceilings are traditionally made of thin tree trunks which have had their bark stripped off. Today the ceiling is whitewashed along with the rest of the house. One beam, located above the edge of the tīt nädäba, is called the ḥāmil; today it is used to hang a neon lamp from, but in the past people would hang an ostrich egg from it because it was believed that doing so would protect the house from lightning. Nowadays, the ceilings are made of varnished wooden planks, with the ḥāmil distinguished by its larger size and distinct shape.
Floors are traditionally made of red earth (called qēḥ afär), and the parts of nädäbas that aren't covered by rugs or mats are also painted red. Today they are often tiled, usually with at least some red present. The red is supposed to be reminiscent of the blood shed at the Battle of Chelenqo.
Some houses will have an adjoining tīt gār or "small house", which has a separate entrance and a nädäba of its own. The tīt gār is often unconnected to the main house. It is used by younger family members, or sometimes rented to tenants. Since the 20th century, some houses add another level above the tīt gār and connect it to the qala as well as giving it a separate entrance via a staircase on the outside of the house.
Each compound typically contained a separate room for a farmhand or servant, without nädäbas or side rooms. There would also be stables for cows and donkeys. There are also typically one or two "kitchen houses", unconnected to the houses, typically located on either sides of the courtyard. These kitchens have no windows, with smoke escaping through the door, so eventually the walls end up covered in soot. Shelves made from tree trunks are used to store kitchen utensils.
In the past, Harari houses would have little to no furniture. Since the 20th century, simple Western-style wooden chairs have proliferated, as well as metal bedsteads with kapok mattresses which are set up on the sutri nädäba.
Richard Francis Burton described the emir's home as the only building whose exterior was whitewashed, implying that most buildings were undecorated at the time of his visit in the 1800s. Most houses were similarly described as neither painted nor whitewashed as late as 1935. Today, though, Hararis typically whitewash their houses with a limestone mixture (called näçih afär) at least once and ideally twice a year, once before Ramadan and once again before the Aräfa festival. Household items and baskets are thoroughly cleaned at the same time. Today, instead of whitewashing, walls are sometimes painted using oil paints. This can be any color, although green is the most popular.
Interior decorating of homes is typically done by women. They cover the nädäbas with rugs, mats, and pillows, and decorate the walls with Harari basketry (which is also typically made by women). Enamel plates and bowls are also hung on the walls today. Decorative baskets are generally hung up symmetrically and in pairs. Each household has its own style of decoration, and women guests often comment on how they like how the host's house is decorated. There is a stereotype that younger women are more fastidious at decorating their homes than older women, and that younger couples reapply the red earth to the floors once a week while older ones only do it a few times a year.
The largest type of decorative baskets are the kind that are used to serve bread and sweets at women's gatherings. These have tall conical lids that are hung above and overlapping them. They are hung in one or two rows on the wall behind the gidīr nädäba and below the niches, and they are typically in alternating pairs. Between the ēqäd ṭāqēts, the two rectangular niches in the center used for storing books, there is a vertical line of small basketry plates called sāgāris along with their lids. These are used to serve coffee beans at wedding or funeral feasts. They are typically in a group of 3, with 2 of them sharing a pattern and design. Next to the amīr nädäba and the dēra, the wall is decorated with other basketry plates in pairs. These are about the size of a breakfast plate and traditionally are used to serve bread. Two of them are called "the baskets for the mother-in-law", or the ḥamāt mot, and these are presented by the family of a bride to the in-laws at a wedding.
Emigrants from Harar often try to stick to the traditional Harari home layout when possible, even in buildings with different architectural styles. There will be some sort of gidīr gār indicated, with rugs and pillows forming an informal nädäba, and the walls will be decorated with traditional Harari basketry. | https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Harar |
Bahrain | The kingdom has a small but professional and well-equipped military called the Bahrain Defence Force (BDF), numbering around 8,200 personnel, including 6,000 in the Royal Bahraini Army, 700 in the Royal Bahraini Naval Force, and 1,500 in the Royal Bahraini Air Force. The BDF command structure also includes the Bahrain Royal Guard, which is the size of one battalion and has its own armored vehicles and artillery. The Bahrain National Guard is separate from the BDF, though it is tasked with assisting it in defense from external threats, and it has about 2,000 personnel. The supreme commander of the Bahraini military is King Hamad bin Isa Al Khalifa and the deputy supreme commander is the Crown Prince, Salman bin Hamad bin Isa Al Khalifa. The Commander-in-Chief of the BDF has been Field Marshal Khalid bin Ahmed Al Khalifa since 2008.
The BDF is primarily equipped with United States-made-equipment, such as the F-16 Fighting Falcon, F-5 Freedom Fighter, UH-60 Blackhawk, M60A3 tanks, and the ex-USS Jack Williams, an Oliver Hazard Perry class frigate renamed the RBNS Sabha. On 7 August 2020, it was announced in a ceremony held at the HMNB Portsmouth Naval Base in the UK, that HMS Clyde had been transferred to the Royal Bahrain Naval Force, with the ship renamed as RBNS Al-Zubara. On 18 January 2024 the Bahraini Navy received a second Oliver Hazard Perry-class frigate, the former USS Robert G. Bradley, which was renamed RBNS Khalid bin Ali. Bahrain was the first country in the Gulf to operate the F-16. Sometime in 2024 the Royal Bahraini Air Force expects to receive 16 aircraft of the modernized F-16 Block 70 variant, in addition to its current 20 F-16C/D and 12 F-5E/F fighters. The Royal Bahraini Army has 180 M60A3 main battle tanks, with 100 in active service and 80 in storage.
The Government of Bahrain has close relations with the United States, having signed a cooperative agreement with the United States Military and has provided the United States a base in Juffair since the early 1990s, although a US naval presence existed since 1948. This is the home of the headquarters for Commander, United States Naval Forces Central Command (COMUSNAVCENT) / United States Fifth Fleet (COMFIFTHFLT), and around 6,000 United States military personnel.
Bahrain participates in the Saudi Arabian-led intervention in Yemen against the Shia Houthis and forces loyal to former President Ali Abdullah Saleh, who was deposed in the 2011 Arab Spring uprising.
The permanent British Royal Navy base at Mina Salman, HMS Jufair, was officially opened in April 2018. | https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Bahrain |
Kuwait | The Al Sabah strongly advocated Islamism throughout the 1980s. At that time, the most serious threat to the continuity of Al Sabah came from home-grown democrats, who were protesting the 1976 suspension of the parliament. The Al Sabah were attracted to Islamists preaching the virtues of a hierarchical order that included loyalty to the Kuwaiti monarchy. In 1981, the Kuwaiti government gerrymandered electoral districts in favour of the Islamists. Islamists were the government's main allies, hence Islamists were able to dominate state agencies, such as the government ministries.
During the Iran–Iraq War, Kuwait ardently supported Iraq. As a result, there were various pro-Iran terror attacks across Kuwait, including the 1983 bombings, the attempted assassination of Emir Jaber in May 1985, the 1985 Kuwait City bombings, and the hijacking of several Kuwait Airways planes. Kuwait's economy and scientific research sector significantly suffered due to the pro-Iran terror attacks.
Simultaneously, Kuwait experienced a major economic crisis after the Souk Al-Manakh stock market crash and decrease in oil price.
After the Iran–Iraq War ended, Kuwait declined an Iraqi request to forgive its US$65 billion debt. An economic rivalry between the two countries ensued after Kuwait increased its oil production by 40 percent. Tensions between the two countries increased further in July 1990, after Iraq complained to OPEC claiming that Kuwait was stealing its oil from a field near the border by slant drilling of the Rumaila field.
In August 1990, Iraqi forces invaded and annexed Kuwait without any warning. After a series of failed diplomatic negotiations, the United States led a coalition to remove the Iraqi forces from Kuwait, in what became known as the Gulf War. On 26 February 1991, in phase of code-named Operation Desert Storm, the coalition succeeded in driving out the Iraqi forces. As they retreated, Iraqi forces carried out a scorched earth policy by setting oil wells on fire.
During the Iraqi occupation, nearly 1,000 civilians were killed in Kuwait. In addition, 600 people went missing during Iraq's occupation; remains of approximately 375 were found in mass graves in Iraq. Kuwait celebrates February 26 as Liberation Day. The event marked the country as the centre of the last major war in the 20th century. | https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Kuwait |
Khalid ibn al-Walid | After Buzakha, Khalid proceeded against the rebel Tamimite chieftain Malik ibn Nuwayra headquartered in al-Butah, in the present-day Qassim region. Malik had been appointed by Muhammad as the collector of the sadaqa ('alms tax') over his clan of the Tamim, the Yarbu, but stopped forwarding this tax to Medina after Muhammad's death. Abu Bakr consequently resolved to have him executed by Khalid. The latter faced divisions within his army regarding this campaign, with the Ansar initially staying behind, citing instructions by Abu Bakr not to campaign further until receiving a direct order by the caliph. Khalid claimed such an order was his prerogative as the commander appointed by the caliph, but he did not force the Ansar to participate and continued his march with troops from the Muhajirun and the Bedouin defectors from Buzakha and its aftermath; the Ansar ultimately rejoined Khalid after internal deliberations.
According to the most common account in the Muslim traditional sources, Khalid's army encountered Malik and eleven of his clansmen from the Yarbu in 632. The Yarbu did not resist, proclaimed their Muslim faith and were escorted to Khalid's camp. Khalid had them all executed over the objection of an Ansarite, who had been among the captors of the tribesmen and argued for the captives' inviolability due to their testaments as Muslims. Afterward, Khalid married Malik's widow Umm Tamim bint al-Minhal. When news of Khalid's actions reached Medina, Umar, who had become Abu Bakr's chief aide, pressed for Khalid to be punished or relieved of command, but Abu Bakr pardoned him.
According to the account of the 8th-century historian Sayf ibn Umar, Malik had also been cooperating with the prophetess Sajah, his kinswoman from the Yarbu, but after they were defeated by rival clans from the Tamim, left her cause and retreated to his camp at al-Butah. There, he was encountered with his small party by the Muslims. The modern historian Wilferd Madelung discounts Sayf's version, asserting that Umar and other Muslims would not have protested Khalid's execution of Malik if the latter had left Islam, while Watt considers accounts about the Tamim during the Ridda in general to be "obscure ... partly because the enemies of Khālid b. al-Walīd have twisted the stories to blacken him". In the view of the modern historian Ella Landau-Tasseron, "the truth behind Malik's career and death will remain buried under a heap of conflicting traditions". | https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Khalid_ibn_al-Walid |
Iran–Saudi Arabia proxy conflict | The Iran–Iraq War began on 22 September 1980, when Iraq under Saddam Hussein invaded Iran, and it ended on 20 August 1988, when Iran accepted the UN-brokered ceasefire. Iraq wanted to replace Iran as the dominant Persian Gulf state, and was worried the 1979 Iranian Revolution would lead Iraq's Shi'ite majority to rebel against the Ba'athist government. The war also followed a long history of border disputes, and Iraq planned to annex the oil-rich Khuzestan Province and the east bank of the Arvand Rud (Shatt al-Arab).
Hussein attempted to take advantage of revolutionary unrest in Iran and quell the revolution in its infancy. Fearing a possible revolutionary wave that could threaten Iraq's stability and embolden its Shia population, Iraq triggered the Iran–Iraq War which lasted for eight years and killed hundreds of thousands. Saddam had reportedly secured Saudi support for Iraq's war effort during an August 1980 visit he made to Saudi Arabia. This was in addition to financial and military support Iraq received from neighbouring leaders in Saudi Arabia, Egypt, Kuwait, Jordan, Qatar, and the United Arab Emirates, in part to hedge Iranian power and prevent the spread of its revolution.
Although Iraq hoped to take advantage of Iran's post-revolutionary chaos, it made limited progress and was quickly repelled; Iran regained virtually all lost territory by June 1982. For the next six years, Iran was on the offensive until near the end of the war.
American support for Iraq during the war had profound effects on Iran. The United States' defense of Saddam and its role in blocking investigations into Iraq's use of chemical weapons on Iranian soldiers and civilians convinced Iran to further pursue its own unconventional weapons program. The government has also used American hostility to justify foreign and domestic policies, including its nuclear program and crackdowns on internal dissent.
Apart from the Iran–Iraq War, Iran and Saudi Arabia engaged in tense competition elsewhere, supporting opposing armed groups in the Lebanese Civil War, the Soviet–Afghan War, and other conflicts. After the Cold War, Iran and Saudi Arabia continued to support different groups and organizations along sectarian lines such as in Afghanistan, Yemen, and Iraq.
After eight years, war-weariness, economic problems, decreased morale, repeated Iranian military failures, recent Iraqi successes, Iraqi use of weapons of mass destruction, lack of international sympathy, and increased U.S.–Iran military tension all led to a ceasefire brokered by the United Nations.
The conflict has been compared to World War I in terms of the tactics used, including large-scale trench warfare with barbed wire stretched across fortified defensive lines, manned machine gun posts, bayonet charges, Iranian human wave attacks, extensive use of chemical weapons by Iraq, and, later, deliberate attacks on civilian targets. A special feature of the war can be seen in the Iranian cult of the martyr which had been developed in the years before the revolution. The discourses on martyrdom formulated in the Iranian Shiite context led to the tactics of "human wave attacks" and thus had a lasting impact on the dynamics of the war. | https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Iran%E2%80%93Saudi_Arabia_proxy_conflict |
Esarhaddon | Seeing as he himself had only acquired the Assyrian throne with great difficulty, Esarhaddon took several steps in order to ensure that the transition of power following his own death would be a smooth and peaceful one. A treaty concluded between Esarhaddon and his vassal Ramataia, the ruler of a Median kingdom in the east called Urakazabarna in c. 672 BC makes it clear that all of Esarhaddon's sons were still minors at the time, which was problematic. The same treaty also shows that Esarhaddon was worried that there might be several factions who might oppose his successor's rise to the throne after his death, listing potential opposing forces as his successor's brothers, uncles and cousins and even "descendants of former royalty" and "one of the chiefs or governors of Assyria".
This indicates that at least some of Esarhaddon's brothers were still alive at this point and that they or their children could possibly represent threats to his own children. The mention of "descendants of former royalty" might allude to the fact that Esarhaddon's grandfather Sargon II had acquired the Assyrian throne through usurpation and may not have been related to any earlier Assyrian king. It is possible that descendants of earlier kings may still have been alive and in a position to press their claims on the Assyrian throne.
In order to avoid a civil war upon his death, Esarhaddon appointed his eldest son Sin-nadin-apli as crown prince in 674, but he died just two years later, again threatening a succession crisis. This time, Esarhaddon appointed two crown princes; his eldest living son Shamash-shum-ukin was selected as the heir to Babylon whilst a younger son, Ashurbanipal, was selected as the heir to Assyria. The two princes arrived at the capital of Nineveh together and partook in a celebration with foreign representatives and Assyrian nobles and soldiers. Promoting one of his sons as the heir to Assyria and another as the heir to Babylon was a new idea, for in the past decades the Assyrian king had simultaneously been the King of Babylon.
The choice to name a younger son as crown prince of Assyria, which was clearly Esarhaddon's primary title, and an older son as crown prince of Babylon might be explained by the mothers of the two sons. While Ashurbanipal's mother was likely Assyrian in origin, Shamash-shum-ukin was the son of a woman from Babylon (though this is uncertain, Ashurbanipal and Shamash-shum-ukin may have shared the same mother which would probably have had problematic consequences if Shamash-shum-ukin was to ascend to the Assyrian throne. Since Ashurbanipal was the next oldest son, he then was the superior candidate to the throne. Esarhaddon probably surmised that the Babylonians would be content with someone of Babylonian heritage as their king and as such set Shamash-shum-ukin to inherit Babylon and the southern parts of his empire instead. Treaties drawn up by Esarhaddon are somewhat unclear as to the relationship he intended his two sons to have. It is clear that Ashurbanipal was the primary heir to the empire and that Shamash-shum-ukin was to swear him an oath of allegiance, but other parts also specify that Ashurbanipal was not to interfere in Shamash-shum-ukin's affairs which indicates a more equal standing. The two crown princes soon became heavily involved with Assyrian politics, which lifted some of the burden from the shoulders of their sickly father.
Esarhaddon's mother Naqiʾa ensured that any potential enemies and claimants took an oath to support Ashurbanipal's rise to the Assyrian throne, another step to avoid the bloodshed which had begun Esarhaddon's own reign. In order to ensure the succession of Ashurbanipal and Shamash-shum-ukin, Esarhaddon himself also concluded succession treaties with at least six independent rulers in the east and with several of his own governors outside the Assyrian heartland in 672. Perhaps the main motivating factor to create these treaties was the possibility that his brothers, particularly Arda-Mulissu, were still alive and sought to claim the Assyrian throne. Some inscriptions suggest that they were alive and free as late as 673. | https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Esarhaddon |
Tariqa | The most popular tariqa in the West is the Mevlevi Order, named after Jalal ad-Din Muhammad Rumi. In the same time the Bektashi Order was also founded, named after the Haji Bektash Veli. Five large tariqas in South Asia are: the Naqshbandi Order, named after Baha-ud-Din Naqshband Bukhari; the Qadiri Order, named after Abdul Qadir Jilani; the Chishti Order, named after Khawaja Mawdood Chisti while Khawaja Moinuddin Chishti is the most famous sheikh; the Suhrawardi Order, named after Shahab al-Din Suhrawardi ; the Burhaniyya becoming popular within the people of Pakistan & India. Large tariqats in Africa include Muridiyya, Burhaniyya and Tijaniyya. Others can be offshoots of a tariqa. For example, the Qalandariyya has roots in Malamatiyya and Wafa'i (a combination of Yasawiyya-Sunni and Batiniyya-Shia) of orders are offshoots of the Suhrawardi order. The Ashrafia after the 13th century illustrious Sufi saint Ashraf Jahangir Semnani is the sub branch of Chishti spiritual lineage. The Maizbhandari Tariqa or Maizbhandari Sufi order is a liberated Sufism order established in the Bangladesh in the 19th century by the Gausul Azam Shah Sufi Syed Ahmadullah Maizbhandari (1826 AD − 1906 AD), 27th descendant of the Islamic prophet, Muhammad. Warsi Tariqa was founded by Waris Ali Shah.
Membership in a particular Sufi order is not exclusive, unlike the Christian monastic orders which are demarcated by firm lines of authority and sacrament. Sufis often are members of various Sufi orders. The non-exclusiveness of Sufi orders has consequences for the social extension of Sufism. They cannot be regarded as indulging in a zero sum competition which a purely political analysis might have suggested. Rather, their joint effect is to impart to Sufism a cumulant body of tradition, rather than individual and isolated experiences.
In most cases the sheikh nominates his khalifa or "successor" during his lifetime, who will take over the order. In rare cases, if the sheikh dies without naming a khalifa, the students of the tariqa elect another spiritual leader by vote. In some orders it is recommended to take a Khalif from the same order as the murshid. In some groups it is customary for the khalifa to be the son of the sheikh, although in other groups the khalīfa and the sheikh are not normally relatives. In yet other orders a successor may be identified through the spiritual dreams of its members.
Tariqas have silsilas (Arabic: سلسلة; "chain, lineage of sheikhs"). All orders claim a silsila that leads back to Muhammad through Ali, except the Naqshbandi silsila, which traces its roots to Abu Bakr, the first Caliph of Sunni Islam.
Every Murid, on entering the tariqa, gets his awrad, or daily recitations, authorized by his murshid (usually to be recited before or after the pre-dawn prayer, after the afternoon prayer and after the evening prayer). Usually these recitations are extensive and time-consuming (for example the awrad may consist of reciting a certain formula 99, 500 or even 1000 times). One must also be in a state of ritual purity (as one is for the obligatory prayers to perform them while facing Mecca). The recitations change as a student (murid) moves from a mere initiate to other Sufi degrees (usually requiring additional initiations). The Initiation ceremony is routine and consists of reading chapter 1 of the Quran followed by a single phrase prayer. Criteria have to be met to be promoted in rank: the common way is to repeat a single phrase prayer 82,000 times or more as in the case of Burhaniyya, a number that grows with each achieved rank. Murids who experience unusual interaction during meditation: hear voices like "would you like to see a prophet?" or see visions who might even communicate with the Murid are held dear in the "Haḍra", the weekly group-chanting of prayers in attempt of reaching spirits as they are likely to experience something unusual and pass it on. This Murid is promoted faster than others. The least common way is to cause a miracle to happen with criteria similar to that of Catholic Sainthood.
Being mostly followers of the spiritual traditions of Islam loosely referred to as Sufism, these groups were sometimes distinct from the Ulma or officially mandated scholars, and often acted as informal missionaries of Islam. They provided accepted avenues for emotional expressions of faith, and the Tariqas spread to all corners of the Muslim world, and often exercised a degree of political influence inordinate to their size (take for example the influence that the sheikhs of the Safavid had over the armies of Tamerlane, or the missionary work of Ali-Shir Nava'i in Turkistan among the Mongol and Tatar people). | https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Tariqa |
Positional notation | Base-12 systems (duodecimal or dozenal) have been popular because multiplication and division are easier than in base-10, with addition and subtraction being just as easy. Twelve is a useful base because it has many factors. It is the smallest common multiple of one, two, three, four and six. There is still a special word for "dozen" in English, and by analogy with the word for 102, hundred, commerce developed a word for 122, gross. The standard 12-hour clock and common use of 12 in English units emphasize the utility of the base. In addition, prior to its conversion to decimal, the old British currency Pound Sterling (GBP) partially used base-12; there were 12 pence (d) in a shilling (s), 20 shillings in a pound (£), and therefore 240 pence in a pound. Hence the term LSD or, more properly, £sd.
The Maya civilization and other civilizations of pre-Columbian Mesoamerica used base-20 (vigesimal), as did several North American tribes (two being in southern California). Evidence of base-20 counting systems is also found in the languages of central and western Africa.
Remnants of a Gaulish base-20 system also exist in French, as seen today in the names of the numbers from 60 through 99. For example, sixty-five is soixante-cinq (literally, "sixty [and] five"), while seventy-five is soixante-quinze (literally, "sixty [and] fifteen"). Furthermore, for any number between 80 and 99, the "tens-column" number is expressed as a multiple of twenty. For example, eighty-two is quatre-vingt-deux (literally, four twenty[s] [and] two), while ninety-two is quatre-vingt-douze (literally, four twenty[s] [and] twelve). In Old French, forty was expressed as two twenties and sixty was three twenties, so that fifty-three was expressed as two twenties [and] thirteen, and so on.
In English the same base-20 counting appears in the use of "scores". Although mostly historical, it is occasionally used colloquially. Verse 10 of Psalm 90 in the King James Version of the Bible starts: "The days of our years are threescore years and ten; and if by reason of strength they be fourscore years, yet is their strength labour and sorrow". The Gettysburg Address starts: "Four score and seven years ago".
The Irish language also used base-20 in the past, twenty being fichid, forty dhá fhichid, sixty trí fhichid and eighty ceithre fhichid. A remnant of this system may be seen in the modern word for 40, daoichead.
The Welsh language continues to use a base-20 counting system, particularly for the age of people, dates and in common phrases. 15 is also important, with 16–19 being "one on 15", "two on 15" etc. 18 is normally "two nines". A decimal system is commonly used.
The Inuit languages use a base-20 counting system. Students from Kaktovik, Alaska invented a base-20 numeral system in 1994
Danish numerals display a similar base-20 structure.
The Māori language of New Zealand also has evidence of an underlying base-20 system as seen in the terms Te Hokowhitu a Tu referring to a war party (literally "the seven 20s of Tu") and Tama-hokotahi, referring to a great warrior ("the one man equal to 20").
The binary system was used in the Egyptian Old Kingdom, 3000 BC to 2050 BC. It was cursive by rounding off rational numbers smaller than 1 to 1/2 + 1/4 + 1/8 + 1/16 + 1/32 + 1/64, with a 1/64 term thrown away (the system was called the Eye of Horus).
A number of Australian Aboriginal languages employ binary or binary-like counting systems. For example, in Kala Lagaw Ya, the numbers one through six are urapon, ukasar, ukasar-urapon, ukasar-ukasar, ukasar-ukasar-urapon, ukasar-ukasar-ukasar.
North and Central American natives used base-4 (quaternary) to represent the four cardinal directions. Mesoamericans tended to add a second base-5 system to create a modified base-20 system.
A base-5 system (quinary) has been used in many cultures for counting. Plainly it is based on the number of digits on a human hand. It may also be regarded as a sub-base of other bases, such as base-10, base-20, and base-60.
A base-8 system (octal) was devised by the Yuki tribe of Northern California, who used the spaces between the fingers to count, corresponding to the digits one through eight. There is also linguistic evidence which suggests that the Bronze Age Proto-Indo Europeans (from whom most European and Indic languages descend) might have replaced a base-8 system (or a system which could only count up to 8) with a base-10 system. The evidence is that the word for 9, newm, is suggested by some to derive from the word for "new", newo-, suggesting that the number 9 had been recently invented and called the "new number".
Many ancient counting systems use five as a primary base, almost surely coming from the number of fingers on a person's hand. Often these systems are supplemented with a secondary base, sometimes ten, sometimes twenty. In some African languages the word for five is the same as "hand" or "fist" (Dyola language of Guinea-Bissau, Banda language of Central Africa). Counting continues by adding 1, 2, 3, or 4 to combinations of 5, until the secondary base is reached. In the case of twenty, this word often means "man complete". This system is referred to as quinquavigesimal. It is found in many languages of the Sudan region.
The Telefol language, spoken in Papua New Guinea, is notable for possessing a base-27 numeral system. | https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Positional_notation |
Ulama | The study of, and commentaries on Quran and hadith, debates about ijtihad and taqlid and the issuing of fatwa as well as the use of Arabic, and later also Persian as common languages of discourse constituted the religious authority of the ulama throughout the entire Islamic world. Zaman has demonstrated that, as personal contacts were key to acquiring knowledge, Islamic scholars sometimes travel far in search of knowledge (ṭalab al-ʿilm). Due to their common training and language, any scholars travelling from one region of the Islamic world to another can easily integrate themselves into the local Muslim community and hold offices there: The traveller Ibn Battuta (1304–1368 or 1369), born in Tangiers, Morocco, to a family of ulema, was appointed qadi by Sultan Muhammad bin Tughluq of Delhi. Nuruddin ar-Raniri (d. 1658), born to a Gujarati Muslim family, travelled to, and worked as Shaykh ul-Islam in modern-day Indonesia under the protection of Iskandar Thani, Sultan of Aceh. Both scholars were able to move freely in an "interconnected world of fellow scholars". According to Zaman, their offices and positions as respected scholars were only questioned if they proved themselves unfamiliar with local customs (as happened to Ibn Battuta]), or met resistance from opponents with stronger local roots (ar-Raniri).
Through their travels and teachings, ulama are able to transmit new knowledge and ideas over considerable distances. However, according to Zaman (2010), scholars have often been required to rely on commonly known texts which could support their fatwas. A text which might be widely known within the intellectual circles of one region could be unknown in another. The ability of scholars from one region to support their argument in another might therefore be limited by the familiarity with the respective texts of the community they are working in. In an era without book print or mass communication media, a scholar's reputation might have remain limited if he was unfamiliar with the local canon of texts. As the ijazah, the scholar's approval by another master, is key to the scholar's reputation, the latter would be greater in regions where the approving masters is more widely known. | https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ulama |
Jamasp | Axworthy, Michael (2008). A History of Iran: Empire of the Mind. New York: Basic Books. pp. 1–368. ISBN 978-0-465-00888-9.
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Daryaee, Touraj; Rezakhani, Khodadad (2017). "The Sasanian Empire". In Daryaee, Touraj (ed.). King of the Seven Climes: A History of the Ancient Iranian World (3000 BCE - 651 CE). UCI Jordan Center for Persian Studies. pp. 1–236. ISBN 9780692864401.
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Payne, Richard (2015). "The Reinvention of Iran: The Sasanian Empire and the Huns". In Maas, Michael (ed.). The Cambridge Companion to the Age of Attila. Cambridge University Press. pp. 282–299. ISBN 978-1-107-63388-9.
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Pourshariati, Parvaneh (2008). Decline and Fall of the Sasanian Empire: The Sasanian-Parthian Confederacy and the Arab Conquest of Iran. London and New York: I.B. Tauris. ISBN 978-1-84511-645-3.
Rezakhani, Khodadad (2017). ReOrienting the Sasanians: East Iran in Late Antiquity. Edinburgh University Press. pp. 1–256. ISBN 9781474400305.
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Shahbazi, A. Shapur (2005). "Sasanian dynasty". Encyclopaedia Iranica, Online Edition. | https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Jamasp |
Ishtar Gate | The front of the gate has a low-relief design with a repeated pattern of images of two of the major gods of the Babylonian pantheon. Marduk, the national deity and chief god, with his servant dragon Mušḫuššu, is depicted as a dragon with a snake-like head and tail, a scaled body of a lion, and powerful talons for back feet. Marduk was seen as the divine champion of good against evil, and the incantations of the Babylonians often sought his protection.
The second god shown in the pattern of reliefs on the Ishtar Gate is Adad (also known as Ishkur), whose sacred animal was the aurochs, a now-extinct ancestor of cattle. Adad had power over destructive storms and beneficial rain. The design of the Ishtar Gate also includes linear borders and patterns of rosettes, often seen as symbols of fertility.
The bricks of the Ishtar gate were made from finely textured clay pressed into wooden forms. Each of the animal reliefs was also made from bricks formed by pressing clay into reusable molds. Seams between the bricks were carefully planned not to occur on the eyes of the animals or any other aesthetically unacceptable places. The bricks were sun-dried and then fired once before glazing. The clay was brownish red in this bisque-fired state.
The background glazes are mainly a vivid blue, which imitates the color of the highly prized lapis lazuli. Gold and brown glazes are used for animal images. The borders and rosettes are glazed in black, white, and gold. It is believed that the glaze recipe used plant ash, sandstone conglomerates, and pebbles for silicates. This combination was repeatedly melted, cooled, and then pulverized. This mixture of silica and fluxes is called a frit. Color-producing minerals, such as cobalt, were added in the final glaze formulations. This was then painted onto the bisque-fired bricks and fired to a higher temperature in a glaze firing.
The creation of the gate out of wood and clay glazed to look like lapis lazuli could possibly be a reference to the goddess Inanna, who became syncretized with the goddess Ishtar during the reign of Sargon of Akkad. In the myth of Inanna's descent to the underworld, Inanna is described as donning seven accoutrements of lapis lazuli symbolizing her divine power. Once captured by the queen of the underworld, Inanna is described as being lapis lazuli, silver, and wood, two of these materials being key components in the construction of the Ishtar Gate. The creation of the gate out of wood and "lapis lazuli" linking the gate to being part of the Goddess herself.
After the glaze firing, the bricks were assembled, leaving narrow horizontal seams from one to six millimeters. The seams were then sealed with a naturally occurring black viscous substance called bitumen, like modern asphalt. The Ishtar Gate is only one small part of the design of ancient Babylon that also included the palace, temples, an inner fortress, walls, gardens, other gates, and the Processional Way. The lavish city was decorated with over 15 million baked bricks, according to estimates.
The main gate led to the Southern Citadel, the gate itself seeming to be a part of Imgur-Bel and Nimitti-Bel, two of the most prominent defensive walls of Babylon. There were three primary entrances to the Ishtar Gate: the central entrance which contained the double gate structure (two sets of double doors, for a fourfold door structure), and doors flanking the main entrance to the left and right, both containing the signature double door structure. | https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ishtar_Gate |
French Algeria | The French faced other opposition as well in the area. The superior of a religious brotherhood, Muhyi ad Din, who had spent time in Ottoman jails for opposing the bey's rule, launched attacks against the French and their makhzen allies at Oran in 1832. In the same year, jihad was declared and to lead it tribal elders chose Muhyi ad Din's son, twenty-five-year-old Abd al Qadir. Abd al Qadir, who was recognized as Amir al-Muminin (commander of the faithful), quickly gained the support of tribes throughout Algeria. A devout and austere marabout, he was also a cunning political leader and a resourceful warrior. From his capital in Tlemcen, Abd al Qadir set about building a territorial Muslim state based on the communities of the interior but drawing its strength from the tribes and religious brotherhoods. By 1839, he controlled more than two-thirds of Algeria. His government maintained an army and a bureaucracy, collected taxes, supported education, undertook public works, and established agricultural and manufacturing cooperatives to stimulate economic activity.
The French in Algiers viewed with concern the success of a Muslim government and the rapid growth of a viable territorial state that barred the extension of European settlement. Abd al Qadir fought running battles across Algeria with French forces, which included units of the Foreign Legion, organized in 1831 for Algerian service. Although his forces were defeated by the French under General Thomas Bugeaud in 1836, Abd al Qadir negotiated a favorable peace treaty the next year. The treaty of Tafna gained conditional recognition for Abd al Qadir's regime by defining the territory under its control and salvaged his prestige among the tribes just as the shaykhs were about to desert him. To provoke new hostilities, the French deliberately broke the treaty in 1839 by occupying Constantine. Abd al Qadir took up the holy war again, destroyed the French settlements on the Mitidja Plain, and at one point advanced to the outskirts of Algiers itself. He struck where the French were weakest and retreated when they advanced against him in greater strength. The government moved from camp to camp with the amir and his army. Gradually, however, superior French resources and manpower and the defection of tribal chieftains took their toll. Reinforcements poured into Algeria after 1840 until Bugeaud had at his disposal 108,000 men, one-third of the French army.
One by one, the amir's strongholds fell to the French, and many of his ablest commanders were killed or captured so that by 1843 the Muslim state had collapsed.
Abd al Qadir took refuge in 1841 with his ally, the sultan of Morocco, Abd ar Rahman II, and launched raids into Algeria. This alliance led the French Navy to bombard and briefly occupy Essaouira (Mogador) under the Prince de Joinville on August 16, 1844. A French force was destroyed at the Battle of Sidi-Brahim in 1845. However, Abd al Qadir was obliged to surrender to the commander of Oran Province, General Louis de Lamoricière, at the end of 1847.
Abd al Qadir was promised safe conduct to Egypt or Palestine if his followers laid down their arms and kept the peace. He accepted these conditions, but the minister of war — who years earlier as general in Algeria had been badly defeated by Abd al Qadir — had him consigned in France in the Château d'Amboise. | https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/French_Algeria |
Bahrain | Bahrain is the first nation other than United States of America to host International Mixed Martial Arts Federation World Championships of Amateur MMA in partnership with Brave Combat Federation. Bahrain have recorded an influx in global athletes visiting the nation for Mixed Martial Arts training during 2017. Brave Combat Federation is a Bahrain-based Mixed Martial Arts promotion that has hosted events in 30 nations which is a record for hosting events in most number of nations by an MMA promotion. Bahrain MMA Federation (BMMAF) has been set up under the patronage of Sheikh Khalid bin Hamad Al Khalifa and the jurisdiction of the Sports Minister, Sheikh Nasser bin Hamad Al Khalifa. The development of MMA in the nation is convened through KHK MMA, which owns Brave Combat Federation which is the largest Mixed Martial Arts promotion in the Middle East. Bahrain will be hosting Amateur World Championships 2017 in association with International Mixed Martial Arts Federation. Bahrain will be the first Asian and Arab country to host the amateur MMA championship. Bahrain is also home to KHK MMA Fight Team, that facilitates training for some of the prominent talent in Mixed Martial Arts in the world who compete in BRAVE Combat Federation, PFL, and UFC.
