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Banu Nadir | After defeat by the Quraish at the Mount Uhud in March, 625, the Banu Nadir challenged Muhammad as the leader of Medina.
In July of the same year, two men were killed by a Muslim named ʿAmr ibn Umayya al-Ḍamrī. Because he and the Banū al-Naḍīr were both obliged by virtue of an agreement with the Banū ʿĀmir to pay the blood money, he visited the Naḍīr in order to negotiate their relative contributions to the blood money. Initially most of the Nadir, except Huyayy ibn Akhtab, were inclined to accept Muhammad's request. However, Ibn Ubayy communicated to ibn Akhtab of his intent, along with allied nomads, to attack Muhammad. The Nadir, then postponed the contribution until later that day.
Muhammad left the locality immediately accusing the Banu Nadir of plotting to assassinate him, saying to have learned this either through revelation or Muhammad ibn Maslama.
According to other sources, the Banu Nadir invited Muhammad to their habitations for a religious debate, to which Muhammad accepted. Muhammad also accepted the condition that he bring no more than three men with him. On his way he was notified by a Banu Nadir convert to Islam of an assassination attempt at the debate.
Muhammad besieged the Banu Nadir. He ordered them to surrender their property and leave Medina within ten days. The tribe at first decided to comply, but "certain people of Medina who were not Believers of Muhammad sent a message to the Banu al-Nadir, saying, 'Hold out, and defend yourselves; we shall not surrender you to Muhammad. If you are attacked we shall fight with you and if you are sent away we shall go with you.'" Huyayy ibn Akhtab decided to put up resistance, hoping also for help from the Banu Qurayza, despite opposition within the tribe. The Nadir were forced to surrender after the siege had lasted for 14 days, when the promised help failed to materialize and when Muhammad ordered the burning and felling of their palm-trees. Under the conditions of surrender, the Banu Nadir could only take with them what they could carry on camels with the exception of weapons.
The Banu Nadir left on 600 camels, parading through Medina to the music of pipes and tambourines. Al-Waqidi described their impressive farewell: "Their women were decked out in litters wearing silk, brocade, velvet, and fine red and green silk. People lined up to gape at them." Most of Banu Nadir found refuge among the Jews of Khaybar, while others emigrated to Syria. According to Ibn Ishaq, the chiefs of Nadir who went to Khaybar were Sallam b. Abu'l-Huqayq, Kenana ibn al-Rabi and Huyayy b. Akhtab. When these chiefs arrived in Khaybar, the Jewish inhabitants of Khaybar became subject to them.
Muhammad divided their land between his companions who had emigrated with him from Mecca. Until then, the emigrants had to rely upon the Medinese sympathizers for financial assistance. Muhammad reserved a share of the seized land for himself, which also made him financially independent.
Upon expulsion of the Banu Nadir, Muhammad is said to have received a revelation of the Surah al-Hashr. | https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Banu_Nadir |
Great Mosque of Kairouan | At the foundation of Kairouan in 670, the Arab general and conqueror Uqba ibn Nafi (himself the founder of the city) chose the site of his mosque in the center of the city, near the headquarters of the governor. Around 690, shortly after its construction, the mosque was destroyed during the occupation of Kairouan by the Berbers, originally conducted by Kusaila. It was rebuilt by the Ghassanid general Hasan ibn al-Nu'man in 703. With the gradual increase of the population of Kairouan and the consequent increase in the number of faithful, Hisham ibn Abd al-Malik, Umayyad Caliph in Damascus, charged his governor Bishr ibn Safwan to carry out development work in the city, which included the renovation and expansion of the mosque around the years 724–728. During this expansion, he pulled down the mosque and rebuilt it with the exception of the mihrab. It was under his auspices that the construction of the minaret began. In 774, a new reconstruction accompanied by modifications and embellishments took place under the direction of the Abbasid governor Yazid ibn Hatim.
Under the rule of the Aghlabid dynasty, Kairouan was at its apogee, and the mosque profited from this period of stability and prosperity. In 836, Emir Ziyadat Allah I reconstructed the mosque once more: this is when the building acquired, at least in its entirety, its current appearance. At the same time, the mihrab's ribbed dome was raised on squinches. Around 862–863, Emir Abu Ibrahim enlarged the oratory, with three bays to the north, and added the cupola over the arched portico which precedes the prayer hall. In 875 Emir Ibrahim II built another three bays, thereby reducing the size of the courtyard which was further limited on the three other sides by the addition of double galleries.
The current state of the mosque can be traced back to the Aghlabid period—no element is earlier than the ninth century besides the mihrab—except for some partial restorations and a few later additions made in 1025 during the Zirid period, 1248 and 1293–1294 under the reign of the Hafsids, 1618 at the time of Muradid beys, and in the late nineteenth and early twentieth century. In 1967, major restoration works, executed during five years and conducted under the direction of the National Institute of Archeology and Art, were achieved throughout the monument, and were ended with an official reopening of the mosque during the celebration of the Mawlid of 1972. | https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Great_Mosque_of_Kairouan |
Nubian pyramids | The Nubian pyramids were built over a period of a few hundred years to serve as tombs for the kings and queens and wealthy citizens of Napata and Meroë.
The first three sites are located around Napata in Lower Nubia, near the modern town of Karima. They were constructed using a shadoof counterbalanced lever hoist, of which the central pivot poles were left buried in the center of the pyramid and covered by their respective cap stones.
The first of these was built at the site of el-Kurru, including the tombs of King Kashta and his son Piye, together with Piye's successors Shabaka, Shabataka, and Tanwetamani. Fourteen pyramids were constructed for their queens, several of whom were renowned warrior queens. Approximately 255 pyramids are known to have been constructed by the Nubians, more than double the number constructed in Ancient Egypt.
Later Napatan pyramids were sited at Nuri, 10 kilometres (6.2 mi) north on the opposite bank of the Nile. This necropolis was the burial place of 21 kings and 52 queens and princes including Anlami and Aspelta. The bodies of these kings were placed in huge granite sarcophagi. Aspelta's weighed 15.5 tons, and its lid weighed four tons. The oldest and largest pyramid at Nuri is that of the Napatan king and Twenty-fifth Dynasty pharaoh Taharqa.
Another small group of nine pyramids is located next to Jebel Barkal itself.
The most extensive Nubian pyramid site is at Meroë, which is located between the fifth and sixth cataracts of the Nile, approximately 240 kilometres (150 mi) north of Khartoum. During the Meroitic period, over forty queens and kings were buried there.
Between 2009 and 2012 a new group of pyramids was discovered near the village Sedeinga.
The physical proportions of Nubian pyramids differ markedly from the Egyptian pyramids: they are built of stepped courses of horizontally positioned stone blocks and range approximately 6–30 metres (20–98 ft) in height, but rise from fairly small foundation footprints, resulting in tall, narrow structures inclined at approximately 70°. Most also have offering temple structures abutting their base with unique Kushite characteristics. Egyptian pyramids of similar height generally had foundation footprints at least five times larger and were inclined at angles between 40–50°.
The Nubian pyramids were constructed using a combination of mud bricks and stone. The interior chambers were lined with plaster and decorated with scenes from the life of the deceased. The largest pyramid at Meroë is 30 metres (98 ft) high and is thought to have been built for the Nubian queen Amanishakheto.
The tombs inside the pyramids of Nubia were plundered in ancient times. Wall reliefs preserved in the tomb chapels reveal that their royal occupants were mummified, covered with jewellery and laid to rest in wooden mummy cases. At the time of their exploration by archaeologists in the 19th and 20th centuries, some pyramids were found to contain the remains of bows, quivers of arrows, archers' thumb rings, horse harnesses, wooden boxes, furniture, pottery, colored glass, metal vessels, and many other artefacts attesting to extensive Meroitic trade with Egypt and the Hellenistic world.
A pyramid excavated at Meroë included hundreds of heavy items such as large blocks decorated with rock art and 390 stones that comprised the pyramid. A cow buried complete with eye ointment was also unearthed in the area to be flooded by the Meroë Dam, as were ringing rocks that were tapped to create a melodic sound.
In the 1830s Giuseppe Ferlini came to Meroe seeking treasure and raided and demolished a number of pyramids which had been found “in good conditions” by Frédéric Cailliaud just a few years earlier. At Wad ban Naqa, he leveled the pyramid N6 of the kandake Amanishakheto starting from the top, and found dozens of gold and silver jewelry pieces. Overall, he is considered responsible for the destruction of over 40 pyramids.
Ferlini returned home in 1836, having found the treasure he was looking for. A year later he wrote a report of his expedition containing a catalog of his findings, which was translated in French and republished in 1838. He tried to sell the treasure, but at this time nobody believed that such high quality jewellery could be made in Sub-Saharan Africa. His finds were finally sold in Germany: part of these were purchased by King Ludwig I of Bavaria and are now in the State Museum of Egyptian Art of Munich, while the remaining – under suggestions of Karl Richard Lepsius and of Christian Charles Josias von Bunsen – was bought by the Egyptian Museum of Berlin where it still is.
George Reisner, a Harvard archaeologist, investigated the pyramids at Nuri and mapped more than 80 royal Kushite burials in 1916–1919. Reisner started to explore burial chambers but he found they were flooded by the rising water table. During his excavation, a staircase collapsed and killed five of his workers. He abandoned his expedition believing it to be too dangerous. Some of his findings were published in 1955.
National Geographic funded explorations from 2015 to 2019 using underwater scuba diving equipment and remote controlled robots. | https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Nubian_pyramids |
Bactrian language | A major difficulty in determining Bactrian phonology is that affricates and voiced stops were not consistently distinguished from the corresponding fricatives in the Greek script.
Proto-Iranian *b, *d, *g have generally become spirants, as in most other Eastern Iranian languages. A distinctive feature of Bactrian, shared within the Iranian languages with Munji, Yidgha and Pashto, is the development of Proto-Iranian *d > *ð further to /l/, which may have been areal in nature. Original *d remains only in a few consonant clusters, e.g. *bandaka > βανδαγο 'servant', *dugdā > λογδο 'daughter'. The clusters /lr/ and /rl/ appear in earlier Bactrian, but revert to /dr/, /rd/ later, e.g. *drauga > λρωγο (4th to 5th century) > δδρωρο (7th to 8th century) 'lie, falsehood'.
Proto-Iranian *p, *t, *č, *k have become voiced between vowels, and after a nasal consonant or *r.
Inside a word, the digraphs ββ, δδ for original voiceless *p, *t can be found, which probably represent [b], [d]. The former is attested only in a single word, αββο 'water'. Manichaean Bactrian appears to only have had /v/ in native vocabulary. According to Gholami, instances of single δ may indicate a fricative pronunciation, [ð].
γ appears to stand for both the stop [ɡ] and the fricative [ɣ], but it is unclear if a contrast existed, and which instances are which. Evidence from the Manichaean script suggests that γ from *k may have been /ɡ/ and γ from *g may have been /ɣ/. According to Greek orthographic practices, γγ represents [ŋɡ].
σ may continue both Proto-Iranian *c > *s and *č, and the Manichaean script confirms that it represents two phonemes, likely /s/ and /ts/.
ζ may continue similarly on one hand Proto-Iranian *dz > *z, and on the other *ǰ and *č, and it represents at least /z/ and /dz/. This distinction is again confirmed by the Manichaean script. Also a third counterpart of ζ is found in Manichaean Bactrian, possibly representing /ʒ/.
The status of θ is unclear; it only appears in the word ιθαο 'thus, also', which may be a loanword from another Iranian language. In most positions Proto-Iranian *θ becomes /h/ (written υ), or is lost, e.g. *puθra- > πουρο 'son'. The cluster *θw, however, appears to become /lf/, e.g. *wikāθwan > οιγαλφο 'witness'.
ϸ continues, in addition to Proto-Iranian *š, also Proto-Iranian *s in the clusters *sr, *str, *rst. In several cases, however, Proto-Iranian *š becomes /h/ or is lost; the distribution is unclear. E.g. *snušā > ασνωυο 'daughter-in-law', *aštā > αταο 'eight', *xšāθriya > χαρο 'ruler', *pašman- > παμανο 'wool'. | https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Bactrian_language |
Central Bank of Iraq | After World War I and the dissolution of the Ottoman Empire, Iraq's monetary system was administered by the British Mandate of Mesopotamia until 1931, when the Iraq Currency Board was established in London to issue the new Iraqi dinar and maintain its reserves. The Iraq Currency Board pursued a "conservative monetary policy, maintaining very high reserves behind the dinar", which was "further strengthened by its link to the British pound".
In 1949, the currency board was replaced by the National Bank of Iraq, which had been founded two years before on 16 November 1947. The National Bank of Iraq became the Central Bank of Iraq in 1956. Since switching over to its own central bank, the Iraqi monetary system was "replete with mismanagement, coercive stop-gap measures, and the production of an unstable, unreliable currency which ha[d] not been tradable on the international market for [many] years". Saddam Hussein wielded monetary and the dinar as "a powerful instrument of repression".
Beginning on 18 March 2003 (the day before United States forces entered Baghdad as part of the 2003 invasion of Iraq), nearly US$1 billion was stolen from the Central Bank of Iraq. That month, a handwritten note signed by Saddam Hussein surfaced, ordering $920 million to be withdrawn and given to his son Qusay Hussein. Bank officials state that Qusay and another unidentified man oversaw the cash, boxes of $100 bills secured with stamped seals known as security money, being loaded into trucks and trailers during a five-hour operation. This was considered the largest bank heist in history until 2011. Qusay Hussein was later killed by the U.S. 101st Airborne Division in a battle.
U.S. Department of the Treasury and Coalition Provisional Authority inspectors discovered the bank in ruins after the Battle of Baghdad and mass looting after the invasion. After the fall of Saddam Hussein's government, the Central Bank of Iraq was established as Iraq's independent central bank by the Central Bank of Iraq Law 2004, with authorised capital of 100 billion dinars. According to the law, 100% of the bank's capital stock would be held by the State and would not be transferable.
The Constitution of Iraq states that the central bank is a financially and administratively independent institution, responsible before the Council of Representatives of Iraq. According to the Constitution, the Iraqi federal government has the "exclusive authority" of "establishing and administering a central bank".
On 25 January 2011, the Supreme Court of Iraq ruled that the Central Bank of Iraq should be under supervision of the Council of Ministers of Iraq. Then Central Bank chief Sinan Al Shabibi warned that the ruling would threaten the institution's requisite independence.
Currently, the acting Governor of the Central Bank of Iraq is Abdel Basset Turki, who also happens to be the head of the state-spending watchdog the Board of Supreme Audit.
During the Battle of Mosul in June 2014, Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) militants looted the Central Bank in Mosul, absconding with over US$429 million. | https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Central_Bank_of_Iraq |
Berbers | Numidia (202 – 46 BC) was an ancient Berber kingdom in modern Algeria and part of Tunisia. It later alternated between being a Roman province and being a Roman client state. The kingdom was located on the eastern border of modern Algeria, bordered by the Roman province of Mauretania (in modern Algeria and Morocco) to the west, the Roman province of Africa (modern Tunisia) to the east, the Mediterranean to the north, and the Sahara Desert to the south. Its people were the Numidians.
The name Numidia was first applied by Polybius and other historians during the third century BC to indicate the territory west of Carthage, including the entire north of Algeria as far as the river Mulucha (Muluya), about 160 kilometres (100 mi) west of Oran. The Numidians were conceived of as two great groups: the Massylii in eastern Numidia, and the Masaesyli in the west. During the first part of the Second Punic War, the eastern Massylii, under King Gala, were allied with Carthage, while the western Masaesyli, under King Syphax, were allied with Rome.
In 206 BC, the new king of the Massylii, Masinissa, allied himself with Rome, and Syphax, of the Masaesyli, switched his allegiance to the Carthaginian side. At the end of the war, the victorious Romans gave all of Numidia to Masinissa. At the time of his death in 148 BC, Masinissa's territory extended from Mauretania to the boundary of Carthaginian territory, and southeast as far as Cyrenaica, so that Numidia entirely surrounded Carthage except towards the sea.
Masinissa was succeeded by his son Micipsa. When Micipsa died in 118 BC, he was succeeded jointly by his two sons Hiempsal I and Adherbal and Masinissa's illegitimate grandson, Jugurtha, of Berber origin, who was very popular among the Numidians. Hiempsal and Jugurtha quarreled immediately after the death of Micipsa. Jugurtha had Hiempsal killed, which led to open war with Adherbal.
After Jugurtha defeated him in open battle, Adherbal fled to Rome for help. The Roman officials, allegedly due to bribes but perhaps more likely out of a desire to quickly end conflict in a profitable client kingdom, sought to settle the quarrel by dividing Numidia into two parts. Jugurtha was assigned the western half. However, soon after, conflict broke out again, leading to the Jugurthine War between Rome and Numidia. | https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Berbers |
Mamluk Sultanate | Barsbay died on 7 June 1438 and, per his wishes, was succeeded by his fourteen-year-old son, al-Aziz Yusuf, with a leading emir of Barsbay, Sayf al-Din Jaqmaq, appointed regent. The usual disputes over succession ensued and after three months Jaqmaq won and became sultan, exiling Yusuf to Alexandria. Jaqmaq maintained friendly relations with the Ottomans. His most important foreign military effort was an abortive campaign to conquer Rhodes from the Knights of St. John, involving three expeditions between 1440 and 1444. Domestically, Jaqmaq largely continued Barsbay's monopolies, though he promised to enact reforms and formally rescinded some tariffs. Jaqmaq died in February 1453. His eighteen-year-old son, al-Mansur Uthman, was installed on the throne but soon lost all support when he tried to buy the loyalty of other mamluks with debased coins.
Sayf al-Din Inal, who Barsbay had made his atabeg al-asakir, won enough support to be declared sultan two months after Jaqmaq's death. He ruled when Mehmed II, the Ottoman sultan, conquered Constantinople in 1453 and ordered public celebrations to commemorate the event, much like the celebrations of a Mamluk victory. It is unclear whether Inal and the Mamluks understood the implications of this event. It marked the rise of the Ottomans as a superpower, a status that brought them into increasing conflict with the evermore stagnant Mamluk Sultanate. By then, the state was under severe financial stress, with the state selling off iqta'at properties, depriving the treasury of their tax revenues. Coins based on precious metals nearly disappeared from circulation.
Inal died on 26 February 1461. His son, al-Mu'ayyad Ahmad, ruled for a short stint under challenges from the governors of Damascus and Jeddah. A compromise candidate, the Greek Khushqadam al-Mu'ayyadi, was then chosen and eventually neturalized his opposition. His reign was marked by further political difficulties abroad and domestically. Cyprus remained a vassal, but Khushqadam's representative was killed in battle after insulting James II (who had been installed by Inal). At home, Bedouin tribes caused unrest and the sultan's attempts to suppress the Labid tribe in the Nile Delta and against the Hawwara in Upper Egypt had little effect. | https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Mamluk_Sultanate |
Oriental rug | In the early fourteenth century, Marco Polo wrote in the account of his travels about Anatolian rugs. Other thirteenth-century European travellers who journeyed to the court of the Mongol Empire were André de Longjumeau, William of Rubruck and Giovanni da Pian del Carpine with Benedykt Polak. None of them visited China except Marco Polo. The Moroccan merchant Ibn Battuta travelled with the Golden Horde and through China in the early-to-mid-14th century. The 14th-century English author John de Mandeville wrote an account of his journeys in the East. The travellers sometimes cursorily mention carpets, but only the luxurious carpets which they saw at royal courts seem to have attracted greater interest.
By the late twelfth century, the Republic of Venice, strategically positioned at the head of the Adriatic, became a flourishing trade center. In 1204, Enrico Dandolo, the Doge of Venice, led the Venetian contingent in the Fourth Crusade which ended in the Sack of Constantinople, and established Venetian predominance in the trade between western Europe and the Islamic world. Occasional reports appear about carpets and rugs being bought in Venice. In a series of letters from Venice dated 18 August - 13 October 1506, the Renaissance painter Albrecht Dürer mentions "two nice and large" carpets which he bought for a friend amongst other luxury goods. Objects of courtly representation and prestige initially, oriental rugs became affordable to wider groups of European citizens with the growing wealth and influence of merchant families and private persons. Inventories and testaments of Venetian citizens found in the archives document extensive collection of carpets.
Oriental rugs are depicted in a large number of Renaissance paintings. Since the late nineteenth century, attempts were made to determine the date when specific rugs were woven, and carpets were identified with designs similar to these reproduced in the paintings. As a rug could not have been woven later than it had appeared in a painting, the age of a carpet can be assessed by this “ante quem” method. However, the scientists who established the method soon realized that their approach was biased, as it focused on representative carpets. Only these were deemed worthy of being reproduced by artists. Village or nomadic rugs were not depicted in paintings aiming to represent dignity and prestige, and not until the mid twentieth century was their artistic and art historic value appreciated in the Western World. | https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Oriental_rug |
Richard Francis Burton | Burton had long had an interest in sexuality and some erotic literature. However, the Obscene Publications Act of 1857 had resulted in many jail sentences for publishers, with prosecutions being brought by the Society for the Suppression of Vice. Burton referred to the society and those who shared its views as Mrs Grundy. A way around this was the private circulation of books amongst the members of a society. For this reason Burton, together with Forster Fitzgerald Arbuthnot, created the Kama Shastra Society to print and circulate books that would be illegal to publish in public.
One of the most celebrated of all his books is his translation of The Book of the Thousand Nights and a Night (commonly called The Arabian Nights in English after early translations of Antoine Galland's French version) in ten volumes (1885), with seven further volumes being added later. The volumes were printed by the Kama Shastra Society in a subscribers-only edition of one thousand with a guarantee that there would never be a larger printing of the books in this form. The stories collected were often sexual in content and were considered pornography at the time of publication. In particular, the Terminal Essay in volume 10 of the Nights contained a 14,000-word essay entitled "Pederasty" (Volume 10, section IV, D), at the time a synonym for homosexuality (as it still is, in modern French). This was and remained for many years the longest and most explicit discussion of homosexuality in any language. Burton speculated that male homosexuality was prevalent in an area of the southern latitudes named by him the "Sotadic zone".
Perhaps Burton's best-known book is his translation of The Kama Sutra. It is untrue that he was the translator since the original manuscript was in ancient Sanskrit, which he could not read. However, he collaborated with Forster Fitzgerald Arbuthnot on the work and provided translations from other manuscripts of later translations. The Kama Shastra Society first printed the book in 1883 and numerous editions of the Burton translation are in print to this day.
His English translation from a French edition of the Arabic erotic guide The Perfumed Garden was printed as The Perfumed Garden of the Cheikh Nefzaoui: A Manual of Arabian Erotology (1886). After Burton's death, Isabel burnt many of his papers, including a manuscript of a subsequent translation, The Scented Garden, containing the final chapter of the work, on pederasty. Burton all along intended for this translation to be published after his death, to provide an income for his widow. | https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Richard_Francis_Burton |
Abdul-Karim Qasim | During Qasim's term, there was much debate over whether Iraq should join the United Arab Republic, led by Gamal Abdel Nasser. Having dissolved the Hashemite Arab Federation with the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan, Qasim refused to allow Iraq to enter the federation, although his government recognized the republic and considered joining it later.
Qasim's growing ties with the communists served to provoke rebellion in the northern Iraqi city of Mosul led by Arab nationalists in charge of military units. In an attempt to reduce the likelihood of a potential coup, Qasim had encouraged a communist backed Peace Partisans rally to be held in Mosul on 6 March 1959. Some 250,000 Peace Partisans and communists thronged through Mosul's streets that day, and although the rally passed peacefully, on 7 March, skirmishes broke out between communists and nationalists. This degenerated into a major civil disturbance over the following days. Although the rebellion was crushed by the military, it had a number of adverse effects that impacted Qasim's position. First, it increased the power of the communists. Second, it increased the strength of the Ba’ath Party, which had been growing steadily since the 14 July coup. The Ba'ath Party believed that the only way of halting the engulfing tide of communism was to assassinate Qasim.
The Ba'ath Party turned against Qasim because of his refusal to join Gamal Abdel Nasser's United Arab Republic. To strengthen his own position within the government, Qasim created an alliance with the Iraqi Communist Party (ICP), which was opposed to any notion of pan-Arabism. Later that year, the Ba'ath Party leadership put in place plans to assassinate Qasim. Saddam Hussein was a leading member of the operation. At the time, the Ba'ath Party was more of an ideological experiment than a strong anti-government fighting machine. The majority of its members were either educated professionals or students, and Saddam fitted in well within this group.
The choice of Saddam was, according to journalist Con Coughlin, "hardly surprising". The idea of assassinating Qasim may have been Nasser's, and there is speculation that some of those who participated in the operation received training in Damascus, which was then part of the United Arabic Republic. However, "no evidence has ever been produced to implicate Nasser directly in the plot".
