title stringlengths 2 79 | passage stringlengths 2.2k 39.3k | link stringlengths 32 109 |
|---|---|---|
Second Intifada | Palestinians have claimed that Sharon's visit was the beginning of the Second Intifada, while others have claimed that Yasser Arafat had pre-planned the uprising.
Some, like Bill Clinton, say that tensions were high due to failed negotiations at the Camp David Summit in July 2000. They note that there were Israeli casualties as early as 27 September; this is the Israeli "conventional wisdom", according to Jeremy Pressman, and the view expressed by the Israeli Foreign Ministry. Most mainstream media outlets have taken the view that the Sharon visit was the spark that triggered the rioting at the start of the Second Intifada. In the first five days of rioting and clashes after the visit, Israeli police and security forces killed 47 Palestinians and wounded 1885, while Palestinians killed 5 Israelis.
Palestinians view the Second Intifada as part of their ongoing struggle for national liberation and an end to Israeli occupation, whereas many Israelis consider it to be a wave of Palestinian terrorism instigated and pre-planned by then Palestinian leader Yasser Arafat.
Support for the idea that Arafat planned the uprising comes from Hamas leader Mahmoud al-Zahar, who said in September 2010 that when Arafat realized that the Camp David Summit in July 2000 would not result in the meeting of all of his demands, he ordered Hamas as well as Fatah and the Aqsa Martyrs Brigades, to launch "military operations" against Israel. Al-Zahar is corroborated by Mosab Hassan Yousef, son of the Hamas founder and leader, Sheikh Hassan Yousef, who claims that the Second Intifada was a political maneuver premeditated by Arafat. Yousef claims that "Arafat had grown extraordinarily wealthy as the international symbol of victimhood. He wasn't about to surrender that status and take on the responsibility of actually building a functioning society."
David Samuels quoted Mamduh Nofal, former military commander of the Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine, who supplied more evidence of pre-28 September military preparations. Nofal recounts that Arafat "told us, Now we are going to the fight, so we must be ready". Barak as early as May had drawn up contingency plans to halt any intifada in its tracks by the extensive use of IDF snipers, a tactic that resulted in the high number of casualties among Palestinians during the first days of rioting.
Arafat's widow Suha Arafat reportedly said on Dubai television in December 2012 that her husband had planned the uprising: "Immediately after the failure of the Camp David [negotiations], I met him in Paris upon his return.... Camp David had failed, and he said to me, 'You should remain in Paris.' I asked him why, and he said, 'Because I am going to start an intifada. They want me to betray the Palestinian cause. They want me to give up on our principles, and I will not do so,'" the research institute [MEMRI] translated Suha as saying.
Israel's unilateral pullout from Lebanon in the summer of 2000 was, according to Philip Mattar, interpreted by the Arabs as an Israeli defeat and had a profound influence on tactics adopted in the Al Aqsa Intifada. PLO official Farouk Kaddoumi told reporters: "We are optimistic. Hezbollah's resistance can be used as an example for other Arabs seeking to regain their rights." Many Palestinian officials have gone on record as saying that the intifada had been planned long in advance to put pressure on Israel. It is disputed however whether Arafat himself gave direct orders for the outbreak, though he did not intervene to put a brake on it A personal advisor to Arafat, Manduh Nufal, claimed in early 2001 that the Palestinian Authority had played a crucial role in the outbreak of the Intifada. Israeli's military response demolished a large part of the infrastructure built by the PA during the years following the Oslo Accords in preparation for a Palestinian state. This infrastructure included the legitimate arming of Palestinian forces for the first time: some 90 paramilitary camps had been set up to train Palestinian youths in armed conflict. Some 40,000 armed and trained Palestinians existed in the occupied territories.
On 29 September 2001 Marwan Barghouti, the leader of the Fatah Tanzim in an interview to Al-Hayat, described his role in the lead up to the intifada.
I knew that the end of September was the last period (of time) before the explosion, but when Sharon reached the al-Aqsa Mosque, this was the most appropriate moment for the outbreak of the intifada.... The night prior to Sharon's visit, I participated in a panel on a local television station and I seized the opportunity to call on the public to go to the al-Aqsa Mosque in the morning, for it was not possible that Sharon would reach al-Haram al-Sharif just so, and walk away peacefully. I finished and went to al-Aqsa in the morning.... We tried to create clashes without success because of the differences of opinion that emerged with others in the al-Aqsa compound at the time.... After Sharon left, I remained for two hours in the presence of other people, we discussed the manner of response and how it was possible to react in all the cities (bilad) and not just in Jerusalem. We contacted all (the Palestinian) factions.
Barghouti also went on record as stating that the example of Hezbollah and Israel's withdrawal from Lebanon was a factor which contributed to the Intifada.
According to Nathan Thrall, from Elliott Abrams's inside accounts of negotiations between 2001 and 2005, it would appear to be an inescapable conclusion that violence played an effective role in shaking Israeli complacency and furthering Palestinian goals: the U.S. endorsed the idea of a Palestinian State, Ariel Sharon became the first Israeli Prime Minister to affirm the same idea, and even spoke of Israel's "occupation", and the bloodshed was such that Sharon also decided to withdraw from Gaza, an area he long imagined Israel keeping. However, Zakaria Zubeidi, former leader of the Al-Aqsa Martyrs' Brigades, considers the Intifada to be a total failure that achieved nothing for the Palestinians. | https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Second_Intifada |
Six-Day War | Israel was to gain almost total control of the West Bank by the evening of 7 June, and began its military occupation of the West Bank on that day, issuing a military order, the "Proclamation Regarding Law and Administration (The West Bank Area) (No. 2)—1967", which established the military government in the West Bank and granted the commander of the area full legislative, executive, and judicial power. Jordan had realised that it had no hope of defence as early as the morning of 6 June, just a day after the conflict had begun. At Nasser's request, Egypt's Abdul Munim Riad sent a situation update at midday on 6 June:
The situation on the West Bank is rapidly deteriorating. A concentrated attack has been launched on all axes, together with heavy fire, day and night. Jordanian, Syrian and Iraqi air forces in position H3 have been virtually destroyed. Upon consultation with King Hussein I have been asked to convey to you the following choices:
1. A political decision to cease fighting to be imposed by a third party (the USA, the Soviet Union or the Security Council).
2. To vacate the West Bank tonight.
3. To go on fighting for one more day, resulting in the isolation and destruction of the entire Jordanian Army.
King Hussein has asked me to refer this matter to you for an immediate reply.
An Egyptian order for Jordanian forces to withdraw across the Jordan River was issued at 10 am on 6 June; however that afternoon King Hussein learned of the impending United Nations Security Council Resolution 233 and decided instead to hold out in the hope that a ceasefire would be implemented soon. It was already too late, as the counter-order caused confusion and in many cases, it was not possible to regain positions that had previously been left.
On 7 June, Dayan ordered his troops not to enter the Old City but, upon hearing that the UN was about to declare a ceasefire, he changed his mind, and without cabinet clearance, decided to capture it. Two paratroop battalions attacked Augusta-Victoria Hill, high ground overlooking the Old City from the east. One battalion attacked from Mount Scopus, and another attacked from the valley between it and the Old City. Another paratroop battalion, personally led by Gur, broke into the Old City and was joined by the other two battalions after their missions were complete. The paratroopers met little resistance. The fighting was conducted solely by the paratroopers; the Israelis did not use armour during the battle out of fear of severe damage to the Old City.
In the north, a battalion from Peled's division checked Jordanian defences in the Jordan Valley. A brigade from Peled's division captured the western part of the West Bank. One brigade attacked Jordanian artillery positions around Jenin, which were shelling Ramat David Airbase. The Jordanian 12th Armored Battalion, which outnumbered the Israelis, held off repeated attempts to capture Jenin. However, Israeli air attacks took their toll, and the Jordanian M48 Pattons, with their external fuel tanks, proved vulnerable at short distances, even to the Israeli-modified Shermans. Twelve Jordanian tanks were destroyed, and only six remained operational.
Just after dusk, Israeli reinforcements arrived. The Jordanians continued to fiercely resist, and the Israelis were unable to advance without artillery and air support. One Israeli jet attacked the Jordanian commander's tank, wounding him and killing his radio operator and intelligence officer. The surviving Jordanian forces then withdrew to Jenin, where they were reinforced by the 25th Infantry Brigade. The Jordanians were effectively surrounded in Jenin.
Jordanian infantry and their three remaining tanks managed to hold off the Israelis until 4:00 am, when three battalions arrived to reinforce them in the afternoon. The Jordanian tanks charged and knocked out multiple Israeli vehicles, and the tide began to shift. After sunrise, Israeli jets and artillery conducted a two-hour bombardment against the Jordanians. The Jordanians lost 10 dead and 250 wounded, and had only seven tanks left, including two without gas, and sixteen APCs. The Israelis then fought their way into Jenin and captured the city after fierce fighting.
After the Old City fell, the Jerusalem Brigade reinforced the paratroopers, and continued to the south, capturing Judea and Gush Etzion. Hebron was taken without any resistance. Fearful that Israeli soldiers would exact retribution for the 1929 massacre of the city's Jewish community, Hebron's residents flew white sheets from their windows and rooftops. The Harel Brigade proceeded eastward, descending to the Jordan River.
On 7 June, Israeli forces seized Bethlehem, taking the city after a brief battle that left some 40 Jordanian soldiers dead, with the remainder fleeing. On the same day, one of Peled's brigades seized Nablus; then it joined one of Central Command's armoured brigades to fight the Jordanian forces; as the Jordanians held the advantage of superior equipment and were equal in numbers to the Israelis.
Again, the air superiority of the IAF proved paramount as it immobilized the Jordanians, leading to their defeat. One of Peled's brigades joined with its Central Command counterparts coming from Ramallah, and the remaining two blocked the Jordan river crossings together with the Central Command's 10th. Engineering Corps sappers blew up the Abdullah and Hussein bridges with captured Jordanian mortar shells, while elements of the Harel Brigade crossed the river and occupied positions along the east bank to cover them, but quickly pulled back due to American pressure. The Jordanians, anticipating an Israeli offensive deep into Jordan, assembled the remnants of their army and Iraqi units in Jordan to protect the western approaches to Amman and the southern slopes of the Golan Heights.
As Israel continued its offensive on 7 June, taking no account of the UN ceasefire resolution, the Egyptian-Jordanian command ordered a full Jordanian withdrawal for the second time, in order to avoid an annihilation of the Jordanian army. This was complete by nightfall on 7 June.
After the Old City was captured, Dayan told his troops to "dig in" to hold it. When an armoured brigade commander entered the West Bank on his own initiative, and stated that he could see Jericho, Dayan ordered him back. It was only after intelligence reports indicated that Hussein had withdrawn his forces across the Jordan River that Dayan ordered his troops to capture the West Bank. According to Narkis:
First, the Israeli government had no intention of capturing the West Bank. On the contrary, it was opposed to it. Second, there was not any provocation on the part of the IDF. Third, the rein was only loosened when a real threat to Jerusalem's security emerged. This is truly how things happened on June 5, although it is difficult to believe. The end result was something that no one had planned. | https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Six-Day_War |
BP | In January 2010, Carl-Henric Svanberg became chairman of BP board of directors.
On 20 April 2010, the Deepwater Horizon oil spill, a major industrial accident, happened. Consequently, Bob Dudley replaced Tony Hayward as the company's CEO, serving from October 2010 to February 2020. BP announced a divestment program to sell about $38 billion worth of non-core assets to compensate its liabilities related to the accident. In July 2010, BP sold its natural gas activities in Alberta and British Columbia, Canada, to Apache Corporation. It sold its stake in the Petroperijá and Boquerón fields in Venezuela and in the Lan Tay and Lan Do fields, the Nam Con Son pipeline and terminal, and the Phu My 3 power plant in Vietnam to TNK-BP, forecourts and supply businesses in Namibia, Botswana, Zambia, Tanzania and Malawi to Puma Energy, the Wytch Farm onshore oilfield in Dorset and a package of North Sea gas assets to Perenco, natural-gas liquids business in Canada to Plains All American Pipeline LP, natural gas assets in Kansas to Linn Energy, Carson Refinery in Southern California and its ARCO retail network to Tesoro, Sunray and Hemphill gas processing plants in Texas, together with their associated gas gathering system, to Eagle Rock Energy Partners, the Texas City Refinery and associated assets to Marathon Petroleum, the Gulf of Mexico located Marlin, Dorado, King, Horn Mountain, and Holstein fields as also its stake in non-operated Diana Hoover and Ram Powell fields to Plains Exploration & Production, non-operating stake in the Draugen oil field to Norske Shell, and the UK's liquefied petroleum gas distribution business to DCC. In November 2012, the U.S. Government temporarily banned BP from bidding any new federal contracts. The ban was conditionally lifted in March 2014.
In February 2011, BP formed a partnership with Reliance Industries, taking a 30% stake in a new Indian joint-venture for an initial payment of $7.2 billion. In September 2012, BP sold its subsidiary BP Chemicals (Malaysia) Sdn. Bhd., an operator of the Kuantan purified terephthalic acid (PTA) plant in Malaysia, to Reliance Industries for $230 million. In October 2012, BP sold its stake in TNK-BP to Rosneft for $12.3 billion in cash and 18.5% of Rosneft's stock. The deal was completed on 21 March 2013. In 2012, BP acquired an acreage in the Utica Shale but these developments plans were cancelled in 2014.
In 2011–2015, BP cut down its alternative energy business. The company announced its departure from the solar energy market in December 2011 by closing its solar power business, BP Solar. In 2012, BP shut down the BP Biofuels Highlands project which was developed since 2008 to make cellulosic ethanol from emerging energy crops like switchgrass and from biomass. In 2015, BP decided to exit from other lignocellulosic ethanol businesses. It sold its stake in Vivergo to Associated British Foods. BP and DuPont also mothballed their joint biobutanol pilot plant in Saltend.
In June 2014, BP agreed to a deal worth around $20 billion to supply CNOOC with liquefied natural gas. In 2014, Statoil Fuel & Retail sold its aviation fuel business to BP. To ensure the approval of competition authorities, BP agreed to sell the former Statoil aviation fuel businesses in Copenhagen, Stockholm, Gothenburg and Malmö airports to World Fuel Services in 2015.
In 2016, BP sold its Decatur, Alabama, plant to Indorama Ventures, of Thailand. At the same year, its Norwegian daughter company BP Norge merged with Det Norske Oljeselskap to form Aker BP.
In April 2017, the company reached an agreement to sell its Forties pipeline system in the North Sea to Ineos for $250 million. The sale included terminals at Dalmeny and Kinneil, a site in Aberdeen, and the Forties Unity Platform. In 2017, the company floated its subsidiary BP Midstream Partners LP, a pipeline operator in the United States, at the New York Stock Exchange. In Argentina, BP and Bridas Corporation agreed to merge their interests in Pan American Energy and Axion Energy to form a jointly owned Pan American Energy Group.
In 2017, BP invested $200 million to acquire a 43% stake in the solar energy developer Lightsource Renewable Energy, a company which was renamed Lightsource BP. In March 2017, the company acquired Clean Energy's biomethane business and assets, including its production sites and existing supply contracts. In April 2017, its subsidiary Butamax bought an isobutanol production company Nesika Energy.
In 2018, the company purchased BHP's shale assets in Texas and Louisiana, including Petrohawk Energy, for $10.5 billion, which were integrated with its subsidiary BPX Energy. Also in 2018, BP bought a 16.5% interest in the Clair field in the UK from ConocoPhillips, increasing its share to 45.1%. BP paid £1.3 billion and gave to ConocoPhillips its 39.2% non-operated stake in the Kuparuk River Oil Field and satellite oil fields in Alaska. In December 2018, BP sold its wind assets in Texas.
In 2018, BP acquired Chargemaster, which operated the UK's largest electric vehicle charging network. In 2019, BP and Didi Chuxing formed a joint venture to build out electric vehicle charging infrastructure in China. In September 2020, BP announced it will build out a rapid charging network in London for Uber.
In January 2019, BP discovered 1 billion barrels (160×10^6 m3) oil at its Thunder Horse location in the Gulf of Mexico. The company also announced plans to spend $1.3 billion on a third phase of its Atlantis field near New Orleans. | https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/BP |
Israeli settlement | A 1996 amendment to an Israeli military order states that land privately owned can not be part of a settlement unless the land in question has been confiscated for military purposes. In 2006 Peace Now acquired a report, which it claims was leaked from the Israeli Government's Civil Administration, indicating that up to 40 percent of the land Israel plans to retain in the West Bank is privately owned by Palestinians. Peace Now called this a violation of Israeli law. Peace Now published a comprehensive report about settlements on private lands. In the wake of a legal battle, Peace Now lowered the figure to 32 percent, which the Civil Administration also denied. The Washington Post reported that "The 38-page report offers what appears to be a comprehensive argument against the Israeli government's contention that it avoids building on private land, drawing on the state's own data to make the case."
In February 2008, the Civil Administration stated that the land on which more than a third of West Bank settlements was built had been expropriated by the IDF for "security purposes." The unauthorized seizure of private Palestinian land was defined by the Civil Administration itself as 'theft.' According to B'Tselem, more than 42 percent of the West Bank are under control of the Israeli settlements, 21 percent of which was seized from private Palestinian owners, much of it in violation of the 1979 Israeli Supreme Court decision.
In 1979, the government decided to extend settlements or build new ones only on "state lands".
A secret database, drafted by a retired senior officer, Baruch Spiegel, on orders from former defense minister Shaul Mofaz, found that some settlements deemed legal by Israel were illegal outposts, and that large portions of Ofra, Elon Moreh and Beit El were built on private Palestinian land. The "Spiegel report" was revealed by Haaretz in 2009. Many settlements are largely built on private lands, without approval of the Israeli Government. According to Israel, the bulk of the land was vacant, was leased from the state, or bought fairly from Palestinian landowners.
Invoking the Absentees' Property Laws to transfer, sell or lease property in East Jerusalem owned by Palestinians who live elsewhere without compensation has been criticized both inside and outside of Israel. Opponents of the settlements claim that "vacant" land belonged to Arabs who fled or collectively to an entire village, a practice that developed under Ottoman rule. B'Tselem charged that Israel is using the absence of modern legal documents for the communal land as a legal basis for expropriating it. These "abandoned lands" are sometimes laundered through a series of fraudulent sales.
According to Amira Hass, one of the techniques used by Israel to expropriate Palestinian land is to place desired areas under a 'military firing zone' classification, and then issue orders for the evacuation of Palestinians from the villages in that range, while allowing contiguous Jewish settlements to remain unaffected. | https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Israeli_settlement |
Sudanese Greeks | When Kitchener's forces defeated the Mahdist army in 1898, they counted a community of 87 Greeks in Omdurman, including non-Greek family members. Many of them, like their dean Dimitri Kokorembas and the later chronicler Nicolas Papadam, chose to remain in the British-dominated Anglo-Egyptian Sudan.
This nucleus of the Greek community was immediately enlarged by interpreters and merchants, who entered the Sudan with the invading army, either from the Red Sea or along the Nile. The latter specialized as contractors in supplying logistics to the military and the newly established government. Some Greeks also officially served in the Anglo-Egyptian administration, particularly in the Railways and Steamers Department, as clerks and technical staff. Altogether, the symbiotic association between the colonial regime and the Greek settlers essentially defined the Hellenic presence in Sudan during the first half of the 20th century.
Makris and the Norwegian historian Endre Stiansen conclude that from the point of view of the British-dominated government the Greeks were the ideal expatriates: "Capato – and probably many other Greeks – saw themselves as stalwarts of the 'colonial' order." Makris has also found that "Greeks from Sudan remembered and emphasized the good relations they had with the Sudanese because, unlike the British, they were not 'colonialists', but rather people of a humble background. This, however, did not prevent them from having racist attitudes towards non-Greek Sudanese, or even people of mixed origin, similar to those other Europeans had." However, Makris does concede "a healthy scepticism towards the British, the French and the other 'Big Powers' and their political schemes".
While the Sudanese middle classes struggled to recover from the crushing defeat of 1898, the Greek traders effectively dominated the market for more than two decades. Already during the first months, Greek speculators purchased land "for trifling sums" in the Khartoum area, so that "much of the most valuable land in the new city passed thus at once into the hands of a few wealthy capitalists". The same happened in the fertile Gezira until the introduction of regulation in 1905. One of those who acquired large estates was Capato. This buying spree, until it was curbed by the government, led to a substantial increase in prices, which in turn induced many urban residents to sell their land.
However, not all of the Greeks who came to Sudan were stereotypically merchants and shopkeepers, but there were many other professions as well, including teachers, physicians, pharmacists, scientists, and engineers. During the 1900s and 1910s, many Greeks, particularly from the island of Karpathos, came to work as builders, carpenters, masons, and other craftsmen. Greek contractors and subcontractors constructed governmental buildings in Khartoum – including the reconstruction of the Governor-General's palace – the new port and town of Port Sudan. They also constructed churches such as the All Saints' Anglican Cathedral on Gordon Avenue in Khartoum, designed by Polychronis Zavolas, as well as the mosque in Ed Dueim. Moreover, they were involved in setting up irrigation canals for cotton plantations and in the expansion of the railway network. Some of them worked even in remote places like Darfur. Most prominently, Dimitrios Fabricius, a Greek of German ancestry, who was the chief architect of the Khedive, designed landmark buildings like the Gordon Memorial College, the historic main building of today's University of Khartoum.
It is still possible to identify a broad pattern of Greek immigration into Sudan that applies also to the Greek diaspora in other parts of Africa: as soon as a Greek, like Capato, had established his business, he would bring in younger compatriots from Greece or Egypt, preferably from his family network. The newly arrived would often work as employees for the first years and then open their own businesses. In this way, it came about that many of the Greeks in Sudan at the beginning of the 20th century originated from the islands of Karpathos (see above), Lesbos, Cephalonia, and Cyprus.
Thus the number of Greeks grew rapidly: in 1902, there were already about 150 in the Khartoum area. In the same year the 'Hellenic Community' of the capital was officially established. Among its founding fathers were businessmen like Capato, John Cutsuridis, and Panayotis Trampas, who had survived the Mahdiya as a captive. Very soon after that, a branch of the Community was founded in Atbara, where many Greeks worked in the headquarters of the Sudan railways network or ran bars. The Greek community school of Khartoum was established in 1906 with 30 students. Their number doubled within the first decade. Also in 1906, the Hellenic Community of Port Sudan was founded. These societies not only undertook educational functions, but also religious ones, as well as offering assistance to their poorer members.
Already in 1901, the Condominium government had given a free grant of land in Khartoum to the Greek Orthodox community to build a church. The design was provided by the architect Nikolaos Pothitos and its foundation stone was laid in 1903, but construction got only completed in 1908. The consecration took place in 1910, yet only two decades later did the Greek Orthodox synod of bishops elect a Metropolitan of Nubia, who remained based in Cairo.
Some 130 Greek volunteers from Sudan – thirty from Khartoum and a hundred from the rest of the country – fought during the Balkan wars of 1912 and 1913 against the Ottoman Empire. Fifteen of them were killed.
In 1913, the "Hellenic Shooting Club" and the "Hellenic Gymnastics Club", which had been founded five years earlier, were merged to form the "Hellenic Athletic Club" (H.A.C.) under the chairmanship of the lawyer George Fragoudis, who later went on to become a member of the Greek parliament and the founder of the Panteion School of Political Sciences of Athens.
At the beginning of World War I in 1914, there were over 800 Greeks in Sudan, by far the largest foreign community. About 500 of them were members in the former Hellenic Shooting Club, which was viewed by the administration as potentially "a very valuable supplementary European force". Some Greeks in Sudan were famous hunters and Capato, for instance, specialized in fitting out big-game hunting parties.
In 1921, the Hellenic Athletic Club participated in a local football championship, which is considered the oldest in Africa. Until today, the H.A.C. has remained active for more than a century and is still one of the most prominent Greek places in Khartoum, located in premises granted in 1947 for a long-term lease.
After the forced displacement of the Greeks from Asia Minor and the 1923 population exchange between Greece and Turkey, many of the Greek newcomers to Sudan originated from Constantinople and Smyrna, escaping abject poverty. By 1929 – when Greek businessmen built the first commercial cinema in Khartoum – the number of Greeks in Khartoum had risen to 1,455. The total number in all of Sudan at that time was at around 4,000 – up from about 2,500 in 1920. The Greek school in Khartoum had 170 students in 1925 and 270 in 1936.
During the 1930s, a multitude of private cotton growing irrigation schemes in the agricultural areas of the Gezira and Gedaref were owned by Greeks. The Hellenic Community of Wad Medani in the Gezira had already been established in 1919. From 1933 to 1937, many Greek masons and craftsmen worked in the construction of the Jebel Aulia Dam irrigation scheme, which became the largest dam in the world at the time.
Beyond the places, where Greeks had already settled before the Mahdiya, the newcomers also gradually moved to the most remote corners of the country, like En Nahud in Western Kordofan, Talodi in the Nuba Mountains and Deim Zubeir in Bahr El Ghazal. Business tycoon Capato soon expanded his business into Kordofan for gum Arabic and southern Sudan for ivory, before going bankrupt after a series of misfortunes in 1912. Some Greek traders also moved on to settle in the Belgian Congo, French Central Africa and other African lands.In southern Sudan, the colonial government preferred giving licences to Greek merchants, who would go to remote places like Jonglei, rather than to northern Sudanese Jellaba traders. Juba, now the national capital of South Sudan, is said to have been established in 1922 by Greek traders. Another center was Wau, where already in 1910 fifteen Greek merchants were based and reportedly made large profits. The Comboni missionary priest Stefano Santandrea, who served in Wau from 1928 to 1948, stressed though that "their competition prevented their [Northern] rivals from exploiting the natives." The Wau-based Hellenic Community of Bahr El Ghazal was founded in 1939.
One major Sudanese city is still named after a Greek trader, over a century after he settled there: Kosti. Konstantinos "Kostas" Mourikis set up a store in this city on the White Nile, where pilgrims from West Africa to Mecca and Southern trade routes crossed, soon after he had arrived in Sudan in 1899 along with his brother.
With regard to the socio-economic composition of the Greeks in Sudan during the Condominium, Makris and Stiansen conclude:«A small number of Greek merchants climbed up the social ladder and became founders of a 'high class' who held decisive influence over a 'middle class' or what could perhaps more aptly be called the 'salariat'. [..] With the exception of Gerasimos Contomichalos, all members of the Greek 'high class' were well-off merchants and shopkeepers, but no more than that. [...] Always mindful of developments in the political arena, Contomichalos cultivated his relations with the Government and the Palace, while at the same time supporting community leaders with nationalist aspirations. Like Capato, he served as president of the Greek community for long periods of time, but had much more impact than the former – founding churches, schools and other community buildings and offering large sums of money to assist in the establishment of smaller communities in the provinces.» | https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Sudanese_Greeks |
Israeli hip hop | Though hip-hop has been adopted by numerous countries throughout the world, Israel remains as a prime example of the manifestation of “glocalization” in the musical realm. Originally hailing from the Japanese business world, this concept was introduced to the Western world by British sociologist Roland Robertson in the early 1990s. As explained by Hartwig Vens in his article in the World Press, the idea of globalization describes the “rising appearance of artistic hybrids that blend the global and the local” which accurately portray the interplay between these seemingly conflicting scenes. By recognizing the dual nature of glocalization, hip-hop's role within Israeli society can be revealed to show its nature of meshing opposing forces to form a creative and original product. Consistent with Vens’ claim, Israeli hip-hop is thus an imitated art, largely globalized and affected tremendously by the United States, while still displaying distinct characteristics specific to Israeli society and culture.
Many of Israel's hip-hop artists thus reflect upon the integration of global and local influences into their music. Global forces have thus proven to be powerful in affecting and shaping hip-hop in Israel. Even the beginnings of rap music in Israel portray the dominant and significant nature of the Western world on global music. Even once it was first presented on the show, the performers still maintained hip-hop's American origins by rapping solely in English. Only once hip-hop expanded to include other music artists was Hebrew utilized as a language to spread person opinions and beliefs of society. Even then, English was still used as an effective means of rapping and reaching audiences, and many Israeli hip-hop songs today incorporate some aspects of English lyrics or colloquial terms into their content.
Though numerous examples are available, one specific music video exemplifies this phenomenon of language thoroughly. In his video for the song, “Bababa,” Subliminal incorporates various musical elements into his performance, including the talents of Miri Ben-Ari on violin. The first thirty seconds of lyrics rapped are entirely in English and could easily be mistaken for a hip-hop song written and produced in America. Such lyrics as “all my real” and “one is for the money, two is for the show…five for that flow” reveal the immense effect American hip-hop has on music produced halfway around the globe. The music video additionally displays other elements of Americanization including the mention of the Grammys and the presentation of the actors as stereotypical members of the hip-hop subculture. One such African-American man is shown wearing a New York Yankees baseball cap, and scantily clad women dancing throughout the video is representative of the stereotypical American hip-hop culture. Within another one of his music videos, “Toro,” Subliminal further expresses qualities of the Western world. Not only is the video reminiscent of hip-hop in the United States, but it holds some elements of reggaeton and Hispanic roots, especially when explicitly mentioning the word “dinero” in the chorus (Spanish for “money”).
Therefore, throughout Israeli hip-hop music, the borrowing from America is quite apparent in the common usage of English language and slang terms in lyrics, as well as through the incorporation of certain American hip-hop culture elements such as break dancing and specific clothing. Not only has Israel maintained a relationship with the United States in its Americanization and adoption of Western qualities, but it has dispersed its own artifacts to America. Though it surfaced only a decade ago, Israeli hip-hop has successfully spread to the United States, primarily through the fan base of young Jewish Zionists living in America. Specific artists, especially Hadag Nachash and Subliminal, have accumulated fans in America and often travel worldwide (and primarily to the US) on tours to further promote their music. Strong connections are present between America and Israel, mostly due to the grounds upon which Israel was established. Since its creation as a state was a result of the Zionist movement, many Jewish Zionists living in the United States feel a strong sense of pride and personal relationship with their religious homeland. Zionist youths primarily are therefore very involved in the current political and social situations occurring in Israel.
Furthermore, they are extremely receptive to any cultural artifacts being produced and released by Israel's music industry, so the hip-hop music of Israeli artists easily thrives within the American Jewish youth population. Thus, many are thrilled when Israeli hip-hop artists come to America to perform and often sing the lyrics along with the performer.
Just as Israeli hip-hop portrays the global trends present in the current times, situations and qualities personal to this specific country are inherently incorporated into the songs and lyrics. As issues such as politics and religion are being fought through the usage of hip-hop, Israeli rap artists display a wide range of opinions being offered and performed. Just as explained by Liron Teeni, the radio DJ who first introduced American hip-hop to America, this variety of perspectives merely reflect the true reality, since “rappers are taking sides on the issue..hip-hop is about being brave, telling the truth like it is and not looking for excuses…just talking about the real stuff.” Discussions of this “real stuff” portrayed in Israeli hip-hop vary from political divides to social tensions and religious fights. Though the music has been maintained as a space for stratified opinionated beliefs, perhaps it holds the power of ultimately uniting those involved in some of these divisions.
One song commenting on the political, religious, and social tensions in Israel is Hadag Nachash’s “Shirat Hasticker,” literally meaning, “The Sticker Song,” has proven to be one of the most popular rap songs, both in Israel and the United States. Unique in its content, the song is entirely composed of various bumper stickers found on cars in Israel. Since bumper stickers are very popular in Israel and are often placed on cars to display the driver's political, religious, and social stances, Hadag Nachash accurately portrays the country's numerous perspectives on all localized issues. By collecting a variety of these bumper stickers and listing them as lyrics in the song, opinions as broad as the citizens within Israel are effectively expressed in the one song alone.
While discussing the relationship between global and local influences on Israeli hip-hop to create the effect of “glocalization,” one music video in particular precisely reveals this phenomenon. “Halayla Zeh Ha’zman,” (or “Tonight is the Time”) performed by Alon De Loco and Gad Elbaz, effectively presents the manner in which glocalization has encompassed Israeli hip-hop. Opening with a seeming stand-off between Palestinians and overtly religious Orthodox Jews, the video begins with obvious influences from American hip-hop, primarily in the break dancing performed by both groups and the clothing reminiscent of American style (such as the Puma shirt and the “bling”). The song continues to illustrate glocalization through the incorporation of Middle Eastern sounding beats and rhythms, and the chorus is sung in a voice reminiscent of many Israeli musicians and singers. Thus, the music video acts as a clear representation of how elements derived from global and local sources are utilized in Israel, so as to create a unique hip-hop subculture. | https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Israeli_hip_hop |
History of Libya under Muammar Gaddafi | Remaking of the economy was parallel with the attempt to remold political and social institutions. Until the late 1970s, Libya's economy was mixed, with a large role for private enterprise except in the fields of oil production and distribution, banking, and insurance. But according to volume two of Gaddafi's Green Book, which appeared in 1978, private retail trade, rent, and wages were forms of exploitation that should be abolished. Instead, workers' self-management committees and profit participation partnerships were to function in public and private enterprises.
A property law was passed that forbade ownership of more than one private dwelling, and Libyan workers took control of a large number of companies, turning them into state-run enterprises. Retail and wholesale trading operations were replaced by state-owned "people's supermarkets", where Libyans in theory could purchase whatever they needed at low prices. By 1981 the state had also restricted access to individual bank accounts to draw upon privately held funds for government projects. The measures created resentment and opposition among the newly dispossessed. The latter joined those already alienated, some of whom had begun to leave the country. By 1982, perhaps 50,000 to 100,000 Libyans had gone abroad; because many of the emigrants were among the enterprising and better educated Libyans, they represented a significant loss of managerial and technical expertise.
The government also built a trans-Sahara water pipeline from major aquifers to both a network of reservoirs and the towns of Tripoli, Sirte and Benghazi in 2006–2007. It is part of the Great Manmade River project, started in 1984. It is pumping large resources of water from the Nubian Sandstone Aquifer System to both urban populations and new irrigation projects around the country.
Libya continued to be plagued with a shortage of skilled labor, which had to be imported along with a broad range of consumer goods, both paid for with petroleum income. The country consistently ranked as the African nation with the highest HDI, standing at 0.755 in 2010, which was 0.041 higher than the next highest African HDI that same year. Gender equality was a major achievement under Gaddafi's rule. According to Lisa Anderson, president of the American University in Cairo and an expert on Libya, said that under Gaddafi more women attended university and had "dramatically" more employment opportunities than most Arab nations. | https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/History_of_Libya_under_Muammar_Gaddafi |
Mass media in Qatar | The evolution of radio broadcasting in Qatar follows the broader trends in media development within the Arab world. Among the notable early Arab radio stations was the Egyptian station Sawt Al Arab, established in 1953, which played a significant role in promoting Arab nationalism and anti-colonial sentiments, albeit experiencing credibility challenges during the Six-Day War. During the 1950s and 1960s, when residents of Qatar first acquired radio technology, most listened to Sawt Al Arab, and to a lesser extent, other Arabic-language radio stations such Radio Bahrain and Kuwait Radio, both of which were established in the 1950s. On a small-scale level, the beginnings of radio broadcasting in Qatar can be traced back to rudimentary devices utilized by Qatar Petroleum and schools in the 1960s for internal communication. Qatar's first major foray into radio broadcasting commenced with the establishment of Qatar Radio on 25 June 1968, representing a collaborative effort between the Qatari government and the British Marconi Company.
Emphasizing locally produced content, Qatar Radio prioritized programs reflecting Qatar's culture. The increasingly diverse demographics of Qatar led to specialized radio services catering to various linguistic demographics, exemplified by the establishment of Holy Quran Radio, English Program, Urdu Program and French Program, among others. The station, initially operating for two hours weekly, garnered a sizable audience before expanding its transmission to four hours. Sawt Al Khaleej Radio was established in 2002 and Sawt Al Rayyan Radio in 2007, both focusing on promoting regional music and folklore. A third radio station, Katara Radio, was inaugurated in 2014 and besides broadcasting programs on cultural practices and folk music of Qatar, it also produces programs on the Arabic language and Islamic history.
Previously, all radio programs in the country were state-owned and are amalgamated as the Qatar Broadcasting Service, but since 2020, the government has granted licenses to private radio stations. In a bid to enhance diversity and accommodate Qatar's multicultural populace, in 2020 the government granted licenses for private radio stations in various languages. These private initiatives, such as "Malayalam," "Snow," "One," and "Olive," catered to specific linguistic communities, such as Malayalam and Hindi. These stations were first announced in 2017. | https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Mass_media_in_Qatar |
Ming dynasty | The Hongwu Emperor forbade eunuchs to learn how to read or engage in politics. Whether or not these restrictions were carried out with absolute success in his reign, eunuchs during the Yongle Emperor's reign (1402–1424) and afterwards managed huge imperial workshops, commanded armies, and participated in matters of appointment and promotion of officials. Yongle put 75 eunuchs in charge of foreign policy; they traveled frequently to vassal states including Annam, Mongolia, the Ryukyu Islands, and Tibet and less frequently to farther-flung places like Japan and Nepal. In the later 15th century, however, eunuch envoys generally only traveled to Korea.
The eunuchs developed their own bureaucracy that was organized parallel to but was not subject to the civil service bureaucracy. Although there were several dictatorial eunuchs throughout the Ming, such as Wang Zhen, Wang Zhi, and Liu Jin, excessive tyrannical eunuch power did not become evident until the 1590s when the Wanli Emperor increased their rights over the civil bureaucracy and granted them power to collect provincial taxes.
The eunuch Wei Zhongxian (1568–1627) dominated the court of the Tianqi Emperor (r. 1620–1627) and had his political rivals tortured to death, mostly the vocal critics from the faction of the Donglin Society. He ordered temples built in his honor throughout the Ming Empire, and built personal palaces created with funds allocated for building the previous emperor's tombs. His friends and family gained important positions without qualifications. Wei also published a historical work lambasting and belittling his political opponents. The instability at court came right as natural calamity, pestilence, rebellion, and foreign invasion came to a peak. The Chongzhen Emperor (r. 1627–44) had Wei dismissed from court, which led to Wei's suicide shortly after.
The eunuchs built their own social structure, providing and gaining support to their birth clans. Instead of fathers promoting sons, it was a matter of uncles promoting nephews.
The Heishanhui Society in Peking sponsored the temple that conducted rituals for worshiping the memory of Gang Tie, a powerful eunuch of the Yuan dynasty. The Temple became an influential base for highly placed eunuchs, and continued in a somewhat diminished role during the Qing dynasty. | https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ming_dynasty |
Battle of Vienna | The main Ottoman army laid siege to Vienna on 14 July. On the same day, Kara Mustafa sent the traditional demand that the city surrender to the Ottoman Empire. Ernst Rüdiger Graf von Starhemberg, leader of the remaining 15,000 troops and 8,700 volunteers with 370 cannons, refused to capitulate. Only days before, he had received news of the mass slaughter at Perchtoldsdorf, a town south of Vienna, where the citizens had handed over the keys of the city after having been given a similar choice but were killed anyway. Siege operations started on 17 July.: 660
The Viennese had demolished many of the houses around the city walls and cleared the debris, leaving an empty plain that would expose the Ottomans to defensive fire if they tried to rush into the city.: 660 In response to this Kara Mustafa Pasha would order his forces to dig long lines of trenches directly toward the city, to help protect them from the defenders as they advanced.
The Ottomans had 130 field guns and 19 medium-caliber cannon, compared to the defenders' 370. Mining tunnels were dug under the city walls, which would then be filled with sufficient quantities of black powder to demolish the walls.: 660 According to Andrew Wheatcroft, the outer palisade was around 150 years old and mostly rotten. To counter this, the defenders set to work knocking very large tree trunks into the ground to surround the walls. This disrupted the Ottoman plan of a quick siege, adding almost another three weeks to the time it would take to get past the old palisade. This, combined with the delay in advancing their army after declaring war, eventually allowed a relief force to arrive in September.: 660 Some historians have speculated that Kara Mustafa wanted to take the city intact with its riches and declined an all-out attack, not wishing to initiate the plundering that would accompany an assault, which was viewed as the right of conquering soldiers.
The Ottoman siege cut virtually all means of food supply into Vienna. Fatigue became so common that von Starhemberg ordered any soldier found asleep on watch to be shot. Increasingly desperate, the forces holding Vienna were on the verge of defeat when, in August, Imperial forces under Charles V, Duke of Lorraine, defeated Thököly at Bisamberg, 5 km (3.1 mi) northwest of Vienna.
On 6 September, the Poles under Sobieski crossed the Danube 30 km (19 mi) northwest of Vienna at Tulln, to unite with imperial troops and the additional forces from Saxony, Bavaria, Baden and other imperial estates. The forces were also joined by several mercenary regiments of Zaporozhian Cossacks hired by the Polish–Lithuanian Commonwealth. Louis XIV of France declined to help his Habsburg rival, having just annexed Alsace.
An alliance between Sobieski and Emperor Leopold I resulted in the addition of the Polish hussars to the existing allied army. The command of the European allied forces was assigned to the Polish king, renowned for his extensive experience in leading campaigns against the Ottoman army. Notably, he achieved a decisive victory over the Ottoman forces in the Battle of Khotyn (1673) and now commanded an army of 70,000–80,000 soldiers, countering a supposed Ottoman force of 150,000.: 661 Sobieski's courage and aptitude for command were already known in Europe.
During early September, approximately 5,000 experienced Ottoman sappers had repeatedly demolished large portions of the walls between the Burg bastion, the Löbel bastion and the Burg ravelin, creating gaps of about 12 metres (39 ft) in width. In response to this, the Viennese began digging their own tunnels to intercept the placing of large amounts of gunpowder in the caverns. The Ottomans finally managed to occupy the Burg ravelin and the low wall nearby on 8 September. Anticipating a breach in the city walls, the remaining Viennese prepared to fight in the inner city. | https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Battle_of_Vienna |
Migrant workers in the Gulf Cooperation Council region | In the United Arab Emirates, the kafala system was part of the 1980 Federal Law on the Regulation of Labour Relations, which regulated the relationship between the state, the sponsor and the sponsored. The law did not require any written contract to be drawn up between the employer and the migrant worker. Migrant workers required the permission of their employers to change employment and the provided sponsorship could not be transferred to another employer. The 1980 Law did regulate issues such as severance pay, repatriation pay, annual leave, standards for maximum working hours and working conditions, payment for overtime and the payment for treatment of labor-related injuries. However, the law also prohibited labor unions and strikes.
Labor law reforms were introduced in the UAE in 2016, which included a standardized offer letter prepared by the UAE's Ministry of Labor, a standardized work contract which must specify duration, nature of the work, place of employment, wages and remuneration. The changes also specify working hours as 8 hours per day or 48 hours per week. However, these working hours could be higher for those working in the service industry. Furthermore, migrant workers are allowed to change employers after six months and only if their employer consents, or if employment is not provided or if a legal complaint of some sort is issued. Both parties can agree to end the employment contract after six months. According to the reforms, contracts must be made available in both Arabic, English and a third language if required. Employers who fail to provide translations are subjected to fines.
Per UAE Federal law No. 6 of 1973 on the Entry and Residence of aliens, an employer may not deny an employee on a work visa right to an annual leave, regular paid wage, 45 days maternity leave, right to resign, resign gratuity, and a 30-day grace period to find a new job. An employer is also prohibited by law to confiscate an employee passport, force the employee to pay for his residency visa fees, or force the employee to work more than 8 hours a day or 45 hours a week without compensation. An employee who wishes to leave needs to complete their legal notice period, which is usually 30 days or less, before leaving their job or risk being banned to work in UAE for up to one year. Alien widows or divorced women whose legal presence in the country was sponsored by their husband's work status are given a 1-year visa to stay in the country without the need for a work permit or a sponsor. | https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Migrant_workers_in_the_Gulf_Cooperation_Council_region |
Posts and telecommunications in Lebanon | In March 2007, Solidere, the Lebanese company for the development and reconstruction of the Beirut Central District, deployed a Broadband Network in partnership with Orange Business Services. Orange operates this IP network using a fiber-optic backbone with dual connection to each building in the city center. Under its unified communication network, Solidere provides IPTV services to all its residents operated and monitored from the network main operation center.