In 2018, Cricket was introduced in Bahrain under the initiative of KHK Sports and Exelon. Bahrain Premier League 2018 comprised six franchise squads of 13 resident cricketers competing in the T20 format. The teams were SRam MRam Falcons, Kalaam Knight-Riders, Intex Lions, Bahrain Super Giants, Four Square Challengers and Awan Warriors.
Football is also a popular sport in Bahrain. Bahrain's national football team has competed multiple times at the Asian Cup, Arab Nations Cup and played in the FIFA World Cup qualifiers, though it has never qualified for the World Cup. Bahrain's national football team won the West Asian Football Federation cup and the Arabian Gulf Cup in 2019. Both the cups came under the helm of Helio Sousa who is the manager of the nation's national football team. Bahrain has its own top-tier domestic professional football league, the Bahraini Premier League. On 3 August 2020, the Kingdom of Bahrain bought a minority stake in the Paris F.C., a team that plays in France's second tier. Bahrain's entry into the soccer club spurred criticism that the country is trying to whitewash its human rights record and this is another way of buying influence in Europe.
Basketball, rugby and horse racing are also widely popular in the country. The government of Bahrain also sponsors a UCI WorldTeam cycling team, Bahrain Victorius, which participated in the 2017 Tour de France.
Bahrain has a Formula One race track, which hosted the inaugural Gulf Air Bahrain Grand Prix on 4 April 2004, the first in an Arab country. This was followed by the Bahrain Grand Prix in 2005. Bahrain hosted the opening Grand Prix of the 2006 season on 12 March of that year. Both the above races were won by Fernando Alonso of Renault. The race has since been hosted annually, except for 2011 when it was cancelled due to ongoing anti-government protests. The 2012 race occurred despite concerns of the safety of the teams and the ongoing protests in the country. The decision to hold the race despite ongoing protests and violence has been described as "controversial" by Al Jazeera English, CNN, AFP and Sky News. The Independent named it "one of the most controversial in the history of the sport".
In 2006, Bahrain also hosted its inaugural Australian V8 Supercar event dubbed the "Desert 400". The V8s returned every November to the Sakhir circuit until 2010, in which it was the second event of the series. The series has not returned since. The Bahrain International Circuit also features a full-length dragstrip where the Bahrain Drag Racing Club has organised invitational events featuring some of Europe's top drag racing teams to try to raise the profile of the sport in the Middle East.
On June 10 2024 the Bahrain Olympic Academy received the Athena honorary distinction for its role in aiding and supporting advancement of sports in its region. The honorary medal was presented to his highness Shaikh Khalid bin Hamad Al Khalifa by Isidoros Kouvelos, President of IOA. | https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Bahrain |
Moab | According to the Hebrew Bible, the Moabites were not hospitable to the Israelites who exited Egypt and hired Balaam to curse them. As a consequence, male Moabites were excluded by Torah law from marrying Jewish women.
The term "tenth generation" used in connection with that prohibition is considered an idiom, used for an unlimited time, as opposed to the third generation, which allows an Egyptian convert to marry into the community. The Talmud expresses the view that the prohibition applied only to male Moabites, who were not allowed to marry born Jews or legitimate converts. Female Moabites, when converted to Judaism, were permitted to marry with only the normal prohibition of a convert marrying a kohen (priest) applying. However, the prohibition was not followed during the Babylonian captivity, and Ezra and Nehemiah sought to compel a return to the law because men had been marrying women who had not been converted at all (Ezra 9:1–2, 12; Nehemiah 13:23–25). The heir of King Solomon was Rehoboam, the son of an Ammonite woman, Naamah (1 Kings 14:21).
On the other hand, the marriages of the Bethlehem Ephrathites (of the tribe of Judah) Mahlon and Chilion to the Moabite women Orpah and Ruth (Ruth 1:2–4), and the marriage of the latter, after her husband's death, to Boaz (Ruth 4:10–13) who by her was the great-grandfather of David, are mentioned with no shade of reproach. The Talmudic explanation, however, is that the language of the law applies only to Moabite and Ammonite men (Hebrew, like all Semitic languages, has grammatical gender). The Talmud also states that the prophet Samuel wrote the Book of Ruth to settle the dispute as the rule had been forgotten since the time of Boaz. Another interpretation is that the Book of Ruth is simply reporting the events in an impartial fashion, leaving any praise or condemnation to be done by the reader.
The Babylonian Talmud in Yevamot 76B explains that one of the reasons was the Ammonites did not greet the Children of Israel with friendship and the Moabites hired Balaam to curse them. The difference in the responses of the two people led to God allowing the Jewish people to harass the Moabites (but not go to war) but forbade them to even harass the Ammonites (Deuteronomy 23:3–4).
Jehoash was one of the four men who pretended to be gods. He was persuaded thereto particularly by the princes, who said to him. "Wert thou not a god thou couldst not come out alive from the Holy of Holies" (Ex R. viii. 3). He was assassinated by two of his servants, one of whom was the son of an Ammonite woman and the other the offspring of a Moabite (2 Chron. 24:26); for God said: "Let the descendants of the two ungrateful families chastise the ungrateful Joash" (Yalk., Ex. 262). Moab and Ammon were the two offspring of Lot's incest with his two daughters as described in Gen. 19:30–38.
Jehoshaphet subsequently joined Jehoram of Israel in a war against the Moabites, who were under tribute to Israel. The Moabites were subdued, but seeing Mesha's act of offering his own son (and singular heir) as a propitiatory human sacrifice on the walls of Kir of Moab filled Israel with horror, and they withdrew and returned to their own land.
According to the Book of Jeremiah, Moab was exiled to Babylon for his arrogance and idolatry. According to Rashi, it was also due to their gross ingratitude even though Abraham, Israel's ancestor, had saved Lot, Moab's ancestor from Sodom. Jeremiah prophesies that Moab's captivity will be returned in the end of days.
The book of Zephaniah states that "Moab will assuredly be like Sodom, and the sons of Ammon like Gomorrah—Ground overgrown with weeds and full of salt mines, and a permanent desolation." (2:9). The prophecy regarding their defeat by the Israelites is linked to the conquests by the Jewish Hasmonean king Alexander Jannaeus. During that period, the Moabites were called the "Arabian Moabites". | https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Moab |
Somaliland Declaration of Independence | On 26 June 1960, the former British Somaliland protectorate briefly obtained independence as the State of Somaliland, with the Trust Territory of Somaliland following suit five days later. The following day, on 27 June 1960, the newly convened Somaliland Legislative Assembly approved a bill that would formally allow for the union of the State of Somaliland with the Trust Territory of Somaliland on 1 July 1960.
Muhammad Haji Ibrahim Egal, who had previously served as an unofficial member of the former British Somaliland protectorate's Executive Council and the Leader of Government Business in the Legislative Council, became the Prime Minister of the State of Somaliland during its planned transition to union with the Trust Territory of Somaliland under Italian Administration, the former Italian Somaliland.
During its brief existence, the State of Somaliland received international recognition from 35 countries, that included China, Egypt, Ethiopia, France, Ghana, Israel, Libya, the Soviet Union. The United States Secretary of State Christian Herter sent a congratulatory message, and the United Kingdom signed several bilateral agreements with Somaliland in Hargeisa on 26 June 1960.
This a copy of the letter that United States Secretary of State Christian Herter sent
June 26, 1960
Their Excellencies,
Council of Ministers of Somaliland, Hargeisa.
Your Excellencies: I extend my best wishes and congratulations on the achievement of your independence. This is a noteworthy milestone in your history, and it is with pleasure that I send
my warmest regards on this happy occasion.
Christian a. Herter
Secretary of State, United States of America .
And here is the letter that Elizabeth II send to the people of Somaliland in the independence day .
"I, my Government and my people in the United Kingdom, wish you well on this day of independence. The connection between our people goes back some 130 years and British administration of the Protectorate for 60 years. I look forward to a continuing and enduring friendship between our two countries."
There were also fears of clashes with populations in Ethiopia.
On 1 July 1960, five days after the former British Somaliland protectorate obtained independence as the State of Somaliland, the territory united as scheduled with the Trust Territory of Somaliland to form the Somali Republic (Somalia).
A government was formed by Abdullahi Issa, with Haji Bashir Ismail Yusuf as President of the Somali National Assembly, Aden Abdullah Osman Daar as President and Abdirashid Ali Shermarke as Prime Minister, later to become President (from 1967 to 1969). On 20 July 1961, and through a popular referendum, the Somali people ratified a new constitution, which was first drafted in 1960. The constitution was widely regarded as unfair in the former Somaliland, however, and over 60% of the northern voters were against it in the referendum. Regardless, it was signed into law. Widespread dissatisfaction spread among the north's population, and British-trained officers attempted a revolt to end the union in December 1961. Their uprising failed, and Somaliland continued to be marginalized by the south during the next decades. | https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Somaliland_Declaration_of_Independence |
Ernest Hanbury Hankin | Arriving in India, Hankin worked on the frequent outbreaks of cholera, challenging the prevalent view that "miasmas" were responsible for them. He demonstrated to the public and the officials that micro-organisms were the cause and published his notes and opinions translated into Indian languages. He noted in 1896 that boiling water supplies was a reliable protection against cholera in India. The press which was against his former association with experimenters who had been accused of vivisection noted that this implied that his services as a bacteriologist were not required. A writer Zoophilist states:- "Remarkable to state, a vivisector has made a beneficial—and common-sense discovery. The discoverer in this case is Mr Hankin an old antagonist of ours, whom we met in debate at Cambridge before he took ship and departed to serve as a bacteriologist in India, where he still remains." In 1896 he published, through the Pasteur Institute, "L'action bactericide des eaux de la Jumna et du Gange sur le vibrion du cholera", a paper in which he described the antibacterial activity of a then unknown source in the Ganges and Jumna rivers in India. He noted that "It is seen that the unboiled water of the Ganges kills the cholera germ in less than 3 hours. The same water, when boiled, does not have the same effect. On the other hand, well water is a good medium for this microbe, whether boiled or filtered." He suggested that it was responsible for limiting the spread of cholera. While many observers have considered this as evidence of early observations of bacteriophage activity, some of his later experiments raise doubts. Hankin subsequently suggested that the bactericidal action was through a "volatile" agent. He further conducted experiments where he showed that Ganges water heated in hermetically sealed containers retained their ability to kill bacterial cultures while open one on heating lost their potency. A 2011 commentator adds that Hankin's initial results suggest extremely high phage counts which seem improbable. It was however not until twenty years later that phage activity was demonstrated without doubt by the experiments of Félix d'Herelle later described at the Pasteur Institute. This observation on the water of the Ganges became quite famous, and even found mention in Mark Twain's More Tramps Abroad.
Hankin was responsible through his letters to officials in prompting the establishment of the Pasteur Institute of India at Kasauli in 1904. One of Hankin's duties as a chemical examiner was to attend to court cases that required the analysis of scientific forensic evidence. He notes that about 700 to 1000 cases of supposed poisoning required tests for poisons to be conducted. | https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ernest_Hanbury_Hankin |
Ni'matullāhī | Dr. Javad Nurbakhsh became pīr of the Niʿmatullāhī Order in 1953 upon the death of his predecessor, Mūnis ʿAli Shah, known as Dhū'l-Rīyāsatayn. Dr. Nurbakhsh was bestowed with the name Nūr 'Ali Shāh Kermani for his initiation when he was 16 years old, and acknowledged as a spiritual prodigy from an early age. Mūnis ʿAli Shah soon assigned the young Javad Nurbakhsh all of the principal duties for operating and maintaining the Nimatullahi khaniqah in Tehran, before the age of twenty — a time when he was also pursuing full-time medical studies in university. His later accession as qotb initiated a period of expansion, vitality and renewal for the order that bore comparison to the revival by his 18th century predecessor and spiritual namesake, Nūr 'Ali Shāh.
Within Iran, the Nimatullahi order was significantly expanded by Javad Nurbakhsh, having 60 new khaniqahs built in cities throughout the country between his accession in 1953 and 1979. During this period of growth in the 1970s, visitors to Iran from the United States and Europe were first accepted the order. In 1974, on invitation by American initiates of the Nimatullahi order, Javad Nurbakhsh went to the United States and determined a need to establish regular khaniqahs there. In 1979, Javad Nurbakhsh's leadership of the Nimatullahi order moved abroad from Tehran, as a result of the revolution in Iran. Dr. Nurbakhsh led the Nimatullahi order from United States until his permanent emigration to England in 1983. By the early 1990s there were nine Nimatullahi khaniqahs in the United States. The composition of individual Nimatullahi members in their assemblies changed and broadened over these two decades, with American khaniqahs in the East Coast — such as Boston, New York and Washington — mostly attended by Americans, while those in California were about half American and half of Iranian origins. Nimatullahi members were also accepted from a diversity of religious backgrounds on the basis of sincerity alone, not exclusively restricted to Shi'a Islam.
The growth of a global Nimatullahi presence proceedes, and as of this writing, in 2022, the Nimatullahi order expanded to many parts of the world, with some 36 khaniqahs located from the United States, Canada, and Mexico, to several European nations, Russia, Western Africa, and Australia.
With the death of Dr. Javad Nurbakhsh in October of 2008, succession of leadership as pīr of the Nimatullahi order passed to his son, Dr. Alireza Nurbakhsh as sole spiritual and material heir. Keeping with the order's injunction to be a productive member of society, Alireza Nurbakhsh is a currently practicing lawyer in London. In addition to being licensed as a solicitor, he obtained his Ph.D in philosophy from the University of Wisconsin-Madison in 1988. Prior to his accession to leadership of the Nimatullahi, Alireza Nurbakhsh established and guided the first 20 years of the Nimatullahi Sufi journal. The Sufi Journal is responsible for much of the scholarly and artistic sponsorship by the order during those years to present time in 2022. Dr. Alireza Nurbakhsh describes his charge for the continuance and growth of the Nimatullahi practical legacy into a new century - a legacy that he's described as nothing other than the ethos of Divine Unity and Loving Kindness. | https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ni%27matull%C4%81h%C4%AB |
Sudanese revolution | Dissolution of the TMC and appointment of the Sovereignty Council, all male except for two women, took place on 20 August 2019. Abdalla Hamdok was appointed Prime Minister on 21 August. Abdel Fattah al-Burhan became Chairman of the Sovereignty Council from 21 August 2019. A "comprehensive peace process" with armed opposition groups began on 1 September 2019. On September 12 thousands of protesters gathered outside the presidential palace in Khartoum to demand a stronger judiciary to bring justice for the unjust torture of the protesters. Nemat Abdullah Khair was appointed Chief Justice on 10 October 2019 with promises of an efficient judiciary body, restoring order in the process.
Exclusion of women
The Sovereignty Council is almost completely male, with only two women members: Aisha Musa el-Said and Raja Nicola. The new Chief Justice appointed on 10 October 2019, Nemat Abdullah Khair, who heads the judiciary and the Supreme Court, is a woman. The candidates initially proposed by the FFC for the Cabinet of Ministers included very few women. The Sudanese Women's Union (SWU) argued on 18 August that women had played as significant a role as men in "the revolution" of 2019 and that Sudanese women "claim an equal share of 50-50 with men at all levels, measured by qualifications and capabilities". Channel 4 reporter Yousra Elbagir criticised the beginning steps of the transition procedures, stating, "For the [first] tangible political progress of decades to exclude women is ridiculous. ... Women were the reason that the mass pro-democracy sit-in was able to continue for nearly two months. They ran make-shift clinics, fed fasting protesters daily during Ramadan, they spent the night at check points searching female protesters."
On 22 August, the SWU organized a protest in front of the SPA's Khartoum office, advocating for a 50% representation of women "at all levels of power and decision-making bodies". The SWU interpreted the Draft Constitutional Declaration to ensure that women would be guaranteed at least 40% of seats at every level of government. Some of the protesters held banners stating "We are also technocrats!" in response to proposals that the Cabinet of Ministers be composed of technocrats. | https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Sudanese_revolution |
Roman–Persian Wars | The Roman–Persian Wars have been characterized as "futile" and too "depressing and tedious to contemplate". Prophetically, Cassius Dio noted their "never-ending cycle of armed confrontations" and observed that "it is shown by the facts themselves that [Severus'] conquest has been a source of constant wars and great expense to us. For it yields very little and uses up vast sums; and now that we have reached out to peoples who are neighbor of the Medes and the Parthians rather than of ourselves, we are always, one might say, fighting the battles of those peoples." In the long series of wars between the two powers, the frontier in upper Mesopotamia remained more or less constant. Historians point out that the stability of the frontier over the centuries is remarkable, although Nisibis, Singara, Dara and other cities of upper Mesopotamia changed hands from time to time, and the possession of these frontier cities gave one empire a trade advantage over the other. As Frye states:
One has the impression that the blood spilled in the warfare between the two states brought as little real gain to one side or the other as the few meters of land gained at terrible cost in the trench warfare of the First World War.
Both sides attempted to justify their respective military goals in both active and reactive ways. According to the Letter of Tansar and the Muslim writer Al-Tha'alibi, Ardashir I's and Pacorus I's invasions, respectively, of Roman territories, were to avenge Alexander the Great's conquest of Persia, which was thought to be the cause of the subsequent Iranian disarray; this is matched by the notion imitatio Alexandri cherished by the Roman emperors Caracalla, Alexander Severus, and Julian. Roman sources reveal long-standing prejudices with regard to the Eastern powers' customs, religious structures, languages, and forms of government. John F. Haldon underscores that "although the conflicts between Persia and East Rome revolved around issues of strategic control around the eastern frontier, yet there was always a religious-ideological element present". From the time of Constantine on, Roman emperors appointed themselves as the protectors of Christians of Persia. This attitude created intense suspicions of the loyalties of Christians living in Sasanian Iran and often led to Roman–Persian tensions or even military confrontations (e.g. in 421–422). A characteristic of the final phase of the conflict, when what had begun in 611–612 as a raid was soon transformed into a war of conquest, was the pre-eminence of the Cross as a symbol of imperial victory and of the strong religious element in the Roman imperial propaganda; Heraclius himself cast Khosrau as the enemy of God, and authors of the 6th and 7th centuries were fiercely hostile to Persia. | https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Roman%E2%80%93Persian_Wars |
Wild boar | Piglets are vulnerable to attack from medium-sized felids like Eurasian lynx (Lynx lynx), jungle cats (Felis chaus), and snow leopards (Panthera uncia), as well as other carnivorans like brown bears (Ursus arctos) and yellow-throated martens (Martes flavigula).
The wolf (Canis lupus) is the main predator of wild boar throughout most of its range. A single wolf can kill around 50 to 80 boars of differing ages in one year. In Italy and Belarus' Belovezhskaya Pushcha National Park, boars are the wolf's primary prey, despite an abundance of alternative, less powerful ungulates. Wolves are particularly threatening during the winter, when deep snow impedes the boars' movements. In the Baltic regions, heavy snowfall can allow wolves to eliminate boars from an area almost completely. Wolves primarily target piglets and subadults and only rarely attack adult sows. Adult males are usually avoided entirely. Dholes (Cuon alpinus) may also prey on boars, to the point of keeping their numbers down in northwestern Bhutan, despite there being many more cattle in the area.
Leopards (Panthera pardus) are predators of wild boar in the Caucasus (particularly Transcaucasia), the Russian Far East, India, China and Iran. In most areas, boars constitute only a small part of the leopard's diet. However, in Iran's Sarigol National Park, boars are the second most frequently targeted prey species after mouflon (Ovis gmelini), though adult individuals are generally avoided, as they are above the leopard's preferred weight range of 10–40 kg (22–88 lb). This dependence on wild boar is largely due in part to the local leopard subspecies' large size.
Boars of all ages were once the primary prey of the tiger (Panthera tigris) in Transcaucasia, Kazakhstan, Middle Asia and the Far East up until the late 19th century. In modern times, tiger numbers are too low to have a limiting effect on boar populations. A single tiger can systematically destroy an entire sounder by preying on its members one by one, before moving on to another sounder. Tigers have been noted to chase boars for longer distances than with other prey. In two rare cases, boars were reported to gore a small tiger and a tigress to death in self-defense. A "large male tiger" died of wounds inflicted by an old wild boar it had killed in "a battle royal" between the two animals.: 500
In the Amur region, wild boars are one of the two most important prey species for Siberian tigers, alongside the Manchurian wapiti (Cervus canadensis xanthopygus), with the two species collectively comprising roughly 80% of the felid's prey. In Sikhote Alin, a tiger can kill 30–34 boars a year. Studies of tigers in India indicate that boars are usually secondary in preference to various cervids and bovids, though when boars are targeted, healthy adults are caught more frequently than young and sick specimens.
On the islands of Komodo, Rinca and Flores, the boar's main predator is the Komodo dragon (Varanus komodoensis). | https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Wild_boar |
Al-Rastan | According to early Muslim geographers, ar-Rastan, despite its strong fortifications and large garrison was swiftly captured then destroyed by Abu Ubaida's forces during the Muslim conquest of Syria in 634, while Umar ibn al-Khattab was caliph. In early 945 the Aleppo-based Hamdanids under the leadership of Sayf al-Dawla decisively defeated the Ikhshidid army led by Abu al-Misk Kafur at ar-Rastan from which they proceeded to conquer Damascus. According to one account, about 4,000 Ikshidid soldiers were taken captive in addition to hundreds killed in action or drowned in the Orontes River.
In 1115 while Artukid ruler Ilghazi was resting at ar-Rastan on his way north to Diyarbakır, Khir Khan ibn Qaraja, the Seljuk ruler of Homs, attacked his camp and briefly had him imprisoned. Following Saladin's arrival at ar-Rastan in February 1175, the Crusaders under Raymond of Tripoli withdrew from their siege of Homs which was then captured by Saladin, bringing most of Syria under Ayyubid rule. In 1226, during Ayyubid rule, Syrian geographer Yaqut al-Hamawi visited ar-Rastan and wrote that it was "a small and ancient town ... It is now a ruin, but the remains still show what was its former splendor."
The Mamluks gained control over Syria in the 1260s, and organized the region into kingdoms subordinate to the sultanate in Cairo. Ar-Rastan became the southernmost town of Mamlakat Hama ("Kingdom of Hama") near the border with Mamlakat Hims. In a major battle at a place between the town and Homs, the Mamluks under Qalawun decisively defeated the invading Mongol army of the Ilkhanate in 1281. Later, in the early 14th century, Abu'l-Fida noted that in ar-Rastan, "Each of the houses is so large as to be almost like a village, with ruins everywhere round of buildings and walls." He further noted that a few arches, gates, parts of the city wall and its water channel were still present.
In the late 16th-century or early 17th-century, during Ottoman rule, the caravanserai Khan ar-Rastan was built just outside the town. Abd al-Ghani al-Nabulsi, the 17th-century Sufi sheikh, visited the false tomb of Persian Sufi mystic Abu Yazid al-Bistami at ar-Rastan (the actual one is in Bistam) in 1678, writing "over his grave there is splendor and awe, asserting his presence there." Khan al-Rastan was visited in 1745 by Edward Pococke who described it as a "huge fortified caravanserai" that was decaying rapidly. | https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Al-Rastan |
Fayum mummy portraits | For a long time, it was assumed that the latest portraits belong to the end of the 4th century, but recent research has modified this view considerably, suggesting that the last wooden portraits belong to the middle, the last directly painted mummy wrappings to the second half of the 3rd century. It is commonly accepted that production reduced considerably since the beginning of the 3rd century. Several reasons for the decline of the mummy portrait have been suggested; no single reason should probably be isolated, rather, they should be seen as operating together.
In the 3rd century the Roman Empire underwent a severe economic crisis, severely limiting the financial abilities of the upper classes. Although they continued to lavishly spend money on representation, they favoured public appearances, like games and festivals, over the production of portraits. However, other elements of sepulchral representation, like sarcophagi, did continue.
There is evidence of a religious crisis at the same time. This may not be as closely connected with the rise of Christianity as previously assumed. (The earlier suggestion of a 4th-century end to the portraits would coincide with the widespread distribution of Christianity in Egypt. Christianity also never banned mummification.) An increasing neglect of Egyptian temples is noticeable during the Roman imperial period, leading to a general drop in interest in all ancient religions.
The Constitutio Antoniniana, i.e. the granting of Roman citizenship to all free subjects changed the social structures of Egypt. For the first time, the individual cities gained a degree of self-administration. At the same time, the provincial upper classes changed in terms of both composition and inter-relations.
Thus, a combination of several factors appears to have led to changes of fashion and ritual. No clear causality can be asserted.
Considering the limited nature of the current understanding of portrait mummies, it remains distinctly possible that future research will considerably modify the image presented here. For example, some scholars suspect that the centre of production of such finds, and thus the centre of the distinctive funerary tradition they represent, may have been located at Alexandria. New finds from Marina el-Alamein strongly support such a view. In view of the near-total loss of Greek and Roman paintings, mummy portraits are today considered to be among the very rare examples of ancient art that can be seen to reflect "Great paintings" and especially Roman portrait painting. | https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Fayum_mummy_portraits |
Ijtihad | Starting in the middle of the 19th century, Islamic modernists such as Sir Sayyid Ahmed Khan, Jamal al-din Al-Afghani, and Muhammad Abduh emerged seeking to revitalize Islam by re-establish and reform Islamic law and its interpretations to accommodate Islam with modern society. They emphasized the use of ijtihad, but in contrast to its original use, they sought to "apply contemporary intellectual methods" such as academic or scientific thought "to the task of reforming Islam". Al-Afghani proposed the new use of ijtihad that he believed would enable Muslims to think critically and apply their own individual interpretations of the innovations of modernity in the context of Islam.
One modernist argument for applying ijtihad to sharia law is that while "the principles and values underlying Sharia (i.e. usul al-fiqh)" are unalterable, human interpretation of sharia is not. Another, (made by Asghar Ali Engineer of India), is that the adaat (customs and traditions) of Arabs were used in the development of the sharia, and form an important part of it. They are very much not divine or immutable, and have no more legal justification to be part of the sharia than the adaat of Muslims—Iranians, Uzbeks, Turks, Chinese, Indians and others—living beyond the home of the original Muslim in the Arab Hejaz.
Ummah was no longer a homogenous group but comprised of various cultural communities with their own age-old customs and traditions. ... When Imam Al-Shafi‘i moved from Hejaz to Egypt, which was a confluence of Arab and Coptic cultures, he realised this and changed his position on several issues.
In Indonesia, following considerable debate among the ulema, Indonesian adaat "become part of Sharia as applicable in that country". This use of ijtihad of adaat applies to mu’amalat (socio-economic matters such as marriage, divorce, inheritance), and not Ibadah fiqh (ritual salat, sawm, zakat, etc.). Asghar Ali Engineer argues that while the Quran was revealed in a "highly patriarchal" Arab adaat that still informs what is understood as sharia, the Quran itself has a "transcendental" vision of justice that includes "absolutely equal rights" between genders and should guide ijtihad of sharia. | https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ijtihad |
Sheep | Sheep meat and milk were one of the earliest staple proteins consumed by human civilization after the transition from hunting and gathering to agriculture. Sheep meat prepared for food is known as either mutton or lamb, and approximately 540 million sheep are slaughtered each year for meat worldwide. "Mutton" is derived from the Old French moton, which was the word for sheep used by the Anglo-Norman rulers of much of the British Isles in the Middle Ages. This became the name for sheep meat in English, while the Old English word sceap was kept for the live animal. Throughout modern history, "mutton" has been limited to the meat of mature sheep usually at least two years of age; "lamb" is used for that of immature sheep less than a year.
In the 21st century, the nations with the highest consumption of sheep meat are the Arab states of the Persian Gulf, New Zealand, Australia, Greece, Uruguay, the United Kingdom and Ireland. These countries eat 14–40 lbs (3–18 kg) of sheep meat per capita, per annum. Sheep meat is also popular in France, Africa (especially the Arab world), the Caribbean, the rest of the Middle East, India, and parts of China. This often reflects a history of sheep production. In these countries in particular, dishes comprising alternative cuts and offal may be popular or traditional. Sheep testicles—called animelles or lamb fries—are considered a delicacy in many parts of the world. Perhaps the most unusual dish of sheep meat is the Scottish haggis, composed of various sheep innards cooked along with oatmeal and chopped onions inside its stomach. In comparison, countries such as the U.S. consume only a pound or less (under 0.5 kg), with Americans eating 50 pounds (22 kg) of pork and 65 pounds (29 kg) of beef. In addition, such countries rarely eat mutton, and may favor the more expensive cuts of lamb: mostly lamb chops and leg of lamb.
Though sheep's milk may be drunk rarely in fresh form, today it is used predominantly in cheese and yogurt making. Sheep have only two teats, and produce a far smaller volume of milk than cows. However, as sheep's milk contains far more fat, solids, and minerals than cow's milk, it is ideal for the cheese-making process. It also resists contamination during cooling better because of its much higher calcium content. Well-known cheeses made from sheep milk include the feta of Bulgaria and Greece, Roquefort of France, Manchego from Spain, the pecorino romano (the Italian word for "sheep" is pecore) and ricotta of Italy. Yogurts, especially some forms of strained yogurt, may also be made from sheep milk. Many of these products are now often made with cow's milk, especially when produced outside their country of origin. Sheep milk contains 4.8% lactose, which may affect those who are intolerant.
As with other domestic animals, the meat of uncastrated males is inferior in quality, especially as they grow. A "bucky" lamb is a lamb which was not castrated early enough, or which was castrated improperly (resulting in one testicle being retained). These lambs are worth less at market. | https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Sheep |
History of Yemen | The Ottomans had two fundamental interests to safeguard in Yemen: The Islamic holy cities of Mecca and Medina and the trade route with India in spices and textiles, both of which were threatened and the latter virtually eclipsed by the arrival of the Portuguese in the Indian Ocean and the Red Sea in the early part of the 16th century. Hadım Suleiman Pasha, the Ottoman governor of Egypt, was ordered to command a fleet of 90 ships to conquer Yemen. The country was in a state of incessant anarchy and discord as Hadım Suleiman Pasha described it by saying:Yemen is a land with no lord, an empty province. It would be not only possible but easy to capture, and should it be captured, it would be master of the lands of India and send every year a great amount of gold and jewels to Constantinople.
Imam al-Mutawakkil Yahya Sharaf ad-Din ruled over the northern highlands including Sana'a while Aden was held by the last Tahiride Sultan 'Amir ibn Dauod. Hadım Suleiman Pasha stormed Aden in 1538, killing its ruler and extended Ottoman's authority to include Zabid in 1539 and eventually Tihama in its entirety. Zabid became the administrative headquarters of Yemen Eyalet. The Ottoman governors did not exercise much control over the highlands; they held sway mainly in the southern coastal region, particularly around Zabid, Mocha and Aden. Out of 80,000 soldiers sent to Yemen from Egypt between 1539 – 1547, only 7,000 survived. The Ottoman accountant-general in Egypt remarks:We have seen no foundry like Yemen for our soldiers. Each time we have sent an expeditionary force there, it has melted away like salt dissolved in water.
The Ottoman sent yet another expeditionary force to Zabid in 1547 while Imam al-Mutawakkil Yahya Sharaf ad-Din was ruling the highlands independently. Imam al-Mutawakkil Yahya chose his son Ali to succeed him, a decision that infuriated his other son al-Mutahhar ibn Yahya. Al-Mutahhar was lame and therefore not qualified for the Imamate. He urged Oais Pasha, the Ottoman colonial governor in Zabid, to attack his father. Indeed, Ottoman troops supported by tribal forces loyal to Imam al-Mutahhar stormed Ta'izz and marched north toward Sana'a in August 1547. The Turks officially made Imam al-Mutahhar a Sanjak-bey with authority over 'Amran. Imam al-Mutahhar assassinated the Ottoman colonial governor and recaptured Sana'a but the Ottomans led by Özdemir Pasha, forced al-Mutahhar to retreat to his fortress in Thula. Özdemir Pasha effectively put Yemen under Ottoman rule between 1552 and 1560. He garrisoned the main cities, built new fortresses and rendered secure the main routes. Özdemir died in Sana'a in 1561 to be succeeded by Mahmud Pasha.
Mahmud Pasha was described by other Ottoman officials as corrupt and unscrupulous governor, he used his authority to take over a number of castles some of which belonged to the former Rasulid Kings. Mahmud Pasha killed a Sunni scholar from Ibb. The Ottoman historian claimed that this incident was celebrated by the Zaydi Shia community in the northern highlands. Disregarding the delicate balance of power in Yemen by acting tactlessly, he alienated different groups within Yemeni society, causing them to forget their rivalries and unite against the Turks. Mahmud Pasha was displaced by Ridvan Pasha in 1564. By 1565, Yemen was split into two provinces: the highlands under the command of Ridvan Pasha and Tihama under Murad Pasha. Imam al-Mutahhar launched a propaganda campaign in which he claimed contact with prophet Mohammed in a dream advising him to wage jihad against the Ottomans. Al-Mutahhar led the tribes to capture Sana'a from Ridvan Pasha in 1567. When Murad tried to relieve Sana'a, highland tribesmen ambushed his unit and slaughtered all of them. Over 80 battles were fought, the last decisive encounter took place in Dhamar around 1568 in which Murad Pasha was beheaded and had his head sent to al-Mutahhar in Sana'a. By 1568, only Zabid remained under the possession of the Turks.
Lala Kara Mustafa Pasha, the Ottoman governor of Syria, was ordered by Selim II to suppress the Yemeni rebels, the Turkish army in Egypt was reluctant to go to Yemen however. Mustafa Pasha sent a letter with two Turkish shawishes hoping to persuade al-Mutahhar to give an apology and say that he did not promote any act of aggression against the Ottoman army, and claim that the ignorant Arabians according to the Turks, acted on their own. Imam al-Mutahhar refused the Ottoman offer. Mustafa Pasha sent an expeditionary force under the command of Uthman Pasha, the expeditionary force was defeated with great casualties. Sultan Selim II was infuriated by Mustafa's hesitation to go Yemen, he executed a number of sanjak-beys in Egypt and ordered Sinan Pasha to lead the entire Turkish army in Egypt to reconquer Yemen. Sinan Pasha was a prominent Ottoman General of Albanian origin. In 1570, he reconquered Aden, Ta'izz, and Ibb, and he besieged Shibam Kawkaban for 7 months until a truce was reached. Imam al-Mutahhar was pushed back but could not be entirely overcome. After al-Mutahhar's demise in 1572, the Zaydi community was not united under an imam; the Turks took advantage of their disparity and conquered Sana'a, Sa'dah and Najran in 1583. Imam al-Nasir Hassan was arrested in 1585 and exiled to Constantinople, thereby putting an end to the Yemeni rebellion.
The Zaydi tribesmen in the northern highlands, particularly those of Hashid and Bakil, were a constant irritant to Turkish rule in Arabia. Justifying their presence in Yemen as a triumph for Islam, the Ottomans accused the Zaydis of being infidels. Hassan Pasha was appointed governor of Yemen, which enjoyed a period of relative peace from 1585 to 1597. Pupils of al-Mansur al-Qasim suggested that he claim the immamate and fight the Turks. He declined at first but was infuriated by the promotion of the Hanafi school of jurisprudence at the expense of Zaydi Islam. He proclaimed the Imamate in September 1597, which was the same year the Ottoman authorities inaugurated al-Bakiriyya Mosque. By 1608, Imam al-Mansur (the victorious) regained control over the highlands and signed a 10-year truce with the Ottomans. When Imam al-Mansur al-Qasim died in 1620 his son Al-Mu'ayyad Muhammad succeeded him and confirmed the truce with the Ottomans. In 1627, the Ottomans lost Aden and Lahej. 'Abdin Pasha was ordered to suppress the rebels but failed and had to retreat to Mocha. After Al-Mu'ayyad Muhammad expelled the Ottomans from Sana'a in 1628, only Zabid and Mocha remained under Ottoman possession. Al-Mu'ayyad Muhammad captured Zabid in 1634 and allowed the Ottomans to leave Mocha peacefully. The reasons behind Al-Mu'ayyad Muhammad's success were the tribes' possession of firearms and the fact that they were unified behind him.