The assassins planned to ambush Qasim on Al-Rashid Street on 7 October 1959. One man was to kill those sitting at the back of the car, the others killing those in front. During the ambush it was claimed that Saddam began shooting prematurely, which disrupted the whole operation. Qasim's chauffeur was killed, and Qasim was hit in the arm and shoulder. The would-be assassins believed they had killed him and quickly retreated to their headquarters, but Qasim survived.
The growing influence of communism was felt throughout 1959. A communist-sponsored purge of the armed forces was carried out in the wake of the Mosul revolt. The Iraqi cabinet began to shift towards the radical-left as several communist sympathisers gained posts in the cabinet. Iraq's foreign policy began to reflect this communist influence, as Qasim removed Iraq from the Baghdad Pact on 24 March, and then fostered closer ties with the Soviet Union, including extensive economic agreements. However, communist successes encouraged them to attempt to expand their power. The communists attempted to replicate their success at Mosul in Kirkuk. A rally was called for 14 July which was intended to intimidate conservative elements. Instead it resulted in widespread bloodshed between ethnic Kurds (who were associated with the ICP at the time) and Iraqi Turkmen, leaving between 30 and 80 people dead.
Despite being largely the result of pre-existing ethnic tensions, the Kirkuk "massacre" was exploited by Iraqi anti-communists and Qasim subsequently purged the communists and in early 1960 he refused to license the ICP as a legitimate political party. Qasim's actions led to a major reduction of communist influence in the Iraqi government. Communist influence in Iraq peaked in 1959 and the ICP squandered its best chance of taking power by remaining loyal to Qasim, while his attempts to appease Iraqi nationalists backfired and contributed to his eventual overthrow. For example, Qasim released Salih Mahdi Ammash from custody and reinstated him in the Iraqi army, allowing Ammash to act as the military liaison to the Ba'athist coup plotters. Furthermore, notwithstanding his outwardly friendly posture towards the Kurds, Qasim was unable to grant Kurdistan autonomous status within Iraq, leading to the 1961 outbreak of the First Iraqi–Kurdish War and secret contacts between the Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP) and Qasim's Ba'athist opponents in 1962 and 1963. The KDP promised not to aid Qasim in the event of a Ba'athist coup, ignoring long-standing Kurdish antipathy towards pan-Arab ideology. Disagreements between Qasim, the ICP and the Kurds thus created a power vacuum that was exploited by a "tiny" group of Iraqi Ba'athists in 1963. | https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Abdul-Karim_Qasim |
Arab world | The political borders of the Arab world have wandered, leaving Arab minorities in non-Arab countries of the Sahel and the Horn of Africa as well as in the Middle Eastern countries of Cyprus, Turkey and Iran, and also leaving non-Arab minorities in Arab countries. However, the basic geography of sea, desert and mountain provides the enduring natural boundaries for this region.
The Arab world straddles two continents, Africa and Asia. It is mainly oriented along an east–west axis.
The West Asian Arab region comprises the Arabian Peninsula, most of the Levant (excluding Cyprus and Israel), most of Mesopotamia (excluding parts of Turkey and Iran) and the Persian Gulf region. The peninsula is roughly a tilted rectangle that leans back against the slope of northeast Africa, the long axis pointing toward Turkey and Europe.
Arab North Africa comprises the entire northern third of the continent. It is surrounded by water on three sides (west, north, and east) and desert or desert scrubland on the fourth (south).
In the west, it is bounded by the shores of the Atlantic Ocean. From northeast to southwest, Morocco, Western Sahara (mostly unilaterally annexed by Morocco), and Mauritania make up the roughly 2,000 kilometers of Arab Atlantic coastline. The southwestern sweep of the coast is gentle but substantial, such that Mauritania's capital, Nouakchott (18°N, 16°W), is far enough west to share longitude with Iceland (13–22°W). Nouakchott is the westernmost capital of the Arab World and the third-westernmost in Africa, and sits on the Atlantic fringe of the southwestern Sahara. Next south along the coast from Mauritania is Senegal, whose abrupt border belies the gradient in culture from Arab to indigenous African that historically characterizes this part of West Africa.
Arab Africa's boundary to the north is again a continental boundary, the Mediterranean Sea. This boundary begins in the west with the narrow Strait of Gibraltar, the thirteen kilometer wide channel that connects the Mediterranean with the Atlantic to the west, and separates Morocco from Spain to the north. East along the coast from Morocco are Algeria, Tunisia, and Libya, followed by Egypt, which forms the region's, and the continent's, northeastern corner. The coast turns briefly but sharply south at Tunisia, slopes more gently southeastward through the Libyan capital of Tripoli, and bumps north through Libya's second city, Benghazi, before turning straight east again through Egypt's second city, Alexandria, at the mouth of the Nile. Along with the spine of Italy to its north, Tunisia marks the junction of western and eastern Mediterranean, and a cultural transition as well: west of Egypt begins the region of the Arab World known as the Maghreb include (Libya, Tunisia, Algeria, Morocco and Mauritania).
Historically the 4,000-kilometer Mediterranean boundary has fluttered. Population centers north of it in Europe have invited contact and Arab exploration—mostly friendly, though sometimes not. Islands and peninsulas near the Arab coast have changed hands. The islands of Sicily and Malta lie just a hundred kilometers east of the Tunisian city of Carthage, which has been a point of contact with Europe since its founding in the first millennium BCE; both Sicily and Malta at times have been part of the Arab World. Just across the Strait of Gibraltar from Morocco, regions of the Iberian peninsula were part of the Arab World throughout the Middle Ages, extending the northern boundary at times to the foothills of the Pyrenees and leaving a substantial mark on local and wider European and Western culture.
The northern boundary of the African Arab world has also fluttered briefly in the other direction, first through the Crusades and later through the imperial involvement of France, Britain, Spain, and Italy. Another visitor from northern shores, Turkey, controlled the east of the region for centuries, though not as a colonizer. Spain still maintains two small enclaves, Ceuta and Melilla (called "Morocco Espanol"), along the otherwise Moroccan coast. Overall this wave has ebbed, though like the Arab expansion north it has left its mark. The proximity of North Africa to Europe has always encouraged interaction, and this continues with Arab immigration to Europe and European interest in the Arab countries today. However, population centers and the physical fact of the sea keeps this boundary of the Arab World settled on the Mediterranean coastline.
To the east, the Red Sea defines the boundary between Africa and Asia, and thus also between Arab Africa and Arab West Asia. This sea is a long and narrow waterway with a northwest tilt, stretching 2,300 kilometers from Egypt's Sinai peninsula southeast to the Bab-el-Mandeb strait between Djibouti in Africa and Yemen in Arabia but on average just 150 kilometers wide. Though the sea is navigable along its length, historically much contact between Arab Africa and Arab West Asia has been either overland across the Sinai or by sea across the Mediterranean or the narrow Bab al Mendeb strait. From northwest to southeast, Egypt, Sudan, and Eritrea form the African coastline, with Djibouti marking Bab al Mendeb's African shore.
Southeast along the coast from Djibouti is Somalia, but the Somali coast soon makes a 90-degree turn and heads northeast, mirroring a bend in the coast of Yemen across the water to the north and defining the south coast of the Gulf of Aden. The Somali coast then takes a hairpin turn back southwest to complete the horn of Africa. For six months of the year the monsoon winds blow from up equatorial Somalia, past Arabia and over the small Yemeni archipelago of Socotra, to rain on India. They then switch directions and blow back.
The east- and especially southeast-coast boundary of Arab Africa has historically been a gateway for maritime trade and cultural exchange with both East Africa and the subcontinent. The trade winds help explain the presence of the Comoros islands, an Arab-African country, off the coast of Mozambique, near Madagascar in the Indian Ocean, the southernmost part of the Arab World.
The southern boundary of Arab North Africa is the strip of scrubland known as the Sahel that crosses the continent south of the Sahara. | https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Arab_world |
Culture of Tunisia | The Bardo National Museum is one of the largest institutions of its kind in the Mediterranean, consisting of archaeological treasures from over several millennia by many cultures. The museum officially opened on May 7, 1888, and offers one of the finest and largest collections of mosaics of ancient Rome. The Archaeological Museum of Sousse, founded in 1951, has the second largest collection of mosaics after the Bardo. The Oceanographic Museum of Salammbo, with its 11 rooms, is the main Tunisian museum dedicated to the sea. The National Museum of Islamic Art in Tunisia has several collections of pottery, pieces of Korans and calligraphy dating from when Raqqada occupied the Aghlabids capital, from the 9th century.
In the 1970s, a program was implemented in cooperation with UNESCO. It provides four types of museum: museums synthesis, regional museums, local museums and specialized museums. The Bardo Museum is a good example of museum synthesis since this type of museum is expected to house objects from all periods of the history of Tunisia without taking into account the origin of these.
The existence of these museums is justified by the fact that they illustrate the evolution of artistic creation over the civilizations. Regional museums are limited to chief towns and governorates, specializing in the history of each region. As for local museums, they are part of a policy of decentralization of culture to participate through museum education of the masses by encouraigng more and more people to visit the museums. Some local museums exist in Makthar, Utica, Carthage and Monastir. Finally, specialized museums themselves can be divided into two other categories of museums: the museums dedicated to a historical period and museums specializing in a given subject. In the first category, there is already the Dar Hussein museum, entirely devoted to the medieval Tunisia. In the second category, two projects were selected: the mosaic museum and a Paleo-Christian museum. The mosaic museum is fully justified by the richness of Tunisia in art museums and provides an evolution both thematically and chronologically on the subject. As for the Paleo-Christian Museum, it is now located in Carthage.
Other specialized museums are also considered as museums of culture and science museums. These are used to trace the history and evolution of technology. | https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Culture_of_Tunisia |
Ben Gurion Airport | Terminal 3, which opened on 28 October 2004, replaced Terminal 1 as the main international gateway to and from Israel. The building was designed by Skidmore, Owings & Merrill (SOM). Moshe Safdie & Associates and TRA (now Black and Veatch) designed a linking structure and the airside departure areas and gates. Ram Karmi and other Israeli architects were the local architects of record. The inaugural flight was an El Al flight to John F. Kennedy International Airport in New York City.
Work on Natbag 2000, as the Terminal 3 project was known, was scheduled for completion prior to 2000 in order to handle a massive influx of pilgrims expected for the Millennium celebrations. This deadline was not met due to higher than anticipated costs and a series of work stoppages in the wake of the bankruptcy of the main Turkish contractor. The project eventually cost an estimated one billion US dollars. Due to the proximity of the airport to the country's largest population centres and the problem of noise pollution, another international airport is being considered to be built elsewhere in the country, such as the new Ilan and Assaf Ramon Airport in Southern Israel.
The overall layout of Terminal 3 is similar to that of airports in Europe and North America, with multiple levels and considerable distances to walk after disembarking from the aircraft. The walk is assisted by escalators and moving walkways. The upper level departures hall, with an area of over 10,000 m2 (110,000 sq ft), is equipped with 110 check-in counters and as well as flight information display systems. A small shopping mall, known as Buy & Bye, is open to both travellers and the general public. The mall, which includes shops, restaurants and a post office, was planned to be a draw for non-flyers too. On the same level as the mall, passengers enter passport control and the security check. Planes taking off and landing can be viewed from a distinctive tilted glass wall. The arrivals hall is located on the ground floor where there are also 20 additional check-in counters (serving Star Alliance airlines). Car rental counters are located in an intermediate level situated between the departing and arriving passenger halls. Terminal 3 has two synagogues.
After the main security check, passengers wait for their flights in the star-shaped duty-free rotunda. A variety of cafes, restaurants and duty-free shops are located there, open 24 hours a day, as well as a synagogue, banking facilities, a transit hall for connecting passengers and a desk for VAT refunds.
Terminal 3 has a total of 40 gates divided among four concourses (B, C, D, and E), each with 8 jet bridge-equipped gates (numbered 2 through 9), as well as two stand gates (bus bays 1 and 1A) from which passengers are ferried to aircraft. Two gates in concourse E utilize dual jet bridges for more efficient processing of very large widebody aircraft. Concourses B, C, and D were opened when terminal 3 opened in 2004, while concourse E was completed in 2018. Space exists for one additional concourse (A) at Terminal 3.
Free wireless internet is provided throughout the terminal.
The terminal has three business lounges—the exclusive El Al King David Lounge for frequent flyers and three Dan lounges for either privileged or paying flyers.
In January 2007, the IAA announced plans for a 120-bed hotel to be located about 300 m (980 ft) west of Terminal 3. The tender for the hotel was published by the IAA in late 2017.
When the terminal was built, it was said to have a capacity for up to 12 million passengers a year. In 2023, 25 million passengers are expected to pass through Ben Gurion Airport. | https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ben_Gurion_Airport |
Punic people | It is unclear when the Phoenicians began to seriously colonize North Africa. Writers in antiquity, such as Pliny the Elder, dated the beginning of the colonization efforts to the 12th and 11th centuries BC, as several legends describe interactions between Phoenician colonists and famous figures from the Trojan War, such as Aeneas. Archaeological evidence, on the other hand, generally implies that the colonies began in the 8th century BC as, barring a few exceptional sites, any material evidence of Phoenician habitation before this time period is lacking.
The Phoenician colonial system was motivated by economic opportunity, not expansionist ideology and, as such, the Phoenicians lacked the numbers or even the desire to establish an "empire" overseas. The colonies were therefore independent city-states, though most were relatively small, probably having a population of less than 1,000. Some colonies, such as Carthage, were able to grow much larger. Effectively establishing a monopoly on the continent's natural resources, the colonies' wealth exploded, which was compounded by an influx of Phoenician traders fleeing from increasing tributary obligations to foreign powers and trade interference.
Within a century, the population of Carthage rose to 30,000, meanwhile, the "mother city" of Tyre, once the economic and political capital of Phoenicia, began to lose its status in the seventh century BC. Phoenicia was eventually conquered by the Neo-Assyrian Empire, by which point Carthage had become the wealthiest and most powerful of all the Phoenician colonies. Around this time, a distinct culture began to emerge from the admixture of local customs with Phoenician traditions, which also gave rise to a nascent sense of national identity. Tyre's status and power continued to diminish under Neo-Assyrian, and subsequently Neo-Babylonian, vassalage, and by the sixth century BC, its voluntary submission to the Achaemenid Empire had severely circumscribed what little power it retained. Its status as the pre-eminent Phoenician city was then usurped by its rival city-state, Sidon – but Sidon too was under Persian subjugation, leading the way for Carthage to fill the power vacuum as the leading Phoenician political power. | https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Punic_people |
History of Yemen | In 2014, the Houthi movement, which had been waging an insurgency against the Yemeni government since 2004, began a gradual takeover of Yemen, defeating government forces in the Battle of Amran and the Battle of Sana'a (2014). Their advance continued throughout Yemen, prompting the start of the Saudi Arabian-led intervention in Yemen. The Houthis attacked Aden on 25 March 2015, beginning the Battle of Aden (2015). Despite Saudi airstrikes, the Houthis managed to take advance into the Tawahi, Khormaksar, and Crater districts. The tide turned on 14 July, when an anti-Houthi counteroffensive managed to trap the Houthis on the peninsula. By 6 August 2015, the Hadi government had captured 75% of Taiz, and the Lahij insurgency had expelled Houthis from the Lahij Governorate. Hadi fortunes dissipated on 16 August, when Houthi forces successfully counterattacked and forced the Hadi forces to retreat from Al-Salih Gardens and the Al-Dabab Mountain region. Hadi forces attributed this reverse to a lack of military equipment. In Hadramaut, Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) managed to take over Mukalla after winning the Battle of Mukalla (2015), and in December 2015 they took over Zinjibar and Jaar.
2016 saw the Hadi government defeat Houthi forces in the Battle of Port Midi, and retake Mukalla from AQAP in the Battle of Mukalla (2016). In January 2017, the United States carried out the Raid on Yakla, in a failed attempt to obtain new intelligence regarding AQAP. In December, the Hadi Government began the Al Hudaydah offensive. In June 2018, the Hadi Government began an attack on the city of Hudaydah itself, starting the Battle of Al Hudaydah, which is considered the largest battle in the war since the start of the Saudi intervention.
In December 2017, former president and strongman Ali Abdullah Saleh was killed. He had been an ally of the Houthis since 2014 until just before his death.
The war in Yemen also resulted in cholera and famine. (See Famine in Yemen (2016–present) and 2016–18 Yemen cholera outbreak)
After losing the support of the Saudi-led coalition, Yemen's President Abd Rabbuh Mansur Hadi resigned and Presidential Leadership Council took power in April 2022. | https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/History_of_Yemen |
Qibla | The qibla is the direction of the Kaaba, a cube-like building at the centre of the Sacred Mosque (al-Masjid al-Haram) in Mecca, in the Hijaz region of Saudi Arabia. Other than its role as qibla, it is also the holiest site for Muslims, also known as the House of God (Bayt Allah) and where the tawaf (the circumambulation ritual) is performed during the Hajj and umrah pilgrimages. The Kaaba has an approximately rectangular ground plan with its four corners pointing close to the four cardinal directions. According to the Quran, it was built by Abraham and Ishmael, both of whom are prophets in Islam. Few historical records remain detailing the history of the Kaaba before the rise of Islam, but in the generations prior to Muhammad, the Kaaba had been used as a shrine of the pre-Islamic Arabic religion.
The qibla status of the Kaaba (or the Sacred Mosque in which it is located) is based on the verses 144, 149, and 150 of the al-Baqarah chapter of the Quran, each of which contains a command to "turn your face toward the Sacred Mosque" (fawalli wajhaka shatr al-Masjid il-Haram). According to Islamic traditions, these verses were revealed in the month of Rajab or Sha'ban in the second Hijri year (623 CE), or about 15 or 16 months after Muhammad's migration to Medina. Prior to these revelations, Muhammad and the Muslims in Medina had prayed towards Jerusalem as the qibla, the same direction as the prayer direction—the mizrah—used by the Jews of Medina. Islamic tradition says that these verses were revealed during a prayer congregation; Muhammad and his followers immediately changed their direction from Jerusalem to Mecca in the middle of the prayer ritual. The location of this event became the Masjid al-Qiblatayn ("The Mosque of the Two Qiblas").
There are different reports of the qibla direction when Muhammad was in Mecca (before his migration to Medina). According to a report cited by historian al-Tabari and exegete (textual interpreter) al-Baydawi, Muhammad prayed towards the Kaaba. Another report, cited by al-Baladhuri and also by al-Tabari, says that Muhammad prayed towards Jerusalem while in Mecca. Another report, mentioned in Ibn Hisham's biography of Muhammad, says that Muhammad prayed in such a way as to face the Kaaba and Jerusalem simultaneously. Today Muslims of all branches, including the Sunni and the Shia, all pray towards the Kaaba. Historically, one major exception was the Qarmatians, a now-defunct syncretic Shia sect which rejected the Kaaba as the qibla; in 930, they sacked Mecca and for a time took the Kaaba's Black Stone to their centre of power in al-Ahsa, with the intention of starting a new era in Islam. | https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Qibla |
Italian Somaliland | By 1935, Mogadishu began to serve as a major naval base and port for the Italians. Then Prime Minister of Italy Benito Mussolini regarded Greater Somalia (La Grande Somalia) as the crown jewel in Italy's colonial empire on the continent. He viewed himself less as an invader than as a liberator of the occupied Somali territories, including the Ogaden region, to which the Ethiopian Empire laid claim. On this basis, he justified his plan to invade Ethiopia. In October 1935, the southern front of the Second Italo-Abyssinian War was launched into Ethiopia from Italian Somaliland. The Italian General Rodolfo Graziani commanded the invasion forces in the south. Over 40,000 Somali troops served in the war, mostly as combat units. They backed up the over 80,000 Italians serving alongside them at the start of the offensive. Many of the Somalis were veterans from serving in Italian Libya. During the invasion of Ethiopia, Mogadishu served as a chief supply base.
In June 1936, after the war ended, Italian Somaliland became part of Italian East Africa (Africa Orientale Italiana) forming the Somalia Governorate. The new colony of the Italian Empire also included Ethiopia and Eritrea. To commemorate the victory, an Arch of Triumph was constructed in Mogadishu.
From 1936 to 1940, new roads were constructed in the region, such as the "Imperial Road" from Mogadishu to Addis Ababa. New railways (114 km from Mogadishu to Jowhar) and many schools, hospitals, ports and bridges were also built.
Since the start of the colony, many Somali troops fought in the so-called Regio Corpo Truppe Coloniali. The soldiers were enrolled as Dubats, Zaptié and Bande irregolari. During World War II, these troops were regarded as a wing of the Italian Army's Infantry Division, as was the case in Libya and Eritrea. The Zaptié were considered the best: they provided a ceremonial escort for the Italian Viceroy (Governor) as well as the territorial police. There were already more than one thousand such soldiers in 1922. In 1941, in Italian Somaliland and Ethiopia, 2,186 Zaptìé plus an additional 500 recruits under training officially constituted a part of the Carabinieri. They were organised into a battalion commanded by Major Alfredo Serranti that defended Culqualber (Ethiopia) for three months until this military unit was destroyed by the Allies. After heavy fighting, all the Italian Carabinieri, including the Somali troops, received full military honors from the British.
In 1935, there were over 50,000 Italians settlers living in Italian Somaliland, constituting 5% of the territory's population. Of those, 20,000 resided in Mogadishu (called officially in Italian language:Mogadiscio), representing around 40% of the city's 50,000 residents. Mogadishu was an administrative capital of Italian East Africa, and new buildings were erected in the Italian architectural tradition. Other Italian settler communities were concentrated in Jowhar, Adale (Itala), Janale, Jamame, and Kismayo. These figures do not include the more than 220,000 Italian soldiers stationed throughout Italian Somaliland during the Second Italo-Ethiopian War.
The colony was also one of the most developed in Africa in terms of the standard of living of the colonists and of the local inhabitants, mainly in the urban areas. By 1940, the Villaggio Duca degli Abruzzi ("Villabruzzi"; Jowhar) had a population of 12,000 people, of whom nearly 3,000 were Italian Somalis, and enjoyed a notable level of development with a small manufacturing area with agricultural industries (sugar mills, etc.).
In the second half of 1940, Italian troops invaded British Somaliland, and ejected the British. The Italians also occupied Kenyan areas bordering Jubaland around the villages of Moyale and Buna. Although the Italian leadership believed were unsure where the British army would land first, Operation Canvas, to capture southern Somalia occurred first in January 1941, whereas the subsequent attempt to capture British Somaliland happened two months later in Operation Appearance.
In the spring of 1941, Britain regained control of British Somaliland and conquered Italian Somaliland with the Ogaden. However, until the summer of 1943, there was an Italian guerrilla war in all the areas of the former Italian East Africa. | https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Italian_Somaliland |
Wahhabism | Pakistani poet Muhammad Iqbal praised the movement as an influential endeavour of Islamic Golden Age that campaigned to put an end to the general stagnation of Muslims, while saying that
The essential thing to note is the spirit of freedom manifested in it, though inwardly this movement, too, is conservative in its own fashion. While it rises in revolt against the finality of the schools, and vigorously asserts the right of private judgement, its vision of the past is wholly uncritical, and in matters of law it mainly falls back on the traditions of the Prophet.Islamic scholar Bilal Philips asserted that the charge of "Wahhabi" was deployed by the proponents of Madh'hab fanaticism during the nineteenth and twentieth centuries to Takfir (excommunicate) the legal non-conformists. According to Philips:
"It is interesting to note that separate places of prayer for each of the Madh-habs remained around the Ka'bah until the first quarter of the twentieth century when 'Abdul-'Azeez ibn Sa'oud and his army conquered Makkah (October 1924) and united all worshippers behind a single Imaam regardless of his or their Madh-habs"Syrian-Egyptian Islamic revivalist scholar Muhammad Rashid Rida was one of the most influential supporters of the Wahhabi movement during the 20th century. Rida had developed favourable views towards the Wahhabis as early as his arrival in Egypt during the 1890s; after reading about the movement in the histories of Al-Jabartī and Al-Nāṣiri. Rida asserted that the social and military expansion of the Wahhabi movement could successfully launch an authentic Islamic revival throughout the Islamic World. Rida believed that the decline of Muslims was a result of the stagnation caused by the excesses of Sufism; which had distorted the pristine message of Islam. As a leading figure of the Salafiyya movement, Rida launched his project of re-habilitating Wahhabism and would popularise Najdi scholarly treatises across the Muslim World through his Al-Manar printing press.