The Beirut Digital District (BDD) was launched in September 2012 as a government-facilitated project with broadband internet and telephone infrastructure facilities. The BBD was designed to become a hub for creative companies and talents. The project aimed to improve the digital industry in Lebanon by providing, at competitive rates, state-of-the-art infrastructure, superior support services for businesses, and a living environment suited to a young and dynamic workforce.
In 2013, the Minister of Telecommunications Nicolas Sehnaoui claimed that 4,700 km of fiber optic network were being deployed across Lebanon, linking 300 fixed central offices with thousands of Active Cabinets being installed with the last mile using copper connections, allowing subscribers to reach a connection speed of 4 Mbit/s and more at home. The backbone FO network consist of 13 rings and was reportedly almost complete. At the time, experts said that Lebanon should have much faster Internet thanks to the international capacity cables, only a small fraction of which was being used in Lebanon.
On 1 July 2015, the Ministry of Telecommunications, then under Boutrous Harb, launched a five-year plan called "2020 Digital Telecom Vision". The plan aimed both to ramp up the country's 4G capacity and to replace Lebanon's aging copper network with fiber-optic cables. By 2020, it was expected to present users with VDSL2+ plans capable of offering speeds reaching 150 Mbit/s, and ensure that the majority of Lebanese population would have access to a full range of services (FTTH, IPTV, video conferencing).
The Fiber to the Home/Fiber to the Office scheme is being deployed in a phased approach in Lebanon under the management of the Ministry of Telecommunications and Ogero (the fixed network owner & maintainer). The four FTTx- phases are as follows:
– 2015–2017: FTTO Organizations SME/SM
– 2015–2020: FTTC (+VDSL) cabinets (& Houses)
– 2016–2020: FTTH1 (Houses)
– 2019–2022: FTTH2 (Houses)
In February 2018, Ogero attributed three contracts worth $283 million to three local companies (out of four bidders) to distribute fiber optics from central stations to end users: SERTA Channels, BMB, and Powertech, respectively paired with international equipment vendors Huawei, Calix, and Nokia.
Upgraded Central Offices with fibre optics GPON or P2P access technology & FTTx deployment phasing can be found on Ogero's website. Also updates are found on the Fibre Optics Lebanon Forum. | https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Posts_and_telecommunications_in_Lebanon |
Physics in the medieval Islamic world | One field in physics, optics, developed rapidly in this period. By the ninth century, there were works on physiological optics as well as mirror reflections, and geometrical and physical optics. In the eleventh century, Ibn al-Haytham not only rejected the Greek idea about vision, he came up with a new theory.
Ibn Sahl (c. 940–1000), a mathematician and physicist connected with the court of Baghdad, wrote a treatise On Burning Mirrors and Lenses in 984 in which he set out his understanding of how curved mirrors and lenses bend and focus light. Ibn Sahl is credited with discovering the law of refraction, now usually called Snell's law. He used this law to work out the shapes of lenses that focus light with no geometric aberrations, known as anaclastic lenses.
Ibn al-Haytham (known in Western Europe as Alhacen or Alhazen) (965-1040), often regarded as the "father of optics" and a pioneer of the scientific method, formulated "the first comprehensive and systematic alternative to Greek optical theories." He postulated in his "Book of Optics" that light was reflected upon different surfaces in different directions, thus causing different light signatures for a certain object that we see. It was a different approach than that which was previously thought by Greek scientists, such as Euclid or Ptolemy, who believed rays were emitted from the eye to an object and back again. Al-Haytham, with this new theory of optics, was able to study the geometric aspects of the visual cone theories without explaining the physiology of perception. Also in his Book of Optics, Ibn al-Haytham used mechanics to try and understand optics. Using projectiles, he observed that objects that hit a target perpendicularly exert much more force than projectiles that hit at an angle. Al-Haytham applied this discovery to optics and tried to explain why direct light hurts the eye, because direct light approaches perpendicularly and not at an oblique angle. He developed a camera obscura to demonstrate that light and color from different candles can be passed through a single aperture in straight lines, without intermingling at the aperture. His theories were transmitted to the West. His work influenced Roger Bacon, John Peckham and Vitello, who built upon his work and ultimately transmitted it to Kepler.
Taqī al-Dīn tried to disprove the widely held belief that light is emitted by the eye and not the object that is being observed. He explained that, if light came from our eyes at a constant velocity it would take much too long to illuminate the stars for us to see them while we are still looking at them, because they are so far away. Therefore, the illumination must be coming from the stars so we can see them as soon as we open our eyes. | https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Physics_in_the_medieval_Islamic_world |
Habesha peoples | Throughout history, various European travelers such as Jeronimo Lobo, James Bruce and Mansfield Parkyns visited Abyssinia. Their written accounts about their experiences include observations and descriptions of the Abyssinian customs and manners.
Cuisine
Habesha cuisine characteristically consists of vegetable and often very spicy meat dishes, usually in the form of wat (also w'et or wot), a thick stew, served atop injera, a large sourdough flatbread, which is about 50 centimeters (20 inches) in diameter and made out of fermented teff flour. People of Ethiopia and Eritrea eat exclusively with their right hands, using pieces of injera to pick up bites of entrées and side dishes.
Fit-fit, or fir-fir, is a common breakfast dish. It is made from shredded injera or kitcha stir-fried with spices or wat. Another popular breakfast food is fatira. The delicacy consists of a large fried pancake made with flour, often with a layer of egg, eaten with honey. Chechebsa (or kita firfir) resembles a pancake covered with berbere and niter kibbeh, or spices, and may be eaten with a spoon. A porridge, genfo is another common breakfast dish. It is usually served in a large bowl with a dug-out made in the middle of the genfo and filled with spiced niter kibbeh.
Wat begins with a large amount of chopped red onion, which is simmered or sauteed in a pot. Once the onions have softened, niter kebbeh (or, in the case of vegan dishes, vegetable oil) is added. Following this, berbere is added to make a spicy keiy wat or keyyih tsebhi. Turmeric is used instead of bebere for a milder alicha wat or both are omitted when making vegetable stews, atkilt wat. Meat such as beef (Amharic: ሥጋ, səga), chicken (Amharic: ዶሮ, doro) or Tigrinya: ደርሆ, derho), fish (Amharic: ዓሣ, asa), goat or lamb (Amharic: በግ, beg or Tigrinya: በጊ, beggi) is also added. Legumes such as split peas (Amharic: ክክ, kək or Tigrinya: ኪኪ, kikki) or lentils (Amharic: ምስር, məsər or birsin); or vegetables such as potatoes (Amharic: ድንች, Dənəch), carrots and chard (Amharic: ቆስጣ) are also used instead in vegan dishes.
Another distinctively Habesha dish is kitfo (frequently spelled ketfo). It consists of raw (or rare) beef mince marinated in mitmita (Amharic: ሚጥሚጣ mīṭmīṭā, a very spicy chili powder similar to the berbere) and niter kibbeh. Gored gored is very similar to kitfo, but uses cubed rather than ground beef. The Ethiopian Orthodox Church prescribes a number of fasting (tsom Ge'ez: ጾም, ṣōm) periods, including Wednesdays, Fridays, and the entire Lenten season; so Habesha cuisine contains many dishes that are vegan.
Dress
According to Leo Africanus, a greater number of the Abyssinians historically wore sheep hides, with the more honourable wearing the hides of lions, tigers and ounces. Duarte Barbosa also attests that their clothes being of hides as the country was in wanting of clothes. Pedro Paez, a Spanish Jesuit who resided in Ethiopia, described that the peasant women wore skins like their husbands and, in some areas, some woollen cloths five or six cubits long and three wide that they call " mahâc ", and they could quite fairly call it haircloth because it is much rougher than what Capuchin monks wear, as in Ethiopia they do not know how to make cloth, and the wool is not suitable for it as it is very coarse. They all go barefoot and often naked from the breasts up, with tiny glass beads of various colours strung so as to make a band two fingers in breadth around their necks.
The habesha kemis is the traditional attire of Habesha women. The ankle length dress is usually worn by Ethiopian and Eritrean women at formal events. It is made of chiffon, and typically comes in white, grey or beige shades. Many women also wrap a shawl called a netela around the formal dress.
The netela or netsela is a handmade cloth many Ethiopian women use to cover their head and shoulders when they wear clothing made out of chiffon, especially when attending church. It is made up of two layers of fabric, unlike gabi, which is made out of four. Kuta is the male version.
An Ethiopian or Eritrean suit is the traditional formal wear of Habesha men. It consists of a long sleeve, knee-length shirt, and matching pants. Most shirts are made with a Mandarin, band, or Nehru collar. The suit is made of chiffon, which is a sheer silk or rayon cloth. The netela shawl or a kuta is wrapped around the suit. | https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Habesha_peoples |
Hussein of Jordan | Egyptian President Nasser received an outpouring of support from the Arab public after the Egyptian–Czechoslovak arms deal was signed in September 1955, and his popularity in Jordan skyrocketed following the nationalization of the Suez Canal in July 1956; his actions were seen as a powerful stance against Western imperialism. Hussein was also supportive of the moves. The coinciding events in Egypt had Jordanian leftist opposition parties leaning greatly towards Nasser.
The parliament that had been elected in 1954 was dissolved, and Hussein promised fair elections. The parliamentary election held on 21 October 1956 saw the National Socialist Party emerge as the largest party, winning 12 seats out of 40 in the House of Representatives. Hussein subsequently asked Suleiman Nabulsi, leader of the Party, to form a government, the only democratically elected government in Jordan's history. Hussein called this a "liberal experiment," to see how Jordanians would "react to responsibility." On 29 October 1956, the Suez Crisis erupted in Egypt, as Britain, France, and Israel launched a military offensive to seize control of the canal. Hussein was furious but Nabulsi discouraged him from intervening. Nabulsi's policies frequently clashed with that of King Hussein's, including on how to deal with the Eisenhower Doctrine. The King had requested Nabulsi, as prime minister, to crack down on the Communist Party and the media it controlled. Nabulsi wanted to move Jordan closer to Nasser's regime, but Hussein wanted it to stay in the Western camp.
Disagreements between the monarchy and the leftist government culminated in March 1957 when Nabulsi provided Hussein with a list of senior officers in the military he wanted to dismiss; Hussein initially heeded the recommendations. However, Nabulsi then presented an expanded list, which Hussein refused to act upon. Nabulsi's government was forced to resign on 10 April. On 13 April, rioting broke in the Zarqa army barracks and the 21-year-old Hussein went to end the violence between royalist and Arab nationalist army units after the latter group spread rumors that the King had been assassinated. A 3,000-man Syrian force started moving south towards the Jordanian border in support of what they perceived as a coup attempt, but turned around after the army units showed their loyalty to the King. Two principal accounts emerged regarding the events at Zarqa, with the royalist version holding that the incident was an abortive coup by army chief of staff Ali Abu Nuwar against King Hussein, and the dissident version asserting that it was a staged, American-backed counter-coup by Hussein against the pan-Arabist movement in Jordan. In either case, Abu Nuwar and other senior Arabist officers resigned and were allowed to leave Jordan for Syria, where they incited opposition to the Jordanian monarchy. Hussein reacted by imposing martial law. Although he eventually relaxed some of these measures, namely military curfews and severe press censorship, Hussein's moves significantly curtailed the constitutional democracy that existed in Jordan in the mid-1950s. The alleged conspirators were sentenced to 15 years in absentia, but later on were pardoned by Hussein in 1964 as part of his reconciliation efforts with his exiled opposition, and were entrusted with senior positions in the government. | https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Hussein_of_Jordan |
Almoravid dynasty | The Almoravids, sometimes called "al-mulathamun" ("the veiled ones", from litham, Arabic for "veil".) trace their origins back to several Saharan Sanhaja nomadic tribes, dwelling in an area that stretches between the Senegal River in the south and the Draa river in the north. The first and main Almoravid founding tribe was the Lamtuna. It occupied the region around Awdaghust (Aoudaghost) in the southern Sahara according to contemporary Arab chroniclers such as al-Ya'qubi, al-Bakri and Ibn Hawqal. According to French historian Charles-André Julien: "The original cell of the Almoravid empire was a powerful Sanhaja tribe of the Sahara, the Lamtuna, whose place of origin was in the Adrar in Mauritania." The Tuareg people are believed to be their descendants.
These nomads had been converted to Islam in the 9th century. They were subsequently united in the 10th century and, with the zeal of new converts, launched several campaigns against the "Sudanese" (pagan peoples of sub-Saharan Africa). Under their king Tinbarutan ibn Usfayshar, the Sanhaja Lamtuna erected (or captured) the citadel of Awdaghust, a critical stop on the trans-Saharan trade route. After the collapse of the Sanhaja union, Awdaghust passed over to the Ghana Empire; and the trans-Saharan routes were taken over by the Zenata Maghrawa of Sijilmasa. The Maghrawa also exploited this disunion to dislodge the Sanhaja Gazzula and Lamta out of their pasturelands in the Sous and Draa valleys. Around 1035, the Lamtuna chieftain Abu Abdallah Muhammad ibn Tifat (alias Tarsina), tried to reunite the Sanhaja desert tribes, but his reign lasted less than three years.
Around 1040, Yahya ibn Ibrahim, a chieftain of the Gudala (and brother-in-law of the late Tarsina), went on pilgrimage to Mecca. On his return, he stopped by Kairouan in Ifriqiya, where he met Abu Imran al-Fasi, a native of Fez and a jurist and scholar of the Sunni Maliki school. At this time, Ifriqiya was in ferment. The Zirid ruler, al-Mu'izz ibn Badis, was openly contemplating breaking with his Shi'ite Fatimid overlords in Cairo, and the jurists of Kairouan were agitating for him to do so. Within this heady atmosphere, Yahya and Abu Imran fell into conversation on the state of the faith in their western homelands, and Yahya expressed his disappointment at the lack of religious education and negligence of Islamic law among his southern Sanhaja people. With Abu Imran's recommendation, Yahya ibn Ibrahim made his way to the ribat of Waggag ibn Zelu in the Sous valley of southern Morocco, to seek out a Maliki teacher for his people. Waggag assigned him one of his residents, Abdallah ibn Yasin.: 122
Abdallah ibn Yasin was a Gazzula Berber, and probably a convert rather than a born Muslim. His name can be read as "son of Ya-Sin" (the title of the 36th surah of the Quran), suggesting he had obliterated his family past and was "re-born" of the Holy Book. Ibn Yasin certainly had the ardor of a puritan zealot; his creed was mainly characterized by a rigid formalism and a strict adherence to the dictates of the Quran, and the Orthodox tradition. (Chroniclers such as al-Bakri allege Ibn Yasin's learning was superficial.) Ibn Yasin's initial meetings with the Guddala people went poorly. As he had more ardor than depth, Ibn Yasin's arguments were disputed by his audience. He responded to questioning with charges of apostasy and handed out harsh punishments for the slightest deviations. The Guddala soon had enough and expelled him almost immediately after the death of his protector, Yahya ibn Ibrahim, sometime in the 1040s.
Ibn Yasin, however, found a more favorable reception among the neighboring Lamtuna people. Probably sensing the useful organizing power of Ibn Yasin's pious fervor, the Lamtuna chieftain Yahya ibn Umar al-Lamtuni invited the man to preach to his people. The Lamtuna leaders, however, kept Ibn Yasin on a careful leash, forging a more productive partnership between them. Invoking stories of the early life of Muhammad, Ibn Yasin preached that conquest was a necessary addendum to Islamicization, that it was not enough to merely adhere to God's law, but necessary to also destroy opposition to it. In Ibn Yasin's ideology, anything and everything outside of Islamic law could be characterized as "opposition". He identified tribalism, in particular, as an obstacle. He believed it was not enough to urge his audiences to put aside their blood loyalties and ethnic differences, and embrace the equality of all Muslims under the Sacred Law, it was necessary to make them do so. For the Lamtuna leadership, this new ideology dovetailed with their long desire to refound the Sanhaja union and recover their lost dominions. In the early 1050s, the Lamtuna, under the joint leadership of Yahya ibn Umar and Abdallah ibn Yasin—soon calling themselves the al-Murabitin (Almoravids)—set out on a campaign to bring their neighbors over to their cause.: 123 | https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Almoravid_dynasty |
Guardianship of the Islamic Jurist | Some of the criticism of Wilayat al-Faqih that they reply to, include:
that there is no straightforward statement in scripture that faqih clerics should rule over the people.
Those concerned over whether Islam supports the concept of wilayat al-faqih, should note that (according to Mesbah Yazdi), the "overwhelmingly dominant opinion" of Shi'ah jurisprudents, (based on "the available views and opinions") is that "a duly competent jurist" (who is "appointed according to the general descriptions ... that the Imam has set") should rule over the people during the occultation of the Imam. Unfortunately, preventing a consensus among jurisprudents on this point are "one or two" contemporary Shi'ah jurists, who insist that for a government to be legitimate, it must be "decided by the people".
Those concerned should also look to several hadith (listed above in "scriptural basis"), which when properly understood, make "it is crystal clear that obedience to the ... decree of the [ruler] faqih" is just as obligatory and mandatory," as obedience to the infallible Imam (‘a).
In addition there are two "Intellectual proofs" (using reason rather than scripture) substantiating wilayat al-faqih:
Proof #1
Everyone needs a government for order and welfare;
the best government is that run by the infallible imam;
since we can't have that at present, we need one resembling it as much as possible;
rule by the Islamic jurist provides that, since the jurist provides "absolute immunity from any kind of corruption, error, sin, selfishness", and "comprehensive and perfect insight and competence in social conditions".
Proof #2
God possesses the exclusive "right to exercise authority over the properties, honor and lives of the people",
a right he bestowed first on "the Holy Prophet (S)" Muhammad and then on the infallibles;
these are now gone, but God couldn't have "abandoned His purpose", namely, "man’s attainment of bliss and perfection", the reason sharia was created;
so he must have "given permission to the most appropriate person to implement them";
and that person is a "competent jurist" who possesses fear of God and "expertise in governing society and ensuring its welfare".
Ahmed Vaezi gives a similar argument, maintaining that a ruling wali (guardian) is a natural progression from God (who several verses in the Quran—Q.3:68, Q.2:257, Q.4:45—describe as a wali over the believers), to the Prophet Muhammad (who is also described as such in Q.5:55, Q.33:6), to the Imams (who are described as wali in numerous Shi'i hadith). So it is natural that the next religious figure after them also have the "universal" powers that Muhammad and the Imams had. This also explains why giving a faqih general powers over the public does not put sane adults in the same category as minors and those without the power of reason. The powers of God, Muhammad and the Imams were total, despite the fact their subjects possessed maturity (bulugh) and ability to reason (ʿaql).
that the concept of wilayat al-faqih ought to be something Shi'a Muslims are able to understand/accept/believe based on their own religious study [i.e. tahqiq] (as they do with the basic principles of belief -- "proving the existence of God or the prophethood of the Prophet"), and not something accepted without question from a religious scholar.
Despite providing hadith and intellectual proofs for absolute wilayat al-faqih, Mesbah Yazdi also argues that the idea of rule of the jurist is a principle of religion that believers must accept on faith [taqlid] -- because of its "special character", it is, "in a sense", an issue "among the subjects pertaining to prophethood and Imamate", (and so outside the bounds of understanding from individual study).
that in Shi'a Islam, all believers already have a religious scholar to provide them with guidance—the "source of emulation (maraji‘ at-taqlid)" that each Shi'i chooses (as of 2022 there were several dozen to choose from, mostly located in Iraq and Iran), and they were not punished by the state if they failed to obey their source. Why do they then need a wilayat? And what happens when he disagrees with a marja'? (there have been differences of opinion between the Supreme leader and other Marjas over issues such as the permissibility in Islam of chess playing, listening to music, or whether to continue fighting a war with Iraq, presenting challenges for the velayat-e faqih system in Iran.) Will the wilayat supersede the marja'?
Mesbah Yazdi and Ahmed Vaezi claim that the maraji‘ at-taqlid and wilayat al-faqih have two different roles. One gives fatwa; the other decrees (hukm). One ('maraji‘) gives opinions on "general issues and Islamic precepts", answering religious questions on practical matters in Islam by making deductions from their religious knowledge; and the other (wilayat) enacts and implements laws and regulations, decrees intended to "effectively organize and resolve difficulties within Muslim society".
Vaezi also explains that while a fatwa may sometimes conflict with a hukm, the Muslim must obey the Wali's hukm over their marja' fatwa because the order/hukm "is binding upon all Muslims"—including other faqih and including Muslims outside of the political jurisdiction of the Wali (i.e. outside Iran), (as explained in The Maqbulah of ‘Umar ibn Hanzalah, the hadith above).
that giving the guardian jurist "absolute" status so that he "may issue orders that disregard the commands of the Shari’ah" (Ahmed Vaezi), not only contradicts "Khomeini's previous promises but also the norms of the sacred law" (Freedom Movement of Iran of Mehdi Bazargan).
About nine years after its founding, a "stalemate" developed within the Islamic Government between Islamic radicals trying to push through "controversial items of social and economic legislation" (labor laws, income tax), and conservatives "Guardian" mullahs vetoing their bills. Both groups were supporters of Khomeini and he attempted to find a compromise with "milder" legislation. In the process of trying to solve this impasse he made a statement in January 1988 elevating "the preservation of the Islamic state to a primary central injunction (al-ahkam al-awwaliyya) and downgraded rituals (e.g., the obligatory salat prayers and fasting during Ramadan) to secondary injunctions (al-ahkam al-thanawiyya)". (This of course also elevated the jurist ruler of the Islamic state, and concept is called velayat-e motlaqaye faqih -- "the absolute authority of the jurist".)
"I should state that the government, which is part of the absolute deputyship of the Prophet, is one of the primary injunctions of Islam and has priority over all secondary injunctions, even prayers fasting and hajj".
Extending the power of the guardian jurist "to the temporary suspension of such essential rites of Islam as the hajj", was seemingly in contradiction for the rationale Khomeini gave for the need for an Islamic government in his 1970 manifesto:
... in Islam the legislative power and competence to establish laws belongs exclusively to God Almighty. The Sacred Legislator of Islam is the sole legislative power. No one has the right to legislate and no law may be executed except the law of the Divine Legislator. ... The law of Islam, divine command, has absolute authority over all individuals and the Islamic government. Everyone, including the Most Noble Messenger (s) and his successors, is subject to law and will remain so for all eternity—the law that has been revealed by God, Almighty and Exalted,...
Concerning this controversy, Mesbah Yazdi maintains that the ruling jurist's priority over things like prayer and hajj involves only things like delaying the offering of salat prayer when "the enemies’ attack is due", not serious changes in Islam.
Similarly, Ahmed Vaezi states that commands to reverse sacred law are only temporary commands applicable when some "significant damage, distress and constriction or disorder" occurs; ‘first order’ laws (al-ahkam al-awaly) remain intact. He explains that under the "revolutionary view" of Ayatollah Khomeini, "Shari’ah … is not the ultimate goal". Islamic laws are only a means to an end, "the protection of Islam and the extension of Justice". For Khomeini "the Islamic State is not merely one part of Islam amongst others, but it is Islam itself".
That unless the ruler is one of the most learned faqih (a Grand Ayatollah), the "intellectual foundations" of the concept of wilayat al-faqih are "undermined" (according to Ervand Abrahamian), and the "logic" of the Islamic revolution comes to an "end" (according to Olivier Roy).
As mentioned above in the History section, in March 1989 Khomeini made a "major pronouncement" declaring that clerics could be categorized "into two distinct groups" — those clerics knowledgeable about "religious scholarship", and those knowledgeable about "the problems of the day", i.e. the contemporary world and economic, social and political matters. It was the second group that should rule, not the "religious" clerics, despite the fact that Khomeini had spent decades denouncing the secularist idea that the affairs of this world "were separate from the understanding of the sacred law".
Also in that month, Hussein-Ali Montazeri, was ousted as Khomeini's officially designated successor, after he called for "an open assessment of failures" of the Revolution and an end to the export of revolution. Montazeri was the only marjaʿ al-taqlid beside Khomeini who had been part of Khomeini's movement, and the only senior cleric trusted by Khomeini's network. Since the constitution called for the Supreme Leader/Wali al-Faqih to be a marja' — and although it stated that its clauses were to endure until the Mahdi reappeared on earth to rule — after Khomeini died the Assembly of Experts amended the constitution to remove scholarly seniority from the qualifications of the leader, accommodating the appointment of a "mid-ranking" but loyal cleric (Ali Khamenei), to be Leader.
Mesbah Yazdi doesn't talk about this event or the controversy. He agrees that "the basic and fundamental raison d’être of wilayat al-faqih is the implementation of Islamic laws and ordinances", and that the guardian jurist "must first and foremost be knowledgeable, familiar with the laws of Islam and is able to identify them very well". But goes on to say that if the leading jurist lacks fear of God and "efficiency in managing the society", he is disqualified from that position.
that the people deserve to choose who rules over them;
Mesbah Yazdi argues that it is a common misconception to hold that in order to have legitimacy, government must represent the people. Since "the entire universe and whatever is in it belongs to God", humans have no more right to choose/elect someone to rule themselves, than they would have to take someone else's property ("house, car, shoes, clothes, etc.") and use it without that person's permission. This does not mean the people do not have a vital role to play in the system of wilayat al-faqih, for by their acceptance of Islamic government, the people secure the actual establishment and stability of divine government.
that Absolute Guardianship of the jurist may lead to, has led to, or will lead to despotic government or dictatorship;
Mesbah-Yazdi raises this doubt, but assures readers that it would be impossible because while a dictator rules according to "his personal whims and caprice", the Guardian Jurist "rules according to the will and choice of God, the Exalted, following the divine laws". What would happen if the Wali drifted "away" from Islam and its laws? He would "spontaneously" lose credibility, and "not be obeyed".
Ahmed Vaezi also reassures readers that absolute guardianship is "totally different" from "totalitarian and dictatorial government" and absolutism found in Western states, because
the Wali possesses the qualities of "justice, piety and the necessary socio-political perspicacity" and will be "dismissed" if he fails to demonstrate them.
that throughout history, integrating religion and politics has not ended well; Because of the corruption of power, if you "want your religion to remain safe and the Qur’an and Islam be respected" you must keep "religion away from the political scene.
instead, the management of social (and economic, political) affairs should be based on the domain of fact, not religion, planning based on what people see and experience.
The idea that rule by religious dignitaries is a mistake because government should be kept separate from religion, (according to Mesbah Yazdi), comes from medieval Europe where "monarchs had to submit to and obey" the Catholic Pope. Eventually, "all the misfortunes, deprivations, and backwardness" of Europe came to be blamed on religion, and now, because of modern technology, these ideas have spread to "Muslim countries and Muslim thinkers" despite their being alien to Islam. The idea that "whatever we feel and see [is] real and we must think about it and set a plan for it", is also based on an erroneous European idea—the philosophy of Positivism
that if we are to have a government by Jurist, he should be chosen by popular vote. After all, didn't Muhammad asked the people in Ghadir Khumm to pay allegiance to ‘Ali (‘a) (the first Imam and fourth Caliph)? why would "the Prophet (S) ask the people to give their allegiance to the Imam (‘a) ... if the legitimacy of the government of ‘Ali (‘a) had indeed nothing to do with the vote of the people"?
Just as you would use professors of mathematics to select the best professor of mathematics, so you use experts on the subject of fiqh—and not public opinion—to pick the best expert on fiqh.
Mesbah Yazdi wrote that bay'ah (oath of allegiance) is only "a means of expressing readiness to assist and cooperate" with the leader, and "has nothing to do with giving legitimacy and granting the right" to rule over them.
Currently there is a "problem of circularity" in selecting a Guardian Jurist/Supreme Leader in the Islamic Republic, preventing the people of Iran from having input in choosing Iran's most powerful official—i.e. The Assembly of Experts picks the Guardian Jurist/Supreme Leader who then can appoint half of the members of the Guardian Council (and may dismiss them at will), the Guardians approve any candidate wishing to run for the office of the Assembly of Experts. This creates a self-perpetuating cycle whereby if the people of Iran oppose the Leader, or oppose the people who select him, they can do little about it.
Misbah Yazdi defends the allegedly circular selection process of the Guardian Council, Assembly of Experts, Supreme Leader by noting it is "stipulated in the Constitution" or Iran, that the approval of candidates for the Council of Guardians is the "prerogative" of wali al-faqih’s (who as previously demonstrated is God's ruler). He further points out that in all modern so-called democracies there is always a first election to vote members of some body of representatives (such as a constitutional assembly to write a constitution) and that body comes "into existence as a result of an election based on a certain set of rules and regulations" which were not "enacted and approved by any popularly-elected cabinet and parliament" (such as who gets to vote—how old do they must be, whether only men can vote, etc.; who gets to be elected to the body, voting system—first past the post, ranked choice, proportional representation, etc..) because it's the first election!
But this "is nothing but the circular relationship to which we have referred at the beginning".
So we see that (according to Mesbah Yazdi) just because there is "circularity" in the wilayat al-faqih system should not disqualify it; otherwise, we would "have to reject all the past, present and future democratic governments and systems in the world." | https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Guardianship_of_the_Islamic_Jurist |
Tower of Babel | The Book of Genesis does not mention how tall the tower was. The phrase used to describe the tower, "its top in the sky" (v.4), was an idiom for impressive height; rather than implying arrogance, this was simply a cliché for height.: 37
The Book of Jubilees mentions the tower's height as being 5,433 cubits and 2 palms, or 2,484 m (8,150 ft), about three times the height of Burj Khalifa, or roughly 1.6 miles high (10:21). The Third Apocalypse of Baruch mentions that the 'tower of strife' reached a height of 463 cubits, or 211.8 m (695 ft), taller than any structure built in human history until the construction of the Eiffel Tower in 1889, which is 324 m (1,063 ft) in height.
Gregory of Tours writing c. 594, quotes the earlier historian Orosius (c. 417) as saying the tower was "laid out foursquare on a very level plain. Its wall, made of baked brick cemented with pitch, is fifty cubits (23 m or 75 ft) wide, two hundred (91.5 m or 300 ft) high, and four hundred and seventy stades (82.72 km or 51.4 miles) in circumference. A stade was an ancient Greek unit of length, based on the circumference of a typical sports stadium of the time which was about 176 metres (577 ft). Twenty-five gates are situated on each side, which make in all one hundred. The doors of these gates, which are of wonderful size, are cast in bronze. The same historian tells many other tales of this city, and says: 'Although such was the glory of its building still it was conquered and destroyed.'"
A typical medieval account is given by Giovanni Villani (1300): He relates that "it measured eighty miles [130 km] round, and it was already 4,000 paces high, or 5.92 km (3.68 mi) and 1,000 paces thick, and each pace is three of our feet." The 14th-century traveler John Mandeville also included an account of the tower and reported that its height had been 64 furlongs, or 13 km (8 mi), according to the local inhabitants.
The 17th-century historian Verstegan provides yet another figure – quoting Isidore, he says that the tower was 5,164 paces high, or 7.6 km (4.7 mi), and quoting Josephus that the tower was wider than it was high, more like a mountain than a tower. He also quotes unnamed authors who say that the spiral path was so wide that it contained lodgings for workers and animals, and other authors who claim that the path was wide enough to have fields for growing grain for the animals used in the construction.
In his book, Structures: Or Why Things Don't Fall Down (Pelican 1978–1984), Professor J.E. Gordon considers the height of the Tower of Babel. He wrote, "brick and stone weigh about 120 lb per cubic foot (2,000 kg per cubic metre) and the crushing strength of these materials is generally rather better than 6,000 lbs per square inch or 40 mega-pascals. Elementary arithmetic shows that a tower with parallel walls could have been built to a height of 2.1 km (1.3 mi) before the bricks at the bottom were crushed. However, by making the walls taper towards the top they ... could well have been built to a height where the men of Shinnar would run short of oxygen and had difficulty in breathing before the brick walls crushed beneath their own dead weight." | https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Tower_of_Babel |
Mandatory Iraq | Three important anticolonial secret societies had been formed in Iraq during 1918 and 1919. The League of the Islamic Awakening (Jam'iyya an-naḥda al-islāmiyya) was organized at Najaf. The Muslim National League (al-Jam'iyya al-waṭaniyya al-islāmiyya) was formed with the object of organizing and mobilizing the population for major resistance. In February 1919, in Baghdad, a coalition of Shia merchants, Sunni teachers, and civil servants, Sunni and Shia ulama, and Iraqi officers formed the Guardians of Independence (Harās al-istiqlāl). The Istiqlal had member groups in Karbala, Najaf, Kut, and Hillah.
The Grand Mujtahid of Karbala, Imam Shirazi, and his son, Mirza Muhammad Riza, began to organize the insurgent effort. Shirazi then issued a ruling, and he called for a resistance against the British. By July 1920, Mosul was in rebellion against British rule, and the armed resistance moved south down the Euphrates River valley. The southern tribes, who cherished their long-held political autonomy, needed little inducement to join in the fray. They did not cooperate in an organized effort against the British, however, which limited the effect of the revolt.
The Iraqi revolt of 1920 was a watershed event in contemporary Iraqi history. For the first time, Sunnis and Shias, tribes and cities, were brought together in a common effort. In the opinion of Hanna Batatu, author of a seminal work on Iraq, the building of a nation-state in Iraq depended upon two major factors: the integration of Shias and Sunnis into the new body politic and the successful resolution of the age-old conflicts between the tribes and the riverine cities and among the tribes themselves over the food-producing flatlands of the Tigris and the Euphrates. The 1920 rebellion brought these groups together, if only briefly; this constituted an important first step in the long and arduous process of forging a nation-state out of Iraq's conflict-ridden social structure. The Assyrian Levies, a military force under British command, participated in the Kirkuk Massacre of 1924 of Kurds, Arabs, and Turkomen. (See Simele Massacres of 1933)
On 1 October 1922, the Royal Air Force (RAF) elements stationed in Iraq were reorganized into the RAF Iraq Command, which came about partially as a result of the 1920 revolt. This new command was primarily designed to suppress any threats to the Hashemite monarchy. Air control was considered by the British government as a more cost-effective method of controlling large areas of territory than land forces, an idea that was heavily promoted by RAF officer Hugh Trenchard. During the 1920s and 30s, the RAF Iraq Command participated in the suppression of numerous protests and revolts against the Hashemite monarchy. Historian Elie Kedourie noted that "the North [of Iraq] as a whole had to be coerced [into submission] by the Royal Air Force." When the Kurdish leader Sheikh Mahmud launched an armed rebellion, the British used the newly established Iraqi army to suppress the revolt, but that proved ineffective. The British then resorted to deploying the RAF, which suppressed the revolt. In the same period, rebellions by the Shia in the South were also suppressed by the RAF. | https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Mandatory_Iraq |
Tunisia national football team | Belgian manager Georges Leekens was appointed in early 2014; early results included a 1–1 draw against Colombia and a 1–0 win over South Korea, both in friendly matches. Under Leekens, the team climbed from 49th to 22nd in the FIFA rankings. Tunisia qualified for the 2015 African Cup of Nations, and topped their group for the first time since 2008, winning against Zambia and drawing with Cape Verde and DR Congo. They were eliminated in the quarter-finals after a defeat to host Equatorial Guinea. In July 2015, Henryk Kasperczak returned as manager after 17 years. He managed to qualify the team for the 2017 African Cup, and reached the quarter-finals of the competition after beating Algeria and Zimbabwe, before losing again in this round, this time against Burkina Faso.
On 27 April 2017, Nabil Maâloul returned as manager despite the disapproval of the Tunisian supporters following the failure at the 2014 World Cup qualifiers, but this time he qualified Tunisia for the 2018 World Cup in Russia. Tunisia's qualification for the World Cup and its results in friendlies against Iran and Costa Rica, led to its rise to 14th place in the FIFA World Rankings, their best ever. Before the World Cup, Tunisia drew with Turkey and Portugal, in addition to a narrow defeat against Spain 1–0. Despite this, in the World Cup, Tunisia were once again eliminated from the group stage. In the first match, England won 2–1. Belgium defeated the North Africans 5–2, and in Tunisia's last game against Panama, the Arab nation won 2–1. Tunisia qualified for the 2019 Africa Cup of Nations with new manager Alain Giresse; the new manager would only record three ties, against Angola, Mali, and Mauritania to qualify for the round 16. They eventually would win against Ghana, and Madagascar 3–0 in the quarter-finals, to qualify for the semi-finals for the first time in 15 years, losing to Senegal 1–0 in extra time. In September 2021, the national team began its 2022 FIFA World Cup qualification campaign with three consecutive victories against Equatorial Guinea, Zambia, and Mauritania; they would then draw Mauritania 0–0 and lose against Equatorial Guinea 1–0, to advance for the third round on the top of the group.
Qatar hosted the 2021 FIFA Arab Cup; Tunisia started with a 5–1 win against Mauritania. They then suffered an unexpected defeat to Syria, before winning against the United Arab Emirates. In the quarter-finals Tunisia won against Oman 2–1, and scored a 95th minute winner against Egypt in the semi-finals. Tunisia faced Algeria in the final, losing 2–0. The 2021 Africa Cup of Nations was postponed to early 2022; in the group stage, Tunisia began with a 1–0 defeat against Mali, with Zambian referee Janny Sikazwe ending the match in the 85th minute. In the second match, the team achieved a 4–0 victory over Mauritania, and lost against Gambia in the last group match. Tunisia defeated Nigeria in the round of 16, and were eliminated by Burkina Faso.
In March, Tunisia qualified for their sixth World Cup, the 2022 tournament in Qatar, the first hosted by an Arab nation, after beating Mali 1–0 on aggregate, taking revenge for the earlier loss in the AFCON. They then defeated Chile and Japan to win the 2022 Kirin Cup Soccer title for the first time, and Ferjani Sassi was named the best player of the tournament while his compatriot Issam Jebali finished as the top scorer with two goals. Tunisia played two pre-World Cup friendlies in France in September 2022, defeating Comoros 1−0 in Croissy-sur-Seine and losing 5−1 to Brazil at the Parc des Princes in Paris. With the exception of Brazil, Tunisia's relatively good forms increased confidence on the side to break the knockout stage taboo as Tunisia found themselves grouped with world champions France, European dark horse Denmark and Asian minnows Australia.
In Group D, Tunisia drew Euro 2020 semi-finalists Denmark 0−0 in a rather decent display by the African side. But a 0−1 loss against Australia followed, severely hampering Tunisia's odds to progress. A 1−0 victory over France courtesy of a goal from Wahbi Khazri was not enough to seal Tunisia's place in the last 16 as Australia's Mathew Leckie goal against Denmark meant the Asian representative placed second. | https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Tunisia_national_football_team |
Justinian I | Justinian achieved lasting fame through his judicial reforms, particularly through the complete revision of all Roman law, something that had not previously been attempted. The total of Justinian's legislation is known today as the Corpus juris civilis. It consists of the Codex Justinianeus, the Digesta or Pandectae, the Institutiones, and the Novellae.
Early in his reign, Justinian had appointed the quaestor Tribonian to oversee this task. The first draft of the Codex Justinianeus, a codification of imperial constitutions from the 2nd century onward, was issued on 7 April 529. (The final version appeared in 534.) It was followed by the Digesta (or Pandectae), a compilation of older legal texts, in 533, and by the Institutiones, a textbook explaining the principles of law. The Novellae, a collection of new laws issued during Justinian's reign, supplements the Corpus. As opposed to the rest of the corpus, the Novellae appeared in Greek, the common language of the Eastern Empire.
The Corpus forms the basis of Latin jurisprudence (including ecclesiastical Canon Law) and, for historians, provides a valuable insight into the concerns and activities of the later Roman Empire. As a collection it gathers together the many sources in which the leges (laws) and the other rules were expressed or published: proper laws, senatorial consults (senatusconsulta), imperial decrees, case law, and jurists' opinions and interpretations (responsa prudentium).
Tribonian's code ensured the survival of Roman law. It formed the basis of later Byzantine law, as expressed in the Basilika of Basil I and Leo VI the Wise. The only western province where the Justinianic code was introduced was Italy (after the conquest by the so-called Pragmatic Sanction of 554), from where it was to pass to Western Europe in the 12th century and become the basis of much Continental European law code, which was eventually spread by European empires to the Americas and beyond in the Age of Discovery. It eventually passed to Eastern Europe where it appeared in Slavic editions, and it also passed on to Russia. It remains influential to this day.
He passed laws to protect prostitutes from exploitation and women from being forced into prostitution. Rapists were treated severely. Further, by his policies: women charged with major crimes should be guarded by other women to prevent sexual abuse; if a woman was widowed, her dowry should be returned; and a husband could not take on a major debt without his wife giving her consent twice.
Family legislation also revealed a greater concern for the interests of children. This was particularly so with respect to children born out of wedlock. The law under Justinian also reveals a striking interest in child neglect issues. Justinian protected the rights of children whose parents remarried and produced more offspring, or who simply separated and abandoned their offspring, forcing them to beg.
Justinian discontinued the regular appointment of Consuls in 541.
In Constantinople, under Justinian, hospitals were built and free medical care provided to the many poor residents of the city. In addition, public baths were free for all residents and 20 state bakeries provided free bread to those who needed it. According to one study, “The empire’s social welfare programs ensured that no one went hungry.” | https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Justinian_I |
Constantine the Great | By the middle of 310, Galerius had become too ill to involve himself in imperial politics. His final act survives: a letter to provincials posted in Nicomedia on 30 April 311, proclaiming an end to the persecutions, and the resumption of religious toleration.
Eusebius maintains "divine providence [...] took action against the perpetrator of these crimes" and gives a graphic account of Galerius' demise:
"Without warning suppurative inflammation broke out round the middle of his genitals, then a deep-seated fistula ulcer; these ate their way incurably into his innermost bowels. From them came a teeming indescribable mass of worms, and a sickening smell was given off, for the whole of his hulking body, thanks to over eating, had been transformed even before his illness into a huge lump of flabby fat, which then decomposed and presented those who came near it with a revolting and horrifying sight."
Galerius died soon after the edict's proclamation, destroying what little remained of the Tetrarchy. Maximinus mobilised against Licinius and seized Asia Minor. A hasty peace was signed on a boat in the middle of the Bosphorus. While Constantine toured Britain and Gaul, Maxentius prepared for war. He fortified northern Italy and strengthened his support in the Christian community by allowing it to elect Eusebius as bishop of Rome.
Maxentius' rule was nevertheless insecure. His early support dissolved in the wake of heightened tax rates and depressed trade; riots broke out in Rome and Carthage; and Domitius Alexander was able to briefly usurp his authority in Africa. By 312, he was a man barely tolerated, not one actively supported, even among Christian Italians. In the summer of 311, Maxentius mobilised against Constantine while Licinius was occupied with affairs in the East. He declared war on Constantine, vowing to avenge his father's "murder". To prevent Maxentius from forming an alliance against him with Licinius, Constantine forged his own alliance with Licinius over the winter of 311–312 and offered him his sister Constantia in marriage. Maximinus considered Constantine's arrangement with Licinius an affront to his authority. In response, he sent ambassadors to Rome, offering political recognition to Maxentius in exchange for a military support, which Maxentius accepted. According to Eusebius, inter-regional travel became impossible, and there was military buildup everywhere. There was "not a place where people were not expecting the onset of hostilities every day".