In 1632, Al-Mu'ayyad Muhammad sent an expeditionary force of 1000 men to conquer Mecca. The army entered the city in triumph and killed its governor. The Ottomans were not ready to lose Mecca after Yemen, so they sent an army from Egypt to fight the Yemenites. Seeing that the Turkish army was too numerous to overcome, the Yemeni army retreated to a valley outside Mecca. Ottoman troops attacked the Yemenis by hiding at the wells that supplied them with water. This plan proceeded successfully, causing the Yemenis over 200 casualties, most from thirst. The tribesmen eventually surrendered and returned to Yemen. Al-Mu'ayyad Muhammad died in 1644. He was succeeded by Al-Mutawakkil Isma'il, another son of al-Mansur al-Qasim, who conquered Yemen in its entirety, from Asir in the north to Dhofar in the east. During his reign and that of his successor, Al-Mahdi Ahmad (1676–1681), the Imamate implemented some of the harshest discriminatory laws (Ar. ghiyar) against the Jews of Yemen, which culminated in the expulsion of all Jews to a hot and arid region in the Tihama coastal plain. The Qasimid state was the strongest Zaydi state to ever exist.
During that period, Yemen was the sole Coffee producer in the world. The country established diplomatic relations with the Safavid dynasty of Persia, the Ottomans of Hejaz, the Mughal Empire in India and Ethiopia. The emperor Fasilides of Ethiopia sent three diplomatic missions to Yemen, but relations did not develop into a political alliance as Fasilides had hoped, due to the rise of powerful feudalists in the country. In the first half of the 18th century, the Europeans broke Yemen's monopoly on coffee by smuggling out coffee trees and cultivating them in their own colonies in the East Indies, East Africa, the West Indies and Latin America. The imammate did not follow a cohesive mechanism for succession, and family quarrels and tribal insubordination led to the political decline of the Qasimi dynasty in the 18th century. In 1728 or 1731 the chief representative of Lahej declared himself an independent Sultan in defiance of the Qasimid Dynasty and conquered Aden thus establishing the Sultanate of Lahej. The rising power of the fervently Islamist Wahhabi movement on the Arabian Peninsula cost the Zaidi state its coastal possessions after 1803. The imam was able to regain them temporarily in 1818, but new intervention by the Ottoman viceroy of Egypt in 1833 again wrested the coast from the ruler in Sana'a. After 1835 the imamate changed hands with great frequency and some imams were assassinated. After 1849 the Zaidi polity descended into chaos that lasted for decades. | https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/History_of_Yemen |
Jarrahids | Al-Hakim switched his approach to the Jarrahids from diplomacy to punitive military force in August 1013. Ali and Mahmud surrendered to the advancing Fatimid army, while al-Hakim had Mufarrij poisoned to death. Hassan, whose ambition was to rule Palestine, fled but later gained a pardon from al-Hakim, who restored to him Mufarrij's iqtaʿat in Palestine. Afterward, Hassan assisted al-Hakim in his expeditions against Aleppo.
In 1019, Hassan, as a representative of the Tayy, entered his tribe into an alliance with the Kalb under Sinan ibn Sulayman and the Kilab under Salih ibn Mirdas. Such an alliance between the three principal Arab tribes of the Levant was unprecedented and was meant to prevent outsider dominance of the Syrian desert and steppe. According to the pact's terms, the Jarrahids would rule Palestine, while the Kalb and Kilab (under the Mirdasids) would rule Damascus and Aleppo, respectively. Al-Hakim's reign ended with his mysterious death in 1021 and he was succeeded by Caliph Ali az-Zahir.
In 1023, the Fatimids installed Anushtakin al-Dizbari as the military governor of Palestine, which the Jarrahids opposed. In 1024, one of Hassan's sons and another Bedouin chieftain sacked Ayla and al-Arish, which the Fatimid central government was unable to respond to. Instead, Anushtakin took the initiative to extract taxes from Hassan's iqtaʿ at Bayt Jibrin and deprive him of the revenues, which ended with the killing of Anushtakin's soldiers. This escalated the conflict with the Jarrahids, particularly after Anushtakin imprisoned two of Hassan's chief aides in Ascalon. The Jarrahids launched an all out war in September to release their men, destroying Tiberias, besieging Ramla and freeing their men by forging release authorization documents. They forced al-Dizbari to flee Ramla, which they plundered, and gained a Fatimid concession to grant Nablus as an iqtaʿ, but not Jerusalem.
The Tayy, Kalb and Kilab renewed their alliance in 1024/25, but their appeal for support from the Byzantines was rebuffed by Emperor Basil II. Nonetheless, they overcame a Fatimid army dispatched by az-Zahir that year at Ascalon and Hassan entered Ramla. After Sinan's death, his nephew and successor defected to the Fatimids, while the Jarrahids and Mirdasids continued their rebellion. They were defeated in the Battle of al-Uqhuwana near Lake Tiberias by the Fatimids under general al-Dizbari in 1029, after which Hassan fled Palestine. The Fatimids consequently transferred the Jarrahids' iqtaʿat in Palestine to more friendly Arab tribes.
The Jarrahids and the Byzantines struck an alliance in 1030. Hassan's envoys were received by the Byzantines in Antioch and given a cross-adorned flag to represent Hassan and a message promising them the restoration of Palestine to their tribe. The tribe also nominally embraced Christianity as part of the Jarrahid agreement with the Byzantines. A Jarrahid-Byzantine coalition was soon after defeated by the Mirdasids. Hassan rekindled his former alliance with the Kalb and together their tribesmen attacked the Fatimids in Hawran until being driven to Palmyra in the desert. Afterward, Emperor Romanus III persuaded Hassan and the Tayy to relocate their encampments to Byzantine territory near Antioch and the 20,000-strong Tayy migrated to al-Ruj in northwestern Syria. There, they faced down two Fatimid assaults at Qastun and Inab. The Jarrahids later raided Afamiya on behalf of the Byzantines and assisted the latter with capturing the fortress of al-Maniqa in the Jabal Ansariya range.
The Byzantines and Fatimids entered into peace negotiations in 1032 and Hassan was present in the discussions in Constantinople. The Byzantines stipulated the restoration of Jarrahid governorship in Palestine under Fatimid suzerainty as a condition for peace, but az-Zahir refused. The Fatimids' rejection of this condition contributed to the collapse of the peace talks. The following year, the Jarrahids offered their loyalty to al-Dizbari in exchange for their former iqtaʿat in Palestine, but the attempt failed. The Fatimids and Byzantines ultimately concluded a ten-year peace treaty, without consideration of the Jarrahids' interests, in 1035. Afterward, Hassan and his son Allaf are mentioned on occasion, such as their assistance in the Byzantine defense of Edessa from the Marwanids and Numayrids in 1035/36. In 1038, the Jarrahids participated in al-Dizbari's conquest of Mirdasid-held Aleppo. As a result, Hassan was forced into confinement in Constantinople until 1040 as a means to prevent his tribe, with its unstable allegiances, from potentially attacking Antioch. The last mention of Hassan is in 1041, by which point the Jarrahids had been permitted by the Fatimids to re-enter Palestine. Hassan's rule at the time was opposed by the Fatimid governor of Damascus. | https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Jarrahids |
Syrian pound | On 5 December 2005, the selling rate quoted by the Commercial Bank of Syria was LS 48.4 = US$1. A rate of about LS 50 to US$1 was usual in the early 2000s, but the rate is subject to fluctuations. Since the start of the civil war in 2011, the pound's unofficial exchange rate has deteriorated significantly. It was LS 47 = US$1 in March 2011 and LS 515 in July 2017. Since July 2007, the Syrian pound has been pegged to the IMF SDR (Special Drawing Rights).
On 29 November 2019, following the Lebanese protests, the black market rate was LS 765 = US$1, a decrease of 30% since the turmoil started in Lebanon a month earlier, as the protests led Lebanese banks to impose tight controls on hard currency withdrawals and transfers abroad, making it hard for Syrians to access funds held by them in those banks.
The black-market rate fell to LS 950 on 2 December 2019, another 25% decrease, while the official rate set by the central bank was LS 434 = US$1.
On 13 January 2020, the currency deteriorated further, as more than LS 1,000 was traded for US$1 in the black market, despite being valued at LS 434 = US$1 by the Syrian Central Bank. During the COVID-19 pandemic in Syria, the Syrian pound continued to fall against the U.S. dollar in the black market, where US$1 equaled more than LS 1,600 in May 2020. A month later, the Syrian pound passed LS 2,000 against the dollar, and a few days later, it passed LS 3,000 against the dollar.
Upon the implementation of the U.S. sanctions related to the Caesar Act, anti-government local authorities in Idlib Governorate adopted the Turkish lira in place of the plummeting Syrian pound. Turkish lira has also replaced Syrian pound in other Turkish occupied areas of northern Syria, such as Afrin and Jarablus.
On 3 March 2021, the Syrian pound hit a new record low on the black market, where US$1 bought LS 4,000, affected by a new low of Lebanese pound which hit LL 10,000 to the dollar. By June 2021, the Syrian pound was around LS 3,150 to the dollar.
On 31 December 2022, the Syrian pound hit a new record low again on the black market, where each US$1 cost LS 7150, twice as much as a year before.
As of 10 May 2023, the official Exchange rate is LS 7,500 to US$1, where as in the black markets it is LS 9,100 to US$1 | https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Syrian_pound |
Kofi Annan Syrian peace plan | The peace plan, reportedly accepted by Syrian president Bashar al-Assad on 27 March 2012, calls on the Syrian authorities to:
(1) commit to work with the Envoy in an inclusive Syrian-led political process to address the legitimate aspirations and concerns of the Syrian people, and, to this end, commit to appoint an empowered interlocutor when invited to do so by the Envoy;
(2) commit to stop the fighting and achieve urgently an effective United Nations supervised cessation of armed violence in all its forms by all parties to protect civilians and stabilise the country.
To this end, the Syrian government should immediately cease troop movements towards, and end the use of heavy weapons in, population centres, and begin pullback of military concentrations in and around population centres.
As these actions are being taken on the ground, the Syrian government should work with the Envoy to bring about a sustained cessation of armed violence in all its forms by all parties with an effective United Nations supervision mechanism.
Similar commitments would be sought by the Envoy from the opposition and all relevant elements to stop the fighting and work with him to bring about a sustained cessation of armed violence in all its forms by all parties with an effective United Nations supervision mechanism;
(3) ensure timely provision of humanitarian assistance to all areas affected by the fighting, and to this end, as immediate steps, to accept and implement a daily two hour humanitarian pause and to coordinate exact time and modalities of the daily pause through an efficient mechanism, including at local level;
(4) intensify the pace and scale of release of arbitrarily detained persons, including especially vulnerable categories of persons, and persons involved in peaceful political activities, provide without delay through appropriate channels a list of all places in which such persons are being detained, immediately begin organizing access to such locations and through appropriate channels respond promptly to all written requests for information, access or release regarding such persons;
(5) ensure freedom of movement throughout the country for journalists and a non-discriminatory visa policy for them;
(6) respect freedom of association and the right to demonstrate peacefully as legally guaranteed. | https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Kofi_Annan_Syrian_peace_plan |
Islam in the United States | In the first half of 2024, anti-Muslim incidents rose about 70% amid Gaza attack. According to a 2011 Gallup poll, over the preceding decade, there had been an increase in Islamophobia, which it defined as "an exaggerated fear, hatred, and hostility toward Islam and Muslims that is perpetuated by negative stereotypes resulting in bias, discrimination, and the marginalization and exclusion of Muslims from social, political, and civic life." Another 2011 poll provided by The Washington Post through the Public Religion Research Institute states that 48 percent of Americans are uncomfortable with Muslim women wearing the burqa. A 2014 Pew Research Center survey found that Muslims were the most disliked religious group in the United States with an average "cold" rating of 40 (out of 100), which is lower than the 41 cold ratings received by atheists. According to a poll in November 2015 by the Public Religion Research Institute 56 percent of Americans believe that the values of Islam are at odds with the American values and ways of life.
Public institutions in the U.S. have also drawn fire for accommodating Islam at the expense of taxpayers. The University of Michigan–Dearborn and a public college in Minnesota have been criticized for accommodating Islamic prayer rituals by constructing footbaths for Muslim students using taxpayer money. Critics said this special accommodation, which is made to satisfy the needs of Muslims alone, is a violation of Constitutional provisions separating church and state. Along the same constitutional lines, a San Diego public elementary school is being criticized for making special accommodations, specifically for American Muslims, by adding Arabic to its curriculum and giving breaks for Muslim prayers. Some critics said exceptions have not been made for any religious group in the past, and they see this as an endorsement of Islam.
The first American Muslim Congressman, Keith Ellison, created controversy when he compared President George W. Bush's actions after the September 11, 2001 attacks to Adolf Hitler's actions after the Nazi-sparked Reichstag fire, saying that Bush was exploiting the aftermath of 9/11 for political gain, as Hitler had exploited the Reichstag fire to suspend constitutional liberties. The United States Holocaust Memorial Museum and the Anti-Defamation League condemned Ellison's remarks. The congressman later retracted the statement, saying that it was "inappropriate" for him to have made the comparison.
In April 2018, former President Donald Trump instigated a ban on Muslim immigration to America that still reverberates today. America had already some of the lowest percentages (about 1.1% of the total US population) of Muslims among Western nations, and with the ban in 2018, many African Muslims were also barred from traveling to the U.S. or seeking refuge there. The ban had a dramatic impact, but the measure was immediately rescinded in 2021, when Joe Biden took office. Muslim Americans, rights advocates and immigration experts, however, say the policy continues to have a lingering effect on Muslim citizens, as well as on their family members living abroad, unable to join their loved ones in America. | https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Islam_in_the_United_States |
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Basra | Why Basra was chosen as a site for the new city remains unclear. The original site lay 15 km from the Shatt al-Arab and thus lacked access to maritime trade and, more importantly, to fresh water. Additionally, neither historical texts nor archaeological finds indicate that there was much of an agricultural hinterland in the area before Basra was founded. Indeed, in an anecdote related by al-Baladhuri, al-Ahnaf ibn Qays pleaded to the caliph Umar that, whereas other Muslim settlers were established in well-watered areas with extensive farmland, the people of Basra had only "reedy salt marsh which never dries up and where pasture never grows, bounded on the east by brackish water and on the west by waterless desert. We have no cultivation or stock farming to provide us with our livelihood or food, which comes to us as through the throat of an ostrich."
Nevertheless, Basra overcame these natural disadvantages and rapidly grew into the second-largest city in Iraq, if not the entire Islamic world. Its role as a military encampment meant that the soldiers had to be fed, and since those soldiers were receiving government salaries, they had money to spend. Thus, both the government and private entrepreneurs invested heavily in developing a vast agricultural infrastructure in the Basra region. These investments were made with the expectation of a profitable return, indicating the value of the Basra food market. Although Zanj slaves from Africa were put to work on these construction projects, most of the labor was done by free men working for wages. Governors sometimes directly supervised these projects, but usually they simply assigned the land while most of the financing was done by private investors.
The result of these investments was a massive irrigation system covering some 57,000 hectares between the Shatt al-Arab and the now-dry western channel of the Tigris. This system was first reported in 962, when just 8,000 hectares of it remained in use, for the cultivation of date palms, while the rest had become desert. This system consists of a regular pattern of two-meter-high ridges in straight lines, separated by old canal beds. The ridges are extremely saline, with salt deposits up to 20 centimeters thick, and are completely barren. The former canal beds are less salty and can support a small population of salt-resistant plants. Contemporary authors recorded how the Zanj slaves were put to work clearing the fields of salty topsoil and putting them into piles; the result was the ridges that remain today. This represents an enormous amount of work: H.S. Nelson calculated that 45 million tons of earth were moved in total, and with his extremely high estimate of one man moving two tons of soil per day, this would have taken a decade of strenuous work by 25,000 men.
Ultimately, Basra's irrigation canals were unsustainable, because they were built at too little of a slope for the water flow to carry salt deposits away. This required the clearing of salty topsoil by the Zanj slaves in order to keep the fields from becoming too saline to grow crops. After Basra was sacked in by Zanj rebels in the late 800s and then by the Qarmatians in the early 900s, there was no financial incentive to invest in restoring the irrigation system, and the infrastructure was almost completely abandoned. Finally, in the late 900s, the city of Basra was entirely relocated, with the old site being abandoned and a new one developing on the banks of the Shatt al-Arab, where it has remained ever since. | https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Basra |
Sanaa | Jews have been present in Yemen since the 5th century BCE and form part of the historic Jewish diasporas. In Sanaʽa, Jews had initially settled within the enclosed citadel, known as al-Qaṣr, near the ruins of the old tower known as Ghumdan Palace, but were evicted from there in the late 6th century by the ruling monarch, and moved to a different section of the city, known as al-Marbaki (also called the Falayhi Quarter). From there, they again uprooted and were made to settle in the section of the city known as al-Quzali, and eventually moved and settled in the neighborhood of al-Sa'ilah. In 1679, during the Mawza Exile, they were once again evicted from their place of residence. Upon returning to the city in 1680, they were given a plot of land outside of the city walls, where they built the new Jewish Quarter, al-Qāʻ (now Qāʻ al-ʻUlufi), and where they remained until the community's demise in the mid-20th century. In 1839 the Reverend Joseph Wolff, who later went to Bukhara to attempt to save Lieutenant Colonel Charles Stoddart and Captain Arthur Conolly, found in Yemen, near Sana'a, a tribe claiming to be descendants of Jehonadab. After the creation of the political State of Israel in 1948, about 49,000 (of an estimated 51,000) of Yemenite Jews were airlifted to Israel, almost 10,000 of whom were from Sanaʽa (see the English-language book Jews and Muslims in lower Yemen: a study in protection and restraint, 1918–1949). There was then essentially no Jewish population in Sanaʽa until the Shia insurgency broke out in northern Yemen in 2004. The Houthis directly threatened the Jewish community in 2007, prompting the government of President Saleh to offer them refuge in Sanaʽa. As of 2010, around 700 Jews were living in the capital under government protection. In April 2017, it was reported that 40 of the last 50 Jews were in an enclave next to the American Embassy in Sana'a, and they were subject to threats of ethnic cleansing by the Houthis.
On 28 April 2020 Yemenite Minister Moammer al-Iryani remarked the fate of the last 50 Jews in Yemen is unknown. On 16 July 2020 5 Jews were allowed to leave Yemen by the Houthi leaving 33 Jews in the country. In July 2020 the Mona Relief reported on their Website that as of July 19, 2020 of the Jewish population in Yemen, there were only a "handful" of Jews in Sana'a. | https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Sanaa |
Islam | Al-Shafi'i codified a method to determine the reliability of hadith. During the early Abbasid era, scholars such as Muhammad al-Bukhari and Muslim ibn al-Hajjaj compiled the major Sunni hadith collections while scholars like Al-Kulayni and Ibn Babawayh compiled major Shia hadith collections. The four Sunni Madh'habs, the Hanafi, Hanbali, Maliki, and Shafi'i, were established around the teachings of Abū Ḥanīfa, Ahmad ibn Hanbal, Malik ibn Anas and al-Shafi'i. In contrast, the teachings of Ja'far al-Sadiq formed the Ja'fari jurisprudence. In the 9th century, Al-Tabari completed the first commentary of the Quran, the Tafsir al-Tabari, which became one of the most cited commentaries in Sunni Islam. Some Muslims began questioning the piety of indulgence in worldly life and emphasized poverty, humility, and avoidance of sin based on renunciation of bodily desires. Ascetics such as Hasan al-Basri inspired a movement that would evolve into tasawwuf or Sufism.
At this time, theological problems, notably on free will, were prominently tackled, with Hasan al Basri holding that although God knows people's actions, good and evil come from abuse of free will and the devil. Greek rationalist philosophy influenced a speculative school of thought known as Muʿtazila, who famously advocated the notion of free-will originated by Wasil ibn Ata. Caliph Mamun al Rashid made it an official creed and unsuccessfully attempted to force this position on the majority. Caliph Al-Mu'tasim carried out inquisitions, with the traditionalist Ahmad ibn Hanbal notably refusing to conform to the Muʿtazila idea that the Quran was created rather than being eternal, which resulted in him being tortured and kept in an unlit prison cell for nearly thirty months. However, other schools of speculative theology – Māturīdism founded by Abu Mansur al-Maturidi and Ash'ari founded by Al-Ash'ari – were more successful in being widely adopted. Philosophers such as Al-Farabi, Avicenna and Averroes sought to harmonize Aristotle's ideas with the teachings of Islam, similar to later scholasticism within Christianity in Europe and Maimonides' work within Judaism, while others like Al-Ghazali argued against such syncretism and ultimately prevailed.
This era is sometimes called the "Islamic Golden Age". Islamic scientific achievements spanned a wide range of subject areas including medicine, mathematics, astronomy, and agriculture as well as physics, economics, engineering and optics. Avicenna was a pioneer in experimental medicine, and his The Canon of Medicine was used as a standard medicinal text in the Islamic world and Europe for centuries. Rhazes was the first to identify the diseases smallpox and measles. Public hospitals of the time issued the first medical diplomas to license doctors. Ibn al-Haytham is regarded as the father of the modern scientific method and often referred to as the "world's first true scientist", in particular regarding his work in optics. In engineering, the Banū Mūsā brothers' automatic flute player is considered to have been the first programmable machine. In mathematics, the concept of the algorithm is named after Muhammad ibn Musa al-Khwarizmi, who is considered a founder of algebra, which is named after his book al-jabr, while others developed the concept of a function. The government paid scientists the equivalent salary of professional athletes today. Guinness World Records recognizes the University of Al Karaouine, founded in 859, as the world's oldest degree-granting university. Many non-Muslims, such as Christians, Jews and Sabians, contributed to the Islamic civilization in various fields, and the institution known as the House of Wisdom employed Christian and Persian scholars to both translate works into Arabic and to develop new knowledge.
Soldiers broke away from the Abbasid empire and established their own dynasties, such as the Tulunids in 868 in Egypt and the Ghaznavid dynasty in 977 in Central Asia. In this fragmentation came the Shi'a Century, roughly between 945 and 1055, which saw the rise of the millennialist Isma'ili Shi'a missionary movement. One Isma'ili group, the Fatimid dynasty, took control of North Africa in the 10th century and another Isma'ili group, the Qarmatians, sacked Mecca and stole the Black Stone, a rock placed within the Kaaba, in their unsuccessful rebellion. Yet another Isma'ili group, the Buyid dynasty, conquered Baghdad and turned the Abbasids into a figurehead monarchy. The Sunni Seljuk dynasty campaigned to reassert Sunni Islam by promulgating the scholarly opinions of the time, notably with the construction of educational institutions known as Nezamiyeh, which are associated with Al-Ghazali and Saadi Shirazi.
The expansion of the Muslim world continued with religious missions converting Volga Bulgaria to Islam. The Delhi Sultanate reached deep into the Indian Subcontinent and many converted to Islam, in particular low-caste Hindus whose descendants make up the vast majority of Indian Muslims. Trade brought many Muslims to China, where they virtually dominated the import and export industry of the Song dynasty. Muslims were recruited as a governing minority class in the Yuan dynasty. | https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Islam |
Apricot | The apricot is the national fruit of Armenia, mostly growing in the Ararat plain. It is often depicted on souvenirs.
The Chinese associate the apricot with education and medicine. For instance, the classical word 杏 壇 (literally: "apricot altar") (xìng tán 杏坛) which means "educational circle", is still widely used in written language. Chuang Tzu, a Chinese philosopher in the fourth century BC, told a story that Confucius taught his students in a forum surrounded by the wood of apricot trees. The association with medicine in turn comes from the common use of apricot kernels as a component in traditional Chinese medicine, and from the story of Dong Feng (董奉), a physician during the Three Kingdoms period, who required no payment from his patients except that they plant apricot trees in his orchard upon recovering from their illnesses, resulting in a large grove of apricot trees and a steady supply of medicinal ingredients. The term "expert of the apricot grove" (杏林高手) is still used as a poetic reference to physicians.
The fact that apricot season is short and unreliable in Egypt has given rise to the common Egyptian Arabic and Palestinian Arabic expression filmishmish ("in apricot [season]") or bukra filmishmish ("tomorrow in apricot [season]"), generally uttered as a riposte to an unlikely prediction, or as a rash promise to fulfill a request. This adynaton has the same sense as the English expression "when pigs fly".
In Middle Eastern and North African cuisines, apricots are used to make Qamar al-Din (lit. "Moon of the faith"), a thick apricot drink that is a popular fixture at Iftar during Ramadan. Qamar al-Din is believed to originate in Damascus, Syria, where the variety of apricots most suitable for the drink was first grown.
In Jewish culture, apricots are commonly eaten as part of the Tu Bishvat seder.
The Turkish idiom bundan iyisi Şam'da kayısı (literally, "the only thing better than this is an apricot in Damascus") means "it doesn't get any better than this".
In the U.S. Marines it is considered exceptionally bad luck to eat or possess apricots, especially near tanks. This superstition has been documented since at least the Vietnam War and is often cited as originating in World War II. Even calling them by their name is considered unlucky, so they are instead called "cots", "Forbidden fruit" or "A-fruit".
US astronauts ate dried apricot on the Apollo 15 and Apollo 17 missions to the moon. | https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Apricot |
Islamic marital practices | In most Islamic societies and communities it is not a common practice for young people to actively seek a partner for themselves by following modern and Western rituals, such as dating. Young Muslim women and men are strongly encouraged to marry as soon as possible, since the family is considered the foundation of Islamic society. According to traditional Islamic law, women and men are not free to date or intermingle, which results in a more drawn-out and deliberate process. The amount of choice and acceptance involved in choosing marriage partners often depends on the class and educational status of the family when it comes to society. In the religion itself though, choosing your partner is allowed and encouraged as long as there are no inappropriate relations, such as dating or being physical. Some important characteristics in choosing a worthy mate are faith and chastity. These traits are pointed out in Quran Chapter 33 Verse 35 "For Muslim men and women, for believing men and women, for true men and women, for men and women who are patient and for men and women who guard their chastity, and for men and women who engage much in Allah's praise, for them has Allah prepared forgiveness and great reward." ‘Forced’ marriages, where consent has not been given by the bride, or is given only under excessive pressure, is considered illegal in all schools of Islamic law. Forced marriage is absolutely and explicitly forbidden.
Since Muslim countries are generally religiously homogeneous, it is much easier for individuals to find socially acceptable partners through traditional methods. Within these communities, families, friends, and services are used to help people find a significant other. However, in non-Muslim countries, like the United States, there is no universal method for matchmaking or finding a spouse. These Muslims must use alternate methods in order to find a partner in a way that closely simulates the traditional process.
Muslims in non-Islamic countries like the United States use Islamic institutions or imams to help them find partners. Islamic institutions like the ISNA (Islamic Society of North America), ICNA (Islamic Circle of North America), and MANA (Muslim Alliance of North America), allow individuals to meet others at annual conventions. The imam is a valued source among these Muslim communities as well. For any individual who values religious piety in a partner and does not have a Muslim social network, the imam is a valuable source of guidance.
The internet also offers new opportunities for Muslim individuals to meet one another. In the past 10 years, Matchmaking sites for Muslims have become an increasingly popular way to meet one's spouse. One website, SingleMuslim.com [1] is one of the first matchmaking sites for Muslims, and is very successful. Adeem Younis, the founder of the website, designed it in accordance with Islamic principles. Halal sites like SingleMuslim.com ask questions about individuals’ piety including prayer habits, fasting, and if they have made the hajj pilgrimage. Among Islamic theological figures there is some dispute over the validity of these websites; however, these sites continue to be created and avidly used. According to Younis, “Because ‘dating’ is not allowed in Islam, the Internet is an ideal vehicle for a discreet first step in finding a marriage partner." Other websites such as, The International Muslim Matrimonial site [2], broaden the depth of choices for individuals looking for a partner. Individual interests like, hobbies, political views, passions, activities, and family values, are all included to make a user profile. In some societies in both the Islamic world and the West, traditional matchmaking practices do not necessarily include this kind of expression of personal characteristics; therefore, these websites expand individuality while maintaining traditional Islamic ideals of matchmaking.
Other websites exist as well, such as Sunnah Match [3], Pure Matrimony [4], Half our Deen [5], My Salafi Spouse [6], and Zawj-Me [7]. | https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Islamic_marital_practices |
Rohingya people | In the prelude to independence, two Rohingyas were elected to the Constituent Assembly of Burma in 1947, M. A. Gaffar and Sultan Ahmed. After Burma became independent in 1948, M. A. Gaffar presented a memorandum of appeal to the Government of the Union of Burma calling for the recognition of the term "Rohingya", based on local Indian names of Arakan (Rohan and Rohang), as the official name of the ethnicity. Sultan Ahmed, who served as Parliamentary Secretary to the Ministry of Minorities, was a member of the Justice Sir Ba U Commission charged with exploring whether Arakan Division should be granted statehood. During the 1951 Burmese general election, five Rohingyas were elected to the Parliament of Burma, including one of the country's first two female MPs, Zura Begum. Six MPs were elected during the 1956 Burmese general election and subsequent by-elections. Sultan Mahmud, a former politician in British India, became Minister of Health in the cabinet of Prime Minister of Burma U Nu. In 1960, Mahmud suggested that either Rohingya-majority northern Arakan remain under the central government or be made a separate province. However, during the 1960 Burmese general election, Prime Minister U Nu's pledges included making all of Arakan into one province. The 1962 Burmese coup d'état ended the country's Westminster-style political system. The 1982 Burmese citizenship law stripped most of the Rohingyas of their stake in citizenship.
Rohingya community leaders were supportive of the 8888 uprising for democracy. During the 1990 Burmese general election, the Rohingya-led National Democratic Party for Human Rights won four seats in the Burmese parliament. The four Rohingya MPs included Shamsul Anwarul Huq, Chit Lwin Ebrahim, Fazal Ahmed and Nur Ahmed. The election was won by the National League for Democracy led by Aung San Suu Kyi, who was placed under house arrest and not permitted to become prime minister. The Burmese military junta banned the National Democratic Party for Human Rights in 1992. Its leaders were arrested, jailed and tortured.
Rohingya politicians have been jailed to disbar them from contesting elections. In 2005, Shamsul Anwarul Huq was charged under Section 18 of the controversial 1982 Burmese citizenship law and sentenced to 47 years in prison. In 2015, a ruling Union Solidarity and Development Party MP Shwe Maung was disbarred from the 2015 Burmese general election, on grounds that his parents were not Burmese citizens under the 1982 citizenship law.
As of 2017, Burma does not have a single Rohingya MP and the Rohingya population have no voting rights. | https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Rohingya_people |
Kurdistan Workers' Party | From the mid-1990s, the organization began to lose the upper hand in its operations as a consequence of a change of tactics by Turkey and Syria's steady abandonment of support for the group. The group also had lost its support from Saddam Hussein. As during the international operation Poised Hammer the collaboration between Barzani and Turkey embittered, the situation for the PKK became even more difficult, with Barzani condemning terrorist attacks by the PKK during a Newroz festival. At the same time, the Turkish government started to use more violent methods to counter Kurdish militants. After in 1992 a high-profile Turkish Delegation visited Damascus, the Syrian Government seemed to have ordered the closure of the PKK camp in the Bekaa valley and told the PKK to keep a low profile for some time.
In March 1993 Öcalan, in presence of PUK leader Jalal Talabani declared a unilateral ceasefire for a month in order to facilitate peace negotiations with Turkey. At an other press conference which took place on 16 April 1993 in Bar Elias, Lebanon, the ceasefire was prolonged indefinitely. To this event, the Kurdish politicians Jamal Talabani, Ahmet Türk from the People's Labor Party (HEP) and also Kemal Burkay also attended and declared their support for the ceasefire. The ceasefire ended after the Turkish army killed 13 PKK members in Kulp, Diyarbakir province in May 1993.
The fighting and violence augmented significantly following the presidential elections of June 1993 after which Tansu Çiller was elected prime minister. In December 1995 the PKK announced another unilateral ceasefire to give a new Government an opportunity to articulate a more peaceful approach towards the conflict. The government elected in December 1995 did not initiate negotiations and kept on evacuating Kurdish populated villages. Despite the violent approach of the Government to the ceasefire, it was upheld by the PKK until August 1996. Turkey was involved in serious human rights violations during the 1990s.
From 1996 to 1999, the organization began to use suicide bombers, VBIED, and ambush attacks against military and police bases. The role of suicide bombers, especially female ones were encouraged and mythologised by giving them the status of a "goddess of freedom", and shown as role models for other women after their death. On 30 July 1996, Zeynep Kınacı, a female PKK fighter, carried out the organization's first suicide attack, killing 8 soldiers and injuring 29 others. The attacks against the civilians, especially the Kurdish citizens who refused to cooperate with them were also reported at the same years. On 20 January 1999, a report published by HRW, stated that the PKK was reported to have been responsible for more than 768 executions. The organization had also reportedly committed 25 massacres, killing more than 300 people. More than a hundred victims were children and women.
In the late 1980s and early 1990s, in an effort to win increased support from the Kurdish peasantry, the PKK altered its leftist secular ideology to better accommodate and accept Islamic beliefs. The group also abandoned its previous strategy of attacking Kurdish and Turkish civilians who were against them, focusing instead on government and military targets. In its campaign, the organization has been criticized of carrying out atrocities against both Turkish and Kurdish civilians and its actions have been criticised by human rights groups such as Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch. Similar actions of the Turkish state have also been criticized by these same groups. The ECHR has investigated Turkey for executions of Kurdish civilians, torturing, forced displacements and massive arrests. In 1998 Turkey increased the pressure on Syria and ended its support for the PKK. The leader of the organization, Abdullah Öcalan, was captured, prosecuted and sentenced to death, but this was later commuted to life imprisonment as part of the government's seeking European Union membership. | https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Kurdistan_Workers%27_Party |
Human rights in Tunisia | Post-revolutionary press laws are considerably more liberal than the legislation they replaced. While it is no longer a crime to defame or offend public officials or institutions, defamation in general remains a crime, although one that is not punishable by imprisonment. Defamation of recognized religions also remains a crime, as does "distributing false information", a charge on which the pre-revolutionary government prosecuted dissidents and human rights activists. This charge was used by the post-revolutionary government on May 29, 2012, to detain police official Samir Feriani, who had accused high-ranking government officials in the death of protesters during the revolution.
The new government has also failed in some cases to protect individuals exercising their free speech. On June 29, 2012, when dozens of Muslims charged into a screening in Tunis of a movie about atheism, police failed to respond. In October 2012, a prosecutor announced plans to investigate a complaint against Nessma TV for broadcasting a film that Muslims considered offensive. Although persons who vandalized and attempted to set fire to the home of Nessma TV co-owner Nebil Karaoui were arrested, they were "detained only briefly and not charged," whereas Karaoui and two Nessma TV employees are still awaiting trial on charges of "undermining sacred values."