Sukarno, the first president of Indonesia, had openly expressed his view in his book "dibawah bendera revolusi", that the progressive "Tajdid" movement by Wahhabis was essential and had positive influence towards Muslims world in global scale, particularly to rising nations which struggled to gain their independence, such as Indonesia. Sukarno also appreciated the "wisdom of Ibn Saud to support Wahhabi scholars in their effort to reject various one thousand one kind of Bidʻah". It is argued by some that Sukarno was also influenced by Islamist figures such as Ahmad Khatib al-Minangkabawi, Agus Salim, and particularly Hamka, his elementary teacher.
According to notable Arab Linguist Taha Hussein (1889–1973 C.E), the Wahhabi movement was new, yet simultaneously old. Although it was novel for its contemporary generations, it was also ancient in its powerful calls for return to a pure Islam untainted by the impurities of Shirk (polytheism). Acclaiming its role in the Arab Awakening and intellectual renewal, Taha Hussein states: "Muhammad Ibn Abdul Wahhab admonished the people of Najd for reverting to the ways of ignorance in creed and practice.... it was hoped, this madhhab would have united the Arabs in the twelfth and thirteenth centuries (AH), just as the appearance of Islam united them in the first century (AH). What we need to emphasize regarding this madhhab is its impact on the intellectual and literary life among Arabs, which was great and profound in various ways. It awakened the Arab soul and placed in front of it, a higher example which it loved, and as a consequence, strived in its cause with the sword, the pen and other weapons. It again directed the attention of all Muslims, especially people of Iraq, Ash-Sham and Egypt, towards the Arabian Peninsula." | https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Wahhabism |
Merv | Sassanian rule ended when the last Sassanian ruler, Yazdegerd III (632–651) was killed near the city and the Sassanian military governor surrendered to the approaching Arab army. Representatives of the caliph, Umar occupied the city, which became the capital of the Umayyad province of Khorasan. In 671, Ziyad ibn Abi Sufyan sent 50,000 Arab troops to Merv as a colony. This colony retained its native Kufan sympathies and became the nucleus of Khurasan. Using the city as their base, the Arabs, led by Qutayba ibn Muslim from 705 to 715, brought large parts of Central Asia, including Balkh, Bukhara, and Fergana under subjection. Merv, and Khorasan, in general, became one of the first parts of the Persian-speaking world to become majority-Muslim. Arab immigration to the area was substantial. A Chinese man captured at Talas, Du Huan, was brought to Baghdad and toured the caliphate. He observed that in Merv, Khurasan, Arabs and Persians lived in mixed concentrations.
Merv gained renewed importance in February 748 when the Iranian general Abu Muslim (d. 755) declared a new Abbasid dynasty at Merv, expanding and re-founding the city, and, in the name of the Abbasid line, used the city as a base of rebellion against the Umayyad caliphate. After the Abbasids established themselves in Baghdad, Abu Muslim continued to rule Merv as a semi-independent prince until his eventual assassination. Indeed, Merv operated as the centre of Abbasid partisanship for the duration of the Abbasid Revolution of 746–750, and became a consistent source of political support for the Abbasid rulers in Baghdad later on; the governorship of Khurasan at Merv was one of the most important political figures of the Caliphate. The influential Barmakid family, based in Merv, played an important part in transferring Greek knowledge (established in Merv since the days of the Seleucids and Greco-Bactrians) into the Arab world.
Throughout the Abbasid era, Merv remained the capital and most important city of Khurasan. During this time, the Arab historian Al-Muqaddasi (c. 945/946–991) called Merv "delightful, fine, elegant, brilliant, extensive, and pleasant". Merv's architecture inspired the Abbasid re-planning of Baghdad. A 10th-century Arab historian, Ibn Hawqal, wrote of Merv: "and in no other city are to be seen such palaces and groves, and gardens and streams".
Merv was also known for its high-quality textiles. A 12th-century Arab geographer al-Idrisi noted: "From this country is derived much silk as well as cotton of a superior quality under the name of Merv cotton, which is extremely soft." The Islamic world admired the elegant robes and silk turbans produced in Merv. The city was notable as a home for immigrants from the Arab lands and those from Sogdia and elsewhere in Central Asia.
In the period from 813 to 818, the temporary residency of the caliph, al-Ma'mun effectively made Merv the capital of the Muslim world and highlighted Merv's importance to the Abbasids. A descendant of the Islamic prophet Muhammad, 8th Imam of Twelver Shia Islam, Ali ar-Ridha moved to Merv and lived there for several years. Merv also became the centre of a major 8th-century Neo-Mazdakite movement led by al-Muqanna, the "Veiled Prophet", who gained many followers by claiming to be an incarnation of God and heir to Abu Muslim; the Khurramiyya inspired by him, persisted in Merv until the 12th century.
During this period Merv, like Samarqand and Bukhara, functioned as one of the great cities of Muslim scholarship; the celebrated historian Yaqut (1179–1229) studied in its libraries. Merv produced a number of scholars in various branches of knowledge, such as Islamic law, hadith, history, and literature. Several scholars have the name "Marwazi" (المروزي) designating them as hailing from Merv. The city continued to have a substantial Christian community. In 1009, the Archbishop of Merv sent a letter to the Patriarch at Baghdad asking that the Keraites be allowed to fast less than other Nestorian Christians. Great Persian polymath Omar Khayyam, among others, spent several years working at the observatory in Merv. As Persian geographer and traveller al-Istakhri wrote of Merv: "Of all the countries of Iran, these people were noted for their talents and education." Yaqut al-Hamawi counted as many as 10 giant libraries in Merv, including one within a major mosque that contained 12,000 volumes.
As the caliphate weakened, Persian general Tahir b. al -Husayn and his Tahirid dynasty replaced Arab rule in Merv in 821. The Tahirids ruled Merv from 821 to 873, followed by the Saffarids, then the Samanids and later the Ghaznavids. | https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Merv |
Mohammed bin Salman | Mohammed took the leadership in the restructuring of Saudi Arabia's economy, which he officially announced in April 2016 when he introduced Vision 2030, the country's strategic orientation for the next 15 years. Vision 2030 plans to reform Saudi Arabia's economy towards a more diversified and privatised structure. It details goals and measures in various fields, from developing non-oil revenues and privatisation of the economy to e-government and sustainable development.
One of the major motives behind this economic restructure through Vision 2030 can be traced back to Saudi Arabia's reliance on a rentier economy, as a limit on oil resources makes its sustainability a problem in the future. While the country claims to own a proven reserve of 266.58 billion barrels of crude oil, the energy analyst Matthew R. Simmons estimates the true number to be far less, as the last non-Saudi report by the General Accounting Office in 1978 only mentioned 110 billion barrels.
At the inaugural Future Investment Initiative conference in Riyadh in October 2017, Mohammed announced plans for the creation of Neom, a $500 billion economic zone to cover an area of 26,000 square kilometres on Saudi Arabia's Red Sea coast, extending into Jordan and Egypt. Neom aims to attract investment in sectors including renewable energy, biotechnology (especially genetically modified agriculture), robotics and advanced manufacturing. The announcement followed plans to develop a 34,000 square kilometre area across a lagoon of 50 islands on Saudi Arabia's Red Sea coastline into a luxury tourism destination with laws on a par with international standards. In a further effort to boost the tourism industry, in November 2017 it was announced that Saudi Arabia would start issuing tourist visas for foreigners, beginning in 2018.
Mohammed's biggest bet was his plan to restore Saudi dominance in global oil markets by driving the new competition into bankruptcy, by keeping the oil price low enough for a long enough period. Saudi Arabia persuaded OPEC to do the same. A few small players went bankrupt, but American frackers only shut down their less-profitable operations temporarily, and waited for oil prices to go up again. Saudi Arabia, which had been spending $100 billion a year to keep services and subsidies going, had to admit defeat in November 2016. It then cut production significantly and asked its OPEC partners to do the same.
In the last week of September 2018, Mohammed inaugurated the much-awaited $6.7bn high-speed railway line connecting Mecca and Medina, the two holiest cities of Islam. The Haramain Express is 450 km line travelling up to 300 km/h that can transport around 60 million passengers annually. The commercial operations of the railway began on 11 October 2018.
In October 2018, Mohammed announced that the Public Investment Fund of Saudi Arabia's assets were approaching $400 billion and would pass $600 billion by 2020.
Mohammed announced a project to build Saudi Arabia's first nuclear reactor in November 2018. The kingdom aims to build 16 nuclear facilities over the next 20 years. Efforts to diversify the Saudi energy sector also include wind and solar, including a 1.8 gigawatt solar plant announced in the same month as part of a long-term project in partnership with SoftBank. | https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Mohammed_bin_Salman |
Solomon's Temple | 1 Kings 8:10–66 and 2 Chronicles 6:1–42 recount the events of the temple's dedication. When the priests emerged from the holy of holies after placing the Ark there, the Temple was filled with an overpowering cloud that interrupted the dedication ceremony, "for the glory of the Lord had filled the house of the Lord [such that] the priests could not stand to minister" (1 Kings 8:10–11; 2 Chronicles 5:13, 14). Solomon interpreted the cloud as "[proof] that his pious work was accepted":
"The Lord has said that he would dwell in thick darkness.
I have built you an exalted house, a place for you to dwell in forever."
The allusion is to Leviticus 16:2:
The Lord said to Moses: Tell your brother Aaron not to come just at any time into the sanctuary inside the curtain before the mercy seat that is upon the ark, or he will die; for I appear in the cloud upon the mercy seat.
The Pulpit Commentary notes that "Solomon had thus every warrant for connecting a theophany with the thick dark cloud". Solomon then led the whole assembly of Israel in prayer, noting that the construction on the temple represented a fulfilment of God's promise to David, dedicating the temple as a place of prayer and reconciliation for the people of Israel and for foreigners living in Israel, and highlighting the paradox that God who lives in the heavens cannot really be contained within a single building. The dedication was concluded with musical celebration and sacrifices said to have included "twenty-two thousand bulls and one hundred and twenty thousand sheep". These sacrifices were offered outside the temple, in "the middle of the court that was in front of the house of the Lord", because the altar inside the temple, despite its extensive dimensions, was not big enough for the offerings being made that day. The celebration lasted eight days and was attended by "very great assembly [gathered] from the entrance of Hamath to the Brook of Egypt". The subsequent feast of Tabernacles extended the whole celebration to 14 days, before the people were "sent away to their homes".
After the dedication, Solomon hears in a dream that God has heard his prayer, and God will continue to hear the prayers of the people of Israel if they adopt the four ways in which they could move God to action: humility, prayer, seeking his face, and turning from wicked ways. Conversely, if they turn aside and forsake God's commandments and worship other gods, then God will abandon the temple: "this house which I have sanctified for My name I will cast out of My sight". | https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Solomon%27s_Temple |
Healthcare in the State of Palestine | To provide an informative overview of the current state of healthcare within the Palestinian Territories, some statistical information about the current system will provide greater clarity on the state of affairs. Currently, the Palestinian territories have approximately sixty hospitals and medical centers within the region, with numerous other medical research institutes pursuing initiatives on various medical advances including issues like cancer and Parkinson's Disease treatments, as well as stem-cell research. However, the Palestinians lack a fundamental and substantive primary care system that can reach out to the local population. Infrastructural challenges restrict the movement of physicians and medical supplies, and lack of efficient logistics prevents a coordinated effort by all healthcare service providers to provide the necessary primary care. Because all medicines must be sourced through Israel, the PA is unable to take advantage of lower prices often available in Arab countries.
The ongoing COVID-19 pandemic emerged in the State of Palestine on 5 March 2020. Currently, 7.32% of the population within the recognized State of Palestine have received COVID-19 vaccinations, which is a total 4.21% below the global average of 11.53% and 55.76% below the State of Israel's total vaccination of 63.08%, drawing praise to Israel's "successful COVID-19 vaccine program". Such praise has been met with severe criticism by human rights organizations, citing Article 56 of the Fourth Geneva Convention, which states that "the Occupying Power has the duty of ensuring and maintaining, with the cooperation of national and local authorities, the medical and hospital establishments and services, public health and hygiene in the occupied territory, with particular reference to the adoption and application of the prophylactic and preventive measures necessary to combat the spread of contagious diseases and epidemics." However, the recent escalation of violence between Israel and Hamas between 10 May 2021 to 11 May 2021 exacerbated this disparity by spiking cases in Gaza after Israel's bombardment of Gaza's "central testing laboratory for COVID-19 at Rimal Clinic"; of over 2,300 housing units, driving 77,000 new Palestinians of Gaza into internal displacement and thus homelessness, further exacerbating the overcrowded conditions of Gaza; and through the 16 May 2021 Israeli airstrikes of the residential building, which resulted in the killing of Dr. Ayman Abu al-Auf, physician chief of internal medicine at Gaza's Al-Shifa Hospital, where he also served as the director of coronavirus response efforts.
While an immunization policy for Palestinian infants has recently been implemented, a policy for young adults and adults does not exist. According to the World Bank, only 44 percent of all Palestinians have access to "reasonable and customary" healthcare. In other words, only 44 percent of all Palestinians have access to all of the treatment that they should. This leaves a startling 56 percent of the population with access to little or no healthcare whatsoever.
The Palestinian Authority and the Vital Statistics Records in the Palestinian Territories records births in the region, and recent research suggests that the fertility rate of Palestinians is nearly at an all-time historical high. In fact, 46% of the population is under 15 years of age. These demographic shifts present interesting challenges and opportunities to the healthcare system in the Palestinian Territories. While there is a socialized healthcare system within the Palestinian Territories that provides universal and compulsory enrollment for all citizens, the healthcare provided in this universal plan is far below the normal standard of care accorded to healthy individuals. These inadequate healthcare provisions, along with improper preventative care and lifestyle choices, contribute to the four primary causes of death within the region, which include cardiovascular disease, cancer, cerebrovascular disease, and diabetes.
Among Palestinians aged 15–64 years, 58% of them are overweight, 36% have high levels of cholesterol, and 8.5% have diabetes mellitus. Additional contributors to poor health include a large prevalence (38%) of men who smoke, and that 75% of Palestinians who do not engage in any vigorous physical activity at all. The Palestinian National Health Strategy attempts to address and mitigate these health issues within the region by suggesting to citizens appropriate diet and exercise routines, providing good governance and leadership in overseeing and regulating the Palestinian health sector, and providing a framework for citizens to have access to and receive high quality, safe health care. | https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Healthcare_in_the_State_of_Palestine |
Odaenathus | Odaenathus was married twice. Nothing is known about his first wife's name or fate. Zenobia was the King's second wife, whom he married in the late 250s when she was 17 or 18.
How many children Odaenathus had with his first wife is unknown and only one is attested:
Hairan I – Herodianus: the name Hairan appears on a 251 inscription from Palmyra describing him as ras, implying that he was already an adult by then. In the Augustan History, Odaenathus' eldest son is named Herod; the dedication at Palmyra from 263 which celebrates Hairan I's coronation mentions him with the name Herodianus. It is possible that the Hairan of the 251 inscription is not the same as the Herodianus of the dedication from 263, but this is contested by Hartmann, who concludes that the reason for the difference in the spelling is the language used in the inscription (Herodianus being the Greek version), meaning that Odaenathus' eldest son and co-king was Hairan Herodianus. Hartmann's view is in line with the academic consensus.
The children of Odaenathus and Zenobia were:
Vaballathus: he is attested on several coins, inscriptions, and in the ancient literature.
Hairan II: his image appears on a seal impression along with his older brother Vaballathus; his identity is much debated. Potter suggested that he is the same as Herodianus, who was crowned in 263, and that the Hairan I mentioned in 251 died before the birth of Hairan II. Andrade suggested the opposite, maintaining that Hairan I, Herodianus and Hairan II are the same.
Herennianus and Timolaus: the two were mentioned in the Augustan History and are not attested in any other source; Herennianus might be a conflation of Hairan and Herodianus while Timolaus is most probably a fabrication, although the historian Dietmar Kienast suggests that he might be Vaballathus.
Possible descendants of Odaenathus living in later centuries are reported: Lucia Septimia Patabiniana Balbilla Tyria Nepotilla Odaenathiana is known through a dedication dating to the late third or early fourth century inscribed on a tombstone erected by a wet nurse to her "sweetest and most loving mistress". The tombstone was found in Rome at the San Callisto in Trastevere. Another possible relative is Eusebius who is mentioned by the fourth century rhetorician Libanius in 391 as a son of one Odaenathus, who was in turn a descendant of the King; the father of Eusebius is mentioned as fighting against the Persians (most probably in the ranks of Emperor Julian's army). In 393, Libanius mentioned that Eusebius promised him a speech written by Longinus for the King. In the fifth century, the philosopher "Syrian Odaenathus" lived in Athens and was a student of Plutarch of Athens; he might have been a distant descendant of the King. | https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Odaenathus |
Zenobia | Less than a hundred years after Zenobia's reign, Athanasius of Alexandria called her a "Jewess" in his History of the Arians. In 391, archbishop John Chrysostom wrote that Zenobia was Jewish; so did a Syriac chronicler around 664 and bishop Bar Hebraeus in the thirteenth century. According to French scholar Javier Teixidor, Zenobia was probably a proselyte; this explained her strained relationship with the rabbis. Teixidor believed that Zenobia became interested in Judaism when Longinus spoke about the philosopher Porphyry and his interest in the Old Testament. Although Talmudic sources were hostile to Palmyra because of Odaenathus' suppression of the Jews of Nehardea, Zenobia apparently had the support of some Jewish communities (particularly in Alexandria). In Cairo, a plaque originally bearing an inscription confirming a grant of immunity to a Jewish synagogue in the last quarter of the first millennium BC by King Ptolemy Euergetes (I or II) was found. At a much later date, the plaque was re-inscribed to commemorate the restoration of immunity "on the orders of the queen and king". Although it is undated, the letters of the inscription date to long after Cleopatra and Anthony's era; Zenobia and her son are the only candidates for a king and a queen ruling Egypt after the Ptolemies.
The historian E. Mary Smallwood wrote that good relations with the diaspora community did not mean that the Jews of Palestine were content with Zenobia's reign, and her rule was apparently opposed in that region. The Jerusalem Talmud, in Tractate Terumot tells the story of the amoraim Rabbi "Ammi" and Rabbi "Samuel bar Nahmani", who visited Zenobia's court and asked for the release of a Jew ("Zeir bar Hinena") detained on her orders. The queen refused, saying: "Why have you come to save him? He teaches that your creator performs miracles for you. Why not let God save him?" During Aurelian's destruction of Palmyra, Palestinian conscripts with "clubs and cudgels" (who may have been Jews) played a vital role in Zenobia's defeat and the destruction of her city.
There is no evidence of Zenobia's birth as a Jew; the names of her and her husband's families belonged to the Aramaic onomasticon (collection of names). The queen's alleged patronage of Paul of Samosata (who was accused of "Judaizing"), may have given rise to the idea that she was a proselyte. Only Christian accounts note Zenobia's Jewishness; no Jewish source mentions it. | https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Zenobia |
Syria Palaestina | During the 1st and 2nd centuries, Judaea became the epicenter of a series of unsuccessful large-scale Jewish rebellions against Rome, known as the Jewish-Roman Wars. The Roman suppression of these revolts led to wide-scale destruction, a very high toll of life and enslavement. The First Jewish-Roman War (66-73) resulted in the destruction of Jerusalem and the Second Temple. Two generations later, the Bar Kokhba revolt (132-136) erupted. Judea's countryside was devastated, and many were killed, displaced or sold into slavery. Jewish presence in the region significantly dwindled after the failure of the Bar Kokhba revolt.
Following the suppression of the Bar Kokhba revolt, Jerusalem was rebuilt as a Roman colony under the name of Aelia Capitolina, and Judaea was renamed Syria Palaestina, a term occasionally used among Greco-Romans for centuries to describe the Southern Levant.A Syria-Palaestina included Judea, Samaria, Galilee, Idumaea, and Philistia. The province retained its capital, Caesarea Maritima, and therefore remained distinct from Syria, which was located further north with its capital in Antioch. Jerusalem, which held special religious significance for the Jews but had been destroyed, was rebuilt as the colonia Aelia Capitolina. Jews were forbidden to settle there or in the immediate vicinity.
While Syria was divided into several smaller provinces by Septimius Severus, and later again by Diocletian, Syria Palaestina survived into late antiquity. Presumably, it was small enough not to become dangerous as a potential starting point for usurpation attempts. Instead, Diocletian even integrated parts of Arabia Petraea into the province, namely the Negev and the Sinai Peninsula. He moved the Legio X Fretensis from Aelia Capitolina to Aila (today's Eilat/Aqaba) to secure the country against Arab incursions. The part of the Roman imperial border that now ran through Palestine was subsequently placed under its own supreme commander, the dux Palaestinae, who is known from the Notitia Dignitatum. The border wall, the Limes Arabicus, which had existed for some time, was pushed further south.
The Crisis of the Third Century (235–284) affected Syria Palaestina, but the fourth century brought an economic upswing due to the Christianization of the Roman Empire and the associated upswing in Christian pilgrimage to the "Holy Land". In the course of late antiquity, with imperial support, Christianity succeeded in asserting itself against both remnants of Semitic as well as trending Hellenistic Paganism in the land.
The province was split into smaller ones during the fourth and fifth centuries. In 358, areas that had formerly belonged to Arabia Petraea were transformed into a separate province of Palaestina Salutaris with Petra as its capital. The remaining territory was named Palaestina Prima. Around the year 400, it had been further split into a smaller Palaestina Prima and Palaestina Secunda. Palaestina Prima included the heartland with the capital at Caesarea, while Palaestina Secunda extended to Galilee, the Golan, and parts of the Transjordan and its capital was Scythopolis (now Beit She'an). Salutaris was named Palaestina Tertia or Salutaris. | https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Syria_Palaestina |
Alawi dynasty | Suleyman's successor, Abd al-Rahman (or Abderrahmane; ruled 1822–1859), tried to reinforce national unity by recruiting local elites of the country and orchestrating military campaigns designed to bolster his image as a defender of Islam against encroaching European powers. The French conquest of Algeria in 1830, however, destabilized the region and put the sultan in a very difficult position. Wide popular support for the Algerians against the French led Morocco to allow the flow of aid and arms to the resistance movement led by Emir Abd al-Qadir, while the Moroccan ulama delivered a fatwa for a supporting jihad in 1837. On the other hand, Abd al-Rahman was reluctant to provide the French with a clear reason to attack Morocco if he ever intervened. He managed to maintain the appearance of neutrality until 1844, when he was compelled to provide refuge to Abd al-Qadir in Morocco. The French, led by the marshall Bugeaud, pursued him and thoroughly routed the Moroccan army at the Battle of Isly, near Oujda, on August 14. At the same time, the French navy bombarded Tangiers on August 6 and bombarded Essaouira on August 16. In the aftermath, Morocco signed the Convention of Lalla Maghnia on March 18, 1845. The treaty made the superior power of France clear and forced the sultan to recognize French authority over Algeria. Abd al-Qadir turned rebel against the sultan and took refuge in the Rif region until his surrender to the French in 1848.: 264–265 The next confrontation, the Hispano-Moroccan War, took place from 1859 to 1860, and the subsequent Treaty of Wad Ras led the Moroccan government to take a massive British loan larger than its national reserves to pay off its war debt to Spain.
In the latter part of the 19th century Morocco's instability resulted in European countries intervening to protect investments and to demand economic concessions. Sultan Hassan I called for the Madrid Conference of 1880 in response to France and Spain's abuse of the protégé system, but the result was an increased European presence in Morocco—in the form of advisors, doctors, businessmen, adventurers, and even missionaries.: 47
After Sultan Abdelaziz appointed his brother Abdelhafid as viceroy of Marrakesh, the latter sought to have him overthrown by fomenting distrust over Abdelaziz's European ties. Abdelhafid was aided by Madani el-Glaoui, older brother of T'hami, one of the Caids of the Atlas. He was assisted in the training of his troops by Andrew Belton, a British officer and veteran of the Second Boer War. For a brief period, Abdelaziz reigned from Rabat while Abdelhafid reigned in Marrakesh and Fez and a conflict known as the Hafidiya (1907–1908) ensued. In 1908 Abdelaziz was defeated in battle. In 1909, Abdelhafid became the recognized leader of Morocco.