Constantine's advisers and generals cautioned against preemptive attack on Maxentius; even his soothsayers recommended against it, stating that the sacrifices had produced unfavourable omens. Constantine, with a spirit that left a deep impression on his followers, inspiring some to believe that he had some form of supernatural guidance, ignored all these cautions. Early in the spring of 312, Constantine crossed the Cottian Alps with a quarter of his army, a force numbering about 40,000. The first town his army encountered was Segusium (Susa, Italy), a heavily fortified town that shut its gates to him. Constantine ordered his men to set fire to its gates and scale its walls. He took the town quickly. Constantine ordered his troops not to loot the town and advanced into northern Italy.
At the approach to the west of the important city of Augusta Taurinorum (Turin, Italy), Constantine met a large force of heavily armed Maxentian cavalry. In the ensuing Battle of Turin Constantine's army encircled Maxentius' cavalry, flanked them with his own cavalry, and dismounted them with blows from his soldiers' iron-tipped clubs. Constantine's armies emerged victorious. Turin refused to give refuge to Maxentius' retreating forces, opening its gates to Constantine instead. Other cities of the north Italian plain sent Constantine embassies of congratulation for his victory. He moved on to Milan, where he was met with open gates and jubilant rejoicing. Constantine rested his army in Milan until mid-summer 312, when he moved on to Brixia (Brescia).
Brescia's army was easily dispersed, and Constantine quickly advanced to Verona where a large Maxentian force was camped. Ruricius Pompeianus, general of the Veronese forces and Maxentius' praetorian prefect, was in a strong defensive position since the town was surrounded on three sides by the Adige. Constantine sent a small force north of the town in an attempt to cross the river unnoticed. Ruricius sent a large detachment to counter Constantine's expeditionary force but was defeated. Constantine's forces successfully surrounded the town and laid siege. Ruricius gave Constantine the slip and returned with a larger force to oppose Constantine. Constantine refused to let up on the siege and sent only a small force to oppose him. In the desperately fought encounter that followed, Ruricius was killed and his army destroyed. Verona surrendered soon afterwards, followed by Aquileia, Mutina (Modena), and Ravenna. The road to Rome was now wide open to Constantine.
Maxentius prepared for the same type of war he had waged against Severus and Galerius: he sat in Rome and prepared for a siege. He still controlled Rome's Praetorian Guard, was well-stocked with African grain, and was surrounded on all sides by the seemingly impregnable Aurelian Walls. He ordered all bridges across the Tiber cut, reportedly on the counsel of the gods, and left the rest of central Italy undefended; Constantine secured that region's support without challenge. Constantine progressed slowly along the Via Flaminia, allowing the weakness of Maxentius to draw his regime further into turmoil. Maxentius' support continued to weaken: at chariot races on 27 October, the crowd openly taunted Maxentius, shouting that Constantine was invincible. Maxentius, no longer certain that he would emerge from a siege victorious, built a temporary boat bridge across the Tiber in preparation for a field battle against Constantine. On 28 October 312, the sixth anniversary of his reign, he approached the keepers of the Sibylline Books for guidance. The keepers prophesied that, on that very day, "the enemy of the Romans" would die. Maxentius advanced north to meet Constantine in battle. | https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Constantine_the_Great |
Al-Adid | Shirkuh died from choking on his meal on 23 March 1169. His unexpected departure left a power vacuum, both in the Fatimid government as well as the Syrian expeditionary force. The Fatimid elites conferred in the caliphal palace. Some proposed that Saladin be appointed to the vizierate, while others, led by the eunuch majordomo Mu'tamin al-Khilafa Jawhar, suggested that the Syrians should be given military fiefs (iqta') in the Nile Delta, thus removing them from Cairo, and that no vizier should be appointed, with al-Adid resuming personal rule like his predecessors at the beginning of the dynasty. The Syrian commanders also vied among themselves for the leadership, until Saladin emerged as the favoured candidate. Then, on 26 March 1169, Saladin was received at the caliphal palace and appointed to the vizierate, with the title of al-Malik al-Nasir (lit. 'the King who Brings Victory'). The fiction that Saladin was al-Adid's servant was upheld, but the real balance of power is shown by the fact that in the document of investiture, for the first time, the vizierate was declared as hereditary.
Nevertheless, Saladin's position was far from secure. His forces numbered a few thousand and, even though superior in combat ability, were massively outnumbered by the Fatimid troops. Furthermore, Saladin could not fully rely on the loyalty of his own commanders. Saladin's role in the Fatimid state was also a source of contradictions: he was a Sunni, who had come into Egypt with a Sunni army, and who still owed allegiance to Nur al-Din's militantly Sunni regime; but as vizier of the Fatimid caliph, he was in charge of a nominally Isma'ili state, and even of the Isma'ili religious establishment (da'wa). The Fatimid elites in the court and the army were bound to oppose Saladin's attempts to dismantle the Egyptian regime, while Nur al-Din was distrustful of his erstwhile subordinate's intentions. This obliged Saladin to tread carefully at first, making a serious effort to establish good relations with al-Adid and promote a public image of harmony between the two. After additional Syrian troops arrived under the command of Saladin's older brother, Turan-Shah, Saladin gradually distanced himself from the Fatimid regime, starting by introducing Nur al-Din's name in the Friday sermon after that of al-Adid. Al-Adid was relegated to a ceremonial role, and even publicly humiliated when Saladin entered the palace on horseback (hitherto a privilege of the caliphs). Saladin also began openly favouring his Syrian troops, awarding them military fiefs for their upkeep, while withdrawing similar fiefs from the Fatimid commanders. Lev points out that a considerable part of the Fatimid civilian bureaucracy, many of them by now Sunnis, had become alienated from the regime they served. Many of them—most notably the chancery official Qadi al-Fadil—chose to collaborate with Saladin and effectively helped him undermine the Fatimid regime.
The pro-Fatimid opposition against the ascendancy of Saladin and his Syrians coalesced around Mu'tamin al-Khilafa Jawhar. The conspirators reportedly did not hesitate to contact the Crusaders for help, in the hopes that a new Crusader invasion would draw Saladin away from Cairo, allowing them to seize control of the capital. When a letter to this effect fell into his hands, Saladin seized the opportunity to quickly and ruthlessly purge Cairo of his rivals, and Mu'tamin al-Khalifa was assassinated. Thereupon, on 21 August 1169, the Black African troops rose in revolt. In street fighting that lasted for two days, Saladin defeated them and ousted them from the city. They were pursued and defeated by Turan-Shah, while their quarters in the suburb of al-Mansuriyya were burnt. In the aftermath, Saladin appointed his confidante, Baha al-Din Qaraqush, as majordomo of the caliphal palaces, thus securing control of the caliph and his court.
Deprived of any loyal troops and closely watched over in his own palace by Qaraqush, al-Adid was now completely at Saladin's mercy. When a joint Byzantine–Crusader attack was launched on Damietta in October–December 1169, al-Adid handed over a million dinars to finance the expedition sent against the invaders. The historian Michael Brett sees in this a measure of accommodation by the caliph to the new situation, but Lev speaks of blatant "extortion" of al-Adid by Saladin, pointing out that the caliph was effectively under house arrest, and that his contribution of such an enormous sum only served to weaken his position. When Saladin's father, Ayyub, arrived in Cairo in March 1170, the caliph in person rode out with Saladin to meet him—an unheard-of honour—and awarded him the title al-Malik al-Awhad (lit. 'the Singular King').
With his position secure, Saladin solidified control of the administrative machinery of Egypt by appointing Syrians instead of native Egyptians to all public posts. As part of this, his immediate family were appointed to the most important provincial governorships. At the same time, Saladin began a slow but inexorable assault on the ideological foundations of the Fatimid state. On 25 August 1170, the call to prayer was changed from the Shi'a formula back to the Sunni one, and the first three Rashidun caliphs included, a practice offensive to Shi'a doctrine. Even al-Adid's name was subtly excluded from it by replacing it with a formula that sought God's blessings for "He who Strengthens God's Faith"—which, as the historian Heinz Halm remarks, could refer to al-Adid's regnal name, but also to "any pious Muslim, even the Sunni caliph of Baghdad". In mid-1170, al-Adid was forbidden from attending the Friday and festival prayers in state. In September 1170, Sunni madrasas were established in the old capital of Fustat; and all juridical posts were filled with Shafi'i Sunnis, mostly Syrians or Kurds. In February 1171, even the chief qadi was replaced by a Sunni appointee, followed by the final suspension of the public lectures of the Isma'ili doctrine at the al-Azhar Mosque. The Sunni jurists even issued a legal decision which allowed Saladin to legally execute al-Adid as a heretic. | https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Al-Adid |
Asia Cup | The tenth edition was held in Sri Lanka, between 15 and 24 June 2010 hosting the Asia Cup for the fourth time. It only featured the four Test playing Asian nations, and seven matches were played in all (including the final). Sri Lanka and India topped the group stages and entered the final. In the final, India beat Sri Lanka comfortably to become champions for the fifth time, winning the tournament for first time in 15 years. Shahid Afridi was the Player of the Tournament.
The eleventh edition of the Asia Cup was held in Dhaka, Bangladesh from 11 to 22 March 2012. Pakistan and Bangladesh qualified to play in the final of the eleventh edition, Bangladesh had beaten India and Sri Lanka to book their place in the final for the first time in the history of the tournament.
Pakistan beat Bangladesh after a thrilling final over, winning their second Asia Cup. Shakib Al Hasan was adjudged the Player of the Tournament. Sachin Tendulkar scored his 100th international century in this tournament.
The twelfth edition was held in Dhaka and Fatullah, Bangladesh from 25 February to 8 March 2014. The tournament consisted of five teams with Afghanistan in it for the first time since its inception in 1984. Sri Lanka defeated Pakistan by 5 wickets in the final to win the Asia Cup for the fifth time. Lahiru Thirimanne was adjudged the Player of the Tournament scoring 279 runs.
After the Asian Cricket Council was downsized by the ICC in 2015, it was announced that Asia Cup tournaments would be played on rotation basis in ODI and T20I format. As a result, 2016 events was the first tournament in T20I format and was played between five teams just ahead of 2016 ICC World Twenty20. The 2016 edition of the Asia Cup tournament was held in Bangladesh for the third consecutive time from 24 February to 6 March. The final was held on 6 March 2016. India won the final by beating Bangladesh by 8 wickets in the final held at the Sher-e-Bangla National Stadium situated in Mirpur locality, Dhaka, Bangladesh. It is for the sixth time that India won the Asia cup title in 2016. Shikhar Dhawan of India was the man of the match for his 60 runs. Sabbir Rahman of Bangladesh was the player of the series.
India won all of its matches played in Asia Cup 2016 beating Bangladesh 2 times, Pakistan, Sri Lanka and UAE.
On 29 October 2015, following the Asian Cricket Council meeting in Singapore, BCCI secretary Anurag Thakur stated that the 2018 edition of the tournament would be held in India. It will follow the ODI format. However, in April 2018, the tournament was moved to the United Arab Emirates, due to political tensions between India and Pakistan.
India were the defending champions, and retained their title, after beating Bangladesh by three wickets in the final. India did not suffer a single defeat in the tournament, with 2 wins each against Pakistan & Bangladesh, a solitary win against Hong Kong, and a tie with Afghanistan.
Shikhar Dhawan was the top run getter with 342 runs in 5 matches, was awarded Man of the Series.
Afghanistan was the only team in the tournament who remained unbeaten against eventual winners India. | https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Asia_Cup |
Italian Empire | In 1922, the leader of the Italian fascist movement, Benito Mussolini, became Prime Minister and dictator. Mussolini resolved the question of sovereignty over the Dodecanese at the 1923 Treaty of Lausanne, which formalized Italian administration of both Libya and the Dodecanese Islands, in return for a payment to Turkey, the successor state to the Ottoman Empire, though he failed in an attempt to extract a mandate of a portion of Iraq from Britain.
The month following the ratification of the Lausanne treaty, Mussolini ordered the invasion of the Greek island of Corfu after the Corfu incident. The Italian press supported the move, noting that Corfu had been a Venetian possession for four hundred years. The matter was taken by Greece to the League of Nations, where Mussolini was convinced by Britain to evacuate Italian troops, in return for reparations from Greece. The confrontation led Britain and Italy to resolve the question of Jubaland in 1924, which was merged into Italian Somaliland.
During the late 1920s, imperial expansion became an increasingly favoured theme in Mussolini's speeches. Amongst Mussolini's aims were that Italy had to become the dominant power in the Mediterranean that would be able to challenge France or Britain, as well as attain access to the Atlantic and Indian Oceans. Mussolini alleged that Italy required uncontested access to the world's oceans and shipping lanes to ensure its national sovereignty. This was elaborated on in a document he later drew up in 1939 called "The March to the Oceans", and included in the official records of a meeting of the Grand Council of Fascism. This text asserted that maritime position determined a nation's independence: countries with free access to the high seas were independent; while those who lacked this, were not. Italy, which only had access to an inland sea without French and British acquiescence, was only a "semi-independent nation", and alleged to be a "prisoner in the Mediterranean":
The bars of this prison are Corsica, Tunisia, Malta, and Cyprus. The guards of this prison are Gibraltar and Suez. Corsica is a pistol pointed at the heart of Italy; Tunisia at Sicily. Malta and Cyprus constitute a threat to all our positions in the eastern and western Mediterranean. Greece, Turkey, and Egypt have been ready to form a chain with Great Britain and to complete the politico-military encirclement of Italy. Thus Greece, Turkey, and Egypt must be considered vital enemies of Italy's expansion ... The aim of Italian policy, which cannot have, and does not have continental objectives of a European territorial nature except Albania, is first of all to break the bars of this prison ... Once the bars are broken, Italian policy can only have one motto – to march to the oceans.
In the Balkans, the Fascist regime claimed Dalmatia and held ambitions over Albania, Slovenia, Croatia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Vardar Macedonia, and Greece based on the precedent of previous Roman dominance in these regions. Dalmatia and Slovenia were to be directly annexed into Italy while the remainder of the Balkans was to be transformed into Italian client states. The regime also sought to establish protective patron-client relationships with Austria, Hungary, Yugoslavia, Romania, and Bulgaria.
In both 1932 and 1935, Italy demanded a League of Nations mandate of the former German Cameroon and a free hand in Ethiopia from France in return for Italian support against Germany (see Stresa Front). This was refused by French Prime Minister Édouard Herriot, who was not yet sufficiently worried about the prospect of a German resurgence.
In its second invasion of Ethiopia in 1935–36, Italy was successful and it merged its new conquest with its older east African colonies to create Italian East Africa (Italian: Africa Orientale Italiana). On 9 May 1936 Mussolini proclaimed the establishment of the Italian Empire in East Africa ("l'Impero"), with King Victor Emmanuel III as Emperor of Ethiopia. In 1939, Italy invaded Albania and incorporated it into the Fascist state. During the Second World War (1939–1945), Italy occupied British Somaliland, parts of south-eastern France, western Egypt and most of Greece, but then lost those conquests and its African colonies, including Ethiopia, to the invading allied forces by 1943. It was forced in the peace treaty of 1947 to relinquish sovereignty over all its colonies. It was granted a trust to administer former Italian Somaliland under United Nations supervision in 1950. When Somalia became independent in 1960, Italy's eight-decade experiment with colonialism had ended.
The Second Italo-Ethiopian War cost Italy 4,359 killed in action—2,313 Italians, 1,086 Eritreans, 507 Somalis and Libyans, and 453 Italian laborers. Ethiopian military and civilian dead, many of them from Italian bomb and mustard gas attacks, were estimated as high as 275,000.
In July 1936, Francisco Franco of the Nationalist faction in the Spanish Civil War requested Italian support against the ruling Republican faction, and guaranteed that, if Italy supported the Nationalists, "future relations would be more than friendly" and that Italian support "would have permitted the influence of Rome to prevail over that of Berlin in the future politics of Spain". Italy intervened in the civil war with the intention of occupying the Balearic Islands and creating a client state in Spain. Italy sought the control of the Balearic Islands due to its strategic position – Italy could use the islands as a base to disrupt the lines of communication between France and its North African colonies and between British Gibraltar and Malta. After the victory by Franco and the Nationalists in the war, Italy pressured Franco to permit an Italian occupation of the Balearic Islands but he did not do so.
After the United Kingdom signed the Anglo-Italian Easter Accords in 1938, Mussolini and foreign minister Ciano issued demands for concessions in the Mediterranean by France, particularly regarding Djibouti, Tunisia and the French-run Suez Canal. Three weeks later, Mussolini told Ciano that he intended for Italy to demand an Italian takeover of Albania. Mussolini professed that Italy would only be able to "breathe easily" if it had acquired a contiguous colonial domain in Africa from the Atlantic to the Indian Oceans, and when ten million Italians had settled in them. In 1938, Italy demanded a sphere of influence in the Suez Canal in Egypt, specifically demanding that the French-dominated Suez Canal Company accept an Italian representative on its board of directors. Italy opposed the French monopoly over the Suez Canal because, under the French-dominated Suez Canal Company, all Italian merchant traffic to its colony of Italian East Africa was forced to pay tolls on entering the canal.
In 1939, Italy invaded and captured Albania and made it a part of the Italian Empire as a protectorate and separate kingdom in personal union with the Italian crown. The region of modern-day Albania had been an early part of the Roman Empire, which had actually been held before northern parts of Italy had been taken by the Romans, but had long since been populated by Albanians, even though Italy had retained strong links with the Albanian leadership and considered it firmly within its sphere of influence. It is possible that Mussolini simply wanted a spectacular success over a smaller neighbour to match Germany's absorption of Austria and Czechoslovakia. Italian King Victor Emmanuel III took the Albanian crown, and a fascist government under Shefqet Verlaci was established to rule over Albania. | https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Italian_Empire |
Zionism | General Zionism (or Liberal Zionism) was initially the dominant trend within the Zionist movement from the First Zionist Congress in 1897 until after the First World War. General Zionists identified with the liberal European middle class to which many Zionist leaders such as Herzl and Chaim Weizmann aspired. Liberal Zionism, although not associated with any single party in modern Israel, remains a strong trend in Israeli politics advocating free market principles, democracy and adherence to human rights. Their political arm was one of the ancestors of the modern-day Likud. Kadima, the main centrist party during the 2000s that split from Likud and is now defunct, however, did identify with many of the fundamental policies of Liberal Zionist ideology, advocating among other things the need for Palestinian statehood in order to form a more democratic society in Israel, affirming the free market, and calling for equal rights for Arab citizens of Israel. In 2013, Ari Shavit suggested that the success of the then-new Yesh Atid party (representing secular, middle-class interests) embodied the success of "the new General Zionists."
Dror Zeigerman writes that the traditional positions of the General Zionists—"liberal positions based on social justice, on law and order, on pluralism in matters of State and Religion, and on moderation and flexibility in the domain of foreign policy and security"—are still favored by important circles and currents within certain active political parties.
Philosopher Carlo Strenger describes a modern-day version of Liberal Zionism (supporting his vision of "Knowledge-Nation Israel"), rooted in the original ideology of Herzl and Ahad Ha'am, that stands in contrast to both the romantic nationalism of the right and the Netzah Yisrael of the ultra-Orthodox. It is marked by a concern for democratic values and human rights, freedom to criticize government policies without accusations of disloyalty, and rejection of excessive religious influence in public life. "Liberal Zionism celebrates the most authentic traits of the Jewish tradition: the willingness for incisive debate; the contrarian spirit of davka; the refusal to bow to authoritarianism." Liberal Zionists see that "Jewish history shows that Jews need and are entitled to a nation-state of their own. But they also think that this state must be a liberal democracy, which means that there must be strict equality before the law independent of religion, ethnicity or gender." | https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Zionism |
Special Operation Forces (Jordan) | In the summer of 2017, the new chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff of JAF, Lieutenant General Mahmoud Freihat, launched a package of reforms across JAF—many of which appear to be driven by budgetary constraints. The reforms included specific initiatives that have significantly changed the shape of the Jordanian special operations community.
The first measure deactivated the Joint Special Operations Command headquarters and downgraded the highest-ranking special forces commander from a major general to a colonel-rank officer.
The second measure transformed the 28th Royal Ranger Brigade out of special operations and re-organized it as the Rapid Intervention / High Readiness Brigade
The third initiative removed the 5th Aviation Brigade from special operations and transferred it to the Jordanian air force. While the brigade's aircraft and pilots now fall under air force control, It has been assigned a direct support role to the King Abdallah ll Special Forces Group.
The result of reforms is to condense a three-brigade Joint Special Operations Command down to a single army-specific group—known as the King Abdullah II Royal Special Operation Forces Group—with most support elements, including administration and logistics, stripped away. At the heart of the new group are the 101st and the 71st battalions, which were converted into Special Unit I—special operations—and Special Unit II—counterterrorism.
The fourth initiative has seen the creation of the Directorate of Special Operations and Rapid Intervention. This new directorate, which forms part of the general staff of the army, is in charge of the King Abdallah ll Special Operations Group and the Rapid Intervention / High Readiness Brigade.
The King Abdullah II Special Forces Group is supported by the Mohammed bin Zayed (MbZ) Quick Reaction Force (QRF) Brigade
.
There are Similar Units to the Special Operations Units like the Special Gendarmerie's Unit 14 (SWAT unit) & Special Police's Unit 30 (SWAT unit) .
With the need for surrounding countries to develop modern forces, Jordan has become a centre of experience and specialized training for special forces. As an established regional centre for special forces training, Jordan has trained forces from Algeria, Bahrain, Iraq, Kuwait, Lebanon, Libya, Morocco, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, the UAE and Yemen. | https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Special_Operation_Forces_(Jordan) |
Suez Canal | In 1951 Egypt repudiated the 1936 treaty with Great Britain. In October 1954 the UK tentatively agreed to remove its troops from the Canal Zone. Because of Egyptian overtures towards the Soviet Union, both the United Kingdom and the United States withdrew their pledge to financially support construction of the Aswan Dam. Egyptian President Gamal Abdel Nasser responded by nationalising the canal on 26 July 1956 and transferring it to the Suez Canal Authority, intending to finance the dam project using revenue from the canal. On the same day that the canal was nationalised Nasser also closed the Straits of Tiran to all Israeli ships. This led to the Suez Crisis in which the UK, France, and Israel invaded Egypt. According to the pre-agreed war plans under the Protocol of Sèvres, Israel invaded the Sinai Peninsula on 29 October, forcing Egypt to engage them militarily, and allowing the Anglo-French partnership to declare the resultant fighting a threat to stability in the Middle East and enter the war – officially to separate the two forces but in reality to regain the Canal and bring down the Nasser government.
To save the British from what he thought was a disastrous action and to stop the war from a possible escalation, Canadian Secretary of State for External Affairs Lester B. Pearson proposed the creation of the first United Nations peacekeeping force to ensure access to the canal for all and an Israeli withdrawal from the Sinai Peninsula. On 4 November 1956, a majority at the United Nations voted for Pearson's peacekeeping resolution, which mandated the UN peacekeepers to stay in Sinai unless both Egypt and Israel agreed to their withdrawal. The United States backed this proposal by putting pressure on the British government through the selling of sterling, which would cause it to depreciate. Britain then called a ceasefire, and later agreed to withdraw its troops by the end of the year. Pearson was later awarded the Nobel Peace Prize. As a result of damage and ships sunk under orders from Nasser the canal was closed until April 1957, when it was cleared with UN assistance. A UN force (UNEF) was established to maintain the free navigability of the canal, and peace in the Sinai Peninsula. | https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Suez_Canal |
Dalida | After a short break Dalida was back on tour, this time starting in Canada where Tu peux le prendre had reached number one. On 5 February, in a popular youth French TV program Toute la Chanson, Dalida performed her latest yé-yé release "La Leçon de Twist". Accompanied on the piano by then leading French teen idol Johnny Hallyday, he also taught Dalida the moves for what she said: "he really showed himself, the most friendly of teachers of this new rhythm". The performance caused a sensation, boosting her track straight to top of French and Belgian charts. "La Leçon de Twist" was followed with another success of the same genre "Achète-moi un Juke-box", with the lyrics "Oh dad, buy me a jukebox, to listen to Elvis Presley, Les Chaussettes Noires, and Johnny Halliday – And Dalida? But what is she doing here, they still listen to her?", Dalida joked on her own account referring to the current situation in France where the youth was fond of young singers, despite her success during yé-yé. Anyway, the record spent two weeks at number one during spring.
From April to July Dalida toured across Italy and Vietnam. In Saigon, her popularity led to traffic congestion when she performed, but the local authorities interrupted her show during a rendition of "La Leçon de Twist" because the song was considered to be a political act. In May Dalida was back on top of international charts with "Le petit Gonzales", a cover of "Speedy Gonzales", which peaked in France, Belgium, Canada and Spain the following month and remained known as "one of the most memorable and nostalgic recordings of yé-yé era", as said by Le Parisien in 1987. The album of the same name was issued by the end of the year.
Although Dalida filmed her first scopitone in 1961 for the song "Loin de moi", starting a string of music videos followed by almost all yé-yé newcomers, her best critically and commercially received scopitone was recorded in September 1962 for song "Le jour le plus long", in which she paid tribute to Allies' disembarkation in Normandy on 6 June 1944. Under the direction of young Claude Lelouch, who later became one of the most acclaimed French directors, Dalida was dressed as a soldier, walked through a war-torn forest in the middle of the bombs and had accompanied real scenes from the Second World War. An unusual image of Dalida found its public and was a hit in cafes. Alongside Dalida's performance of the song on 26 September, in front of a crowd of 2,000 people on the first floor of the Eiffel Tower, "Le jour le plus long" topped charts in France for two weeks and earned her another gold disc. | https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Dalida |
Sudanese conflict in South Kordofan and Blue Nile | On 1 September, SPLM-N rebels in South Kordofan claimed the military was deliberately destroying crops and farms belonging to the Nuba people in an attempt to starve the state into submission. Meanwhile, state-run media claimed SPLM-N guerrillas killed 17 civilians, including children, and wounded 14 in the Kalugi region of South Kordofan on the same day.
On 7 September, clashes between Abdel Wahid's Sudan Liberation Army and the Sudanese army were reported in Jebel Marra. Rebels claimed to have killed 40 Sudanese soldiers and captured six of their vehicles. Three rebels were killed and another four were wounded.
A spokesman for the Sudanese military said that the SPLM-N militants attacked army positions in Ad-Damazin, the capital of Blue Nile state, on 1 September. Governor of Blue Nile State, Malik Agar disputed this account, saying the army attacked Blue Nile state institutions first, including his official residence. The military quickly took control of Ad-Damazin, and Khartoum replaced Agar with a military governor. Agar and his allies regrouped in southern Blue Nile. On 2 September, the federal government declared a state of emergency in the state. The Sudanese Air Force reportedly carried out strike missions, bombing SPLM-N villages and towns with the SPLM-N claiming that four civilians were killed in an aerial bombing of Kormok.
By 22 September, the SPLM-N had claimed victory in several battlefields (in the areas of Ibri, locality of Dlami; Angrto, locality of Talodi and Abolhassan, in the locality of Cdarno) killing 25 soldiers and militias belonging to the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) and captured several soldiers and weapons.
The JEM and the SLM, issued a joint statement on 4 September condemning the Sudanese military's use of force against the SPLM-N in Blue Nile, calling it a plot to spread "chaos and killing" across the country. They also called on the United Nations Security Council to impose a no-fly zone over Blue Nile, Darfur, and South Kordofan.
The Sudanese military claimed on 10 September to have broken an SPLM-N siege of Qiessan, near the Ethiopian border, and evacuated its wounded soldiers from the town. Both Agar and Yahia Mohamed Kheir, the military governor appointed by al-Bashir, claimed control of 80 percent of Blue Nile state. Meanwhile, the Sudanese government said 5,000 people had fled their homes in Blue Nile as a result of the fighting, and Information Minister Sana Hamad al-Awad claimed it had proof the South Sudanese government was paying the salaries of SPLM-N fighters across the border.
On 3 October, SPLM-N forces clashed with the Sudanese army in South Kordofan killing 47 soldiers, including three well-known militia leaders and injuring 23 more.
On 9 October the SPLM-N ambushed Sudanese soldiers in Khor Adrak in Blue Nile, killing 30 of them and destroying three army vehicles and capturing one.
The Sudanese military seized control of Kurmuk, the former stronghold of the SPLM-N in Blue Nile state, on 2 November. Al-Bashir visited the town four days later to declare it "liberated". He also threatened South Sudan with war, accusing it of supporting the SPLM-N in its anti-government activities.
On 10 November, it was reported that the Sudanese government bombed Yida camp in South Sudan's Unity state. Two Antonov makeshift bombers were seen leaving the area. They were said to have dropped five bombs, four detonating. The local official Miabek Lang said at least 12 people had been killed and 20 wounded during the strike. The Sudanese government has denied the claims.
Darfuri factions and the SPLM-N in Blue Nile and South Kordofan states announced the formation of an alliance called the Sudan Revolutionary Front (SRF) on 12 November. The stated goal of the coalition is to overthrow al-Bashir's government and install a democratic system in Sudan.
On 23 November, the Sudanese Liberation Army faction led by Abdul Wahid al-Nur (SLA-AW) clashed with the SAF in North Darfur's Kabkabiya region and captured 10 Land Cruisers loaded with guns in addition to capturing three soldiers, one with the rank of sergeant. 35 Sudanese soldiers were killed in the clashes.
The Sudanese Armed forces said they managed on 5 of December to defeat the rebels of the SPLA in South Kordofan's region of Lake Alubaid, where the armed forces seized the head of division nine in all its three camps. The Sudan People's Liberation Movement denied this happening and asserted that it had destroyed a whole unit of militias affiliated with the National Congress Party (NCP) and its armed forces near the city Toroj, killing 60 of the Sudanese army and militia and destroying 3 armored vehicles. They also stated that they took over armored vehicles and artillery guns with a number of ammunition and fuel.
On 9 December the SAF and the SPLM-N both claimed victory in battle in South Kordofan. The SPLM-N claimed to have killed 40 members of the Central Reserves Police, including the head of the team. They also said that three Land Cruisers loaded with guns were destroyed; three artilleriy pieces and tens of light weapons, including RBG 7 and BKM machine guns were captured. They also claimed to have dispersed militias of the NCP under the leadership of Kafi Tayar who attacked Dalkoma, ten kilometers south of Kadugli, resulting in nine deaths.
SPLM-N fighters in South Kordofan reported turning back Sudanese army forces attempting to dislodge them from positions in Warni on 10 December, as well as the capture of the localities of Abu al-Hassan and al-Rashad three days earlier. The battles left 19 dead, according to a spokesman for the group.
By 12 December, fighting had shifted to Taruje, near the border with South Sudan. In a related skirmish, South Sudanese and Sudanese regular divisions clashed at Jau, a disputed town on the border, in what a Sudanese army spokesman described as a victory for Khartoum's soldiers.
On 25 December, JEM leader Khalil Ibrahim was intercepted and killed along with 30 of his fighters in North Kordofan, west of Wad Banda. Sudanese state media reported Ibrahim was defeated in fighting with the army. JEM confirmed Ibrahim's death, but said he had been killed by an airstrike, not in combat with Sudanese ground troops. Ibrahim's death came a day after JEM fighters attacked three villages in the state. | https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Sudanese_conflict_in_South_Kordofan_and_Blue_Nile |
Abdul-Karim Qasim | During Qasim's term, there was much debate over whether Iraq should join the United Arab Republic, led by Gamal Abdel Nasser. Having dissolved the Hashemite Arab Federation with the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan, Qasim refused to allow Iraq to enter the federation, although his government recognized the republic and considered joining it later.
Qasim's growing ties with the communists served to provoke rebellion in the northern Iraqi city of Mosul led by Arab nationalists in charge of military units. In an attempt to reduce the likelihood of a potential coup, Qasim had encouraged a communist backed Peace Partisans rally to be held in Mosul on 6 March 1959. Some 250,000 Peace Partisans and communists thronged through Mosul's streets that day, and although the rally passed peacefully, on 7 March, skirmishes broke out between communists and nationalists. This degenerated into a major civil disturbance over the following days. Although the rebellion was crushed by the military, it had a number of adverse effects that impacted Qasim's position. First, it increased the power of the communists. Second, it increased the strength of the Ba’ath Party, which had been growing steadily since the 14 July coup. The Ba'ath Party believed that the only way of halting the engulfing tide of communism was to assassinate Qasim.
The Ba'ath Party turned against Qasim because of his refusal to join Gamal Abdel Nasser's United Arab Republic. To strengthen his own position within the government, Qasim created an alliance with the Iraqi Communist Party (ICP), which was opposed to any notion of pan-Arabism. Later that year, the Ba'ath Party leadership put in place plans to assassinate Qasim. Saddam Hussein was a leading member of the operation. At the time, the Ba'ath Party was more of an ideological experiment than a strong anti-government fighting machine. The majority of its members were either educated professionals or students, and Saddam fitted in well within this group.
The choice of Saddam was, according to journalist Con Coughlin, "hardly surprising". The idea of assassinating Qasim may have been Nasser's, and there is speculation that some of those who participated in the operation received training in Damascus, which was then part of the United Arabic Republic. However, "no evidence has ever been produced to implicate Nasser directly in the plot".
The assassins planned to ambush Qasim on Al-Rashid Street on 7 October 1959. One man was to kill those sitting at the back of the car, the others killing those in front. During the ambush it was claimed that Saddam began shooting prematurely, which disrupted the whole operation. Qasim's chauffeur was killed, and Qasim was hit in the arm and shoulder. The would-be assassins believed they had killed him and quickly retreated to their headquarters, but Qasim survived.
The growing influence of communism was felt throughout 1959. A communist-sponsored purge of the armed forces was carried out in the wake of the Mosul revolt. The Iraqi cabinet began to shift towards the radical-left as several communist sympathisers gained posts in the cabinet. Iraq's foreign policy began to reflect this communist influence, as Qasim removed Iraq from the Baghdad Pact on 24 March, and then fostered closer ties with the Soviet Union, including extensive economic agreements. However, communist successes encouraged them to attempt to expand their power. The communists attempted to replicate their success at Mosul in Kirkuk. A rally was called for 14 July which was intended to intimidate conservative elements. Instead it resulted in widespread bloodshed between ethnic Kurds (who were associated with the ICP at the time) and Iraqi Turkmen, leaving between 30 and 80 people dead.
Despite being largely the result of pre-existing ethnic tensions, the Kirkuk "massacre" was exploited by Iraqi anti-communists and Qasim subsequently purged the communists and in early 1960 he refused to license the ICP as a legitimate political party. Qasim's actions led to a major reduction of communist influence in the Iraqi government. Communist influence in Iraq peaked in 1959 and the ICP squandered its best chance of taking power by remaining loyal to Qasim, while his attempts to appease Iraqi nationalists backfired and contributed to his eventual overthrow. For example, Qasim released Salih Mahdi Ammash from custody and reinstated him in the Iraqi army, allowing Ammash to act as the military liaison to the Ba'athist coup plotters. Furthermore, notwithstanding his outwardly friendly posture towards the Kurds, Qasim was unable to grant Kurdistan autonomous status within Iraq, leading to the 1961 outbreak of the First Iraqi–Kurdish War and secret contacts between the Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP) and Qasim's Ba'athist opponents in 1962 and 1963. The KDP promised not to aid Qasim in the event of a Ba'athist coup, ignoring long-standing Kurdish antipathy towards pan-Arab ideology. Disagreements between Qasim, the ICP and the Kurds thus created a power vacuum that was exploited by a "tiny" group of Iraqi Ba'athists in 1963. | https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Abdul-Karim_Qasim |
Cradle of civilization | One of the earliest Neolithic sites in the Indian subcontinent is Bhirrana along the ancient Ghaggar-Hakra riverine system in the present day state of Haryana in India, dating to around 7600 BC. Other early sites include Lahuradewa in the Middle Ganges region and Jhusi near the confluence of Ganges and Yamuna rivers, both dating to around 7000 BC.
The aceramic Neolithic at Mehrgarh in present-day Pakistan lasts from 7000 to 5500 BC, with the ceramic Neolithic at Mehrgarh lasting up to 3300 BC; blending into the Early Bronze Age. Mehrgarh is one of the earliest sites with evidence of farming and herding in the Indian subcontinent. It is likely that the culture centered around Mehrgarh migrated into the Indus Valley in present-day Pakistan and became the Indus Valley Civilisation. The earliest fortified town in the region is found at Rehman Dheri, dated 4000 BC in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa close to River Zhob Valley in present-day Pakistan . Other fortified towns found to date are at Amri (3600–3300 BC), Kot Diji in Sindh, and at Kalibangan (3000 BC) at the Hakra River.
The Indus Valley Civilization starts around 3300 BC with what is referred to as the Early Harappan Phase (3300–2600 BC), although at the start this was still a village-based culture, leaving mostly pottery for archaeologists. The earliest examples of the Indus script date to this period, as well as the emergence of citadels representing centralised authority and an increasingly urban quality of life. Trade networks linked this culture with related regional cultures and distant sources of raw materials, including lapis lazuli and other materials for bead-making. By around 2600 BC, villagers had domesticated numerous crops, including peas, sesame seeds, dates, and cotton, as well as animals, including the water buffalo.
2600 to 1900 BC marks the Mature Harappan Phase during which Early Harappan communities turned into large urban centers including Harappa, Dholavira, Mohenjo-Daro, Lothal, Rupar, and Rakhigarhi, and more than 1,000 towns and villages, often of relatively small size. Mature Harappans evolved new techniques in metallurgy and produced copper, bronze, lead, and tin and displayed advanced levels of engineering. As seen in Harappa, Mohenjo-daro and the recently partially excavated Rakhigarhi, this urban plan included the world's first known urban sanitation systems: see hydraulic engineering of the Indus Valley civilization. Within the city, individual homes or groups of homes obtained water from wells. From a room that appears to have been set aside for bathing, waste water was directed to covered drains, which lined the major streets. Houses opened only to inner courtyards and smaller lanes. The housebuilding in some villages in the region still resembles in some respects the housebuilding of the Harappans. The advanced architecture of the Harappans is shown by their impressive dockyards, granaries, warehouses, brick platforms, and protective walls. The massive walls of Indus cities most likely protected the Harappans from floods and may have dissuaded military conflicts.
The people of the Indus Civilization achieved great accuracy in measuring length, mass, and time. They were among the first to develop a system of uniform weights and measures. A comparison of available objects indicates large scale variation across the Indus territories. Their smallest division, which is marked on an ivory scale found in Lothal in Gujarat, was approximately 1.704 mm, the smallest division ever recorded on a scale of the Bronze Age. Harappan engineers followed the decimal division of measurement for all practical purposes, including the measurement of mass as revealed by their hexahedron weights. These chert weights were in a ratio of 5:2:1 with weights of 0.05, 0.1, 0.2, 0.5, 1, 2, 5, 10, 20, 50, 100, 200, and 500 units, with each unit weighing approximately 28 grams, similar to the English Imperial ounce or Greek uncia, and smaller objects were weighed in similar ratios with the units of 0.871. However, as in other cultures, actual weights were not uniform throughout the area. The weights and measures later used in Kautilya's Arthashastra (4th century BC) are the same as those used in Lothal.
Around 1800 BC, signs of a gradual decline began to emerge, and by around 1700 BC most of the cities had been abandoned. Suggested contributory causes for the localisation of the IVC include changes in the course of the river, and climate change that is also signalled for the neighbouring areas of the Middle East. As of 2016 many scholars believe that drought led to a decline in trade with Egypt and Mesopotamia contributing to the collapse of the Indus Civilization. The Ghaggar-Hakra system was rain-fed, and water-supply depended on the monsoons. The Indus Valley climate grew significantly cooler and drier from about 1800 BC, linked to a general weakening of the monsoon at that time. The Indian monsoon declined and aridity increased, with the Ghaggar-Hakra retracting its reach towards the foothills of the Himalaya, leading to erratic and less extensive floods that made inundation agriculture less sustainable. Aridification reduced the water supply enough to cause the civilization's demise, and to scatter its population eastward. As the monsoons kept shifting south, the floods grew too erratic for sustainable agricultural activities. The residents then migrated away into smaller communities. However trade with the old cities did not flourish. The small surplus produced in these small communities did not allow development of trade, and the cities died out. The Indo-Aryan peoples migrated into the Indus River Valley during this period and began the Vedic age of India. The Indus Valley Civilization did not disappear suddenly and many elements of the civilization continued in later Indian subcontinent and Vedic cultures. | https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Cradle_of_civilization |
Ni'matullāhī | Dr. Javad Nurbakhsh became pīr of the Niʿmatullāhī Order in 1953 upon the death of his predecessor, Mūnis ʿAli Shah, known as Dhū'l-Rīyāsatayn. Dr. Nurbakhsh was bestowed with the name Nūr 'Ali Shāh Kermani for his initiation when he was 16 years old, and acknowledged as a spiritual prodigy from an early age. Mūnis ʿAli Shah soon assigned the young Javad Nurbakhsh all of the principal duties for operating and maintaining the Nimatullahi khaniqah in Tehran, before the age of twenty — a time when he was also pursuing full-time medical studies in university. His later accession as qotb initiated a period of expansion, vitality and renewal for the order that bore comparison to the revival by his 18th century predecessor and spiritual namesake, Nūr 'Ali Shāh.
Within Iran, the Nimatullahi order was significantly expanded by Javad Nurbakhsh, having 60 new khaniqahs built in cities throughout the country between his accession in 1953 and 1979. During this period of growth in the 1970s, visitors to Iran from the United States and Europe were first accepted the order. In 1974, on invitation by American initiates of the Nimatullahi order, Javad Nurbakhsh went to the United States and determined a need to establish regular khaniqahs there. In 1979, Javad Nurbakhsh's leadership of the Nimatullahi order moved abroad from Tehran, as a result of the revolution in Iran. Dr. Nurbakhsh led the Nimatullahi order from United States until his permanent emigration to England in 1983. By the early 1990s there were nine Nimatullahi khaniqahs in the United States. The composition of individual Nimatullahi members in their assemblies changed and broadened over these two decades, with American khaniqahs in the East Coast — such as Boston, New York and Washington — mostly attended by Americans, while those in California were about half American and half of Iranian origins. Nimatullahi members were also accepted from a diversity of religious backgrounds on the basis of sincerity alone, not exclusively restricted to Shi'a Islam.
The growth of a global Nimatullahi presence proceedes, and as of this writing, in 2022, the Nimatullahi order expanded to many parts of the world, with some 36 khaniqahs located from the United States, Canada, and Mexico, to several European nations, Russia, Western Africa, and Australia.
With the death of Dr. Javad Nurbakhsh in October of 2008, succession of leadership as pīr of the Nimatullahi order passed to his son, Dr. Alireza Nurbakhsh as sole spiritual and material heir. Keeping with the order's injunction to be a productive member of society, Alireza Nurbakhsh is a currently practicing lawyer in London. In addition to being licensed as a solicitor, he obtained his Ph.D in philosophy from the University of Wisconsin-Madison in 1988. Prior to his accession to leadership of the Nimatullahi, Alireza Nurbakhsh established and guided the first 20 years of the Nimatullahi Sufi journal. The Sufi Journal is responsible for much of the scholarly and artistic sponsorship by the order during those years to present time in 2022. Dr. Alireza Nurbakhsh describes his charge for the continuance and growth of the Nimatullahi practical legacy into a new century - a legacy that he's described as nothing other than the ethos of Divine Unity and Loving Kindness. | https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ni%27matull%C4%81h%C4%AB |
International propagation of Salafism and Wahhabism by region | Saudi and Islamist forces helped the Afghan Mujahideen in their struggle against the Soviets, with Saudi Arabian government providing approximately $4 billion in aid to the mujahidin from 1980 to 1990.
Saudi Arabia and other Arab states of the Persian Gulf became "important backers" for Islamic schools (madrassas) for Afghan refugees in Pakistan which appeared in the 1980s near the Afghan-Pakistan border. In 1988, the Muslim World League stated that it had opened 150 Quran study centers and 85 Islamic schools for Afghan refugee students in Peshawar, a short distance across the border in Pakistan.