In December 2012, Human Rights Watch called on Tunisia's justice minister to "ensure the immediate release of Sami Fehri, the director of the privately owned Attounissia TV channel," who remained in prison after Tunisia's highest court, the Court of Cassation, had ordered his immediate release on November 28. Although Fehri had been charged with embezzlement, Fehri claimed that the real reason for his arrest was his broadcasting of a satirical show about leading Tunisian politicians. "Refusing to carry out a ruling by the highest judicial authority undermines the rule of law in Tunisia," said Eric Goldstein of Human Rights Watch.
Academic freedom, which was seriously limited before the revolution, has been significantly expanded.
Human Rights Watch criticized two journalists trial in the military courts in 2016. Both journalists can be jailed for up to three years under article 91 of the code of military justice, which criminalizes offenses against the dignity, reputation, or morale of the army. | https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Human_rights_in_Tunisia |
Disi Water Conveyance | The project became controversial in 2009 when a study performed by Avner Vengosh of Duke University revealed the Disi water to be highly radioactive. Water was tested from 37 existing wells in the aquifer, and all but one had concentrations of radioactive radium-226 and radium-228 isotopes that exceeded international standards for drinking water. Some of the water tested exceeded standards by 2,000%. Drinking water with these isotopes has been linked to bone cancer and leukemia. Though expensive, the water could be purified of the radioactive isotopes through ion-exchange purification.
Jordan's Ministry of Water and Irrigation has stated that the radioactivity is not a problem because the water is to be diluted with an equal amount of water from other sources. This dilution would presumably halve the radioactivity of the water which, according to Vengosh's data, would not be enough to bring the water up to standards. The Ministry of Water and Irrigation, however, has declared Vengosh's data to be inaccurate, as his study did not test water from any of the wells that will be used in the project. As radiation varies from well to well, it is possible that the data Vengosh collected does not accurately reflect the water sources to be used in the project.
Although testing at the well sites that supply Aqaba reveals high radioactivity, testing performed using water from the tap in Aqaba shows the water to be safe. There is no confirmed explanation for this phenomenon, although it is hypothesized that the depth of the wells (the ones that supply Aqaba are relatively shallow) may play a role as the radiation varies greatly at shallow depths.
In May, 2011, the President of the Jordanian Geologists Association Bahjat Al Adwan stated that the radiation is present in the water in the form of Radon, and thus dissipates harmlessly when the water is exposed to air on the surface. This explanation has not been confirmed scientifically, however.
During the inauguration of the conveyor in July 2013 Minister of Water and Irrigation Hazim El-Nasser said that after mixing Disi water radiation is less than 0.5 millisievert per year. The worldwide average natural dose of human's exposure to radiation is about 2.5-3 millisievert per year. "Disi water is purer than bottled water and I take full responsibility for what I’m saying,” the Minister said during a press conference. | https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Disi_Water_Conveyance |
Islamic eschatology | While "some traditional and contemporary commentators" have interpreted the Quran as condemning all Jews, Farid Esack argues this condemnation is neither "universal" nor "eternal", and asks, 'if the Qur'an is to consign the Jews to eternal damnation, then what becomes of the sacred text as a means of guidance for all humankind? Would that vision too be damned?'
An example of a line criticizing the Jews can be found in Surah 5:
"The Jews say, 'God's Hand is shackled.' Shackled are their hands, and they are cursed for what they say. Nay, but His two Hands are outstretched, He bestows as He wills. Surely that which has been sent down unto thee from thy Lord will increase many of them in rebellion and disbelief. And we cast enmity and hatred among them till the Day of Resurrection. As often they ignite a flame for war, God extinguishes it. They endeavor to work corruption upon the earth. And God loves not thee workers of corruption." (Q.5:64)
A Sahih hadith concerning Jews and one of the signs of the coming of Judgement Day has been quoted many times, (it became a part of the charter of Hamas).
The Day of Judgement will not come about until Muslims fight the Jews, when the Jew will hide behind stones and trees. The stones and trees will say O Muslims, O Abdullah, there is a Jew behind me, come and kill him. Only the Gharkad tree, (the Boxthorn tree) would not do that because it is one of the trees of the Jews.
However, some scripture praises the dedication of Jews to monotheism, and this verse of the Qur'an in surah 3, can be interpreted as taking a more reconciliatory tone:
"They are not all alike. Among the People of the Book is an upright community who recite God's signs in the watches of the night, while they prostrate. They believe in God and the Last Day, enjoin right and forbid wrong, and hasten unto good deeds. And they are among the righteous. Whatsoever good they do, they will not be denied it. And God knows the reverent". (Q.3:113–115)
After reconciling the different descriptions, one can conclude that the transgressions of the "apes and pigs" are not indicative of the entire community, and that while some Jews are on their way to damnation, others are not. | https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Islamic_eschatology |
Marrakesh | Surrounded by lemon, orange, and olive groves, the city's culinary characteristics are rich and heavily spiced but not hot, using various preparations of Ras el hanout (which means "Head of the shop"), a blend of dozens of spices which include ash berries, chilli, cinnamon, grains of paradise, monk's pepper, nutmeg, and turmeric. A specialty of the city and the symbol of its cuisine is tanjia marrakshia, affectionately referred to as bint ar-rimad (بنت الرماد "daughter of the ash"), a local meal prepared with beef meat, spices, and smen and slow-cooked in a ceramic pot in traditional oven in hot ashes. Tajines can be prepared with chicken, lamb, beef or fish, adding fruit, olives and preserved lemon, vegetables and spices, including cumin, peppers, saffron, turmeric, and ras el hanout. The meal is prepared in a tajine pot and slow-cooked with steam. Another version of tajine includes vegetables and chickpeas seasoned with flower petals. Tajines may also be basted with "smen" Moroccan ghee that has a flavour similar to blue cheese.
Shrimp, chicken and lemon-filled briouats are another traditional specialty of Marrakesh. Rice is cooked with saffron, raisins, spices, and almonds, while couscous may have added vegetables. A pastilla is a filo-wrapped pie stuffed with minced chicken or pigeon that has been prepared with almonds, cinnamon, spices and sugar. Harira soup in Marrakesh typically includes lamb with a blend of chickpeas, lentils, vermicelli, and tomato paste, seasoned with coriander, spices and parsley. Kefta (mince meat), liver in crépinette, merguez and tripe stew are commonly sold at the stalls of Jemaa el-Fnaa.
The desserts of Marrakesh include chebakia (sesame spice cookies usually prepared and served during Ramadan), tartlets of filo dough with dried fruit, or cheesecake with dates.
The Moroccan tea culture is practiced in Marrakesh; green tea with mint is served with sugar from a curved teapot spout into small glasses. Another popular non-alcoholic drink is orange juice. Under the Almoravids, alcohol consumption was common; historically, hundreds of Jews produced and sold alcohol in the city. In the present day, alcohol is sold in some hotel bars and restaurants. | https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Marrakesh |
Battle of Vienna | In this table, only household and retinue troops’ numbers are certain, 78,500 and 44,200 while other troops’ numbers are rounded, 50,000 Tatars, 10,000 Wallachian, 170,000 rear service etc. Based on this, Kahraman Şakul claims that this anonymous table shows counted numbers of household and retinue troops while number of provincial troops (Tımarlı Sipahi: 40,000) and vassal states’ troops (100,000) are expected numbers. For instance, Tatars, Nogais and Circassians number was more than 100,000 while this table shows that the Tatars (general term for Crimean Khanate and its vassals) brought 50,000 warriors. Ottoman accounts state the size of the household army as 25,529 Janissaries, 3045 weaponeers (in Ottoman Turkish: cebeci) and 4000 gunners, totaling 32,574 as opposed to 60,000 estimation in this table. Therefore, according to K. Şakul's assessment, the Ottoman army consisted of approximately 120,000 soldiers and 156 guns. Within their ranks, 30,000 troops were strategically stationed in captured castles and deployed to disrupt the approaching relief army's movements.
According to Austrian Ambassador Kunitz, the besieging Ottoman army had already decreased to 90,000 combatants as of 12 August. Kunitz also claimed that he learned from Ottoman captives that casualties were reaching 20,000 by end of August (other Austrian sources give Ottoman casualties as 12,000 until 13 August, demonstrating a steady increase in casualties of the Ottoman army in the days of siege). An Ottoman account captured after battle recorded the number of casualties as 48,544 until 10 September: 10,000 janissary, 12,000 sipahi (elite heavy cavalry), 16,000 beldar (digger), 6,000 engineer (in Turkish lağımcı: miner), 2,000 provincial sipahi and 2,000 Tatars, totaling 48,544 deaths. Compounding this, desertion (Ottoman sources and Luigi Marsigli give a 1/4 desertion of the Ottoman army) and disease diminished the Ottoman army on a large scale. According to Ottoman sources, the number of soldiers decreased from 120,000 (according to Kunitz, the Ottoman army totalled 180,000 men and 1/3 of the army was stationed away from the siege) to a warweary 40,000 soldiers. K. Şakul combines Kunitz's 90,000 combatant information for 12 August with an Ottoman casualties list, estimating the Ottoman army as 90,000 men (65,000 soldiers, around 60 guns and 25,000 rear service) but Kunitz's 90,000 combatant information belongs to 12 August while the Ottoman list is for 10 September. The Ottoman vassals of Transylvania, Wallachia and Moldavia were assigned to hold bridges on key retreat routes, thus not participating in the battle. The Tatar vassals were expected to participate in battle by the Ottomans but the mostly irregular Tatar horsemen demonstrated little effectiveness in battle, dissimilar to previous engagements. A lone 28,400 to 50,000 Ottoman army would battle against the relief army consisting of 65,000 soldiers (68,000 misinformation is originated from counting the 3,000 Polish contingent twice joined to the relief army beforehand) with 165–200 guns. | https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Battle_of_Vienna |
LGBT people and Islam | In 2013, the Pew Research Center conducted a study on the global acceptance of homosexuality and found a widespread rejection of homosexuality in many nations that are predominantly Muslim. In some countries, views were becoming more conservative among younger people.
2019 Arab Barometer Survey:
A 2007 survey of British Muslims showed that 61% believe homosexuality should be illegal. A later Gallup poll in 2009 showed that none of the 500 British Muslims polled believed homosexuality to be "morally acceptable". In a 2016 ICM poll of 1,081 British Muslims, 52% of those polled disagreed with the statement 'Homosexuality should be legal in Britain' while 18% agreed. In the same poll, 56% of British Muslims polled disagreed with the statement 'Gay marriage should be legal in Britain' compared with 20% of the control group and 47% disagreed with the statement 'It is acceptable for a homosexual person to be a teacher in a school' compared with 14% of the control group.
According to a 2012 poll, 51% of the Turks in Germany, who account for nearly two thirds of the total Muslim population in Germany, believed that homosexuality is an illness. However, a more recent poll from 2015 found that more than 60% of Muslims in Germany support gay marriage. A poll in 2017 also found 60% support for gay marriage.
American Muslims – in line with general public attitudes in the United States – have become much more accepting of homosexuality over recent years. In a 2007 poll conducted by Pew Research Center, only 27% of American Muslims believed that homosexuality should be accepted. In a 2011 poll, that rose to 39%. In a July 2017 poll, Muslims who say homosexuality should be accepted by society clearly outnumber those who say it should be discouraged (52% versus 33%), a level of acceptance similar to American Protestants (52% in 2016). According to research by the Public Religion Research Institute's 2017 American Values Atlas, 51% of American Muslims favor same-sex marriage, while 34% are opposed.
The 2009 Gallup poll showed that 35% of the French Muslims believed that homosexuality to be "morally acceptable".
A 2016 iVOX survey of Belgian Muslims found that 53% agreed with the statement: "I have no issues with homosexuality." Approximately 30% disagreed with the statement while the rest refused to answer or were unsure.
A 2016 survey of Canadian Muslims showed that 36% agreed with the statement homosexuality should be accepted by society with 47% young Canadian Muslims (18–34) holding this belief. The survey also stated that 43% of Canadian Muslims agreed with the statement homosexuality should not be accepted by society. The Muslim groups that mostly opposed acceptance of homosexuality by society were the older age group 45 to 59 (55%) and the lowest income group <$30K (56%).
Turkey Muslims: According to the survey conducted by the Kadir Has University in Istanbul in 2016, 33 per cent of people said that LGBT people should have equal rights. This increased to 45 per cent in 2020. Another survey by Kadir Has University in 2018 found that 55.3 percent of people wouldn't want a homosexual neighbour. This decreased to 46.5 per cent in 2019. | https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/LGBT_people_and_Islam |
International recognition of the State of Palestine | On 22 November 1974, United Nations General Assembly Resolution 3236 recognised the right of the Palestinian people to self-determination, national independence and sovereignty in Palestine. It also recognised the PLO as the sole legitimate representative of the Palestinian people, and accorded it observer status in the United Nations. The designation "Palestine" for the PLO was adopted by the United Nations in 1988 in acknowledgment of the Palestinian declaration of independence, but the proclaimed state still has no formal status within the system.
Shortly after the 1988 declaration, the State of Palestine was recognised by many developing states in Africa and Asia, and from communist and non-aligned states. At the time, however, the United States was using its Foreign Assistance Act and other measures to discourage other countries and international organisations from extending recognition. Although these measures were successful in many cases, the Arab League and the Organisation of the Islamic Conference (OIC) immediately published statements of recognition of, support for, and solidarity with Palestine, which was accepted as a member state in both forums.
In February 1989 at the United Nations Security Council, the PLO representative acknowledged that 94 states had recognised the new Palestinian state. It subsequently attempted to gain membership as a state in several agencies connected to the United Nations, but its efforts faced threats from the U.S. that it would withhold funding from any organisation that admitted Palestine. For example, in April of the same year, the PLO applied for membership as a state in the World Health Organization, an application that failed to produce a result after the U.S. informed the organisation that it would withdraw funding if Palestine were admitted. In May, a group of OIC members submitted to UNESCO an application for membership on behalf of Palestine, and listed a total of 91 states that had recognised the State of Palestine.
In June 1989, the PLO submitted to the government of Switzerland letters of accession to the Geneva Conventions of 1949. However, Switzerland, as the depositary state, determined that because the question of Palestinian statehood had not been settled within the international community, it was therefore incapable of determining whether the letter constituted a valid instrument of accession.Due to the [uncertainty] within the international community as to the existence or the non-existence of a State of Palestine and as long as the issue has not been settled in an appropriate framework, the Swiss Government, in its capacity as depositary of the Geneva Conventions and their additional Protocols, is not in a position to decide whether this communication can be considered as an instrument of accession in the sense of the relevant provisions of the Conventions and their additional Protocols.
Consequently, in November 1989, the Arab League proposed a General Assembly resolution to formally recognise the PLO as the government of an independent Palestinian state. The draft, however, was abandoned when the U.S. again threatened to cut off its financing for the United Nations should the vote go ahead. The Arab states agreed not to press the resolution, but demanded that the U.S. promise not to threaten the United Nations with financial sanctions again.
Many of the early statements of recognition of the State of Palestine were termed ambiguously. In addition, hesitation from others did not necessarily mean that these nations did not regard Palestine as a state. This has seemingly resulted in confusion regarding the number of states that have officially recognized the state declared in 1988. Numbers reported in the past are often conflicting, with figures as high as 130 being seen frequently. In July 2011, in an interview with Haaretz, Palestinian ambassador to the United Nations, Riyad Mansour claimed that 122 states had so far extended formal recognition. At the end of the month, the PLO published a paper on why the world's governments should recognize the State of Palestine and listed the 122 countries that had already done so. By the end of September the same year, Mansour claimed the figure had reached 139. | https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/International_recognition_of_the_State_of_Palestine |
Berlin–Baghdad railway | In 1919, the Treaty of Versailles cancelled all German rights to the Baghdad railway, however, the Deutsche Bank transferred its holdings to a Swiss bank.
The Treaty of Ankara in 1921 established the Syria–Turkey border as running along the railway track from Al-Rai in the west to Nusaybin in the east, with the border being on the Syrian side of the track, leaving the track in Turkish territory. Further west, the Treaty also set the border immediately north of the town and railway station of Meidan Ekbis.
People in Turkey, Italy, France, and Britain created various arrangements that gave a certain degree of control over the Baghdad railway to various indistinct interests in those nations. Investors, speculators, and financiers were involved by 1923 in secretive and clandestine ways.
The British Army had completed the southeastern section from Baghdad to Basra, so that part was under British control. The French held negotiations to obtain some degree of control over the central portion of the railway, and Turkish interests controlled the oldest sections that had been constructed inside of Turkey, but talks continued to be held after 1923. The United States involvement in the Near East began in 1923 when Turkey approved the Chester concession, which aroused disapprovals from France and the United Kingdom.
In 1930, a passenger service by road was introduced to bridge the missing section of line between Nusaybin and Kirkuk. At different times the service used Rolls-Royce cars and Thornycroft buses.
In 1932, the Kingdom of Iraq became independent from the UK. In 1936, Iraq bought all railways in its territory from the UK and started building the missing section of line from Tel Kotchek to Baiji. On 15 July 1940 the railway had been completed, and two days later the Taurus Express made its first complete journey between Istanbul and Baghdad. In that year, the Robert Stephenson and Hawthorns locomotive works in Britain built a class of streamlined Pacific steam locomotives to haul the Taurus Express between Baghdad and Tel Kotchek. These were delivered to Iraqi State Railways in 1941 and entered service as the PC class.
A new standard gauge railway opened between Baghdad and Basra for freight traffic in 1964 and for freight in 1968. It was also used for passenger traffic at least into the 1970s. This replaced a metre gauge line built in 1920 and for the first time connected the Bosphorus with the Persian Gulf without a break of gauge. Due to the strained relations between Turkey, Syria and Iraq however, continuous traffic remained rare, and other means of transport soon reduced its strategic and economic relevance. | https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Berlin%E2%80%93Baghdad_railway |
Horses in Sudan | Horses were used for warfare in the central Sudan region since the 9th century, where they were considered "the most precious commodity following the slave." The first conclusive evidence of horses playing a major role in the warfare of West Africa dates to the 11th century when the region was controlled by the Almoravids, a Muslim Berber dynasty.: 119 During the 13th and 14th centuries, cavalry became an important factor in the area.: 119 This coincided with the introduction of larger breeds of horse and the widespread adoption of saddles and stirrups.: 127–133
Mounted warfare was a prominent feature of Sudanese military strategies. Horses served as cavalry, offering not only mobility but also the ability to charge into enemy lines with force. Cavalry units were known for their speed and manoeuvrability, making them a formidable presence on the battlefield. They played a crucial role in various campaigns and conflicts, contributing to Sudan's military successes. Horses held symbolic significance in Sudanese warfare. They were not only tools of combat but also symbols of victory and prestige. Victorious leaders often paraded on horseback, showcasing their authority and triumph. Horses became a source of pride and a representation of power in Sudanese culture. The use of horses in Sudan's military history also extended to trade and exchange. Sudan imported horses from North Africa and the Western Sahara, often exchanging them for slaves. This trade had significant economic and military implications for the region, highlighting the multifaceted role of horses in Sudanese society.
During the 18th and 19th centuries, horses were extensively used in inter-tribal conflicts in Sudan. Their agility and speed made them invaluable assets on the battlefield, allowing for swift manoeuvres and rapid charges. Horses became a common sight in these battles, as various tribes vied for power and territory within the region.
While horses once dominated the battlefield in Sudan, modern conflicts have witnessed changes in military technology and tactics. The role of horses in warfare has evolved, with mechanised vehicles and modern weaponry largely replacing them. Still, organised armed fighters on horseback are occasionally seen. The best-known current examples are the Janjaweed, militia groups seen in the Darfur region of Sudan, who became notorious for their attacks upon unarmed civilian populations in the Darfur conflict. Many nations still maintain small numbers of mounted military units for certain types of patrol and reconnaissance duties in extremely rugged terrain, including the conflict in Afghanistan. | https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Horses_in_Sudan |
Nabataean Kingdom | The Nabataean Arabs did not emerge as a political power suddenly; their rise instead went through two phases. The first phase was in the 4th century BC (ruled then by an elders' council), which was marked by the growth of Nabataean control over trade routes and various tribes and towns. Their presence in Transjordan by the end of the fourth century BC is guaranteed by Antigonus's operations in the region, and despite recent suggestions that there is no evidence of Nabataean occupation of the Hauran in the early period, the Zenon papyri firmly attest the penetration of the Hauran by the Nabataeans in the mid-third century BC beyond all doubt, and according to Bowersock, it "establish[es] these Arabs in one of the principal areas of subsequent splendor". Simultaneously, the Nabataeans had probably moved across the 'Araba to the west into the desert tracts of the Negev. In their early history, before establishing urban centers, the Nabataeans demonstrated on several occasions their impressive and well organized military prowess by successfully defending their territory against larger powers.
The second phase saw the creation of the Nabataean political state in the mid-3rd century BC. Kingship is regarded as a characteristic of a state and urban society. The Nabataean institution of kingship came about as a result of multiple factors, such as the indispensabilities of trade organization and war; the subsequent outcomes of the Greek expeditions on the Nabataeans played a role in the political centralization of the Nabatu tribe. The earliest evidence of Nabataean kingship comes from a Nabataean inscription in the Hauran region, probably Bosra, which mentions a Nabataean king whose name was lost, dated by Stracky to the early third century BC. The dating is significant, since the available evidence does not attest the existence of Nabataean monarchy until the second century BC. This nameless Nabataean king perhaps could be linked with a reference from the Zenon archive (the second historical mention of the Nabataeans) to deliveries of grain to "Rabbel's men", Rabbel being a characteristically royal Nabataean name, it is thus possible to link Rabbel of the Zenon archive with the nameless king of Bosra's inscription, though it is highly speculative.
A recent papyrological discovery, the Milan Papyrus, provides further evidence. The relevant part of the Lithika section of the papyrus describes an Arabian cavalry of a certain Nabataean king, providing an early 3rd century BC reference to a Nabataean monarch. The word Nabataean stands alone beside a missing word that start with the letter M; one of the suggested words for filling the gap is the traditional name of Nabataean kings, Malichus. Furthermore, the anonymous Nabataean coins dated by Barkay to the second half of the 3rd century BC, found mainly in Nabataean territory, support such an early date of the Nabataean Kingdom. This is in line with Strabo's account (whose description of Arabia derives ultimately from reports by 3rd century BC Ptolemaic officials) that the Nabataean kingship was old and traditional. In conclusion, Rachel Barkay states that "the Nabataean economy and political regime were in existence by the third century BC". The Kingship of the Nabataeans, was in the view of Strabo, an effective one, where the Nabataean kingdom was "very well governed" and the king was "a man of the people". For more than four centuries the Nabataean kingdom dominated, politically and commercially, a large territory and was arguably the first Arab kingdom in the area.
The testimony of the 4th and 3rd century external accounts and local materialistic evidence demonstrate that the Nabataeans played a relatively substantial political and economic role in the sphere of the early Hellenistic world. While the Nabataeans didn't attain observable characteristics of a Hellenistic state (i.e. monumental architecture) in their early period, similar to contemporary Seleucid Syria, the Milan papyrus speaks of their wealth and prestige in this period. In that respect, the Nabataeans must be considered a unique entity.
Aretas I, mentioned in II Macc as "the tyrant of the Arabs" (169-168 BC), is regarded as the first explicitly named king of the Nabataeans. His first appearance in history is in the II Macc, where the high-priest Jason, driven by his rival Menelaus, sought the protection of Aretas. Upon his arrival at the land of the Nabataeans, Aretas imprisoned Jason. It is not clear why or when that happened; his arrest by Aretas was either after he escaped Jerusalem, where Aretas, fearing the retaliation of Antiochus IV Epiphanes for "openly demonstrating pro-Ptolemaic stand" (in Hammond's view however, Aretas hoped to use Jason as a political bargaining counter with the Seleucids), arrested Jason. Or his imprisonment might have happened at a later date (167 BC), as a result of the established friendship between the Nabataeans and Judas Maccabaeus, aimed to hand Jason to the Jews. "Either suggestion is feasible and so the riddle remains unresolved", according to Kasher.
A Nabataean inscription in the Negev, mentions a Nabataean king called Aretas, the date given by Starcky is not later than 150 BC. However, the dating is difficult. It has been claimed that the inscription dates to the 3rd century BC, based on the pre-Nabataean writing style, or somewhere in the 2nd century BC. Generally, the inscription is attributed to Aretas I of II Macc, or perhaps as suggested by others, to Aretas II.
Around the same time, the Arab Nabataeans and the neighboring Jewish Maccabees had maintained a friendly relationship, the former had sympathized with the Maccabees, who were being mistreated by the Seleucids. The Romano-Jewish historian Josephus report that Judas Maccabeus and his brother Jonathan marched three days into the wilderness before encountering the Nabataeans in the Hauran, where they were settled in for at least a century. The Nabataeans treated them peacefully and told them of what happened to the Jews residing in the land of Galaad. This peaceful meeting between the Nabataeans and two brothers in the first book of Maccabees seems to contradict a parallel account from the second book where a pastoral Arab tribe launched a surprise attack on the two brothers. Despite open contradiction between the two accounts, scholars tend to identify the plundering Arab tribe of the second book with the Nabataeans in the first book. They were evidently not Nabataeans, for good relations between the Maccabees and their "friends", the Nabataeans, continued to exist. The friendly relations between them is further emphasized by Jonathan decision to send his brother John to "lodge his baggage" with the Nabataeans until the battle with the Seleucids is over. Again, the Maccabean caravan suffered an attack by a murderer Arab tribe in the vicinity of Madaba. This tribe was clearly not Nabataean, for they were identified as the sons of Amrai. In Bowersock view, the interpretation of the evidence in the books of Maccabees "illustrates the danger of assuming that any reference to Arabs in areas known to have been settled by the Nabataeans must automatically refer to them". But the picture is different, many Arab tribes in the region continued to be nomadic and moved in and out of the emerging Nabataean kingdom, and the Nabataeans, as well as invading armies and eventually the Romans also, had to cope with these people.
The Nabataeans began to mint coins during the second century BC, revealing the extensive economic and political independence they enjoyed.
Petra was included in a list of major cities in the Mediterranean area to be visited by a notable from Priene, a sign of the significance of Nabataea in the ancient world. Petra was counted with Alexandria, which was considered to be a supreme city in the civilized world. | https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Nabataean_Kingdom |
Rafic Hariri | Hariri implemented an aggressive new economic policy. In 1992 inflation was running at 131% but such was the confidence in Hariri's leadership that within two years it had been reduced to 12%. Perhaps Hariri's most important creation in the beginning of his career was "Horizon 2000" the government's name for its new rejuvenation plan. A large component of "Horizon 2000" was Solidere, the privately owned construction company that was established to reconstruct post-war Lebanon. Solidere was owned by the government and private investors. Solidere was largely focused on redeveloping Beirut's downtown and turning it into a new urban center as quickly as possible as one aspect of the various infrastructure redevelopment plans that would be implemented by "Horizon 2000". Solidere was given powers of compulsory purchase, compensating in Solidere shares rather than cash, and was accused of harassment and underpaying former land owners. Another aspect of the decade-long plan was the privatization of major industries. Numerous contracts were awarded in important industries such as energy, telecommunications, electricity, airports and roads.
The last and perhaps most significant aspect of "Horizon 2000" was economic stimulus via foreign direct investment. Specifically, Hariri supported foreign firms and individuals taking an interest in Lebanon's developmental potential. Hariri simplified tax codes and provided tax breaks to foreign investors. Due to his previous successes in the private sector and the numerous resulting international connections, Hariri was able to garner a significant amount of low-interest loans from foreign investors. Hariri also pursued aggressive macroeconomic policy such as maintaining strict regulations on bank reserves and inter-bank interest rates to curb inflation and raise the value of the Lebanese pound relative to the dollar.
Hariri's economic policies were a remarkable success during his first year in office. From 1992 to 1993 there was a 6 percent increase in real national income, the capital base of commercial banks effectively doubled, the budgetary earnings hovered at around a billion dollars, and commercial banks' consolidated balance sheets increased about 25%. By 1998, however, real GDP growth was around 1%, a year later it would be −1%, national debt had skyrocketed 540% from two to eighteen billion dollars, Lebanon's economy was in a miserable state.
In 1996 it was estimated that 30% of Lebanon's population were living below the poverty line and that there were 500,000 Syrian labourers working illegally in the country. | https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Rafic_Hariri |
Sasanian Empire | 224–241: Reign of Ardashir I:
224: Overthrow of the Parthian Empire
229–232: War with Rome
Zoroastrianism is revived as official religion
The collection of texts known as the Zend Avesta is assembled
241–271: Reign of Shapur I "the Great":
241–244: War with Rome
252–261: War with Rome. Decisive victory of Persian at Edessa and Capture of Roman emperor Valerian
215–271: Mani, founder of Manichaeism
271–301: A period of dynastic struggles.
283: War with Rome.
293: Revolt of Narseh.
296–298: War with Rome – Persia cedes five provinces east of the Tigris to Rome.
309–379: Reign of Shapur II "the Great":
325: Shapur II defeats many Arab tribes and makes the Lakhmid kingdom his vassal.
337–350: First war with Rome with relatively little success
359–363: Second war with Rome. Rome cedes Northern and Eastern Mesopotamia, Georgia and Armenia including fifteen fortresses as well as Nisibis to Persia.
387: Armenia partitioned into Roman and Persian zones
399–420: Reign of Yazdegerd I "the Sinner":
410: Church of the East formalised at the synod of Isaac under the patronage of Yazdegerd. Christians are permitted to publicly worship and to build churches
416–420: Persecution of Christians as Yazdegerd revokes his earlier order
420–438: Reign of Bahram V:
421–422: War with Rome
424: Council of Dad-Ishu declares the Eastern Church independent of Constantinople
428: Persian zone of Armenia annexed to Sasanian Empire
438–457: Reign of Yazdegerd II:
440: War with the Byzantine Empire; the Romans give some payments to the Sasanians
449–451: Armenian revolt. Battle of Avarayr fought in 451 against the Christian Armenian rebels led by Vardan Mamikonian.
482–483: Armenian and Iberian revolt
483: Edict of Toleration granted to Christians
484: Peroz I defeated and killed by Hephthalites. The Treaty of Nvarsak grants the Armenians the right to profess Christianity freely.
491: Armenian revolt. Armenian Church repudiates the Council of Chalcedon; Nestorian Christianity becomes dominant Christian sect in Sasanian Empire
502–506: War with the Byzantine Empire. In the end the Byzantine Empire pays 1,000 pounds of gold to the Sasanian Empire The Sasanians capture Theodosiopolis and Martyropolis.Byzantine Empire received Amida for 1,000 pounds of gold.
526–532: War with the Byzantine Empire. Treaty of Eternal Peace: The Sasanian Empire keeps Iberia and the Byzantine Empire receives Lazica and Persarmenia; the Byzantine Empire pays tribute 11,000 lbs gold/year.
531–579: Reign of Khosrow I, "with the immortal soul" (Anushirvan).
541–562: War with the Byzantine Empire.
572–591: War with the Byzantine Empire.
580: The Sasanians under Hormizd IV abolish the monarchy of the Kingdom of Iberia. Direct control through Sasanian-appointed governors starts.
590: Rebellion of Bahram Chobin and other Sasanian nobles, Khosrow II overthrows Hormizd IV but loses the throne to Bahram Chobin.
591: Khosrow II regains the throne with help from the Byzantine Empire and cedes Persian Armenia and the western half of Iberia to the Byzantine Empire.
593: Attempted usurpation of Hormizd V
595–602: Rebellion of Vistahm
603–628: War with the Byzantine Empire. Persia occupies Byzantine Mesopotamia, Anatolia, Syria, Palestine, Egypt and the Transcaucasus, before being driven to withdraw to pre-war frontiers by Byzantine counter-offensive
610: Arabs defeat a Sasanian army at Dhu-Qar
626: Unsuccessful siege of Constantinople by Avars, Persians, and Slavs.
627: Byzantine Emperor Heraclius invades Sasanian Mesopotamia. Decisive defeat of Persian forces at the battle of Nineveh
628: Kavad II overthrows Khosrow II and becomes Shahanshah.
628: A devastating plague kills half of the population in Western Persia, including Kavad II.
628–632: Civil war
632–644: Reign of Yazdegerd III
636: Decisive Sasanian defeat at the Battle of al-Qādisiyyah during the Muslim conquest of Persia
641: The Muslims defeat a massive Sasanian army with heavy casualties during the Battle of Nihawānd
644: The Muslims conquer Khorasan; Yazdegerd III becomes a hunted fugitive
651: Yazdegerd III flees eastward from one district to another, until at last he is killed by a local miller for his purse at Merv (present-day Turkmenistan), ending the dynasty. Yazdegerd is given a burial by the Assyrian bishop Mar Gregory. His son, Peroz III, and many others go into exile in China. | https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Sasanian_Empire |
History of Islam in southern Italy | After suppressing another revolt in 948, the Fatimid Caliph Ismail al-Mansur named al-Hasan ibn Ali al-Kalbi as emir of the island. As his position soon became hereditary, his emirate became de facto independent from the African government. In 950, Hassan waged war against the Byzantines in southern Italy, reaching up to Gerace and Cassano allo Ionio. A second Calabrian campaign in 952 resulted in the defeat of the Byzantine army; Gerace was again besieged, but in the end Emperor Constantine VII was forced to accept having the Calabrian cities pay a tribute to Sicily.
In 956, the Byzantines reconquered Reggio and invaded Sicily; a truce was signed in 960. Two years later a revolt in Taormina was bloodily suppressed, but the resistance of the Christians in the Siege of Rometta led the new emperor Nikephoros II Phokas to send an army of 40,000 Armenians, Thracians, and Slavs under his nephew Manuel, who captured Messina in October 964. The Byzantine forces, however, were swiftly routed in Rometta and at the Battle of the Straits, and the city soon fell to the Muslims, completing the Islamic conquest of Sicily. Manuel, along with 10,000 of his men, was killed in the fray.
The new emir Abu'l-Qasim Ali ibn al-Hasan al-Kalbi (964–982) launched a series of attacks against Calabria in the 970s, while the fleet under his brother attacked the Adriatic coasts of Apulia, capturing some strongholds. As the Byzantines were busy against the Fatimids in Syria and with the partial conquest of the Bulgarian Empire, the German Emperor Otto II decided to intervene. The allied German-Lombard army was defeated in 982 at the Battle of Stilo. However, as al-Qasim himself had been killed, his son Jabir al-Kalbi prudently retreated to Sicily without exploiting the victory. In 1005, a Christian fleet coming from Pisa sacked the Arab held Reggio Calabria and massacred all the Saracens to the great jubilation of the local population. In 1006 a new Saracen fleet was defeated near Reggio Calabria by the Pisans.
The emirate reached its cultural peak under the emirs Ja'far (983–985) and Yusuf al-Kalbi (990–998), both patrons of the arts. The latter's son Ja'far was instead a cruel and violent lord who expelled the Berbers from the island after an unsuccessful revolt against him. In 1019, another uprising in Palermo was successful, and Ja'far was exiled to Africa and replaced by his brother al-Akhal (1019–1037).
With the support of the Fatimids, al-Akhal defeated two Byzantine expeditions in 1026 and 1031. His attempt to raise a heavy tax to pay his mercenaries caused a civil war. Al-Akhal asked the Byzantines for support while his brother abu-Hafs, leader of the rebels, received troops from the Zirid Emir of Ifriqiya, al-Muizz ibn Badis, which were commanded by his son Abdallah.