In 1911, rebellion broke out against the sultan. This led to the Agadir Crisis, also known as the Second Moroccan Crisis. These events led Abdelhafid to abdicate after signing the Treaty of Fes on 30 March 1912, which made Morocco a French protectorate. He signed his abdication only when on the quay in Rabat, with the ship that would take him to France already waiting. When news of the treaty finally leaked to the Moroccan populace, it was met with immediate and violent backlash in the Intifada of Fez. His brother Youssef was proclaimed Sultan by the French administration several months later (13 August 1912). At the same time a large part of northern Morocco was placed under Spanish control. | https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Alawi_dynasty |
Slavery | In the early 17th century, the majority of the labour in Barbados was provided by European indentured servants, mainly English, Irish and Scottish, with African and native American slaves providing little of the workforce. The introduction of sugar cane in 1640 completely transformed society and the economy. Barbados eventually had one of the world's largest sugar industries. The workable sugar plantation required a large investment and a great deal of heavy labour. At first, Dutch traders supplied the equipment, financing, and African slaves, in addition to transporting most of the sugar to Europe. In 1644, the population of Barbados was estimated at 30,000, of which about 800 were of African descent, with the remainder mainly of English descent. By 1700, there were 15,000 free whites and 50,000 enslaved Africans. In Jamaica, although the African slave population in the 1670s and 1680s never exceeded 10,000, by 1800 it had increased to over 300,000. The increased implementation of slave codes or black codes, which created differential treatment between Africans and the white workers and ruling planter class. In response to these codes, several slave rebellions were attempted or planned during this time, but none succeeded.
The planters of the Dutch colony of Suriname relied heavily on African slaves to cultivate, harvest and process the commodity crops of coffee, cocoa, sugar cane and cotton plantations. The Netherlands abolished slavery in Suriname in 1863.
Many slaves escaped the plantations. With the help of the native South Americans living in the adjoining rain forests, these runaway slaves established a new and unique culture in the interior that was highly successful in its own right. They were known collectively in English as Maroons, in French as Nèg'Marrons (literally meaning "brown negroes", that is "pale-skinned negroes"), and in Dutch as Marrons. The Maroons gradually developed several independent tribes through a process of ethnogenesis, as they were made up of slaves from different African ethnicities. These tribes include the Saramaka, Paramaka, Ndyuka or Aukan, Kwinti, Aluku or Boni, and Matawai. The Maroons often raided plantations to recruit new members from the slaves and capture women, as well as to acquire weapons, food and supplies. They sometimes killed planters and their families in the raids. The colonists also mounted armed campaigns against the Maroons, who generally escaped through the rain forest, which they knew much better than did the colonists. To end hostilities, in the 18th century the European colonial authorities signed several peace treaties with different tribes. They granted the Maroons sovereign status and trade rights in their inland territories, giving them autonomy. | https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Slavery |
Pepi I Meryre | Trade with settlements along the Levantine coast, which had existed during the Fifth Dynasty, seems to have peaked under Pepi I and Pepi II. Their chief trade partner there might have been Byblos, where dozens of inscriptions on stone vessels showing Pepi's cartouches have been found, and a large alabaster vessel bearing Pepi's titulary and commemorating his jubilee from the Temple of Baalat Gebal. The high official, Iny, served Pepi during several successful expeditions to Byblos for which the king rewarded him with the name "Inydjefaw", meaning, "He who brings back provisions". Through Byblos, Egypt, had indirect contacts with the city of Ebla in modern-day Syria. The contact with Ebla is established by alabaster vessels bearing Pepi's name found near its royal palace G, destroyed in the 23rd century BC, possibly by the Akkadian Empire under Sargon. Trading parties departed Egypt for the Levant from a Nile Delta port called Ra-Hat, "the first mouth [of the Nile]". This trade benefited the nearby city of Mendes, from which one of Pepi's viziers probably originated. Further contacts with Canaan may be inferred from a statue of Pepi, which is said to have been unearthed in Gezer but has since been lost.
Expeditions and mining activities that were already taking place in the Fifth and early Sixth Dynasty continued unabated. These include at least one expedition of workmen and their military escort to the mines of turquoise and copper in Wadi Maghareh, Sinai, around Pepi's 36th year on the throne. In all likelihood, this expedition departed Egypt from the Red Sea coast port of Ayn Soukhna, which was active during Pepi's reign. The same port may also have been the origin of an expedition to the southern Red Sea, possibly to Punt, as witnessed by Ethiopian obsidian discovered on the site. There were also one or more expeditions to Hatnub, where alabaster was extracted at least once in Pepi's 49th year of reign, as well as visits to the Gebel el-Silsila and Sehel Island. A trading expedition fetching lapis-lazuli and lead or tin may also have passed further south through Mirgissa. Greywacke and siltstone for building projects originated from quarries of the Wadi Hammamat, where some eighty graffiti mention Pepi I. At the same time, an extensive network of caravan routes traversed Egypt's Western Desert, for example, from Abydos to the Kharga Oasis and from there to the Dakhla and Selima Oases. | https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Pepi_I_Meryre |
New York University | NYU has successfully completed a seven-year, $2.5 billion campaign, surpassing expectations by raising more than $3 billion over the seven-year period. Started in 2001, this campaign was the university's largest in its history, in which they planned to "raise $1 million per day for scholarships and financial aid, faculty building, new academic initiatives, and enhancing NYU's physical facilities." The campaign included a $50 million gift from the Tisch family (after which one building and the art school are named) and a $60 million gift from six trustees called "The Partners Fund", aimed at hiring new faculty. On October 15, 2007, the university announced that the Silver family donated $50 million to the School of Social Work, which will be renamed as a result. This is the largest donation ever to a school of social work in the United States.
The 2007–2008 academic year was the most successful fundraising year to date for NYU, with the school raising $698 million in only the first 11 months of the year, representing a 70% increase in donations from the prior year. The university also recently announced plans for NYU's Call to Action, a new initiative to ask alumni and donors to support financial aid for students at NYU.
The university has announced a 25-year strategic development plan, scheduled to coincide with its bicentennial in 2031. Included in the "NYU 200" plans are increasing resident and academic space, hiring additional faculty, and involving the New York City community in a transparent planning process. Additionally, NYU hopes to make their buildings more environmentally friendly, which will be facilitated by an evaluation of all campus spaces. As a part of this plan, NYU purchased 118 million kilowatt-hours of wind power during the 2006–2007 academic year – the largest purchase of wind power by any university in the country and any institution in New York City. For 2007, the university expanded its purchase of wind power to 132 million kilowatt-hours. As a result, the EPA ranked NYU as one of the greenest colleges in the country in its annual College & University Green Power Challenge.
NYU consistently ranks as one of the top fundraising institutions in the country, raising $506.4 million in 2015 and $648 million in 2016. NYU is also the 19th wealthiest university in America with $5.3 billion in cash and investments in fiscal year 2014. | https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/New_York_University |
Sephardic Jewish cuisine | Sephardic Jewish cuisine underwent significant changes following the expulsion of Jews from Spain in 1492, representing a pivotal moment for Sephardic Jews, who were faced with the choice of converting to Christianity or fleeing their homes. Many resettled across the Mediterranean, with a significant number finding refuge in the Ottoman Empire. This migration posed considerable challenges, including the disruption of established communal structures and institutions. According to Sara Gardner, during this period, Sephardic women played a crucial role in preserving cultural identity, especially as communal institutions collapsed. The domestic sphere, traditionally overseen by women, became the focal point for maintaining religious and cultural practices, including culinary traditions.
Upon their settlement in the Ottoman Empire, Sephardic Jews began the process of recreating their Spanish culinary heritage despite the lack of familiar ingredients and cooking methods. Sephardic women were instrumental in this process, modifying their recipes to incorporate new local ingredients while maintaining traditional dishes. Foods such as adafina, a traditional Shabbat stew; almodrote, a casserole made with eggplant and cheese; and biskochos, cakes made with ground nuts and eggs—once used to identify crypto-Jews in Spain during the Spanish Inquisition—were reintroduced in their new Ottoman homes.
The integration of Sephardic Jews into Ottoman society led to a fusion of Sephardic and Ottoman culinary styles. Sephardic women adapted local ingredients and techniques, resulting in the creation of new dishes such as tishpishti, a semolina cake soaked in syrup, and pishkado ahilado, a stew of fried fish with tomato sauce. Other ingredients known from Spain were also available in the new home. Eggplant, a key ingredient associated with Jews in Spain, remained a hallmark of Sephardic cuisine in the Ottoman Empire. The classic Judaeo-Spanish koplas song "Siete modos de gizar la berendgena" lists various methods of preparing eggplant popular among Jews in Ottoman lands, alongside several eggplant dishes influenced by local cuisine. The incorporation of Ottoman culinary methods, such as the use of filo pastry, facilitated innovations such as bourekas. This adaptation illustrates the evolution of Sephardic cuisine within its new context, while retaining elements from its Iberian origins and reflecting both continuity and change across the Mediterranean. | https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Sephardic_Jewish_cuisine |
Israel–United Arab Emirates normalization agreement | On August 16, 2020, Israel and the UAE inaugurated direct telephone services. The Emirati company APEX National Investment and Israel's Tera Group signed an agreement to partner in research on COVID-19, making it the first business deal signed between companies of the two nations since normalization of ties. The director of the Mossad Yossi Cohen arrived in the UAE on August 18 to discuss security cooperation, regional developments as well as issues that concerned both countries with the National Security Advisor Tahnoun bin Zayed Al Nahyan. This marked the first visit of an Israeli official since the announcement of the deal. The UAE formally ended its boycott of Israel on August 29.
On August 17, Israeli Prime Minister Netanyahu said that Israel was working to start direct flights to the UAE using Saudi Arabia's airspace. Netanyahu's office and other officials later denied reports of approving the United States' sales of F-35 warplanes to the UAE following the deal. Emirati foreign minister Anwar Gargash said in an interview with the Atlantic Council that the peace deal should remove any obstructions in acquiring the jets, though any sale would take years to negotiate and deliver and the UAE had not made a new request for them after the deal.
An El Al spokesman announced on August 28 that the company will operate El Al 971, the first ever commercial flight between Israel and the UAE, flying from Tel Aviv's Ben Gurion Airport towards Abu Dhabi. Saudi Arabia allowed use of its airspace for the airplane to fly directly towards the UAE and it landed at Abu Dhabi International Airport. The flight carried a delegation of American and Israeli officials which included Jared Kushner, Robert C. O'Brien and Israeli national security advisor Meir Ben-Shabbat. The airplane had the word "peace" painted in Hebrew, Arabic and English languages painted above its cockpit window and received a red carpet welcome. Both Saudi Arabia and Bahrain later permanently opened their airspace for flights between Israel and the UAE.
On September 3, El Al announced that it would operate weekly indirect cargo flights to the UAE through the Belgian city of Liège, with the first one scheduled for September 16, carrying agricultural and high-tech equipment. On September 10, Israir became the first airline company to announce a direct flight route between Israel and the UAE. The company stated that the flights will travel between the Ben Gurion Airport and the Abu Dhabi International Airport, taking three-and-a-half hours to reach their destination. The first cargo ship from the UAE entered Israel at the Port of Haifa on October 12, with the ship MCS Paris scheduled to arrive at the port on a weekly basis.
Habtoor Hospitality became the first Emirati hotel group to start serving kosher food as part of its menu, partnering with Elli's Kosher Kitchen for its making. Abu Dhabi Department of Culture & Tourism issued a note to Abu Dhabi hotels, recommending they serve kosher food in menus as well as outlets. The Orthodox Union was selected to certify kosher food. The Emirati airlines Emirates' catering service Emirates Flight Catering announced on September 17, that it will establish a facility to produce kosher food called "Kosher Arabia" in partnership with CCL Holdings. The UAE's first kosher-certified restaurant called "Armani/Kaf" opened in Armani Hotel Dubai on September 17, located in Burj Khalifa.
On September 9, the Arab League refused to condemn the UAE's decision to normalize with Israel after several countries objected to the submitted Palestinian draft resolution. Nevertheless, secretary-general Ahmed Aboul Gheit said, "The goal all our Arab countries seek, without exception, is to end the occupation and establish an independent Palestinian state on the 1967 borders with East Jerusalem as its capital." Gheit confirmed rejection of any accords presented on an international stage, which negatively impacted Palestinian rights or the status of Jerusalem.
On September 22, United States Secretary of Defense Mark Esper assured Israeli defense minister Benny Gantz during his visit to Washington that Israel's military edge will be protected, a sentiment earlier echoed by Senate Majority Leader Mitch McConnell and Speaker of the United States House of Representatives Nancy Pelosi, who, following President Donald Trump saying that he personally had no problem with selling F-35s to the UAE, warned that any such decision would be scrutinized by the United States Congress.
While the two countries had long-maintained de facto recognition in areas of business including the diamond trade and high tech industries including artificial intelligence and defence, the accord opened the door to a much wider range of economic cooperation, including formal investments. Abu Dhabi Investment Office opened its first overseas branch in Israel. And on October 13, Dubai-based NY Koen Group has announced its intention to purchase Israir. | https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Israel%E2%80%93United_Arab_Emirates_normalization_agreement |
Islamic marital jurisprudence | An engagement may be arranged between families for their children, but Islamic requirements for a legal marriage include the requirement that both parties, bride, groom and guardian for the bride (wali), give their legal consent. A marriage without the consent of the bride or performed under coercion is illegal according to the majority of scholars.
If a girl has not attained the age of puberty, the vast majority of scholars hold that she cannot be married; and many stipulate that it must be in her best interest in order to be considered a valid marriage. There is some dispute as to whether or not an under-age bride can leave her family's custody and be transferred to her husband's custody, if she has not yet reached puberty. Some evidence supporting both sides can be seen in the following narrations from Muhammad:
Sahih Bukhari Volume 7, Book 62, Number 65 Narrated 'Aisha: that the Prophet married her when she was six years old and he consummated his marriage when she was nine years old. Hisham said: I have been informed that 'Aisha remained with the Prophet for nine years (i.e. till his death).
Sahih Bukhari 7.18 Narrated 'Ursa: The Prophet asked Abu Bakr for 'Aisha's hand in marriage. Abu Bakr said "But I am your brother." The Prophet said, "You are my brother in Allah's religion and His Book, but she (Aisha) is lawful for me to marry."
However, evidence from other Islamic sources seems to suggest that this is not something allowed for all Muslims; rather specifically for Muhammad. The evidence for this view is as follows:
Abu Hurayrah reported that the Prophet said: "A non-virgin woman may not be married without her command, and a virgin may not be married without her permission; and it is permission enough for her to remain silent (because of her natural shyness)." [Al-Bukhari:6455, Muslim & Others]
It is reported in a hadith that A'ishah related that she once asked the Prophet: "In the case of a young girl whose parents marry her off, should her permission be sought or not?" He replied: "Yes, she must give her permission." She then said: "But a virgin would be shy, O Messenger of Allaah!" He replied: "Her silence is [considered as] her permission." [Al-Bukhari, Muslim, & Others]
It appears that the permission of an under-age bride is indeed necessary for her marriage to be considered valid; the above narrations seem to clearly make the approval of the bride a condition for a valid marriage contract. | https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Islamic_marital_jurisprudence |
Second Syrian Republic | The project of a new constitution was discussed by a Constituent Assembly elected in April 1928, but as the pro-independence National Bloc had won a majority and insisted on the insertion of several articles "that did not preserve the prerogatives of the mandatary power", the Assembly was dissolved on 9 August 1928. On 14 May 1930, the State of Syria was declared the Republic of Syria and a new Syrian constitution was promulgated by the French High Commissioner, in the same time as the Lebanese Constitution, the Règlement du Sandjak d'Alexandrette, the Statute of the Alawi Government, the Statute of the Jabal Druze State. A new flag was also mentioned in this constitution:
The Syrian flag shall be composed as follows, the length shall be double the height. It shall contain three bands of equal dimensions, the upper band being green, the middle band white, and the lower band black. The white portion shall bear three red stars in line, having five points each.
During December 1931 and January 1932, the first elections under the new constitution were held, under an electoral law providing for "the representation of religious minorities" as imposed by article 37 of the constitution. The National Bloc was in the minority in the new Chamber of deputies with only 16 deputies out of 70, due to intensive vote-rigging by the French authorities. Among the deputies were also three members of the Syrian Kurdish nationalist Xoybûn (Khoyboun) party, Khalil bey Ibn Ibrahim Pacha (Al-Jazira province), Mustafa bey Ibn Shahin (Jarabulus) and Hassan Aouni (Kurd Dagh). There were later in the year, from 30 March to 6 April, "complementary elections".
In 1933, France attempted to impose a treaty of independence heavily prejudiced in favor of France. It promised gradual independence but kept the Syrian Mountains under French control. The Syrian head of state at the time was a French puppet, Muhammad 'Ali Bay al-'Abid. Fierce opposition to this treaty was spearheaded by senior nationalist and parliamentarian Hashim al-Atassi, who called for a sixty-day strike in protest. Atassi's political coalition, the National Bloc, mobilized massive popular support for his call. Riots and demonstrations raged, and the economy came to a standstill.
After negotiations in March with Damien de Martel, the French High Commissioner in Syria, Hashim al-Atassi went to Paris heading a senior Bloc delegation. The new Popular Front-led French government, formed in June 1936 after the April–May elections, had agreed to recognize the National Bloc as the sole legitimate representatives of the Syrian people and invited al-Atassi to independence negotiations. The resulting treaty called for immediate recognition of Syrian independence as a sovereign republic, with full emancipation granted gradually over a 25-year period.
In 1936, the Franco-Syrian Treaty of Independence was signed, a treaty that would not be ratified by the French legislature. However, the treaty allowed Jabal Druze, the Alawite region (now called Latakia), and Alexandretta to be incorporated into the Syrian republic within the following two years. Greater Lebanon (now the Lebanese Republic) was the only state that did not join the Syrian Republic. Hashim al-Atassi, who was Prime Minister during King Faisal's brief reign (1918–1920), was the first president to be elected under a new constitution adopted after the independence treaty.
The treaty guaranteed incorporation of previously autonomous Druze and Alawite regions into Greater Syria, but not Lebanon, with which France signed a similar treaty in November. The treaty also promised curtailment of French intervention in Syrian domestic affairs as well as a reduction of French troops, personnel and military bases in Syria. In return, Syria pledged to support France in times of war, including the use of its air space, and to allow France to maintain two military bases on Syrian territory. Other political, economic and cultural provisions were included.
Atassi returned to Syria in triumph on 27 September 1936 and was elected President of the Republic in November.
In September 1938, France again separated the Syrian Sanjak of Alexandretta and transformed it into the State of Hatay. The State of Hatay joined Turkey in the following year by an election which is made by the people in Hatay. In June 1939. Syria did not recognize the incorporation of Hatay into Turkey and the issue is still disputed until the present time.
The emerging threat of Adolf Hitler induced a fear of being outflanked by Nazi Germany if France relinquished its colonies in the Middle East. That, coupled with lingering imperialist inclinations in some levels of the French government, led France to reconsider its promises and refuse to ratify the treaty. Also, France ceded the Sanjak of Alexandretta, whose territory was guaranteed as part of Syria in the treaty, to Turkey. Riots again broke out, Atassi resigned, and Syrian independence was deferred until after World War II.
With the fall of France in 1940 during World War II, Syria came under the control of the Vichy Government until the British and Free French invaded and occupied the country in July 1941. Syria proclaimed its independence again in 1941 but it wasn't until 1 January 1944, that it was recognized as an independent republic.
In the 1940s, Britain secretly advocated the creation of a Greater Syrian state that would secure Britain preferential status in military, economic and cultural matters, in return for putting a complete halt to Jewish ambition in Palestine. France and the United States opposed British hegemony in the region, which eventually led to the creation of Israel.
On 27 September 1941, France proclaimed, by virtue of, and within the framework of the Mandate, the independence and sovereignty of the Syrian State. The proclamation said "the independence and sovereignty of Syria and Lebanon will not affect the juridical situation as it results from the Mandate Act. Indeed, this situation could be changed only with the agreement of the Council of the League of Nations, with the consent of the Government of the United States, a signatory of the Franco-American Convention of 4 April 1924, and only after the conclusion between the French Government and the Syrian and Lebanese Governments of treaties duly ratified in accordance with the laws of the French Republic.
Benqt Broms said that it was important to note that there were several founding members of the United Nations whose statehood was doubtful at the time of the San Francisco Conference and that the Government of France still considered Syria and Lebanon to be mandates.
Duncan Hall said "Thus, the Syrian mandate may be said to have been terminated without any formal action on the part of the League or its successor. The mandate was terminated by the declaration of the mandatory power, and of the new states themselves, of their independence, followed by a process of piecemeal unconditional recognition by other powers, culminating in formal admission to the United Nations. Article 78 of the Charter ended the status of tutelage for any member state: 'The trusteeship system shall not apply to territories which have become Members of the United Nations, relationship among which shall be based on respect for the principle of sovereign equality.'" So when the UN officially came into existence on 24 October 1945, after ratification of the United Nations Charter by the five permanent members, as both Syria and Lebanon were founding member states, the French mandate for both was legally terminated on that date and full independence attained.
On 29 May 1945, France bombed Damascus and tried to arrest its democratically elected leaders. While French planes were bombing Damascus, Prime Minister Faris al-Khoury was at the founding conference of the United Nations in San Francisco, presenting Syria's claim for independence from the French Mandate.
Syrian independence was attained on 24 October 1945, with recognition of the international community. Continuing pressure from Syrian nationalist groups and British pressure forced the French to evacuate their last troops on 17 April 1946. Although rapid economic development followed the declaration of independence, Syrian politics from independence through the late 1960s was marked by upheaval. | https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Second_Syrian_Republic |
Athena | Athena is associated with the city of Athens. The name of the city in ancient Greek is Ἀθῆναι (Athȇnai), a plural toponym, designating the place where—according to myth—she presided over the Athenai, a sisterhood devoted to her worship. In ancient times, scholars argued whether Athena was named after Athens or Athens after Athena. Now scholars generally agree that the goddess takes her name from the city; the ending -ene is common in names of locations, but rare for personal names. Testimonies from different cities in ancient Greece attest that similar city goddesses were worshipped in other cities and, like Athena, took their names from the cities where they were worshipped. For example, in Mycenae there was a goddess called Mykene, whose sisterhood was known as Mykenai, whereas at Thebes an analogous deity was called Thebe, and the city was known under the plural form Thebai (or Thebes, in English, where the 's' is the plural formation). The name Athenai is likely of Pre-Greek origin because it contains the presumably Pre-Greek morpheme *-ān-.
In his dialogue Cratylus, the ancient Greek philosopher Plato (428–347 BC) gives some rather imaginative etymologies of Athena's name, based on the theories of the ancient Athenians and his etymological speculations:
That is a graver matter, and there, my friend, the modern interpreters of Homer may, I think, assist in explaining the view of the ancients. Most of these in their explanations of the poet, assert that he meant by Athena "mind" [νοῦς, noũs] and "intelligence" [διάνοια, diánoia], and the maker of names appears to have had a singular notion about her; and indeed calls her by a still higher title, "divine intelligence" [θεοῦ νόησις, theoũ nóēsis], as though he would say: This is she who has the mind of God [ἁ θεονόα, a theonóa]. Perhaps, however, the name Theonoe may mean "she who knows divine things" [τὰ θεῖα νοοῦσα, ta theia noousa] better than others. Nor shall we be far wrong in supposing that the author of it wished to identify this Goddess with moral intelligence [εν έθει νόεσιν, en éthei nóesin], and therefore gave her the name Etheonoe; which, however, either he or his successors have altered into what they thought a nicer form, and called her Athena.
Thus, Plato believed that Athena's name was derived from Greek Ἀθεονόα, Atheonóa—which the later Greeks rationalised as from the deity's (θεός, theós) mind (νοῦς, noũs). The second-century AD orator Aelius Aristides attempted to derive natural symbols from the etymological roots of Athena's names to be aether, air, earth, and moon. | https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Athena |
Lebanese Shia Muslims | Isma'ilism, or "Sevener Shi'ism", is a branch of Shia Islam which emerged in 765 from a disagreement over the succession to Muhammad. Isma'ilis hold that Isma'il ibn Jafar was the true seventh imam, and not Musa al-Kadhim as the Twelvers believe. Isma'ili Shi'ism also differs doctrinally from Imami Shi'ism, having beliefs and practices that are more esoteric and maintaining seven pillars of faith rather than five pillars and ten ancillary precepts.
Though perhaps somewhat better established in neighbouring Syria, where the faith founded one of its first da'wah outposts in the city of Salamiyah (the supposed resting place of the Imam Isma'il) in the 8th century, it has been present in what is now Lebanon for centuries. Early Lebanese Isma'ilism showed perhaps an unusual propensity to foster radical movements within it, particularly in the areas of Wadi al-Taym, adjoining the Beqaa valley at the foot of Mount Hermon, and Jabal Shuf, in the highlands of Mount Lebanon.