Many were radical schools sponsored by the Pakistan JUI religious party and became "a supply line for jihad" in Afghanistan. According to analysts the ideology of the schools became "hybridization" of the Deobandi school of the Pakistani sponsors and the Salafism supported by Saudi financers.
Many of the Taliban were graduates of these schools. (Eight Taliban government ministers came from one school, Dar-ul-Uloom Haqqania.) While in power, the Taliban implemented the "strictest interpretation of Sharia law ever seen in the Muslim world."
After the Taliban came to power the Saudis helped them in a number of ways. Saudi Arabia was one of only three countries (Pakistan and United Arab Emirates being the others) officially to recognize the Taliban as the official government of Afghanistan before the 9/11 attacks, (after 9/11 no country recognized it). King Fahd of Saudi Arabia “expressed happiness at the good measures taken by the Taliban and over the imposition of shari’a in our country," During a visit by the Taliban's leadership to the kingdom in 1997.
According to Ahmed Rashid, "Wahhabi" practices might have influenced the Deobandi Taliban. One example was the Saudi religious police, according to Rashid.
`I remember that all the Taliban who had worked or done hajj in Saudi Arabia were terribly impressed by the religious police and tried to copy that system to the letter. The money for their training and salaries came partly from Saudi Arabia.` The taliban also practiced public beheadings common in Saudi Arabia. Ahmed Rashid came across ten thousand men and children gathering at Kandahar football stadium one Thursday afternoon, curious as to why (the Taliban had banned sports) he "went inside to discover a convicted murderer being led between the goalposts to be executed by a member of the victim's family."
Another activity Afghan Muslims had not engaged in before this time was destruction of statues. In 2001, the Taliban dynamited and rocketed the nearly 2000-year-old statues Buddhist Bamiyan Valley, which had been undamaged by Afghan Sunni Muslim for centuries prior to then. Mullah Omar declared "Muslims should be proud of smashing idols. It has given praise to Allah that we have destroyed them." | https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/International_propagation_of_Salafism_and_Wahhabism_by_region |
Kashmiri cuisine | Foods mentioned in ancient Kashmiri scriptures/chronicles/travellers' accounts include:
Rice, which could be imported from other countries in times of famine. Patañjali's Mahabhashya reveals that rice was already being cultivated in the valley c.150 BC. Sultan Zain-ul-Abidin diverted the waters of the Dal Lake into the Mar canal which he extended up to Shadipur where it emptied itself at the confluence of Jhelum and Indus. Owing to these irrigation works, and reclamation of large areas for cultivation, Kashmir became self-sufficient in rice production. The natives considered the hot water at Dewsur sacred, and said that when one wished to know if any undertaking will prosper, they must take an earthen vessel, fill it with rice, and having secured the mouth, so that water may be excluded, throw it into the holy font. If on coming up the rice was boiled, it was deemed a fortunate omen, but unpropitious if otherwise.
Pilau, yellow pilau, black pilau, shola pilau etc.
Bikabatta, a dish consisting of rice, goat's fat and water.
Rice mixed with sugar and sugarcane.
Bread, it was not custom to eat naan/tsoet until early 17th century.
Milk, of cows and probably of buffaloes was consumed.
Butter.
Strawberries, which could vie with the best in England.
Yellow raspberries.
Musk-Melons, by the permission of Akbar, the crop was imported from Kashmir in the later season.
Guavas, of Kashmir were considered to be 'middling' by Jahangir.
Peaches, ripened in July.
Other diverse fruits, (apple, crabapple, pear, peach, apricot, cherry, mulberry, melon, water melon, greengage, gooseberry, currants, raspberry, sour cherry).
Diverse vegetables, (red beet, water parsnips, radishes)
Rhubarb (pambahak), grew on the mountains surrounding Kashmir. Both Hindus and Muslims were fond of the stalks.
Turnips, The turnips (gogjee) of Haripur were said to be the best in the valley.
Carrots. The carrots (gazar) were eaten by the Muslim inhabitants but not by the Hindus.
New potatoes.
Leeks. Leeks (gaudapraan) were not eaten by the Hindus of the valley.
Artichokes.
Asparagus, in great stalks.
Lettuce.
Tomatoes, scarlet in colour.
Dimb. A vegetable found only in the Dal and Anchar lakes in Kashmir.
Raw Flesh, there was an animal sacrifice in connection with the marriage ceremony.
Ram. Meat (mesa) was generally fried and sometimes highly spiced. The mutton of Nandipur was said to be the finest of Kashmir.
Meat cooked in yoghurt.
Ducks
Pigeons.
Beef, Kashmiri mystic Nund Reshi or Sheikh Noor ud-Din Wali expressed his disdain for a preacher who ate beef (moshi) and then complained it was the ogre's greed in one of his shruks. Sultan Ghiyas-ud-din Zain-ul-Abidin had banned cow slaughter in the state in deference to the religious sentiment of his Hindu subjects.
Horse meat, was taken with relish in Kashmir.
Pork, domestic pigs (gramya sukara) were eaten in Kashmir without any adverse notice in the 11th century AD. The fragmentary jaw of a pig was found at the trial excavations at Burzahom.
Poultry, the valley of Lolab was famous for the best quality of poultry. The practice of capon was known to the Kashmiris.
Chicken Soup (shurba literally meaning saltish water, ba is the reverse of aab meaning water).
Other edible birds.
Dog's flesh, cooked by people of Dom origin.
Handu sheep, delicate and sweet in flavour and wholesome.
Stags, chased down the Wular lake.
Caul fat, oblations of animal fat were offered in the sacrificial fire in place of ghee (clarified butter) in other parts of India.
Carp, mentioned in the Samaya Matrika of Ksemendra.
Fish Soup, eaten to keep up aphrodisiacal vigour by men addicted to women.
Trout
Danube Salmon.
Fowls (kukkuta). A favourite dish of the Kashmiris was to cook fowl and aubergines together.
Honey.
Boiled Eggs, the eggs were brought from Gilgit and Little Tibet (Ladakh) where they were procured in greater abundance.
Pircham, an omelette-like preparation.
Masura, a sort of lentil.
Samudga, moong dal. Feeding only on rice and samudga was known to be miserly.
Other Pulses (including Peas and Broad Beans).
Parpata or papara, modern papad. Another kind of food made from pulses.
Ksira (kheer), rice boiled in milk.
Machhama, a dish eaten by the Kashmiris consisting of rice, vegetables, raisins, colouring matter and sugar.
Walnuts, which were eaten during famine as shali rice became dear.
Pistachios.
Sugar-cane., the country around Martand was planted with the crop.
Grapes, grown only in Kashmir in India, according to Hiuen Tsang and which were rare even in Heaven, according to Kalhana. The Persian writer Abul Fazl considered them to be in plenty, but the finer qualities were rare. Walter R. Lawrence praised the white and red grapes of the state vineyard at Raipur. Of the foreign varieties, husaini and fakhri varieties were from Khorasan, supposed to be the best in Persia.
Unripe grapes (kur), the Kashmiris made excellent vinegar of it.
Garlic, several Brahmanas who used to eat it were expelled, according to Kalhana. Both garlic and onion were considered as aphrodisiacs in ancient Kashmir.
Pomegranates, already in abundance in the late part of 19th century.
Holy Basil.
Salt, a precious article and according to Ksemendra, consumed by the rich alone. Two varieties were found in the bazaars of Kashmir: rock salt from the Punjab, and powder salt, called bota nun from Ladakh.
Saffron, historians suggest Persian saffron corms were transplanted to Kashmiri soil after Persia conquered Kashmir. The first harvest occurred sometime prior to 500 BC. Hiuen Tsang, a Chinese traveller in his Travels in India (631 AD) says that saffron flowers were long used to adorn the neck of oxen at the autumn festival in the country of Kashmir. Reference has been made of Kashmiri saffron in the Ratnavali of Harsha. Buddhist tradition claims Mādhyandina, a disciple or companion of the Buddha’s disciple Ānanda, introduced the saffron crocus in Kashmir. Kashmiri poet Bilhana in his Vikramanka Charitam says that the cultivation of saffron flowers in Kashmir originated from Takshaka Naga, a holy spring. A popular myth talks about how when a naga chieftain (a water god) fell sick with an eye complaint, he was cured by the vaidya of Padmapur (Pampore). In gratitude, the naga gave him a bulb of saffron and thus the locals began the cultivation. Ksemendra mentioned that traders used to earn a lot through trade in saffron, in his 11th century satire Samayamatrka. In the Kaula tradition, a ceremony was performed with saffron for warriors. The Persian historian Firishta (1612) mentions that the saffron of Kashmir was particularly good. At the time of Jehangir (1605–27), the annual crop was 18.5 tonnes, more than anywhere in the world.
Clarified Butter, lamps were prepared with ghee. It was sold by itinerant sellers who went from door to door.
Oil. Wooden oil presses constructed more than 200 years ago have been operating in Kashmir. Till the mid-1940s there were sixteen oil mills operating in Srinagar. Large quantities of dried apricots called Bote Chire were imported to Kashmir from Ladakh in the bygone days, and oil was pressed from their kernels at Kashmiri oil presses. The rapeseed oil was considered best for eating while walnut and almond oil were also used. In the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, the cultivation of mustard plants grew considerably in Kashmir, and the use of walnut oil fell considerably.
Gold Dust.
Curd.
Half ripe Barley.
Bread (apupa) and cake (pistaka) made from barley. A particular day of the year was observed as a festival, when barely became ripe in the fields.
Spring Water, of Kokar Nag was said to appease hunger and renew appetite. A fountain in the neighbourhood of Achh Bal was scarcely equalled for its coldness, limpidity and refreshing qualities. Malakhnag in Anantnag was cherished for its mineral-rich waters.
Tea, came to Kashmir by caravans across Chinese Tartary and Tibet.
Beer. For Kashmiri polymath Abhinavagupta, alcohol was the external essence of Shiva. Without alcohol, there was neither enjoyment nor liberation. The use of drink is admitted during the sautramani sacrifice of the brahmans, during a great battle in case of warriors, during farming in case of peasants, at great family celebrations, at the birth of a son, on the occasion of marriage or gathering of friends, and at the conclusion of the cremation ritual in case of slaves. For his commentator Jayaratha, the practitioner should drink because of a sort of bhairavic greatness, but not like a bonded animal, because of greed. The finest drink is on every occasion, the drink of average value is at the junctures, the worst is only once a month, and beyond a month he becomes a bonded animal. Hops, too, grew in Kashmir and factories were close by in which raw produce was transferred into excellent liquids.
Wheat Beer.
Mead.
Rum, from treacle.
Wine, called mas in Kashmiri language. Kashmir was the only part of India where wine was made from the juice of the grape, a fact to be attributed rather to its acescent quality, than to any scarcity of fruit. A wine culture inflected by Hellenism thrived in Kashmir in the early centuries AD. At the beaded ring of a statue of goddess Lakshmi in a distinctively Gandharan style discovered by Frenchman Albert Foucher near the village of Brar in Bandipora in 1896, one can see clusters and foliage of vines. In the Mulasarvastivada vinaya, a Buddhist text from the first half of the 2nd century AD, some monks travel in the Northwest and a yakṣa presents them with some grapes, which are said to be from Kashmir and apparently a great novelty. The Buddha explains that they can be eaten after purifying them with a burning ember, and that people can also make juice/syrup from them. For Abhinavagupta, alcohol which came from grape was splendour to a supreme degree. He praised the wine of his native Kashmir as mahabhairava (the mercurial essence). Jayaratha cautions against mixing it with any other ingredient, for the reason that its effectiveness would be quite limited. Lalitaditya was so intoxicated with wine he told his ministers that if they wished to increase the beauty of his city, they should burn Pravarapura, the city built by king Sri Pravarasena of the Alchon Huns and his orders could not be disobeyed. There are many references which show that making and drinking wine was not prohibited during the early Sultanate period even though it was strongly disapproved of by the orthodox section of the society. It was a common sight to see laymen and Brahman priests alike in a state of drunkenness during Hindu festivals. Despite the Islamic ban on alcohol, the Muslims, who participated in these festivals, also freely partook of wine. Zainul Abidin took it in moderation, but Haider Shah was a confirmed drunkard. Sikandar Butshikan, or the destroyer of idols (c.1416) prohibited vending wine in Kashmir. During the Sikh and Dogra periods, thousands of acres were covered with vines in full bearing. The indigenous vines were generally planted at the foot of poplar and ran up to the height of fifty or sixty feet, bearing an abundance of fruit. After harvesting grapes in October, they were kept in shallow earthen vessels till spring, then they were applied to the fabrication of wine, vinegar and brandy. In 1815, the early wine writer André Jullien compared Kashmiri wine to madeira. Maharaja Ranbir Singh introduced vines from Bordeaux in France and Marion Doughty, a woman who visited Kashmir in 1900 wrote that the Medoc and Barsac were both strengthening and pleasant to taste. Anguri and qandi were the cherished drinks of singers.
Maireya Wine, a spicy wine perfumed by camphor, and made out of fruits and flowers with a natural sugar base.
Asava Wine, decocted extracts or cold infusion extracts of different herbs fermented with flowers of dhataki (woodfordia fruticosa).
New Wine. The Hindus pressed the juice of the grape, strained it, placed it in the sun for four or five days and then drank it.
Sweet wine, like Madeira. It would be found to improve greatly in quality with age.
Fruit wine (madapan), made out of pears, apples or mulberry.
Brandy, distilled from wine.
Vinegar, Kashmiris made various pickles with it, the best of which was garlic, according to Jehangir.
Flour cakes, fine flour could become expensive.
Spirit from Grapes, liquor (mrdvika) was drunk with incantation and blessing.
Spirit from Datura (Thorn-Apple).
Sesame. Oil was extracted from it.
Ginger., Jonaraja compares his words (as meagre) to water in dried ginger.
Coarse sugar.
Meat cakes.
Fish.
Dried food.
Ira-flowers(drink).
Green vegetables | https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Kashmiri_cuisine |
Hudud | The offences subject to hudud punishment:
Some types of theft (sariqa, السرقة). Punished with amputation of a hand.
Highway robbery (hirabah, qat' al-tariq). Punished with death followed by crucifixion, amputation of the right hand and the left foot (the combined right-left double amputation procedure is known as the ancient punishment of "cross-amputation") or banishment. Different punishments are prescribed for different scenarios and there are differences of opinion regarding specifics within and between legal schools.
Apostasy (riddah, ردة or irtidad, ارتداد), leaving Islam for another religion or for atheism, is regarded as one of hudud crimes liable to capital punishment in traditional Maliki, Hanbali and Shia jurisprudence, but not in Hanafi and Shafi’i fiqh as the hudud are a kaffarah for the hudud offences, though these schools all regard apostasy as a grave crime and prescribe the death penalty for apostates.
Illicit sexual intercourse (zina, الزنا). Includes pre-marital sex and extra-marital sex. Classification of homosexual intercourse as zina differs according to legal school. Although stoning for zina is not mentioned in the Quran, all schools of traditional jurisprudence agreed on the basis of hadith that it is to be punished by stoning if the offender is muhsan (adult, free, Muslim, and married or previously married). Lashing is the penalty for offenders who are not muhsan, i.e. they do not meet all of the above criteria. The offenders must have acted of their own free will.
False accusation of zina (qadhf, القذف). Punished by 80 lashes.
Drinking alcohol (shurb al-khamr). Punished by 40 to 80 lashes, depending on the legal school.
Rebellion (baghi). Although it is not listed as a hudud offense in most works of fiqh (Islamic jurisprudence), rebellion against a Muslim ruler is considered a hadd offense by some jurists, based on Quran 49:9. There is juristic consensus that the rebels must be exhorted to lay down their arms through a trusted negotiator before loyal troops have a license to fight and kill them.
There are a number of differences in views between the different madhhabs with regard to the punishments appropriate in specific situations and the required process before they are carried out. There are also legal differences (ikhtilaf) over the term limitation of pronouncing the punishment. Hanafite scholars assert that punishment for hadd crimes other than qadhf (false accusation of illegal sex) have to be implemented within a month; except for witnesses with a valid legal justifications for delayed testimony or in cases of self-confession.
Marja' following Shia jurisprudence generally believe that hudud punishments can be changed by appropriately qualified jurists.
Murder, injury and property damage are not hudud crimes in Islamic criminal jurisprudence, and are subsumed under other categories of Islamic penal law, which are:
Qisas (meaning retaliation, and following the principle of "eye for an eye"), and diyah ("blood money", financial compensation paid to the victim or heirs of a victim in the cases of murder, bodily harm or property damage. Diyyah is an alternative to Qisas for the same class of crimes).
Ta'zeer – punishment administered at the discretion of the judge. | https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Hudud |
2019–2021 Iraqi protests | 2 December: Several Iraqi civil servants reportedly took to the streets of the Kurdistan Region of northern Iraq, to protest over the delay in payment of salaries. The protesters were said to have gathered at the epicenter of Sulaimani's anti-government protests of 2011, the Saraa square. Water cannons, tear gas, rubber bullets, including live rounds was believed to have been used by security forces to break up the gathering of protesters, according to the Middle East Eye.
7 December: Following days of protests in the northern Kurdish region of Iraq, a protester was said to have been killed by armed men who were protecting the headquarters of the Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP). Two other protesters were also wounded during the unrest. According to a statement by the spokesman of the Chamchamal Health Directorate in Sulaymaniyah district, Sherif Rahim, the protester who was killed was a 16-year-old teenager.
8 December: As of Wednesday, the death toll was reported to have reached eight people, since the beginning of the protests against delayed payment of salaries in Kurdish Iraq. In an effort by the Iraqi Kurdish authorities to prevent the violence from extending, a 24-hour ban on movement was imposed in Sulaymaniyah and other nearby towns, which was expected to last until Wednesday midnight. The demonstrations had already extended across six towns surrounding Sulaymaniyah on Tuesday, with disgruntled protesters setting government offices and political parties' headquarters on fire.
Iraq's president, Barham Salih has urged security forces to adhere to the law and avoid applying unlawful use of force against peaceful protesters. The Iraqi president further called on the demonstrators, including the security forces to conduct themselves peacefully and not resort to violence. Also, the United Nations Assistance Mission for Iraq (UNAMI criticized the unlawful use of force that was applied against the demonstrators in Sulaymaniyah district, as the citizens' right to peaceful protest must be ensured.
9 December: According to the Oil Ministry, two explosions hit an oil field in northern Kirkuk province on Wednesday, which they described as a terrorist attack. Despite two small oil wells being set on fire, there was no impact on the entire production from the oil field, VOA News added. However, no casualties have been reported during the blast so far.
Meanwhile, the Kurdish Prime Minister Masrour Barzani, has blamed Baghdad for the ongoing violence which erupted due to the delay in payment of salaries in Iraq's northern Kurdish region. Barzani added that the Iraqi government failed to carry out the budget transfers which were required to make the payments of salary possible.
15 December: Salah al-Iraqi, a notable Iraqi activist was reportedly killed by unknown gunmen in Baghdad, according to Al Jazeera. Local media reports suggested that Salah was shot five times by the unknown assailants who were in masks, in the suburb of Baghdad al-Jadeed. Salah al-Iraqi was said to have played a vital role in anti-government protests that began last year against deteriorating economic conditions, corruption and massive unemployment rate. According to the Iraqi Network for Social Media (INSM), prior to al-Iraqi's killing on Tuesday, he had already been targeted twice.
20 December: Just two weeks to the one-year anniversary of the killing of Iranian general Qassem Soleimani, reports have shown that the US Embassy in Baghdad's heavily fortified Green Zone has been under a rocket attack. At least eight Katyusha rockets were said to have been fired at the Green Zone on Sunday, which led to a few damages on the compound, the US embassy and Iraqi military disclosed. According to CNN, at least one Iraqi soldier was wounded when one of the rockets landed close to a security checkpoint. Although, the U.S. Embassy's C-RAM defense system was said to have been activated during the attack in order to intercept the rockets, the ABC News added.
However, in a statement made by the U.S. Secretary of State Mike Pompeo, revealed that there had been at least one Iraqi civilian that was injured. Meanwhile, the US embassy has urged all Iraqi leaders to ensure that the perpetrators face justice and also take preventive measures from these kinds of attacks. | https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/2019%E2%80%932021_Iraqi_protests |
Chalga | In 1989, when the communism fell, restrictions on broadcasting Chalga or Pop-folk music were lifted. A new generation of musicians adopted the genre and grabbed the public spotlight, performing daring and overtly sexual songs forbidden earlier. Pop-folk also infiltrated the mass media with a string of controversial sensational coverage. Though it was still widely considered "degenerate" and "low level" music, it managed to gain popularity in the following decade. In the first years of the rise of Chalga, the melodies were influenced by Arabic, Turkish, Roma and Greek folk music featuring instruments such as zurna, clarinet, accordion and buzuki. The early Pop-folk divas and "kings", such as Toni Dacheva and Boni- singers of Kristal Orchestra - Gloria, Valdes, Rado Shisharkata and Sasho Roman, opened the way for uprising stars such as Sashka Vaseva, Desi Slava, Ivana, Kamelia, Reni, Extra Nina, Tsvetelina, Vesela, Joro Lyubimetsa. Although, some had only several years of success, many of the stars of the early Pop-folk years became icons for the genre. Several recording studios such as Payner Music and ARA Music, pumped out a steady stream of tracks every week on dedicated TV channels.
By the 2000s, Chalga's popularity greatly increased, in far greater proportion to its neighboring popular traditions of Serbian Turbo-folk or Greek Laïko. The processes of liberalisation in the country allowed the Chalga genre to deal openly with more provocative displays of sex, money, as well as profanity in general similar in attitude to the rap or hip-hop music videos. The beginning of the 21st century gave rise to the star of Azis in the Bulgarian musical scene. His provocative public displays of nudity and homosexuality along with the more vulgar lyrics of some of his songs and his flamboyant clothing played a great role in controversially popularizing the genre internationally as a typical Bulgarian music. His shocking public behaviour and announcements, alongside his undisputed musical talent boosted his fame and he is considered by many to be the king of the Chalga genre. However, constant competition among for media attention singers and reliance on displays of sex, alcohol, money and the use of vulgar language has left the public with negative attitude towards the genre. A particular example of infamy in seeking commercial success is the incorporation of the anthem of the Bulgarian army into a song.
Other competing styles made efforts to create fusion using Chalga elements in rap and hip-hop music, represented by artists and groups like Ustata, by acts like Dope Reach Squad, and Mangasarian Bros.
Today Pop-folk record companies collaborate with various partners, mainly from other Balkan countries, giving in to the popular world trends of RnB and hip-hop, as well as dance, techno, house, trap music and even dubstep, dub, EDM and drum and bass, making this type of music having a more widespread popularity abroad. | https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Chalga |
Sub-Saharan Africa | Sub-Saharan Africa has more variety of grains than anywhere in the world. Between 13,000 and 11,000 BCE wild grains began to be collected as a source of food in the cataract region of the Nile, south of Egypt. The collecting of wild grains as source of food spread to Syria, parts of Turkey, and Iran by the eleventh millennium BCE. By the tenth and ninth millennia southwest Asians domesticated their wild grains, wheat, and barley after the notion of collecting wild grains spread from the Nile.
Numerous crops have been domesticated in the region and spread to other parts of the world. These crops included sorghum, castor beans, coffee, cotton, okra, black-eyed peas, watermelon, gourd, and pearl millet. Other domesticated crops included teff, enset, African rice, yams, kola nuts, oil palm, and raffia palm.
Domesticated animals include the guinea fowl and the donkey.
Agriculture represents 20% to 30% of GDP and 50% of exports. In some cases, 60% to 90% of the labor force are employed in agriculture. Most agricultural activity is subsistence farming. This has made agricultural activity vulnerable to climate change and global warming. As of right now Sub-Saharan Africa has degraded land covering one million square kilometres. Biotechnology has been advocated to create high yield, pest and environmentally resistant crops in the hands of small farmers. The Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation is a strong advocate and donor to this cause. Biotechnology and GM crops have met resistance both by natives and environmental groups.
Cash crops include cotton, coffee, tea, cocoa, sugar, and tobacco.
The OECD says Africa has the potential to become an agricultural superbloc if it can unlock the wealth of the savannahs by allowing farmers to use their land as collateral for credit. There is such international interest in sub-Saharan agriculture, that the World Bank increased its financing of African agricultural programs to $1.3 billion in the 2011 fiscal year. Recently, there has been a trend to purchase large tracts of land in sub-Sahara for agricultural use by developing countries.
Early in 2009, George Soros highlighted a new farmland buying frenzy caused by growing population, scarce water supplies and climate change. Chinese interests bought up large swathes of Senegal to supply it with sesame. Aggressive moves by China, South Korea, and Gulf states to buy vast tracts of agricultural land in sub-Saharan Africa could soon be limited by a new global international protocol. | https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Sub-Saharan_Africa |
2019 AFC Asian Cup final | Japan is the most successful nation at the Asian Cup, having won it a record four times—most recently in 2011. They qualified for the 2019 tournament by topping Group E with an undefeated record of seven wins and one draw, scoring 27 goals and conceding none. After the team reached the round of 16 during the 2018 FIFA World Cup, head coach Akira Nishino was replaced by Hajime Moriyasu, who had assisted Nishino and served as coach of the under-23 team preparing for the 2020 Summer Olympics. Moriyasu elected to exclude several veteran players in his Asian Cup squad, including midfielder Shinji Kagawa and striker Shinji Okazaki, with the goal of exposing younger, in-form players to international competition. Under Moriyasu's tenure, Japan was undefeated in five matches before the start of the Asian Cup.
In their opening match of the Asian Cup, Japan faced Turkmenistan and conceded a goal in the 26th minute, a long-range strike by Arslanmyrat Amanow, and entered halftime trailing 1–0. Japan took the lead in the second half with a brace from Yuya Osako, who scored in the 56th and 60th minutes, and added a third goal by Ritsu Dōan eleven minutes later. The lead was cut back to 3–2 by a penalty kick scored in the 78th minute by Ahmet Ataýew. Moriyasu acknowledged that the team struggled in the match against Turkmenistan and praised their performance before adding that they would need to improve in order to advance from the group stage. In their second match against Oman, Japan had several early chances that they failed to convert into goals before earning a penalty in the 28th minute for a tackle on Genki Haraguchi, who scored. The 1–0 win, which came with Oman being denied a penalty for an alleged handball in the first half, saw Japan qualify for the knockout round. Moriyasu fielded an entirely new starting lineup, save for forward Koya Kitagawa, for the final group stage match against Uzbekistan. Japan and clinched a first-place finish in Group F through a come-from-behind 2–1 victory over Uzbekistan. After conceding a goal in the 40th minute, Japan responded with a header scored by Yoshinori Muto in the 43rd minute and a long-distance strike by Tsukasa Shiotani in the 58th minute.
The Samurai Blue faced Saudi Arabia in the round of 16 and played defensively, fielding a lineup similar to their first two group stage matches. Japan advanced with a 1–0 victory over the Saudis on a 20th-minute header scored by Takehiro Tomiyasu and protected the lead against the majority of possession and shots held by the Saudis. The quarter-finals marked the debut of the video assistant referee (VAR) system at the Asian Cup and was used in the match between Japan and Vietnam, calling back a goal in the 25th minute for a handball and awarding Japan a penalty kick in the 57th minute, which was scored by Ritsu Dōan to give the Samurai Blue a 1–0 win. Moriyasu defended the team's results after receiving criticism over the team's style of play, which relied on one-goal margins in the group stage and knockout rounds to reach the semi-finals. Playing in the semi-finals against the top-ranked Iranian team, who had yet to concede a goal, the two teams were kept to a scoreless draw in the first half. Japan made several halftime adjustments to its attack that produced a 3–0 victory and advancement to their fifth Asian Cup final. Yuya Osako netted a brace with a header in the 56th minute and a penalty kick in the 67th minute that was awarded by VAR for a handball; Genki Haraguchi then added a third goal in stoppage time to seal the team's win. | https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/2019_AFC_Asian_Cup_final |
Arecaceae | Whether as shrubs, tree-like, or vines, palms have two methods of growth: solitary or clustered. The common representation is that of a solitary shoot ending in a crown of leaves. This monopodial character may be exhibited by prostrate, trunkless, and trunk-forming members. Some common palms restricted to solitary growth include Washingtonia and Roystonea. Palms may instead grow in sparse though dense clusters. The trunk develops an axillary bud at a leaf node, usually near the base, from which a new shoot emerges. The new shoot, in turn, produces an axillary bud and a clustering habit results. Exclusively sympodial genera include many of the rattans, Guihaia, and Rhapis. Several palm genera have both solitary and clustering members. Palms which are usually solitary may grow in clusters and vice versa.
Palms have large, evergreen leaves that are either palmately ('fan-leaved') or pinnately ('feather-leaved') compound and spirally arranged at the top of the stem. The leaves have a tubular sheath at the base that usually splits open on one side at maturity. The inflorescence is a spadix or spike surrounded by one or more bracts or spathes that become woody at maturity. The flowers are generally small and white, radially symmetric, and can be either uni- or bisexual. The sepals and petals usually number three each and may be distinct or joined at the base. The stamens generally number six, with filaments that may be separate, attached to each other, or attached to the pistil at the base. The fruit is usually a single-seeded drupe (sometimes berry-like) but some genera (e.g., Salacca) may contain two or more seeds in each fruit.
Like all monocots, palms do not have the ability to increase the width of a stem (secondary growth) via the same kind of vascular cambium found in non-monocot woody plants. This explains the cylindrical shape of the trunk (almost constant diameter) that is often seen in palms, unlike in ring-forming trees. However, many palms, like some other monocots, do have secondary growth, although because it does not arise from a single vascular cambium producing xylem inwards and phloem outwards, it is often called "anomalous secondary growth".
The Arecaceae are notable among monocots for their height and for the size of their seeds, leaves, and inflorescences. Ceroxylon quindiuense, Colombia's national tree, is the tallest monocot in the world, reaching up to 60 metres (197 ft) tall. The coco de mer (Lodoicea maldivica) has the largest seeds of any plant, 40–50 centimetres (16–20 in) in diameter and weighing 15–30 kilograms (33–66 lb) each (coconuts are the second largest). Raffia palms (Raphia spp.) have the largest leaves of any plant, up to 25 metres (82 ft) long and 3 metres (10 ft) wide. The Corypha species have the largest inflorescence of any plant, up to 7.5 metres (25 ft) tall and containing millions of small flowers. Calamus stems can reach 200 metres (656 ft) in length. | https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Arecaceae |
Muhammad Zia-ul-Haq | The coup (codenamed "Operation Fair Play") transpired in the small hours of 5 July 1977. Before the announcement of any agreement, Bhutto and members of his cabinet were arrested by troops of the Military Police under the order of Zia. Bhutto tried to call Zia but all telephone lines were disconnected. When Zia spoke to him later, he reportedly told Bhutto that he was sorry that he had been forced to perform such an "unpleasant task". Zia and his military government portrayed the coup as a "spontaneous response to a difficult situation", but his response was a complete contradiction. Soon after the coup, Zia told the British journalist Edward Behr of Newsweek:
I [Zia] am the only man who took this decision [Fair Play] and I did so on 1700 Hrs on 4[th] July after hearing the press statement which indicated that the talks between Mr. Bhutto and the opposition had broken down. Had an agreement been reached between them, I would certainly never had done what I did.
However, Zia's Chief of Army Staff General Khalid Mahmud Arif contradicted Zia's statement when Arif noted that the coup had already been planned, and the senior leadership of Pakistan Armed Forces had solid information. Therefore, Arif met with Bhutto on an emergency basis, stressing and urging Bhutto to "rush negotiations with the opposition". By Arif's and independent expert's accounts, the talks had not broken down even though the coup was very much in the offing. Zia further argued that Fair Play against Bhutto had been necessitated by the prospect of a civil war that Bhutto had been planning, by distributing weapons to his supporters. However, Arif strongly rejected Zia's remarks on Bhutto, and citing no evidence that weapons were found or recovered at any of the party's election offices, the military junta did not prosecute Bhutto on the charge of planning civil war. After deposing Prime Minister Bhutto on 5 July 1977, Zia-ul-Haq declared martial law, and appointed himself Chief Martial Law Administrator, which he remained until becoming president on 16 September 1978.
Immediately, the Chief of Naval Staff Admiral Mohammad Shariff announced his and the navy's strong support for Zia and his military government. But the Chief of Air Staff General Zulfikar Ali Khan remained unsupportive, but the Chairman Joint Chiefs of Staff Committee General Muhammad Shariff remained neutral, while he silently expressed his support to Prime Minister Zulfikar Bhutto. In 1978, Zia pressured President Fazal Ilahi Chaudhry to appoint General Anwar Shamim as Chief of Air Staff; and Admiral Karamat Rahman Niazi as Chief of Naval Staff in 1979. On Zia's recommendation, President Illahi appointed Admiral Mohammad Shariff as Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, hence making the Admiral the highest-ranking officer and principal military adviser overlooking all of the inter-services, including the Chiefs of Staff of the respected forces. In 1979, the Chiefs of Army, Navy, and the Air Force, including the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff validated the coup as constitutional and legal under the war-torn circumstances, pledging their support to Zia as well. | https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Muhammad_Zia-ul-Haq |
1990 FIFA World Cup | On 9 December 1989 the draw was conducted at the Palazzetto dello Sport in Rome, where the teams were drawn out from the three pots to be placed with the seeded teams in their predetermined groups, in alphabetic order. A special draw decided teams should first be drawn from Pot 1, then from Pot 3, and finally from Pot 2. Each drawn team also had their group position number drawn from a separate group bowl, in order to decide their exact match schedule. The only stipulation of the draw was that no group could feature two South American teams. Hence, a special rule was set up that:
Pot 2 rule (final version): If the two South American teams (Colombia and Uruguay) are drawn as the second/third team from Pot 2, then they will not go into group B/C - as those two groups are led by the two seeded South American teams (Argentina and Brazil); but instead they will be placed in the next open group in the alphabet led by a seeded European team (Group D/E).
The procedure for the draw, was presented by FIFA at a press meeting the day before the draw. However, after having received objections from Italian officials, FIFA opted to slightly change their special Pot 2 rule, during the last 24 hours ahead of the draw. Before this rule was changed into the final wording given in the paragraph above, it had been intended to say:
Pot 2 rule (dropped initial version): First two drawn European teams from Pot 2 shall, irrespectively of the alphabet order for the open groups, first be drawn into the two groups led by a seeded South American team (Argentina's Group B and Brazil's Group C); while the two drawn South American teams (Colombia and Uruguay) can not join Group B+C and shall instead be drawn into the first still open group being led by a seeded European team.
This dropped initial wording, would have increased the risk for Italy in Group A to draw one of the difficult two South American teams, instead of one of the easier European teams from Pot 2; because for Italy to get paired with a European Pot 2 team it would have required the less likely event that all three first drawn teams from Pot 2 should be European. When FIFA accepted to change the Pot 2 rule into the final version presented at the televised draw, this lowered the chance for the Italian Group A to draw a South American Pot 2 team, from the 80% chance created by the initial wording to only a 33% chance (two out of six teams).
The ceremony was hosted by Italian television presenter Pippo Baudo, with Italian actress Sophia Loren and opera singer Luciano Pavarotti conducting the draw alongside FIFA general secretary Sepp Blatter. The draw show was FIFA's most ambitious yet with Pelé, Bobby Moore and Karl-Heinz Rummenigge appearing, as well as a performance of the Italian version of the tournament's official song "To Be Number One" by Giorgio Moroder, performed as "Un'estate italiana" by Edoardo Bennato and Gianna Nannini.
The event also featured the official mascot of this World Cup, Ciao, a stick figure player with a football head and an Italian tricolor body that formed the word "ITALIA" when deconstructed and reconstructed. Its name is a greeting in Italian. | https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/1990_FIFA_World_Cup |
Mirdasid dynasty | Salih was succeeded by his sons Shibl al-Dawla Nasr and Mu'izz al-Dawla Thimal, who concentrated their forces in northern Syria and the western Jazira after the Fatimid offensive. Not long after their succession, they faced an offensive from the Byzantine Empire, which controlled Antioch and the Anatolia region north of their domains. A diplomatic appeal to the Byzantine emperor Romanos III by their cousin Muqallid ibn Kamil ibn Mirdas was rejected and the emperor led the assault on the young Mirdasid emirs in person, in the summer of 1030. While Thimal strategically withdrew with the bulk of the Mirdasids' forces from Aleppo, Nasr and his Bedouin warriors from the Kilab and Numayr confronted Romanos and routed his forces at the Battle of Azaz. In the aftermath, Nasr became the sole Mirdasid ruler of Aleppo with the backing of the Byzantines, while Thimal's power was centered in al-Rahba, where most of the Kilab supported him.
Nasr's rule came to an end in 1038, when he was killed in battle confronting an offensive led by Anushtakin, who had objected to Nasr's allotment of Homs by the Fatimid government in Cairo. Thimal briefly took control of Aleppo, but soon after withdrew to al-Rahba, while Anushtakin followed up by seizing control of Aleppo from Thimal's deputies there, his cousin Muqallid and Khalifa ibn Jabir al-Kilabi, in the summer of 1038. Thimal further lost Balis and Manbij to Anushtakin, but retained control of al-Rahba. The Mirdasids had also since lost control of Raqqa and al-Rafiqa to the Numayrids, but Thimal married the Numayrid princess, al-Sayyida al-Alawiyya, and practically inherited control of the twin cities after the death of their ruler, al-Sayyida's brother Shabib ibn Waththab, in 1039 or 1040. He subsequently made Raqqa his capital to position himself closer to Aleppo. In late 1041, the Fatimid government appointed Thimal governor of Aleppo, but Anushtakin refused to vacate. He died of natural causes in 1042, but Thimal still had to seize the city by force from Anushtakin's forces, which he captured by the end of the year.
While initially remaining on good terms with the Fatimid caliph al-Mustansir (r. , Thimal also requested Byzantine protection, and became a vassal of the empire. He successfully fought off two imperial Fatimid campaigns between 1048 and 1050, the first led by a scion of the Hamdanids, Nasir al-Dawla ibn Hamdan, and the second by the eunuch Rifq. Peace was subsequently reached between Thimal and the caliph, largely a result of a successful diplomatic mission to Cairo led by al-Sayyida al-Alawiyya. The following seven years were marked by stability and prosperity and Aleppo experienced a major construction boom during this period. Nevertheless, Thimal vacated his seat in Aleppo due to an inability to satiate the financial demands of his Kilabi tribal base and the growing conflict with his Balis-based brother, Atiyya, who was backed by a good part of their tribe. The Fatimids installed their own governor, Ibn Mulhim, while compensating Thimal with holdings along the central Syrian coast. When Thimal's nephew, Nasr's son Rashid al-Dawla Mahmud, captured Aleppo in 1060, the Fatimids stripped Thimal of his coastal possessions, prompting Thimal to return to Aleppo. He was unable to oust Mahmud by force, but the Kilabi chiefs brokered a settlement, giving Thimal control of Aleppo in 1061, in return for financial concessions. | https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Mirdasid_dynasty |
Egyptian hip hop | Hip hop originally emerged in the United States in the 1970s and it has influenced the emergence of hip hop music in Egypt. In the early 1990s, hip hop music entered the Arab world and has since then grown into a popular music genre in the region and in Egypt. Palestine can be credited with the first Middle East
country to internalize hip hop as they were the first to introduce western styles of music making and beats, thereby creating a discography dedicated to resistance against Israeli settler-colonialism. In regards to Egypt, hip hop music gained traction in Egypt more recently. It was not until the early 2000s that hip hop began to rise in popularity in Egypt.
In the late 1990s and early 2000s, Egyptian musicians and producers were influenced by the American and Western hip hop music and Egyptian music groups such as MTM (Mezzika Tilakhbat Mukkah), MC Amin, Egy Rap School, and Way Crow Family began to insert hip hop elements in their own music. However, at first, Egyptian hip hop did not grow very fast and the amount of hip hop music that was produced was not extensive due to the fact that the majority of radiostations were controlled by the Egyptian government which attempted to prevent that hip hop music would dominate the Egyptian radio. It was not until the rise of the Internet that Egyptian hip hop reached a greater audience and after the rise of social media, Egyptian musicians started to share their music online and as a result, Egyptian hip hop music gained signifiant popularity in Egypt and in the global context.
Andrew A. El-Sayid (OsamaBinRappin) is believed to be the first person to bring hip hop music to Egypt. OsamaBinRappin is a rapper from West Covina, California, and he brought Dr. Dre's "Nuthin' but a 'G' Thang" ft. Snoop Dogg cassette single, and DJ Jazzy Jeff & The Fresh Prince's "Boom! Shake the Room" red cassette single to Egypt on July 25, 1993. During his visit to Egypt he would play this music for his cousins, and would take the two cassettes on tour throughout his 1 month vacation, to cities such as Alexandria (Agami Beach) and he would eventually these cassettes accidentally with the DJ at 'Disco 54' a club downstairs at the hotel.
On August 26, while taking a taxi to Cairo Airport with his father and brother, the country of Egypt heard hip hop for the first time on its radio airwaves. The song played was "Boom! Shake the Room." | https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Egyptian_hip_hop |
Middle Assyrian Empire | The Assyrian kings never ceased to believe that the lost lands would eventually be retaken. In the end, the collapse of the Hittites and the Egyptian lands in the Levant benefitted Assyria; with the old empires shattered, the fragmented territories surrounding the Assyrian heartland would eventually prove to be easy conquests for the Assyrian army. The reign of Ashur-dan II (r. 934–912 BC) effectively terminated the poorly documented second period of Middle Assyrian decline. Multiple inscriptions survive from Ashur-dan's time, several of which describe campaigns in the peripheries of the Assyrian heartland, illustrating that Assyrian power was beginning to resurge. Ashur-dan's campaigns were mainly focused on the northeast and northwest. Among the victories recorded in his inscriptions was the conquest of Katmuḫu, which once again had gained independence during the decline. According to the inscription, Ashur-dan captured Katmuḫu, razed the city's royal palace, brought its king to Arbela, flayed and executed him, and then displayed his skin on the wall of one of his cities. Assyrian reconquest meant that a high level of threat had to be established in order to keep the vassals in line; an explanation for the brutality and violence of certain acts (such as Ashur-dan's treatment of the defeated king) committed by the Assyrian kings. The descriptions of such acts in inscriptions do not necessarily reflect the truth given that they also served as intimidating tools for propaganda and psychological warfare.
The campaigns of Ashur-dan paved the way of grander efforts to restore and expand Assyrian power, beginning in the reign of his son and successor Adad-nirari II (r. 911–891 BC), whose accession conventionally marks the beginning of the succeeding Neo-Assyrian Empire. Although historically sometimes treated as a separate and distinct entity from the Middle Assyrian Empire, the Neo-Assyrian Empire was clearly the direct continuation of the Middle Assyrian civilization given that the line of kings and inhabitation of the Assyrian heartland was continuous. The inscriptions of early Neo-Assyrian kings typically treat their wars of expansions as reconquests of territory lost during the decline of the Middle Assyrian Empire. | https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Middle_Assyrian_Empire |
Seleucid Empire | As a hegemonic empire, the state's primary focus was maintaining its sizable army via wealth extraction from three major sources: tribute from autonomous poleis and temples, and proportional land-tax from royal land. The definition of "royal land" remains contested. While all agree poleis do not constitute royal land, some remain uncertain over the status of temple land. Yet, they commanded notable economic power and functioned almost independently from the state. Nevertheless, the Seleucid manner of extraction, in contrast to earlier regimes, is considered more "aggressive" and "predatory".