The local population conquered by the Muslims were Greek speaking Byzantine Christians, but there were also a significant number of Jews. These conquered people were afforded a limited freedom of religion under the Muslims as dhimmi, protected peoples, but were subject to some legal restrictions. The dhimmi were also required to pay the jizya, or poll tax, and the kharaj or land tax, but were exempt from the tax that Muslims had to pay (Zakaat). Under Arab rule there were different categories of Jizya payers, but their common denominator was the payment of the Jizya as a mark of subjection to Muslim rule in exchange for protection against foreign and internal aggression. The conquered population could avoid this subservient status simply by converting to Islam. Whether by honest religious conviction or societal compulsion large numbers of native Sicilians converted to Islam. However, even after 100 years of Islamic rule, numerous Greek speaking Christian communities prospered, especially in north-eastern Sicily, as dhimmi. This was largely a result of the Jizya system which allowed subservient co-existence. This co-existence with the conquered population fell apart after the reconquest of Sicily, particularly following the death of King William II of Sicily in 1189. | https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/History_of_Islam_in_southern_Italy |
Qatar | Association football is the most popular sport in Qatar, both in terms of players and spectators. Shortly after the Qatar Football Association became affiliated with FIFA in 1970, one of the country's earliest international accolades came in 1981 when the Qatar national under-20 team's emerged as runners-up to West Germany in that year's edition of the FIFA World Youth Championship after being defeated 4–0 in the final. At the senior level, Qatar has played host to three editions of the AFC Asian Cup; the first being the ninth edition in 1988, the second being the fifteenth edition held in 2011, and the third being the eighteenth edition held in 2023. For the first time in the country's history, the Qatar national football team won the AFC Asian Cup in the 2019 edition hosted in the United Arab Emirates, beating Japan 3–1 in the final. They won all seven of their matches, conceding only a single goal throughout the tournament. As hosts and defending champions in the following 2023 edition, Qatar successfully retained their title, defeating Jordan in the final.
On 2 December 2010, Qatar won their bid to host the 2022 FIFA World Cup, despite never previously qualifying for the FIFA World Cup Finals. Local organisers built seven new stadiums and expanded one existing stadium for this event. Qatar's winning bid for the 2022 World Cup was greeted enthusiastically in the Persian Gulf region as it was the first time a country in the Middle East had been selected to host the tournament. At the same time, the bid was embroiled in much controversy, including allegations of bribery and interference in the investigation of the alleged bribery. European football associations also objected to the 2022 World Cup being held in Qatar for a variety of reasons, from the impact of warm temperatures on players' fitness, to the disruption it might cause in European domestic league calendars should the event be rescheduled to take place during winter. In May 2014, Qatari football official Mohammed bin Hammam was accused of making payments totalling £3 million to officials in return for their support for the Qatar bid. A FIFA inquiry into the bidding process in November 2014 cleared Qatar of any wrongdoing.
The Guardian, a British national daily newspaper, produced a short documentary named "Abuse and exploitation of migrant workers preparing emirate for 2022". A 2014 investigation by The Guardian reported that migrant workers who had been constructing luxurious offices for the organisers of the 2022 World Cup had not been paid in over a year, and were now "working illegally from cockroach-infested lodgings." For 2014, Nepalese migrants involved in constructing infrastructure for the 2022 World Cup died at a rate of one every two days. The Qatar 2022 organising committee responded to various allegations by claiming that hosting the World Cup in Qatar would act as a "catalyst for change" in the region. According to a February 2021 article in The Guardian, some 6,500 migrant construction workers had died. However, the World Cup in Qatar was the most expensive in the competition's history and had many modern technologies, with many expressing their satisfaction with the country's handling of the tournament.
Qatar was estimated to host a football fanbase of 1.6 million for the 2022 FIFA World Cup. However, the construction work in country was expected to only take the available 37,000 hotel rooms to 70,000 by the end of 2021. In December 2019, the Qatari World Cup officials approached the organizers of the Glastonbury Festival in England and the Coachella Festival in the United States, to plan huge desert campsites for thousands of football fans. The World Cup campsites on the outskirts were reported to have licensed bars, restaurants, entertainment and washing facilities. Moreover, two cruise ships were also reserved as temporary floating accommodations for nearly 40,000 people during the tournament.
Though football is the most popular sport, other team sports have experienced considerable success at senior level. In 2015, the national handball team emerged as runners-up to France in the World Men's Handball Championship as hosts, however the tournament was marred by numerous controversies regarding the host nation and its team. Further, in 2014, Qatar won the world championship in men's 3x3 basketball.
Cricket is popular amongst the South Asian diaspora in Qatar. Casual street cricket is the most popular format of the game, but the Qatar Cricket Association has been a member of the International Cricket Council (ICC) since 1999 and the men's and women's national teams both play regularly in ICC competitions. The primary cricket ground in Qatar is the West End Park International Cricket Stadium.
Basketball is a developed sport amongst Asian people in Qatar. Qatar hosted the 2005 FIBA Asia Championship, 2013 FIBA Asia 3x3 Championship, 2014 FIBA Asia Under-18 Championship and 2022 FIBA Under-16 Asian Championship. Qatar will host the 2027 FIBA Basketball World Cup making this become the first Arab country to host the FIBA Basketball World Cup.
Khalifa International Tennis and Squash Complex in Doha hosted the WTA Tour Championships in women's tennis between 2008 and 2010. Doha holds the WTA Premier tournament Qatar Ladies Open annually. Since 2002, Qatar has hosted the annual Tour of Qatar, a cycling race in six stages. Every February, riders are racing on the roads across Qatar's flat land for six days. Each stage covers a distance of more than 100 km, though the time trial usually is a shorter distance. Tour of Qatar is organised by the Qatar Cycling Federation for professional riders in the category of Elite Men.
The Qatar Army Skydiving Team has several different skydiving disciplines placing among the top nations in the world. The Qatar National Parachute team performs annually during Qatar's National Day and at other large events, such as the 2015 World Handball Championship.
Doha four times was the host of the official FIVB Volleyball Men's Club World Championship and three times host FIVB Volleyball Women's Club World Championship. Doha also hosted the Asian Volleyball Championship once. | https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Qatar |
Liberalism | Jean Charles Léonard Simonde de Sismondi's New Principles of Political Economy (French: Nouveaux principes d'économie politique, ou de la richesse dans ses rapports avec la population) (1819) represents the first comprehensive liberal critique of early capitalism and laissez-faire economics, and his writings, which were studied by John Stuart Mill and Karl Marx among many others, had a profound influence on both liberal and socialist responses to the failures and contradictions of industrial society. By the end of the 19th century, the principles of classical liberalism were being increasingly challenged by downturns in economic growth, a growing perception of the evils of poverty, unemployment and relative deprivation present within modern industrial cities, as well as the agitation of organised labour. The ideal of the self-made individual who could make his or her place in the world through hard work and talent seemed increasingly implausible. A major political reaction against the changes introduced by industrialisation and laissez-faire capitalism came from conservatives concerned about social balance, although socialism later became a more important force for change and reform. Some Victorian writers, including Charles Dickens, Thomas Carlyle and Matthew Arnold, became early influential critics of social injustice.: 36–37
New liberals began to adapt the old language of liberalism to confront these difficult circumstances, which they believed could only be resolved through a broader and more interventionist conception of the state. An equal right to liberty could not be established merely by ensuring that individuals did not physically interfere with each other or by having impartially formulated and applied laws. More positive and proactive measures were required to ensure that every individual would have an equal opportunity for success.
John Stuart Mill contributed enormously to liberal thought by combining elements of classical liberalism with what eventually became known as the new liberalism. Mill's 1859 On Liberty addressed the nature and limits of the power that can be legitimately exercised by society over the individual. He gave an impassioned defence of free speech, arguing that free discourse is a necessary condition for intellectual and social progress. Mill defined "social liberty" as protection from "the tyranny of political rulers". He introduced many different concepts of the form tyranny can take, referred to as social tyranny and tyranny of the majority. Social liberty meant limits on the ruler's power through obtaining recognition of political liberties or rights and establishing a system of "constitutional checks".
His definition of liberty, influenced by Joseph Priestley and Josiah Warren, was that the individual ought to be free to do as he wishes unless he harms others. However, although Mill's initial economic philosophy supported free markets and argued that progressive taxation penalised those who worked harder, he later altered his views toward a more socialist bent, adding chapters to his Principles of Political Economy in defence of a socialist outlook and defending some socialist causes, including the radical proposal that the whole wage system be abolished in favour of a co-operative wage system.
Another early liberal convert to greater government intervention was T. H. Green. Seeing the effects of alcohol, he believed that the state should foster and protect the social, political and economic environments in which individuals will have the best chance of acting according to their consciences. The state should intervene only where there is a clear, proven and strong tendency of liberty to enslave the individual. Green regarded the national state as legitimate only to the extent that it upholds a system of rights and obligations most likely to foster individual self-realisation.
The New Liberalism or social liberalism movement emerged in about 1900 in Britain. The New Liberals, including intellectuals like L. T. Hobhouse and John A. Hobson, saw individual liberty as something achievable only under favourable social and economic circumstances.: 29 In their view, the poverty, squalor and ignorance in which many people lived made it impossible for freedom and individuality to flourish. New Liberals believed these conditions could be ameliorated only through collective action coordinated by a strong, welfare-oriented, interventionist state. It supports a mixed economy that includes public and private property in capital goods.
Principles that can be described as social liberal have been based upon or developed by philosophers such as John Stuart Mill, Eduard Bernstein, John Dewey, Carlo Rosselli, Norberto Bobbio and Chantal Mouffe. Other important social liberal figures include Guido Calogero, Piero Gobetti, Leonard Trelawny Hobhouse and R. H. Tawney. Liberal socialism has been particularly prominent in British and Italian politics. | https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Liberalism |
Wars of Alexander the Great | The Battle of the Granicus River in May 334 BC was fought in Northwestern Asia Minor (modern-day Turkey), near the site of Troy. After crossing the Hellespont, Alexander advanced up the road to the capital of the Satrapy of Phrygia. The various satraps of the Persian Empire gathered their forces at the town of Zelea and offered battle on the banks of the Granicus River. Alexander ultimately fought many of his battles on a river bank. By doing so, he was able to minimize the advantage the Persians had in numbers. In addition, the deadly Persian chariots were useless on a cramped, muddy river bank.
Arrian, Diodorus, and Plutarch all mention the battle, with Arrian providing the most detail. The Persians placed their cavalry in front of their infantry, and drew up on the right (east) bank of the river. The Macedonian line was arrayed with the heavy Phalanxes in the middle, Macedonian cavalry led by Alexander on the right, and allied Thessalian cavalry led by Parmenion on the left. The Persians expected the main assault to come from Alexander's position and moved units from their center to that flank.
Alexander's second-in-command, Parmenion, suggested crossing the river upstream and attacking at dawn the next day, but Alexander attacked immediately. He ordered a small group of cavalry and light infantry to attack from the Macedonian right to draw the Persians off the bank and into the river. Seeing that he had broken the Persian line, Alexander led his horse companions in oblique order further to the right in order to outflank the Persians and buy time for his infantry to cross the river. Several high-ranking Persian nobles were killed by Alexander himself or his bodyguards, although Alexander was stunned by an axe-blow from a Persian nobleman named Spithridates. Before the noble could deal a death-blow, however, he was killed by Cleitus the Black. The Macedonian cavalry opened a hole in the Persian line as the Macedonian infantry advanced, forcing the enemy back and eventually breaking their center. The Persian cavalry turned and fled the battlefield, and the Greek mercenary infantry they held in reserve were encircled by the Macedonians and slaughtered; only around two-thousand of which survived, and were sent back to Macedonia for labor. | https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Wars_of_Alexander_the_Great |
Women in Islam | During medieval times, the labor force in Spanish Caliphate included women in diverse occupations and economic activities such as farming, construction workers, textile workers, managing slave girls, collecting taxes from prostitutes, as well as presidents of guilds, creditors, religious scholars.
In the 12th century, Ibn Rushd claimed that women were equal to men in all respects and possessed equal capacities to shine, citing examples of female warriors among the Arabs, Greeks and Africans to support his case. In the early history of Islam, examples of notable female Muslims who fought during the Muslim conquests and Fitna (civil wars) as soldiers or generals included Nusaybah bint Ka'ab a.k.a. Umm Amarah, Aisha, Kahula and Wafeira.
Medieval Bimarestan or hospitals included female staff as female nurses. Muslim hospitals were also the first to employ female physicians, such as Banu Zuhr family who served the Almohad caliph ruler Abu Yusuf Yaqub al-Mansur in the 12th century. This was necessary due to the segregation of male and female patients in Islamic hospitals. Later in the 15th century, female surgeons were employed at Şerafeddin Sabuncuoğlu's Cerrahiyyetu'l-Haniyye (Imperial Surgery).
Islamic faith states that in the eyes of God, men and women should be equal and are allowed to fulfill the same roles. Therefore, they also are required to complete all the duties of a Muslim worshiper, including the completion of religious traditions, specifically the pilgrimage to Mecca. Islamic culture marked a movement towards liberation and equality for women, since prior Arab cultures did not enable women to have such freedoms. There is evidence that Muhammad asked women for advice and took their thoughts into account, specifically with regard to the Quran. Women were allowed to pray with men, take part in commercial interactions, and played a role in education. One of Muhammad's wives, Aisha, played a significant role in medicine, history and rhetoric. Women, however, did not hold religious titles, but some held political power with their husbands or on their own. The historic role of women in Islam is connected to societal patriarchal ideals, rather than actual ties to the Quran. The issue of women in Islam is becoming more prevalent in modern society. | https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Women_in_Islam |
Delhi Sultanate | The rise of the Delhi Sultanate in India was part of a wider trend affecting much of the Asian continent, including the whole of southern and western Asia: the influx of nomadic Turkic peoples from the Central Asian steppes. This can be traced back to the 9th century when the Islamic Caliphate began fragmenting in the Middle East, where Muslim rulers in rival states began enslaving non-Muslim nomadic Turks from the Central Asian steppes and raising many of them to become loyal army slaves called Mamluks. Soon, Turks were migrating to Muslim lands and becoming Islamicized. Many of the Turkic Mamluk slaves eventually rose to become rulers and conquered large parts of the Muslim world, establishing Mamluk Sultanates from Egypt to present-day Afghanistan, before turning their attention to the Indian subcontinent.
It is also part of a longer trend predating the spread of Islam. Like other settled, agrarian societies in history, those in the Indian subcontinent have been attacked by nomadic tribes throughout its long history. In evaluating the impact of Islam on the subcontinent, one must note that the northwestern subcontinent was a frequent target of tribes raiding from Central Asia in the pre-Islamic era. In that sense, the Muslim intrusions and later Muslim invasions were not dissimilar to those of the earlier invasions during the 1st millennium.
By 962 AD, Hindu and Buddhist kingdoms in South Asia faced a series of raids from Muslim armies from Central Asia. Among them was Mahmud of Ghazni, the son of a Turkic Mamluk military slave, who raided and plundered kingdoms in northern India from east of the Indus river to west of the Yamuna river seventeen times between 997 and 1030. Mahmud of Ghazni raided the treasuries but retreated each time, only extending Islamic rule into western Punjab.
The series of raids on northern and western Indian kingdoms by Muslim warlords continued after Mahmud of Ghazni. The raids did not establish or extend the permanent boundaries of the Islamic kingdoms. In contrast, the Ghurid Sultan Mu'izz ad-Din Muhammad Ghori (commonly known as Muhammad of Ghor) began a systematic war of expansion into northern India in 1173. He sought to carve out a principality for himself and expand the Islamic world. Muhammad of Ghor created a Sunni Islamic kingdom of his own extending east of the Indus river, and he thus laid the foundation for the Muslim kingdom called the Delhi Sultanate. Some historians chronicle the Delhi Sultanate from 1192 due to the presence and geographical claims of Muhammad Ghori in South Asia by that time.
Ghori was assassinated in 1206, by Ismāʿīlī Shia Muslims. After the assassination, one of Ghori's slaves (or Mamluks), the Turkic Qutb al-Din Aibak, assumed power, becoming the first Sultan of Delhi. | https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Delhi_Sultanate |
Blockade of the Gaza Strip | Following the implementation of the blockade, Israel halted all exports from the Gaza Strip. Israeli human rights organization Gisha, the Legal Center for Freedom of Movement, obtained an Israeli government document which says "A country has the right to decide that it chooses not to engage in economic relations or to give economic assistance to the other party to the conflict, or that it wishes to operate using 'economic warfare'". Sari Bashi, the director of Gisha, said that this showed that Israel was not imposing its blockade for its stated reasons of a security measure to prevent weapons from entering Gaza, but rather as collective punishment for the Palestinian population of Gaza.
In November 2010, the Israeli government allowed Gaza to resume agricultural exports, while still banning industrial exports. Shortly afterward, Gazan farmers began exporting strawberries, peppers, carnations, and cherry tomatoes. The exports travel to Europe via Israel, and Israel then transfers the money to agricultural cooperatives, which in turn pay the Palestinian farmers. The exports were implemented with aid from the Netherlands, which was monitored by the Israeli defense establishment.
It is estimated that in November, less than 20,000 liters of fuel per week entered Gaza via the tunnels, compared to nearly 1 million liters per day until June 2013. The Gaza Power Plant (GPP), which had been supplying 30 percent of the electricity available in Gaza, has been exclusively dependent on Egyptian diesel smuggled through the tunnels, since early 2011. On 1 November, after depleting its fuel reserves, the GPP was forced to shut down, triggering power outages of up to 16 hours per day, up from 8–12 hours prior to that.
The World Bank estimated in 2015 that the GDP losses caused by the blockade since 2007 was above 50%, and entailed large welfare losses. Gaza's manufacturing sector, once significant, shrunk by as much as 60 percent in real terms, due to the wars in the past 20 years and the blockade. Gaza's exports virtually disappeared since the imposition of the 2007 blockade. It stated that "solutions have to be found to enable faster inflow of construction materials into Gaza", while taking into account "legitimate security concerns of neighboring countries." | https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Blockade_of_the_Gaza_Strip |
David | Literary works about David include:
1517 The Davidiad is a Neo-Latin epic poem by the Croatian national poet, Roman Catholic priest, and Renaissance humanist Marko Marulić (whose name is sometimes Latinized as "Marcus Marulus"). In addition to the small portions that attempt to recall the epics of Homer, The Davidiad is heavily modeled upon Virgil's Aeneid. This is so much the case that Marulić's contemporaries called him the "Christian Virgil from Split." The philologist Miroslav Marcovich also detects, "the influence of Ovid, Lucan, and Statius" in the work.
1681–82 Dryden's long poem Absalom and Achitophel is an allegory that uses the story of the rebellion of Absalom against King David as the basis for his satire of the contemporary political situation, including events such as the Monmouth Rebellion (1685), the Popish Plot (1678) and the Exclusion Crisis.
1893 Sir Arthur Conan Doyle may have used the story of David and Bathsheba as a foundation for the Sherlock Holmes story The Adventure of the Crooked Man. Holmes mentions "the small affair of Uriah and Bathsheba" at the end of the story.
1928 Elmer Davis's novel Giant Killer retells and embellishes the biblical story of David, casting David as primarily a poet who managed always to find others to do the "dirty work" of heroism and kingship. In the novel, Elhanan in fact killed Goliath but David claimed the credit; and Joab, David's cousin and general, took it upon himself to make many of the difficult decisions of war and statecraft when David vacillated or wrote poetry instead.
1936 William Faulkner's Absalom, Absalom! refers to the story of Absalom, David's son; his rebellion against his father and his death at the hands of David's general, Joab. In addition it parallels Absalom's vengeance for the rape of his sister Tamar by his half-brother, Amnon.
1946 Gladys Schmitt's novel David the King was a richly embellished biography of David's entire life. The book took a risk, especially for its time, in portraying David's relationship with Jonathan as overtly homoerotic, but was ultimately panned by critics as a bland rendition of the title character.
1966 Juan Bosch, a Dominican political leader and writer, wrote David: Biography of a King, as a realistic portrayal of David's life and political career.
1970 Dan Jacobson's The Rape of Tamar is an imagined account, by one of David's courtiers Yonadab, of the rape of Tamar by Amnon.
1972 Stefan Heym wrote The King David Report in which the historian Ethan compiles upon King Solomon's orders "a true and authoritative report on the life of David, Son of Jesse"—the East German writer's wry depiction of a court historian writing an "authorized" history, many incidents clearly intended as satirical references to the writer's own time.
1974 In Thomas Burnett Swann's biblical fantasy novel How are the Mighty Fallen, David and Jonathan are explicitly stated to be lovers. Moreover, Jonathan is a member of a winged semi-human race (possibly nephilim), one of several such races coexisting with humanity but often persecuted by it.
1980 Malachi Martin's factional novel King of Kings: A Novel of the Life of David relates the life of David, Adonai's champion in his battle with the Philistine deity Dagon.
1984 Joseph Heller wrote a novel based on David called God Knows, published by Simon & Schuster. Told from the perspective of an aging David, the humanity—rather than the heroism—of various biblical characters is emphasized. The portrayal of David as a man of flaws such as greed, lust, selfishness, and his alienation from God, the falling apart of his family is a distinctly 20th-century interpretation of the events told in the Bible.
1993 Madeleine L'Engle's novel Certain Women explores family, the Christian faith, and the nature of God through the story of King David's family and an analogous modern family's saga.
1995 Allan Massie wrote King David, a novel about David's career that portrays the king's relationship to Jonathan as sexual.
2015 Geraldine Brooks wrote a novel about David, The Secret Chord, told from the point of view of the prophet Nathan.
2020 Michael Arditti wrote The Anointed, a novel about David told by three of his wives, Michal, Abigail and Bathsheba. | https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/David |
Spread of Islam | The Siege of Jerusalem (636–637) by the forces of the Rashid Caliph Umar against the Byzantines began in November 636. For four months, the siege continued. Ultimately, the Greek Orthodox Patriarch of Jerusalem, Sophronius, an ethnic Arab, agreed to surrender Jerusalem to Umar in person. The caliph, then in Medina, agreed to these terms and travelled to Jerusalem to sign the capitulation in the spring of 637.
Sophronius also negotiated a pact with Umar known as Umar's Assurance, allowing for the religious freedom for Christians in exchange for jizya, a tax to be paid by conquered non-Muslims, called dhimmis. Under Muslim rule, the Jewish and Christian population of Jerusalem in this period enjoyed the usual tolerance given to non-Muslim theists.
Having accepted the surrender, Omar then entered Jerusalem with Sophronius "and courteously discoursed with the patriarch concerning its religious antiquities". When the hour for his prayer came, Omar was in the Anastasis church, but refused to pray there, lest in the future Muslims should use that as an excuse to break the treaty and confiscate the church. The Mosque of Umar, opposite the doors of the Church of the Holy Sepulchre, with the tall minaret, is known as the place to which he retired for his prayer.
Bishop Arculf, whose account of his pilgrimage to the Holy Land in the seventh century, De locis sanctis, written down by the monk Adamnan, described reasonably pleasant living conditions of Christians in Palestine in the first period of Muslim rule. The caliphs of Damascus (661-750) were tolerant princes who were on generally good terms with their Christian subjects. Many Christians, such as John of Damascus, held important offices at their court. The Abbasid caliphs at Baghdad (753-1242), as long as they ruled Syria, were also tolerant to Christians. Harun Abu Jaʻfar (786-809), sent the keys of the Church of the Holy Sepulchre to Charlemagne, who built a hospice for Latin pilgrims near the shrine.
Rival dynasties and revolutions led to the eventual disunion of the Muslim world. In the ninth century, Palestine was conquered by the Fatimid Caliphate, whose capital was Cairo. Palestine once again became a battleground as the various enemies of the Fatimids counterattacked. At the same time, the Byzantines continued to attempt to regain their lost territories, including Jerusalem. Christians in Jerusalem who sided with the Byzantines were put to death for high treason by the ruling Shiʻi Muslims. In 969, the Patriarch of Jerusalem, John VII, was put to death for treasonous correspondence with the Byzantines.
As Jerusalem grew in importance to Muslims and pilgrimages increased, tolerance for other religions declined. Christians were persecuted and churches destroyed. The Sixth Fatimid caliph, al-Hakim bi-Amr Allah, 996–1021, who was believed to be "God made manifest" by his most zealous Shiʻi followers, now known as the Druze, destroyed the Holy Sepulchre in 1009. This powerful provocation helped ignite the flame of fury that led to the First Crusade. The dynasty was later overtaken by Saladin of the Ayyubid dynasty. | https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Spread_of_Islam |
List of Assyrian kings | Ancient Assyria was an absolute monarchy, with the king believed to be appointed directly through divine right by the chief deity, Ashur. The Assyrians believed that the king was the link between the gods and the earthly realm. As such, it was the king's primary duty to discover the will of the gods and enact this, often through the construction of temples or waging war. To aid the king with this duty, there was a number of priests at the royal court trained in reading and interpreting signs from the gods.
The heartland of the Assyrian realm, Assyria itself, was thought to represent a serene and perfect place of order whilst the lands governed by foreign powers were perceived as infested with disorder and chaos. The peoples of these "outer" lands were seen as uncivilized, strange and as speaking strange languages. Because the king was the earthly link to the gods, it was his duty to spread order throughout the world through the military conquest of these strange and chaotic countries. As such, imperial expansion was not just expansion for expansion's sake but was also seen as a process of bringing divine order and destroying chaos to create civilization.
There exists several ancient inscriptions in which the god Ashur explicitly orders kings to extend the borders of Assyria. A text from the reign of Tukulti-Ninurta I (r. c. 1243–1207 BC) states that the king received a royal scepter and was commanded to "broaden the land of Ashur". A similar inscription from the reign of Ashurbanipal (r. 668–631 BC) commands the king to "extend the land at his feet".
The king was also tasked with protecting his own people, often being referred to as a "shepherd". This protection included defending against external enemies and defending citizens from dangerous wild animals. To the Assyrians, the most dangerous animal of all was the lion, used (similarly to foreign powers) as an example of chaos and disorder due to their aggressive nature. To prove themselves worthy of rule and illustrate that they were competent protectors, Assyrian kings engaged in ritual lion hunts. Lion-hunting was reserved for Assyrian royalty and was a public event, staged at parks in or near the Assyrian cities. In some cases, the hunt even took place with captive lions in an arena. | https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_Assyrian_kings |
Anatolian beyliks | Following the 1071 Seljuk victory over the Byzantine Empire at the Battle of Manzikert and the subsequent conquest of Anatolia, Oghuz Turkic clans began settling in present-day Turkey. The Seljuk Sultanate of Rum's central power established in Konya was largely as a result of using these clans under appointed beys called uç bey or uj begi (especially in border areas to ensure safety against the Byzantines); uç is a Turkish term that denotes a border or frontier territory equivalent to marches, with the similar term margrave used in other parts of Europe. These clans, led by beys, would receive military and financial support from the Seljuks in return for their fealty.
However, Mongol invasions from the East saw a decline in Seljuk power which gradually deteriorated. The Ilkhanate commanders in Anatolia then gained strength and authority which encouraged the beys, who had until then been vassals to the Sultanate of Rum, to declare sovereignty over their dominions. With the fall of Seljuk centralized power in Konya, many beys joined forces with the atabegs (former Seljuk leaders), and other religious Muslim leaders, in addition to employing Ghazi warriors from Persia and Turkestan, who also fled the Mongols. The ghazis fought under the inspiration of either a mullah or a general, trying to assert Islamic power, with the attacks on Byzantine territory further expanding the power sphere of the beyliks.
As the Byzantine Empire weakened, their cities in Asia Minor became gradually less and less able to resist these attacks, and many Turks began to settle in western parts of Anatolia. As a result, many more beyliks were founded in these newly conquered realms, who engaged in power struggles with the Byzantines, the Genoese, the Knights Templar, as well as between each other.
By 1300, the Turks had reached the Aegean coastline, held momentarily two centuries before. In the beginning, the most powerful states were the Karamanids and the Germiyanids in the central area. The Beylik of Osmanoğlu, who would later go on to become the Ottoman Empire, was situated in the northwest, around Söğüt, and was at that stage relatively small and possessed modest military power. Along the Aegean coast, from North to South, were the principalities of Karasi, Saruhan, Aydin, Menteşe, and Teke. The Candar dynasty (later also known as Isfendiyar) reigned in the Black Sea region around the provinces of Kastamonu and Sinop in what was the Beylik of Candar.
Under its eponymous founder, Osman I, the Beylik of Osman expanded at Byzantine expense westwards and southwards of the Sea of Marmara in the first decades of the 14th century. With their annexation of the neighboring Beylik of Karasi and their advance into Rumelia starting in 1354, they soon gained strength to emerge as the principal rivals of the Beylik of Karaman, who at the time were thought to be the strongest. Towards the end of the 14th century, the Ottomans advanced further into Anatolia either through the acquisition of towns or by cementing marriage alliances. Meanwhile, wary of an increase in Ottoman regional power, the Karamanids repeatedly engaged in conflict with the Ottomans with the help of other beyliks, Mamluks, Aq Qoyunlu ("White Sheep Turkomans"), Byzantines, Pontics and Hungarians, failing and losing power every time. By the close of the century, the early Ottoman leaders had conquered large parts of land from Karamanids and other less prominent beyliks. These had a short respite when their territories were restored to them after the Ottoman defeat suffered against Tamerlane in 1402 in the Battle of Ankara.
But the Ottoman state quickly collected itself under Mehmed I and his son Murad II, who reincorporated most of these beyliks into Ottoman territory in a period of about 25 years. The final blow to the Beylik of Karaman was struck by Mehmed II, who conquered their lands and re-assured a homogeneous rule in Anatolia. The further steps towards a single rule by the Ottomans were taken by Selim I who conquered territories of the Beylik of Ramadan and the Beylik of Dulkadir in 1515 during his campaign against the Mamluk Sultanate, and his son Süleyman the Magnificent who more or less completely united the present territories of Turkey (and much more) in his 1534 campaign. Many of the former Anatolian beyliks subsequently became the basis for the administrative subdivisions in the Ottoman Empire. | https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Anatolian_beyliks |
Bahrain administrative reforms of the 1920s | By the end of the 1920s, the administration in Bahrain was described as "reasonably efficient and modern". The British involvement however, was very deep. Belgrave was in control of all offices and British officials involvement was described in November 1927 by Denys Bray, the Secretary of the Foreign Department of the Government of India as "more than desirable". "A British Financial Adviser, British Police Superintendent and British Customs Manamager, this is more British than Katal, which is a Border state", he added. He also stated that the British position in Bahrain could only be adequately covered by a treaty that would extinguish "the Shaikh's sovereignty to a degree less than that possessed by an Indian chief. A more optimistic description of the situation was made in 1929 by C. G. Prior, then the British Political Agent. He stated that the British officials were indispensable and that they have made enormous improvements to the administration. He also said: The Baharnah have had security and justice for the first time for 150 years and have come to think of their rights. Divers' serfage has been much ameliorated and there is little or no opposition to Government activities and crimes of violence have almost ceased... Instead of resisting the reforms the public spirit now demands them. The relationship between Baharnah and Al Khalifa was "improved dramatically". Baharnah co-operated with the administration and were optimistic about reforms. Despite these improved conditions of the Shia, Mahdi Al-Tajir stated that by 1929 some inequalities remained, especially with regards to "education, law and representation on various Government Councils". Schumacher gave an even darker evaluation of the situations. She stated that: British reforms reaffirmed inequalities and reinforced the Sunni-ruler/Shi'i-ruled equation by institutionalising Al Khalifa power. The Al Khalifa no longer had to steal land because the methods devised for determining land ownership guaranteed that most of it belonged to them. "Fleecing the Baharna" could be done legally through the new judicial system, whose judges were the Al Khalifa and the British president... The institutions set up by the British and controlled by the Al khalifa did little more than to redirect Baharna complaints".
Although many in Al Khalifa initially opposed the reforms, they gradually accepted them and cooperated with the new authority. They ended up taking many of the newly created offices such as Minister of Education, head of police and judges. Shaikh Isa however, remained opposed to the reforms and continued to view himself as ruler of Bahrain. For instance, in April 1924 when Lt-Col F. B. Prideaux succeeded Trevor as British Political Resident, Shaikh Isa sent him a congratulatory telegram as ruler of Bahrain. Several influential members of Al Khalifa also continued to oppose the reforms and therefore remained under the surveillance Belgrave until his departure in 1957, after which they began to regain their former influence. Belgrave presided over many positions, that Shaikh Hamad was widely seen as "little more than a puppet". | https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Bahrain_administrative_reforms_of_the_1920s |
Islamic banking and finance | The influx of "petro-dollars" and a "general re-Islamisation" following the Yom Kippur War and 1973 oil crisis encouraged the development of the Islamic banking sector, and since 1975 it has spread globally.
In 1975, the Islamic Development Bank was set up with the mission to provide funding to projects in the member countries. The first modern commercial Islamic bank, Dubai Islamic Bank, was established in 1979. The first Islamic insurance (or takaful) company – the Islamic Insurance Company of Sudan – was established in 1979. The Amana Income Fund, the world's first Islamic mutual fund (which invests only in Sharia-compliant equities), was created in 1986 in Indiana.
From 1980 to 1985, Islamic investments underwent a "spectacular expansion" throughout the Muslim world, attracting deposits with the promise of "great gains" and "religious guarantees" supplied by Islamic jurists who were "recruited to issue fatwas denouncing conventional banks and recommending their Islamic rivals." This growth was temporarily reversed in 1988 in the largest Arab Muslim country, Egypt, when the Egyptian state – worried that Islamist movements were building up a "war chest" and being given financial independence – reversed its tacit support for the industry, and launched a media campaign against Islamic banks. The ensuing financial panic led to the bankruptcy of some companies.
In 1990 an accounting organization for Islamic financial institutions (Accounting and Auditing Organization for Islamic Financial Institutions, AAOIFI), was established in Algiers by a group of Islamic financial institutions.
Also in that year the Islamic bond market emerged when the first tradable sukuk – the Islamic alternative to conventional bonds – were issued by Shell MDS in Malaysia. In 2002, the Malaysia-based Islamic Financial Services Board (IFSB) was established as an international standard-setting body for Islamic financial institutions.
By 1995, 144 Islamic financial institutions had been established worldwide, including 33 government-run banks, 40 private banks, and 71 investment companies. The large US-based Citibank began to offer Islamic banking services in 1996 when it established the Citi Islamic Investment Bank in Bahrain. The first successful benchmark for the performance of Islamic investment funds was established in 1999, with the Dow Jones Islamic Market Index (DJIMI).
Also in the 1990s, a false start was made in Islamic banking in the UK, where bankers declared returns "interest" for tax purposes, while insisting to depositors they were actually "profit" and so not riba. Islamic scholars issued a fatwa stating they had "no objection to the use of the term 'interest'" in loan contracts for purposes of tax avoidance provided the transaction did not actually involve riba, and the Islamic bankers used the term for fear that lack of tax deductions available for interest (but not profit) would put them at a competitive disadvantage to conventional banks. Muslim customers were not persuaded, and a "bad taste" was left "in the mouth" of the market for Islamic financial products. The Islamic Bank of Britain, the first Islamic commercial bank established outside the Muslim world, was not established until 2004.
By 2008 Islamic banking was growing at a rate of 10–15% per year and continued growth was forecast. There were over 300 Islamic financial institutions spread over 51 countries, as well as an additional 250 mutual funds complying with Islamic principles. Worldwide, approximately 0.5% of financial assets were estimated to be under Sharia-compliant management according to The Economist magazine.