The syncretic beliefs of the Qarmatians, typically classed as an Isma'ili splinter sect with Zoroastrian influences, spread into the area of the Beqaa valley and possibly also Jabal Shuf starting in the 9th century. The group soon became widely vilified in the Islamic world for its armed campaigns across throughout the following decades, which included slaughtering Muslim pilgrims and sacking Mecca and Medina—and Salamiyah. Other Muslim rulers soon acted to crush this powerful heretical movement. In the Levant, the Qarmatians were ordered to be stamped out by the ruling Fatimid, themselves Isma'ilis and from whom the lineage of the modern Nizari Aga Khan is claimed to descend. The Qarmatian movement in the Levant was largely extinguished by the turn of the millennium.
The semi-divine personality of the Fatimid caliph in Isma'ilism was elevated further in the doctrines of a secretive group which began to venerate the caliph Hakim as the embodiment of divine unity. Unsuccessful in the imperial capital of Cairo, they began discreetly proselytising around the year 1017 among certain Arab tribes in the Levant. The Isma'ilis of Wadi al-Taym and Jabal Shuf were among those who converted before the movement was permanently closed off a few decades later to guard against outside prying by mainstream Sunni and Shia Muslims, who often viewed their doctrines as heresy. This deeply esoteric group became known as the Druze, who in belief, practice, and history have long since become distinct from Isma'ilis proper. Druze constitute 5.2% of the modern population of Lebanon and still have a strong demographic presence in their traditional regions within the country to this day.
Due to official persecution by the Sunni Zengid dynasty that stoked escalating sectarian clashes with Sunnis, many Isma'ilis in the regions of Damascus and Aleppo are said to have fled west during the 12th century. Some settled in the mountains of Lebanon, while others settled further north along the coastal ridges in Syria, where the Alawites had earlier taken refuge—and where their brethren in the Assassins were cultivating a fearsome reputation as they staved off armies of Crusaders and Sunnis alike for many years.
Once far more numerous and widespread in many areas now part of Lebanon, the Isma'ili population has largely vanished over time. It has been suggested that Ottoman-era persecution might have spurred them to leave for elsewhere in the region, though there is no record or evidence of any kind of large exodus.
Isma'ilis were originally included as one of five officially-defined Muslim sects in a 1936 edict issued by the French Mandate governing religious affairs in the territory of Greater Lebanon, alongside Sunnis, Twelver Shias, Alawites, and Druzes. However, Muslims collectively rejected being classified as divided, and so were left out of the law in the end. Ignored in a post-independence law passed in 1951 that defined only Judaism and Christian sects as official, Muslims continued under traditional Ottoman law, within the confines of which small communities like Isma'ilis and Alawites found it difficult to establish their own institutions.
The Aga Khan IV made a brief stop in Beirut on 4 August 1957 while on a global tour of Nizari Isma'ili centres, drawing an estimated 600 Syrian and Lebanese followers of the religion to the Beirut Airport in order to welcome him. In the mid-1980s, several hundred Isma'ilis were thought to still live in a few communities scattered across several parts of Lebanon. Though they are nominally counted among the 18 officially-recognised sects under modern Lebanese law, they currently have no representation in state functions and continue to lack personal status laws for their sect, which has led to increased conversions to established sects to avoid the perpetual inconveniences this produces.
War in the region has also caused pressures on Lebanese Isma'ilis. In the 2006 Lebanon War, Israeli warplanes bombed the factory of the Maliban Glass company in the Beqaa valley on 19 July. The factory was bought in the late 1960s by the Madhvani Group under the direction of Isma'ili entrepreneur Abdel-Hamid al-Fil after the Aga Khan personally brought the two into contact. It had expanded over the next few decades from an ailing relic to the largest glass manufacturer in the Levant, with 300 locally hired workers producing around 220,000 tons of glass per day. Al-Fil closed the plant down on 15 July just after the war broke out to safeguard against the deaths of workers in the event of such an attack, but the damage was estimated at a steep 55 million US dollars, with the reconstruction timeframe indefinite due to instability and government hesitation. | https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Lebanese_Shia_Muslims |
Delhi | Delhi has the highest road density of 2103 km/100 km2 in India. It is connected to other parts of India by five National Highways: NH 1, NH 2, NH 8, NH 10 and NH 24. The Delhi–Mumbai and Delhi–Kolkata prongs of the Golden Quadrilateral start from the city. The majority of the city's roads which are 60 ft (18 m) wide or above are maintained by the Public Works Department (PWD) which is under the jurisdiction of the Government of Delhi while some are maintained by Delhi Development Authority and New Delhi Municipal Council which are under the jurisdiction of the Government of India. Roads and streets less than 60 ft (18 m) wide are maintained by the Municipal Corporation of Delhi. Roads and streets in unauthorised colonies are maintained by the local Member of the Legislative Assembly.
Buses are the most popular means of road transport, catering to about 60% of Delhi's total demand. Delhi has one of India's largest bus transport systems. In 1998, the Supreme Court of India ruled that all public transport vehicles in Delhi must be fuelled by compressed natural gas (CNG) to tackle increasing vehicular pollution. The state-owned Delhi Transport Corporation (DTC) is a major bus service provider which operates the world's largest fleet of CNG-fuelled buses. In addition, cluster scheme buses are operated by Delhi Integrated Multi-Modal Transit System (DIMTS) with the participation of private concessionaires and DTC. In December 2017, the DTC and cluster buses carried over 4.19 million passengers per day. Kashmiri Gate ISBT, Anand Vihar ISBT and Sarai Kale Khan ISBT are the main bus terminals for outstation buses plying to neighbouring states. Delhi's rapid rate of economic development and population growth has resulted in an increasing demand for transport, creating excessive pressure on the city's transport infrastructure. To meet the transport demand, the State and Union government constructed a mass rapid transit system, including the Delhi Metro. Delhi Bus Rapid Transit System runs between Ambedkar Nagar and Delhi Gate. As per February 2024, Delhi has around 1,650 electric buses managed by the Delhi Transport Corporation, the highest in India and the third highest in the world after Shenzhen and Santiago.
Personal vehicles, especially cars also form a major chunk of vehicles plying on Delhi roads. As of 2007, private vehicles account for 30% of the total demand for transport. Delhi has the highest number of registered cars compared to any other metropolitan city in India. Taxis, auto rickshaws, and cycle rickshaws also ply on Delhi roads in large numbers. As of 2008, the number of vehicles in the metropolitan region, Delhi NCR, was 11.2 million (11.2 million). In 2008, there were 85 cars in Delhi for every 1,000 of its residents. In 2017, the number of vehicles in Delhi city alone crossed the ten million mark with the transport department of Delhi Government putting the total number of registered vehicles at 10,567,712 until 25 May of the year. | https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Delhi |
Politics of Libya | Political parties were banned in Libya from 1972 until the removal of Gaddafi's government, and all elections were nonpartisan under law. However, during the revolution, the National Transitional Council (NTC), a body formed on 27 February 2011 by anti-Gaddafi forces to act as the "political face of the revolution", made the introduction of multiparty democracy a cornerstone of its agenda. In June 2011, Saif al-Islam Gaddafi said his father would agree to internationally monitored general elections, and would step down if he lost them, but his offer was refused by the rebels and ignored by the UN Security Council.
On 8 March, the NTC issued a statement in which it declared itself to be the "sole representative all over Libya". The council formed an interim governing body on 23 March. As of 20 October 2011, 100 countries declared full support to the council by severing all relations with Gaddafi's rule and recognizing the National Transitional Council as the "rightful representative of Libya".
On 3 August 2011, the NTC issued a Constitutional Declaration which declared the statehood of Libya as a democracy with Islam as its state religion, in which the state guarantees the rule of law and an independent judiciary as well as civic and human basic rights (including freedom of religion and women's rights), and which contains provisions for a phase of transition to a presidential republic with an elected national assembly and a democratically legitimized constitution by 2013. Vice Chairman Abdul Hafiz Ghoga declared Libya to be "liberated" on 23 October 2011, announcing an official end to the war. Chairman Mustafa Abdul Jalil said Libya would become an Islamic democracy in the wake of Gaddafi's death, though the extent of Islamic law's influence would be determined by elected lawmakers. Ghoga later confirmed that Libya will continue to adhere to all international agreements to which it was signatory prior to the uprising.
On 7 July 2012 an election was held for the General National Congress (GNC) to replace the NTC. There were 2,501 candidates for the 200 seats – 136 for political parties and 64 for independent candidates. About 300 candidates' views were considered unacceptable and removed from candidates list, suspected of sympathizing with the defeated forces of the Jamahiriya. Accreditation centers have also been organized in European cities with larger Libyan communities like Berlin and Paris, in order to allow Libyan nationals, there to cast their vote.
On 8 August 2012 the NTC officially dissolved and transferred power to the General National Congress. | https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Politics_of_Libya |
Middle Persian | The consonant phonemes were the following:
A major distinction between the pronunciation of the early Middle Persian of the Arsacid period (until the 3rd century CE) and the Middle Persian of the Sassanid period (3rd – 7th century CE) is due to a process of consonant lenition after voiced sounds that took place during the transition between the two. Its effects were as follows:
1. Voiced stops, when occurring after vowels, became semivowels:
/b/ > /w/, /d/ > /j/, /ɡ/ > /w/ or /j/ (the latter after /i/)
This process may have taken place very early, but it is nevertheless often the old pronunciation or a transitional one that is reflected in the Pahlavi spelling.
Old Persian naiba- > Middle Persian nēw (Pahlavi TB or nyw'), but:
Old Persian asabāra- > Middle Persian asvār 'horseman' (Pahlavi PLŠYA, ʾswblʾ).
Proto-Iranian *pād- > Middle Persian pāy 'foot' (Pahlavi LGLE, pʾd, Manichaean pʾy).
Old Persian magu- > Middle Persian mow- 'Magian' (Pahlavi mgw-).
Proto-Iranian *ni-gauš- > Middle Persian niyōš- 'listen' (Pahlavi nydwhš-, also nydwk(h)š-), Manichaean nywš).
2. Voiceless stops and affricates, when occurring after vowels as well as other voiced sounds, became voiced:
/p/ > /b/, /t/ > /d/, /k/ > /ɡ/, /t͡ʃ/ > /d͡ʒ/
This process is thought not to have been taken place before Sassanid Pahlavi, and it generally is not reflected in Pahlavi spelling.
A further stage in this lenition process is expressed in a synchronic alternation: at least at some stage in late Middle Persian (later than the 3rd century), the consonants /b/, /d/, /ɡ/ appear to have had, after vowels, the fricative allophones [β], [ð], [ɣ]. This is slightly more controversial for /ɡ/, since there appears to have been a separate phoneme /ɣ/ as well. A parallel development seems to have affected /d͡ʒ/ in the same position, possibly earlier; not only was it weakened to a fricative [ʒ], but it was also depalatalised to [z]. In fact, old Persian [d͡ʒ] and [ʒ] in any position also produced [z]. Unlike the case with the spirantisation of stops, this change is uncontroversially recognised for Sassanid times.
The lenition of voiceless stops and affricates remained largely unexpressed in Pahlavi spelling, which continues to reflect the Arsacid sound values, but is known from the more phonetic Manichaean spelling of texts from Sassanid times.
Arsacid šap > Sassanid šab (late [ʃaβ]) 'night' (Pahlavi LYLYA, šp'; Manichaean šb)
Arsacid pit > Sassanid pid (late [pið]) 'father' (Pahlavi AB, p(y)t', Manichaean pyd)
Arsacid pārak > Sassanid pārag (late [paːraɣ]) 'gift' (Pahlavi pʾlk')
Arsacid hač > Sassanid az 'from' (Pahlavi MN, hc, Manichaean ʾc or ʾz)
As a result of these changes, the voiceless stops and affricates /p/, /t/, /k/, /t͡ʃ/ rarely occurred after vowels – mostly when geminated, which has protected them from the lenition (e.g. waččag, sp. wck' 'child'), and due to some other sound changes.
Another difference between Arsacid and Sassanid-era pronunciation is that Arsacid word-initial /j/ produced Sassanid /d͡ʒ/ (another change that is not reflected in the Pahlavi spelling). The sound probably passed through the phase /ʒ/, which may have continued until very late Middle Persian, since Manichaean texts did not identify Indic /d͡ʒ/ with it and introduced a separate sign for the former instead of using the letter for their native sound. Nonetheless, word-initial /j/ was retained/reintroduced in learned borrowings from Avestan.
Arsacid yām > Sassanid ǰām 'glass' (Pahlavi yʾm, Manichaean jʾm); but:
Avestan yazata > Middle Persian yazd 'god' (Pahlavi yzdt')
Furthermore, some forms of Middle Persian appear to have preserved ǰ (from Proto-Iranian /d͡ʒ/ or /t͡ʃ/) after n due to Parthian influence, instead of the usual weakening to z. This pronunciation is reflected in Book Pahlavi, but not in Manichaean texts:
Proto-Iranian *panča > panǰ (spelt pnc in Book Pahlavi) or panz (spelt pnz in Manichaean)
Judging from the spelling, the consonant /θ/ may have been pronounced before /r/ in certain borrowings from Parthian in Arsacid times (unlike native words, which had /h/ for earlier *θ in general and /s/ for the cluster *θr in particular), but it had been replaced by /h/ by the Sassanid period:
Arsacid miθr > Sassanid mihr 'Mithra, contract' (Pahlavi mtr', Manichaean myhr).
The phoneme /ɣ/ (as opposed to the late allophone of /ɡ/) is rare and occurs almost only in learned borrowings from Avestan and Parthian, e.g. moγ (Pahlavi mgw or mwg 'Magian'), maγ (Pahlavi mγ) 'hole, pit'.
The sound /ʒ/ may also have functioned as a marginal phoneme in borrowings as well.
The phoneme /l/ was still relatively rare as well, especially so in Manichaean texts, mostly resulting from Proto-Iranian *rd, *rz and, more rarely, *r. It also occurred in the combination /hl/, which was a reflex of Old Persian /rθ/ and /rs/ (cf. the words 'Pahlavi' and 'Parthian').
The sound /xw/ may be viewed as a phoneme or merely as a combination of /x/ and /w/.
Usually /x/, /xw/ and /ɣ/ are considered to have been velar; a less common view is that /x/ and /ɣ/ were uvular instead.
Finally, it may be pointed out that most scholars consider the phoneme /w/ as being still a labial approximant, but a few regard it as a voiced labial fricative /v/.
The initial clusters of /s/ and a stop (/sp-/, /st-/, /sk-/) had acquired a prosthetic vowel /i/ by the time of the Manichaean Middle Persian texts: istāyišn (ՙst՚yšn) 'praise' vs Pahlavi stāyišn (ՙst՚dšn') 'praise'. | https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Middle_Persian |
Hadad | In religious texts, Ba‘al/Hadad is the lord of the sky who governs rain and crops, master of fertility and protector of life and growth. His absence brings drought, starvation, and chaos. Texts of the Baal Cycle from Ugarit are fragmentary and assume much background knowledge.
The supreme god El resides on Mount Lel (Night?) where the assembly of the gods meets. At the beginning of the cycle, there appears to a feud between El and Ba‘al. El appoints one of his sons, called both prince Yamm (Sea) and judge Nahar (River), as king over the gods and changes Yamm's name from yw to mdd ’il (darling of El). El tells his son that he will have to drive off Ba‘al to secure the throne.
In this battle Ba‘al is somehow weakened, but the divine craftsman Kothar-wa-Khasis strikes down Yamm with two magic clubs and Ba'al is supreme. ‘Athtart proclaims Ba‘al's victory and salutes Ba‘al/Hadad as lrkb ‘rpt (Rider on the Clouds), a phrase applied by editors of modern English Bibles to Yahweh in Psalm 68.4. At ‘Athtart's urging Ba‘al "scatters" Yamm and proclaims that he is dead and warmth is assured.
A later passage refers to Ba‘al's victory over Lotan, the many-headed sea dragon. Due to gaps in the text it is not known whether Lotan is another name for Yamm or a character in a similar story. These stories may have been allegories of crops threatened by the winds, storms, and floods from the Mediterranean sea.
A palace is built for Ba‘al with silver, gold, and cedar wood from Mount Lebanon and Sirion. In his new palace Ba‘al hosts a great feast for the other gods. When urged by Kothar-wa-Khasis, Ba’al reluctantly opens a window in his palace and sends forth thunder and lightning. He then invites Mot (Death, the god of drought and the underworld), another son of El, to join the feast.
But Mot, the eater of human flesh and blood, is insulted when offered only bread and wine. He threatens to break Ba‘al to pieces and swallow him, and even Ba‘al cannot stand against Death. Gaps here make interpretation dubious. It seems that by the advice of the sun goddess Shapash, Ba‘al mates with a heifer and dresses the resultant calf in his own clothes as a gift to Mot, and then himself prepares to go down to the underworld in the guise of a helpless shade. News of Ba‘al's apparent death leads even El to mourn. Ba‘al's sister ‘Anat finds Ba‘al's corpse, presumably really the dead calf, and she buries the body with a funeral feast. The god ‘Athtar is appointed to take Ba‘al's place, but he is a poor substitute. Meanwhile, ‘Anat finds Mot, cleaves him with a sword, burns him with fire, and throws his remains to the birds. But the earth is still cracked with drought until Shapsh fetches Ba‘al back.
Seven years later Mot returns and attacks Ba‘al, but the battle is quelled when Shapsh tells Mot that El now supports Ba’al. Mot surrenders to Ba‘al and recognizes him as king. | https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Hadad |
George Curzon, 1st Marquess Curzon of Kedleston | After nine months as acting Secretary while Balfour was at the Paris Peace Conference, Curzon was appointed Foreign Secretary in October 1919. He gave his name to the British government's proposed Soviet-Polish boundary, the Curzon Line of December 1919. Although during the subsequent Polish-Soviet War, Poland conquered territory in the east, after World War II, Poland was shifted westwards, leaving the border between Poland and its eastern neighbours today approximately at the Curzon Line.
Curzon was largely responsible for the Peace Day ceremonies on 19 July 1919. These included the plaster Cenotaph, designed by the noted architect Sir Edwin Lutyens, for the Allied Victory parade in London. It was so successful that it was reproduced in stone, and still stands.
In 1918, during World War I, as Britain occupied Mesopotamia, Curzon tried to convince the Indian government to reconsider his scheme for Persia to be a buffer against Russian advances. British and Indian troops were in Persia protecting the oilfields at Abadan and watching the Afghan frontier – Curzon believed that British economic and military aid, sent via India, could prop up the Persian government and make her a British client state. The Anglo-Persian Agreement of August 1919 was never ratified and the British government rejected the plan as Russia had the geographical advantage and the defensive benefits would not justify the high economic cost.
Small British forces had twice occupied Baku on the Caspian in 1918, while an entire British division had occupied Batum on the Black Sea, supervising German and Turkish withdrawal. Against Curzon's wishes, but on the advice of Sir George Milne, the commander on the spot, the CIGS Sir Henry Wilson, who wanted to concentrate troops in Britain, Ireland, India, and Egypt, and of Churchill (Secretary of State for War), the British withdrew from Baku (the small British naval presence was also withdrawn from the Caspian Sea), at the end of August 1919 leaving only three battalions at Batum.
In January 1920 Curzon insisted that British troops remain in Batum, against the wishes of Wilson and the Prime Minister. In February, while Curzon was on holiday, Wilson persuaded the Cabinet to allow withdrawal, but Curzon had the decision reversed on his return, although to Curzon's fury (he thought it "abuse of authority") Wilson gave Milne permission to withdraw if he deemed it necessary. At Cabinet on 5 May 1920 Curzon "by a long-winded jaw" (in Wilson's description) argued for a stay in Batum. After a British garrison at Enzeli (on the Persian Caspian coast) was taken prisoner by Bolshevik forces on 19 May 1920, Lloyd George finally insisted on a withdrawal from Batum early in June 1920. For the rest of 1920 Curzon, supported by Milner (Colonial Secretary), argued that Britain should retain control of Persia. When Wilson asked (15 July 1920) to pull troops out of Persia to put down the rebellions in Iraq and Ireland, Lloyd George blocked the move, saying that Curzon "would not stand it". In the end, financial retrenchment forced a British withdrawal from Persia in the spring of 1921.
Curzon worked on several Middle Eastern problems. He designed the Treaty of Sèvres (August 10, 1920) between the victorious Allies and the Ottoman Empire. The treaty obliged Turkey to renounce all rights over Arab Asia and North Africa, but a new government in Turkey under Kemal Atatürk rejected the treaty. The Greeks invaded Turkey. Curzon tried and failed to induce the Greeks to accept a compromise on the status of Smyrna and failed to force the Turks to renounce their nationalist program. Lloyd George tried to use force at Chanak but lost support and was forced to step down as prime minister. Curzon remained as foreign secretary and helped tie down loose ends in the Middle East at the peace conference at Lausanne.
Curzon helped to negotiate Egyptian independence (agreed in 1922) and the division of the British Mandate of Palestine, despite the strong disagreement he held with the policy of his predecessor Arthur Balfour, and helped create the Emirate of Transjordan for Faisal's brother, which may also have delayed the problems there. According to Sir David Gilmour, Curzon "was the only senior figure in the British government at the time who foresaw that its policy would lead to decades of Arab–Jewish hostility".
During the Irish War of Independence, but before the introduction of martial law in December 1920, Curzon suggested the "Indian" solution of blockading villages and imposing collective fines for attacks on the police and army.
In 1921 Curzon was created Earl of Kedleston, in the County of Derby, and Marquess Curzon of Kedleston.
In 1922, he was the chief negotiator for the Allies of the Treaty of Lausanne, which officially ended the war with the Ottoman Empire and defined the borders of Turkey.
Curzon defended the geopolitical talent of Eyre Crowe, who served as Permanent Under-Secretary at the Foreign Office from 1920 until his death in 1925. | https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/George_Curzon,_1st_Marquess_Curzon_of_Kedleston |
Bishriyya | Specifically focusing on the Bishriyya school following the thoughts of Bishr ibn al-Mu'tamir, there were six distinctions between them and the general Mu'tazila doctrine.
They believed that senses like color, taste, and smell may stem from the secondary effects of man's actions. They've taken this from the naturalists at this time yet they differentiate themselves from these other thinkers by identifying a primary effect as opposed to a secondary effect.
"I do not maintain that man acts with this capacity in the first moment nor in the second moment; but I say that man acts, and the act does not take place except in the second moment." This is saying that he believes in order to be judged according to your actions that you must be competent and within your true capacity. He defines capacity in such a way that you must be within full health- physically, mentally, and internally.
Bishr believes that although God's abilities to punish a child are well within His rights to use that he will not because in doing so he would be committing an act of injustice which God cannot do. He explains how a child, not being within his or her capacity, is incapable of deserving punishment due to the nature of not being able to make their own valid decisions. Were God to punish a child, He would be therefore punishing a child on the merits of an adult in a way that would be contradictory to the nature of God and the nature of punishment.
God's will is a will of His acts. Due to the nature of the Mu'tazili thought of a created Quran and a rationalistic approach to God, the Bishriyya follow a doctrine that God's will is therefore succeeding him in being. In the classic take on God's presence in the Islamic sense, God's word is co-eternal but as a subset of the Mu'tazila school, they believe in God preceding his creations and actions.
God's grace is something that would cause everyone to believe in God and therefore act in a way of deserving reward the same as which those who currently believe deserve reward, except even more in this case because of God's grace. It is important to note though, that while God has grace, God is not required to bestow his grace upon anyone ever. A very interesting aspect to this belief also is that God's goodness is never ending and the bestowment of his grace and goodness is without limit and God must choose. Seeing as there is no limit to how much good God can do, God can always do better and therefore he is not required to do the best because there is no such thing. However, God must provide man with the capacity to believe without inhibitors of belief.
The final major distinction of the Bishriyya is that they believed that if you commit a grave sin, repent, and then commit the same grave sin again, that you deserve not only punishment for the grave sin you just committed but also punishment for the first time you committed said sin because when you repented, you were forgiven of that sin on the basis that you would not commit the sin again. | https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Bishriyya |
Regency of Algiers | The tribe was a primary social and political structure based upon family. Competition among tribes for land and water was mediated through a sense of unity based on consanguinity, shared Islamic faith and their economic need to trade with each other, preventing dangerous social frictions and allowing union against external threats.
This system persisted under the Regency. The traditional isolation of the city from the hinterland ceased, ending the traditional divide between urban and rural areas of the central Maghreb. Cities and villages articulated their own organizations within the tribal systems and confederations. Cities left room for individuality, but although they depended on tribal society, they distanced people from tribal ways. However, the tribe did not disappear, but adapted, and its importance varied from region to region. It remained relatively important in the Aurès, for example.