In theory, the Seleucid state was an absolute monarchy that did not recognize private property in our modern sense. Any land that was not delegated to the poleis or temples was considered private property of the sovereign; thus, considered as Royal Land and liable to direct tax by the state. Here, a "proportional land-tax", that is, a tax based on the size of one's plot, is collected by the local governor (or Satrap) and sent to the capital. However, there is no evidence for the amount that was taxed on any given region.
Tribute was heavily levied on poleis and temples. Although tribute is paid annually, the amount demanded increases significantly during wartime. During a civil war in 149 BC, Demetrius II demanded the province of Judaea to pay 300 talents of silver, which was seen as "severe." But this was far from an isolated case. In fact, the Babylonian Astronomical Diaries in 308/7 BC note a hefty 50% tax on harvest "from the lands of the temple of Shamash (in Sipprar or Larsa)." Nevertheless, annual tribute was "a long-accepted and uncontroversial practice." Also, royal land was regularly donated to the temples and poleis; albeit under the assumption that a greater share of revenue is given to the state in exchange.
The controversial practice of temple "despoliation", however, was a regular occurrence under the Seleucids—in contrast to earlier times. Although the Seleucid kings were aware and appreciated the sacrosanctity of religious treasures, their concentration in these places "proved irresistible" in the face of "short-term fiscal constraints." As an example, Antiochus III's despoliation of the Anahit Temple in Ecbatana, wherein he procured 4000 silver talents, was used to fund his Great Eastern campaign. According to historian Michael J. Taylor:It is difficult to believe that these monarchs who knew enough to bow before Nabu, bake bricks for Esagil, and enforce kosher regulations in Jerusalem, would be blithely aware of the political hazards of removing Temple treasures. It is more likely that they knew the risks but took them anyway.
A rebellion in 169 BC during Antiochus III's campaign in Egypt demonstrates that these "risks" occasionally backfire. The increasingly bold interference is due, in large part, to the appointment of provincial high-priests by the monarch himself. Often they were his court "favorites", whose prerogatives were purely administrative; essentially, they served to collect tribute for the state. Unsurprisingly: "native elites profoundly feared that the arrival of a Seleucid official might quickly cascade into a wholesale removal of Temple treasures." | https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Seleucid_Empire |
Emirate of Granada | Ibn al-Ahmar reigned with relative peace and stability until 1264, when the Mudéjar revolt took place in Castile, lasting until 1266. Mudéjar is a term used to refer to the Muslims who lived under the rule of the Christian kingdoms at this time, among whom different communities lived under different circumstances. The rebellion of 1264 was wide-ranging but it did not involve the Muslims in the old territories of Castile to the north, who lived in stable communities and were relatively well-integrated into Castilian society. Instead, it involved the Muslim inhabitants of the Guadalquivir valley and of Castilian Andalucia, for whom the Castilian conquests of the 13th century had represented a major and still recent disruption of their communities. Some of these communities, like those of Murcia and Niebla, had been allowed to govern themselves under Castilian overlordship, while others were subjected to forced displacement and lived under harsher conditions. It's unclear whether Ibn al-Ahmar played a role in inciting the rebellion, but he did support it.
The rebellion represents the last serious attempt to reverse the Castilian conquests of the 13th century and break the Christian hold on southern Iberia. The conditions for this must have appeared favourable at the time. Ibn al-Ahmar was enjoying good relations with the Hafsids (based in present-day Tunisia) and the Marinids (based in present-day Morocco), while the king of Castile, Alfonso X, was preoccupied with other matters. Initially, the Marinids even sent a contingent to assist the rebellion, landing at Tarifa. A number of cities fell into Muslim hands, including Jerez, Utrera, Lebrija, Arcos, and Medina Sidonia. Alfonso X also had to contend with revolts by some of the Castilian nobles. However, his forces progressively took back control. In some cases, as in Jerez, this involved a full siege and a fresh campaign of conquest. In the end, the Muslim kingdoms of Granada and North Africa did not provide extensive assistance. By 1265, the Castilians were invading the Vega (valley) of Granada and Ibn al-Ahmar was forced to renegotiate peace. By the time the rebellion was over, the surviving Mudéjar inhabitants of Andalucia were mostly expelled and their towns resettled by Christians from other parts of Castile. | https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Emirate_of_Granada |
Bektashi Order | After lodges in Turkey were shut down, the order's headquarters moved to Albania. On 20 March 1930, Sali Njazi was elected as the First Dedebaba of the Bektashi community. Njazi established the Bektashi World Headquarters in Tirana. Its construction was finished in 1941 during the Italian occupation of Albania. Njazi promoted Bektashi Islam by introducing major ceremonies at popular tekkes. After he was murdered, Ali Riza succeeded him as the Dedebaba.
Despite the negative effect of the ban of lodges on Bektashi culture, most Bektashis in Turkey have been generally supportive of secularism to this day, since these reforms have relatively relaxed the religious intolerance that had historically been shown against them by the official Sunni establishment.
In the Balkans the Bektashi order had a considerable impact on the Islamization of many areas, primarily Albania and Bulgaria, as well as parts of Macedonia, particularly among Ottoman-era Greek Muslims from western Greek Macedonia such as the Vallahades. By the 18th century Bektashism began to gain a considerable hold over the population of southern Albania and northwestern Greece (Epirus and western Greek Macedonia). Following the ban on Sufi orders in the Republic of Turkey, the Bektashi community's headquarters was moved from Hacıbektaş in central Anatolia, to Tirana, Albania. In Albania, the Bektashi community declared its separation from the Sunni community and they were perceived ever after as a distinct Islamic sect rather than a branch of Sunni Islam. Bektashism continued to flourish until the Second World War. After the communists took power in 1945, several babas and dervishes were executed and a gradual constriction of Bektashi influence began. Ultimately, in 1967 all tekkes were shut down when Enver Hoxha banned all religious practice. When this ban was rescinded in 1990 the Bektashism reestablished itself, although there were few left with any real knowledge of the spiritual path. Nevertheless, many "tekkes" (lodges) operate today in Albania. The most recent head of the order in Albania was Hajji Reshat Bardhi Dedebaba (1935–2011) and the main tekke has been reopened in Tirana. In June 2011 Baba Edmond Brahimaj was chosen as the head of the Bektashi order by a council of Albanian babas. Today sympathy for the order is generally widespread in Albania where approximately 20% of Muslims identify themselves as having some connection to Bektashism.
There are also important Bektashi communities among the Albanian communities of North Macedonia and Kosovo, the most important being the Arabati Baba Teḱe in the city of Tetovo, which was until recently under the guidance of Baba Tahir Emini (1941–2006). Following the death of Baba Tahir Emini, the dedelik of Tirana appointed Baba Edmond Brahimaj (known as Baba Mondi), formerly head of the Turan Tekke of Korçë, to oversee the Harabati baba tekke. A splinter branch of the order has recently sprung up in the town of Kičevo which has ties to the Turkish Bektashi community under Haydar Ercan Dede rather than Tirana. A smaller Bektashi tekke, the Dikmen Baba Tekkesi, is in operation in the Turkish-speaking town of Kanatlarci, North Macedonia that also has stronger ties with Turkey's Bektashis. In Kosovo, the relatively small Bektashi community has a tekke in the town of Gjakovë and is under the leadership of Baba Mumin Lama and it recognizes the leadership of Tirana.
In Bulgaria, the türbes of Kıdlemi Baba, Ak Yazılı Baba, Demir Baba and Otman Baba function as heterodox Islamic pilgrimage sites and before 1842 were the centers of Bektashi tekkes.
Bektashis continue to be active in Turkey and their semi-clandestine organizations can be found in Istanbul, Ankara and İzmir. There are currently two rival claimants to the dedebaba in Turkey: Mustafa Eke and Haydar Ercan.
A large functioning Bektashi tekke was also established in the United States in 1954 by Baba Rexheb. This tekke is found in the Detroit suburb of Taylor and the tomb (türbe) of Baba Rexheb continues to draw pilgrims of all faiths. | https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Bektashi_Order |
Sulaymaniyah | The region of Slemani was known as Zamwa prior to the foundation of the modern city in 1784. The capital of the Kurdish Baban principality (1649–1850), before Slemani, was a territory named "Qelaçiwalan". At the time of the Babani's rule there were major conflicts between the Safavid dynasty and the Ottoman Empire. Qelaçiwalan became a battleground for the two rivals.
Being of strategic importance and lying deep inside Safavid territory, there was concern that Qelaçiwalan would be attacked and captured if the Babani did not give the Safavids military support, as both Sultan Mahmud II and Nader Shah were trying to gain the support of the dispersed Kurdish Emirates. This obliged Mahmud of Baban in 1781 to think about moving the centre of the emirate to a safer place. He chose Melkendî, then a village but now a district in central Slemani, to construct a number of serahs.
In 1783, Ibrahim Baban became ruler of the emirate and began the reconstruction of a city which once constructed by Ottoman Sultan Sulaiman (the name of Sulaimaniyah came from his name) new city which would become its capital. In 1784 he finished erecting a number of palaces for trade called Qeyserîs and bazaars, which were also used as baths, and began inviting people from the surrounding villages and emirates to move to the newly established city. Soon Melkendî, which was originally intended to be the city itself, instead became one of its quarters. The new city of Slemani was named after Sulaiman Baba, who was the first Baban prince to gain control of the province of Şarezûr. Sulaiman Baban invaded the neighboring Kurdish vassaldom of Ardalan, defeating their forces in 1694. Ottoman Sultan Mustafa II assigned him the district of Baban.
According to Jewish tradition, Sulaiman baban emphasized the importance of a town having Jewish residents for its completeness. A mission was then sent to Qaradagh, a town with a thriving Jewish community, and surrounding villages. The Jews of Qaradagh responded by sending the first group of Jewish inhabitants to Sulaimaniya.
In the early 1800s refugees from Ardalan moved to Slemani, including Mastura Ardalan, the widow of Xosraw Xanî Erdalan, the ruler of the kingdom. Erdalan wrote an account of Kurdish history in Persian and was buried in Slemani when he died in 1848.
From 1922 to 1924, Slemani was the capital of the Kingdom of Kurdistan, a short-lived unrecognized state declared by Iraqi Kurds following the collapse of the Ottoman Empire. | https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Sulaymaniyah |
Jasmine (Aladdin) | The character's blurb on the official Disney website reads, "Jasmine is an independent, fiery beauty capable of taking care of herself" who "longs to experience life outside the palace." The writers had originally conceived Jasmine as a spoiled and materialistic princess whose interests were limited to clothing and jewelry, but eventually developed her into a stronger, more mature character. Larkin described Jasmine as "a very strong, well defined character from the very beginning." Mark Henn served as Jasmine's supervising animator. Having originally been hired to animate Aladdin's mother, the removal of the character from the film ultimately provided Henn with the opportunity to animate Jasmine instead. Throughout Disney's previous animated film Beauty and the Beast, the design of the heroine Belle – whom Henn had also helped animate – suffered from various inconsistencies due to the character having been animated at two completely separate studio locations. To avoid experiencing a similar dilemma with Jasmine, the filmmakers ultimately decided to have the princess animated entirely at one studio. Because Jasmine is the film's love interest as opposed to its main character, the princess was animated at the company's secondary studio in Florida, while Aladdin was animated in California. However, the more intimate love scenes between the two leads forced Henn to frequently communicate with Aladdin's lead animator Glen Keane through phone and fax, and the animators also sent designs and discs to each other. Out of his desire to introduce Indian architecture into the film, art director Bill Perkins based Jasmine's design on the famous mausoleum, the Taj Mahal, which itself incorporates and expands on Indian design, particularly the curves demonstrated in the character's hair, clothes and jewelry.
Having just recently animated two previous Disney heroines – Ariel from The Little Mermaid and Belle from Beauty and the Beast, respectively – Henn initially suffered from a severe case of "artist's block" while attempting to design his third heroine, Jasmine. While working on the character at Disney-MGM Studios in Florida, Henn noticed a young female amusement park guest with long black hair, and ultimately decided to use her as his initial inspiration for Jasmine; the guest's identity remains anonymous to date. Earliest sketches of Jasmine were based on various exotic-looking supermodels in addition to her namesake Jasmine Guy, but the actress' facial features were ultimately considered to be too "severe" for an animated character. In search of "something fresh to help with the physical look of her," Henn was eventually inspired by a high school graduation photograph of his younger sister Beth Allen, who wore her hair in a style similar to what would ultimately become Jasmine's. Henn credits his sister with helping him overcome his artist's block, and the directors ultimately approved of Henn's concept design. The character's facial features were further inspired by actress Jennifer Connelly, specifically her eyebrows. Additionally, some of Larkin's own mannerisms and physical traits were incorporated into the character. Henn credits one particular dinner conversation he had shared with Larkin with proving very inspirational in terms of helping him discover Jasmine's emotional side. Model Robina Ritchie served as an on-location reference for the animation, pantomiming actions to the recording of Larkin's voiceovers so, in Henn's words, "the animator gets the feeling of what the real human movement would be."
The final appearance of Jasmine consequently inspired the studio to redesign Aladdin; accordingly, Katzenberg felt that the main character, who was originally depicted as a younger, "scrawny" underdog, did not resemble a suitable leading man for Jasmine, which they feared would result in unconvincing chemistry between the couple. Thus, they ultimately decided to base Aladdin on actor Tom Cruise instead. Henn's favorite sequence to animate was the scene in which Jasmine discovers Aladdin's true identity and gives him "a look." The filmmakers decided to dress Jasmine in blue to symbolically represent water, which is "the most precious substance one can find in a desert." The animators sat the character next to a fountain when she is first introduced in the film to further emphasize this motif and comparison. With her appearance finalized, Jasmine became Disney's first non-white princess as opposed to being of European heritage. | https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Jasmine_(Aladdin) |
Abdullahi Yusuf Ahmed | On 10 October 2004, in a session held by the Transitional Federal Parliamentin the neighbouring Kenyan capital of Nairobi, Ahmed was elected as President of the Transitional Federal Government (TFG), an interim federal administrative body that he had helped establish earlier in the year. He received 189 votes from the TFG Parliament, while the closest contender being, former Somali Ambassador to the United States Abdullahi Ahmed Addou, got 79 votes in the third round of voting. The then incumbent President of Somalia, Abdiqasim Salad Hassan, peacefully withdrew his candidature. Ahmed was sworn in a few days later on 14 October 2004.
As President, Ahmed pledged to promote reconciliation and to set about rebuilding the country. However, his government was beset by internal disagreements and contentions with other stakeholders in Somalia. For example, he was at loggerheads with some warlords and government members over where the administration should be based. The President and Prime Minister opposed a move to Mogadishu, citing security reasons. Consequently, Ahmed along with his Prime Minister Ali Mohammed Ghedi and the Speaker of the Parliament Sharif Hassan Sheikh Aden helped to relocate the Transitional Federal Institutions (TFIs) from Nairobi to the Somali cities of Jowhar and Baidoa, where the TFG resided until the government eventually took control of Mogadishu.
The make up of a possible foreign peacekeeping force – in particular the inclusion of Ethiopian troops – was another bone of contention. Ethiopia was accused of backing rival Somali warlords in order to keep the country weak. The African Union Mission to Somalia (AMISOM) mission therefore excluded countries neighboring Somalia from participating in peacekeeping activities.
Due to a lack of funding and human resources, an arms embargo that made it difficult to re-establish a national security force, and general indifference on the part of the international community, President Ahmed also found himself obliged to deploy thousands of troops from Puntland to Mogadishu to sustain the battle against insurgent elements in the southern part of the country. Financial support for this effort was provided by the autonomous region's government. This left little revenue for Puntland's own security forces and civil service employees, leaving the territory vulnerable to piracy and terrorist attacks. | https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Abdullahi_Yusuf_Ahmed |
Shakira | Shakira has received numerous awards and recognition for her work. She is the recipient of three Grammy Awards and fifteen Latin Grammy Awards—the second most for a female artist. Shakira has sold more than 75 million records worldwide, making her one of world's best-selling music artists. By the time she released Laundry Service in 2001, she have already sold 10 million albums in Latin America according to Billboard. Three of her albums are among the best-selling Latin albums in the United States: Fijación Oral, Vol. 1 (8th), Dónde Están los Ladrones? (9th) and Pies Descalzos (23rd); she is the female artist with the highest number of best-selling Latin albums in the country. Fijación Oral, Vol. 1 became the best-selling Latin pop album and the second best-selling Latin album overall of the 2000s in the U.S. Dónde Están los Ladrones? is also one of the best-selling albums in Argentina, Chile, Colombia and Mexico; as well as Pies Descalzos is one of the best-selling albums in Brazil and Colombia.
Nielsen Broadcast Data Systems said that "Hips Don't Lie" was the most-played pop song in a single week in American radio history, being played 9,637 times in one week. This song makes Shakira the first artist in the history of the Billboard charts to reach the number-one spots on both the Top 40 Mainstream and a Latin chart in the same week. Additionally, she became the only artist from South America to reach the number-one spot on the U.S. Billboard Hot 100, the Australian ARIA chart, and the UK Singles Chart. Shakira is the female artist with most top-ten hits on the Billboard's Hot Latin Songs chart (36). Her song "La Tortura" at one time held the chart's record for most weeks appearing at number-one, with a total of 25 non-consecutive weeks (this record is currently held by the Luis Fonsi song "Despacito" with 56 weeks). She is also the act with most number-one songs on the Latin Digital Song Sales chart (17) and the female artist with most number-one hits on the Latin Airplay chart (23).
Nokia stated in 2010, that there were more Shakira music downloads in the prior year than for any other Latino artist in the last five years, and She Wolf topped the Top 10 Latino downloads. In 2010, she was ranked number five on the 'Online Video's Most Viral Artists of 2010' with 404,118,932 views.
In 2011, Shakira was honored at the Latin Grammys as Latin Recording Academy Person of the Year, and by the Harvard Foundation as Cultural Rhythms Artist of the Year. She also received a star on the Hollywood Walk of Fame located at 6270 Hollywood Blvd. Originally, she was to be given a star on the Hollywood Walk of Fame in 2004, but she turned the offer down. In 2012, she received the honor of Chevalier De L'Ordre des Arts et des Lettres. In 2014, Shakira became the first musical act to perform three times at the FIFA World Cup. In the same year, Aleiodes shakirae, a new species of parasitic wasp was named after her because it causes its host to "shake and wiggle". Forbes ranked Shakira on their list of "Top 100 World's Most Powerful Women" at number 40 in 2012, at 52 in 2013, and at 58 in 2014. In 2015 Time recognized Shakira as one of the most influential people on social media. Shakira and Argentine president Cristina Fernández de Kirchner were the only Latin influencers named on the list. More so, Time noted that Shakira has an "unparalleled platform" on social media where she promotes her philanthropy. In 2008, Shakira was named as the Honorary Chair of the Global Campaign for Education Global Action Week.
In 2018, Spotify included Shakira in the list of the top 10 most streamed female artists of the decade on the platform, making her the highest streamed Latin artist. In 2020, Shakira became the first female artist to have 4 songs from different decades to have over 100 million streams on Spotify, also marking her as the only artist with Spanish songs, the only Latin artist, and third overall after Michael Jackson and Eminem to achieve this milestone. In the same year, she broke the Vevo Certified Awards record, and set it at 37, becoming the artist with the most videos with over 100 million views. She is now worth $300 million. | https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Shakira |
Circassians | The word Circassian ( sər-KASS-ee-ənz) is an exonym, Latinized from Russian Cherkess (Russian: Черкес; Adyghe: Чэркэс/Шэрджэс), which is of debated origin. The term, in Russian, was traditionally applied to all Circassians before Soviet times, but it has since usually referred only to Circassians living in northern Karachay-Cherkessia, a federal subject of Russia, where they are indigenous and were about 12% of the population in 2010. In English, it still refers to all Circassians.
The origin of the term "Circassian" is disputed. One view is that its root stems from Turkic languages, and means "head choppers" or "warrior killers", because of the Circassians' battle practices. Other sources argue that the term comes from Mongolian Jerkes, meaning "one who blocks a path". Some believe it comes from the ancient Greek name of the region, Siraces. According to another view, its origin is Persian and combines two parts, kar ("mountain") and kās ("region", in Pahlavi), meaning "mountainous region". The spelling Cherkess may be an abbreviation of Persian Chahār-kas ("four people"), denoting four tribes. Ali ibn al-Athir (died c. 1232/3) and Ibn Khaldun (died 1406) used the term Jahārkas, but the Persian hypothesis remains uncertain.
In early Russian sources, Circassians are called Kasogi, but one view holds that the modern term "Cherkes" derives from Kerket, the name of one of the ancient Circassian tribes.
In languages spoken geographically close to the Caucasus, the native people originally had other names for the Circassians (such as Georgian: ჯიქი, Jiqi), but with Russian influence, the name has been settled as Cherkess. It is the same or similar in many world languages that cite these languages.
The Encyclopaedia Islamica adds: "The Cherkess: the Kabardians and the western Adyghe people share a common language, which is spoken by the north-western Caucasian people, and belongs to the family known as Abkhazian-Adyghe".
In Medieval Oriental and European texts, the Adyghe people were known by the name Cherkess/Circassians. In Persian sources, Charkas/Cherkes is used to refer to the "actual" Circassians of the northwest Caucasus, and in some occasions as a general designation for Caucasians who live beyond Derbent (Darband). | https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Circassians |
Zionism | Labor Zionism originated in Eastern Europe. Socialist Zionists believed that centuries of oppression in antisemitic societies had reduced Jews to a meek, vulnerable, despairing existence that invited further antisemitism, a view originally stipulated by Theodor Herzl. They argued that a revolution of the Jewish soul and society was necessary and achievable in part by Jews moving to Israel and becoming farmers, workers, and soldiers in a country of their own. Most socialist Zionists rejected the observance of traditional religious Judaism as perpetuating a "Diaspora mentality" among the Jewish people, and established rural communes in Israel called "kibbutzim". The kibbutz began as a variation on a "national farm" scheme, a form of cooperative agriculture where the Jewish National Fund hired Jewish workers under trained supervision. The kibbutzim were a symbol of the Second Aliyah in that they put great emphasis on communalism and egalitarianism, representing Utopian socialism to a certain extent. Furthermore, they stressed self-sufficiency, which became an essential aspect of Labor Zionism. Though socialist Zionism draws its inspiration and is philosophically founded on the fundamental values and spirituality of Judaism, its progressive expression of that Judaism has often fostered an antagonistic relationship with Orthodox Judaism.
Traditionalist Israeli historian Anita Shapira describes labor Zionism's use of violence against Palestinians for political means as essentially the same as that of radical conservative Zionist groups. For example, Shapira notes that during the 1936 Palestine revolt, the Irgun Zvai Leumi engaged in the "uninhibited use of terror", "mass indiscriminate killings of the aged, women and children", "attacks against British without any consideration of possible injuries to innocent bystanders, and the murder of British in cold blood". Shapira argues that there were only marginal differences in military behavior between the Irgun and the labor Zionist Palmah. In following with policies laid out by Ben-Gurion, the prevalent method among field squads was that if an Arab gang had used a village as a hideout, it was considered acceptable to hold the entire village collectively responsible. The lines delineating what was acceptable and unacceptable while dealing with these villagers were "vague and intentionally blurred". As Shapira suggests, these ambiguous limits practically did not differ from those of the openly terrorist group, Irgun.
Labor Zionism became the dominant force in the political and economic life of the Yishuv during the British Mandate of Palestine and was the dominant ideology of the political establishment in Israel until the 1977 election when the Israeli Labor Party was defeated. The Israeli Labor Party continues the tradition, although the most popular party in the kibbutzim is Meretz. Labor Zionism's main institution is the Histadrut (general organisation of labor unions), which began by providing strikebreakers against a Palestinian worker's strike in 1920 and until 1970s was the largest employer in Israel after the Israeli government. | https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Zionism |
Almohad Caliphate | Along with the Almoravid period preceding it, the Almohad period is considered one of the most formative stages of Moroccan and Moorish architecture, establishing many of the forms and motifs that were refined in subsequent centuries. The main sites of Almohad architecture and art include Fes, Marrakesh, Rabat and Seville. In general, Almohad architecture was built mostly in rammed earth and brick rather than stone. These two materials were relatively cheap, readily available at most sites, and already widely used in the preceding centuries. Almohad architects refined both the manufacturing process of these materials and their on-site assembly, making the execution of numerous and ambitious construction projects possible. According to scholar Felix Arnold, during the Almohad period "construction became an industry on a scale not seen since Roman times."
Compared to the earlier Almoravid period and the Taifas or Caliphal period in al-Andalus, early Almohad architecture was much more restrained in its ornamentation, focusing its attention on overall architectural forms rather than on detailed surface decoration. In addition to continuing the integration of Moroccan and Andalusi artistic traditions, some currents in Almohad architecture may also reflect influences from Algeria and Tunisia (Ifriqiya). Some Almohad elements, such as polylobed arches, have their earliest precedents in Fatimid architecture in Ifriqiya and Egypt and had also appeared in Andalusi architecture such as the Aljaferia palace. In the Almohad period, this type of arch was further refined for decorative functions while horseshoe arches continued to be standard elsewhere. The decoration around mihrab arches inside mosques also evolved into richer and more monumental forms in the great ceremonial stone gates of Almohad architecture such as Bab Agnaou in Marrakesh and Bab Oudaia and Bab er-Rouah in Rabat. These gates employed varying decorative motifs arranged in concentric semi-circles around the arch of the gate, all of which was in turn framed inside an outer rectangular band with other motifs. This style remained evident in Marinid gateways (e.g. the main gate of Chellah) and in later Moroccan gateways.
The Almohad Kutubiyya and Tinmal mosques are often considered the prototypes of later Moroccan and Andalusi mosques, although the Great Mosque of Taza (later modified by the Marinids) is the oldest surviving Almohad mosque (begun in 1142). Like earlier mosques in the region, Almohad mosques have interiors consisting of large hypostyle halls divided by rows of arches that create a repetitive visual effect. However, the aisle or "nave" leading towards the mihrab (niche symbolizing the qibla in the southern/southeastern wall) and the aisle running along the qibla wall itself were usually wider than the others and were highlighted with distinctive arches and greater decoration. This layout, already present in Almoravid mosques, is often referred to as the "T-plan" by art historians (because the aisle running parallel to the qibla wall and the aisle leading to the mihrab, perpendicular to it, form a "T" shape), and became standard in mosques of the region for centuries. The minarets of Almohad mosques also established the standard form and style of subsequent minarets in the region, with a square base and two-tiered shaft covered in polylobed arch and darj wa ktaf motifs. The minaret of the Kasbah Mosque of Marrakesh was particularly influential and set a style that was repeated, with minor elaborations, in the following Marinid period. The most famous minarets of this time, however, are the minarets of the Kutubiyya Mosque (begun in 1147 by Abd al-Mu'min but subsequently rebuilt before 1195), the Giralda of Seville (part of a Great Mosque begun in 1171 by Abu Ya'qub Yusuf), and the unfinished "Hassan Tower" of Rabat (part of a huge mosque begun by Abu Yusuf Ya'qub al-Mansur in 1191 but never completed).
The Almohads were also prolific builders of fortifications and forts across their realm. They were responsible for building (or rebuilding) the city walls of Cordoba, Seville, Fes, and Taza, as well as many smaller forts and castles across Morocco and southern Spain and Portugal. In Rabat, Abd al-Mu'min built most of the current Kasbah of the Udayas in 1150–1151 (after having destroyed an earlier Almoravid ribat there), while Abu Yusuf Ya'qub al-Mansur embarked on the construction of a vast new capital and citadel on its south side called Ribat al-Fath (for which the enormous unfinished mosque of the Hassan Tower was also intended). While never finished, this project created the current outer walls of the historic center of Rabat, along with multiple gates such as Bab er-Rouah and the ceremonial main gate of the Kasbah of the Udayas. Al-Mansur also created the Kasbah of Marrakesh, a large royal citadel and palace complex to house the caliph's family and administration. The main public entrance of this kasbah was the ornamental gate of Bab Agnaou. In Seville, the Almohads built the Torre del Oro, a defensive tower on the shores of the Guadalquivir River which dates from 1220 to 1221 and remains a landmark of the city today. Likewise, the Calahorra Tower in Cordoba is believed to be an originally Almohad structure designed to defend the river and the city's old bridge.
The Almohad caliphs also constructed multiple country estates just outside the main cities where they resided, continuing a tradition that existed under the Almoravids. The best-known examples of these estates were centered around large water basins or reservoirs that sustained orchards of fruit trees and other plants. Some of them are referred to as al-Buḥayra ("little sea") in Arabic sources, likely in reference to these artificial lakes. Small palaces or pleasure pavilions were built on the edge of the reservoirs. In Marrakesh, the present-day Agdal and Menara gardens both developed from such Almohad creations. In Seville, the remains of the al-Buḥayra garden, founded in 1171, were excavated and partly restored in the 1970s. A similar garden estate was also created in Rabat but has not been found by archaeologists. The Alcázar Genil (originally called al-Qaṣr as-Sayyid) in Granada, created in the late Almohad period and later remodeled by the Nasrids, stood next to an enormous pool on the outskirts of the city. A small ribat, consisting of a square hall covered by a sixteen-sided dome on squinches, was built nearby at the same time and has been preserved today as a Christian hermitage. Sunken gardens were also part of Almohad palace architecture. In some cases the gardens were divided symmetrically into four parts, much like a riyad garden. Examples of these have been found in several courtyards in the Alcázar of Seville, where former Almohad palaces once stood. | https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Almohad_Caliphate |
Averroes | Averroes's main influence on the Christian West was through his extensive commentaries on Aristotle. After the fall of the Western Roman Empire, western Europe fell into a cultural decline that resulted in the loss of nearly all of the intellectual legacy of the Classical Greek scholars, including Aristotle. Averroes's commentaries, which were translated into Latin and entered western Europe in the thirteenth century, provided an expert account of Aristotle's legacy and made them available again. The influence of his commentaries led to Averroes being referred to simply as "The Commentator" rather than by name in Latin Christian writings. He has been sometimes described as the "father of free thought and unbelief" and "father of rationalism".
Michael Scot (1175 – c. 1232) was the first Latin translator of Averroes who translated the long commentaries of Physics, Metaphysics, On the Soul and On the Heavens, as well as multiple middle and short commentaries, starting in 1217 in Paris and Toledo. Following this, European authors such as Hermannus Alemannus, William de Luna and Armengaud of Montpellier translated Averroes's other works, sometimes with help from Jewish authors. Soon after, Averroes's works propagated among Christian scholars in the scholastic tradition. His writing attracted a strong circle of followers known as the Latin Averroists. Paris and Padua were major centers of Latin Averroism, and its prominent thirteenth-century leaders included Siger of Brabant and Boethius of Dacia.
Authorities of the Roman Catholic Church reacted against the spread of Averroism. In 1270, the Bishop of Paris Étienne Tempier issued a condemnation against 15 doctrines—many of which were Aristotelian or Averroist—that he said were in conflict with the doctrines of the church. In 1277, at the request of Pope John XXI, Tempier issued another condemnation, this time targeting 219 theses drawn from many sources, mainly the teachings of Aristotle and Averroes.
Averroes received a mixed reception from other Catholic thinkers; Thomas Aquinas, a leading Catholic thinker of the thirteenth century, relied extensively on Averroes's interpretation of Aristotle but disagreed with him on many points. For example, he wrote a detailed attack on Averroes's theory that all humans share the same intellect. He also opposed Averroes on the eternity of the universe and divine providence.
The Catholic Church's condemnations of 1270 and 1277, and the detailed critique by Aquinas weakened the spread of Averroism in Latin Christendom, though it maintained a following until the sixteenth century, when European thought began to diverge from Aristotelianism. Leading Averroists in the following centuries included John of Jandun and Marsilius of Padua (fourteenth century), Gaetano da Thiene and Pietro Pomponazzi (fifteenth century), and Agostino Nifo and Marcantonio Zimara (sixteenth century). | https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Averroes |
Jury | In criminal law in federal courts and a minority of state court systems of the United States, a grand jury is convened to hear only testimony and evidence to determine whether there is a sufficient basis for deciding to indict the defendant and proceed toward trial. In each court district where a grand jury is required, a group of 16–23 citizens holds an inquiry on criminal complaints brought by the prosecutor to decide whether a trial is warranted (based on the standard that probable cause exists that a crime was committed), in which case an indictment is issued. In jurisdictions where the size of a jury varies, in general the size of juries tends to be larger if the crime alleged is more serious. If a grand jury rejects a proposed indictment the grand jury's action is known as a "no bill." If they accept a proposed indictment, the grand jury's action is known as a "true bill." Grand jury proceedings are ex parte: only the prosecutor and witnesses who the prosecutor calls may present evidence to the grand jury and defendants are not allowed to present mitigating evidence or even to know the testimony that was presented to the grand jury, and hearsay evidence is permitted. This is so because a grand jury cannot convict a defendant. It can only decide to indict the defendant and proceed forward toward trial. Grand juries vote to indict in the overwhelming majority of cases, and prosecutors are not prohibited from presenting the same case to a new grand jury if a "no bill" was returned by a previous grand jury. A typical grand jury considers a new criminal case every fifteen minutes. In some jurisdictions, in addition to indicting persons for crimes, a grand jury may also issue reports on matters that they investigate apart from the criminal indictments, particularly when the grand jury investigation involves a public scandal. Historically, grand juries were sometimes used in American law to serve a purpose similar to an investigatory commission.
Both Article III of the U.S. Constitution and the Sixth Amendment require that criminal cases be tried by a jury. Originally this applied only to federal courts. However, the Fourteenth Amendment extended this mandate to the states. Although the Constitution originally did not require a jury for civil cases, this led to an uproar which was followed by adoption of the Seventh Amendment, which requires a civil jury in cases where the value in dispute is greater than twenty dollars. However, the Seventh Amendment right to a civil jury trial does not apply in state courts, where the right to a jury is strictly a matter of state law. However, in practice, all states except Louisiana preserve the right to a jury trial in almost all civil cases where the sole remedy sought is money damages to the same extent as jury trials are permitted by the Seventh Amendment. Under the law of many states, jury trials are not allowed in small claims cases. The civil jury in the United States is a defining element of the process by which personal injury trials are handled.
In practice, even though the defendant in a criminal action is entitled to a trial by jury, most criminal actions in the U.S. are resolved by plea bargain. Only about 2% of civil cases go to trial, with only about half of those trials being conducted before juries.
In 1898 the Supreme Court held that the jury must be composed of at least twelve persons, although this was not necessarily extended to state civil jury trials. In 1970, however, the Supreme Court held that the twelve person requirement was a "historical accident", and upheld six-person juries if provided for under state law in both criminal and civil state court cases. There is controversy over smaller juries, with proponents arguing that they are more efficient and opponents arguing that they lead to fluctuating verdicts. In a later case, however, the court rejected the use of five-person juries in criminal cases. Juries go through a selection process called voir dire in which the lawyers question the jurors and then make "challenges for cause" and "peremptory challenges" to remove jurors. Traditionally the removal of jurors based on a peremptory challenge required no justification or explanation, but the tradition has been changed by the Supreme Court where the reason for the peremptory challenge was the race of the potential juror. Since the 1970s "scientific jury selection" has become popular.
Unanimous jury verdicts have been standard in US American law. This requirement was upheld by the Supreme Court in 1897, but the standard was relaxed in 1972 in two criminal cases. As of 1999 over thirty states had laws allowing less than unanimity in civil cases, but, until 2020, Oregon and Louisiana were the only states which have laws allowing less than unanimous jury verdicts for criminal cases (these laws were overturned in Ramos v. Louisiana). When the required number of jurors cannot agree on a verdict (a situation sometimes referred to as a hung jury), a mistrial is declared, and the case may be retried with a newly constituted jury. The practice generally was that the jury rules only on questions of fact and guilt; setting the penalty was reserved for the judge. This practice was confirmed by rulings of the U.S. Supreme Court such as in Ring v. Arizona, which found Arizona's practice of having the judge decide whether aggravating factors exist to make a defendant eligible for the death penalty, to be unconstitutional, and reserving the determination of whether the aggravating factors exist to be decided by the jury. However, in some states (such as Alabama and Florida), the ultimate decision on the punishment is made by the judge, and the jury gives only a non-binding recommendation. The judge can impose the death penalty even if the jury recommends life without parole.
There is no set format for jury deliberations, and the jury takes a period of time to settle into discussing the evidence and deciding on guilt and any other facts the judge instructs them to determine. Deliberation is done by the jury only, with none of the lawyers, the judge, or the defendant present. The first step will typically be to find out the initial feeling or reaction of the jurors to the case, which may be by a show of hands, or via secret ballot. The jury will then attempt to arrive at a consensus verdict. The discussion usually helps to identify jurors' views to see whether a consensus will emerge as well as areas that bear further discussion. Points often arise that were not specifically discussed during the trial. The result of these discussions is that in most cases the jury comes to a unanimous decision and a verdict is thus achieved. In some states and under circumstances, the decision need not be unanimous.
In a few states and in death penalty cases, depending upon the law, the trial jury, or sometimes a separate jury, may determine whether the death penalty is appropriate in "capital" murder cases. Usually, sentencing is handled by the judge at a separate hearing. The judge may but does not always follow the recommendations of the jury when deciding on a sentence. | https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Jury |
Almoravid dynasty | Initially, it appears Ibn Tashfin had little interest in involving the Almoravids in the politics of al-Andalus (the Muslim territories on the Iberian Peninsula). After the collapse of the Caliphate of Córdoba in the early 11th century, al-Andalus had split into small kingdoms or city-states known as the Taifas. These states constantly fought with each other but were unable to raise large armies of their own, so they became reliant instead on the Christian kingdoms of the north for military support. This support was secured through the regular payment of parias (tributes) to the Christian kings, but the payments became a fiscal burden that drained the treasuries of these local rulers. In turn, the Taifa rulers burdened their subjects with increased taxation, including taxes and tariffs that were not considered legal under Islamic law. As the payments of tribute began to falter, the Christian kingdoms resorted to punitive raids and eventually to conquest. The Taifa kings were unwilling or unable to unite to counter this threat, and even the most powerful Taifa kingdom, Seville, was unable to resist Christian advances.
After the Almoravid capture of Ceuta (1083) on the southern shore of the Strait of Gibraltar, the way was now open for Ibn Tashfin to intervene in al-Andalus. It was in this same year that Alfonso VI, king of Castile and León, led a military campaign into southern al-Andalus to punish al-Mu'tamid of Seville for failing to pay him tribute. His expedition penetrated all the way to Tarifa, the southernmost point of the Iberian Peninsula. A couple of years later, in May 1085, he seized control of Toledo, previously one of the most powerful city-states in al-Andalus. Soon after, he also began a siege of Zaragoza. These dramatic events forced the Taifa kings to finally consider seeking an external intervention by the Almoravids. According to the most detailed Arabic source, it was al-Mu'tamid, the ruler of Seville, who convened a meeting with his neighbours, al-Mutawwakil of Badajoz and Abdallah ibn Buluggin of Granada, where they agreed to send an embassy to Ibn Tashfin to appeal for his assistance. The Taifa kings were aware of the risks that came with an Almoravid intervention but considered it the best choice among their bad options. Al-Mu'tamid is said to have remarked bitterly: "Better to pasture camels than to be a swineherd"—meaning that it was better to submit to another Muslim ruler than to end up as subjects of a Christian king.
As a condition for his assistance, Ibn Tashfin demanded that Algeciras (a city on the northern shore of the Strait of Gibraltar, across from Ceuta) be surrendered to him so he could use it as a base for his troops. Al-Mu'tamid agreed. Ibn Tashfin, wary of the hesitation of the Taifa kings, immediately sent an advance force of 500 troops across the strait to take control of Algeciras. They did so in July 1086 without encountering resistance. The rest of the Almoravid army, numbering around 12,000, soon followed. Ibn Tashfin and his army then marched to Seville, where they met up with the forces of al-Mu'tamid, al-Mutawwakil, and Abdallah ibn Buluggin. Alfonso VI, hearing of this development, lifted his siege of Zaragoza and marched south to confront them. The two sides met at a place north of Badajoz, called Zallaqa in Arabic sources and Sagrajas in Christian sources. In the Battle of Sagrajas (or Battle of Zallaqa), on 23 October 1086, Alfonso was soundly defeated and forced to retreat north in disorder. Al-Mu'tamid recommended that they press their advantage, but Ibn Tashfin did not pursue the Christian army further, returning instead to Seville and then to North Africa. It is possible he was unwilling to be away from his home base for too long or that the death of his eldest son, Sir, encouraged him to return.
After Ibn Tashfin's departure, Alfonso VI quickly resumed his pressure on the Taifa kings and forced them to send tribute payments again. He captured the fortress of Aledo, cutting off eastern al-Andalus from the other Muslim kingdoms. Meanwhile, Ibn Rashiq, the ruler of Murcia, was embroiled in a rivalry with al-Mu'tamid of Seville. As a result, this time it was the elites or notables (wujūh) of al-Andalus who now called for help from the Almoravids, rather than the kings. In May–June 1088, Ibn Tashfin landed at Algeciras with another army, soon joined by al-Mu'tamid of Seville, by Abdallah ibn Buluggin of Granada, and by other troops sent by Ibn Sumadih of Almería and Ibn Rashiq of Murcia. They then set out to retake Aledo. The siege, however, was undermined by rivalries and disunity among the Taifa kings. News eventually reached the Muslims that Alfonso VI was bringing an army to help the Castilian garrison. In November 1088, Ibn Tashfin lifted the siege and returned to North Africa again, having achieved nothing. Alfonso VI sent his trusted commander, Alvar Fañez, to pressure the Taifa kings again. He succeeded in forcing Abdallah ibn Buluggin to resume tribute payments and began to pressure al-Mu'tamid in turn.
In 1090, Ibn Tashfin returned to al-Andalus yet again, but by this point he seemed to have given up on the Taifa kings and now intended to take direct control of the region. The Almoravid cause benefited from the support of the Maliki fuqahā (Islamic jurists) in Al-Andalus, who extolled the Almoravid devotion to jihad while criticizing the Taifa kings as impious, self-indulgent, and thus illegitimate. In September 1090, Ibn Tashfin forced Granada to surrender to him and sent Abdallah ibn Buluggin into exile in Aghmat. He then returned to North Africa again, but this time he left his nephew, Sir ibn Abu Bakr, in charge of Almoravid forces in al-Andalus. Al-Mu'tamid, seeking to salvage his position, resorted to striking an alliance with Alfonso VI, which further undermined his own popular support. In early 1091, the Almoravids took control of Cordoba and turned towards Seville, defeating a Castilian force led Alvar Fañez that came to help al-Mu'tamid. In September 1091, al-Mu'tamid surrendered Seville to the Almoravids and was exiled to Aghmat. In late 1091, the Almoravids captured Almería. In late 1091 or January 1092, Ibn Aisha, one of Ibn Tashfin's sons, seized control of Murcia. | https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Almoravid_dynasty |
2003–2006 phase of the Iraqi insurgency | In response to the attacks taking place, on June 9, the U.S. military launched Operation Peninsula Strike, in which 2,000 soldiers from Task Force Iron Horse swept through the Tigris River peninsula of Thuluiya in the Sunni Triangle, detaining 397 Iraqis. Almost all of the detainees were later released, and the operation failed to stem the tide of the assaults. A series of similar operations were launched throughout the summer in the Sunni Triangle, such as Operation Sidewinder, Operation Soda Mountain, and Operation Ivy Serpent. One, known as Operation Desert Scorpion, succeeded in destroying an encampment of over 70 local fighters, possibly linked to the Fedayeen Saddam, near the Syrian border town of Rawa.