But as the industry grew it also drew criticism (from M.T. Usmani among others) for not progressing from "debt-based contracts", such as murabaha, to the more "genuine" profit and loss sharing mode, but instead moving in the opposite direction, "competing to present themselves with all of the same characteristics of the conventional, interest-based marketplace".
During the 2007–2008 financial crisis, Islamic banks were not initially impacted by the 'toxic assets' built up on the balance sheets of US banks as these were not Sharia-compliant and not owned by Islamic banks. In 2009, the official newspaper of the Vatican (L'Osservatore Romano) put forward the idea that "the ethical principles on which Islamic finance is based may bring banks closer to their clients and to the true spirit which should mark every financial service". (The Catholic Church forbids usury but began to relax its ban on all interest in the 16th century.)
However, the drop in valuation of real estate and private equity – two segments heavily invested by Islamic firms – following the collapse of Lehman Brothers Islamic did hurt Islamic financial institutions.
As of 2015, $2.004 trillion in assets were being managed in a Sharia-compliant manner according to the State of the Global Islamic Economy Report. Of these $342 billion were sukuk. The market for Islamic Sukuk bonds in that year was made up of 2,354 sukuk issues, and had become strong enough that several non-Muslim majority states – UK, Hong Kong, and Luxemburg – issued sukuk.
There are multiple Shari'ah-compliant indexes, created by Shari'ah screening of companies. Such indexes include DJIM, S&PSI, MSCI and country-based indexes like KMI-Pakistan and SCM-Malaysia. | https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Islamic_banking_and_finance |
Somalia | Following World War II, Britain retained control of both British Somaliland and Italian Somaliland as protectorates. In 1945, during the Potsdam Conference, the United Nations granted Italy trusteeship of Italian Somaliland as the Trust Territory of Somaliland, on the condition first proposed by the Somali Youth League (SYL) and other nascent Somali political organizations, such as Hizbia Digil Mirifle Somali (HDMS) and the Somali National League (SNL)—that Somalia achieve independence within ten years. British Somaliland remained a protectorate of Britain until 1960.
To the extent that Italy held the territory by UN mandate, the trusteeship provisions gave the Somalis the opportunity to gain experience in Western political education and self-government. These were advantages that British Somaliland, which was to be incorporated into the new Somali state, did not have. Although in the 1950s British colonial officials attempted, through various administrative development efforts, to make up for past neglect, the protectorate stagnated in political administrative development. The disparity between the two territories in economic development and political experience would later cause serious difficulties integrating the two parts.Meanwhile, in 1948, under pressure from their World War II allies and to the dismay of the Somalis, the British returned the Haud (an important Somali grazing area that was presumably protected by British treaties with the Somalis in 1884 and 1886) and the Somali Region to Ethiopia, based on a treaty they signed in 1897 in which the British ceded Somali territory to the Ethiopian Emperor Menelik in exchange for his help against possible advances by the French.
Britain included the conditional provision that the Somali residents would retain their autonomy, but Ethiopia immediately claimed sovereignty over the area. This prompted an unsuccessful bid by Britain in 1956 to buy back the Somali lands it had turned over. Britain also granted administration of the almost exclusively Somali-inhabited Northern Frontier District (NFD) to Kenyan nationalists. This was despite a plebiscite in which, according to a British colonial commission, almost all of the territory's ethnic Somalis favored joining the newly formed Somali Republic.
A referendum was held in neighbouring Djibouti (then known as French Somaliland) in 1958, on the eve of Somalia's independence in 1960, to decide whether or not to join the Somali Republic or to remain with France. The referendum turned out in favour of a continued association with France, largely due to a combined yes vote by the sizable Afar ethnic group and resident Europeans. There was also widespread vote rigging, with the French expelling thousands of Somalis before the referendum reached the polls.
The majority of those who voted 'no' were Somalis who were strongly in favour of joining a united Somalia, as had been proposed by Mahmoud Harbi, Vice President of the Government Council. Harbi was killed in a plane crash two years later. Djibouti finally gained independence from France in 1977, and Hassan Gouled Aptidon, a Somali who had campaigned for a 'yes' vote in the referendum of 1976, eventually became Djibouti's first president (1977–1999).
On 1 July 1960, five days after the former British Somaliland protectorate obtained independence as the State of Somaliland, the territory united with the Trust Territory of Somaliland to form the Somali Republic, albeit within boundaries drawn up by Italy and Britain. A government was formed by Abdullahi Issa and Muhammad Haji Ibrahim Egal with other members of the trusteeship and protectorate governments, with Abdulcadir Muhammed Aden as President of the Somali National Assembly, Aden Abdullah Osman Daar as President of the Somali Republic, and Abdirashid Ali Shermarke as Prime Minister (later to become president from 1967 to 1969). On 20 July 1961 and through a popular referendum, was ratified popularly by the people of Somalia under Italian trusteeship, Most of the people from the former Somaliland Protectorate did not participate in the referendum, although only a small number of Somalilanders who participated the referendum voted against the new constitution, which was first drafted in 1960. In 1967, Muhammad Haji Ibrahim Egal became Prime Minister, a position to which he was appointed by Shermarke. Egal would later become the President of the autonomous Somaliland region in northwestern Somalia.
On 15 October 1969, while paying a visit to the northern town of Las Anod, Somalia's then President Abdirashid Ali Shermarke was shot dead by one of his own bodyguards. His assassination was quickly followed by a military coup d'état on 21 October 1969, in which the Somali Army seized power without encountering armed opposition — essentially a bloodless takeover. The putsch was spearheaded by Major General Mohamed Siad Barre, who at the time commanded the army. | https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Somalia |
Jubba River | The Jubba River has a rich history of a once-booming sophisticated civilization and trade network conducted by the powerful Somalis that held sway over the Jubba River.
During the Middle Ages Jubba River was under the Ajuran Empire of the Horn of Africa which utilized the Jubba River for its plantations and was the only hydraulic empire in Africa. A hydraulic empire that rose in the 13th century AD, Ajuran monopolized the water resources of the Jubba River and Shebelle. Through hydraulic engineering, it also constructed many of the limestone wells and cisterns of the state that are still operative and in use today. Its rulers developed new systems for agriculture and taxation, which continued to be used in parts of the Horn of Africa as late as the 19th century.
Through their control of the region's wells, the Garen rulers effectively held a monopoly over their nomadic subjects as they were one of the few hydraulic empire in Africa. Large wells made out of limestone were constructed throughout the state, which attracted Somali nomads with their livestock. The centralized regulations of the wells made it easier for the nomads to settle disputes by taking their queries to government officials who would act as mediators. Long distance caravan trade, a long-time practice in the Horn of Africa, continued unchanged in Ajuran times. Today, numerous ruins and abandoned towns throughout the interior of Somalia and the Horn of Africa are evidence of a once-booming inland trade network dating from the medieval period.
With the centralized supervision of the Ajuran, farms in Afgooye, Bardhere and other areas in the Jubba and Shebelle valleys increased their productivity. A system of irrigation ditches known locally as Kelliyo fed directly from the Shebelle River and Jubba River into the plantations where sorghum, maize, beans, grain and cotton were grown during the gu (Spring in Somali) and xagaa (Summer in Somali) seasons of the Somali calendar. This irrigation system was supported by numerous dikes and dams. To determine the average size of a farm, a land measurement system was also invented with moos, taraab and guldeed being the terms used.
The urban centers of Mogadishu, Merca, Barawa, Kismayo and Hobyo and other respective ports became profitable trade outlets for commodities originating from the interior of the State. The Somali farming communities of the hinterland from Jubba and Shebelle valleys brought their crops to the Somali coastal cities, where they were sold to local merchants who maintained a lucrative foreign commerce with ships sailing to and coming from Arabia, Persia, India, Venice, Egypt, Portugal, and as far away as Java and China. | https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Jubba_River |
Affad Basin | Initially, the sites of Affad were surveyed between 1998 and 2003. In 2012, archaeologists from the Institute of Archaeology and Ethnology, Polish Academy of Sciences began excavation of the sites. The excavation data spans approximately 70,000 years of this region's history in Sudan.
Affad 23 is an archaeological site located in alluvial deposits formed by an ancient channel of the Nile in the Affad region of southern Dongola Reach in northern Sudan. Affad 23 hosts "the well-preserved remains of prehistoric camps (relics of the oldest open-air hut in the world) and diverse hunting and gathering loci some 50,000 years old". Osypińska (2021) states:
The complex of Middle Paleolithic sites around Affad in the Southern Dongola Reach is important from the point of view of the oldest stages of the history of the Middle Nile region. At sites encompassing the remains of hunter-gatherer encampments from about 50,000 years ago, more than 10,000 petrified animal remains have been discovered. The main group of animals hunted by the late Pleistocene communities in Affad were even-toed ungulates. The hunting patterns of Middle Paleolithic communities varied according to the season. In winter, the dry season, the zone of coastal forest and scrub was exploited. The main species hunted was the shy, medium-sized kob antelope (Kobus sp.). It is most likely that large catfish (Siluriformes) were also caught at low water levels in winter. In summer, when the waters of the Nile flooded the lower-lying areas, people hunted animals living in the more open area of the wooded park savanna. The main species killed then was the auroch (Bos primigenius). An archaeozoological discovery made at Affad turned out to be of great importance for the entire history of cattle on the African continent. A large skull fragment and a nearly complete horn core of an auroch, a wild ancestor of domestic cattle, were discovered at sites dating back 50,000 years and associated with the MSA. These are the oldest remains of the auroch in Sudan, and they also mark the southernmost range of this species in the world.
In addition to the harvesting and utilization of cereals (e.g., millet), an abundant amount of pottery was produced at Affad 69. Based on the cattle (Bos) remains found at Affad and Letti, Osypiński (2022) indicates that it is "justified to raise again the issue of the origin of cattle in Northeast Africa. The idea of domestic cattle in Africa coming from the Fertile Crescent exclusively is now seen as having serious shortcomings." | https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Affad_Basin |
Othello | The over-reliance of the plot of Othello upon a trivial prop, the handkerchief, was noted in the play's earliest criticism. The same Thomas Rymer quoted above, in his 1693 A Short View of Tragedy, suggested that the play should better have been called "The Tragedy of the Handkerchief", arguing "the handkerchief is so remote a trifle, no booby on this side Mauritania could make any consequence from it."
In spite of Othello's protestations in the first act that no magic was used in his wooing of Desdemona, he later claims magical properties for the handkerchief, his first gift to her. A question which has interested critics is whether he himself believes these stories or is using them to pressure or test Desdemona. There is certainly a contradiction between Othello's assertion – linked to its supposed magical properties – that his mother received the handkerchief from an Egyptian charmer in Act 3 Scene 4, and his later assertion that his father gave it to his mother, made in Act 4 Scene 2. Are we, the audience, intended to believe in the handkerchief's magical properties?
The handkerchief provides many examples of how chance operates in support of Iago's plots: Desdemona loses it just when Iago is in need of evidence of the invented affair; Cassio fails to recognise that it is hers; Cassio gives it to Bianca to copy, who throws it back at him at the very moment when Othello is eavesdropping.
Symbolically the handkerchief represents the bond between Othello and Desdemona, and its loss the breaking of that bond: Othello blames Desdemona for its loss when in fact he casts it aside while she is trying to use it to help him. The whiteness of the handkerchief is often taken to represent Desdemona's purity; and the red strawberries blood from her hymen symbolising her virgin marriage. In contrast, professor Ian Smith argues that a handkerchief "dyed in mummy" would not be white but black, and therefore symbolic of Othello.
In a 1997 production at the Royal National Theatre, the handkerchief fell to the ground immediately before the interval and remained onstage throughout it, as if – as the reviewer Richard Butler put it – "challenging one of us to pick it up and prevent a tragedy." | https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Othello |
Fez, Morocco | In the 16th century the Saadis, a dynasty claiming prophetic heritage, rose to power in southern Morocco and challenged the Wattasids. Around the same time, the Ottoman Empire came close to Fez after its conquest of Algeria. In January 1549, the Saadi sultan Mohammed ash-Sheikh took Fez and ousted the last Wattasid sultan Ali Abu Hassun. The Wattasids later retook the city in 1554 with Ottoman support, but this reconquest was short-lived and later that same year the Wattasids were decisively defeated by the Saadis.: 157 The Ottomans attempted to invade Morocco after the assassination of Mohammed ash-Sheikh in 1558, but were stopped by his son Abdallah al-Ghalib at the Battle of Wadi al-Laban north of Fez.: 158 After the death of Abdallah al-Ghalib a new power struggle emerged. Abd al-Malik, Abdallah's brother, captured Fez with Ottoman support and ousted his nephew Abu Abdullah from the throne. This led to the Battle of Wadi al-Makhazin (also known as Battle of the Three Kings) in which Abd al-Malik's army defeated an invading Portuguese army, ensuring Moroccan independence. Abd al-Malik was killed during the battle and was succeeded by Ahmad al-Mansur (r. 1578–1603).
The Saadis, who used Marrakesh again as their capital, did not lavish much attention on Fez, with the exception of the ornate ablutions pavilions added to the Qarawiyyin Mosque's courtyard during their time.: 70 Perhaps as a result of persistent tensions with the city's inhabitants, the Saadis built a number of new forts and bastions around the city which appear to have been aimed at keeping control over the local population.
After the long reign of Ahmad al-Mansur, the Saadi state fell into civil war between his sons and potential successors. Fez became a rival seat of power for a number of brothers vying against other family members ruling from Marrakesh. Both cities changed hands multiple times until the internecine conflict finally ended in 1627. Despite the reunification of the realm after 1627, the Saadis were in full decline and Fez had already suffered considerably from the repeated conquests and reconquests during the conflict. In 1641, Muhammad al-Haj of the Sanhaja Dilā' Sufi order occupied Fez.: 88 The time was particularly difficult for Fessi Jews.: 88
It was only when the founder of the 'Alawi dynasty, Moulay Rashid, took Fez in 1666 that the city saw a revival and became the capital again, albeit briefly.: 25 Moulay Rashid set about restoring the city after a long period of neglect. He built the Kasbah Cherarda (also known as the Kasbah al-Khemis) to the north of Fes Jdid in order to house a large part of his tribal troops.: 84 : 25 He also restored or rebuilt what became known as the Kasbah an-Nouar, which became the living quarters of his followers from the Tafilalt region (the 'Alawi dynasty's ancestral home).: 84 : 72–73 Moulay Rashid also built a large new madrasa, the Cherratine Madrasa, in 1670.
After Rashid's death, Fez underwent another dark period. Moulay Isma'il, his successor, apparently disliked the city—possibly due to a rebellion there in his early reign—and chose nearby Meknès as his capital instead.: 84 Although he did restore or rebuild some major monuments in the city, such as the Zawiya of Moulay Idris II, he also frequently imposed heavy taxes on the city's inhabitants and sometimes even forcibly transferred parts of its population to repopulate other cities in the country.: 84–85 After his death, Morocco was plunged into anarchy and decades of conflict between his sons who vied to succeed him. Fez suffered particularly from repeated conflicts with the Udayas (or Oudayas), a guich tribe (vassal tribe serving as a garrison and military force) previously installed in the Kasbah Cherarda by Moulay Isma'il. Sultan Moulay Abdallah, who reigned intermittently during this period and used Fez as a capital, was initially welcomed in 1728–29 as an enemy of the Udayas, but relations between him and the city's population quickly soured due to his choice of governor. He immediately built a separate fortified palace in the countryside, Dar Dbibegh, where he resided instead. For nearly three more decades the city remained in more or less perpetual conflict with both the Udayas and the 'Alawi sultans.: 85–86
Starting with the reign of Moulay Muhammad ibn Abdallah, between 1757 and 1790, the country stabilized and Fez finally regained its fortunes. Although its status was partly shared with Marrakesh, it remained the capital of Morocco for the rest of the 'Alawi period up to the 20th century.: 88 : 25–26 The 'Alawis continued to rebuild or restore various monuments and undertook a series of extensions to the Royal Palace. The sultans and their entourages also became more and more closely associated with the elites of Fez and other urban centers, with the ulama (religious scholars) of Fez being particularly influential. After Moulay Slimane's death, powerful families from Fez became the main players of the country's political and intellectual scene.: 242–247
The Tijani Sufi order, started by Ahmad al-Tijani (d. 1815), has had its spiritual center in Fez since al-Tijani moved here from Algeria in 1789.: 244 The order spread quickly among the literary elite of North West Africa and its ulama had significant religious, intellectual, and political influence in Fez and beyond. Until the 19th century the city was the only source of fezzes (also known as the tarboosh).
The last major change to Fez's topography before the 20th century was made during the reign of Moulay Hassan I (1873–1894), who finally connected Fes Jdid and Fes el-Bali by building a walled corridor between them.: 89 : 25–26 New gardens and summer palaces, used by the royals and the capital's high society, were built within the corridor, such as the Jnan Sbil Gardens and the Dar Batha palace.: 89–90 Moulay Hassan also expanded the old Royal Palace itself, extending its entrance up to the current location of the Old Mechouar while adding the New Mechouar, along with the Dar al-Makina, to the north. The expansion separated the Moulay Abdallah neighbourhood to the northwest from the rest of Fes Jdid.
Fez played a central role in the Hafidhiya, the brief civil war that erupted when Abdelhafid challenged his brother Abdelaziz for the throne. The ulama of Fez, led by the Sufi modernist Muhammad Bin Abdul-Kabir Al-Kattani, offered their conditioned support to Abd al-Hafid, which turned the tide of the conflict. Abdelaziz was defeated in the Battle of Marrakesh in 1908.: 76–78 Abdelhafid's reign soon deteriorated and in early 1911 the sultan was besieged in Fez by the tribes of the Middle Atlas. Abdelhafid appealed for French help and a French force under Colonel Charles Émile Moinier arrived in Fez on May 21 and established a command centre at Dar Dbibegh.: 313 : 78 | https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Fez,_Morocco |
Tingi | The town came under Roman rule in the 1st century BC. Q. Sertorius, took and held Tingis for a number of years in the 70s BC as part of his war against Sulla's regime in Rome. Tingis grew in importance as a free city under Augustus and then as a colony under Claudius, who made it the capital of Mauritania Tingitana. As a Roman colony, it bore the formal name Colonia Iulia Tingi, the "Julian colony of Tingis". Under the early empire, it began to use Latin script, issuing its bronze coins with the legend IVL TIN; these bore Augustus and Agrippa's heads obverse and Baal's head reverse.
Called Colonia Iulia Tingi on its coins, governed most likely under Latin law and at first attached administratively to Spain, it became under Claudius a Roman colony and chief city of the province of Mauretania Tingitana after it was set up. In 297 the city probably served Maximianus as a base during his campaign against the Moorish rebels, and it was very likely about this time that the Christians Marcellus and Cassienus were put to death. The former belonged to a Spanish community, the latter, however, probably to a local church which funerary inscriptions show existed in the 4th-5th c. although there is no mention of a bishopric until the 6th c. The limits of the ancient settlement are clearly marked by the necropolis discovered to the northwest (that of Marshan and Avenue Cenario), to the west (Mendoubia) and south (Bou Kachkach). Nothing remains of the substructures, which could still be seen on the seashore at the beginning of the century. There were also some baths underneath the Casbah, and confused remains of a monument—apparently a Christian basilica—have been uncovered in the Rue de Belgique. So far as the rest of the city is concerned one can only presume that the forum was situated on the site of the Petit Socco and what was perhaps a temple on the site of the Great Mosque, and that the decumanus maximus corresponded roughly to the Zenga Es Siaghine. Among the few antiquities that have been discovered, the only noteworthy finds, aside from inscriptions and a few mosaic fragments, are a statue of a woman of indifferent workmanship and a mutilated head of the emperor Galba.
As a provincial capital, Tingis developed and prospered. In the 4th century, it surpassed Volubilis when that city was left south of the Roman lines and unprotected by Roman legions. Tingis at its peak reached 20,000 inhabitants, all thoroughly romanized and mostly Christian. Tingis was famed throughout the Roman Empire for its fishing conserve industry. Under Septimius Severus, two Roman roads were constructed from Tingis: one on the Atlantic coast to Sala Colonia and the second into the mountainous interior toward Volubilis.
During Diocletian's reform of Roman governmental structures in AD 296, Mauretania Tingitana became part of the Diocese of Hispania. Tingis remained the capital of the larger territory, maintaining its status and development. | https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Tingi |
Christian mission | A wave of missions, starting in the early 1850s, targeted inland areas, led by a Briton Hudson Taylor (1832–1905) with his China Inland Mission (1865– ). Taylor was later supported by Henry Grattan Guinness (1835–1910) who founded (1883) Cliff College, which continues as of 2014 to train and equip for local and global mission.
The missions inspired by Taylor and Guinness have collectively been called "faith missions" and owe much to the ideas and example of Anthony Norris Groves (1795–1853). Taylor, a thorough-going nativist, offended the missionaries of his era by wearing Chinese clothing and speaking Chinese at home. His books, speaking, and examples led to the formation of numerous inland missions and of the Student Volunteer Movement (SVM, founded in 1886), which from 1850 to about 1950 sent nearly 10,000 missionaries to inland areas, often at great personal sacrifice. Many early SVM missionaries traveling to areas with endemic tropical diseases left with their belongings packed in a coffin, aware that 80% of them would die within two years.
Missionary activity in China was undertaken by the Protestant churches, as well as the French Catholic Church. According to John K. Fairbank:The opening of the country in the 1860s facilitated the great effort to Christianize China. Building on old foundations, the Roman Catholic establishment totaled by 1894 some 750 European missionaries, 400 native priests, and over half a million communicants. By 1894 the newer Protestant mission effort supported over 1300 missionaries, mainly British and American, and maintained some 500 stations-each with a church, residences, street chapels, and usually a small school and possibly a hospital or dispensary-in about 350 different cities and towns. Yet they had made fewer than 60,000 Chinese Christian converts.
There was limited success in terms of converts and establishing schools in a nation of about 400 million people, but there was escalating anger at the threat of cultural imperialism. The main result was the Boxer Rebellion (1899-1901), in which missions were attacked and thousands of Chinese Christians were massacred in order to destroy Western influences. Some Europeans were killed and many others threatened, Britain joined the other powers in a military invasion that suppressed the Boxers. | https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Christian_mission |
Sardinia | From about 1500 BC onwards, villages were built around a kind of round tower-fortress called nuraghe (usually pluralized as nuraghes in English and as nuraghi in Italian). These towers were often reinforced and enlarged with battlements. Tribal boundaries were guarded by smaller lookout Nuraghes erected on strategic hills commanding a view of other territories.
Today, some 7,000 Nuraghes dot the Sardinian landscape. While initially these Nuraghes had a relatively simple structure, with time they became extremely complex and monumental (see for example the Nuraghe Santu Antine, Su Nuraxi, or Nuraghe Arrubiu). The scale, complexity and territorial spread of these buildings attest to the level of wealth accumulated by the Nuragic Sardinians, their advances in technology and the complexity of their society, which was able to coordinate large numbers of people with different roles for the purpose of building the monumental Nuraghes.
The Nuraghes are not the only Nuragic buildings that stand in place, as there are several sacred wells around Sardinia and other buildings with religious purposes such as the Giants' grave (monumental collective tombs) and collections of religious buildings that probably served as destinations for pilgrimage and mass religious rites (e.g. Su Romanzesu near Bitti).
At the time, Sardinia was at the centre of several commercial routes and it was an important provider of raw materials such as copper and lead, which were pivotal for the manufacture of the time. By controlling the extraction of these raw materials and by trading them with other countries, the ancient Sardinians were able to accumulate wealth and reach a level of sophistication that is not only reflected in the complexity of its surviving buildings, but also in its artworks (e.g. the votive bronze statuettes found across Sardinia or the statues of Mont'e Prama).
According to some scholars, the Nuragic people(s) are identifiable with the Sherden, a tribe of the Sea Peoples.
The Nuragic civilization was linked with other contemporaneous megalithic civilization of the western Mediterranean, such as the Talaiotic culture of the Balearic Islands and the Torrean civilization of Southern Corsica. Evidence of trade with the other civilizations of the time is attested by several artefacts (e.g. pots), coming from as far as Cyprus, Crete, Mainland Greece, Spain and Italy, that have been found in Nuragic sites, bearing witness to the scope of commercial relations between the Nuragic people and other peoples in Europe and beyond. | https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Sardinia |
Amin al-Husseini | The Supreme Muslim Council and its head al-Husseini, who regarded himself as guardian of one of the three holy sites of Islam, launched an international campaign in Muslim countries to gather funds to restore and improve the Haram ash-Sharif (Noble Sanctuary) or Temple Mount, and particularly the Al-Aqsa Mosque and the Dome of the Rock shrine (which houses also the holiest site in Judaism).
The whole area required extensive restoration, given the disrepair into which it had fallen from neglect in Ottoman times. Jerusalem was the original direction towards which Muslims prayed, until the Qibla was reorientated towards Mecca by Mohammed in the year 624. Al-Husseini commissioned the Turkish architect Mimar Kemalettin.
In restoring the site, al-Husseini was also assisted by the Mandatory power's Catholic Director of Antiquities, Ernest Richmond.
Under Richmond's supervision, the Turkish architect drew up a plan, and the execution of the works gave a notable stimulus to the revival of traditional artisan arts like mosaic tessellation, glassware production, woodcraft, wicker work and iron-mongering.
Al-Husseini's vigorous efforts to transform the Haram into a symbol of pan-Arabic and Palestinian nationalism were intended to rally Arab support against the postwar influx of Jewish immigrants. In his campaigning, al-Husseini often accused Jews of planning to take possession of the Western Wall of Jerusalem, which belonged to the waqf of Abu Madyan as an inalienable property, and rebuild the Temple over the Al-Aqsa Mosque. He took certain statements, for example, by the Ashkenazi chief rabbi of Palestine, Abraham Isaac Kook regarding the eventual return in time of the Temple Mount back to Jewish hands, and turned them to a concrete political plot to seize control of the area.
Al-Husseini's intensive work to refurbish the shrine as a cynosure for the Muslim world, and Jewish endeavours to improve their access to, and establish a ritually appropriate ambiance on the plaza by the Western Wall, led to increased conflict between the two communities, each seeing the site only from their own traditional perspective and interests. Zionist narratives pinpointed al-Husseini's works on, and publicity about, the site and threats to it, as attempts to restore his own family's waning prestige. Arab narratives read the heightened agitation of certain Jewish groups over the Wall as an attempt to revive diaspora's interest in Zionism after some years of relative decline, depression and emigration.
Each attempt to make minor alterations to the status quo, still governed by Ottoman law, was bitterly protested before the British authorities by the Muslim authorities. If Muslims could cite an Ottoman regulation of 1912 specifically forbidding objects like seating to be introduced, the Jews could cite testimonies to the fact that before 1914 certain exceptions had been made to improve their access and use of the Wall.
The decade witnessed several such episodes of strong friction, and the simmering tensions came to a head in late 1928, only to erupt, after a brief respite, into an explosion of violence a year later. | https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Amin_al-Husseini |
Architecture of Palestine | Archaeological artifacts imparting information as to the nature of monumental construction, such as city walls, palaces, tomb and cult centers, in ancient Palestine are abundant. The paucity of written records, and the incompleteness of archaeological remains of ancient Palestinian housing available to early scholars, resulted in biblical archaeologists often looking to modern Palestinian houses to determine how ancient housing in Palestine was constructed during the time of the Kingdom of Judah and the Kingdom of Israel (Samaria). Cautioning against the conclusiveness of such comparisons, H. Keith Beebe writes that, "Arab houses are structured with regard to specific social customs and economic conditions, different from those of ancient Palestine." Beebe notes that a full account of the architectural details of ancient Palestinian housing is rarely possible, but that written records and archaeological findings available to scholars at his time of writing (1968), provide "a quite reliable picture of houses in the common life of ancient Palestine."
Excavations in Beidha in modern-day Jordan indicate that the earliest Palestinian houses were constructed about 9,000 years ago. Consisting of stone foundations with a superstructure made of mud-brick, they were simple structures, most often not more than one room with a single doorway, and likely without windows. Four different floor plans preserved from this time period have been identified: multagonal circular, true circular, square, and rectangular. Roofs were normally made of wooden supports upon which woven reed mats or brush were laid atop of which were added layers of clay mortar, rolled smooth to make an impermeable surface. Many of these early houses contained burial chambers beneath the floor. Food was prepared outside the house where the storage silos were also located. Houses were grouped closely together, and sometimes shared a back or side wall in common.
Among the foundations discovered in the Beidha excavations were those of a six-sided, one room house dated to 6800 BCE. Circular house foundations in Beidha dating to about 6000 BCE resembled those found at pre-Pottery Neolithic A Jericho. The floors of the Jericho round houses differed in that they were sunken beneath ground level, with wooden steps leading down into the house. This sunken feature is interpreted as a sign of continuous occupation of these houses over a long period of time. By 5000 BCE, the houses in Jericho were of a rectangular shape, with more than one room. These rooms had straight walls, but with rounded corners that may be a remnant of the prior round house building tradition. Some of the doorframes were reinforced by timber, perhaps to reduce the wear and tear to the mud-brick structure that would be incurred from constant human contact. The floors were covered with hard lime plaster, extending up the walls. By this time, water and grain storage had moved to house interiors, while thick layers of charcoal uncovered in house courtyards indicate that food preparations were carried out there. | https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Architecture_of_Palestine |
Boxing | Hitting with different extremities of the body, such as kicks and punches, as an act of human aggression, has existed across the world throughout human history, being a combat system as old as wrestling. However, in terms of sports competition, due to the lack of writing in the prehistoric times and the lack of references, it is not possible to determine rules of any kind of boxing in prehistory, and in ancient times only can be inferred from the few intact sources and references to the sport.
The origin of the sport of boxing is unknown, however according to some sources boxing in any of its forms has prehistoric origins in present-day Ethiopia, where it appeared in the sixth millennium BC. When the Egyptians invaded Nubia they learned the art of boxing from the local population, and they took the sport to Egypt where it became popular. From Egypt, boxing spread to other countries including Greece, eastward to Mesopotamia, and northward to Rome.
The earliest visual evidence of any type of boxing comes from Egypt and Sumer both from the third millennium BC. A relief sculpture from Egyptian Thebes (c. 1350 BC) shows both boxers and spectators. These early Middle-Eastern and Egyptian depictions showed contests where fighters were either bare-fisted or had a band supporting the wrist. The earliest evidence of use of gloves can be found in Minoan Crete (c. 1500–1400 BC).
Various types of boxing existed in ancient India. The earliest references to musti-yuddha come from classical Vedic epics such as the Rig Veda (c. 1500–1000 BCE) and Ramayana (c. 700–400 BCE). The Mahabharata describes two combatants boxing with clenched fists and fighting with kicks, finger strikes, knee strikes and headbutts during the time of King Virata. Duels (niyuddham) were often fought to the death. During the period of the Western Satraps, the ruler Rudradaman—in addition to being well-versed in "the great sciences" which included Indian classical music, Sanskrit grammar, and logic—was said to be an excellent horseman, charioteer, elephant rider, swordsman and boxer. The Gurbilas Shemi, an 18th-century Sikh text, gives numerous references to musti-yuddha. The martial art is related to other forms of martial arts found in other parts of the Indian cultural sphere including Muay Thai in Thailand, Muay Lao in Laos, Pradal Serey in Cambodia and Lethwei in Myanmar.
In Ancient Greece boxing was a well developed sport called pygmachia, and enjoyed consistent popularity. In Olympic terms, it was first introduced in the 23rd Olympiad, 688 BC. The boxers would wind leather thongs around their hands in order to protect them. There were no rounds and boxers fought until one of them acknowledged defeat or could not continue. Weight categories were not used, which meant heavier fighters had a tendency to dominate. The style of boxing practiced typically featured an advanced left leg stance, with the left arm semi-extended as a guard, in addition to being used for striking, and with the right arm drawn back ready to strike. It was the head of the opponent which was primarily targeted, and there is little evidence to suggest that targeting the body or the use of kicks was common, in which it resembled modern western boxing.
Boxing was a popular spectator sport in Ancient Rome. Fighters protected their knuckles with leather strips wrapped around their fists. Eventually harder leather was used and the strips became a weapon. Metal studs were introduced to the strips to make the cestus. Fighting events were held at Roman amphitheatres. | https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Boxing |
Granada | The Charterhouse of Granada is a monastery of cloistered monks, located in what was a farm or Muslim almunia called Aynadamar ("fountain of tears") that had an abundance of water and fruit trees. The initiative to build the monastery in that place was begun by Gonzalo Fernández de Córdoba, known as El Gran Capitán. The charterhouse was founded in 1506; construction started ten years later, and continued for the following 300 years.
The Monastery suffered heavy damage during the Peninsular War and lost considerable property in 1837 as a result of the confiscations of Mendizábal. Currently, the monastery belongs to the Carthusians, reporting directly to the Archdiocese of Granada.
The street entrance to the complex is an ornate arch of Plateresque style. Through it one reaches a large courtyard, at the end which is a wide staircase leading to the entrance of the church. The church, of early 16th century style and plan, has three entrances, one for the faithful and the other two for monks and clergy. Its plan has a single nave divided into four sections, highlighting the retables of Juan Sánchez Cotán and the chancel's glass doors, adorned with mother-of-pearl, silver, rare woods, and ivory. The presbytery is covered by elliptical vaulting. The main altar, between the chancel arch and the church tabernacle, is gilded wood.
The church's tabernacle and sancta sanctorum are considered a masterpiece of Baroque Spanish art in its blend of architecture, painting and sculpture. The dome that covers this area is decorated with frescoes by the Córdoba artist Antonio Palomino (18th century) representing the triumph of the Church Militant, faith, and religious life.
The courtyard, with galleries of arches on Doric order columns opening on it, is centered by a fountain. The Chapter House of Legos is the oldest building of the monastery (1517). It is rectangular and covered with groin vaulting.
Mosque of Granada
The Mosque of Granada was inaugurated in 2003 on the summit of the neighborhood of Albayzin. The mosque was built near the Church of San Salvador and the Church of San Nicolás. The Church of San Salvador was built on the site of the Great Mosque of Albayzin. The Society for the Return of Islam in Spain purchased the site in 1981, but it took many years for the plans to be approved. The mosque's initial funding was supplied by Shaykh 'Abdalqadir as-Sufi al-Murabit who envisioned providing Granada's new Spanish Muslim community with a mosque. Additional funding came from Malaysia, Morocco and the United Arab Emirates. In 1991 the CIE (Comunidad Islámica en España) hired the architect Renato Ramirez Sanchez to design the mosque. In the 1990s, there was a heated debate pertaining to the design of the minaret. Construction eventually began in 2001. The mosque now serves about 500 people. | https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Granada |
Ardabil Carpet | Completed after about four years weaving during the rule of the Safavid Shah Tahmasp I in 1539-40, probably in Kashan, the carpets are considered some of the best of the classical Iranian (Persian) school of carpet creation. According to the traditional story, now rather doubted by historians, when new they were placed in the Sheikh Safi al-Din Khānegāh and Shrine Ensemble in Ardabil, but became heavily worn and were sold in 1890 to a British carpet dealer who restored one of the carpets using the other and then resold the restored one to the Victoria and Albert Museum.
Many specialists are now dubious that the carpets were made for Ardabil; apart from anything else, they would not fit in the shrine there. They also do not match any carpets described in an inventory of the shrine from 1795. On the other hand, at their presumed original size, the two would fit into a space in the more important Imam Reza Shrine at Mashad.