A complex link of interdependencies developed between tribes and the state as they adapted to government pressure. They were assigned social roles; the Biskri Berbers were charged with street maintenance and guarding quarters, the Mozabite Ibadi theocracy was respected and represented in Algiers, and the Berbers of Kabylia and Aures frequently worked in Algiers.
The state was sometimes necessary for the consolidation of the tribes. These relations even seemed complementary. Makhzen tribes derived their legitimacy from their affiliation to the government, protecting urban areas, collecting taxes and exercising military control of the state in the countryside. The rayas tribes were tax-paying subjects and siba tribes were dissidents who opposed taxes, which reduced their surplus production. But they still depended on market access organized by the state and the makhzen tribes. The markets outside the territories dependent on the state were managed by the marabouts who very often acted as guarantors of tribal order.
The political authority of the tribes depended on either their military strength or their religious lineage. These two aristocracies, the religious brotherhoods who dominated the west, and the djouad strongman families of the east, often opposed one another. Algerian society had three separate aristocracies:
djouads: warriors, often heads of powerful autonomous tribes or tribal confederations, like the Berber Mokranis, Beni Abbas or Ben-Gana family of the Arab Hilalian confederations in the eastern beylik. The latter were related to Ahmed Bey of Constantine. The Regency often saw these tribes as allies.
sharifs: a religious nobility who claimed descent from the prophet Muhammad, and often members of the Naqib al-ashraf institution of the Ottoman Empire. The author Al-Zahar was a member of this nobility. Other sharifs were members of Sufi zawiyas, like the Emir Abdelkader, who was affiliated with the Qadiriyya tariqa.
marabouts like the Awled Sidi Cheikh ruled the western oases until the 19th century. They were a principality, a polity based on princedom, not themselves a central power, but vassals of Algiers. Nor were they a dynasty, but rather a political confederation, headed by a riyasa (chiefdom) of the Awlad Sidi Cheikh maraboutic brotherhoods. Marabouts also shared in corsair booty. | https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Regency_of_Algiers |
Christian denomination | In the Eastern world, the largest body of believers in modern times is the Eastern Orthodox Church, sometimes imprecisely called "Greek Orthodox" because from the time of Christ through the Byzantine empire, Greek was its common language. However, the term "Greek Orthodox" actually refers to only one portion of the entire Eastern Orthodox Church. The Eastern Orthodox Church believes itself to be the continuation of the original Christian Church established by Jesus Christ, and the Apostles. The Orthodox and Catholics have been separated since the 11th century, following the East–West Schism, with each of them saying they represent the original pre-schism Church.
The Eastern Orthodox consider themselves to be spiritually one body, which is administratively grouped into several autocephalous jurisdictions (also commonly referred to as "churches", despite being parts of one Church). They do not recognize any single bishop as universal church leader, but rather each bishop governs only his own diocese. The Patriarch of Constantinople is known as the Ecumenical Patriarch, and holds the title "first among equals", meaning only that if a great council is called, the patriarch sits as president of the council. He has no more power than any other bishop. Currently, the largest synod with the most members is the Russian Orthodox Church. Others include the ancient Patriarchates of Constantinople, Alexandria, Antioch and Jerusalem, the Georgian, Romanian, Serbian and Bulgarian Orthodox churches, and several smaller ones.
The second largest Eastern Christian communion is Oriental Orthodoxy, which is organized in a similar manner, with six national autocephalous groups and two autonomous bodies, although there are greater internal differences than among the Eastern Orthodox (especially in the diversity of rites being used). The six autocephalous Oriental Orthodox churches are the Coptic (Egyptian), Syriac, Armenian, Malankara (Indian), Ethiopian and Eritrean Orthodox churches. In the Aramaic-speaking areas of the Middle East, the Syriac Orthodox Church has long been dominant. Although the region of modern-day Ethiopia and Eritrea has had a strong body of believers since the infancy of Christianity, these regions only gained autocephaly in 1963 and 1994 respectively. The Oriental Orthodox are distinguished from the Eastern Orthodox by doctrinal differences concerning the union of human and divine natures in the person of Jesus Christ, and the two communions separated as a consequence of the Council of Chalcedon in the year 451, although there have been recent moves towards reconciliation. Since these groups are relatively obscure in the West, literature on them has sometimes included the Church of the East, which, like the Oriental Orthodox, originated in the 1st century A.D., but has not been in communion with them since before the Council of Ephesus of 431.
Largely aniconic, the Church of the East represents a third Eastern Christian tradition in its own right. In recent centuries, it has split into three Churches. The largest (since the early 20th century) is the Baghdad-based Chaldean Catholic Church formed from groups that entered communion with Rome at different times, beginning in 1552. The second-largest is what since 1976 is officially called the Assyrian Church of the East and which from 1933 to 2015 was headquartered first in Cyprus and then in the United States, but whose present Catholicos-Patriarch, Gewargis III, elected in 2015, lives in Erbil, Iraq. The third is the Ancient Church of the East, distinct since 1964 and headed by Addai II Giwargis, resident in Baghdad.
There are also the Eastern Catholic Churches, most of which are counterparts of those listed above, sharing with them the same theological and liturgical traditions, but differing from them in that they recognize the Bishop of Rome as the universal head of the Church. They are fully part of the Catholic communion, on the same level juridically as the Latin Church. Most of their members do not describe themselves as "Roman Catholics", a term they associate with membership of the Latin Church, and speak of themselves in relation to whichever Church they belong to: Maronites, Melkites, Ukrainian Catholics, Coptic Catholics, Chaldean Catholics, etc.
And finally the smallest Eastern Christian group founded in early 20th century is Byzantine Rite Lutheranism where accept Byzantine Rite as Church's liturgy while retaining their Lutheran traditions like Ukrainian Lutheran Church. It is considered part of Eastern Protestant denominational movement. | https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Christian_denomination |
Sharia | Early Islamic law developed a number of legal concepts that anticipated similar such concepts that later appeared in English common law. Similarities exist between the royal English contract protected by the action of debt and the Islamic Aqd, between the English assize of novel disseisin and the Islamic Istihqaq, and between the English jury and the Islamic Lafif in classical Maliki jurisprudence. The law schools known as Inns of Court also parallel Madrasahs. The methodology of legal precedent and reasoning by analogy (Qiyas) are also similar in both the Islamic and common law systems, as are the English trust and agency institutions to the Islamic Waqf and Hawala institutions, respectively.
Elements of Islamic law also have other parallels in Western legal systems. For example, the influence of Islam on the development of an international law of the sea can be discerned alongside that of the Roman influence. George Makdisi has argued that the madrasa system of attestation paralleled the legal scholastic system in the West, which gave rise to the modern university system. The triple status of faqih ("master of law"), mufti ("professor of legal opinions") and mudarris ("teacher"), conferred by the classical Islamic legal degree, had its equivalents in the medieval Latin terms magister, professor and doctor, respectively, although they all came to be used synonymously in both East and West.
Makdisi suggested that the medieval European doctorate, licentia docendi was modeled on the Islamic degree ijazat al-tadris wa-l-ifta’, of which it is a word-for-word translation, with the term ifta’ (issuing of fatwas) omitted. He also argued that these systems shared fundamental freedoms: the freedom of a professor to profess his personal opinion and the freedom of a student to pass judgement on what he is learning.
There are differences between Islamic and Western legal systems. For example, Sharia classically recognizes only natural persons, and never developed the concept of a legal person, or corporation, i.e., a legal entity that limits the liabilities of its managers, shareholders, and employees; exists beyond the lifetimes of its founders; and that can own assets, sign contracts, and appear in court through representatives. Interest prohibitions imposed secondary costs by discouraging record keeping and delaying the introduction of modern accounting. Such factors, according to Timur Kuran, have played a significant role in retarding economic development in the Middle East. However, the rise of monopoly wealth and corporations have proven to also be detrimental to the economic equality of a society. Ziauddin Sardar also suggests that the promotion of equitable wealth distribution and suppression of monopoly capital are a part of Islam's message that emphasises genuine equity and justice. | https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Sharia |
Slavery | Slavery in Haiti started with the arrival of Christopher Columbus on the island in 1492. The practice was devastating to the native population. Following the indigenous Taíno's near decimation from forced labour, disease and war, the Spanish, under advisement of the Catholic priest Bartolomé de las Casas, and with the blessing of the Catholic church, who also wished to protect the indigenous people, began engaging in earnest in the use of African slaves. During the French colonial period beginning in 1625, the economy of Haiti (then known as Saint-Domingue) was based on slavery, and the practice there was regarded as the most brutal in the world.
Following the Treaty of Ryswick of 1697, Hispaniola was divided between France and Spain. France received the western third and subsequently named it Saint-Domingue. To develop it into sugarcane plantations, the French imported thousands of slaves from Africa. Sugar was a lucrative commodity crop throughout the 18th century. By 1789, approximately 40,000 white colonists lived in Saint-Domingue. The whites were vastly outnumbered by the tens of thousands of African slaves they had imported to work on their plantations, which were primarily devoted to the production of sugarcane. In the north of the island, slaves were able to retain many ties to African cultures, religion and language; these ties were continually being renewed by newly imported Africans. Blacks outnumbered whites by about ten to one.
The French-enacted Code Noir ("Black Code"), prepared by Jean-Baptiste Colbert and ratified by Louis XIV, had established rules on slave treatment and permissible freedoms. Saint-Domingue has been described as one of the most brutally efficient slave colonies; one-third of newly imported Africans died within a few years. Many slaves died from diseases such as smallpox and typhoid fever. They had birth rates around 3 percent, and there is evidence that some women aborted fetuses, or committed infanticide, rather than allow their children to live within the bonds of slavery.
As in its Louisiana colony, the French colonial government allowed some rights to free people of color: the mixed-race descendants of white male colonists and black female slaves (and later, mixed-race women). Over time, many were released from slavery. They established a separate social class. White French Creole fathers frequently sent their mixed-race sons to France for their education. Some men of color were admitted into the military. More of the free people of color lived in the south of the island, near Port-au-Prince, and many intermarried within their community. They frequently worked as artisans and tradesmen, and began to own some property. Some became slave holders. The free people of color petitioned the colonial government to expand their rights.
Slaves that made it to Haiti from the trans-Atlantic journey and slaves born in Haiti were first documented in Haiti's archives and transferred to France's Ministry of Defense and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. As of 2015, these records are in The National Archives of France. According to the 1788 Census, Haiti's population consisted of nearly 40,000 whites, 30,000 free coloureds and 450,000 slaves.
The Haitian Revolution of 1804, the only successful slave revolt in human history, precipitated the end of slavery in all French colonies, which came in 1848. | https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Slavery |
Tafsir-i Kabir | A peculiar feature of this work is that the author claimed to have been divinely taught the meanings and purport of Quranic verses and chapters. Throughout the commentary he suggests the vital importance of the order in which chapters were arranged in the present form. The commentary stresses the importance of a number of aspects in Quranic commentary which were thought a novel approach at the time of its publication such as the inter-relationship of the text of the entire Quran and of each Surah to the preceding, the themes of the Quran are connected and all chapters, verses and words are perfectly and purposefully arranged according to a coherent and logical system. It also presents a distinctive eschatological reading of the Qur'an, applying many of its prophecies to the present times, as per Ahmadiyya beliefs, such as with reference to Surah 18 (al-Kahf) and especially the latter chapters of the Quran.
the explanatory notes place a particular importance on refuting the principal objections raised against Islam by non-Muslim writers. It is claimed that such objections were based either upon ignorance or deliberate misrepresentation of the teachings of Islam. Such objections have been refuted with the intent to remove the bias and prejudice against Islam, and make a better understanding of its teachings possible. The commentary is thus written in the style of an argument for Islam. Repeated references and comments are made on the works of famous orientalists like Theodor Nöldeke, William Muir and William Montgomery Watt as well as numerous Muslim theologians and commentators. The author has frequently dismissed the views of these writers in favour of a more linguistic approach towards understanding the meanings of the Quran. As compared to other classical texts, this commentary seems to rely less on Asbab al-nuzul or reasons of revelation of verses. This approach greatly reduces the impact and validity of negative remarks and objections made on the Quran by non-Muslim critics. It deals particularly with such practical teachings of the Quran as pertain to moral and socio-political ideas and economic relations; and frequently comments upon verses with reference to the various theories and findings of what were then the newly emerging natural and social sciences of the 19th and early 20th centuries. The commentary also adopts a more comparative approach to the Quran than earlier commentators vis-a-vis the beliefs and teachings found in other religions and ideologies.
Each verse is explained separately in two sections. The first section gives different translations of the words in the verse according to major classical Arabic lexicons along with their different uses derived from classical Arabic prose and poetry. The second section contains detailed commentary. A detailed bibliography of references and indices are provided at the end of each volume. | https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Tafsir-i_Kabir |
Regency of Algiers | Algiers' refusal to follow Ottoman foreign policy led European powers to negotiate treaties with it directly on trade, tribute and slave ransoms, recognizing Algerian autonomy despite its formal subordination to the Ottomans. Algiers used privateering as a foreign policy tool, playing its European counterparts against one other, and hunting merchant ships, prompting European states to conclude peace treaties and seek Mediterranean passes to help them secure lucrative cabotage trade.
This gave the Regency internal legitimacy as champions of jihad and according to early modern European authors international respect for the Regency's sovereignty as an established government, despite still being a "nest of Pirates". Dutch jurist Hugo Grotius (1583–1645) noted that "Algiers exercised the jus ad bellum of a sovereign power through its corsairs". Historian Daniel Panzac stressed:
Indeed, privateering was based on two fundamental priniciples: it was one of the forms of war practiced by the Maghreb against the Christian states, which conferred upon it a dimension that was at one and the same time legitimate and religious; and it was exercised in a framework defined by a state strong enough to enact its rules and control their application.
Algiers first established relations with France in 1617, with a treaty signed in 1619, and another in 1628. These mostly concerned the Bastion de France and the rights of French merchants in Algiers. But the Bastion was razed a second time by Ali Bitchin in 1637, as armed incidents between French and Algerian vessels were frequent. Nonetheless, a treaty in 1640 allowed France to regain its North African commercial establishments.
After attacks by the English in 1621 and Dutch in 1624, Algerian corsairs took thousands of English and Dutch sailors to the Algerian slave market, resulting in intermittent wars followed by long lasting peace treaties whose tribute payments terms ranged from money to weapons.
Under Louis XIV, France built a strong navy to fend off the corsairs who raided Corsica and were everywhere in the waters off Marseilles in the late 1650s. It launched multiple campaigns against the Regency, first in Jijel and Collo in 1664, then several bombings of Algiers were conducted between 1682 and 1688 in what is known as the Franco-Algerian war, which ended when a 100-year peace treaty was signed between Dey Hussein Mezzo Morto and Louis XIV. | https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Regency_of_Algiers |
Abd al-Malik ibn Marwan | Re-establishing Umayyad rule across the Caliphate was the major priority of Abd al-Malik. His initial focus was the reconquest of Iraq, the Caliphate's wealthiest province. Iraq was also home to a large population of Arab tribesmen, the group from which the Caliphate derived the bulk of its troops. In contrast, Egypt, which provided significant income to the treasury, possessed a small Arab community and was thus a meager source of troops. The demand for soldiers was pressing for the Umayyads as the backbone of their military, the Syrian army, remained fractured along Yamani and Qaysi lines. Though the roughly 6,000 Yamani soldiers of Abd al-Malik's predecessor were able to consolidate the Umayyad position in Syria, they were too few to reassert authority throughout the Caliphate. Ibn Ziyad, a key figure in the establishment of Marwanid power, set about enlarging the army by recruiting widely among the Arab tribes, including those which nominally belonged to the Qays faction.
Ibn Ziyad had been tasked by Abd al-Malik's father with the reconquest of Iraq. At the time, Iraq and its dependencies were split between the pro-Alid forces of al-Mukhtar al-Thaqafi in Kufa and the forces of Ibn al-Zubayr's brother Mus'ab in Basra. In August 686, Ibn Ziyad's 60,000-strong army was routed at the Battle of Khazir and he was slain, alongside most of his deputy commanders, at the hands of al-Mukhtar's much smaller pro-Alid force led by Ibrahim ibn al-Ashtar. The decisive defeat and the loss of Ibn Ziyad represented a major setback to Abd al-Malik's ambitions in Iraq. He refrained from further major campaigns in the province for the next five years, during which Mus'ab defeated and killed al-Mukhtar and his supporters and became Iraq's sole ruler.
Abd al-Malik shifted his focus to consolidating control of Syria. His efforts in Iraq had been undermined by the Qaysi–Yamani schism when a Qaysi general in Ibn Ziyad's army, Umayr ibn al-Hubab al-Sulami, defected with his men mid-battle to join Zufar's rebellion. Umayr's subsequent campaign against the large Christian Banu Taghlib tribe in the Jazira sparked a series of tit-for-tat raids and further deepened Arab tribal divisions, the previously neutral Taghlib throwing in its lot with the Yaman and the Umayyads. The Taghlib killed Umayr in 689 and delivered his head to Abd al-Malik. | https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Abd_al-Malik_ibn_Marwan |
Oman | Torture methods in use in Oman include mock execution, beating, hooding, solitary confinement, subjection to extremes of temperature and to constant noise, abuse and humiliation. There have been numerous reports of torture and other inhumane forms of punishment perpetrated by Omani security forces on protesters and detainees. Several prisoners detained in 2012 complained of sleep deprivation, extreme temperatures and solitary confinement. Homosexuality is criminalised within Oman.
The Omani government decides who can or cannot be a journalist and this permission can be withdrawn at any time. Censorship and self-censorship are a constant factor. Omanis have limited access to political information through the media. Access to news and information can be problematic: journalists have to be content with news compiled by the official news agency on some issues. Through a decree by the Sultan, the government has now extended its control over the media to blogs and other websites. Omanis cannot hold a public meeting without the government's approval. Omanis who want to set up a non-governmental organisation of any kind need a licence. The Omani government does not permit the formation of independent civil society associations. Human Rights Watch issued in 2016, that an Omani court sentenced three journalists to prison and ordered the permanent closure of their newspaper, over an article that alleged corruption in the judiciary.
Omani law prohibits criticism of the Sultan and government in any form or medium. Oman's police do not need search warrants to enter people's homes. The law does not provide citizens with the right to change their government. The Sultan retains ultimate authority on all foreign and domestic issues. Government officials are not subject to financial disclosure laws. Criticism of government figures and politically objectionable views have been suppressed. Publication of books is limited and the government restricts their importation and distribution, as with other media products.
Until 2023, Omani citizens needed government permission to marry foreigners. In April 2023 the law was changed by a royal decree, allowing Omani citizens to marry foreigners without government permission. According to HRW, women in Oman face discrimination.
The plight of domestic workers in Oman is a taboo subject. In 2011, the Philippines government determined that out of all the countries in the Middle East, only Oman and Israel qualify as safe for Filipino migrants. Migrant workers remained insufficiently protected against exploitation. | https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Oman |
Aram (region) | The Arameans appear to have displaced the earlier Semitic Amorite (Aḫlamū) populations of ancient Syria during the period from 1100 BC to 900 BC, which was a Dark Age for the entire Near East, North Africa, Caucasus, Mediterranean regions, with great upheavals and mass movements of people. The early history of the Arameans is tied to that of the Aḫlamū and Sutû who were already known in the Late Bronze Age and who seem to have played a role in the period's demise. The Arameans rose to be the prominent group amongst the Ahlamu, and from c. 1200 BC on, the Amorites disappeared from the pages of history and the term Ahlamu underwent a semantic shift, becoming an accepted term for Aramean. From then on, the region that they had inhabited became known as Aram and Eber-Nari.
The Arameans emerged in a region which was largely under the domination of the Middle Assyrian Empire (1365–1050 BC) and quickly posed a threat to the Assyrian polity which was largely located west of the Euphrates. In order to nullify this threat, Tiglath-Pileser I (1115–1077 BC) of Assyria performed many campaigns in Aramean territory, although the numerous campaigns that the Assyrian records recorded that he took indicate that Assyrian military campaigns were unsuccessful at exercising power or dominance over the Arameans. Some scholars believe that the Arameans took Nineveh in this time. In the 11th century BC, Assyria fell into decline which may have been caused by the incursions of the emerging Arameans, allowing the Arameans to establish a string of states across the Levant and make notable expansions into Assyrian territory in this time such as in the Khabur Valley. During the period 1050 – 900 BC Arameans came to dominate most of what is now Syria but was then called Eber-Nari and Aramea.
Two medium-sized Aramaean kingdoms, Aram-Damascus and Hamath, along with several smaller kingdoms and independent city-states, developed in the region during the early first millennium BCE. The most notable of these were Bit Adini, Bit Bahiani, Bit Hadipe, Aram-Rehob, Aram-Zobah, Bit-Zamani, Bit-Halupe and Aram-Ma'akah, as well as the Aramean tribal polities of the Gambulu, Litau and Puqudu.
There was some synthesis with neo Hittite populations in northern Syria and south central Anatolia, and a number of small so called Syro-Hittite states arose in the region, such as Tabal. The east Mediterranean coast was largely dominated by Phoenician city states such as Tyre, Sidon, Berytus and Arvad.
With the advent of the Neo Assyrian Empire, the region was invaded on several occasions, since the middle of the 9th century, and finally fell under the control of Assyrian kings during the second half of the 8th century BCE. Large numbers of people living in the region were deported into Assyria, Babylonia and elsewhere. A few steles that name kings of this period have been found, such as the 8th-century Zakkur stele. The Assyrians and Babylonians themselves adopted a Mesopotamian form of Aramaic, known as Imperial Aramaic in the 8th century BC, when Tiglath-pileser III made it the lingua franca of his vast empire. The Neo Aramaic dialects still spoken by the indigenous Assyrians and Mandeans of northern Iraq, south east Turkey, north east Syria and north west Iran, descend from this language.
The Neo Assyrian Empire was riven by unremitting civil war from 626 BC onward, weakening it severely, and allowing it to be attacked and destroyed by a coalition of its former vassals between 616 and 605 BCE. The region of Aram was subsequently fought over by the Neo-Babylonian Empire and Egyptians, the latter of whom had belatedly come to the aid of their former Assyrian overlords. The Babylonians prevailed and Aram became a part of the Neo-Babylonian Empire (612–539 BC) where it remained named Eber-Nari.
The Persian Achaemenid Empire (539–332 BC) overthrew the Babylonians and conquered the region. They retained the Imperial Aramaic introduced by the Assyrians, and the name of Eber-Nari.
In 332 BC the region was conquered by the Greek ruler, Alexander the Great. Upon his death in 323 BC this area became part of the Greek Seleucid Empire, at which point Greek replaced the Assyrian introduced Imperial Aramaic as the official language of Empire, as were the names Eber-Nari and Aramea. This area and other parts of the former Assyrian Empire to the east (including Assyria itself) were renamed Syria (Seleucid Syria), a 9th-century BC Hurrian, Luwian and Greek corruption of Assyria (see Etymology of Syria and Name of Syria), which had for centuries until this point referred specifically to the land of Assyria and the Assyrians, which in modern terms actually covered the northern half of Iraq, north east Syria, south east Turkey and the north western fringes of Iran, and not the bulk of modern Syria and Lebanon and its largely Aramean and Phoenician inhabitants.
It is from this period that the later Syria vs Assyria naming controversy arises, the Seleucids confusingly applied the name not only to the Mesopotamian land of Assyria itself, but also to the lands west of Euphrates which had never been part of Assyria itself, but merely Aramean, Phoenician, Neo-Hittite and Sutean inhabited colonies. When they lost control of Assyria itself to the Parthians, the name Syria survived but was dislocated from its original source, and was applied only to the land west of Euphrates that had once been part of the Assyrian empire, while Assyria-proper went back to being called Assyria (and also Athura/Assuristan). However, this situation led to both Assyrians and Arameans being dubbed Syrians and later Syriacs in Greco-Roman culture.
This area, by now called Syria, was fought over by Seleucids and Parthians during the 2nd century BCE, and later still by the Romans and Sassanid Persians. Palmyra, a powerful Aramean kingdom arose during this period,
and for a time it dominated the area and successfully resisted Roman and Persian attempts at conquest. The region eventually came under the control of the Byzantine Empire. Christianity began to take hold from the 1st to 3rd centuries AD, and the Aramaic language gradually supplanted Canaanite in Phoenecia and Hebrew in Palestine.
In the mid-7th century AD the region fell to the Arab Islamic conquest. Aramaic survived among a sizable portion of the population of Syria, who resisted Arabization. However, the native Western Aramaic of the Aramean Christian population of Syria is spoken today by only a few thousand people, the majority having now adopted the Arabic language. Mesopotamian Eastern Aramaic, which still contains a number of loanwords from the Akkadian, as well as structural similarities, still survives among the majority of ethnically distinct Assyrians, who are mainly based in northern Iraq, north-eastern Syria, south-eastern Turkey and north-western Iran. | https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Aram_(region) |
Bible | The following list presents the books of Ketuvim in the order they appear in most current printed editions.