However, these initial counterinsurgency efforts failed to suppress the insurgency. The sweeps failed to stem the tide of the attacks, which during the summer of 2003 numbered about a dozen a day and resulted in, on average, 1 U.S. soldier killed and 7 more wounded every day. The guerrillas began adopting new and more complex tactics, such as the planting of IEDs (concealed bombs usually placed on the roadside), the use of mortars, and better-planned ambushes. Although some humanitarian operations were included in what was intended to be a "carrot and stick" strategy, the cordon and search operations are widely criticized for being far too blunt and not carefully targeted. The large numbers of innocent Iraqis detained during the raids, the removal of palm trees and other foliage to deprive guerrillas of cover for ambushes (and which represented the livelihoods of many farmers) and the failure to restore basic services such as water and electricity to pre-war levels began increasing the nationalist resistance among the Sunnis and began resulting in the disillusionment of an Iraqi populace. In addition, as the summer neared its end, a series of suicide bombings began that suggested an increasing Islamist terrorist threats. The Canal Hotel bombing targeting the UN on August 19, and the massive blast at the Imam Ali shrine that assassinated Ayatollah Mohammed Baqir al-Hakim along with dozens of others. Only ten days later marked the beginning of another phase to the conflict.
An effort began in August by the coalition to increase human intelligence gathering in order to more carefully target operations. The effort did eventually begin to reap limited and temporary results in the north-central region of the country (which includes Tikrit and up to the southern borders of Mosul and Kirkuk), as informants guided troops over the next six months to hideouts and weapons caches primarily belonging to the Fedayeen Saddam and the remaining Ba'athist resistance. However, most of the Sunni regions saw the military situation gradually worsen for the U.S. as a disaffected nationalist resistance began to take hold. | https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/2003%E2%80%932006_phase_of_the_Iraqi_insurgency |
Naucratis | The site was discovered by Flinders Petrie who dug there in 1884–1885. He was followed by Ernest Arthur Gardner and finally David George Hogarth, in 1899 and 1903. Hogarth was assisted in the 1903 dig by Campbell Cowan Edgar.
The archaeological focus fell into two areas of northern and southern quarters. Found farthest south was a large Egyptian storehouse or treasury (A on sketch at right—originally identified by Petrie as the "great temenos") and just north of that a Greek mud-brick Temple of Aphrodite roughly 14 m × 8 m (curiously not mentioned in Herodotus' list.) Directly east of this temple was unearthed a small factory for faience scarab seals.
In the northern section were found several temple ruins (E: Temple of Hera, F: Temple of Apollo & G: Temple of Dioscuri) including what may be Herodotus' Hellenion discovered by Hogarth in 1899 (directly east of F). "None of the votive pottery found here need have arrived earlier than the reign of Amasis, so it may well be that the Hellenion was founded as the result of his reorganization of the status of Naucratis, while the independent sanctuaries ... are of the earlier years of the town."
More recently American archaeologists W. Coulson and A. Leonard founded "The Naucratis Project" in 1977 carrying out surveys in 1977–1978 and further surveys and excavations to the south of the site from 1980–1982 (under the auspices of the American Research Center in Egypt). Unfortunately they found the original northern sanctuary section submerged under a lake formed by the risen water table and roughly 15 m deep. This part of the site remains under water today, making further work there difficult if not impossible. Their assessment of the approach taken and methods used by their predecessors was less than complimentary. "Unfortunately, much of the emphasis of the early excavators was placed on these religious structures at the expense of the commercial and domestic quarters. Consequently our knowledge of the mercantile character of ancient Naukratis—the very facet of its early history that made it so exceptional—has suffered greatly. Furthermore, the later historical sequences, such as the Hellenistic and Roman periods, were almost totally neglected." Also discouraging to them was the destruction wrought by the local populace on the site. "Already in Petrie's day about a third of the half-mile by quarter-mile site of Naukratis had been dug away by the local farmers for use as high-phosphate fertilizer (sebakh) in their fields.... In the intervening 100 years or so, the sebakhin have totally destroyed this eastern portion of the site." The barrier of the high water table made it impossible for them to find anything older than the Ptolemaic era. They agreed with Hogarth that the "great temenos" of Petrie was actually an Egyptian building and that indeed the entire south section of the town appeared to be non-Greek. Overall most of the finds were vases (some whole, most fragmentary) used as votives in the temples, but also perfume flasks (several in the form of a hedgehog) and stone statuettes and scarab seals. These are scattered to museums and collections around the world, the earlier material largely brought to Britain (mostly in the British Museum) and the latter to the Graeco-Roman Museum in Alexandria. | https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Naucratis |
Macedonia (ancient kingdom) | Modern scholars have argued over the possible role of Alexander III "the Great" and his mother Olympias in the assassination of Philip II, noting the latter's choice to exclude Alexander from his planned invasion of Asia, choosing instead for him to act as regent of Greece and deputy hegemon of the League of Corinth, and the potential bearing of another male heir between Philip II and his new wife, Cleopatra Eurydice. Alexander III (r. 336–323 BC) was immediately proclaimed king by an assembly of the army and leading aristocrats, chief among them being Antipater and Parmenion. By the end of his reign and military career in 323 BC, Alexander would rule over an empire consisting of mainland Greece, Asia Minor, the Levant, ancient Egypt, Mesopotamia, Persia, and much of Central and South Asia (i.e. modern Pakistan). Among his first acts was the burial of his father at Aigai. The members of the League of Corinth revolted at the news of Philip II's death, but were soon quelled by military force alongside persuasive diplomacy, electing Alexander as hegemon of the league to carry out the planned invasion of Achaemenid Persia.
In 335 BC, Alexander fought against the Thracian tribe of the Triballi at Haemus Mons and along the Danube, forcing their surrender on Peuce Island. Shortly thereafter, the Illyrian chieftain Cleitus, son of Bardylis, threatened to attack Macedonia with the aid of Glaucias, king of the Taulantii, but Alexander took the initiative and besieged the Illyrians at Pelion (in modern Albania). When Thebes had once again revolted from the League of Corinth and was besieging the Macedonian garrison in the Cadmea, Alexander left the Illyrian front and marched to Thebes, which he placed under siege. After breaching the walls, Alexander's forces killed 6,000 Thebans, took 30,000 inhabitants as prisoners of war, and burned the city to the ground as a warning that convinced all other Greek states except Sparta not to challenge Alexander again.
Throughout his military career, Alexander won every battle that he personally commanded. His first victory against the Persians in Asia Minor at the Battle of the Granicus in 334 BC used a small cavalry contingent as a distraction to allow his infantry to cross the river followed by a cavalry charge from his companion cavalry. Alexander led the cavalry charge at the Battle of Issus in 333 BC, forcing the Persian king Darius III and his army to flee. Darius III, despite having superior numbers, was again forced to flee the Battle of Gaugamela in 331 BC. The Persian king was later captured and executed by his own satrap of Bactria and kinsman, Bessus, in 330 BC. The Macedonian king subsequently hunted down and executed Bessus in what is now Afghanistan, securing the region of Sogdia in the process. At the 326 BC Battle of the Hydaspes (modern-day Punjab), when the war elephants of King Porus of the Pauravas threatened Alexander's troops, he had them form open ranks to surround the elephants and dislodge their handlers by using their sarissa pikes. When his Macedonian troops threatened mutiny in 324 BC at Opis, Babylonia (near modern Baghdad, Iraq), Alexander offered Macedonian military titles and greater responsibilities to Persian officers and units instead, forcing his troops to seek forgiveness at a staged banquet of reconciliation between Persians and Macedonians.
Alexander perhaps undercut his own rule by demonstrating signs of megalomania. While utilizing effective propaganda such as the cutting of the Gordian Knot, he also attempted to portray himself as a living god and son of Zeus following his visit to the oracle at Siwah in the Libyan Desert (in modern-day Egypt) in 331 BC. His attempt in 327 BC to have his men prostrate before him in Bactra in an act of proskynesis borrowed from the Persian kings was rejected as religious blasphemy by his Macedonian and Greek subjects after his court historian Callisthenes refused to perform this ritual. When Alexander had Parmenion murdered at Ecbatana (near modern Hamadan, Iran) in 330 BC, this was "symptomatic of the growing gulf between the king's interests and those of his country and people", according to Errington. His murder of Cleitus the Black in 328 BC is described as "vengeful and reckless" by Dawn L. Gilley and Ian Worthington. Continuing the polygamous habits of his father, Alexander encouraged his men to marry native women in Asia, leading by example when he wed Roxana, a Sogdian princess of Bactria. He then married Stateira II, eldest daughter of Darius III, and Parysatis II, youngest daughter of Artaxerxes III, at the Susa weddings in 324 BC.
Meanwhile, in Greece, the Spartan king Agis III attempted to lead a rebellion of the Greeks against Macedonia. He was defeated in 331 BC at the Battle of Megalopolis by Antipater, who was serving as regent of Macedonia and deputy hegemon of the League of Corinth in Alexander's stead. Before Antipater embarked on his campaign in the Peloponnese, Memnon, the governor of Thrace, was dissuaded from rebellion by use of diplomacy. Antipater deferred the punishment of Sparta to the League of Corinth headed by Alexander, who ultimately pardoned the Spartans on the condition that they submit fifty nobles as hostages. Antipater's hegemony was somewhat unpopular in Greece due to his practice (perhaps by order of Alexander) of exiling malcontents and garrisoning cities with Macedonian troops, yet in 330 BC, Alexander declared that the tyrannies installed in Greece were to be abolished and Greek freedom was to be restored.
When Alexander the Great died at Babylon in 323 BC, his mother Olympias immediately accused Antipater and his faction of poisoning him, although there is no evidence to confirm this. With no official heir apparent, the Macedonian military command split, with one side proclaiming Alexander's half-brother Philip III Arrhidaeus (r. 323–317 BC) as king and the other siding with the infant son of Alexander and Roxana, Alexander IV (r. 323–309 BC). Except for the Euboeans and Boeotians, the Greeks also immediately rose up in a rebellion against Antipater known as the Lamian War (323–322 BC). When Antipater was defeated at the 323 BC Battle of Thermopylae, he fled to Lamia where he was besieged by the Athenian commander Leosthenes. A Macedonian army led by Leonnatus rescued Antipater by lifting the siege. Antipater defeated the rebellion, yet his death in 319 BC left a power vacuum wherein the two proclaimed kings of Macedonia became pawns in a power struggle between the diadochi, the former generals of Alexander's army.
A council of the army convened in Babylon immediately after Alexander's death, naming Philip III as king and the chiliarch Perdiccas as his regent. Antipater, Antigonus Monophthalmus, Craterus, and Ptolemy formed a coalition against Perdiccas in a civil war initiated by Ptolemy's seizure of the hearse of Alexander the Great. Perdiccas was assassinated in 321 BC by his own officers during a failed campaign in Egypt against Ptolemy, where his march along the Nile River resulted in the drowning of 2,000 of his men. Although Eumenes of Cardia managed to kill Craterus in battle, this had little to no effect on the outcome of the 321 BC Partition of Triparadisus in Syria where the victorious coalition settled the issue of a new regency and territorial rights. Antipater was appointed as regent over the two kings. Before Antipater died in 319 BC, he named the staunch Argead loyalist Polyperchon as his successor, passing over his own son Cassander and ignoring the right of the king to choose a new regent (since Philip III was considered mentally unstable), in effect bypassing the council of the army as well.
Forming an alliance with Ptolemy, Antigonus, and Lysimachus, Cassander had his officer Nicanor capture the Munichia fortress of Athens' port town Piraeus in defiance of Polyperchon's decree that Greek cities should be free of Macedonian garrisons, sparking the Second War of the Diadochi (319–315 BC). Given a string of military failures by Polyperchon, in 317 BC, Philip III, by way of his politically engaged wife Eurydice II of Macedon, officially replaced him as regent with Cassander. Afterwards, Polyperchon desperately sought the aid of Olympias in Epirus. A joint force of Epirotes, Aetolians, and Polyperchon's troops invaded Macedonia and forced the surrender of Philip III and Eurydice's army, allowing Olympias to execute the king and force his queen to commit suicide. Olympias then had Nicanor and dozens of other Macedonian nobles killed, but by the spring of 316 BC, Cassander had defeated her forces, captured her, and placed her on trial for murder before sentencing her to death.
Cassander married Philip II's daughter Thessalonike and briefly extended Macedonian control into Illyria as far as Epidamnos (modern Durrës, Albania). By 313 BC, it was retaken by the Illyrian king Glaucias of Taulantii. By 316 BC, Antigonus had taken the territory of Eumenes and managed to eject Seleucus Nicator from his Babylonian satrapy, leading Cassander, Ptolemy, and Lysimachus to issue a joint ultimatum to Antigonus in 315 BC for him to surrender various territories in Asia. Antigonus promptly allied with Polyperchon, now based in Corinth, and issued an ultimatum of his own to Cassander, charging him with murder for executing Olympias and demanding that he hand over the royal family, King Alexander IV and the queen mother Roxana. The conflict that followed lasted until the winter of 312/311 BC, when a new peace settlement recognized Cassander as general of Europe, Antigonus as "first in Asia", Ptolemy as general of Egypt, and Lysimachus as general of Thrace. Cassander had Alexander IV and Roxana put to death in the winter of 311/310 BC, and between 306 and 305 BC the diadochi were declared kings of their respective territories. | https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Macedonia_(ancient_kingdom) |
Ba'athism | Cyprian Blamires, a historian of fascism, claims that "Ba'athism may have been a Middle Eastern variant of fascism, even though Aflaq and other Ba'athist leaders criticized particular fascist ideas and practices". According to him, the Ba'ath movement shared several characteristics with the European fascist movements, such as "the attempt to synthesize radical, illiberal nationalism and non-Marxist socialism, a romantic, mythopoetic, and elitist 'revolutionary' vision, the desire to create a 'new man' and restore past greatness, a centralised authoritarian party divided into 'right-wing' and 'left-wing' factions and so forth; several close associates later admitted that Aflaq had been directly inspired by certain fascist and Nazi theorists". Others have argued against Aflaq's fascist credentials, based on the fact that he was an active member of the Syrian–Lebanese Communist Party, he participated in the activities of the French Communist Party during his stay in France, and that he was influenced by some of the ideas of Karl Marx.
According to Sami al-Jundi, one of the co-founders of the Arab Ba'ath Party established by Zaki Arsuzi, the party's emblem was the tiger because it would "excite the imagination of the youth, in the tradition of Nazism and Fascism, but taking into consideration the fact that the Arab is in his nature distant from pagan symbols [like the swastika]". Arsuzi's Ba'ath Party believed in the virtues of "one leader" and Arsuzi himself personally believed in the racial superiority of the Arabs. The party's members read Nazi literature, such as The Foundations of the Nineteenth Century; they were one of the first groups to plan the translation of Mein Kampf into Arabic; and they also actively searched for a copy of The Myth of the Twentieth Century—according to Moshe Ma'oz, the only copy of it was in Damascus and it was owned by Aflaq. Arsuzi did not support the Axis powers and refused Italy's advances for party-to-party relations, but he was also influenced by the racial theories of racialist philosopher Houston Stewart Chamberlain. Arsuzi claimed that historically, Islam and Muhammad had reinforced the nobility and purity of the Arabs, which had both degenerated because Islam had been adopted by other peoples. He was associated with the League of Nationalist Action, a political party which existed in Syria from 1932 to 1939 and was strongly influenced by fascism and Nazism, as evidenced by its paramilitary "Ironshirts".
According to a British journalist who interviewed Barzan Ibrahim Tikriti, the head of the Iraqi intelligence services, Saddam Hussein drew inspiration on how to rule Iraq from Joseph Stalin and Adolf Hitler, and he had once asked Barzan to procure copies of their works, not for racist or antisemitic purposes, but "as an example of the successful organisation of an entire society by the state for the achievement of national goals". Journalist Jonathan Teperman interviewed Syrian president Bashar al-Assad in 2015 and described him to be as delusional as "Hitler in his bunker when the Russians were an hour outside Berlin" for advocating unrealistic objectives and being remorseless about his crimes, despite losing most of his Syrian territories.
Simon Wiesenthal Center reported that Nazi war-criminal Alois Brunner, the right-hand man of Adolf Eichman and a key participant in the Final Solution, had died in Syria in 2010 under the asylum of Bashar al-Assad. Under the alias "Dr. Georg Fischer", Brunner assisted Syrian rulers Bashar al-Assad and his father Hafez for over 30 years, serving as an instructor on torture techniques, combating internal dissent, and purging Syria's Jewish community. While the Assad regime regularly reject accusations of sheltering Brunner to this day, it had long denied permission to probe his whereabouts.
Bashar al-Assad's Ba'athist regime received support from Western neo-Nazi and far-right extremists, who became aware of him during the European refugee crisis that was partially brought on by the Syrian Civil War. Assad's bombings of Syrian cities were praised in the far-right's Islamophobic propaganda, which portrayed Muslims as a civilizational enemy to the West. Several Western far-right groups also view Bashar al-Assad as an authoritarian, anti-semitic bulwark against globalism and Zionism. Several pro-Assadist slogans were chanted in the neo-Nazi Unite the Right rally held in Charlottesville in 2017. Neo-nazi militants from the Greek Strasserist group Black Lily joined the Syrian civil war to fight alongside the Syrian Arab Army. | https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ba%27athism |
Achaemenid Empire | The position of women in the Achaemenid Empire differed depending on which culture they belonged to and therefore varied depending on the region. The position of Persian women in actual Persia has traditionally been described from mythological Biblical references and the sometimes biased Ancient Greek sources, neither of them fully reliable as sources, but the most reliable references are the archeological Persepolis Fortification Tablets (PFT), which describes women in connection to the royal court in Persepolis, from royal women to female laborers who were recipients of food rations at Persepolis.
The hierarchy of the royal women at the Persian court was ranked with the king's mother first, followed by the queen and the king's daughters, the king's concubines, and the other women of the royal palace. The king normally married a female member of the royal family or a Persian noblewoman related to a satrap or another important Persian man; it was permitted for members of the royal family to marry relatives, but there is no evidence for marriage between closer family members than half-siblings. The king's concubines were often either slaves, sometimes prisoners of war, or foreign princesses, whom the king did not marry because they were foreigners, and whose children did not have the right to inherit the throne.
Greek sources accuse the king of having hundreds of concubines secluded in a harem, but there is no archeological evidence supporting the existence of a harem, or the seclusion of women from contact with men, at the Persian court. The royal women joined the king at breakfast and dinner and accompanied him on his journeys. They may have participated in the royal hunt, as well as during the royal banquets; Herodotus relates how the Persian envoys at the Macedonian court demanded the presence of women during a banquet because it was the custom for women to participate in the banquets in their own country. The queen may have attended the king's audience, and archeological evidence shows that she gave her own audiences, at least for female supplicants. Royal women and noblewomen at court could furthermore travel on their own, accompanied by both male and female staff, own and manage their own fortune, land, and business. Depictions of Persian women show them with long dresses and veils which did not cover their faces nor their hair, only flowing down over their neck at the back of the head as an ornament.
Royal and aristocratic Achaemenid women were given an education in subjects that did not appear compatible with seclusions, such as horsemanship and archery. Royal and aristocratic women held and managed vast estates and workshops and employed large numbers of servants and professional laborers. Royal and aristocratic women do not seem to have lived in seclusion from men, since it is known that they appeared in public and traveled with their husbands, participated in hunting and in feasts: at least the chief wife of a royal or aristocratic man did not live in seclusion, as it is clearly stated that wives customarily accompanied their husbands at dinner banquets, although they left the banquet when the "women entertainers" came in and the men began "merrymaking".
No woman ever ruled the Achaemenid Empire, as monarch or as regent, but some queen's consorts are known to have had influence over the affairs of state, notably Atossa and Parysatis.
There are no evidence of any women being employed as an official in the administration or within religious service, however, there are plenty of archeological evidence of women being employed as free labourers in Persepolis, where they worked alongside men. Women could be employed as the leaders of their workforce, known by the title arraššara pašabena, which were then given a higher salary than the male workers of their workforce; and while female laborers were given less than men, qualified workers within the crafts were given equal pay regardless of their sex. | https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Achaemenid_Empire |
Anti-imperialism | An early use of the term "anti-imperialist" occurred after the United States entered the Spanish–American War in 1898. Most activists supported the war itself, but opposed the annexation of new territory, especially the Philippines. The Anti-Imperialist League was founded on June 15, 1898, in Boston in opposition of the acquisition of the Philippines, which would happen anyway. The anti-imperialists opposed the expansion because they believed imperialism violated the credo of republicanism, especially the need for "consent of the governed". Appalled by American imperialism, the Anti-Imperialist League, which included famous citizens such as Andrew Carnegie, Henry James, William James and Mark Twain, formed a platform which stated:
We hold that the policy known as imperialism is hostile to liberty and tends toward militarism, an evil from which it has been our glory to be free. We regret that it has become necessary in the land of Washington and Lincoln to reaffirm that all men, of whatever race or color, are entitled to life, liberty and the pursuit of happiness. We maintain that governments derive their just powers from the consent of the governed. We insist that the subjugation of any people is "criminal aggression" and open disloyalty to the distinctive principles of our Government...
We cordially invite the cooperation of all men and women who remain loyal to the Declaration of Independence and the Constitution of the United States.
Fred Harrington states that "the anti-imperialist's did not oppose expansion because of commercial, religious, constitutional, or humanitarian reasons but instead because they thought that an imperialist policy ran counter to the political doctrines of the Declaration of Independence, Washington's Farewell Address, and Lincoln's Gettysburg Address".
An important influence on American intellectuals was the work of British writer John A. Hobson. especially Imperialism: A Study (1902). Historians Peter Duignan and Lewis H. Gann argue that Hobson had an enormous influence in the early 20th century that caused widespread distrust of imperialism:
Hobson's ...hatred of moneyed men and monopolies, his loathing of secret compacts and public bluster, fused all existing indictments of imperialism into one coherent system....His ideas influenced German nationalist opponents of the British Empire as well as French Anglophobes and Marxists; they colored the thoughts of American liberals and isolationist critics of colonialism. In days to come they were to contribute to American distrust of Western Europe and of the British Empire. Hobson helped make the British averse to the exercise of colonial rule; he provided indigenous nationalists in Asia and Africa with the ammunition to resist rule from Europe.
The American rejection of the League of Nations in 1919 was accompanied with a sharp American reaction against European imperialism. American textbooks denounced imperialism as a major cause of the World War. The uglier aspects of British colonial rule were emphasized, recalling the long-standing anti-British sentiments in the United States. | https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Anti-imperialism |
Cave of the Patriarchs massacre | The date 25 February 1994 coincided with the Jewish festival of Purim and fell during the Muslim Ramadan. On the eve of the massacre, Goldstein listened to a reading in the Hall of Abraham of the Scroll of Esther, and spoke to others of the need to behave like Esther. Some consider it not coincidental that he then carried out the murders as Purim was celebrated. In this context, the festival of Purim was associated with a reading that concerns Amalek, with whom, in Israeli extremist rhetoric, Palestinians are often identified. Joseph Tuman has conjectured he saw himself as Mordecai. Ian Lustick thinks it likely Goldstein thought of Yasser Arafat as a modern-day Haman. Both Jews and Muslims were permitted to access their respective parts of the compound. At 5:00 a.m. on February 25, around 800 Palestinian Muslims passed through the east gate of the cave to participate in Fajr, the first of the five daily Islamic prayers. The cave was under Israeli Army guard, but of the nine soldiers supposed to have been on duty, four were late turning up, and only one officer was there.
Shortly afterwards, passing through the Hall of Abraham, Goldstein entered the Hall of Isaac, where some 800 Muslims were at prayer. He was dressed in his army uniform and carried an IMI Galil assault rifle and four magazines of ammunition, which held a total of 140 rounds in 35 rounds per magazine. He was not stopped by the guards, who assumed that he was an officer entering the tomb to pray in an adjacent chamber reserved for Jews. Standing in front of the only exit from the hall and positioned to the rear of the Muslim worshippers, he is reported as having thrown a grenade into the middle of the hall before opening fire, eventually killing 29 people and wounding another 125, among them children. Several people were left with paralyzing wounds. According to survivors, Goldstein bided his time until sujūd, the part of the prayer where worshippers prostrate themselves with their heads on the floor. He was overcome when someone in the crowd hurled a fire extinguisher which struck him on the head, allowing the crowd to disarm and then beat him to death.
Reports after the massacre were often contradictory. There was initial uncertainty about whether Goldstein had acted alone; it was reported that eyewitnesses had seen "another man, also dressed as a soldier, handing him ammunition". There were many testimonies that made mention of Israeli guards outside the cave having opened fire. Israeli military officials claim that no Israeli troops fired on the Palestinian worshippers. However, The New York Times interviewed over 40 Palestinian eyewitnesses, many of whom were confined to hospital beds with gunshot wounds, and thus "unable to compare notes". All witnesses corroborated that three Israeli guards opened fire, likely in panic amid the confusion, as the Muslims fled the shrine, with at least one soldier firing into the crowd. During the inquiry, an Israeli Army official said three worshippers died in the stampede following the attack and five Palestinians were killed in street riots within Hebron later that day.
The testimony of various Israeli military officials was often contradictory. For instance, Danny Yatom asserted that two of the guards had fired six or seven shots in the confusion "but only in the air," while the two guards themselves, sergeants Kobi Yosef and Niv Drori, later testified to firing four shots "chest high". The guards' testimony was also at odds with the testimony of their ranking officer in claiming they had seen another Jewish settler enter the cave bearing arms. Tikva Honig-Parnass wrote that 10 Palestinians were killed and more than 100 injured by Israeli soldiers who continued to shoot at those who were trying to flee the mosque, at those who were evacuating the wounded, and at people who were rioting at the Ahli hospital. Arafat Baya’at, for one, is reported as having been shot dead by Israeli troops outside the hospital when he picked up a stone to throw at soldiers after seeing a friend of his being carried out of an ambulance. Several Palestinian survivors have told that they believe Israeli soldiers collaborated with Goldstein, stating there were fewer soldiers than usual at the mosque, and that exclusively on that day the metal detector was turned-off and no-one conducted searches: "they [the soldiers] were relaxed and laughing, they didn't think anybody was going to get out alive", said one man who was left paralyzed as a result of being shot by Goldstein. | https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Cave_of_the_Patriarchs_massacre |
The Guardian | The newspaper opposed slavery and supported free trade. An 1823 leading article on the continuing "cruelty and injustice" to slaves in the West Indies long after the abolition of the slave trade with the Slave Trade Act 1807 wanted fairness to the interests and claims both of the planters and of their oppressed slaves. It welcomed the Slavery Abolition Act 1833 and accepted the "increased compensation" to the planters as the "guilt of slavery attaches far more to the nation" rather than individuals. Success of the Act would encourage emancipation in other slave-owning nations to avoid "imminent risk of a violent and bloody termination." However, the newspaper argued against restricting trade with countries that had not yet abolished slavery.
Complex tensions developed in the United States. When the abolitionist George Thompson toured, the newspaper said that "[s]lavery is a monstrous evil, but civil war is not a less one; and we would not seek the abolition even of the former through the imminent hazard of the latter". It suggested that the United States should compensate slave-owners for freeing slaves and called on President Franklin Pierce to resolve the 1856 "civil war", the Sacking of Lawrence due to pro-slavery laws imposed by Congress.
In 1860, The Observer quoted a report that the newly elected president Abraham Lincoln was opposed to abolition of slavery. On 13 May 1861, shortly after the start of the American Civil War, the Manchester Guardian portrayed the Northern states as primarily imposing a burdensome trade monopoly on the Confederate States, arguing that if the South was freed to have direct trade with Europe, "the day would not be distant when slavery itself would cease". Therefore, the newspaper asked "Why should the South be prevented from freeing itself from slavery?" This hopeful view was also held by the Liberal leader William Ewart Gladstone.
There was division in Britain over the Civil War, even within political parties. The Manchester Guardian had also been conflicted. It had supported other independence movements and felt it should also support the rights of the Confederacy to self-determination. It criticised Lincoln's Emancipation Proclamation for not freeing all American slaves. On 10 October 1862, it wrote: "It is impossible to cast any reflections upon a man so evidently sincere and well-intentioned as Mr Lincoln but it is also impossible not to feel that it was an evil day both for America and the world, when he was chosen President of the United States". By then, the Union blockade was causing suffering in British towns. Some including Liverpool supported the Confederacy as did "current opinion in all classes" in London. On 31 December 1862, cotton workers held a meeting at the Free Trade Hall in Manchester which resolved "its detestation of negro slavery in America, and of the attempt of the rebellious Southern slave-holders to organise on the great American continent a nation having slavery as its basis". There was a comment that "an effort had been made in a leading article of the Manchester Guardian to deter the working men from assembling together for such a purpose". The newspaper reported all this and published their letter to President Lincoln while complaining that "the chief occupation, if not the chief object of the meeting, seems to have been to abuse the Manchester Guardian". Lincoln replied to the letter thanking the workers for their "sublime Christian heroism" and American ships delivered relief supplies to Britain.
The newspaper reported the shock to the community of the assassination of Abraham Lincoln in 1865, concluding that "[t]he parting of his family with the dying President is too sad for description", but in what from today's perspective looks an ill-judged editorial wrote that "[o]f his rule we can never speak except as a series of acts abhorrent to every true notion of constitutional right and human liberty", adding: "it is doubtless to be regretted that he had not the opportunity of vindicating his good intentions".
According to Martin Kettle, writing for The Guardian in February 2011: "The Guardian had always hated slavery. But it doubted the Union hated slavery to the same degree. It argued that the Union had always tacitly condoned slavery by shielding the southern slave states from the condemnation they deserved. It was critical of Lincoln's emancipation proclamation for stopping short of a full repudiation of slavery throughout the US. And it chastised the president for being so willing to negotiate with the south, with slavery one of the issues still on the table." | https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/The_Guardian |
World Heritage Site | A site may be added to the List of World Heritage in Danger if conditions threaten the characteristics for which the landmark or area was inscribed on the World Heritage List. Such problems may involve armed conflict and war, natural disasters, pollution, poaching, or uncontrolled urbanisation or human development. This danger list is intended to increase international awareness of the threats and to encourage counteractive measures. Threats to a site can be either proven imminent threats or potential dangers that could have adverse effects on a site.
The state of conservation for each site on the danger list is reviewed yearly; after this, the Committee may request additional measures, delete the property from the list if the threats have ceased or consider deletion from both the List of World Heritage in Danger and the World Heritage List. Only three sites have ever been delisted: the Arabian Oryx Sanctuary in Oman, the Dresden Elbe Valley in Germany, and the Liverpool Maritime Mercantile City in the United Kingdom.
The Arabian Oryx Sanctuary was directly delisted in 2007, instead of first being put on the danger list, after the Omani government decided to reduce the protected area's size by 90%. The Dresden Elbe Valley was first placed on the danger list in 2006 when the World Heritage Committee decided that plans to construct the Waldschlösschen Bridge would significantly alter the valley's landscape. In response, the Dresden City Council attempted to stop the bridge's construction. However, after several court decisions allowed the building of the bridge to proceed, the valley was removed from the World Heritage List in 2009. Liverpool's World Heritage status was revoked in July 2021, following developments (Liverpool Waters and Bramley-Moore Dock Stadium) on the northern docks of the World Heritage site leading to the "irreversible loss of attributes" on the site.
The first global assessment to quantitatively measure threats to Natural World Heritage Sites found that 63% of sites have been damaged by increasing human pressures including encroaching roads, agriculture infrastructure and settlements over the last two decades. These activities endanger Natural World Heritage Sites and could compromise their unique values. Of the Natural World Heritage Sites that contain forest, 91% experienced some loss since 2000. Many of them are more threatened than previously thought and require immediate conservation action.
The destruction of cultural assets and identity-establishing sites is one of the primary goals of modern asymmetrical warfare. Terrorists, rebels, and mercenary armies deliberately smash archaeological sites, sacred and secular monuments and loot libraries, archives and museums. The UN, United Nations peacekeeping and UNESCO in cooperation with Blue Shield International are active in preventing such acts. "No strike lists" are also created to protect cultural assets from air strikes.
The founding president of Blue Shield International Karl von Habsburg summed it up with the words: "Without the local community and without the local participants, that would be completely impossible". | https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/World_Heritage_Site |
Ulama | In Iran, a period of political instability began with the collapse of the Safavid reign after shah Sultan Husayns death in 1722. In the light of the discontinuity and fragmentation of the central government, two social groups maintained continuity and, consequently, rose in power: Tribal chieftains established, amongst others, the Khanates of the Caucasus, the Afsharid and Zand dynasties. The second group who benefitted from the weakness of the central authority was the Shi'a ulama. According to Garthwaite (2010), "the ulama constituted one institution that not only provided continuity, but gradually asserted its role over and against royal authority." A process of change began which continued throughout the 19th century and into the present.
Already some of the last Safavids, Sulayman Shah (r. 1666–1694) and Tahmasp II (r. 1722–1732) had sought the ulama's support in an attempt to strengthen their authority. Particularly, they associated themselves with a group of ulama who supported the "official" Twelver Shi'a doctrine, established by the Iranian Shaykh al-Islām Mohammad-Baqer Majlesi (1627–1699) during the later decades of Safavid rule. The dispute between the Twelver Shi'a and Mir Damad's (d. 1631 or 1632) and Mulla Sadra's (c. 1571/2 – 1640) School of Isfahan, who promoted Sufi mysticism and Islamic philosophy, continued throughout the 18th century, and shaped the relationship between ulama and government during the reigns of the subsequent dynasties.
With the accession of Agha Mohammad Khan Qajar to the Iranian throne, the Qajar dynasty consolidated the central power. However, the Qajar Shahs, in particular Naser al-Din Shah Qajar (r. 1848–1896), whose reign paralleled that of the Ottoman Sultans of the Tanzimat time, failed at obtaining central control over the ulama. The Shiite scholars retained their political influence on the Persian society. They also maintained unrestricted access to the financial resources from the religious endowments. In addition, the Islamic Zakat tax was paid to individual imams and not to state-sponsored tax collectors. Both their religious influence and their financial means allowed the Shiite ulama to act, at times, against the Shah. Thus, under the Qajar dynasty, the ulama provided a source of religious legitimacy and served as interpreters of religious law in a dual legal system where the state administered law based on custom (ʻurf). | https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ulama |
Gaza War (2008–2009) | On 13 December, Israel announced that it favored extending the cease-fire, provided Hamas adhered to the conditions. On 14 December, a Hamas delegation in Cairo proposed that Hamas was prepared to stop all rocket attacks against Israel if the Israelis would open up the Gaza border crossings and pledge not to launch attacks in Gaza, as per the original June 2008 truce terms, to that date not complied with by Israel. On the same day, Hamas officials said that earlier reports, quoting Khaled Meshaal as saying there would be no renewal of the truce, were inaccurate. A Hamas spokesman said that the lull would not be renewed, "as long as there is no real Israeli commitment to all of its conditions". A spokesman for the Israeli Prime Minister replied that Israel was committed to the truce but "it's clear there can't be a one-sided ceasefire, ... where rockets are everyday coming from the Gaza Strip targeting Israeli civilians."
On 15 December, Israel assassinated a senior Palestinian commander in Jenin, sparking a round of attacks between Israel and Hamas.
On 17 December, a 40-year-old Palestinian was killed by IDF fire in Northern Gaza. The following day, 18 December, Hamas declared the end of the cease-fire, a day before the truce officially expired. More than 20 rockets were fired from Gaza into southern Israel on that day.
On 19 December, Hamas refused to enter talks to renew the six-month truce and a Hamas spokesman announced that it would not extend the cease-fire. The spokesman, Ayman Taha, specified that Hamas's refusal was "because the enemy did not abide by its obligations" to ease a crippling blockade of the Gaza Strip, and had not halted all attacks. Palestinian sources said that Hamas wanted to renew the truce, but only on improved terms – a complete opening of the border crossings with Israel, the opening of the Rafah border crossing with Egypt, a complete ban on Israeli military activity in Gaza and an extension of the truce to the West Bank as well. Israel was not ready to accept these terms. This was confirmed by Yuval Diskin, head of Shin Bet (Israel's internal security agency), at an Israeli cabinet meeting on 21 December. Diskin said he thought Hamas was "interested in continuing the truce, but wants to improve its terms ... it wants us to lift the siege of Gaza, stop attacks, and extend the truce to include the West Bank". Three Qassam rockets fired from the northern Gaza Strip landed in Israel.
On 22 December, Israeli Defense Minister Ehud Barak said that his country will not accept the ongoing rocket fire from the Palestinian militants in the Gaza Strip, Israeli Foreign Minister Tzipi Livni, who had supported the truce until recently, suggested that military actions be taken against the Hamas government in Gaza.
On 23 December, senior Hamas leader Mahmoud al-Zahar said that Hamas was willing to renew the cease-fire under the original terms, demanding an Israeli commitment to refrain from any military operation in the Strip and to keep the border crossings open. Speaking with Egyptian newspaper al-Ahram, al-Zahar said that the movement would reassess the situation in Gaza once the 24 hours during which Hamas vowed to halt rocket fire had ended. Despite the temporary ceasefire declared by the armed Palestinian factions, eight Qassam rockets and eight mortar shells hit the Negev. Also that day, Israeli Defense Forces killed three Palestinian militants, stating they were planting explosives on the border.
On 24 December, an Israeli airstrike hit a group of militants in the Gaza Strip. An Israeli military spokesman said that the militants had fired mortars at Israel. Palestinian medics said that one Hamas militant was killed in the strike and two other Palestinians were wounded, including a cameraman from Hamas' television station. On that day, Hamas military wing issued a statement saying that it began an operation code-named "Operation Oil Stain". 87 Palestinian mortar shells, Katyusha and Qassam rockets hit the Negev. Hamas said that it would expand the "Oil Stain" and put thousands of Israelis "under fire". Hamas said it was ready for the war: "far greater than surrendering to Israeli threats and that they became much more prepared to counter Israeli aggression and to defend themselves than in the past."
On 25 December, after Israel had "wrapped up preparations for a broad offensive", Israeli Prime Minister Ehud Olmert delivered a final warning in an interview with the Arabic language satellite channel al-Arabiya. He said "I am telling them now, it may be the last minute, I'm telling them stop it. We are stronger." Another six Qassams landed in southern Israel. | https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Gaza_War_(2008%E2%80%932009) |
Italian settlers in Libya | From 1947 to 1951, Tripolitania and Cyrenaica were under British administration, while the French controlled Fezzan. Under the terms of the 1947 peace treaty with the Allies, Italy relinquished all claims to Libya. On 21 November 1949, the UN General Assembly passed a resolution stating that Libya should become independent before 1 January 1952. On 24 December 1951, Libya declared its independence as the United Kingdom of Libya, a constitutional and hereditary monarchy.
The Italian population virtually disappeared after the Libyan leader Muammar Gaddafi ordered the expulsion of remaining Italians (about 20,000) in 1970. After the nationalization of Italian companies, only a small number of Italians remained in Libya. In 1986, after the political crisis between the United States and Libya, the number of Italians decreased even further, reaching an all-time low of 1,500 people, that is, less than 0.1% of the population. In the 1990s and 2000s, with the end of the economic embargo, some Colonial-era Italians (a few dozen pensioners) returned to Libya. In 2004 there were 22,530 Italians in Libya, almost the same number as in 1962, mainly skilled workers in the oil industries (principally in Eni, which has been present in Libya since 1953) arrived at the end of the nineties. Only a few hundred of them were allowed to return to Libya in the 2000s.
On 30 August 2008, Gaddafi and Italian Prime Minister Silvio Berlusconi signed a historic cooperation treaty in Benghazi. Under its terms, Italy would pay $5 billion to Libya as compensation for its former military occupation. In exchange, Libya would take measures to combat illegal immigration coming from its shores and boost investments in Italian companies. The treaty was ratified by Italy on 6 February 2009, and by Libya on 2 March, during a visit to Tripoli by Berlusconi. Co-operation ended in February 2011 as a result of the Libyan Civil War which overthrew Gaddafi. At the signing ceremony of the document, Italian Prime Minister Silvio Berlusconi recognized historic atrocities and repression committed by the state of Italy against the Libyan people during colonial rule, stating: In this historic document, Italy apologizes for its killing, destruction and repression of the Libyan people during the period of colonial rule." and went on to say that this was a "complete and moral acknowledgement of the damage inflicted on Libya by Italy during the colonial era". | https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Italian_settlers_in_Libya |
Robert of Ketton | Prior to 1141, Robert and Hermann of Carinthia were engaged in a project of translating Arabic texts into Latin for their own use and education. Richard Hakluyt surmised that the two men had travelled in Arabic-speaking countries. Only one product of Robert from this early collaboration is known or has survived. On Hermann's request, Robert translated al-Kindi's Astrological Judgements, under the Latin title Judicia. (Many later manuscripts misattribute it to the astronomer Robertus Anglicus.) In the preface to this translation, he explains that his interest is in geometry and astronomy, but that he is undertaking an astrological work for the sake of his friendship with Hermann. Their real plan, he says, is to work through Euclid's Elements and Theodosius's Spherics in order to be capable of understanding Ptolemy's Almagest. All of these texts would have been available to them only in Arabic at that time.
It has been suggested that one other text that survives might be Robert's work from his and Hermann's private collaboration: a translation of Euclid's Elements known as "Adelard II", which is usually attributed to Adelard of Bath and sometimes to Robert of Chester. It was the most popular of several Latin translations of Euclid from the twelfth century. In his translation of Ptolemy's Planisphere of 1143, Hermann also mentions that Robert gave him the astronomical tables of al-Battani, perhaps in translation.
In 1141, Robert and Hermann met Abbot Peter the Venerable on the banks of the Ebro, probably at Logroño, and he convinced them to translate some Islamic texts for his collection, which has become known as the Toledan Collection. For this project, Robert translated a history of the early Caliphate under the title Chronica mendosa Saracenorum (Lying Chronicle of the Saracens) and the Quran itself under the title Lex Mahumet pseudoprophete (Law of the False Prophet Muhammad). For the latter work he was assisted by a certain Muhammad. His translation is very free and he does not subdivide the text according to the suras. The entire Toledan Collection was printed by the Protestant printer Theodore Bibliander at Basel in 1543.
As late as 1143, Robert still had in mind his and Hermann's pet project of astronomical translations, for he wrote a letter to Peter the Venerable promising "a celestial gift which embraces within itself the whole of science … revealing most accurately, according to number, proportion and measure, all the celestial circles and their quantities, orders and conditions, and, finally, all the various movements of the stars, and their effects and natures." | https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Robert_of_Ketton |
Thabo Mbeki | Mbeki had been highly involved in economic policy as deputy president, especially in spearheading the Growth, Employment and Redistribution (GEAR) programme, which was introduced in 1996 and remained a cornerstone of Mbeki's administration after 1999. In comparison to the Reconstruction and Development Programme policy which had been the basis of the ANC's platform in 1994, GEAR placed less emphasis on developmental and redistributive imperatives, and subscribed to elements of the liberalisation, deregulation, and privatisation at the centre of Washington Consensus-style reforms. It was therefore viewed by some as a "policy reversal" and embrace of neoliberalism, and thus as an abandonment of the ANC's socialist principles. Mbeki also emphasised communication between government, business, and labour, establishing four working groups – for big business, black business, trade unions, and commercial agriculture – under which ministers, senior officials, and Mbeki himself met regularly with business and union leaders to build trust and explore solutions to structural economic problems.
Conservative groups such as the Cato Institute commended Mbeki's macroeconomic policies, which reduced the budget deficit and public debt and which according to them likely played a role in increasing economic growth. According to the Free Market Foundation, during the Mbeki presidency, average annualised quarter-on-quarter GDP growth was 4.2%, and average annual inflation was 5.7%. On the other hand, the shift alienated leftists, including inside in the ANC and its Tripartite Alliance. Zwelinzima Vavi of the Congress of South African Trade Unions (COSATU) was an outspoken critic of Mbeki's "market-friendly" economic policies, claiming that Mbeki's "flirtation" with neoliberalism had been "absolutely disastrous" for development, and especially for the labour-intensive development required to address South Africa's high unemployment rate. The discord between Mbeki and the left was on public display by December 2002, when Mbeki attacked what he called divisive "ultra-leftists" in a speech to the ANC's 51st National Conference.