This carpet was sold by the dealer Edward Stebbing of Robinson and Company as "The Holy Carpet of the Mosque at Ardebil", stressing the "exceptionalism of the carpet and its provenance as a product of the Safavid royal atelier of Shah Tahmasp, made for the Safavid dynastic shrine at Ardabil". William Morris advised the V&A in the acquisition: "It was William Morris, in his capacity as one of the V&A's Art Referees, who persuaded the Museum to raise, with the aid of public subscription, the then vast sum of £2000 to purchase the carpet in March 1893". Morris wrote in a letter to Thomas Armstrong that "it has no counterpart". Gradually, word came out that there was a second Ardabil carpet. When the Victoria and Albert Museum began to check out the piece in 1914, the historical consensus came to be that the modifications on the current Los Angeles Ardabil to repair the London Ardabil were managed by Ziegler and Company, the first buyer of the carpets from Persian resident Hildebrand Stevens, supposedly using Tabriz or Turkish craftsmen. The second Ardabil had visible changes in its structure, with its borders replaced into a newly woven narrow line while the London Ardabil was thoroughly over-restored. Historians of the time spoke to this, stating 'The highest market value was for complete carpets, rather than damaged ones or fragments. The London carpet was 'a remarkable work of Art', and as Morris has said, of real historical importance, but it had been compromised to suit the market values of 19th century art connoisseurship.' The carpet was for decades displayed hanging on a wall. Since 2006, it has been shown flat in a special glass pavilion in the centre of the Jameel gallery, Room 42 of Islamic art. The lighting is kept very low to prevent fading, and is increased for a brief period each hour.
The second "secret" carpet, smaller, now borderless and with some of the field missing, made up from the remaining usable sections, was sold to the American businessmen Clarence Mackay and was exchanged by wealthy buyers for years. Passing through the Mackay, Yerkes, and De la Mare art collections, it was eventually revealed and shown in 1931 at an exhibition in London. American industrialist J. Paul Getty saw it, and bought it from Lord Duveen for approximately $70,000 several years later. Getty was approached by agents on behalf of King Farouk of Egypt who offered $250,000 so that it could be given as a wedding present to his sister and the Shah of Iran. Getty later donated the carpet to the Los Angeles County Museum of Science, History, and Art in the Exposition Park in Los Angeles. Other fragments have appeared on the market from time to time. The knot density is actually higher on the Los Angeles carpet. It is now in the Los Angeles County Museum of Art in Los Angeles. In 2003 it was cleaned and restored by the Royal Collection's Textile Conservation Studios at Hampton Court Palace, near London. | https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ardabil_Carpet |
Ex-Muslims | Simon Cottee (2015) wrote that it is very difficult for Muslims to express doubts and questions about Islam. Those who get the opportunity, must conduct self-search on the Internet, and if they wish to ask questions to any religious expert, then they have to do so with a lot of caution to avoid accusations of disbelief; rather than asking why God said something in the scriptures, they need to rephrase their inquiry in religiously 'right' language, asking what God meant by something. In other cases, doubters use real or imaginary proxies to avoid hostility towards themselves. Since many doubts are not answered, the unintended consequence is a further level of dissatisfaction. Cottee says ex-Muslims focus their doubts mostly on the truth claims of Islam, and the utility and morality of Islamic commands or prohibitions.
Phil Zuckerman summarizes Cottee's points about types of doubts engaged by ex-Muslims on the path of leaving Islam, namely: epistemological, moral, and instrumental doubts, as well as forms of doubts such as significant personal experiences, exposure to alternatives, scriptural discoveries, spiritual alienation, political events, etc. Epistemological doubts question the existence of God in several ways, such as through the problem of evil, by looking at injustice and misery around the world, which allegedly would not have existed if there really had been a good God. They also question the Islamic creation myth with respect to the theory of evolution, and the contradictions between the concepts of free will and predestination. Moral doubts concern issues such as the unequal treatment of women in Islam, and why non-Muslim children or good non-Muslims go to hell according to Islamic theology. Instrumental doubts question the utility and morality of Islamic commands or prohibitions, such as the prohibition of artistic representation of living beings (see Aniconism in Islam), which doubters claim hamper freedom of artistic expressions such as drawing, photography, sports like chess, music, etc. (see also Muslim women in sport), in turn, hampers individual growth and social-cultural participation.
Cottee's study indicates that ex-Muslims start feeling that they are betraying their true self and also deceiving their loved ones in the process, leading to feelings of shame for their own continued closeted pretending and subsequent feelings of isolation and loneliness. On the one hand, ex-Muslims often opt to reduce commitment to social relationships that require pretending to be Muslim; on the other hand, they often do not have the freedom to choose the kind of social relationships they prefer, thus exacerbating their social isolation and loneliness further. Cottee outlines different phases on the way of leaving Islam: disavowal of self, relief, excitement, guilt, anger, residual anxiety, confusion, disclosure, and more. | https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ex-Muslims |
Apostasy in Islam by country | During the Ottoman Turkish Muslim rule of Bosnia and Herzegovina (1463–1878), a large minority of the Southern Slavic-speaking inhabitants converted to Islam for various reasons, whilst others remained Roman Catholics (Croats) or Orthodox Christians (Serbs). These converts and their descendants were simply known as "Bosnian Muslims" or just "Muslims", until the term Bosniaks was adopted in 1993. In contemporary Balkans some Bosniaks are "Muslim" by name or cultural background, rather than conviction, profession or practice. In a 1998 public opinion poll, just 78.3% of Bosniaks in the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina declared themselves to be religious.
The Ottomans punished apostasy from Islam with the death penalty until the Edict of Toleration 1844; subsequently, apostates could be imprisoned or deported instead. When Austria-Hungary occupied Bosnia and Herzegovina in 1878, this practice was abolished. The Austrian government held that any mature citizen was free to convert to another religion without having to fear any legal penalty, and issued a directive to its officials to keep their involvement in religious matters to a minimum. This clashed with the rigorous hostility to conversion exhibited by traditional Bosnian Muslims, who perceived it as a threat to the survival of Islam. During the four decades of Habsburg rule, several apostasy controversies occurred, most often involving young women with a low socio-economic status who sought to convert to Christianity.
In August 1890, during the Austro-Hungarian rule in Bosnia and Herzegovina, a sixteen-year-old Bosnian girl called Uzeifa Delahmatović claimed to have voluntarily converted from Islam to Catholicism, the Habsburg state's official and majority religion. This stirred up controversy about whether she was forced, or whether a Muslim was even allowed to change their religion. Subsequent debates resulted in the Austrian Conversion Ordinance of 1891, which made religious conversion of subjects a matter of state. A strict procedure required the convert to be an adult and mentally healthy, and the conversion should be recognised by all parties involved; if not, the state would intervene and set up a commission for arbitration.
In the 20th century, religion became highly politicised in Bosnia, and the basis for most citizens' national identity and political loyalty, leading to numerous conflicts culminating in the Bosnian War (1992–1995). The resulting violence and misery has caused a group of Bosnians to reject religion (and nationalism) altogether. This atheist community faces discrimination, and is frequently verbally attacked by religious leaders as "corrupt people without morals". | https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Apostasy_in_Islam_by_country |
Ayyubid dynasty | By the 12th century, Islam was the dominant religion in the Middle East. It is not certain, however, if it was the religion of the majority outside the Arabian Peninsula. Arabic was the language of high culture and of the urban population, although other languages dating to pre-Islamic rule were still being used to a certain extent. Most Egyptians were speaking Arabic by the time the Ayyubids took power there.
Kurdish was the mother tongue of the early Ayyubids, at the time of their departure from Dvin. Sultan Saladin spoke both Arabic and Kurdish, and likely Turkish as well. There was a strong ethnic consciousness between the Ayyubids and other Kurds. According to the historian R. Stephen Humphreys, Saladin obtained the Fatimid vizierate partly on the strength of it. Kurdish ethnic consciousness was reinforced by the existence of ethnic friction. After Shirkuh's death, Saladin's close associate Diya' al-Din Isa al-Hakkari, a Kurd, visited the leaders of each faction contending for power to try to win them over to the election of Saladin, and to one Kurdish emir, Qutb al-Din Khusrau ibn al-Talal, he used the following argument: "Verily, everybody is for Saladin except you and al-Yaruqi [a Turkmen amir from the north Syrian Yürük tribe]. What is needed now, above all, is an understanding between you and Saladin, especially because of his Kurdish origin, so that the command does not go from him to the Turks." Within a few months of Saladin's election, all the Turkish amirs had returned to Syria save those in the late Shirkuh's Asadiyya corps.
According to Yasser Tabbaa, an anthropologist specializing in medieval Islamic culture, the Ayyubid rulers who reigned in the late 12th-century were far removed from their Kurdish origins, and unlike their Seljuq predecessors and their Mamluk successors, they were firmly "Arabized." Arabic culture and language formed the main component of their identity instead of their Kurdish heritage. Arabic surnames were much more prevalent among the Ayyubids, a tribe that had already been partially assimilated into the Arabic-speaking world before its members came to power, than non-Arabic names. Some Iranic romanticism can be detected in such names borne by the Ayyubids, such as Shahan-Shah, Bahram-Shah, farrukh-Shah andTuran-Shah. Most of the Ayyubid rulers spoke fluent Arabic and a number of them, such as az-Zahir Ghazi, al-Mu'azzam Isa and the minor emirs of Hama, composed Arabic poetry. Al-Salih Ayyub, however, did not write poetry, but was a patron of two great Arab poets, Baha al-Din Zuhayr and Ibn Matrouh.
Kurds and free born Kurdish mercenaries dominated the cavalry and nomadic Turcomans and Arabs filled the ranks of the infantry. These groups typically settled in the pastoral areas outside of the cities, the centers of cultural life, and as such they were relatively isolated from the Arabic-dominant urban environment. This isolation allowed them to preserve their traditions. Like their Fatimid predecessors, the Ayyubid rulers of Egypt maintained a substantial force of mamluks (military slaves). By the first half of the 13th century mamluks were mostly drawn from Kipchak Turks and Circassians and there is strong evidence that these forces continued to speak Kipchak Turkish.
In Egypt, there were large communities of Coptic Christians, Melkites, Turks, Armenians, and Black Africans—the latter two groups had a large presence in Upper Egypt. Under the Fatimids, non-Muslims in Egypt generally prospered, with the exception of Caliph al-Hakim's reign. However, with Shirkuh's ascendancy to the vizier position, a number edicts were enacted against the non-Muslim population. With the advent of the Syrian expeditionary force (consisting of Oghuz Turks and Kurds) into Egypt, waves of maltreatment of minorities occurred, irrespective of religion. These incidents occurred while Shirkuh and Saladin were viziers to the Fatimid caliph.
At the beginning of Saladin's reign as sultan in Egypt, upon the encouragement of his adviser, Qadi al-Fadil, Christians were prohibited from employment in the fiscal administration, but various Ayyubid emirs continued to allow Christians to serve in their posts. A number of other regulations were imposed, including the bans on alcohol consumption, religious processions, and the ringing of church bells. Conversion of formerly high-ranking Christians and their families to Islam took place throughout the early period of Ayyubid rule. According to historian Yaakov Lev, the persecution of non-Muslims had some permanent effects on them, but nonetheless, the effects were local and contained. To manage Mediterranean trade, the Ayyubids permitted Europeans—mainly Italians, but also French and Catalans—to settle in Alexandria in large numbers. However, in the aftermath of the Fifth Crusade, 3,000 merchants from the area were arrested or expelled.
The majority of Syria's population in the 12th century consisted of Sunni Muslims, typically from Arab or Kurdish backgrounds. There were also sizable Muslim communities of Twelver Shias, Druzes, and Alawites. The Ismaili presence was small and most were of Persian origin, having migrated from Alamut. They mostly resided in the mountainous area near the northern Syrian coastline. Large Christian communities existed in northern Syria, Palestine, Transjordan and Upper Mesopotamia. They were Aramaic-speaking and indigenous to the area, mostly belonging to the Syriac Orthodox Church. They lived in villages of Christian or mixed Christian and Muslim population, monasteries, and in small towns where they appear to have been on friendly terms with their Muslim neighbors. Ideologically, they were led by the Patriarch of Antioch.
In Yemen and Hadramaut, much of the population adhered to Shia Islam in its Zaydi form. The inhabitants of Upper Mesopotamia were made up of Sunni Muslim Kurds and Turks, although there was a significant Yazidi minority in that region as well. Jews were spread throughout the Islamic world and most Ayyubid cities had Jewish communities due to the important roles Jews played in trade, manufacture, finance, and medicine. In Yemen and some parts of Syria, Jews also lived in rural towns. The Ayyubid emir of Yemen in 1197–1202, al-Malik Mu'izz Isma'il, attempted to forcibly convert the Jews of Aden, but this process ceased after his death in 1202. Within the Jewish community, particularly in Egypt and Palestine, there existed a minority of Karaites.
The Ayyubids generally employed Kurds, Turks, and people from the Caucasus for the higher-ranking posts of the military and bureaucratic fields. Not much is known about the foot soldiers of the Ayyubid army, but the numbers of cavalrymen are known to have fluctuated between 8,500 and 12,000. The cavalry was largely composed of free-born Kurds and Turks whom Ayyubid emirs and sultans purchased as military slaves or mamluks; in the early days of the Ayyubids, there was also a large contingent of Turkomans. In addition, there existed Arab auxiliaries, former Fatimid units such as the Nubians, and separate Arab contingents—notably from the Kinaniyya tribe, who were largely devoted to the defense of Egypt. Rivalry between Kurdish and Turkish troops occurred occasionally when leading positions were at stake and towards the end of Ayyubid rule, Turks outnumbered Kurds in the army. Despite their Kurdish background, the sultans remained impartial to both groups. | https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ayyubid_dynasty |
Ibn Taymiyya | In 1269, Ibn Taymiyya, aged seven, left Harran together with his father and three brothers; however, the city was completely destroyed by the ensuing Mongol invasion. Ibn Taymiyya's family moved and settled in Damascus, Syria, which was ruled by the Mamluk Sultanate at the time.
In Damascus, his father served as the director of the Sukkariyya Madrasa, a place where Ibn Taymiyya also received his early education. He acquainted himself with the religious and secular sciences of his time. His religious studies began in his early teens when he committed the entire Quran to memory, and later came to learn the disciplines of the Quran. From his father, he learnt the religious science of jurisprudence and its principles. Ibn Taymiyya studied the works of Ahmad ibn Hanbal, Abu Bakr al-Khallal, and Ibn Qudama, as well as the works of his own grandfather, Majd al-Din. His study of jurisprudence was not limited to the Hanbali tradition, as he also studied the other schools of jurisprudence.
The number of scholars under which he studied hadith is said to number more than two-hundred, four of whom were women. Those who are known by name amount to forty hadith teachers, as recorded by Ibn Taymiyya in his work titled Arba'un Haditha. Serajul Haque says, based on this, Ibn Taymiyya started to hear hadith from the age of five. One of Ibn Taymiyya's teachers was the first Hanbali Chief Justice of Syria, Shams al-Din al-Maqdisi, who held the newly created position instituted by Baibars as part of a reform of the judiciary. Al-Maqdisi later came to give Ibn Taymiyya permission to issue legal verdicts, making him a judge at the age of seventeen.
Ibn Taymiyya's secular studies led him to devote attention to the Arabic language and literature by studying Arabic grammar and lexicography under Ali ibn Abd al-Qawi al-Tufi. He went on to master the famous book of Arabic grammar al-Kitab, written by the grammarian Sibawayhi. He also studied mathematics, algebra, calligraphy, speculative theology, philosophy, history, and heresiography. With the knowledge he gained from history and philosophy, he set to refute the prevalent philosophical discourses of his time, one of which was Aristotelianism. Ibn Taymiyya also learnt about Sufism and stated he had reflected on the works of Sahl al-Tustari, al-Junayd al-Baghdadi, Abu Talib al-Makki, Abd al-Qadir al-Jilani, Shihab al-Din Umar al-Suhrawardi, and Ibn Arabi. In 1282, Ibn Taymiyya completed his education at the age of 20. | https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ibn_Taymiyya |
Argobba language | Prepositions have either 1 or 2 syllables and two allomorphems, that differ in the vocal in the end. When a preposition is added onto a noun that starts in the epenthesevocal (ɨ) the preposition end in “i“. When the prepositions are added onto other nouns, all the other prepositions end on the vocal (ɜ) except for the preposition “ama“. When a preposition is added onto a relative verb then the end vocal of the preposition is dropped.
tɜ- (can be translated with “in, on, by, at, to, from“)
The preposition tɜ is used in different contexts to show distinct relations and the exact meaning of the preposition is determined by the context. Often it shows a stationary location or a movement towards the location or towards a target. It consists of three allomorphemes which are determined by the word that it is prefixing. Only when it is added onto a word that starts with a consonant, the tɜ is used entirely, otherwise it is changed to ti, when it is added onto a word that starts with the ɨ, or the ɜ is dropped when in combination with a demonstrative noun.
lɜ- (can be translated with “for“)
In combination with a noun, it is used to mark the recipient of a verbal act. On the other hand, it is used in combination with a di-transitive verb when it takes on the role of a dative or a benefactive. It can also be used to show the goal or reason behind a verbal act. Sometimes it is used in temporal concepts when adding it onto a nominative phrase that is showing a time frame or a point in time. In combination with the morpheme drɜs it is used to articulate a duration of a time frame.
bɜ- (can be translated with at, on, in, to, through (directionality) & with (instrumentality))
In many ways it is used similarly to the preposition tɜ-, it is also used when forming adpositional phrases that show locality and directionality. In addition to that, it also shows instrumentality, modality and causality. Usually it is added onto adverbs, postpositions or relational nouns that go after the noun they refer to. When speaking about a month, or a specific time frame, it can be added as well.
bɜhidarinna bɜtihsɜs (in November and December)
ɨntɜ-
It is often used to form adpositional phrases with ablative meaning, or to mark temporal and conditional phrases. It can also show the start of a movement and a reason for a situation. When used in a comparative-construct it is formed with the relational noun nɜh (amount)
ex. fat’uma ɨntɜħalima nɜħ amħɨr nɜčč (Fatuma is prettier than Halima)
ama-
It is also used to form adpositionalphrases that show modality or have a similative meaning and are adding into nominative phrases to dictate the standard comparison. When used with relative verbs ama is used to mark the complementative phrases, modal phrases and a certain type of temporal phrases. Requests are formed with the preposition ama- when it is a prefix to an imperfect form, that is portraying a negative or positive request.
sɨlɜ- (can be translated with because of / about)
It is used in the formation of adpositional phrases and it shows the focus of the conversation. It can also function in the formation of a causal sentence when it is used as a prefix to a relative verb.
sɨletɨmɨrt nɜyi (Is it because of the class?)
ɨstɜ-
The preposition ɨstɜ- is used to show distance in time and location when it is a prefix to a noun that is portraying the ending point of the said distance. In that case it is also usually used in combination with the postposition -drɜs. In some cases it can be translated with the world “including“ when attempting to make an inclusion statement. | https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Argobba_language |
Syed Muhammad Naquib al-Attas | (1959) Rangkaian Ruba'iyat (Kuala Lumpur: Dewan Bahasa dan Pustaka).
(1963) Some Aspects of Sufism as Understood and Practised among the Malays (Singapore: Malaysian Sociological Research Institute).
(1968) The Origin of The Malay Sha'ir (Kuala Lumpur: Dewan Bahasa dan Pustaka).
(1969) Raniri and the Wujudiyyah of the 17th Century Acheh (Kuala Lumpur: Monographs of the Malaysian Branch of the Royal Asiatic Society).
(1969) Preliminary Statement On A General Theory of The Islamization of The Malay-Indonesian Archipelago (Kuala Lumpur: Dewan Bahasa dan Pustaka).
(1970) The Mysticism of Hamzah Fansuri (Kuala Lumpur: University of Malaya Press).
(1970) The Correct Date of the Terengganu Inscription (Kuala Lumpur: Museum Department).
(1971) Concluding Postscript to The Origin of The Malay Sha'ir (Kuala Lumpur: Dewan Bahasa dan Pustaka).
(1972) Islam dalam Sejarah dan Kebudayaan Melayu (Kuala Lumpur: Universiti Kebangsaan Malaysia).
(1975) Comments on the Re-Examination of Al-Raniri's Hujjatu’l Siddiq: A Refutation (Kuala Lumpur: Museum Department).
(1977) Islām: Faham Agama dan Asas Akhlak (Kuala Lumpur: Angkatan Belia Islam Malaysia (ABIM))
(1978) Islam and Secularism (Kuala Lumpur: Muslim Youth Movement of Malaysia (ABIM); reprint, Kuala Lumpur: International Institute of Islamic Thought and Civilisation (ISTAC), 1993).
(1980) The Concept of Education in Islam (Kuala Lumpur: Muslim Youth Movement of Malaysia (ABIM); reprint, Kuala Lumpur: International Institute of Islamic Thought and Civilisation (ISTAC)).
(1986) A Commentary on the Hujjat al-Siddiq of Nur al-Din al-Raniri: Being an Exposition the Salient Points of Distinction between the Positions of the Theologians, the Philosophers, the Sufis and the Pseudo-Sufis on the Ontological Relationship between God and the World and Related Questions (Kuala Lumpur: Malaysian Ministry of Culture).
(1988) The Oldest Known Malay Manuscript: A 16th Century Malay Translation of the `Aqa’id of al-Nasafi (Kuala Lumpur: University of Malaya).
(1989) Islam and the Philosophy of Science (Kuala Lumpur: International Institute of Islamic Thought and Civilisation (ISTAC)) (tr. into German by Christoph Marcinkowski as Islam und die Grundlagen von Wissenschaft, Kuala Lumpur: ISTAC, 2001)
(1990) The Nature of Man and the Psychology of the Human Soul (Kuala Lumpur: International Institute of Islamic Thought and Civilisation (ISTAC)).
(1990) On Quiddity and Essence (Kuala Lumpur: International Institute of Islamic Thought and Civilisation (ISTAC)).
(1990) The Intuition of Existence (Kuala Lumpur: International Institute of Islamic Thought and Civilisation (ISTAC)).
(1992) Islam: The Concept of Religion and the Foundation of Ethics and Morality (Kuala Lumpur: International Institute of Islamic Thought and Civilisation (ISTAC)).
(1993) The Meaning and Experience of Happiness in Islam (tr. into Malay by Muhammad Zainiy 'Uthman as Ma'na Kebahagiaan dan Pengalamannya dalam Islam, Kuala Lumpur: ISTAC; and into German by Christoph Marcinkowski as Die Bedeutung und das Erleben von Glückseligkeit im Islam, Kuala Lumpur: ISTAC, 1998)
(1994) The Degrees of Existence
(1995) Prolegomena to the Metaphysics of Islam: An Exposition of the Fundamental Elements of the Worldview of Islam (Kuala Lumpur: International Institute of Islamic Thought and Civilization (ISTAC)).
(2001) Risalah untuk Kaum Muslimin (Kuala Lumpur: International Institute of Islamic Thought and Civilization (ISTAC)).
(2007) Tinjauan Ringkas Peri Ilmu dan Pandangan Alam (Penang, Malaysia: Universiti Sains Malaysia).
(2011) Historical Fact and Fiction (Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia: UTM Press).
(2015) On Justice and the Nature of Man (Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia: IBFIM).
(2023) Islam: The Covenants Fulfilled (Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia: Ta'dib International). | https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Syed_Muhammad_Naquib_al-Attas |
Granada | The Umayyad conquest of Hispania, starting in 711 AD, brought large parts of the Iberian Peninsula under Moorish control and established al-Andalus. The earliest Arabic historical sources mention that a town named Qashtīliya, later known as Madīnat Ilbīra (Elvira), was located on the southern slopes of the Sierra de Elvira mountains (near present-day Atarfe) and became the most important settlement in the area. A smaller settlement and fortress (ḥiṣn) named Ġarnāṭa (also transliterated as Gharnāṭa) existed on the south side of the Darro River or on the site of the current Albaicín neighbourhood. The latter had a mainly Jewish population and thus was also known as Gharnāṭat al-Yahūd ("Gharnāṭa of the Jews"). The district around the city was known as Kūrat Ilbīra (roughly "Province of Elvira"). After 743 the town of Ilbīra was settled by soldiers from the region of Syria who played a role in supporting Abd al-Rahman I, the founder of the Emirate of Córdoba and a new Umayyad dynasty. In the late 9th century, during the reign of Abdallah (r. 844–912), the city and its surrounding district were the site of conflict between muwallads (Muslim converts) who were loyal to the central government and Arabs, led by Sawwār ibn Ḥamdūn, who resented them.
At the beginning of the 11th century, the area became dominated by the Zirids, a Sanhaja Berber group and offshoot of the Zirids who ruled parts of North Africa. This group became an important contingent in the army of ʿAbd al-Malik al-Muẓaffar, the prime minister of Caliph Hisham II (r. 976–1009) and successor to Ibn Abi ʿAmir al-Mansur (Almanzor) as de facto ruler of the Caliphate of Córdoba. For their service, the Zirids were granted control of the province of Elvira. When the Caliphate collapsed after 1009 and the Fitna (civil war) began, the Zirid leader Zawi ben Ziri established an independent kingdom for himself, the Taifa of Granada. Arab sources such as al-Idrisi consider him to be the founder of the city of Granada. His surviving memoirs – the only ones for the Spanish "Middle Ages" – provide considerable detail for this brief period. Because Madīnat Ilbīra was situated on a low plain and, as a result, difficult to protect from attacks, the ruler decided to transfer his residence to the higher situated area of Ġarnāṭa. According to Arabic sources Ilbīra was razed during the Fitna, afterwards it was not restored at its previous place and instead Ġarnāṭa, the former Jewish town, replaced it as the main city. In a short time this town was transformed into one of the most important cities of al-Andalus. Until the 11th century it had a mixed population of Christians, Muslims, and Jews.
The Zirids built their citadel and palace, known as the al-Qaṣaba al-Qadīma ("Old Citadel"), on the hill now occupied by the Albaicín neighborhood. It was connected to two smaller fortresses on the Sabika hill (site of the future Alhambra) and Mauror hill to the south. The city around it grew during the 11th century to include the Albaicín, the Sabika, the Mauror, and a part of the surrounding plains. The city was fortified with walls encompassing an area of approximately 75 hectares. The northern part of these walls, near the Albaicin citadel, have survived to the present day, along with two of its gates: Bāb al-Unaydar (now called Puerta Monaita in Spanish) and Bāb al-Ziyāda (now known as Arco de las Pesas or Puerta Nueva). The city and its residences were supplied with water through an extensive network of underground cisterns and pipes. On the Darro River, along the wall connecting the Zirid citadel with the Sabika hill, was a sluice gate called Bāb al-Difāf ("Gate of the Tambourines"), which could be closed or opened to control the flow of the river and retain water if necessary. The nearby Bañuelo, a former hammam (bathhouse), also likely dates from this time, as does the former minaret of a mosque in the Albaicín, now part of the Church of San José.
Under the Zirid kings Habbus ibn Maksan and Badis, the most powerful figure was the Jewish administrator known as Samuel ha-Nagid (in Hebrew) or Isma'il ibn Nagrilla (in Arabic). Samuel was a highly educated member of the former elites of Cordoba, who fled that city after the outbreak of the Fitna. He eventually found his way to Granada, where Habbus ibn Maksan appointed him his secretary in 1020 and entrusted him with many important responsibilities, including tax collection. Under Badis, he even took charge of the army. During this period, the Muslim king was looked upon as a mainly symbolic figurehead. Granada was the center of Jewish Sephardi culture and scholarship. According to Daniel Eisenberg:
Granada was in the eleventh century the center of Sephardic civilization at its peak, and from 1027 until 1066 Granada was a powerful Jewish state. Jews did not hold the foreigner (dhimmi) status typical of Islamic rule. Samuel ibn Nagrilla, recognized by Sephardic Jews everywhere as the quasi-political ha-Nagid ('The Prince'), was king in all but name. As vizier he made policy and—much more unusual—led the army. [...] It is said that Samuel's strengthening and fortification of Granada was what permitted it, later, to survive as the last Islamic state in the Iberian peninsula. All of the greatest figures of eleventh-century Hispano-Jewish culture are associated with Granada. Moses Ibn Ezra was from Granada; on his invitation Judah ha-Levi spent several years there as his guest. Ibn Gabirol’s patrons and hosts were the Jewish viziers of Granada, Samuel ha-Nagid and his son Joseph.
After Samuel's death, his son Joseph took over after his position but proved to lack his father's diplomacy, bringing on the 1066 Granada massacre, which ended the Golden age of Jewish culture in Spain.
From the late 11th century to the early 13th century, Al-Andalus was dominated by two successive North African Berber empires. The Almoravids ruled Granada from 1090 and the Almohads from 1166. Granada also served as an administrative capital of Almoravid rule in al-Andalus. Evidence from the artistic and archeological remains of this period suggest that the city thrived under the Almoravids but declined under the Almohads. Remnants of the Almohad period in the city include the Alcázar Genil, built in 1218–1219 (but later redecorated under the Nasrids), and possibly the former minaret attached to the present-day Church of San Juan de los Reyes in the Albaicin. | https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Granada |
Kalam | Al-Shawkani, a 18th AD Atharism, and Zahiri scholar, early Salafi movement figure, and and Muhammad ibn Abd al-Wahhab contemporary; has expressed his view for literal theological interpretation and opposition to kalam (speculative theology)
Siddiq Hasan Khan, 19th AD North Indian Salafi scholar, co-founder of Ahl-i Hadith movement, and also Nawab (viceroy) of Bhopal State; has rejected kalam as he regards it as "full of speculations". It was stated by himself that his opposition towards kalam were influenced by the thoughts of Al-Shawkani, Al-San'ani and Ibn Taymiyya.
Rashid Rida, 19th century AD reformer of Islamics school; in his later years of life has perceived the Athari theology as more rational than Kalam and actively condemning Kalam, as he view the Athari methodology had stronger religious foundations of Islam. Furthermore, he also saw the Ash'arite theology as ineffective against philosophical doubts.
Al-Albani, prominent figure of Salafism and modern era Hadith scholar; considered kalam doctrine as misguided in the Islamic creed due to their Ta'til methodology, which consequently divesting the Names of God in Islam. Al-Albani stated the notable example was the rejection of kalam scholars of the al-ʿAliyy (Most highest) attribute of God.
Manzoor Elahi, 21th century AD Bangladeshi Salafi scholar and academic; has stated in his book "The Importance of Right Aqeedah in Reforming Society" edited by Abubakar Muhammad Zakaria says about Ilmul Kalam,
The Mutaqallimin called the Aqeedah studies "Ilmul Kalam" and the philosophers called "Al-Falsafa al-Islamiyyah" or Islamic philosophy, "Al-Ilahiyat" and "Metaphysics" (supernaturalism). About the latter names, Dr. Nasser al-Aql and many others say that it is not pure to call the Islamic Aqeedah by these names. Explaining the reason, Muhammad Ibrahim Al Hamad said, “Because the source of Ilmul Kalam is human intellect, which is based on Hindu and Greek philosophy. On the other hand, the main source of Tawheed is revelation. Moreover, Ilmul Kalam includes restlessness, imbalance, ignorance and doubt. That is why the Salaf Saleheen condemned Ilmul Kalam. And Tawheed is based on knowledge, conviction and faith,….. Another reason can be said that the foundation of philosophy is based on assumptions, false beliefs, imaginary thoughts and superstitious ideas”. Imam Harawi wrote a 5-volume book called ذم الكلام وأهله and Imam Ghazali wrote a book called تهافت الفلاسفة. Besides, Imam Ibn Taymiyyah and Ibn al-Qayyim, among other Muslim scholars have discussed in detail that 'Ilmul Kalam' and 'Falsafa' do not represent the correct Islamic belief.
Similar sentiment were also stated by ʻUthmān ibn Jumʻah Ḍumayrīyah, an Islamic theology professor of University of Sharjah and Umm al-Qura University; that kalam science inherently contradicts the Islamic creed of al-Burooj Quran 85:16 chapter regarding the attribute of God's name as omnipotent (al-Jabbār); which contain the attribute of capability to perform any wills (yurīd). ʻUthmān views that kalam's doctrine omitted such attribute by human's logic only. | https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Kalam |
2003 invasion of Iraq | Bravo and Charlie companies of 1st Battalion 5th SFG crossed the Kuwait border at H-Hour with ODA 531 using breaching demolition charges to clear a path through the sand berms. Charlie company's seven ODAs in 35 vehicles took the southeastern operation box of the western desert heading towards the towns of Nukyab, Habbariya and Mudyasis, ODA's 534 and 532 split off to head for the area surrounding Nukyab searching for mobile Scud-B TEL launch sites. ODA 532 also inserted a mobile weather station that provided planners with vital real time weather updates of the battle space. Bravo company set out for the central town of Ar Rutba and H-3 Air Base with six ODAs and a support ODB (Operational Detachment Bravo). ODAs 523 and 524 searched a suspected Scud-B storage facility while ODAs 521 and 525 were tasked with clearing several abandoned airfields, with no sign of Scud launchers, ODA 525 deployed a Special Reconnaissance team to conduct pattern of life surveillance on the town of Ar Rutba. A two-man team called in a pair of nearby F-16C Fighting Falcons to destroy an Iraqi Army radio direction-finding facility they had identified. A second reconnaissance team from ODA 525 deployed to cover the two highways leading to Ar Rutbah, however as the team was compromised by roving Bedouins who informed the Iraqi Army garrison at Ar Rutbah of the teams presence and location, armed Iraqi technicals crewed by the Fedayeen drove out to search for them, so the Green Berets mounted their GMVs, left their hide and found a position to ambush the Fedayeen, under the weight of fire the Fedayeen retreated. ODA 525 attempted to link up with the two-man reconnaissance team and extract it to safety but large numbers of Iraqi vehicles began driving out of the town to them, the ODAs called in immediate air support. While waiting, the reconnaissance team and Target Acquisition Marines fired on the Fedayeen leaders with their suppressed MK12 sniper rifle and contacted ODA 521 (who were clearing suspects east of the town) and they reinforced ODA 525. Within minutes, F-16Cs arrived and engaged the Fedayeen vehicles, another Fedayeen convoy attempted to outflank ODA 525 but ran into the guns of ODA 524, after 4 hours of constant and punishing airstrikes on the encircling Fedayeen, eight GMVs of ODA 521 and 525 managed to extract the exposed reconnaissance team under the cover of a B-1B strategic bomber, the vehicles withdrew to ODB 520s staging area south of Ar Rutbah. Over 100 Fedayeen fighters were killed and four armed technicals were destroyed. To the west ODA 523 reinforced ODA 524, but ran into a pair of armed technicals on the highway, both were destroyed by the GMVs, the Green Berets ceased fire when a civilian station wagon full of Iraqi children drove into the middle of the firefight. ODA 522 also identified two Fedayeen armed technicals proceeding down the highway toward ODA 523, they set an ambush for them, destroying the vehicles and killing 15 Fedayeen.