Tehillim (Psalms) תְהִלִּים is an anthology of individual Hebrew religious hymns.
Mishlei (Book of Proverbs) מִשְלֵי is a "collection of collections" on values, moral behaviour, the meaning of life and right conduct, and its basis in faith.
Iyyôbh (Book of Job) אִיּוֹב is about faith, without understanding or justifying suffering.
Shīr Hashshīrīm (Song of Songs) or (Song of Solomon) שִׁיר הַשִׁירִים (Passover) is poetry about love and sex.
Rūth (Book of Ruth) רוּת (Shābhû‘ôth) tells of the Moabite woman Ruth, who decides to follow the God of the Israelites, and remains loyal to her mother-in-law, who is then rewarded.
Eikhah (Lamentations) איכה (Ninth of Av) [Also called Kinnot in Hebrew.] is a collection of poetic laments for the destruction of Jerusalem in 586 BCE.
Qōheleth (Ecclesiastes) קהלת (Sukkôth) contains wisdom sayings disagreed over by scholars. Is it positive and life-affirming, or deeply pessimistic?
Estēr (Book of Esther) אֶסְתֵר (Pûrîm) tells of a Hebrew woman in Persia who becomes queen and thwarts a genocide of her people.
Dānî’ēl (Book of Daniel) דָּנִיֵּאל combines prophecy and eschatology (end times) in story of God saving Daniel just as He will save Israel.
‘Ezrā (Book of Ezra–Book of Nehemiah) עזרא tells of rebuilding the walls of Jerusalem after the Babylonian exile.
Divrei ha-Yamim (Chronicles) דברי הימים contains genealogy.
The Jewish textual tradition never finalized the order of the books in Ketuvim. The Babylonian Talmud (Bava Batra 14b–15a) gives their order as Ruth, Psalms, Job, Proverbs, Ecclesiastes, Song of Solomon, Lamentations of Jeremiah, Daniel, Scroll of Esther, Ezra, Chronicles.
One of the large scale differences between the Babylonian and the Tiberian biblical traditions is the order of the books. Isaiah is placed after Ezekiel in the Babylonian, while Chronicles opens the Ketuvim in the Tiberian, and closes it in the Babylonian.
The Ketuvim is the last of the three portions of the Tanakh to have been accepted as canonical. While the Torah may have been considered canon by Israel as early as the fifth century BCE and the Former and Latter Prophets were canonized by the second century BCE, the Ketuvim was not a fixed canon until the second century CE.
Evidence suggests, however, that the people of Israel were adding what would become the Ketuvim to their holy literature shortly after the canonization of the prophets. As early as 132 BCE references suggest that the Ketuvim was starting to take shape, although it lacked a formal title. Against Apion, the writing of Josephus in 95 CE, treated the text of the Hebrew Bible as a closed canon to which "... no one has ventured either to add, or to remove, or to alter a syllable..." For an extended period after 95CE, the divine inspiration of Esther, the Song of Songs, and Ecclesiastes was often under scrutiny. | https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Bible |
Arwa al-Sulayhi | In 1067, Ali al-Sulayhi was killed by the Najahid ruler of Zabid, Sa'id. Queen Asma was taken prisoner in Zabid along with several other women. Al-Mukarram Ahmad succeeded Ali as both king and da'i, bringing Arwa to the new rank of queen consort. Local rulers across Yemen were rising up in defiance of Sulayhid authority, hoping to take advantage of the power vacuum after Ali's death. Ahmad spent the next few years campaigning to try and reassert his authority, which he eventually succeeded at doing.
According to Shahla Haeri and Taef El-Azhari, there is no evidence that Arwa was ever in a position of political or religious authority during this period. According to Samer Traboulsi, however, al-Mukarram's absence during his continuous campaigning would have given Arwa a chance to play a political role.
The role of Asma bint Shihab at this point is disputed, as is her influence on Arwa. According to Fatema Mernissi, Asma had in effect been co-ruler of Yemen alongside her husband Ali during his life, and then was the power behind the throne during al-Mukarram's nominal reign. Taef El-Azhari, however, says that this assertion is not supported by contemporary sources - while they do portray Asma as a highly esteemed individual, there is only one instance of her actually setting policy: in 1063, when she got her brother As'ad appointed as deputy over the Tihama region. As a result, El-Azhari says, Asma was probably not a major influence on Arwa's political career. On the other hand, Delia Cortese and Simonetta Calderini suggest that Umara's account of Asma convincing her son to wage war on another tribe indicates that she did wield political influence during his reign. They also point to Ibn Khaldun, who "candidly" wrote that Asma was the one who was really in charge during her son's early reign. Meanwhile, Shahla Haeri says that Asma was "in charge of political affairs and governance, controlling sensitive strategic information and managing all state and financial matters" until her death, and that Arwa "might have learned from Asma simply by observing her or assisting her in her various official duties, given the close relationship between the two women and the ease with which Arwa replaced her mother-in-law after her death". | https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Arwa_al-Sulayhi |
15th century in literature | Early 15th c. – Henry Lovelich, English poet and translator from London
1405: 18 October – Aeneas Sylvius Piccolomini, Italian erotic poet and novelist, later Pope Pius II (died 1464)
1406 – Matteo Palmieri, Florentine humanist and historian (died 1475)
1413 – Giosafat Barbaro, Venetian travel writer (died 1494)
c. 1426 – Bhalan, Indian Gujarati-language poet (died c. 1500)
1432 – Ōta Dōkan (太田 道灌, Ōta Sukenaga), Japanese samurai warrior-poet and Buddhist monk (died 1486)
1434: 29 August – Janus Pannonius, Hungarian/Croatian poet and bishop writing in Latin (died 1472)
c. 1435 – Johannes Tinctoris (Jehan le Teinturier), Low Countries' writer on music and musician (died 1511)
1441: 9 February – Ali-Shir Nava'i, Chagatai Turkic-language Timurid poet and scholar (died 1501)
c. 1441 – Felix Fabri (Felix Faber), Swiss Dominican theologian and travel writer (died 1502)
1449 – Aldus Manutius, Italian publisher (died 1515)
c. 1451 – Richard Methley, English Dominican writer and translator (died 1527 or 1528)
1453 – Ermolao Barbaro, Italian scholar (died 1493)
c. 1460 – John Skelton, English poet (died 1529)
1462: 8 September – Henry Medwall, English playwright and ecclesiastical lawyer (died c. 1501/2?)
1465 – Yamazaki Sōkan (山崎宗鑑, Shina Norishige), Japanese poet (died 1553)
1470: 20 May – Pietro Bembo, Venetian-born scholar, poet and cardinal (died 1547)
c. 1473 – Jean Lemaire de Belges, Walloon French poet and historian (died c. 1525)
1475 – Ludovico Vicentino degli Arrighi, Italian calligrapher and type designer (died 1527)
1483: 6 March – Francesco Guicciardini, Italian historian and statesman
1483: 19 April – Paolo Giovio, Italian contemporary historian, bishop and scientist (died 1552)
1485 – Hanibal Lucić, Croatian poet and playwright (died 1553)
1486: 28 July – Pieter Gillis, Flemish humanist, printer and Antwerp city official (died 1533)
1488: c. 24 August – Ferdinand Columbus, Spanish bibliophile (died 1539)
1488: (estimated) – Otto Brunfels, German botanist and theologian (died 1534)
1490: Gáspár Heltai (Kaspar Helth), Transylvanian writer in German (died 1574)
1492: 11 April – Marguerite de Navarre, princess of France, queen consort, writer, religious reformer and patron of the arts (died 1549)
1494: November (probable) – François Rabelais, French writer (died 1553)
1496: 23 November – Clément Marot, French poet (died 1544)
1497 – Edward Hall, English historian, politician and lawyer (died 1547) | https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/15th_century_in_literature |
Azali Assoumani | Assoumani became the President of the Council of State of the Comoros in 1999 after overthrowing interim president Tadjidine Ben Said Massounde in a coup d'état. His troops justified the coup on the basis of protecting territorial integrity after Massounde had begun negotiations with representatives of the island of Anjouan for greater autonomy or independence. This was despite the fact that an international conference in Antananarivo had resulted in a settlement on the matter between the three islands of the Comoros, although the government of Anjouan had delayed ratifying the agreement.
On 23 December 2001, Assoumani's new proposed constitution was adopted by referendum. The constitution established a rotating presidency and granted considerable autonomy to the Comorian islands, each of which gained its own basic law, flag and executive branch of government. It also renamed the country from the Federal Islamic Republic of the Comoros to the Union of the Comoros and redesigned the national flag to remove its religious inscriptions and become multicolour, as can be seen today.
Assoumani announced elections for 2002, with violent clashes between state forces and the opposition erupting across the country during the campaign. Reports of arbitrary arrests also emerged. Assoumani resigned from his position as President of the Council of State on 21 January 2002, in order to run for President of the Union of the Comoros and was succeeded by Hamada Madi. Assoumani was then elected president with 75% of the vote in the multiparty 2002 Comorian presidential election, and was inaugurated on 26 May 2002.
Assoumani's presidency was marked by conflicts over jurisdiction and political gridlock due to his refusal to devolve power to the autonomous regions of the Comoros, as mandated by the constitution. The latter also required that successive presidents be from different islands, allowing Ahmed Abdallah Mohamed Sambi from Anjouan to succeed him after winning the 2006 presidential election.
Assoumani launched a second presidential bid in the 2016 presidential election. In the first round on 21 February, he came third with 14.96% of the vote, before winning the second round with 40.98% of the vote on 10 April. However, both Assoumani and his opponent Mohamed Ali Solihi disputed the election result, alleging irregularities and electoral fraud in the second round. Assoumani demanded the invalidation of ballots from most of the polling stations on Anjouan in particular. Consequently, a third round of voting took place on 11 May. The Constitutional Court declared Assoumani the winner with 41.43% of the vote on 15 May, and he took office on 26 May for a five-year term. His first vice-president was Djaffar Ahmed Said, the former attorney-general and director of judicial affairs, who was later replaced by Moustadroine Aboudou from Anjouan and then Abdallah Said Sarouma from Mohéli.
During his tenure, the opposition accused Assoumani of having amended the constitution to remain in power until 2029. In addition, his closing of the Constitutional Court and Anti-Corruption Court caused the European Union to suspend all cooperation with the Comoros in protest.
On 13 February 2019, Assoumani resigned the presidency to campaign for re-election in the 2019 Comorian presidential election on 24 March. He was elected in the first round and assumed office again on 3 April.
On August 7, 2024, Azali Assoumani granted extensive powers to his son and presumed successor Nour El Fath, allowing him to intervene at several stages of the government decision-making process. | https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Azali_Assoumani |
Fez, Morocco | In 1069–1070 (or possibly a few years later), Fez was conquered by the Almoravids under Yusuf ibn Tashfin. In the same year of this conquest, Yusuf ibn Tashfin unified Madinat Fas and al-ʿĀliyá into one city. The walls dividing them were destroyed, bridges connecting them were built or renovated, and a new circuit of walls was constructed that encompassed both cities. A kasbah (Arabic term for "citadel") was built at the western edge of the city (just west of Bab Bou Jeloud today) to house the city's governor and garrison.: 53 Although the capital was moved to Marrakesh under the Almoravids, Fez acquired a reputation for Maliki legal scholarship and remained an important centre of trade and industry.: 52–54 : 17–18 Almoravid impact on the city's structure was such that Yusuf ibn Tashfin is sometimes considered to be the second founder of Fez.
In 1145 the Almohad leader Abd al-Mu'min besieged and conquered the city during the Almohad overthrow of the Almoravids. Due to the ferocious resistance they encountered from the local population, the Almohads demolished the city's fortifications.: 55 However, due to Fez's continuing economic and military importance, the Almohad caliph Ya'qub al-Mansur ordered the reconstruction of the ramparts.: 36 : 606 The walls were completed by his successor Muhammad al-Nasir in 1204,: 36 giving them their definitive shape and establishing the perimeter of Fes el-Bali to this day.: 56 : 19 The Almohads built the Kasbah Bou Jeloud on the site of the former Almoravid kasbah: 56 and also built the first kasbah occupying the site of the current Kasbah an-Nouar.: 72 : 109 Not all the land within the city walls was densely inhabited; much of it was still relatively open and was occupied by crops and gardens used by the inhabitants.: 19 During the 12th century, the city was one of the largest in the world, with an estimated population of 200,000. By 1200, Fez and Cairo had probably become the largest Muslim cities.
In 1250, Fez regained its status as the capital under the Marinid dynasty. The city reached its golden age in the Marinid period.: 16 : 61–78 : 20 In 1276, an anti-Marinid revolt resulted in a massacre of the Jewish community that was stopped by the intervention of the ruler Abu Yusuf Ya'qub. Following the revolt, Abu Yusuf Yaqub founded Fes Jdid as the new administrative and military centre. Under the Marinids, many of the principal monuments in the medina were built and the city established its reputation as an important intellectual centre.: 61–78 Between 1271 and 1357 seven madrasas were built, which are among the best examples of Moroccan architecture and some of the most richly decorated monuments in Fez.: 285–289, 291–293 : 312–314
The Jewish quarter of Fez, the Mellah, was created in Fes Jdid at some point during the Marinid period. The exact date and circumstances of its formation are not firmly established, but many scholars date the transfer of the Jewish population from Fes el-Bali to the new Mellah to the 15th century, a period of political tension and instability. In particular, Jewish sources describe the transfer as a consequence of the rediscovery of Idris II's body in the heart of the city in 1437, which caused the surrounding area—if not the entire city—to acquire a holy (haram) status, requiring that non-Muslims be removed from the area. The Moroccan Jewish community had initially consisted of indigenous local Jews (known as the Toshavim) but these were joined by Western Sephardic Jews fleeing from the Iberian Peninsula (known as the Megorashim) in subsequent generations, especially after the 1492 expulsion of Jews from Spain and 1496 expulsion of Jews from Portugal.
The 1465 Moroccan revolt overthrew the last Marinid sultan. In 1472 the Wattasids, another Zenata dynasty which had previously served as viziers under the Marinid sultans, succeeded as rulers of Morocco from Fez.: 114–115 They perpetuated the structure of the Marinid state and continued its policies, but were unable to control all of Morocco.: 15 : 207–209 They did not contribute significantly to the physical fabric of Fez. | https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Fez,_Morocco |
Geography of Syria | The most striking feature of the climate is the contrast. Between the humid Mediterranean coast and the arid desert regions lies a semiarid steppe zone extending across three-quarters of the country and bordered on the west by the Anti-Lebanon Mountains and the Jabal an Nusayriyah, on the north by the Turkish mountain region, and on the southeast by the Jabal al Arab, Jabal ar Ruwaq, Jabal Abu Rujmayn, and the Jabal Bishri ranges.
Rainfall in the coastal region is fairly abundant, annual precipitation ranging between 750 and 1,200 millimeters (30 and 47 in). Most of the rain, carried by winds from the Mediterranean, falls between November and May. Daily mean temperatures range from 7 °C (45 °F) in January to 27 °C (81 °F) in August. Because the high ridges of the Jabal an Nusayriyah catch most of the rains from the Mediterranean, the Al Ghab depression, located east of these mountains, is in a relatively arid zone with warm, dry winds and scanty rainfall. Frost is unknown in any season, although the peaks of the Jabal an Nusayriyah are sometimes snow-covered.
Farther south, rain-bearing clouds from the Mediterranean pass through the gap between the Jabal an Nusayriyah and the Anti-Lebanon Mountains, reaching the area of Homs and, sometimes, the steppe region east of that city. Still farther to the south, however, the Anti-Lebanon Mountains bar the rains from the Mediterranean, and the area, including the capital city of Damascus, becomes part of the semiarid climatic zone of the steppe, with precipitation averaging less than 200 millimeters (8 in) a year and with daily mean temperatures ranging from 5 °C (41 °F) in January to 29 °C (84 °F) in July and August. The vicinity of the capital is, nevertheless, verdant and cultivable because of irrigation from the Barada River by aqueducts built during Roman times.
In the southeast, the humidity decreases, and annual precipitation falls below 100 millimeters (4 in). The scanty amounts of rain, moreover, are highly variable from year to year, causing periodic droughts. In the barren stony desert south of the Jabal ar Ruwaq, Jabal Abu Rujmayn, and Jabal Bishri ranges, maximum temperatures in July often exceed 45 °C (113 °F). Sandstorms, common during February and May, damage vegetation and prevent grazing. North of the desert ranges and east of the Al Ghab depression lie the vast steppes of the plateau, where cloudless skies and high daytime temperatures prevail during the summer, but frosts, at times severe, are common from November to March. Precipitation averages 250 millimeters (10 in) a year but falls below 200 millimeters (8 in) in a large belt along the southern desert area. In this belt, only the Euphrates and Khabur rivers provide sufficient water for settlement and cultivation. | https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Geography_of_Syria |
Philosophy | Methods of philosophy are ways of conducting philosophical inquiry. They include techniques for arriving at philosophical knowledge and justifying philosophical claims as well as principles used for choosing between competing theories. A great variety of methods have been employed throughout the history of philosophy. Many of them differ significantly from the methods used in the natural sciences in that they do not use experimental data obtained through measuring equipment. The choice of one's method usually has important implications both for how philosophical theories are constructed and for the arguments cited for or against them. This choice is often guided by epistemological considerations about what constitutes philosophical evidence.
Methodological disagreements can cause conflicts among philosophical theories or about the answers to philosophical questions. The discovery of new methods has often had important consequences both for how philosophers conduct their research and for what claims they defend. Some philosophers engage in most of their theorizing using one particular method while others employ a wider range of methods based on which one fits the specific problem investigated best.
Conceptual analysis is a common method in analytic philosophy. It aims to clarify the meaning of concepts by analyzing them into their component parts. Another method often employed in analytic philosophy is based on common sense. It starts with commonly accepted beliefs and tries to draw unexpected conclusions from them, which it often employs in a negative sense to criticize philosophical theories that are too far removed from how the average person sees the issue. It is similar to how ordinary language philosophy approaches philosophical questions by investigating how ordinary language is used.
Various methods in philosophy give particular importance to intuitions, that is, non-inferential impressions about the correctness of specific claims or general principles. For example, they play an important role in thought experiments, which employ counterfactual thinking to evaluate the possible consequences of an imagined situation. These anticipated consequences can then be used to confirm or refute philosophical theories. The method of reflective equilibrium also employs intuitions. It seeks to form a coherent position on a certain issue by examining all the relevant beliefs and intuitions, some of which often have to be deemphasized or reformulated to arrive at a coherent perspective.
Pragmatists stress the significance of concrete practical consequences for assessing whether a philosophical theory is true. According to the pragmatic maxim as formulated by Charles Sanders Peirce, the idea a person has of an object is nothing more than the totality of practical consequences they associate with this object. Pragmatists have also used this method to expose disagreements as merely verbal, that is, to show they make no genuine difference on the level of consequences.
Phenomenologists seek knowledge of the realm of appearance and the structure of human experience. They insist upon the first-personal character of all experience and proceed by suspending theoretical judgments about the external world. This technique of phenomenological reduction is known as "bracketing" or epoché. The goal is to give an unbiased description of the appearances of things.
Methodological naturalism places great emphasis on the empirical approach and the resulting theories found in the natural sciences. In this way, it contrasts with methodologies that give more weight to pure reasoning and introspection. | https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Philosophy |
1947–1948 civil war in Mandatory Palestine | Following the 'fiasco' of Mishmar HaEmek, Fawzi Al-Qawuqji ordered the Druze regiment of the Arab Liberation Army into action, to carry out diversion operations. Druze soldiers took position in several Arab villages 12 kilometres to the east of Haifa, whence they occasionally attacked traffic and Jewish settlements, including Ramat Yohanan.
The Kibbutznikim and the Haganah soldiers that supported them forced back their attacks and razed the villages from which they launched their attacks. Having run out of ammunition, the Druze withdrew to their base in Shefa-'Amr, with one hundred casualties. After an initial failure, a battalion-sized Carmeli force on the night of 15–16 April overran the two villages. The Druze Battalion, on 16 April assaulted the Carmeli positions nine times but the Carmeli troops fought back. By afternoon, the exhausted Druze troops retreated. An Haganah report praised "the well trained and very brave enemy forces."
The Druze had already made contact on several occasions with Yishuv agents and following their defeat at Ramat Yohanan, the Druze officers offered to defect and to join the ranks of Haganah. This proposition was discussed with Yigael Yadin, who refused the proposal but suggested that they could help to carry out sabotage operations behind the backs of the Arabs and to influence their comrades into deserting the army. By the start of May, 212 Wahab soldiers deserted. Taking into account the attitude of his men, Wahab met with Jewish liaison officers on 9 May and agreed to cooperate with Haganah. The two parties avoided clashes, and Wahab created a neutral enclave in the centre of Galilee. Wahab's army did not respond to calls for it to help fight Haganah's occupation of Acre, and avoided being present while Haganah occupied the police fortress of Shefa-'Amr during its evacuation by the British.
The position that the Druze took influenced their fate after the war. Given the good relationship between the Druze and Yishuv from 1930 onwards despite their collaboration with the Arab Higher Council and the Arab League, Ben-Gurion insisted that the Druze, as well as the Circassians and the Maronites benefit from a different position to that of the other Arabs. | https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/1947%E2%80%931948_civil_war_in_Mandatory_Palestine |
Bedouin | Prior to the 1948 Israeli Declaration of Independence, an estimated 65,000–90,000 Bedouins lived in the Negev desert. According to Encyclopedia Judaica, 15,000 Bedouin remained in the Negev after 1948; other sources put the number as low as 11,000. Another source states that in 1999 110,000 Bedouins lived in the Negev, 50,000 in the Galilee and 10,000 in the central region of Israel. All of the Bedouins residing in Israel were granted Israeli citizenship in 1954.
As of 2020, there are 210,000 Bedouins in Israel: 150,000 in the Negev, 50,000 in Galilee and the Jezreel Valley, and 10,000 in the central region of Israel.
Galilee Bedouins have been living in the northern part of Israel for four centuries. Today, they live in 28 settlements in the north. They also live in mixed villages with other non-Bedouin Arabs.
The Bedouin who remained in the Negev belonged to the Tiaha confederation as well as some smaller groups such as the 'Azazme and the Jahalin. After 1948, some Negev Bedouins were displaced. The Jahalin tribe, for instance, lived in the Tel Arad region of the Negev prior to the 1950s. In the early 1950s, the Jahalin were among the tribes that, according to Emanuel Marx, "moved or were removed by the military government". They ended up in the so-called E1 area East of Jerusalem.
About 1,600 Bedouin serve as volunteers in the Israel Defense Forces, many as trackers in the IDF's elite tracking units.
Famously, Bedouin shepherds were the first to discover the Dead Sea Scrolls, a collection of Jewish texts from antiquity, in the Judean caves of Qumran in 1946. Of great religious, cultural, historical and linguistic significance, 972 texts were found over the following decade, many of which were discovered by Bedouins. Successive Israeli administrations tried to demolish Bedouins villages in the Negev. Between 1967 and 1989, Israel built seven legal townships in the north-east of the Negev, with Tel as-Sabi or Tel Sheva the first. The largest, city of Rahat, has a population of over 58,700 (as of December 2013); as such it is the largest Bedouin settlement in the world. Another well-known township out of the seven of them that the Israeli government built, is Hura. According to the Israel Land Administration (2007), some 60 per cent of the Negev Bedouin live in urban areas. The rest live in so-called unrecognized villages, which are not officially recognized by the state due to general planning issues and other political reasons. They were built chaotically without taking into consideration local infrastructure. These communities are scattered all over the Northern Negev and often are situated in inappropriate places, such as military fire zones, natural reserves, landfills, etc. On 29 September 2003, Israeli government adapted a new "Abu Basma Plan" (Resolution 881), according to which a new regional council was formed, unifying a number of unrecognized Bedouin settlements—Abu Basma Regional Council. This resolution also regarded the need to establish seven new Bedouin settlements in the Negev, literally meaning the official recognition of unrecognized settlements, providing them with a municipal status and consequently with all the basic services and infrastructure. The council was established by the Interior Ministry on 28 January 2004.