However, Mbeki clearly never subscribed to undiluted neoliberalism. He retained various social democratic programmes and principles, and generally endorsed a mixed economy in South Africa. One of the ANC's slogans in the campaign for his 2004 re-election was, "A people's contract for growth and development." He popularised the concept of a dual or two-track economy in South Africa, with severe underdevelopment in one segment of the population, and, for example in a 2003 newsletter, argued that high growth alone would only benefit the developed segment, without significant trickle-down benefits for the rest of the population. Yet, somewhat paradoxically, he explicitly advocated state support for the creation of a black capitalist class in South Africa. The government's black economic empowerment policy, which was expanded and consolidated under his administration, was criticised precisely for benefitting only a small black elite and thereby failing to address inequality. | https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Thabo_Mbeki |
Fez, Morocco | In 1912, French colonial rule was instituted over Morocco following the Treaty of Fes. One immediate consequence was the 1912 riots in Fez, a popular uprising which included deadly attacks targeting Europeans as well as native Jewish inhabitants in the Mellah, followed by an even deadlier repression. The first French resident general, Hubert Lyautey, decided to move the administrative capital of the Protectorate to Rabat in 1912–1913, which has remained the capital ever since.: 149
A number of social and physical changes took place during this period and across the 20th century. Starting under Lyautey, one important policy with long-term consequences was the decision to largely forego redevelopment of existing historic walled cities in Morocco and to intentionally preserve them as sites of historic heritage, still known today as "medinas". Instead, the French administration built new modern cities (the Villes Nouvelles) just outside the old cities, where European settlers largely resided with modern Western-style amenities. This was part of a larger "policy of association" adopted by Lyautey which favoured various forms of indirect colonial rule by preserving local institutions and elites, in contrast with other French colonial policies that had favoured "assimilation". The Ville Nouvelle also became known as Dar Dbibegh by Moroccans, as the former palace of Moulay Abdallah was located in the same area.The creation of the separate French Ville Nouvelle to the west had a wider impact on the entire city's development. While new colonial policies preserved historic monuments, they stalled urban development in heritage areas. Scholar Janet Abu-Lughod has argued that these policies created a kind of urban "apartheid" between the indigenous Moroccan urban areas, who were forced to remain stagnant in terms of urban development and architectural innovation, and the new, mainly European-inhabited planned cities, which expanded to occupy lands formerly used by Moroccans outside the city.: 165–166 This separation was partly softened, however, by wealthy Moroccans who started moving into the Ville Nouvelles during this period.: 26 By contrast, the old city (medina) of Fez was increasingly settled by poorer rural migrants from the countryside.: 26
Fez also played a role in the Moroccan nationalist movement and in protests against the French colonial regime. Many Moroccan nationalists received their education at the Al-Qarawiyyin University and some of their informal political networks were established thanks to this shared educational background.: 140, 146 In July 1930, the students and other inhabitants protested against the Berber Dahir, decreed by the French authorities in May of that year.: 143–144 In 1937, the Al-Qarawiyyin Mosque and R'cif Mosque were rallying points for demonstrations against a violent crackdown on Moroccan protesters in the nearby city of Meknes, which ended with French troops being deployed across Fes el-Bali, including at the mosques themselves.: 387–389 : 168 Towards the end of World War II, Moroccan nationalists gathered in Fez to draft a demand for independence which they submitted to the Allies on January 11, 1944. This resulted in the arrest of nationalist leaders followed by the violent suppression of protests across many cities, including Fez.: 255 | https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Fez,_Morocco |
Abdel Fattah el-Sisi | Considered its worst in decades, Egypt's energy crisis that helped inflame the protests against former president Mohamed Morsi continued to grow in Sisi's first months in office, challenging the new government. Due to shortage in energy production, growing consumption, terrorist attacks on Egypt's energy infrastructure, debts to foreign oil companies and the absence of the needed periodic maintenance of the power plants, the energy blackout rates in Egypt rose to unprecedented levels, with some parts of the country facing around six power cuts a day for up to two hours each. In August 2014, daily electricity consumption hit a record high of 27.7 gigawatts, 20% more power than stations could provide. The next month Egypt suffered a massive power outage that halted parts of the Cairo Metro, took television stations off the air, and ground much of the country to a halt for several hours because of the sudden loss of 50 percent of the country's power generation. Sisi, on his part, said that the idler would be held accountable and promised to partially solve the economic crisis by August 2015, and that, beginning with December that year, the crisis will be dealt with entirely. Both long-term and short-term plans were introduced. In the short-term, Egypt signed a contract with General Electric (GE) to provide the country with 2.6 gigawatts by the summer of 2015. The first phase entered service in June and the final phase was expected to be completed by the end of August, making it one of the fastest energy transferring operations in the world according to GE. In June, Sisi's administration stated that for the first time in years, Egypt achieved a surplus in power generating capacity estimated at 2.9 gigawatts. In the long-term, Egypt paid more than $6 billion it owed to foreign oil companies between January and March. Energy contracts were placed as a top priority in the Egypt Economic Development Conference in March 2015, resulting in a $9 billion contract with Siemens to supply gas and wind power plants to boost the country's electricity generation by 50 percent, in addition to an energy deal worth $12 billion (£E91.5 billion) with BP to provide the country with an extra quarter of local energy production. Sisi also stated that Egypt is not just solving its energy crisis, but rather seeking to become a "global hub for energy trading". In Nicosia on 21 November 2017 he met President of Cyprus Nicos Anastasiades and the Prime Minister of Greece Alexis Tsipras. They encouraged and welcomed private sector initiatives of energy infrastructure projects, important for energy security of all three countries such as the EuroAfrica Interconnector, interconnector between Greek, Cypriot, and Egypt power grids via submarine power cable of length around 1,619-kilometre (1,006 mi). | https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Abdel_Fattah_el-Sisi |
Berbers | The Muslims who invaded the Iberian Peninsula in 711 were mainly Berbers, and were led by a Berber, Tariq ibn Ziyad, under the suzerainty of the Arab Caliph of Damascus Abd al-Malik ibn Marwan and his North African Viceroy, Musa ibn Nusayr. Due to subsequent antagonism between Arabs and Berbers, and due to the fact that most of the histories of al-Andalus were written from an Arab perspective, the Berber role is understated in the available sources. The biographical dictionary of Ibn Khallikan preserves the record of the Berber predominance in the invasion of 711, in the entry on Tariq ibn Ziyad. A second mixed army of Arabs and Berbers came in 712 under Ibn Nusayr himself. They supposedly helped the Umayyad caliph Abd ar-Rahman I in al-Andalus, because his mother was a Berber.
English medievalist Roger Collins suggests that if the forces that invaded the Iberian peninsula were predominantly Berber, it is because there were insufficient Arab forces in Africa to maintain control of Africa and attack Iberia at the same time.: 98 Thus, although north Africa had only been conquered about a dozen years previously, the Arabs already employed forces of the defeated Berbers to carry out their next invasion.: 98 This would explain the predominance of Berbers over Arabs in the initial invasion. In addition, Collins argues that Berber social organization made it possible for the Arabs to recruit entire tribal units into their armies, making the defeated Berbers excellent military auxiliaries.: 99 The Berber forces in the invasion of Iberia came from Ifriqiya or as far away as Tripolitania.
Governor As-Samh distributed land to the conquering forces, apparently by tribe, though it is difficult to determine from the few historical sources available.: 48–49 It was at this time that the positions of Arabs and Berbers were regularized across the Iberian peninsula. Berbers were positioned in many of the most mountainous regions of Spain, such as Granada, the Pyrenees, Cantabria, and Galicia. Collins suggests this may be because some Berbers were familiar with mountain terrain, whereas the Arabs were not.: 49–50 By the late 710s, there was a Berber governor in Leon or Gijon.: 149 When Pelagius revolted in Asturias, it was against a Berber governor. This revolt challenged As-Samh's plans to settle Berbers in the Galician and Cantabrian mountains, and by the middle of the eighth century it seems there was no more Berber presence in Galicia.: 49–50 The expulsion of the Berber garrisons from central Asturias, following the battle of Covadonga, contributed to the eventual formation of the independent Asturian kingdom.: 63
Many Berbers were settled in what were then the frontier lands near Toledo, Talavera, and Mérida,: 195 Mérida becoming a major Berber stronghold in the eighth century.: 201 The Berber garrison in Talavera would later be commanded by Amrus ibn Yusuf and was involved in military operations against rebels in Toledo in the late 700s and early 800s.: 210 Berbers were also initially settled in the eastern Pyrenees and Catalonia.: 88–89, 195 They were not settled in the major cities of the south, and were generally kept in the frontier zones away from Cordoba.: 207
Roger Collins cites the work of Pierre Guichard to argue that Berber groups in Iberia retained their own distinctive social organization.: 90 According to this traditional view of Arab and Berber culture in the Iberian peninsula, Berber society was highly impermeable to outside influences, whereas Arabs became assimilated and Hispanized.: 90 Some support for the view that Berbers assimilated less comes from an excavation of an Islamic cemetery in northern Spain, which reveals that the Berbers accompanying the initial invasion brought their families with them from north Africa.
In 731, the eastern Pyrenees were under the control of Berber forces garrisoned in the major towns under the command of Munnuza. Munnuza attempted a Berber uprising against the Arabs in Spain, citing mistreatment of Berbers by Arabic judges in north Africa, and made an alliance with Duke Eudo of Aquitaine. However, governor Abd ar-Rahman attacked Munnuza before he was ready, and, besieging him, defeated him at Cerdanya. Because of the alliance with Munnuza, Abd ar-Rahman wanted to punish Eudo, and his punitive expedition ended in the Arab defeat at Poitiers.: 88–90
By the time of the governor Uqba, and possibly as early as 714, the city of Pamplona was occupied by a Berber garrison.: 205–206 An eighth-century cemetery has been discovered with 190 burials all according to Islamic custom, testifying to the presence of this garrison.: 205–206 In 798, however, Pamplona is recorded as being under a Banu Qasi governor, Mutarrif ibn Musa. Ibn Musa lost control of Pamplona to a popular uprising. In 806 Pamplona gave its allegiance to the Franks, and in 824 became the independent Kingdom of Pamplona. These events put an end to the Berber garrison in Pamplona.: 206–208
Medieval Egyptian historian Al-Hakam wrote that there was a major Berber revolt in north Africa in 740–741, led by Masayra. The Chronicle of 754 calls these rebels Arures, which Collins translates as 'heretics', arguing it is a reference to the Berber rebels' Ibadi or Khariji sympathies.: 107 After Charles Martel attacked Arab ally Maurontus at Marseille in 739, governor Uqba planned a punitive attack against the Franks, but news of a Berber revolt in north Africa made him turn back when he reached Zaragoza.: 92 Instead, according to the Chronicle of 754, Uqba carried out an attack against Berber fortresses in Africa. Initially, these attacks were unsuccessful; but eventually Uqba destroyed the rebels, secured all the crossing points to Spain, and then returned to his governorship.: 105–106
Although Masayra was killed by his own followers, the revolt spread and the Berber rebels defeated three Arab armies.: 106–108 After the defeat of the third army, which included elite units of Syrians commanded by Kulthum and Balj, the Berber revolt spread further. At this time, the Berber military colonies in Spain revolted.: 108 At the same time, Uqba died and was replaced by Ibn Qatan. By this time, the Berbers controlled most of the north of the Iberian peninsula, except for the Ebro valley, and were menacing Toledo. Ibn Qatan invited Balj and his Syrian troops, who were at that time in Ceuta, to cross to the Iberian peninsula to fight against the Berbers.: 109–110
The Berbers marched south in three columns, simultaneously attacking Toledo, Cordoba, and the ports on the Gibraltar strait. However, Ibn Qatan's sons defeated the army attacking Toledo, the governor's forces defeated the attack on Cordoba, and Balj defeated the attack on the strait. After this, Balj seized power by marching on Cordoba and executing Ibn Qatan.: 108 Collins points out that Balj's troops were away from Syria just when the Abbasid revolt against the Umayyads broke out, and this may have contributed to the fall of the Umayyad regime.: 121
In Africa, the Berbers were hampered by divided leadership. Their attack on Kairouan was defeated, and a new governor of Africa, Hanzala ibn Safwan, proceeded to defeat the rebels in Africa and then to impose peace between Balj's troops and the existing Andalusi Arabs.: 110–111
Roger Collins argues that the Great Berber revolt facilitated the establishment of the Kingdom of Asturias and altered the demographics of the Berber population in the Iberian peninsula, specifically contributing to the Berber departure from the northwest of the peninsula.: 150–151 When the Arabs first invaded the peninsula, Berber groups were situated in the northwest. However, due to the Berber revolt, the Umayyad governors were forced to protect their southern flank and were unable to mount an offense against the Asturians. Some presence of Berbers in the northwest may have been maintained at first, but after the 740s there is no more mention of the northwestern Berbers in the sources.: 150–151, 153–154 | https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Berbers |
Saudi Arabia | Education is free at all levels, although higher education is restricted to citizens only. The school system is composed of elementary, intermediate, and secondary schools. Classes are segregated by sex. At the secondary level, students are able to choose from three types of schools: general education, vocational and technical, or religious. The rate of literacy is 99% among males and 96% among females in 2020. Youth literacy rose to approximately 99.5% for both sexes.
Higher education has expanded rapidly, with large numbers of universities and colleges being founded particularly since 2000. Institutions of higher education include King Saud University, the Islamic University at Medina, and the King Abdulaziz University in Jeddah. Princess Norah University is the largest women's university in the world. King Abdullah University of Science and Technology, known as KAUST, is the first mixed-gender university campus in Saudi Arabia and was founded in 2009. Other colleges and universities emphasize curricula in sciences and technology, military studies, religion, and medicine. Institutes devoted to Islamic studies, in particular, abound. Women typically receive college instruction in segregated institutions.
The Academic Ranking of World Universities, known as Shanghai Ranking, ranked five Saudi institutions among its 2022 list of the 500 top universities in the world. The QS World University Rankings lists 14 Saudi universities among the 2022 world's top universities and 23 universities among the top 100 in the Arab world. The 2022 list of U.S. News & World Report Best Global University Ranking ranked King Abdulaziz University among the top 50 universities in the world and King Abdullah University of Science and Technology among the top 100 universities in the world.
In 2018, Saudi Arabia ranked 28th worldwide in terms of high-quality research output according to the scientific journal Nature.
This makes Saudi Arabia the best performing Middle Eastern, Arab, and Muslim country. Saudi Arabia spends 8.8% of its gross domestic product on education, compared with the global average of 4.6%. Saudi Arabia was ranked 48th in the Global Innovation Index in 2023, up from 68th in 2019.
The Saudi education system has been accused of encouraging Islamic terrorism, leading to reform efforts. Following the 9/11 attacks, the government aimed to tackle the twin problems of encouraging extremism and the inadequacy of the country's university education for a modern economy, by slowly modernizing the education system through the "Tatweer" reform programme. The Tatweer programme is reported to have a budget of approximately US$2 billion and focuses on moving teaching away from the traditional Saudi methods of memorization and rote learning towards encouraging students to analyse and problem-solve. It also aims to create an education system which will provide a more secular and vocationally based training.
In 2021, the Washington Post reported on the measures taken by Saudi Arabia to clean textbooks from paragraphs considered antisemitic and sexist. The paragraphs dealing with the punishment of homosexuality or same-sex relations have been deleted, and expressions of admiration for the extremist martyrdom. Antisemitic expressions and calls to fight the Jews became fewer. David Weinberg, director of international affairs for the Anti-Defamation League, said that references to demonizing Jews, Christians, and Shiites have been removed from some places or have toned down. The U.S. State Department expressed in an email that it welcomed the changes. The Saudi Ministry of Foreign Affairs supports a training programme for Saudi teachers. | https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Saudi_Arabia |
Mamluk architecture | Mamluk architecture is distinguished by the construction of multi-functional buildings whose floor plans became increasingly complex due to the limited available space in cities and the desire to make monuments visually dominant in their urban surroundings. Expanding on Fatimid architecture's development of street-adjusted mosque façades, the Mamluks developed their architecture to enhance street vistas, positioning major elements in a deliberate way to be clearly visible by passersby. While the organization of Mamluk-era monuments varied, the funerary dome and minaret were constant themes. These attributes are prominent features in a Mamluk mosque's profile and were significant in the beautification of the city skyline. In Cairo, the funerary dome and minaret were respected as symbols of commemoration and worship. One aspect of Mamluk design was the intentional juxtaposition of the round dome, the vertical minaret, and the tall façade walls of the building, which architects placed in differing arrangements in order to maximize the visual impact of a building in its specific urban environment. Patrons also prioritized the placement of their mausoleum next to both the prayer hall inside and the street outside, so that those walking by or offering prayers could easily see the tomb through the windows.
Mamluk buildings could include a single mausoleum or a small charitable building (e.g. a public drinking fountain), while larger architectural complexes typically combined many functions into one or more buildings. These could include charitable functions and social services, such as a mosque, khanqah (Sufi lodge), madrasa, bimaristan (hospital), maktab or kuttab (elementary school), sabil (kiosk for dispensing free water), or hod (drinking trough for animals); or commercial functions, such as a wikala or khan (a caravanserai to house merchants and their goods) or a rabʿ (a Cairene apartment complex for renters).
Among other developments, during the Mamluk period the cruciform or four-iwan floor plan was adopted for madrasas and became more common for new monumental complexes than the traditional hypostyle mosque, although the vaulted iwans of the early period were replaced with flat-roofed iwans in the later period. Monumental decorated entrance portals became common compared to earlier periods, often carved with muqarnas and covered in other decorative schemes. Vestibule chambers behind these were sometimes covered with ornate vaulted ceilings in stone. The vestibule of the Madrasa of Uljay al-Yusufi (circa 1373) features the first ornate groin vault ceiling of its kind in Mamluk architecture and variations of this feature were repeated in later monuments.
Architectural types and elements | https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Mamluk_architecture |
Shukri al-Quwatli | The growing hardships in the country during the early years of World War I pushed Quwatli to join the secret society of al-Fatat, which was facilitated by his childhood friend and co-founder, Nasib al-Bakri. Al-Fatat was an underground organization established in Paris in 1911 by Arab nationalists with the aim of gaining independence and unity of the various Arab territories in the Ottoman Empire. In 1913, the society established its main branch in Damascus, and was successful in attracting the Syrian elite into its ranks.
In 1915, Sharif Hussein, trying to garner support for his planned uprising against the Ottomans, sent his son Faisal to Damascus to lobby the Syrian notables on his behalf. Faisal, a member of al-Fatat himself, met secretly with other members of the society, including Quwatli, in the house of Nasib al-Bakri. When the Ottoman authorities learned of the meeting, they ordered the arrest of al-Bakri and his two brothers, Fawzi and Sami, accusing them of treason. Quwatli was charged by the al-Fatat leadership with the task of facilitating their escape, in which he succeeded. In retaliation, Ottoman authorities placed him under arrest, in which he was subjected to torture and humiliation. Nevertheless, Quwatli refused to confess to anything, and his captors failed to implicate him in the operation so they released him a month later. The tremendous pressure of that experience, however, took its toll on the young Quwatli, and upon his release he retired to his country house in Saidnaya and stopped all contacts with members of al-Fatat and the opposition.
In late 1916 he was approached by Fasih al-Ayyubi in hope that Quwatli could help him secure an escape route for his ailing father, Shukri al-Ayyubi, who was arrested by the Ottomans, like he did for Nasib al-Bakri. However, despite Quwatli's refusal to help, Ottoman authorities tracked down the contact and arrested both men. Quwatli was subjected to further torture to coerce him to reveal the names of his al-Fatat colleagues. In an attempt to prevent himself from surrendering the names, Quwatli tried to commit suicide. After cutting his wrists, Quwatli's life was saved at the last minute by fellow inmate, al-Fatat member and practicing doctor, Ahmad Qadri. He spent four more months in jail, before being released on bail by his relative, Shafiq al-Quwatli, who served as a deputy at the Ottoman Parliament, on 28 January 1917. His experience in jail and the story about his attempted suicide turned Quwatli into a nationalist hero in Syria. | https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Shukri_al-Quwatli |
BRICS | In 2012, Hu Jintao, the then General Secretary of the Chinese Communist Party and President of China, described the BRICS countries as defenders and promoters of developing countries and a force for world peace. Western analysts have highlighted potential divisions and weaknesses in the grouping, including significant economic instabilities, disagreements among the members over the UN Security Council reform, and India and China's disputes over territorial issues.
On 9 April 2013, Isobel Coleman, director of the Civil Society, Markets, and Democracy Program at the American think tank Council on Foreign Relations, and later U.S. representative to the UN, claimed that the BRICS members share a lack of consensus. They uphold drastically different political systems, from a vibrant democracy in Brazil to entrenched oligarchy in Russia, and their economies are little integrated and are different in size by orders of magnitude. She also claimed that the significant difference in GDP influences the reserves: China accounts for over 41% of the contribution, which in turn leads to its bigger political say within the association.
In 2014, the Indian Marxist author Vijay Prashad raised the limitations of the BRICS as a political and economic "locomotive of the South" because they follow neoliberal policies. They have established neither new counter-balancing institutions nor come up with an alternative ideology. Furthermore, the BRICS project, argues Prashad, cannot challenge the primacy of the United States and NATO.
A multi-year study at Tufts University published in July 2023 found that the "common portrayal of BRICS as a China-dominated group primarily pursuing anti-U.S. agendas" was misplaced. The study asserted: "The BRICS countries connect around common development interests and a quest for a multipolar world order in which no single power dominates. Yet BRICS consolidation has turned the group into a potent negotiation force that now challenges Washington's geopolitical and economic goals".
After the August 2023 BRICS Summit, Con Coughlin—defense and foreign affairs editor at The Daily Telegraph—claimed "the challenge BRICS presents to the established world order seems destined to failure" and accused the organization of being used by China as a vehicle for expanding its global influence. Coughlin also noted the contradictions within the organization, such as the border dispute between China and India, and called for greater Western engagement with India as part of a new strategic alliance.
According to the Atlantic Council's Thomas Hill in December 2023, the de-dollarization efforts within BRICS, particularly in North Africa, present a significant challenge to US interests. The inclusion of Egypt and the enthusiasm in Algiers and Tunis suggest that North African states may actively support BRICS's priority of de-dollarization. This poses a threat to the US, as a coordinated de-dollarization effort in the region could diminish American influence and impact existing trade agreements. The expansion of BRICS raises concerns for US policymakers, given the group's commitment to global de-dollarization, which aims to replace the dollar with the "R5" or "the renminbi, ruble, rupee, real, and rand", or with other multilateral central bank digital currency (CBDC) as the new global currency. This shift could limit the US's ability to run deficits and maintain low interest rates. Moreover, de-dollarization would undermine the effectiveness of US sanctions, relying on the SWIFT system, as BRICS seeks alternative financial systems, potentially making SWIFT obsolete.
According to a Gallup International poll conducted between October and December 2023, almost a third of people around the world had never heard of BRICS but Western countries were much more negative towards the alliance than elsewhere. The most negative attitudes were found in Sweden (45%), Spain (30%), the USA (30%), Portugal (29%), and Ukraine (29%) while the most positive net attitudes were in Russia (38%), Iran (37%), Nigeria (36%), Saudi Arabia (33%) and Malaysia (32%). In India, 36% had a positive view of BRICS while 29% had a negative view. | https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/BRICS |
Harem | The harem system that developed in the Umayyad and Abbasid Caliphates was reproduced by the Islamic realms developing from them, such as in the Emirates and Caliphates in Muslim Spain, Al-Andalus, which attracted a lot of attention in Europe during the Middle Ages until the Emirate of Granada was conquered in 1492.
The most famous of the Andalusian harems was perhaps the harem of the Caliph of Cordoba. Except for the female relatives of the Caliph, the harem women consisted of his slave concubines. The slaves of the Caliph were often European saqaliba slaves trafficked from Northern or Eastern Europe. While male saqaliba could be given work in a number offices such as: in the kitchen, falconry, mint, textile workshops, the administration or the royal guard (in the case of harem guards, they were castrated), but female saqaliba were placed in the harem.
The harem could contain thousands of slave concubines; the harem of Abd al-Rahman I consisted of 6,300 women. The saqaliba concubines were appreciated for their light skin. The concubines (jawaris) were educated in accomplishments to make them attractive and useful for their master, and many became known and respected for their knowledge in a variety of subjects from music to medicine.
A jawaris concubine who gave birth to a child attained the status of an umm walad, and a favorite concubine was given great luxury and honorary titles such as in the case of Marjan, who gave birth to al-Hakam II, the heir of Abd al-Rahman III; he called her al-sayyida al-kubra (great lady).
Several concubines were known to have had great influence through their masters or their sons, notably Subh during the Caliphate of Cordoba, and Isabel de Solís during the Emirate of Granada.
However, concubines were always slaves subjected the will of their master. Caliph Abd al-Rahman III is known to have executed two concubines for reciting what he saw as inappropriate verses, and tortured another concubine with a burning candle in her face while she was held by two eunuchs after she refused sexual intercourse.
The concubines of Abu Marwan al-Tubni (d. 1065) were reportedly so badly treated that they conspired to murder him; women of the harem were also known to have been subjected to rape when rivaling factions conquered different palaces. | https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Harem |
Dubai | The school system in Dubai follows that of the United Arab Emirates. As of 2009, there are 79 public schools run by the Ministry of Education that serve Emiratis and expatriate Arab people as well as 207 private schools. The medium of instruction in public schools is Arabic with emphasis on English as a second language, while most of the private schools use English as their medium of instruction. Currently only the Swiss International Scientific School in Dubai claims to offer parallel streams in different languages – bi-lingual English/French or English/German. Most private schools cater to one or more expatriate communities.
Some 36 schools offer an international education using the one or more of the four International Baccalaureate Programmes for students aged 3–19. Currently, 15 schools have introduced the IB Career-related Programme that can be combined with a vocational qualification such as a BTEC.
While there are more UK-curriculum-based schools in Dubai than any other, more students attend an Indian-curriculum school, which tend to be considerably larger, and cost less to attend. There are 34 Indian-curriculum schools in the emirate, most of which offer the CBSE, and just a handful the Indian Certificate of Secondary Education (ICSE) Indian syllabus. Examples of Indian-curriculum schools include IHS, DPS, DMHS. There are a small number of Pakistani schools offering the FBISE curriculum for expatriate children in Dubai.
A total of 18 schools offer British primary education up to the age of 11. There are 64 schools that offer a variation of a UK curriculum style secondary education, either a pure GCSE and A-Level offering, or increasingly I/GCSE up to 16, and then the IB Diploma post-16. Currently, no school in the UAE offers the choice of IB or A-Level at 16, but several schools have said they will do so in the future. British style eleven-to-eighteen secondary schools offering General Certificate of Secondary Education and A-Levels include Dubai College, Dubai British School, English Language School Pvt. Some schools, such as The American School of Dubai, also offer the curriculum of the United States.
Dubai has a very active education regulator, the KHDA, which is best known for its school ratings, but actually has a wide mandate when it comes to school improvement in the emirate. Its inspections truly matter, and there is no doubt that school quality has improved as a result of its implementation. A total of 17 schools are currently rated Outstanding (2020), and a further 40 rated Very Good. Parents in general rate schools highly.
The top 10 largest universities by student numbers in Dubai according to the KHDA (2024) are Middlesex University Dubai, Heriot-Watt University Dubai, University of Wollongong in Dubai, Manipal Academy of Higher Education, Dubai, American University in Dubai, S P Jain School of Global Management, Rochester Institute of Technology of Dubai, Amity University Dubai, University of Birmingham Dubai and Birla Institute of Technology and Science Pilani Dubai. They offer courses in all major subjects with the most popular subject areas being Business, followed by Information Technology, then Engineering. Most Universities in Dubai are located in the two Educational Zones (Knowledge Village or Academic City). In 2013 Synergy University Dubai Campus opened its campus in Jumeirah Lakes Towers being a first University in Dubai to be located outside of Educational Zones (Knowledge Village or Academic City).
Only 4 Dubai Universities are present in the QS World University Rankings 2024/2025. To allow the assessment of more UAE Universities, the Ministry of Education launched The National Higher Education Institutions Classification Framework which classifies UAE Universities based on their research and teaching. Of the top 10 largest Dubai universities University of Wollongong in Dubai, American University in Dubai, and Rochester Institute of Technology of Dubai, were all classified as "Very Good" within The National Higher Education Institutions Classification Framework. | https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Dubai |
Naskh (tafsir) | Two theories have been proposed to deal with contradictory commands of revelation without the chronology of verses and the abrogation of earlier ayat in favor of later ones:
Abrogation of (later) Medinan verses, not earlier ones
The Quran has been divided by scholars into those verses revealed while Muhammad was in Mecca (the Meccan surah) preaching to develop a following, and those revealed after he left Mecca to govern the city of Medina (the Medinan surah). Sudanese Islamic scholar Mahmoud Mohammed Taha has advanced the idea that the Meccan surah contain "the basic and pure doctrine of Islam", and should form the "basis of the legislation" for modern society. These Meccan verses give more prominence to the position of women and praise other prophets and their communities — i.e. Jews and Christians. Taha argues that the Medinan surah, though revealed later in the mission of Muhammad, are not corrections of Meccan revelations but contain specialized commands/doctrine, "compromises" for the political climate, which while appropriate for their time are not eternal and are not necessarily appropriate for the 20th or 21st century.
Replace abrogation with application of commands according to circumstances
Ahmad Hasan argues that since the Quran is valid for eternity, the solution to any contradictions found within it is not to abrogate earlier verses, but to recognize that Qur'anic revelations varied to keep "pace with the changing conditions and environment" and must be studied and applied to their "historical context". In the case of the Meccan surahs that ask "Muslims to be patient and to tolerate the aggression of the infidels" (for example: Q.2:109; Q.6:106; Q10:109; Q15:85; Q29:46), and which conflict with the Medinan Sword Verse (Q.9:5) that calls on Muslims to attack "the infidels and kill them wherever they are found"; neither is a pure/basic doctrine, nor a temporary tactic. The Meccan surahs were revealed when the Muslims were/are weak and could not retaliate against aggression, Medinan surahs when Muslim were/are strong. The proper command to implement is the one for "conditions similar to those in which they were revealed" — apply the Sword Verse when Muslims are strong, the earlier verses when they are not. Mohammed al-Ghazali also states, "There is no contradiction in the Qur'an whatsoever, for every verse has a context within which it functions. ... He, the Legislator who knows the conditions in which the verses may be applied, and it is in this manner that the Qur'anic verses are to be considered in light of the state of human affairs — with wisdom and exhortation."
In their rejection of the theory of naskh the Ahmadiyya also argue that a ruling is considered valid not because it was revealed after any other on a given subject, but because it is most suited to the situation at hand. Ahmadiyya believe all Qur'anic verses have equal validity, in keeping with their emphasis on the "unsurpassable beauty and unquestionable validity of the Qur'ān", but in Ahmadī fiqh rulings apply to the specific situation for which a verse/hadith was revealed | https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Naskh_(tafsir) |
United Nations Security Council Resolution 1701 | Israel says that Hezbollah routinely violates the resolution by bringing its forces south of the Litani River, sometimes to the border with Israel. In 2018, the Israeli Defence Force uncovered miles of underground Hezbollah tunnels into Israel from Southern Lebanon. Hezbollah leader Hassan Nasrallah said "Part of our plan in the next war is to enter into Galilee, a part of our plan we are capable of, God willing. The important thing is that we have this capability and we have had it for years".
As of February 2009, many key points in the resolution remained insufficiently addressed. In a special report, United Nations Secretary-General Ban Ki-Moon mentions that "Hezbollah continues to refuse to provide any information on the release or fate of abducted soldiers, and places conditions and demands for the release that are far outside the scope of resolution 1701," Ban wrote in the report. The report also points out that Hezbollah has replenished its stock of rockets and missiles in South Lebanon, and is now in possession of 10,000 long-range rockets and 20,000 short-range projectiles. The latest Israeli estimate of Hezbollah's rocket stockpile puts it at approx. 150,000.
The United Nations has been criticised for failing to implement Resolution 1701 and its failure to dismantle or disarm Hezbollah and for failing to prevent it from deploying forces south of the Litani river per Resolution 1701. According to one analyst, "since 2006, Hezbollah has instead fortified southern Lebanon, particularly towns and villages along the 120-kilometer-long (about 75-mile-long) demarcation line. It has built unauthorized firing ranges, stocked rockets in civilian infrastructure, built tunnels into Israel, and repeatedly stopped UNIFIL from accessing certain areas." Since the 7 October Hamas massacre in Israel, Hezbollah has continued to fire hundreds of rockets into civilian areas of Northern Israel. Approx. 300,000 Israeli civilians have been internally displaced and forced to flee south as a consequence of the bombardment and more than 2,000 civilian buildings destroyed by Hezbollah rockets.
Israel has since killed a number of senior Hezbollah officials south of the Litani river, including Taleb Abdullah on 11 June 2024, a senior Hezbollah commander operating in South Lebanon between the Litani River and the border with Israel. | https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/United_Nations_Security_Council_Resolution_1701 |
Yazidis | Towards the end of the 19th century, the Ottoman policies towards Yezidis gained a new dimension under the reign of Abdulhamid II, under whose regime the Muslim Identity became increasingly essential for the Sultan's perceptions of loyalty among his subjects. As missionary activity and nationalism among non-Muslim groups was on the rise, conversion to Islam in order to ensure their political loyalty was crucial in the perspective of Abdulhamid's government. Conscription was one of the steps taken in order to convert them. Thereafter, Yezidis would be subject to persecution from Omer Wehbi Pasha, who had been sent to Mosul by the Sultan for a task involving institutionalization of a conscription system, collection of taxes, resettlement of tribes, and crushing local tribal rebellions. He took the initiative of completing his tasks through violence due to the lack of cooperation from Yezidis. Around 500 Yezidis died in the Shingal campaign of November–December 1892, Lalish was forcibly converted into a madrasah, sacred objects of the Yezidis were confiscated, mosques built in Yezidi villages and the Yezidi Mir Mirza Beg was provoked into converting to Islam. However, in contrast to the expectations of Ottomans, the campaign of the Pasha had crucial influence in setting a widespread religious revival in motion at Shingal. Yezidi refugees fleeing from Sheikhan, including both the commoners and the clergy, took shelter on Shingal mountain and their stories about the atrocities in Sheikhan that were committed by Muslims facilitated the vigoruous millenarian and anti-Muslim propaganda that were carried out by two religious personalities from Sheikhan who had settled in Shingal, Mirza al-Kabari and Alias Khallu. Slogans about an imminent and new Yezidi reign of justice and prosperity against Muslim oppression were successful in mobilizing large sections of the local Yezidi populace. This prompted Omar Wehbi Pasha to launch an unsuccessful intervention in Shingal, which resulted in the faqir, Hemoyê Shero, who had earlier declared himself the Paramount of Shingal, together with his followers becoming the focus of anti-Muslim resistance and increasing their military capacity by seizing a huge amount of Turkish armaments and ammunition which would be a determining factor in World War I.
In the following years, a dispute occurred among the community on the mountain, causing the power of Musqura and Mihirkan tribes to deteriorate as they included large Muslim sections and were thus traditionally viewed with the suspicion of being inclined to insitage Ottoman interference in the Shingali affairs. On 9 December 1892, Sultan Abdulhamid sent a telegram in which he dismissed Omar Wehbi Pasha from his post and ordered him to remain in Mosul, pending arrival of a commission of inquiry and to be prepared to answer the charges of using Ottoman troops in combat without being given permission by the Ministry of War. Four months later the Pasha returned to the capital in disgrace. Yezidis finally regained the possession of Lalish in 1904, and the stolen sacred objects were returned to them in 1914.
As Hemoye Shero had acquired the Paramountcy of Sinjar, his followers drastically increased in numbers and they began to serve as a compact and organized group which started to be named as the Fuqara tribe. Among the Fuqara, tribal cohesion very much depended on membership in the faqir religious class to which all the male members of the tribe belonged.
At the Tur Abdin foothills west of Shingal, Hasan Kanjo, a Yezidi chieftain, converted to Islam and joined the Hamidiye together with his tribe. He later became the right-hand man and lieutenant of Ibrahim Pasha, the powerful chieftain of Milan confederacy and highly regarded by the Sultan Abdulhamid. Hasan Kanjo built a fortress at Haleli, east of Viranşehir, to serve as a base for fighting the desert Arab tribes including the Shammar. Members of his tribe had been allowed to keep their Yezidi faith and were camped around the fortress.
In Mosul, a new Governor by the name of Aziz Pasha was appointed; he had arranged a peace settlement in Shingal and allowed Yezidis of Sheikhan to practice their religion again. The Yezidi Mir, Mirza Beg, among other prominent converts to Islam, resumed their old faith. However, the price for these compromises was enforcement of military service, continuance of the Islamic schools in the settlements on a voluntary basis and the surrender of the Lalish sanctuary to Muslim dervishes, who had established a retreat there and operated an Islamic school. Lalish would later be largely abandoned and left in ruins, with reports of overgrowth of nettles and shrubbery in places where the roofs had fallen in, and the dome above Sheikh Adi's mausoleum smashed, allowing the sun to shine inside, until Yezidis would rebuild and regain the possession of the sanctuary in 1904. | https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Yazidis |
Jair Bolsonaro | Brazil has the world's largest tropical rainforest in the Amazon basin. According to The Washington Post, "Bolsonaro is a powerful supporter of agribusiness ... and is likely to favor profits over preservation. ... Bolsonaro has chafed at foreign pressure to safeguard the Amazon rainforest, and he served notice to international nonprofit groups such as the World Wide Fund for Nature that he will not tolerate their agendas in Brazil. He has also come out strongly against lands reserved for indigenous tribes. Bolsonaro advisers additionally say that he plans to expand nuclear and hydroelectric power into the Amazon."
Bolsonaro rejects the scientific consensus on climate change. He repeatedly threatened to withdraw from the Paris Agreement during his campaign. Even before taking office, he backed out of Brazil's offer to host the 2019 UN Climate Change Conference. Ernesto Araújo, the new Minister of Foreign Affairs appointed by Bolsonaro, has called global warming a plot by "cultural Marxists", and eliminated the Climate Change Division of the ministry. Two departments of the Ministry of the Environment dealing with climate change in Brazil and mitigation and one dealing with deforestation were also eliminated.
In April 2019, the American Museum of Natural History canceled an event honoring Bolsonaro after facing heavy public criticism, including from New York Mayor Bill de Blasio. The museum's directorate justified its decision in a statement, "With mutual respect for the work and goals of our organizations, we jointly agreed that the Museum is not the optimal location for the Brazilian-Am. Chamber of Commerce gala dinner. This traditional event will go forward at another location on the original date and time." Bolsonaro supported plans to open the Reserva Nacional do Cobre e Associados (Renca) Amazonian reserve in Brazil's northern states of Pará and Amapá to commercial mining.
Destruction of the Amazon rainforest increased by 88% for the month of June 2019, during Bolsonaro's first year as president, as compared with the previous year, according to the National Institute for Space Research (INPE). Bolsonaro rejected the agency's data as false. The INPE director was fired after he rebutted Bolsonaro's criticism of the institute. The Bolsonaro administration decreased government efforts to combat illegal logging, ranching and mining in the Amazon. Government enforcement actions such as fines, warnings and the confiscation or destruction of illegal equipment in protected areas decreased by 20% in the first half of 2018 compared to the first half of 2017.
His damage to the Amazon has widely been described by indigenous groups, human rights groups, politicians, academics and journalists as an ecocide and a genocide. Indigenous chiefs and human rights organizations have submitted an Article 15 communication to the International Criminal Court for crimes against humanity and genocide for harm to Indigenous people and destruction of the Amazon. Another has been submitted for ecocide by indigenous chiefs. | https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Jair_Bolsonaro |
Ancient Carthage | Since at least the reign of Mago I in the early sixth century BC, Carthage regularly utilized its military to advance its commercial and strategic interests. According to Polybius, Carthage relied heavily, though not exclusively, on foreign mercenaries, especially in overseas warfare. Modern historians regard this as an oversimplification, as many foreign troops were actually auxiliaries from allied or client states, provided through formal agreements, tributary obligations, or military pacts. The Carthaginians maintained close relations, sometimes through political marriages, with the rulers of various tribes and kingdoms, most notably the Numidians (based in modern northern Algeria). These leaders would in turn provide their respective contingent of forces, sometimes even leading them in Carthaginian campaigns. In any event, Carthage leveraged its vast wealth and hegemony to help fill the ranks of its military.
Contrary to popular belief, especially among the more martial Greeks and Romans, Carthage did utilize citizen soldiers—i.e., ethnic Punics/Phoenicians—particularly during the Sicilian Wars. Moreover, like their Greco-Roman contemporaries, the Carthaginians respected "military valour", with Aristotle reporting the practice of citizens wearing armbands to signify their combat experience. Greek observers also described the "Sacred Band of Carthage", a Hellenistic term for professional citizen soldiers who fought in Sicily in the mid fourth century BC. However, after this force was destroyed by Agathocles in 310 BC, foreign mercenaries and auxiliaries formed a more significant part of the army. This indicates that the Carthaginians had a capacity to adapt their military as circumstances required; when larger or more specialized forces were needed, such as during the Punic Wars, they would employ mercenaries or auxiliaries accordingly. Carthaginian citizens would be enlisted in large numbers only by necessity, such as for the pivotal Battle of Zama in the Second Punic War, or in the final siege of the city in the Third Punic War.
The core of the Carthaginian army was always from its own territory in Northwest Africa, namely ethnic Libyans, Numidians, and "Liby-Phoenicians", a broad label that included ethnic Phoenicians, those of mixed Punic-North African descent, and Libyans who had integrated into Phoenician culture. These troops were supported by mercenaries from different ethnic groups and geographic locations across the Mediterranean, who fought in their own national units. For instance, Celts, Balearics, and Iberians were recruited in significant numbers to fight in Sicily. Greek mercenaries, who were highly valued for their skill, were hired for the Sicilian campaigns. Carthage employed Iberian troops long before the Punic Wars; Herodotus and Alcibiades both describe the fighting capabilities of the Iberians among the western Mediterranean mercenaries. Later, after the Barcids conquered large portions of Iberia (modern Spain and Portugal), Iberians came to form an even greater part of the Carthaginian forces, albeit based more on their loyalty to the Barcid faction than to Carthage itself. The Carthaginians also fielded slingers, soldiers armed with straps of cloth used to toss small stones at high speeds; for this they often recruited Balearic Islanders, who were reputed for their accuracy.
The uniquely diverse makeup of Carthage's army, particularly during the Second Punic War, was noteworthy to the Romans; Livy characterized Hannibal's army as a "hotch-potch of the riff-raff of all nationalities". He also observed that the Carthaginians, at least under Hannibal, never forced any uniformity upon their disparate forces, which nonetheless had such a high degree of unity that they "never quarreled amongst themselves nor mutinied", even during difficult circumstances. Punic officers at all levels maintained some degree of unity and coordination among these otherwise disparate forces. They also dealt with the challenge of ensuring military commands were properly communicated and translated to their respective foreign troops.
Carthage used the diversity of its forces to its own advantage, capitalizing on the particular strengths or capabilities of each nationality. Celts and Iberians were often utilized as shock troops, North Africans as cavalry, and Campanians from southern Italy as heavy infantry. Moreover, these units would typically be deployed to nonnative lands, which ensured they had no affinity for their opponents and could surprise them with unfamiliar tactics. For example, Hannibal used Iberians and Gauls (from what is today France) for campaigns in Italy and Africa.