The strategic intent of the US Army Special Forces ODAs had been to shut down the main supply routes and deny access around Ar Rutbah and the strategically important H-3 air base, which was defended by a battalion of Iraqi troops and significant numbers of mobile and static anti aircraft guns. On 24 March 2003, the surrounding ODAs supported by Task Force 7 (British Special Air Service) and Task Force 64 (Australian Special Air Service Regiment) called in constant 24 hours of precision airstrikes on H-3 using SOFLAM target designators, the aerial bombardment forced the Iraqi military vehicles to leave the base and headed towards Baghdad. ODA 521 over watching the highway they were travelling on ambushed the convoy destroying a truck mounted ZU-23, the convoy was thrown into disarray, a sandstorm prevented the ODA calling in airstrikes and the convoy scattered into the desert. Bravo company 5th SFG and the coalition SOF secured the airfield, finding a Roland surface-to-air missile system, around 80 assorted anti aircraft cannon guns including ZSU-23-4 Shilka, SA-7 grail handheld SAMs and an enormous amount of ammunition. H-3 was established as an Advanced Operating Base for Bravo company, with supplies delivered by C-130s and MH-47Es; ODA 581 vehicle checkpoint managed to capture the Iraqi general in command of H-3 as he was trying to escape in civilian attire, he was secured and flown by an unmarked CIA SAD Air Branch Little Bird on 28 March for further interrogation. Additionally, ODA 523 discovered what may have been chemical weapons samples in a laboratory on the grounds of H-3.
Bravo company turned its attention to Ar Rutbah, signals intercepts by SOT-A (Support Operations Team – Alpha) and an informer network among the Bedouins as well as inhabitants of the town indicated that around 800 Fedayeen remained in the town; Fedayeen patrols from the town were engaged by surrounding Green Berets and captured. ODAs guided precision airstrikes on Fedayeen anti aircraft guns on the outskirts of the town and on top of the airstrikes, they also struck large groups of Fedayeen militia with Javelin missiles. On 9 April, nine ODAs secured the main roads into the town and commenced a day of near continuous final airstrikes from fix-wing aircraft and Apache helicopters. Civilians from the town approached the Green Berets asking them to stop the bombing, the Green Berets struck a deal with the civilians and they entered the town the next day. A B-52 and 2 F-16Cs flew show of force flights over the town as the Green Berets entered, the Fedayeen blended in with the population. Within days, the Green Berets helped the town to elect a mayor and set up markets, get sixty percent of the electricity grid working and repair water supplies. ODA 521 and 525 continued to operate in the region, stopping several trucks carrying foreign fighters, they disarmed them, took their details and warned them not to come back before sending them to Syria; in late May, the teams were replaced by the 3rd Armoured Cavalry Regiment. | https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/2003_invasion_of_Iraq |
Politics of the Comoros | Sultanates in the late nineteenth century used a cyclic age system and hierarchical lineage membership to provide the foundation for participation in the political process. In the capital, "the sultan was assisted by his ministers and by a madjelis, an advisory council composed of elders, whom he consulted regularly". Apart from local administration, the age system was used to include the population in decision making, depending on the scope of the decision being made. For example, the elders of the island of Njazidja held considerable influence on the authority of the sultan. Though sultanates granted rights to their free inhabitants, were provided with warriors during war and taxed the towns under their authority, their definition as a state is open to debate. The islands' incorporation as a province of the colony of Madagascar into the French colonial empire marked the end of the sultanates.
Despite French colonization, Comorans identify first with kinship or regional ties and rarely ever with the central government. This is a lingering effect of the sovereign sultanates of pre-colonial times. French colonial administration was based on a misconception that the sultanates operated as absolute monarchs: district boundaries were the same as the sultanates', multiple new taxes forced men into wage labor on colonial plantations and was reinforced through a compulsory public labor system that had little effect on infrastructure. French policy was hampered by an absence of settlers, effective communication across islands, rough geographical terrain and hostility towards the colonial government. Policies were made to apply to Madagascar as a whole and seldom to the nuances of each province: civil servants were typically Christian, unaware of local customs and unable to speak the local language. The French established the Ouatou Akouba in 1915, a local form of governance based on "customary structures" already in place that attempted to model itself after the age system in place under the sultanates. Their understanding of the elders' council as a corporate group bypassed the reality that there were men "who had accomplished the necessary customary rituals to be accorded the status of elder and thus be eligible to participate in the political process in the village", which effectively rendered the French elders' council ineffective. Though the Ouatou Akouba was disbanded, it resulted in the consolidation and formalization of the age system as access to power in the customary and local government spheres. The French failure to establish a functioning state in the Comoros has had repercussions in the post-independence era. | https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Politics_of_the_Comoros |
Allah | In contrast with pre-Islamic Arabian polytheism, as stated by Gerhard Böwering, God in Islam does not have associates and companions, nor is there any kinship between God and jinn. Pre-Islamic pagan Arabs believed in a blind, powerful, inexorable and insensible fate over which man had no control. This was replaced with the Islamic notion of a powerful but provident and merciful God. According to Francis Edward Peters, "The Qur’ān insists, Muslims believe, and historians affirm that Muhammad and his followers worship the same God as the Jews (29:46). The Qur’an's Allah is the same Creator God who covenanted with Abraham". Peters states that the Qur'an portrays Allah as both more powerful and more remote than Yahweh, and as a universal deity, unlike Yahweh who closely follows Israelites.
Since the first centuries of Islam, Arabic-speaking commentators of Jewish, Christian, and Islamic faith used the term Allah as a generic term for the supreme being. Saadia Gaon used the term Allah interchangeably with the term ʾĔlōhīm. Theodore Abu Qurrah translates theos as Allah in his Bible, as in John 1:1 "the Word was with Allah". Muslim commentators likewise used the term Allah for the Biblical concept of God. Ibn Qutayba writes "You cannot serve both Allah and Mammon.". However, Muslim translators of the Middle East, North Africa, and Asia rarely translated the Tetragrammaton, referring to the supreme being in Israelite tradition, as Allah. Instead, most commentators either translated Yahweh as either yahwah or rabb, the latter corresponding to the Jewish custom to refer to Yahweh as Adonai.
Most Quran commentators, including al-Tabari (d. 923), al-Zamakhshari (d. 1143/44), and al-Razi (d. 1209), regard Allah to be a proper name. While other names of God in Islam denote attributes or adjectives, the term Allah specifically refers to his essence as his real name (ism'alam li-dhatih). The other names are known as the 99 Names of Allah (al-asmā' al-ḥusná lit. meaning: 'the best names' or 'the most beautiful names') and considered attributes, each of which evoke a distinct characteristic of Allah. All these names refer to Allah, the supreme and all-comprehensive divine name. Among the 99 names of God, the most famous and most frequent of these names are "the Merciful" (ar-Raḥmān) and "the Compassionate" (ar-Raḥīm), including the forementioned above al-Aḥad ("the One, the Indivisible") and al-Wāḥid ("the Unique, the Single").
According to Islamic belief, Allah is the most common word to represent God, and humble submission to his will, divine ordinances and commandments is the pivot of the Muslim faith. "He is the only God, creator of the universe, and the judge of humankind." "He is unique (wāḥid) and inherently one (aḥad), all-merciful and omnipotent." No human eyes can see Allah till the Day Of Judgement. The Qur'an declares "the reality of Allah, His inaccessible mystery, His various names, and His actions on behalf of His creatures." Allah does not depend on anything. Allah is not considered a part of the Christian Trinity. God has no parents and no children.
The concept correlates to the Tawhid, where chapter 112 of the Qur'an (Al-'Ikhlās, The Sincerity) reads:
Say, God is one God;
the eternal God:
He begetteth not, neither is He begotten:
and there is not any one like unto Him.
In a Sufi practice known as dhikr Allah (Arabic: ذكر الله, lit. "Remembrance of God"), the Sufi repeats and contemplates the name Allah or other associated divine names to Him while controlling his or her breath. | https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Allah |
Muslim conquest of Transoxiana | Pursuing the Sasanian shah, Yazdegerd III, the Arabs under Abdallah ibn Amir and his lieutenant, Ahnaf ibn Qais, entered Khorasan in 651. Abandoned by his local governors, who resented his overbearing demands and harboured designs for autonomy, Yazdegerd was killed by a local peasant. The local Persian resistance was defeated by the Arabs, despite the intervention of the Hephthalites of Herat. The Arabs imposed tribute on the Persian governors and cities of Khorasan, before marching on Herat, whose ruler likewise agreed to the payment of tribute. Ahnaf was then sent to invade Tokharistan in 652 with 4,000 Arabs and 1,000 Iranian converts (mawali). The city of Marw al-Rudh was forced to capitulate and become a tributary ally of the Arabs. When marching against Lower Tokharistan, Ahnaf was opposed by the united forces of the local princes, reportedly 30,000 men, and suffered heavy losses. A second expedition under al-Aqra ibn Habis was able to defeat the prince of Juzjan, and occupy Juzjan, Faryab, Talaqan, and Balkh. Detachments of Arabs plundered far and wide, some reaching as far as Khwarizm.
With the onset of winter, Ibn Amir left only 4,000 men at Marw, and returned to his base in Iraq. In 654, the Arabs reportedly raided the town of Mayamurgh in Sogdia, but their position was shaky: the Arab garrisons were very small, and the loyalty of the local princes dubious. As the historian Michael G. Morony emphasizes, their promises of tribute were more a "temporary expedient to secure their own positions, sometimes, against local rivals, with Muslim military backing", and not a firm commitment to the Arab cause. Furthermore, until the early 8th century, Muslim forces in the region were usually outnumbered by those of the native rulers; while they sufficed to subdue individual cities and force them to pay tribute, the Arab armies were unable to impose permanent control on the native principalities. As a result, very soon after Ibn Amir's departure, the local population, led by a certain Qarin (possibly a member of the House of Karen), rose in revolt. Ibn Amir reacted with alacrity, sending generals to the region who scored some success—the rebel leader Qarin was captured or killed and Muslim armies campaigned as far as Bust and Zabul in what is now southern Afghanistan. Nevertheless, with the outbreak of the First Fitna (656–661), Arab authority collapsed across Khorasan. According to Chinese sources, the princes of Tokharistan restored Yazdegerd III's son Peroz as titular king of Persia for a time. Preoccupied with their civil war the Arabs were unable to react, although raiding expeditions continue to be recorded in 655–658. | https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Muslim_conquest_of_Transoxiana |
Education in Lebanon | Secondary education is three years education, the first year is common for all students, and the second year is either scientific or literature whereas the third year composes of (humanities, economics, life sciences, general sciences) and technical education (about 55 different fields of study). Most schools, however have deviated from this system. They usually do not offer Humanities education, citing socio-economics as a better and more efficient alternative School principals decide students’ path based on students’ aptitude as shown by the first secondary and second secondary years. When students complete three years education, they take official Lebanese Baccalaureate exams in their respective tracks (four in all). Students who finish examinations successfully obtain the Lebanese Baccalaureate Certificate of Secondary Education (Shahaadat Al-Bakaalouriya al Lubnaaniya l’il-ta ‘liim al-Thaanawi) or the Technical Baccalaureate (Al-Bakaalouriya al-Finniya) In 2014, the Minister of Education passed all students who took the exam, regardless of their score.
According to the United Nations Human Development Index, the gross enrollment rate for secondary school is 74%.
Palestinian refugees in Lebanon have limited access to public secondary education. Most of them are not able to afford the high cost of private secondary education. UNRWA operates three secondary schools in Beirut, Saida and Tyre. School operated by UNRWA partially offset the absence of available educational opportunities at the secondary school level. (UNRWA website)
According to the World Bank database, gross enrollment rate of secondary education is 69.8 percent for male, 80.2 percent for female, and 74.9 percent for total. According to UIS database, technical and vocational enrollment as percent of total enrollment in secondary level is 27.8 percent in 2008. Private enrollment share of general education in intermediate level is 49.8 percent and that of technical and vocational education is 56.9 percent in 2008.
Lebanon participated in TIMSS in 2003 and 2007. Score of mathematics at 8th grade is 433 in 2003 and 449 in 2007. Score of science at 8th grade is 435 in 2003 and 404 in 2007.
At the end of middle school, each student has to enter the official exams. | https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Education_in_Lebanon |
Abu Ghraib prison | From 2003 until August 2006, Abu Ghraib prison was used for detention purposes by both the U.S.-led coalition forces and the Iraqi government. The Iraqi government has controlled the area of the facility known as "The Hard Site". The prison was used to house only convicted criminals. Suspected criminals, insurgents or those arrested and awaiting trial were held at other facilities, commonly known as "camps" in U.S. military parlance. The U.S. housed all its detainees at "Camp Redemption", which is divided into five security levels. This camp built in the summer of 2004 replaced the three-level setup of Camp Ganci, Camp Vigilant and Abu Ghraib's Tier 1. The remainder of the facility was occupied by the U.S. military.
Abu Ghraib served as both a FOB (Forward Operating Base) and a detention facility. When the U.S. military was using the Abu Ghraib prison as a detention facility, it housed approximately 7,490 prisoners there in March 2004. Later population of detainees was much smaller, because Camp Redemption had a much smaller capacity than Camp Ganci had, and many detainees have been sent from Abu Ghraib to Camp Bucca for this reason. The U.S. military initially held all "persons of interest" in Camp Redemption. Some were suspected rebels, and some suspected criminals. Those convicted by trial in Iraqi court are transferred to the Iraqi-run Hard Site.
In the Abu Ghraib torture and prisoner abuse scandal, reserve soldiers from the 372nd Military Police Company were charged under the Uniform Code of Military Justice with prisoner abuse, beginning with an Army Criminal Investigation Division investigation on January 14, 2004. In April 2004, U.S. television news-magazine 60 Minutes reported on a story from the magazine The New Yorker, which recounted torture and humiliation of Iraqi detainees by U.S. soldiers and contracted civilians. The story included photographs depicting the abuse of prisoners. The events created a substantial political scandal within the U.S. and other coalition countries.
On April 20, 2004, insurgents fired 40 mortar rounds into the prison, killing 24 detainees and injuring 92. Commentators thought the attack was either an attempt to incite a riot or retribution for detainees' cooperating with the United States. In May 2004, the U.S.-led coalition embarked on a prisoner-release policy to reduce numbers to fewer than 2,000. The U.S. military released nearly 1,000 detainees at the prison during the week ending August 27, 2005, at the request of the Iraqi government. In a May 24, 2004 address at the U.S. Army War College, President George W. Bush announced that the prison would be demolished. On June 14 Iraqi interim President Ghazi Mashal Ajil al-Yawer said he opposed this decision; on June 21 U.S. military judge Col. James Pohl ruled the prison was a crime scene and could not be demolished until investigations and trials were completed.
On April 2, 2005, the prison was attacked by more than 60 insurgents in the engagement known as the Battle of Abu Ghraib. In the two hours before being forced to retreat, the attackers suffered at least 50 casualties according to the U.S. military. Thirty-six persons at or in the prison, including U.S. military personnel, civilians and detainees, were injured in the attack. The attackers used small arms, rockets, and RPGs as weapons, and threw grenades over the walls. A suicide VBIED detonated just outside the front wall after Marines fired on it. Officials believe that the car bomb was intended to breach the prison wall, enabling an assault and/or mass escape for detainees. Insurgents also attacked military forces nearby on highways en route to the prison for reinforcement and used ambushes along the roads. Al Qaeda in Iraq claimed responsibility. | https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Abu_Ghraib_prison |
State religion | Jurisdictions where a Lutheran church has been fully or partially established as a state recognized religion include the Nordic States.
Denmark: Section 4 of the Constitution of Denmark confirms the Church of Denmark as the established church.
Faroe Islands: The Church of the Faroe Islands is the state church of the Faroe Islands, an autonomous administrative division within the Danish Realm.
Greenland: The Church of Denmark is the state church of Greenland, an autonomous administrative division within the Danish Realm.
Iceland: The Constitution of Iceland confirms the Church of Iceland as the state church of Iceland.
Norway: Until 2012, the Church of Norway was not a separate legal entity from the government. It was disestablished and became a national church, a legally distinct entity from the state with special constitutional status. The King of Norway is required by the Constitution to be a member of the Church of Norway, and the church is regulated by special canon law, unlike other religions.
Jurisdictions that give various degrees of recognition in their constitutions to Lutheranism without establishing it as the state religion:
Finland: The Evangelical Lutheran Church of Finland has a special relationship with the Finnish state, its internal structure being described in a special law, the Church Act. The Church Act can be amended only by a decision of the synod of the Evangelical Lutheran Church and subsequent ratification by the Parliament of Finland. The Church Act is protected by the Constitution of Finland and the state cannot change the Church Act without changing the constitution. The church has the power to tax its members. The state collects these taxes for the church, for a fee. On the other hand, the church is required to give a burial place for everyone in its graveyards. The President of Finland also decides the themes for intercession days. The church does not consider itself a state church, as the Finnish state does not have the power to influence its internal workings or its theology, although it has a veto in those changes of the internal structure which require changing the Church Act. Neither does the Finnish state accord any precedence to Lutherans or the Lutheran faith in its own acts.
Sweden: The Church of Sweden was the state church of Sweden between 1527 when King Gustav Vasa broke all ties with Rome and 2000 when the state officially became secular. Much like in Finland, it does have a special relation to the Swedish state unlike any other religious organizations. For example, there is a special law that regulates certain aspects of the church and the members of the royal family are required to belong to it in order to have a claim to the line of succession. A majority of the population still belongs to the Church of Sweden. | https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/State_religion |
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Anatolian Seljuk architecture | The Seljuk Turks created the Seljuk Empire in the 11th century, conquering all of Iran and other extensive territories from the Hindu Kush to eastern Anatolia and from Central Asia to the Persian Gulf. In 1071, following the Seljuk victory over the Byzantine Empire at the Battle of Manzikert, Anatolia was opened up to Turkic settlers. The center of Seljuk architectural patronage was Iran, where the first permanent Seljuk edifices were constructed.
After the decline of the Great Seljuks in the late 12th century, various Turkic dynasties formed smaller states and empires. A branch of the Seljuk dynasty ruled a Sultanate in Anatolia (also known as the Anatolian Seljuks or Seljuks of Rum), the Zengids and Artuqids ruled in Northern Mesopotomia (known as the Jazira) and nearby regions, and the Khwarazmian Empire ruled over Iran and Central Asia until the Mongol invasions of the 13th century. In addition to the Anatolian Seljuks, with their capital at Konya, other local dynasties and principalities existed across Anatolia such as the Danishmendids at Kayseri and Sivas, the Saltuqids at Erzurum, and the Mengujekids in Divriği and Erzincan. During the second half of the 12th century and the beginning of the 13th century these other principalities were progressively conquered or assimilated by the Seljuks of Konya. The Danishmendid realm was annexed in 1178, the Saltuqid realm was annexed in 1202, and the Menjukids became an allied local dynasty related to the Konya Seljuks by marriage.
The golden age of the Anatolian Seljuk empire followed in the early 13th century. During the first half of their rule, the Anatolian Seljuks did not engage in much construction activity as they contended with military conflicts and were trying to establish themselves. After they attained political stability, they directed more of their energy towards building and developing a unique architectural style. Under the patronage of the Anatolian Seljuks, the Artuqids, and other local dynasties, both indigenous Christian architectural traditions – such as Byzantine, Armenian, and Georgian – and regional Islamic architectural traditions – such as those of Syria, Iraq, Iran, and Central Asia – were synthesized into a highly inventive and original style, with further local variations under some dynasties.
Anatolian Seljuk architecture is concentrated in major cities of the period such as Konya (their main capital), Kayseri, Sivas, Niğde, and Erzurum, but Seljuk works can be found in almost any major Anatolian town in Central and Eastern Anatolia. Along the coasts, the Seljuks occupied Antalya and Sinop and built a new fortified port at Alanya. Smaller Turkish principalities in Anatolia, such as the Danishmendids and the Saltuqids who were conquered by the Seljuks, nonetheless also contributed to the architecture of Anatolia during this era. The Zengids and Artuqids, who had initially served the Great Seljuks before controlling their own realms, also turned cities like Mosul, Diyarbakir, Hasankeyf, and Mardin into important centers of architectural development that had a long-term influence in the wider regions of Anatolia and Syria.
Anatolian Seljuk authority declined after their defeat at the hands of the Mongols in the Battle of Köse Dağ in 1243. In eastern Anatolia the Mongol Ilkhanids ruled indirectly through Seljuk vassals at first, before taking direct control after 1308. Smaller principalities and emirates emerged locally again, known collectively as the Beyliks. Even as the Seljuk empire was weakening in the thirteenth century, their intense building activity did not stop. Despite the decline of Seljuk power, the Seljuk tradition of architecture largely persisted and continued to evolve under new rulers and patrons. The attachment of a large part of Anatolia to the Ilkhanid Empire may have also renewed artistic connections with Iran, the center of that empire. For example, the construction of monumental portals flanked by two minarets is attested in earlier Iranian Seljuk monuments but did not appear in Anatolian Seljuk monuments until after the Mongol conquest. In central and eastern Anatolia, under dynasties like the Karamanids and the Eretnids, architecture remained fairly traditional. In western Anatolia, Turkish principalities such as Saruhanids, the Beylik of Aydın, and the Menteşe Beylik all existed on the Byzantine frontier in a region with many ancient Greek and Roman monuments. As a result, architecture here experimented with both Seljuk elements and Byzantine and Mediterranean traditions. One of the local Turkish dynasties, the Ottomans, eventually went on to establish the Ottoman Empire and developed a style of Ottoman architecture. | https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Anatolian_Seljuk_architecture |
Medina quarter | Prior to the rise and intrusion of European colonial rule in North Africa, the region was home to many major cities which had long been centres of culture, commerce, and political power over many centuries.
In Algeria, the French conquest that began in 1830 and brought the country under colonial control resulted in significant destruction of the urban fabric of its historic cities. Colonial rule also led to the dismantling of many traditional urban institutions, the disruption of local culture, and even a certain level of depopulation over time. Fewer cities have preserved their pre-colonial urban fabric in Algeria by comparison with neighbouring countries, but significant remains have been preserved in historic cities such as Algiers, Tlemcen, Nedroma, and Constantine, as well as in many Saharan towns.: 100 In Algiers, most of the historic lower town was demolished and remodeled along European lines after the French conquest. The only part of the old city that remained relatively untouched was the upper town, which contained the citadel (qasaba) and the former residence of the rulers, and thus became known as the "Casbah" of Algiers.: 237
The fate of traditional walled cities in Tunisia and Morocco, which also came under French colonial rule over the next hundred years, was quite different.: 69 The French conquest of Tunisia took place in 1881 and resulted in the establishment of a French "Protectorate", while nominally retaining the existing Tunisian monarchy. In Tunisia the French generally built new planned cities (the Villes Nouvelles) outside the established historic cities. These new planned towns were almost exclusively inhabited by European colonists while the indigenous population predominantly resided in the old districts, resulting in a certain level of racial segregation during the colonial period. Some French assimilationist policies, as witnessed in Algeria, were also implemented in Tunisia. In Tunis, the old city was preserved but it was physically linked with the European town, making it easier to police, while its traditional economic and administrative systems were marginalized, rendering it dependent on the European districts. The most important preserved historic towns or medinas today include those of Tunis, Kairouan, Mahdia, Sfax, and Sousse.
In Morocco, the Treaty of Fes established another French Protectorate over that country in 1912. The first French resident general in Morocco, Hubert Lyautey, appointed Henri Prost to oversee the urban development of cities under his control. One important colonial policy with long-term consequences was the decision to largely forego development of existing historic cities and to deliberately preserve them as sites of historic heritage, the "medinas". The French administration again built new planned cities outside the old walled cities, where European settlers largely resided with modern Western-style amenities. This was part of a larger "policy of association" adopted by Lyautey which favoured various forms of indirect colonial rule by preserving local institutions and elites, in contrast with other French colonial policies favouring assimilation. The desire to preserve historic cities was also consistent with one of the trends in European ideas about urban planning at the time which argued for the preservation of historic cities in Europe – ideas which Lyautey himself favored. Scholar Janet Abu-Lughod has argued that French urban policies and regulations created a kind of urban "apartheid" between the indigenous Moroccan urban areas – which were forced to remain stagnant in terms of urban development – and the new planned cities which were mainly inhabited by Europeans and expanded to occupy rural lands outside the city which were formerly used by Moroccans. This separation was partly softened by wealthy Moroccans who started moving into the Villes Nouvelles during the colonial period. | https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Medina_quarter |
Faisal I of Iraq | On 23 October 1916 at Hamra in Wadi Safra, Faisal met Captain T. E. Lawrence, a junior British intelligence officer from Cairo. Lawrence, who envisioned an independent post-war Arabian state, sought the right man to lead the Hashemite forces and achieve this. In 1916–18, Faisal headed the Northern Army of the rebellion that confronted the Ottomans in what was to later become western Saudi Arabia, Jordan and Syria. In 1917, Faisal, desiring an empire for himself instead of conquering one for his father, attempted to negotiate an arrangement with the Ottomans under which he would rule the Ottoman vilayets of Syria and Mosul as an Ottoman vassal. In December 1917 Faisal contacted General Djemal Pasha declaring his willingness to defect to the Ottoman side provided they would give him an empire to rule, saying the Sykes–Picot agreement had disillusioned him in the Allies and he now wanted to work with his fellow Muslims. Only the unwillingness of the Three Pashas to subcontract ruling part of the Ottoman Empire to Faisal kept him loyal to his father when it finally dawned on him that the Ottomans were just trying to divide and conquer the Hashemite forces.
In his book Seven Pillars of Wisdom, Lawrence sought to put the best gloss on Faisal's double-dealing as it would contradict the image he was seeking to promote of Faisal as a faithful friend of the Allies betrayed by the British and the French, claiming that Faisal was only seeking to divide the "nationalist" and "Islamist" factions in the ruling Committee of Union and Progress (CUP). The Israeli historians Efraim Karsh and his wife Inari wrote that the veracity of Lawrence's account is open to question given that the major dispute within the CUP was not between the Islamist Djemal Pasha and the nationalist Mustafa Kemal as claimed by Lawrence, but rather between Enver Pasha and Djemal Pasha.
In the spring of 1918, after Germany launched Operation Michael on 21 March 1918, which appeared for a time to foreordain the defeat of the Allies, Faisal again contacted Djemal Pasha asking for peace provided that he be allowed to rule Syria as an Ottoman vassal, which Djemal, confident of victory, declined to consider. After a 30-month-long siege, he conquered Medina, defeating the defence organised by Fakhri Pasha and looted the city. Emir Faisal also worked with the Allies during World War I in their conquest of the region of Syria and the capture of Damascus in October 1918. Faisal became part of a new Arab government at Damascus, formed after the capture of that city in 1918. Emir Faisal's role in the Arab Revolt was described by Lawrence in Seven Pillars of Wisdom. However, the accuracy of that book, not least the importance given by the author to his own contribution during the Revolt, has been criticized by some historians, including David Fromkin. | https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Faisal_I_of_Iraq |
Sharia | Jonathan A.C. Brown says:
The vast majority of the ulama across the Sunni schools of law inherited the Prophet's unease over domestic violence and placed further restrictions on the evident meaning of the 'Wife Beating Verse'. A leading Meccan scholar from the second generation of Muslims, Ata' bin Abi Rabah, counseled a husband not to beat his wife even if she ignored him but rather to express his anger in some other way. Darimi, a teacher of both Tirmidhi and Muslim bin Hajjaj as well as a leading early scholar in Iran, collected all the Hadiths showing Muhammad's disapproval of beating in a chapter entitled 'The Prohibition on Striking Women'. A thirteenth-century scholar from Granada, Ibn Faras, notes that one camp of ulama had staked out a stance forbidding striking a wife altogether, declaring it contrary to the Prophet's example and denying the authenticity of any Hadiths that seemed to permit beating. Even Ibn Hajar, the pillar of late medieval Sunni Hadith scholarship, concludes that, contrary to what seems to be an explicit command in the Qur'an, the Hadiths of the Prophet leave no doubt that striking one's wife to discipline her actually falls under the Shariah ruling of 'strongly disliked' or 'disliked verging on prohibited'.
The Surah 4:34, in the Quran, has been debated for domestic violence and also has been the subject to varied interpretations. According to some interpretations, Sharia condones certain forms of domestic violence against women, when a husband suspects nushuz (disobedience, disloyalty, rebellion, ill conduct) in his wife only after admonishing and staying away from the bed does not work. These interpretations have been criticized as inconsistent with women's rights in domestic abuse cases. Musawah, CEDAW, KAFA and other organizations have proposed ways to modify Sharia-inspired laws to improve women's rights in Muslim-majority nations, including women's rights in domestic abuse cases.
Others believe that wife-beating is not consistent with a more modernist perspective of the Quran. Many Imams and scholars who learned Shariah in traditional Islamic seminaries object to the misuse of this verse to justify domestic violence. Muslims for White Ribbon Campaign was launched in 2010 with Imams and Muslim leaders committing to join with others to work to end violence against women. Khutbah campaigns were held in many parts of the world to speak out against domestic violence and encourage Muslim congregants to eradicate domestic abuse. | https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Sharia |
2022 Tunisian constitutional referendum | As a result of the highly fractured parliament from the 2019 Tunisian parliamentary election—which saw the largest party, Ennahda, receive less than half of the 109 seats required for a legislative majority—a coalition was formed in February 2020 of five parties and several independents, with Elyes Fakhfakh as Prime Minister. Only five months later, in July, the coalition collapsed when Ennahda withdrew following a conflict with Prime Minister Fakhfakh. A new cabinet of mostly technocrats was then formed under Hichem Mechichi.
On 25 July 2021, upon the collapse of the coalition government, violent demonstrations against the government took place across Tunisia to demand that basic services be provided amid the growing COVID-19 outbreak, the dissolution of the Assembly of the Representatives of the People, and a change of regime. In response to the protests and threats on his power, President Saied suspended the Assembly for thirty days, relieved Prime Minister Mechichi of his duties, waived the immunity of Assembly members, closed the offices of various foreign news agencies, and ordered the military to close the Assembly house. Saied's actions were widely seen, both nationally and internationally, as those of a coup d'etat. His actions directly disregarded Article 80 of the Tunisian constitution, which stated that the Assembly could not be suspended and that before declaring a state of emergency, the president was required to consult his prime minister and the head of the Assembly. At the time, there was no constitutional court in the nation to assess the legality of Saied's interpretation of the constitution.
On 29 September, President Saied instructed Prime Minister Najla Bouden to form a new government. From 15 January to 20 March 2022, an electronic consultation was conducted on the reforms to be proposed in anticipation of the referendum. During the consultation, which had very low turnout, the options of a transition to a presidential system and to a uninominal majority ballot for legislative elections received the most support. On 30 March 2022, 120 deputies under the chairmanship of the second vice president of the Assembly, Tarek Fetiti, met in a virtual session to vote to end the exceptional measures in force since 25 July. That same day, President Saied dissolved the Assembly, against constitutional procedure, and threatened the deputies with legal proceedings. About one month later, on 22 April 2022, President Saied passed a decree-law that assigned to the President of the Republic the responsibility of appointing the seven members and spokesperson of the national election committee, the Independent High Authority for Elections (ISIE). A former president of the ISIE, Nabil Bafoun, criticized this law as undermining the independence of the ISIE in violation of international standards.
On 1 June 2022, another decree-law was signed, modifying much of the law relating to elections and referendums. Per the new law, the ISIE became responsible for maintaining voter registration that would be "accurate, transparent, complete and up-to-date". Upon the passing of this law, a constitutional referendum was announced for 25 July 2022, despite criticism from the opposition, in order to make Saied's changes official. | https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/2022_Tunisian_constitutional_referendum |
History of Islamic economics | Burke, Edmund (June 2009). "Islam at the Center: Technological Complexes and the Roots of Modernity". Journal of World History. 20 (2). University of Hawaii Press: 165–186. doi:10.1353/jwh.0.0045. S2CID 143484233.
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Turkish people | During the 11th century, the Seljuk Turks, who were influenced by Persian civilization in many ways, grew in strength and succeeded in taking the eastern province of the Abbasid Empire. By 1055, the Seljuks captured Baghdad and began to make their first incursions into Anatolia. When they won the Battle of Manzikert against the Byzantine Empire in 1071, it opened the gates of Anatolia to them. Although ethnically Turkish, the Seljuk Turks appreciated and became carriers of Persian culture rather than Turkish culture. Nonetheless, the Turkish language and Islam were introduced and gradually spread over the region and the slow transition from a predominantly Christian and Greek-speaking Anatolia to a predominantly Muslim and Turkish-speaking one was underway.
In dire straits, the Byzantine Empire turned to the West for help, setting in motion the pleas that led to the First Crusade. Once the Crusaders took Iznik, the Seljuk Turks established the Sultanate of Rum from their new capital, Konya, in 1097. By the 12th century, Europeans had begun to call the Anatolian region Turchia or Turkey, the land of the Turks. The Turkish society in Anatolia was divided into urban, rural and nomadic populations; other Turkoman (Turkmen) tribes who had arrived into Anatolia at the same time as the Seljuks kept their nomadic ways. These tribes were more numerous than the Seljuks, and rejecting the sedentary lifestyle, adhered to an Islam impregnated with animism and shamanism from their Central Asian steppeland origins, which then mixed with new Christian influences. From this popular and syncretist Islam, with its mystical and revolutionary aspects, sects such as the Alevis and Bektashis emerged. Furthermore, intermarriage between the Turks and local inhabitants, as well as the conversion of many to Islam, also increased the Turkish-speaking Muslim population in Anatolia.
By 1243, at the Battle of Köse Dağ, the Mongols defeated the Seljuk Turks and became the new rulers of Anatolia, and in 1256, the second Mongol invasion of Anatolia caused widespread destruction. Particularly after 1277, political stability within the Seljuk territories rapidly disintegrated, leading to the strengthening of Turkoman principalities in the western and southern parts of Anatolia called the "beyliks". | https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Turkish_people |
Head of state | Sometimes multiple individuals are co-equal heads of state, or a corporate person embodies the functions of head of state. In some cases precedence rotates among the members of the collective as the term of office progresses. Of multiple royal systems, a diarchy, in which two rulers is the constitutional norm, may be distinguished from a coregency, in which a monarchy experiences an exceptional period of multiple rulers. Examples of collective republican systems include nominal triumvirates; the French Directory of the 1790s; the seven-member Swiss Federal Council, where each member acts in turn as President for one year; the Presidency of Bosnia and Herzegovina with members from three nations; the two Captains Regent of San Marino, which maintains the tradition of Italian medieval republics that had always had an even number of consuls.
In the Roman Republic there were two heads of state, styled consul, both of whom alternated months of authority during their year in office, similarly there was an even number of supreme magistrates in the Italic republics of Ancient Age. In the Athenian Republic there were nine supreme magistrates, styled archons. In Carthage there were two supreme magistrates, styled kings or suffetes (judges). In ancient Sparta there were two hereditary kings, belonging to two dynasties.
In the Soviet Union, the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet (between 1938 and 1989) served as the collective head of state. After World War II the Soviet model was subsequently adopted by almost all countries belonged to its sphere of influence. Czechoslovakia remained the only country among them that retained an office of president as a form of a single head of state throughout this period; Poland and Hungary, which initially had western-style constitutions (and therefore, western-style presidencies), switched to the presidium model with the adoption of new Soviet-influenced constitutions; Romania, which was a monarchy before the Soviet takeover, was the only country to move to a unitary presidency from a collective head of state, a move done by dictator Nicolae Ceausescu in 1974.
A modern example of a collective head of state is the Sovereignty Council of Sudan, the interim ruling council of Sudan. The Sovereignty Council comprises 11 ministers, who together have exercised all governmental functions for Sudan since the fall of President Omar Al-Bashir. Decisions are made either by consensus or by a super majority vote (8 members).
The National Government of the Republic of China, established in 1928, had a panel of about 40 people as collective head of state. Though beginning that year, a provisional constitution made the Kuomintang the sole government party and the National Government bound to the instructions of the Central Executive Committee of that party. | https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Head_of_state |
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