Carthage seems to have fielded a formidable cavalry force, especially in its Northwest African homeland; a significant part of it was composed of light Numidian cavalry, who were considered "by far the best horsemen in Africa". Their speed and agility proved pivotal to several Carthaginian victories, most notably the Battle of Trebia, the first major action in the Second Punic War. The reputation and effectiveness of Numidian cavalry was such that the Romans utilized a contingent of their own in the decisive Battle of Zama, where they reportedly "turned the scales" in Rome's favor. Polybius suggests that cavalry remained the force in which Carthaginian citizens were most represented following the shift to mostly foreign troops after the third century BC.
Owing to Hannibal's campaigns in the Second Punic War, Carthage is perhaps best remembered for its use of the now extinct North African elephant, which was specially trained for warfare and, among other uses, was commonly utilized for frontal assaults or as anticavalry protection. An army could field up to several hundred of these animals, but on most reported occasions fewer than a hundred were deployed. The riders of these elephants were armed with a spike and hammer to kill the elephants, in case they charged toward their own army.
During the sixth century BC, Carthaginian generals became a distinct political office known in Punic as rb mhnt, or rab mahanet. Unlike in other ancient societies. Carthage maintained a separation of military and political power, with generals either appointed by the administration or elected by citizens. Generals did not serve fixed terms but were usually selected based on the length or scale of a war. Initially, the generalship was apparently occupied by two separate but equal offices, such as an army commander and an admiral; by the mid third century, military campaigns were usually carried out by a supreme commander and a deputy. During the Second Punic War, Hannibal appears to have exercised total control over all military affairs, and had up to seven subordinate generals divided along different theaters of war. | https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ancient_Carthage |
Avempace | Ibn Bajja, also known as Avempace, was an important Islamic philosopher, among his many other trades. In his time, he was seen as a controversial figure, receiving criticism from his peers like Ibn Tufayl. However, he was also respected by his peers and even his critics. While Ibn Tufayl was noted for criticizing Ibn Bajjah's work, he also described him as having one of the sharpest minds with one of the soundest reasoning as compared to the others following the first generation of speakers.
Around his time, Islamic philosophy, and the post-hellenic world, was mainly divided into two opposing branches of thoughts. The Eastern branch, which was led by Ibn Sina, known as Avicenna in Latin, and the Western branch, which was led by Ibn Bajjah. Avempace's work in philosophy is seen as uneven and mostly incomplete, but what parts of his work that survive to this day demonstrates originality in his thought process. His main philosophical work is the unfinished politico-ethical treatise Governance of the Solitary.
Upon his unplanned trip to Egypt, Avempace wrote Risālat al-wadāʿ (Letter of Bidding Farewell) and Risālat al-ittiṣāl al-ʿaql bi al-insān (Letter on the Union of the Intellect with Human Beings) that were dedicated to Ibn al-Imām. His famous works included Tadbīr al-mutawaḥḥid (Management of the Solitary), the Kitāb al-nafs (Book on the Soul), and the Risāla fī l-Ghāya al-insāniyya (Treatise on the Objective of Human Beings). The reflections of his famous accomplishments show how these were written near the end of his life. He was inspired based on Aristotelian line. In Avempace's philosophy, it contains two key pillars, solitude and conjunction. Solitude represents the isolation philosopher commonly seeks in order to protect himself from the corruption of society and conjunction refers to the philosopher's quest for the lowest celestial intelligence. It is required for the human soul's development.
These works are tough to understand. Nevertheless, Risālat al-ittiṣāl has interpreted the introduction. The treatise stated the overall point of Avempace's thinking:"The ultimate end of man, namely the contemplation of truth, with the active intellect joining the human intellect in a contemplative and almost mystic way."However, the most important idea from Avempace's system was not mentioned in the treatise, "how the union of the active intellect with man occurs, which is the ultimate goal being pursued by the solitary."
From his writings, Ibn Bajjah has been shown to take a liking to Plato's contribution to philosophy. Ibn Bajjah, in particular, takes from Plato's idea of the necessary connection between man and city with a bit of a twist. Plato's idea was to model the perfect city after the human soul. On the other hand, Avempace wanted to use the perfect city as a model for the human soul. Avempace imagines the perfect city as a place that is free of any beliefs or opinions that are in opposition of the truth and where true science reigns supreme. Any man or idea that contradicts these true beliefs are defined as "weeds." Weeds are only to be found in imperfect cities.
Avempace also wrote on the health of a perfect man. He alluded to the idea that the perfect man does not just require physical health, but spiritual health too. Avempace goes into more detail about the soul, which he describes of having both an acquired intellect, as well as an active intellect. The active intellect has no basis coming from the physical world. Acquired intellect, however, is a result of experiences from the material world. The perfect man can exist in either a perfect city or a non-perfect city. However, if a perfect man lives in a non-perfect city, he believes that they are to remain apart from the rest of the society. This is because a non-perfect city is full of weeds. In order for a perfect person to preserve themselves from the weeds, they need to live in solitude despite living in solitude being against human nature.
In addition, Avempace had changed forgotten non-syllogistic arts into “practical arts”, and wrote:"If some of them [the practical arts] employ syllogisms as medicine and agriculture do, they are not called syllogistic because their purpose is not [to convince another] nor to employ syllogisms, but to do some activity."He wrote nine medical treatises. Galen inscribed commentary on Hippocrates’ Aphorisms in “Commentary on Aphorisms” that includes Avempace's view about medicine. Medical syllogisms are revolved by means of experience. Experience is obtained in a person's life time through perception. Avempace defines experience:"As man's reliance on perception to know particular [aspects, juz’iyyat] of some matter so that some science results from this perception.Experience is said in general and in particular. If it is said in general, it points out that perception intents knowing particular [aspects] of a matter, from which a universal proposition results. The particular [instances] may take place either by man's will or naturally."Avempace considers experience as the second essential part of medicine. Avempace's theoretic system sketched out all reality. Reality comes in many forms that includes motion and action. Avempace categorizes them between natural and artificial. Natural reality forms move bodies with power while bodies within artificial reality forms are unintentionally moved. It also show how the body is viewed.“Art (sina‛a) is the elaborated form abstracted from matter; it is abstracted from its matter. The artificial form which exists in its matter does not have any power to move that which is in it nor to move something else. This is the difference between artificial and natural forms."This example also represents the use of motion:“If there is a house, there is a foundation by necessity, and this kind of necessity is a relationship between the causes of the existing [object] and the final [cause]. If [the final cause] is described, the various kinds of the causes follow it by necessity, and the form acts in a similar way.If the form is the final [cause] of a motion, motion follows it by necessity, and it is something evident because, if there is building activity, there will be a house, and if there is building, there is the art of construction, but if there is only the art of construction, there will be no building. If [form] is acquired ‘by design,’ the other causes result in an orderly way from the final cause by necessity.”This shows as human involvement is design. Absolute necessity reigns over the heavens. Avempace views necessity into three kinds: absolute, design, and material. Avempace demonstrates the moon eclipses using absolute necessity over time. Based on the relations of the moon eclipses, Avempace indicates “possibility shares necessity”. He defines the body as an artificial collection of matter, which acts as an instrument for the soul to work through. In doing so, he establishes the soul as an autonomous subject. Avempace believes that the human soul has three stages. It starts in the plant stage, then to the animal stage, and finally to human stage. Each stage has an important attribute that the soul grows from. The plant life is where the soul is provided with nourishment and growth. In the animal stage, the soul is introduced to sensations. When the soul moves to the human state, the soul gains common sense, imagination, and memory. Additionally, Avempace writes that the soul is geometrically formless. Because its form is beyond our understanding of geometric shapes, he states, it exists on a plane higher than that which we perceive with our bodies. Avempace is said to have been influenced by Platonic and Aristotelian views on the subject. He credits Plato with the theory of the soul as a substance:"Since it was clear to Plato that the soul is assigned to substance, and that substance is predicated on the form and matter which is body, and that the soul cannot be said to be a body, he fervently defined the soul in its particular aspect. Since he had established that the forms of spheres are souls, he looked for the commonality of all [souls], and found that sense perception is particular to animals, [but] that movement is particular to all, and therefore he defined the soul as “something which moves itself."
Avempace also describes four types of Intelligible forms. They are described as bodies that have an eternal circular motion, an acquired intellect, those with external senses, and those with internal senses. These ideas are consistent with Aristotle's descriptions of the soul and its properties in his treatise De Anima, though there is speculation that there were no Arabic transcriptions available to Avempace.
Avempace, known as "Ibn al-Sa’igh" by Jewish tradition, is rarely recognized for his philosophical and astronomical works that influenced and were employed by many Medieval Jewish philosophers during and after his short life. The first record of Avempace's influence on Jewish philosophy comes from a well-known Jewish contemporary author and philosopher: Judah Halevi. In Chapter 1 of his greatest philosophical work, The Kuzari, Halevi summarizes three ideas directly influenced by works of Ibn Bajja: one's unification with the Active Intellect is attainable during their lifetime, this unification implies cognitive identity with others who are aware of the truth, and a philosopher's life is a solitary regimen.
The renowned polymath and Jewish philosopher, Maimonides, was possibly born in the same year of Avempace's death, yet he preserved and studied the works of the deceased Andalusian. Maimonides admired Avempace for his achievements, stating that "[Ibn Bajja] was a great and wise philosopher, and all of his works are right and correct". Maimonides also valued Ibn Bajja's commentary on Aristotle's works on astronomy. In one of his three major works, The Guide for the Perplexed, Maimonides assesses Hebrew Bible theology with Aristotelian philosophy, directly drawing influence from Ibn Bajja philosophical and scientific ideas. Specifically incorporating Avempace's philosophies regarding the existence of a single intellect after death, the union of man with the Active Intellect, the division of man into three classes of increasing consciousness, and the proposal of the prophet as an ideal solitary man.
Avempace rejects that feeling ultimate pleasure comes from witnessing the divine world internally. For Avempace, the highest form of spiritual happiness comes from science and the truth. Science allows for the truth to be discovered. As a result, in order to be spiritually healthy and, therefore, happy, we must obtain knowledge and search for the truth.
Despite all the ideas that have been presented by Avempace, a central theory was never actually developed. He attributed this to being a very busy man and having his hands in a variety of a fields. | https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Avempace |
Syrian opposition | Syria has been an independent republic since 1946 after the expulsion of the French forces. For decades, the country was partially stable with a series of coups until the Ba'ath Party seized power in Syria in 1963 after a coup d'état. The head of state since 1971 has been a member of the Assad dynasty, beginning with Hafez al-Assad (1971–2000). Syria was under emergency law from the time of the 1963 Syrian coup d'état until 21 April 2011, when it was rescinded by Bashar al-Assad, Hafez's eldest surviving son and the current President of Syria.
The rule of Assad dynasty was marked by heavy repression of secular opposition factions such as the Arab nationalist Nasserists and liberal democrats. The biggest organised resistance to the Ba’athist rule has been the Syrian Muslim Brotherhood; which successfully capitalised on the widespread Sunni resentment against the Alawite hegemony. Syrian Ikhwan was inspired by the Syrian Salafiyya movement led by Muhammad Rashid Rida, an influential Sunni Islamic theologian who is respected as their Imam. In line with the teachings of Rashid Rida, the Muslim Brotherhood advocates the replacement of the Ba’ath party rule with an Islamic state led by an Emir elected by qualified Muslim delegates known as Ahl al-Hall wa-al-‘Aqd. The Islamic government should implement laws based on sharia (Islamic law) with the assistance of ulema who are to be consulted on solving contemporary challenges. The power of the ruler is also to be checked by the provisions laid out in an Islamic constitution through shura (consultation) with the Ahl al-Hall wa-al-‘Aqd. Assad regime introduced Law No. 49 in 1980 which banned the movement and instituted death penalty of anyone accused of membership in the Brotherhood. In response, the Syrian Islamic Front was established the same year to topple the Assadist military dictatorship through an armed revolution. The Front got widespread support from the traditional Sunni ulema and the conservative population; enabling the Syrian Ikhwan al-Muslimeen to rise as the most powerful opposition force by the 1980s.
As the revolutionary wave commonly referred to as the Arab Spring began to take shape in early 2011, Syrian protesters began consolidating opposition councils. | https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Syrian_opposition |
Islam in China | In Chinese, a mosque is called qīngzhēn sì (清真寺) or "pure truth temple". The Huaisheng Mosque and Great Mosque of Xi'an (first established during the Tang era) and the Great Southern Mosque in Jinan, whose current buildings date from the Ming dynasty, do not replicate many of the features often associated with traditional mosques. Instead, they follow traditional Chinese architecture. Mosques in western China incorporate more of the elements seen in mosques in other parts of the world. Western Chinese mosques were more likely to incorporate minarets and domes while eastern Chinese mosques were more likely to look like pagodas.
An important feature in Chinese architecture is its emphasis on symmetry, which connotes a sense of grandeur; this applies to everything from palaces to mosques. One notable exception is in the design of gardens, which tends to be as asymmetrical as possible. Like Chinese scroll paintings, the principle underlying the garden's composition is to create enduring flow; to let the patron wander and enjoy the garden without prescription, as in nature herself. The Qingjing Mosque was built in 1009.
On the foothills of Mount Lingshan are the tombs of two of the four companions that Muhammad sent eastwards to preach Islam. Known as the "Holy Tombs", they house the companions Sa-Ke-Zu and Wu-Ko-Shun—their Chinese names, of course. The other two companions went to Guangzhou and Yangzhou.
As in all regions the Chinese Islamic architecture reflects the local architecture resembling temples in its style. However, in western China the mosques resemble those of the middle east, with tall, slender minarets, curvy arches and dome shaped roofs. In northwest China where the Chinese Hui have built their mosques, there is a combination of east and west. The mosques have flared Chinese-style roofs set in walled courtyards entered through archways with miniature domes and minarets. The first mosque was the Great Mosque of Xian or the Xian Mosque, which was created in the Tang dynasty in the 7th century. In July 2019, Indonesian Islamic scholar Said Aqil Siradj said that Chinese authorities including those in Xinjiang were building and repairing mosques along with creating hundreds of halal restaurants.
Ningxia officials notified on 3 August 2018 that the Weizhou Grand Mosque will be forcibly demolished on Friday because it had not received the proper permits before construction. Officials in the town were saying the mosque had not been given proper building permits, because it is built in a Middle Eastern style and include numerous domes and minarets. The residents of Weizhou alarmed each other by social media and finally stopped the mosque destruction by public demonstrations. According to a September 2020 report by the Australian Strategic Policy Institute, since 2017, Chinese authorities have destroyed or damaged 16,000 mosques in Xinjiang – 65% of the region's total. | https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Islam_in_China |
Zarqa | Although the area has been inhabited since the first century AD, the city of Zarqa was only established in 1902, by Chechen immigrants who were displaced due to the wars between the Ottoman and Russian Empires. They settled along the Zarqa River. At that time a station on the Hejaz Railway was built in the new settlement. The railway station turned Zarqa into an important hub. On 10 April 1905, the Ottoman governor issued a decree that allowed the Chechen immigrants to own the land they had settled on. The population then quickly grew in size. On 18 November 1928, the new Jordanian government issued a decree to establish the first municipal council for Zarqa.
After the Transjordan Frontier Force was formed in 1926, military bases were constructed in the city by the British Army, and the city later became known as the "military city". The headquarters of Jordan's Arab Legion were also located in Zarqa.
The oldest Palestinian refugee camp in Jordan, known as Zarqa Camp, is located near the city. It was set up by the International Committee of the Red Cross in 1949, after the exodus of Palestinian refugees from the 1948 Arab-Israeli War. Although the camp initially consisted of tents, UNRWA eventually replaced these tents with concrete shelters. More refugees came to Zarqa after the 1990–91 Gulf War, when the Kuwaiti government expelled a quarter-million Palestinians, whom it suspected of supporting Saddam Hussein's Iraq in that war. More than half of those expelled went to Zarqa or the nearby city of Russeifa.
During the Black September conflict in 1970, Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine members hijacked five airplanes, and forced three to land at Dawson's Field, an airstrip in the desert near Zarqa.
Zarqa is regarded today as a "marginalized" and "conservative" city, with a large Palestinian population. It is a stronghold of political Islamism, and is home to many supporters of the opposition Islamic Action Front party, which is the political wing of the Muslim Brotherhood in Jordan. The city was home to jihadist Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, the first leader of Al-Qaeda in Iraq. About one-third of Jordanians who left to fight in the Syrian Civil War, mainly for Islamist groups, are believed to have come from Zarqa - more than from any other area in the country. | https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Zarqa |
Persian language | The complex grammatical conjugation and declension of Old Persian yielded to the structure of Middle Persian in which the dual number disappeared, leaving only singular and plural, as did gender. Middle Persian developed the ezāfe construction, expressed through ī (modern e/ye), to indicate some of the relations between words that have been lost with the simplification of the earlier grammatical system.
Although the "middle period" of the Iranian languages formally begins with the fall of the Achaemenid Empire, the transition from Old to Middle Persian had probably already begun before the 4th century BC. However, Middle Persian is not actually attested until 600 years later when it appears in the Sassanid era (224–651 AD) inscriptions, so any form of the language before this date cannot be described with any degree of certainty. Moreover, as a literary language, Middle Persian is not attested until much later, in the 6th or 7th century. From the 8th century onward, Middle Persian gradually began yielding to New Persian, with the middle-period form only continuing in the texts of Zoroastrianism.
Middle Persian is considered to be a later form of the same dialect as Old Persian. The native name of Middle Persian was Parsig or Parsik, after the name of the ethnic group of the southwest, that is, "of Pars", Old Persian Parsa, New Persian Fars. This is the origin of the name Farsi as it is today used to signify New Persian. Following the collapse of the Sassanid state, Parsik came to be applied exclusively to (either Middle or New) Persian that was written in the Arabic script. From about the 9th century onward, as Middle Persian was on the threshold of becoming New Persian, the older form of the language came to be erroneously called Pahlavi, which was actually but one of the writing systems used to render both Middle Persian as well as various other Middle Iranian languages. That writing system had previously been adopted by the Sassanids (who were Persians, i.e. from the southwest) from the preceding Arsacids (who were Parthians, i.e. from the northeast). While Ibn al-Muqaffa' (eighth century) still distinguished between Pahlavi (i.e. Parthian) and Persian (in Arabic text: al-Farisiyah) (i.e. Middle Persian), this distinction is not evident in Arab commentaries written after that date. | https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Persian_language |
Indian influence on Islamic science | The etymology of the word "sine" comes from the Latin mistranslation of the word jiba, which is an Arabic transliteration of the Sanskrit word for half the chord, jya-ardha.
The sin and cos functions of trigonometry, were important mathematical concepts, imported from the Gupta period of Indian astronomy namely the jyā and koṭi-jyā functions via translation of texts like the Aryabhatiya and Surya Siddhanta, from Sanskrit to Arabic, and then from Arabic to Latin, and later to other European languages.Al-Khowarizmi (ca. 840) contributed a work on algebra and an account of the Hindu—Arabic numerals including the use of zero as a place-holder...the history of early Hindu mathematics has always presented considerable
problems for the West...it is still not possible to form a clear picture of either method or motivation in Hindu mathematics...this, together with the absence of any formalised proof structure, militated against continuous mathematical development...much of the Hindu approach to mathematics was certainly conveyed to western Europe through Arabs. The Algebraic method formerly considered to have been invented by Al Khowarizimi can now be seen to stem from Hindu sources. The place-value system involving the use of nine numerals and a zero as place-holder is undoubtedly of Hindu origin and its transmission to the West had a profound influence on the whole course of mathematics.
As in the rest of mathematical science so in Trigonometry, were the Arabs pupils of the Hindus and still more of the Greeks, but not without important devices of their own.
For over five hundred years Arabic writers and others continued to apply to works on arithmetic the name Indian.
Another important early treatise that publicized decimal numbers was the Iranian mathematician and astronomer Kushyar ibn Labban's leading arithmetic book Kitab fi usul hisab al-hind (principals of Hindu reckoning).
Abu'l-Hasan al-Uqlidisi a scholar in the Abbasid caliphate wrote al-Fusul fi al-Hisab al-Hindi ("chapters in Indian calculation") to address the difficulty in procedures for calculation from the Euclid's Elements and endorsed the use of Indian calculation. He highlighted its ease of use, speed, fewer requirements of memory and the focused scope on the subject. | https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Indian_influence_on_Islamic_science |
1966 Syrian coup d'état | After the success of the 1963 Syrian coup d'état, officially the 8th of March Revolution, a power struggle erupted between the Nasserites in the National Council for the Revolutionary Command and the Ba'ath Party. The Nasserites sought to reestablish the United Arab Republic, the former federation encompassing Egypt and Syria from 1958 to 1961, on Gamal Abdel Nasser's terms, but the Ba'athists were skeptical of a new union with Nasser and wanted a loose federation where the Ba'ath Party could rule Syria alone without interference. The Nasserites mobilised large street demonstrations in favour of a union. It took time before the Ba'ath Party knew how to respond to the issue, since the majority of Syrian Arab Nationalists were not adherents to Ba'athism, but of Nasserism and Nasser in general.
Instead of trying to win the support of the populace, the Ba'athists moved to consolidate their control over the Syrian military. Several hundred Nasserites and conservatives were purged from the military, and Ba'athists were recruited to fill senior positions. Most of the newly recruited Ba'athist officers came from the countryside or from a low social class. These Ba'athist officers replaced the chiefly "urban Sunni upper-middle and middle class" officer corps, and replaced it with an officer corps with a rural background who more often the "kinsmen of the leading minority officer". These changes led to the decimation of Sunni control over the military establishment.
The cost of clamping down on the protests was a loss of legitimacy, and the emergence of Amin al-Hafiz as the first Ba'athist military strongman. In 1965, Amin al-Hafiz imposed the socialist policies adopted in the 6th National Congress; fully nationalizing Syrian industry, vast segments of private sector and established a centralized command economy. The traditional elite, consisting of the upper classes, who had been overthrown from political power by the Ba'athists, felt threatened by the Ba'ath Party's socialist policies. The Muslim Brotherhood in Syria was a historical rival of the Syrian Regional Branch, and it felt threatened by the party's secularist nature. Akram al-Hawrani and his supporters and the Syrian Communist Party opposed the one-party system which the Ba'ath Party was establishing.
The majority of Sunni Muslims were Arab nationalists, but not Ba'athist, making them feel alienated. The party was chiefly dominated by minority groups such as Alawites, Druzes, and Isma'ilis, and people from the countryside in general; this created an urban–rural conflict based predominantly on ethnic differences. With its coming to power, the Ba'ath Party was threatened by the predominantly anti-Ba'athist sentiment in urban politics—probably the only reason why the Ba'athists managed to stay in power was the rather weakly organised and fragmented opposition it faced. | https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/1966_Syrian_coup_d%27%C3%A9tat |
Grand vizier | The term vizier was originally used in the Abbasid Caliphate in the 8th century AD. This position was later adopted by the Ottomans in the early 14th century, by the Seljuks of Anatolia. During the nascent phases of the Ottoman state, "vizier" was the only title used. The first of these Ottoman viziers who was titled "Grand Vizier" (French spelling: grand-vézir) was Çandarlı Halil Pasha the Elder. The purpose in instituting the title "Grand Vizier" was to distinguish the holder of the sultan's seal from other viziers. The initially more frequently used title of vezir-ı a’zam (وزیر اعظم) was gradually replaced by another one, sadr-ı a’zam (صدر اعظم from Arabic صَدْر "front part, bosom, forehead, lead, forefront" and أعْظَم "superior, major, maximal, paramount, grand", informally pronounced sadrazam), both meaning "grand vizier" in practice. Throughout the Ottoman history, the Grand Viziers have also been termed sadr-ı âlî (صدر عالی, "sublime vizier"), vekil-ı mutlak (وكیل مطلق, "absolute attorney"), sâhib-ı devlet (صاحب دولت, "holder of the State"), serdar-ı ekrem (سردار اكرم, "most noble [commander-in-]chief"), serdar-ı a’zam (سردار اعظم, "grand [commander-in-]chief") and zât-ı âsafî (ذات آصفی, "vizieral person").
Halil Pasha the Elder reformed the role of the vizier in several ways. Several viziers before him held an equivalent, but differently named office; he was the first who held the position of "Grand Vizier", during the reign of Murad I. He was the first advisor with a military background – his forerunners had come from a more scholarly class of men. It is also significant that he was the first of a political family that, at the time, rivaled the Ottoman dynasty itself. Several of Çandarlı Halil Pasha the Elder's kin went on to hold the office of Grand Vizier in the decades following his death.
Çandarlı Halil Pasha the Younger, the grandson of Pasha the Elder, was also highly influential in shaping the role of the Grand Vizier. During the reign of Mehmed II, the Younger opposed the siege of Constantinople and the ongoing hostilities with Christians. Two days after the siege was won by Mehmed II, the Younger was executed for his opposition. After his death, the position of Grand Vizier was chosen nearly exclusively from the kul system. Often, the men who were chosen had a Byzantine or Balkan background. According to Gábor, this was usually a political move, designed to appease powerful European factions to Ottoman supremacy. In fact, it was easier for the sultan to control an enslaved and non-Turk administrator. In the Ottoman Empire, executing a Grand Vizier of Turkish origin (in the event they were rebellious) and an enslaved foreigner would also give rise to different reactions. Further, the devshirme were less subject to influence from court factions. From the very beginning, the Turcoman were a danger that undermined the Sultan's creation of a strong state.
Grand Viziers gained immense political supremacy in the later days of the Ottoman Empire. Power was centralized in the position of the Grand Vizier during the Köprülü era. Köprülü Mehmed Pasha was a powerful political figure during the reign of Mehmed IV, and was appointed to the office of Grand Vizier in 1656. He consolidated power within the position and sent the Sultan away from the city on hunting trips, thus stopping Mehmed's direct management over the state. Next, he forcibly removed any officers suspected of corruption; those who did not leave were executed. He also conducted campaigns against Venice and the Habsburgs, as well as quelling rebellions in Anatolia. On his deathbed five years later, he convinced Mehmed to appoint his son (Köprülü Fazıl Ahmed Pasha) as the next Grand Vizier, thus securing his dynasty a position of supreme power in the Empire. It was during the Köprülü era that the Ottoman Empire reached its largest geographic expansion across Europe, Asia Minor, and Africa.
In Ottoman legal theory, the Sultan was supposed to conduct affairs of state exclusively via the Grand Vizier, but in reality, this arrangement was often circumvented. As the Ottomanist Colin Imber writes, the sultan "had closer contact with the pages of the privy chamber, the kapi agha, the kizlar agha or with other courtiers than he did with the Grand Vizier, and these too could petition the sultan on their own or somebody else’s behalf. He might, too, be more inclined to take the advice of his mother, a concubine, or the head gardener at the helm of the royal barge, than of the Grand Vizier".
After the Tanzimat period of the Ottoman Empire in the 19th century, the Grand Viziers came to assume a role more like that of the prime ministers of contemporary Western monarchies.
Forty nine Grand Viziers of Albanian ethnicity served the empire during the Ottoman period and most of them were southern Albanians (Tosks). | https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Grand_vizier |
Post-classical history | The time frame of 500–1500 in East Asia's history and China in particular has been proposed as a possible classification for the region's history within the context of global post-classical history. Discussions within Columbia University's Association of Asian studies have postulated that similarities between China and other regions of Eurasia during post-classical times have often been overlooked. Typically the English language histography of Japan postulates that its 'medieval period' began as late as 1185.
During this period the Eastern empires continued to expand through trade, migration and conquests of neighboring areas. Japan and Korea went under the process of voluntary Sinicization, or the impression of Chinese cultural and political ideas.
Korea and Japan sinicized because their ruling class were largely impressed by China's bureaucracy. The major influences China had on these countries were the spread of Confucianism, the spread of Buddhism, and the establishment of centralized governance. Throughout East Asia, Buddhism was most visible in monasteries and local educational institutions and Confucianism remained the ideology of social cohesion and state power.
In the times of the Sui, Tang, and Song dynasties (581–1279), China remained the world's largest economy and most technologically advanced society. Inventions such as gunpowder, woodblock printing, and the magnetic compass were improved upon. China stood in contrast to other areas at the time as the imperial governments exhibited concentrated central authority instead of feudalism.
China exhibited much interest in foreign affairs during the Tang and Song dynasties. From the 7th through the 10th centuries, Tang China was focused on securing the Silk Road as the selling of its goods westwards was central to the nation's economy. For a time China successfully secured its frontiers by integrating their nomadic neighbors - the Göktürks - into their civilization. The Tang dynasty expanded into Central Asia and received tribute from countries as distant as Eastern Iran. Western expansion ended with wars with the Abbasid Caliphate and the deadly An Lushan Rebellion which resulted in a deadly but uncertain death toll of millions. After the collapse of the Tang dynasty and subsequent civil wars came the second phase of Chinese interest in foreign relations. Unlike the Tang, the Song specialized in overseas trade and peacefully created a maritime network, and China's population became concentrated in the south. Chinese merchant ships reached Indonesia, India, and Arabia. Southeast Asia's economy flourished from trade with Song China.
With the country's emphasis on trade and economic growth. Song China's economy began to use machines to manufacture goods and coal as a source of energy. The advances of the Song in the 11th/12th centuries have been considered an early industrial revolution. Economic advancements came at the cost of military affairs and the Song became open to invasions from the north. China became divided as Song's northern lands were conquered by the Jurchen people. By 1200, there were five Chinese kingdoms stretching from modern day Turkestan to the Sea of Japan including the Western Liao, Western Xia, Jin, Southern Song, and Dali. Because these states competed with each other they all were eventually annexed by the rising Mongol Empire before 1279. After seventy years of conquest, the Mongols proclaimed the Yuan dynasty and also annexed Korea; they failed to conquer Japan. Mongol conquerors also made China accessible to European travelers such as Marco Polo. The Mongol era was short lived due to plagues and famine. After the revolution in 1368, the succeeding Ming dynasty ushered in a period of prosperity and brief foreign expeditions before isolating itself from global affairs for centuries.
Korea and Japan however continued to have relations with China and with other Asian countries. In the 15th century Sejong the Great of Korea cemented his country's identity by creating the Hangul writing system to replace use of Chinese characters. Meanwhile, Japan fell under military rule of the Kamakura and later Ashikaga Shogunate dominated by the samurai. | https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Post-classical_history |
Yemenite War of 1979 | The Marxist government of South Yemen was alleged to be supplying aid to rebels in the north through the National Democratic Front and crossing the border.
On 24 February, forces from North and South Yemen began firing at each other across the border. Forces from North Yemen, led by some radical army officers, crossed the border into South Yemen and attacked a number of villages. The PDRY, with support from the Soviet Union, Cuba, and East Germany, responded by invading the north using 3 regular divisions and a Tactical Air Force regiment. The PDRY was also supported by the NDF, who were in the midst of fighting their own rebellion against the government of North Yemen. Within 3 days of the invasion, the numerically smaller South Yemeni forces had established complete air superiority over the theater, thus forcing the North Yemeni ground forces on the back foot for the rest of the War.
The South Yemeni attack carried the advantage of surprise and was spearheaded by an artillery barrage and groups of sappers, who were effectively able to blow up the early warning air defences and radars and thus help the Air Force establish air superiority within days over much of Taiz and Dhale Governorates and parts of Al Bayda Governorate, after a dogfight that downed most of the North Yemeni planes. After the initial Air Force attack, a South Yemeni armoured division composed of T-55 and T-62 Tanks spearheaded the ground assault on a North Yemeni Armoured Division stationed near Taiz city, followed by an Infantry Division covered by an artillery brigade providing fire support with BM-21 Grad rockets and M-46 field howitzers.
This was soon followed by the Soviet-trained South Yemeni Air Force further destroying several North Yemeni MiG-17 and MiG-21 fighter jets and helicopters on the ground in airfields and airbases in Dhamar, thus preventing any chance of a Northern aerial counter-attack. The attack was coordinated by the Deputy Chief of the Air Force, Brigadier Sa'ad Hesham al Din, formerly of the Aden Protectorate Levies since 1959 who had trained as a pilot in the United Kingdom and Soviet Union from 1969–1972. Brigadier Sa'ad himself led the aerial sorties, flying in an Su-22. The Fighter Group was led by Colonel Khaled Omar, of the ALP since 1964, who had trained in India in 1971–73. He led the combat air patrols in a MiG-21. On the ground and in the air in a couple of Il-38, Soviet combat controllers directed the fire control and battlespace and operated the Early Warning systems. The war dragged on for nearly a month, with North Yemen being unable to send reinforcement units from Sanaa down to Taiz due to the constant Southern airstrikes and aggressive air patrolling hitting reinforcement convoys on difficult and winding mountain roads as far north as Dhamar. Although Northern forces vastly outnumbered Southern forces overall, they were outnumbered and overwhelmed within the theater of operations in and around Taiz and Dhale, since a single Division had to face an attack from three enemy divisions without any reinforcement or close air support due to the Southern air patrolling and airstrikes on Northern roads throughout the month.
On 8 March, the South Yemeni Air Force managed to carry out an attack on Sanaa, with 3 Su-22 and 3 Su-7 bombers with 5 MiG-21 fighters flying top cover, dropping 500-pound bombs on an artillery base and strafing the Judges' Court and Central Prison, causing mass panic among civilians. North Yemeni Air Defences operating the SA-3 engaged and managed to shoot down one of the Su-7 bombers and one MiG-21, capturing the pilots. Another deep raid on 10 March saw 4 South Yemeni MiG-21s and 3 Su-22s strafe an airbase and the seaport near Hodeidah, sinking a civilian Egyptian cargo ship. With losses escalating, Northern forces appearing on the verge of exhaustion, Southern forces capturing a wide range of Northern territory and besieging Taiz and Al Bayda, Saudi Arabia and the United States rushed arms to bolster the government of North Yemen by 9-10 March. On 11 March, North Yemeni forces fired 8 Frog-7 missiles on a South Yemeni combined infantry brigade and tank battalion north of Ibb, killing at least 100 South Yemeni soldiers. The introduction of Frog-7 missiles by North Yemen forced South Yemen to cease further advances.
On 13 March, South Yemen fired two Scud-B missiles at Sanaa, destroying a Republican Guard barracks and killing 19 soldiers and 15 civilians. Citing the alleged Soviet-backed PDRY aggression against the YAR, and the threat this could pose to U.S. ally Saudi Arabia, the United States greatly stepped up military assistance to the YAR government. As part of this aid, the U.S. shipped 18 F-5E planes to the YAR in order to strengthen the government. However, there were no YAR pilots trained in flying the F-5E, and as a result the U.S. and Saudi Arabia arranged to have 80 Taiwanese pilots plus ground crew and Iraqi anti-air defense units sent to North Yemen. A U.S. Navy task force was also sent to the Arabian Sea in response to the escalating violence.
The war showed the weakness of the North Yemeni military training and equipment, and soon its allies - led by Egypt, Iraq and Saudi Arabia - started an aggressive re-armament and training programme to enable it to regain strategic balance against PDRY forces. By 1983–84, the North had regained its military strength. | https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Yemenite_War_of_1979 |
Mamluk Sultanate | Al-Nasir Muhammad died in 1341 and his rule was followed by a succession of descendants in a period marked by political instability. Most of his successors, except for al-Nasir Hasan (r. 1347–1351, 1354–1361) and al-Ashraf Sha'ban (r. 1363–1367), were sultans in name only, with the patrons of the leading mamluk factions holding actual power. The first of al-Nasir Muhammad's sons to accede was al-Mansur Abu Bakr, who al-Nasir Muhammad designated as successor. Al-Nasir Muhammad's senior aide, Qawsun, held real power and imprisoned and executed Abu Bakr and had al-Nasir Muhammad's infant son, al-Ashraf Kujuk, appointed instead. By January 1342, Qawsun and Kujuk were toppled, and the latter's half-brother, al-Nasir Ahmad of al-Karak, was declared sultan. Ahmad relocated to al-Karak and left a deputy to govern in Cairo. This unorthodox arrangement, together with his seclusive and frivolous behavior and his execution of loyal partisans, ended with Ahmad's deposition and replacement by his half-brother al-Salih Isma'il in June 1342. Isma'il ruled until his death in August 1345, and was succeeded by his brother al-Kamil Sha'ban. The latter was killed in a mamluk revolt and was succeeded by his brother al-Muzaffar Hajji, who was also killed in a mamluk revolt in late 1347.
After Hajji's death, the senior emirs hastily appointed another son of al-Nasir Muhammad, the twelve-year-old al-Nasir Hasan. Coinciding with Hasan's first reign, in 1347–1348, the Bubonic Plague arrived in Egypt and other plagues followed, causing mass death in the country, which led to major social and economic changes in the region. In 1351, the senior emirs, led by Emir Taz, ousted and replaced Hasan with his brother, al-Salih Salih. The emirs Shaykhu and Sirghitmish deposed Salih and restored Hasan in 1355, after which Hasan gradually purged Taz, Shaykhu and Sirghitmish and their mamluks from his administration. Hasan recruited and promoted the awlad al-nas (descendants of mamluks who did not undergo the enslavement/manumission process) in the military and administration, a process lasted for the remainder of the Bahri period. This caused resentment among Hasan's own mamluks, led by Emir Yalbugha al-Umari, who killed Hasan in 1361.
Yalbugha became regent to Hasan's successor, the young son of the late sultan Hajji, al-Mansur Muhammad. By then, mamluk solidarity and loyalty to the emirs had dissipated. To restore discipline and unity within the Mamluk state and military, Yalbugha revived the rigorous training of mamluks used under Baybars and Qalawun. In 1365, a Mamluk attempt to annex Armenia, which had since replaced Crusader Acre as the Christian commercial foothold of Asia, was stifled by an invasion of Alexandria by Peter I of Cyprus. The Mamluks concurrently experienced a deterioration of their lucrative position in international trade and the economy declined, further weakening the Bahri regime. Meanwhile, the harshness of Yalbugha's educational methods and his refusal to rescind his disciplinary reforms provoked a mamluk backlash. Yalbugha was killed by his mamluks in an uprising in 1366. The rebels were supported by Sultan al-Ashraf Sha'ban, who Yalbugha had installed in 1363. Sha'ban ruled as the real power in the sultanate until 1377, when he was killed by mamluk dissidents on his way to Mecca perform the Hajj. | https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Mamluk_Sultanate |
Arabic maqam | It is sometimes said that each maqam evokes a specific emotion or set of emotions determined by the tone row and the nucleus, with different maqams sharing the same tone row but differing in nucleus and thus emotion. Maqam Rast is said to evoke pride, power, and soundness of mind. Maqam Bayati: vitality, joy, and femininity. Sikah: love. Saba: sadness and pain. Hijaz: distant desert.
In an experiment where maqam Saba was played to an equal number of Arabs and non-Arabs who were asked to record their emotions in concentric circles with the weakest emotions in the outer circles, Arab subjects reported experiencing Saba as "sad", "tragic", and "lamenting", while only 48 percent of the non-Arabs described it thus with 28 percent of non-Arabs describing feelings such as "seriousness", "longing", and tension", and 6 percent experienced feelings such as "happy", "active", and "very lively" and 10 percent identified no feelings.
These emotions are said to be evoked in part through change in the size of an interval during a maqam presentation. Maqam Saba, for example, contains in its first four notes, D, E, F, and G♭, two medium seconds one larger (160 cents) and one smaller (140 cents) than a three quarter tone, and a minor second (95 cents). Further, E and G♭ may vary slightly, said to cause a "sad" or "sensitive" mood.
Generally speaking, each maqam is said to evoke a different emotion in the listener. At a more basic level, each jins is claimed to convey a different mood or color. For this reason maqams of the same family are said to share a common mood since they start with the same jins. There is no consensus on exactly what the mood of each maqam or jins is. Some references describe maqam moods using very vague and subjective terminology (e.g. maqams evoking 'love', 'femininity', 'pride' or 'distant desert'). However, there has not been any serious research using scientific methodology on a diverse sample of listeners (whether Arab or non-Arab) proving that they feel the same emotion when hearing the same maqam.
Attempting the same exercise in more recent tonal classical music would mean relating a mood to the major and minor modes. In that case there is some consensus that the minor scale is "sadder" and the major scale is "happier". | https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Arabic_maqam |
Swahili language | Maho (2009) considers these to be distinct languages:
Kimwani is spoken in the Kerimba Islands and northern coastal Mozambique.
Chimwiini is spoken by the ethnic minorities in and around the town of Barawa on the southern coast of Somalia.
Kibajuni is spoken by the Bajuni minority ethnic group on the coast and islands on both sides of the Somali–Kenyan border and in the Bajuni Islands (the northern part of the Lamu archipelago) and is also called Kitikuu and Kigunya.
Socotra Swahili (extinct)
Sidi, in Gujarat, India (possibly extinct)
The rest of the dialects are divided by him into two groups:
Mombasa–Lamu Swahili
Lamu
The dialects of the Lamu group (especially Kiamu, Kipate, Kingozi) are the linguistic base of the oldest (c. 1600 CE) Swahili manuscripts and poems that reached us. They are sometimes described as "literary" dialects but they were also used for everyday life and are still spoken today except Kingozi.
Kiamu is spoken in and around the island of Lamu (Amu) and have an important corpus of classical poems of the 18st and 19st centuries written in Arabic script (Kiajemi).
Kipate is a local dialect of Pate Island, considered to be closest to the original dialect of Kingozi. It has also an important classical corpus of poems from the 18st and 19st centuries.
Kingozi is an extinct dialect spoken on the Indian Ocean coast between Lamu and Somalia and is sometimes still used in poetry. It is often considered the source of Swahili. Academic theories about Kingozi as an old literary dialect are conflicting. It is sometimes linked to the epics of Liongo. For Sacleux, it's and old and "an exclusively literary, arcane dialect". It varies depending on the authors whose will to return to a pure form of the old language make them use Kigunya mainly (Kipate is a subdialect of Kigunya) and secondarily Kiamu and Kimvita. Knappert, on the contrary, states the existence of a literary koine in the 18th century based on the Kingozi as a prestigious and widespread dialect. The 2009 New Updated Guthrie List, a referential classification of the Bantu languages, considers kiOzi as a dialect in itself. It is not the ancestor language of Kiswahili but a member of the Lamu group (code G42a) with Kiamu, Kipate and Kisiu. This brief overview indicates that the state of research is fragmented and uncertain on the history of the kingozi.
Mombasa
Chijomvu is a subdialect of the Mombasa area.
Kimvita is the major dialect of Mombasa (also known as "Mvita", which means "war", in reference to the many wars which were fought over it, the other major dialect alongside Kiunguja. It has an important classical corpus written in Arabic script from the 18st and 19st century.
Kingare is the subdialect of the Mombasa area.
Kimrima is spoken around Pangani, Vanga, Dar es Salaam, Rufiji and Mafia Island.
Kiunguja is spoken in Zanzibar City and environs on Unguja (Zanzibar) Island. Kitumbatu (Pemba) dialects occupy the bulk of the island.
Mambrui, Malindi
Chichifundi, a dialect of the southern Kenya coast.
Chwaka
Kivumba, a dialect of the southern Kenya coast.
Nosse Be (Madagascar)
Pemba Swahili
Kipemba is a local dialect of the Pemba Island.
Kitumbatu and Kimakunduchi are the countryside dialects of the island of Zanzibar. Kimakunduchi is a recent renaming of "Kihadimu"; the old name means "serf" and so is considered pejorative.
Makunduchi
Mafia, Mbwera
Kilwa (extinct)
Kimgao used to be spoken around Kilwa District and to the south.
Maho includes the various Comorian dialects as a third group. Most other authorities consider Comorian to be a Sabaki language, distinct from Swahili. | https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Swahili_language |
Subsets and Splits
No community queries yet
The top public SQL queries from the community will appear here once available.