Israel is currently building or enlarging some 13 towns and cities in the Negev. According to the general planning, all of them will be fully equipped with the relevant infrastructure: schools, medical clinics, postal offices, etc. and they also will have electricity, running water and waste control. Several new industrial zones meant to fight unemployment are planned, some are already being constructed, like Idan HaNegev in the suburbs of Rahat. It will have a hospital and a new campus inside. The Bedouins of Israel receive free education and medical services from the state. They are allotted child cash benefits, which has contributed to the high birth rate among the Bedouin of 5% per year. But unemployment rate remains very high, and few obtain a high school degree (4%), and even fewer graduate from university (0.6%).
In September 2011, the Israeli government approved a five-year economic development plan called the Prawer plan. One of its implications is a relocation of some 30.000-40.000 Negev Bedouin from areas not recognized by the government to government-approved townships. In a 2012 resolution the European Parliament called for the withdrawal of the Prawer plan and respect for the rights of the Bedouin people. In September 2014, Yair Shamir, who heads the Israeli government's ministerial committee on Bedouin resettlement arrangements, stated that the government was examining ways to lower the birthrate of the Bedouin community in order to improve its standard of living. Shamir claimed that without intervention, the Bedouin population could exceed half a million by 2035.
In May 2015, the United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs and the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees have combined forces. Both organizations called on Israel to stop its plans to relocate Bedouin communities currently living in the West Bank to land outside of Jerusalem for better access to infrastructure, health, and education. Officials stated that a "forcible transfer" of over 7000 Bedouin people would "destroy their culture and livelihoods." | https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Bedouin |
Suriname | Due to the variety of habitats and temperatures, biodiversity in Suriname is considered high. In October 2013, 16 international scientists researching the ecosystems during a three-week expedition in Suriname's Upper Palumeu River Watershed catalogued 1,378 species and found 60—including six frogs, one snake, and 11 fish—that may be previously unknown species. According to the environmental non-profit Conservation International, which funded the expedition, Suriname's ample supply of fresh water is vital to the biodiversity and healthy ecosystems of the region.
Snakewood (Brosimum guianense), a tree, is native to this tropical region of the Americas. Customs in Suriname report that snakewood is often illegally exported to French Guiana, thought to be for the crafts industry.
On 21 March 2013, Suriname's REDD+ Readiness Preparation Proposal (R-PP 2013) was approved by the member countries of the Participants Committee of the Forest Carbon Partnership Facility (FCPF).
As in other parts of Central and South America, indigenous communities have increased their activism to protect their lands and preserve habitat. In March 2015, the "Trio and Wayana communities presented a declaration of cooperation to the National Assembly of Suriname that announces an indigenous conservation corridor spanning 72,000 square kilometers (27,799 square miles) of southern Suriname. The declaration, led by these indigenous communities and with the support of Conservation International (CI) and World Wildlife Fund (WWF) Guianas, comprises almost half of the total area of Suriname. This area includes large forests and is considered "essential for the country's climate resilience, freshwater security, and green development strategy."
The Central Suriname Nature Reserve has been designated a UNESCO World Heritage Site for its unspoiled forests and biodiversity. There are many national parks in the country, including Galibi National Reserve along the coast; Brownsberg Nature Park and Eilerts de Haan Nature Park in central Suriname; and the Sipaliwani Nature Reserve on the Brazilian border. In all, 16% of the country's land area is national parks and lakes, according to the UNEP World Conservation Monitoring Centre.
Suriname's extensive tree cover is vital to the country's efforts to mitigate climate change and maintain carbon negativity. | https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Suriname |
Christianity and Druze | Conversion of Druze to Christianity used to be common practice in the Levant region. Over the centuries, a number prominent Druze embraced Christianity, such as some of Shihab dynasty members, as well as the Abi-Lamma clan. Since emir Bashir III was among the Shehab princes who converted to Christianity at an earlier time, the Druze considered him an apostate, a traitor to the Druze community in particular. The Abu'l-Lama family and clan, originally of Tanukh descent, ruled over Lebanon's Metn region during the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. Initially adherents of the Druze faith, the Abu'l-Lama sheikhs and clan members later converted to Christianity and joined the Maronite Church at the beginning of the eighteenth century. The clan constructed numerous palaces and structures, many of which still stand today in the Metn region and Mount Lebanon. After converting to Christianity, many of Abu'l-Lama clan members assumed the position of qaimmaqam of the Christians in Lebanon during the Ottoman period. Among them was emir Haydar Ahmad Abu al-Lamaʿ, who served as the qāʾim maqām of the largely Christian northern district.
During the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, Protestant missionaries established schools and churches in Druze strongholds, with some Druze converting to Protestant Christianity; yet they did not succeed to convert Druze to Christianity en masse. On the other hand, many Druze immigrants to the United States converted to Protestantism, becoming communicants of the Presbyterian or Methodist Churches. There are also a few thousand Druze immigrants from Lebanon in the United States of America, who have converted to Christianity. In the period of Egyptian rule in the Levant in the 1830s, many Druze converted to Christianity to avoid enlistment into the Egyptian army. The baptism of children in accordance with Christian custom was usual in large, well-known Lebanese Druze families, according to historian Aharon Layish there is also explicit evidence of Druzes in Lebanon under the Ottoman rule were posing Christians for practical reasons. The early Druze migrants from Levant to Venezuela tended to mix well with the local population, and some Druze converted to Catholicism.
By one estimate made by Elisabe Granli from University of Oslo, around 1,920 Syrian Druze converted to Christianity; according to the same study, Christians with a Druze background (Druze converts to Christianity) still regard themselves as Druze, and claim that there is no contradiction between being Druze and being Christian. According to the Druze religious courts, between 1952 and 2009, around 10% of Israeli Druze who left the Druze faith converted to Christianity.
According to Open Doors, there is a small but growing community of Druze converts to Christianity in Syria and Lebanon, with most converting to Evangelical Protestantism. These converts have established churches specifically for Christians of Druze background, primarily comprising women, girls, and young men who have abandoned the Druze religion they were raised in. These churches provide a space for worship and community support for those who have left the Druze faith.
Prominent converts from the Druze faith to Christianity include: Mohamed Alí Seineldín, Nada Nadim Prouty, Selwa Carmen Showker "Lucky" Roosevelt, and others. | https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Christianity_and_Druze |
Anwar Sadat | The initial Egyptian and Syrian victories in the war restored popular morale throughout Egypt and the Arab World and, for many years after, Sadat was known as the "Hero of the Crossing". Israel recognized Egypt as a formidable foe, and Egypt's renewed political significance eventually led to regaining and reopening the Suez Canal through the peace process. His new peace policy led to the conclusion of two agreements on disengagement of forces with the Israeli government. The first of these agreements was signed on 18 January 1974, and the second on 4 September 1975.
One major aspect of Sadat's peace policy was to gain some religious support for his efforts. Already during his visit to the US in October–November 1975, he invited Evangelical pastor Billy Graham for an official visit, which was held a few days after Sadat's visit. In addition to cultivating relations with Evangelical Christians in the US, he also built some cooperation with the Vatican. On 8 April 1976, he visited the Vatican for the first time, and got a message of support from Pope Paul VI regarding achieving peace with Israel, to include a just solution to the Palestinian issue. Sadat, on his part, extended to the Pope a public invitation to visit Cairo.
Sadat also used the media to promote his purposes. In an interview he gave to the Lebanese magazine Al Hawadeth in early February 1976, he claimed he had secret commitment from the US government to put pressure on the Israeli government for a major withdrawal in Sinai and the Golan Heights. This statement caused some concern to the Israeli government, but Kissinger denied such a promise was ever made.
In January 1977, a series of 'Bread Riots' protested Sadat's economic liberalization and specifically a government decree lifting price controls on basic necessities like bread. The riots lasted for two days and included hundreds of thousands in Cairo. 120 buses and hundreds of buildings were destroyed in Cairo alone. The riots ended with the deployment of the army and the re-institution of the subsidies/price controls. During this time, Sadat was also taking a new approach towards improving relations with the West.
The United States and the Soviet Union agreed on 1 October 1977, on principles to govern a Geneva conference on the Middle East. Syria continued to resist such a conference. Not wanting either Syria or the Soviet Union to influence the peace process, Sadat decided to take more progressive stance towards building a comprehensive peace agreement with Israel.
The 1977 visit by Anwar Sadat to Israel was the first time an Arab leader officially visited Israel. Sadat met with Israeli Prime Minister Menachem Begin, and spoke before the Knesset in Jerusalem about his views on how to achieve a comprehensive peace to the Arab–Israeli conflict, which included the full implementation of UN Resolutions 242 and 338.
The Peace treaty was finally signed by Anwar Sadat and Israeli Prime Minister Menachem Begin in Washington, D.C., United States, on 26 March 1979, following the Camp David Accords, a series of meetings between Egypt and Israel facilitated by US President Jimmy Carter. Both Sadat and Begin were awarded the Nobel Peace Prize for creating the treaty. In his acceptance speech, Sadat referred to the long-awaited peace desired by both Arabs and Israelis.
The main features of the agreement were the mutual recognition of each country by the other, the cessation of the state of war that had existed since the 1948 Arab–Israeli War, and the complete withdrawal by Israel of its armed forces and civilians from the rest of the Sinai Peninsula, which Israel had captured during the 1967 Six-Day War.
The agreement also provided for the free passage of Israeli ships through the Suez Canal and recognition of the Strait of Tiran and the Gulf of Aqaba as international waterways. The agreement notably made Egypt the first Arab country to officially recognize Israel. The peace agreement between Egypt and Israel has remained in effect since the treaty was signed.
The treaty was extremely unpopular in most of the Arab World and the wider Muslim World. His predecessor Nasser had made Egypt an icon of Arab nationalism, an ideology that appeared to be sidelined by an Egyptian orientation following the 1973 war (see National identity of Egyptians). The neighboring Arab countries believed that in signing the accords, Sadat had put Egypt's interests ahead of Arab unity, betraying Nasser's pan-Arabism, and destroyed the vision of a united "Arab front" for the support of the Palestinians against the "Zionist Entity". However, Sadat decided early on that peace was the solution. Sadat's shift towards a strategic relationship with the US was also seen as a betrayal by many Arabs. In the United States his peace moves gained him popularity among some Evangelical circles. He was awarded the Prince of Peace Award by Pat Robertson.
In 1979, the Arab League suspended Egypt in the wake of the Egyptian–Israel peace agreement, and the League moved its headquarters from Cairo to Tunis. Arab League member states believed in the elimination of the "Zionist Entity" and Israel at that time. It was not until 1989 that the League re-admitted Egypt as a member, and returned its headquarters to Cairo. As part of the peace deal, Israel withdrew from the Sinai Peninsula in phases, completing its withdrawal from the entire territory except the town of Taba by 25 April 1982 (withdrawal from which did not occur until 1989). The improved relations Egypt gained with the West through the Camp David Accords soon gave the country resilient economic growth. By 1980, however, Egypt's strained relations with the Arab World would result in a period of rapid inflation. | https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Anwar_Sadat |
Ottoman Egypt | Ali went to war against the sultan on the pretext of chastising the ex-Mamluk Abdullah Pasha of Acre, for refusing to send back Egyptian fugitives from the effects of Muhammad Ali's reforms. The true reason was the refusal of Sultan Mahmud II to hand over Syria according to agreement.
For ten years from this date the relations of sultan and pasha remained in the forefront of the questions which agitated the diplomatic world. It was not only the very existence of the Ottoman Empire that seemed to be at stake, but Egypt itself had become more than ever an object of attention, to British statesmen especially, and in the issue of the struggle were involved the interests of the British Empire in the two routes to India by the Isthmus of Suez and the valley of the Euphrates.
Ibrahim, who once more commanded in his father's name, launched another brilliant campaign beginning with the storming of Acre on 27 May 1832, and culminating in the rout and capture of Reşid Mehmed Pasha at Konya on 22 December.
Soon after he was blocked by the intervention of Russia, however. As the result of endless discussions between the representatives of the powers, the Porte and the pasha, the Convention of Kütahya was signed on 14 May 1833, by which the sultan agreed to bestow on Muhammad Ali the pashaliks of Syria, Damascus, Aleppo and Itcheli, together with the district of Adana.
Muhammad Ali now ruled over a virtually independent empire, subject only to a moderate tribute, stretching from the Sudan to the Taurus Mountains. However the unsound foundations of his authority were not long in revealing themselves. Scarcely a year from the signing of the Convention of Kütahya the application by Ibrahim of Egyptian methods of government, notably of the monopolies and conscription, had driven Syrian Druze and Sunni Arabs, who had welcomed him as a deliverer, into revolt. The unrest was suppressed by Muhammad Ali in person, and the Syrians were terrorized, but their discontent encouraged Sultan Mahmud to hope for revenge, and a renewal of the conflict was only staved off by the anxious efforts of the European powers.
In the spring of 1839 the sultan ordered his army, concentrated under Reshid in the border district of Bir on the Euphrates, to advance over the Syrian frontier. Ibrahim, seeing his flank menaced, attacked it at Nezib on 24 June. Once more, however, the Ottomans were utterly routed. Six days later, before the news reached Constantinople, Mahmud died.
Now, with the defeat of the Ottomans and the conquest of Syria, Muhammad Ali had reached the height of his power, controlling Egypt, the Sudan, and Syria. He saw the Ottoman armies collapse or fall into disorganization after their defeat in Syria, and it looked like the Middle East and Anatolia were his for the taking.
With the Ottoman Empire at the feet of Muhammad Ali, the European powers were greatly alarmed and now put into action a plan that had been prepared to meet a contingency which had been long foreseen. Their intervention during the Oriental Crisis of 1840 was prompt, and they made short work of Muhammad Ali's army. But the Western Powers had no intention of removing Ali and the block he placed on Ottoman power. Thus, though the peace treaty was harsh, it left the Muhammad Ali dynasty in power. | https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ottoman_Egypt |
Astarte | In various cultures Astarte was connected with some combination of the following spheres: war, sexuality, royal power, beauty, healing and - especially in Ugarit and Emar - hunting; however, known sources do not indicate she was a fertility goddess, contrary to opinions in early scholarship. Her symbol was the lion and she was also often associated with the horse and by extension chariots. The dove might be a symbol of her as well, as evidenced by some Bronze Age cylinder seals. The only images identified with absolute certainty as Astarte are these depicting her as a combatant on horseback or in a chariot. While many authors in the past asserted that she has been known as the deified morning and/or evening star, it has been called into question if she had an astral character at all, at least in Ugarit and Emar. God lists known from Ugarit and other prominent Bronze Age Syrian cities regarded her as the counterpart of Assyro-Babylonian goddess Ištar, and of the Hurrian Ishtar-like goddesses Ishara (presumably in her aspect of "lady of love") and Shaushka; in some cities, the western forms of the name and the eastern form "Ishtar" were fully interchangeable.
In later times Astarte was worshipped in Syria and Canaan. Her worship spread to Cyprus, where she may have been merged with an ancient Cypriot goddess. This merged Cypriot goddess may have been adopted into the Greek pantheon in Mycenaean and Dark Age times to form Aphrodite. An outdated argument, however, postulates that Astarte's character was less erotic and more warlike than Ishtar originally was, perhaps because she was influenced by the Canaanite goddess Anat, and that therefore Ishtar, not Astarte, was the direct forerunner of the Cypriot goddess. However, evidence from Iron Age Phoenicia show that Astarte became a more erotic goddess as opposed to her early Bronze Age worship in Ugarit and Syria, and that early attestations of Aphrodite, were more war-like.
Greeks in classical, Hellenistic, and Roman times occasionally equated Aphrodite with Astarte and many other Near Eastern goddesses, in keeping with their frequent practice of syncretizing other deities with their own. In addition, certain aspects of other Greek gods, such as Artemis Astrateia are hypothesized to be heavily influenced by Astarte.
Major centers of Astarte's worship in the Iron Age were the Phoenician city-states of Sidon, Tyre, and Byblos. Coins from Sidon portray a chariot in which a globe appears, presumably a stone representing Astarte. "She was often depicted on Sidonian coins as standing on the prow of a galley, leaning forward with right hand outstretched, being thus the original of all figureheads for sailing ships." In Sidon, she shared a temple with Eshmun. Coins from Beirut show Poseidon, Astarte, and Eshmun worshipped together.
Other significant locations where she was introduced by Phoenician sailors and colonists were Cythera, Malta, and Eryx in Sicily from which she became known to the Romans as Venus Erycina. Three inscriptions from the Pyrgi Tablets dating to about 500 BC found near Caere in Etruria mentions the construction of a shrine to Astarte in the temple of the local goddess Uni-Astre (𐌔𐌄𐌓𐌕𐌔𐌀𐌋𐌀𐌉𐌍𐌖). At Carthage Astarte was worshipped alongside the goddess Tanit, and frequently appeared as a theophoric element in personal names. | https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Astarte |
Byzantine Empire | The ecclesiastical forms of Byzantine music—composed to Greek texts as ceremonial, festival, or church music—are today the most well-known forms. Ecclesiastical chants were a fundamental part of this genre. Greek and foreign historians agree that the ecclesiastical tones and in general the whole system of Byzantine music is closely related to the ancient Greek system. It remains the oldest genre of extant music, of which the manner of performance and (with increasing accuracy from the 5th century onwards) the names of the composers, and sometimes the particulars of each musical work's circumstances, are known.
The 9th-century Persian geographer Ibn Khordadbeh, in his lexicographical discussion of instruments, cited the lyra (lūrā) as the typical instrument of the Byzantines along with the urghun (organ), shilyani (probably a type of harp or lyre) and the salandj (probably a bagpipe). The first of these, the early bowed stringed instrument known as the Byzantine lyra, came to be called the lira da braccio, in Venice, where it is considered by many to have been the predecessor of the contemporary violin, which later flourished there. The bowed "lyra" is still played in former Byzantine regions, where it is known as the Politiki lyra (lit. 'lyra of the City', i.e. Constantinople) in Greece, the Calabrian lira in southern Italy, and the lijerica in Dalmatia. The water organ originated in the Hellenistic world and was used in the Hippodrome during races. A pipe organ with "great leaden pipes" was sent by Emperor Constantine V to Pepin the Short, King of the Franks in 757. Pepin's son Charlemagne requested a similar organ for his chapel in Aachen in 812, beginning its establishment in Western church music. The aulos was a double-reeded woodwind like the modern oboe or Armenian duduk. Other forms include the plagiaulos (πλαγίαυλος, from πλάγιος "sideways"), which resembled the flute, and the askaulos (ἀσκός askos – wineskin), a bagpipe. The modern descendant of the aulos is the Greek Zourna. Bagpipes, also known as dankiyo (from ancient Greek: angion (Τὸ ἀγγεῖον) "the container"), had been played even in Roman times and continued to be played throughout the empire's former realms till the present day. These are namely the Balkan Gaida, Greek Tsampouna, Pontic Tulum, Cretan Askomandoura, Armenian Parkapzuk, and Romanian Cimpoi. Other instruments used in Byzantine music were the Kanonaki, Oud, Laouto, Santouri, Tambouras, Seistron (defi tambourine), Toubeleki, and Daouli. | https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Byzantine_Empire |
Education in Saudi Arabia | Education is free for all students at all levels. The education system in Saudi Arabia is primarily under the jurisdiction of the Ministry of Education and the Technical and Vocational Training Corporation (TVTC). Other authorities such as the Ministry of Defense and Aviation, the Presidency of the National Guard, and the Ministry of the Interior provide their affiliates and children with education at all levels, consistent with Ministry of Education guidelines. The highest authority that supervises education in Saudi Arabia is the Supreme Committee for Educational Policy, established in 1963.
According to the World Bank database, public spending on education was 5.1 percent of GDP in 2006, and public spending on education as a percentage of government expenditure was 27.6 percent in 2004. Education spending as a percentage of overall spending tripled from 1970 to 2000, and neither economic growth nor the price of oil had much impact on this trend.
The Ministry of Education developed The Ministry of Education Ten–Year Plan 1425–1435, which set the following goals:
The education of 4- to 6-year-old children and the consideration of kindergarten as an independent stage as compared with other educational stages in terms of its buildings and syllabi
Accommodation of all age categories from 6 to 18 years old at various stages of education
Deepening the spirit of loyalty and pride of the country through intellectual awareness of Saudi Arabia's national issues
Preparing students academically and culturally at the local and international levels to be able to achieve advanced international posts in the fields of mathematics and science for various age categories, taking into account International tests' standards
Organization of girls' technical education
Development of an educational system for students with special needs
Development and growth of educational and administrative training for the Ministry's personnel
Improvement of internal and external sufficiency for the educational system
Development of syllabi based on Islamic values leading to the development of male and female students' personality and to their integration in society as well as to the achievement of scientific and thinking skills and life characteristics resulting in self-education and lifelong learning
To improve the quality of male and female teachers and to increase the citizens' rate in the education sector to achieve the full use of Saudi human resources
To develop the educational structure and to update the school map to meet the expected quantitative and qualitative changes in the next stage
To develop the infrastructure of information and communication technology and its employment in education and learning
To develop male and female adults' education and to eradicate illiteracy
The Ministry's comprehensive administrative development
Expansion of social participation in education
To establish integrated systems for accountability | https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Education_in_Saudi_Arabia |
Mu'tazilism | During the Abbasid dynasty, the poet, theologian, and jurist, Ibrahim an-Nazzam founded a madhhab called the Nazzamiyya that rejected the authority of Hadiths by Abu Hurayra. His famous student, Al-Jahiz, was also critical of those who followed such Hadiths, referring to his Hadithist opponents as al-nabita ("the contemptible").
According to Racha El Omari, early Mu'tazilites believed that hadith were susceptible to "abuse as a polemical ideological tool"; that the matn (content) of the hadith—not just the isnad—ought to be scrutinized for doctrine and clarity; that for hadith to be valid they ought to be mutawatir, i.e. supported by tawātur or many isnād (chains of oral transmitters), each beginning with a different Companion.
In writing about mutawatir (multi-isnād Hadith) and ahad (single-isnad hadith, i.e. almost all hadith) and their importance from the legal theoretician's point of view, Wael Hallaq notes the medieval scholar Al-Nawawi (1233–1277) argued that any non-mutawatir hadith is only probable and can not reach the level of certainty that a mutawatir hadith can. However, these mutawir were extremely scarce. Scholars like Ibn al-Salah (died 1245 CE), al-Ansari (died 1707 CE), and Ibn ‘Abd al-Shakur (died 1810 CE) found "no more than eight or nine" hadiths that fell into the mutawatir category.
Wāṣil ibn ʿAṭāʾ (700–748 CE, by many accounts a founder of the Mu'tazilite school of thought), held that there was evidence for the veracity of a report when it had four independent transmitters. His assumption was that there could be no agreement between all transmitters in fabricating a report. Wāṣil's acceptance of tawātur seems to have been inspired by the juridical notion of witnesses as proof that an event did indeed take place. Hence, the existence of a certain number of witnesses precluded the possibility that they were able to agree on a lie, as opposed to the single report which was witnessed by one person only, its very name meaning the "report of one individual" (khabar al-wāḥid). Abū l-Hudhayl al-ʿAllāf (died 227/841) continued this verification of reports through tawātur, but proposed that the number of witnesses required for veracity be twenty, with the additional requirement that at least one of the transmitters be a believer.
For Ibrahim an-Nazzam (c. 775 – c. 845), both the single and the mutawātir hadith reports as narrated by Abu Hurayra, the most prolific hadith narrater, could not be trusted to yield knowledge. He recounted contradictory ḥadīth from Abu Hurayra and examined their divergent content (matn) to show why they should be rejected: they relied on both faulty human memory and bias, neither of which could be trusted to transmit what is true. Al-Naẓẓām bolstered his strong refutation of the trustworthiness of ḥadīths narrated by Abu Hurayra within the larger claim that his ḥadīths circulated and thrived to support polemical causes of various theological sects and jurists, and that no single transmitter could by himself be held above suspicion of altering the content of a single report. Al-Naẓẓām's skepticism involved far more than excluding the possible verification of a report narrated by Abu Hurayra, be it single or mutawātir. His stance also excluded the trustworthiness of consensus, which proved pivotal to classical Mu'tazilite criteria devised for verifying the single report (see below). Indeed, his shunning of both consensus and tawātur as narrated by Abu Hurayra earned him a special mention for the depth and extent of his skepticism. | https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Mu%27tazilism |
Kharijites | Many Kharijites were well-versed in traditional Arabic eloquence and poetry, which the orientalist Giorgio Levi Della Vida attributes to the majority of their early leaders being from Bedouin stock. The sermons and poems of many Kharijite leaders were compiled into collections (diwans). Kharijite poetry is mainly concerned with religious beliefs, with piety and activism, martyrdom, selling life to God (shira), and afterlife being some of the most prominent themes, though the themes of heroism and courage are also evident. Referring to his rebellion, Abu Bilal Mirdas said: "Fear of God and the dread of the fire made me go out, and selling my soul for which has no price [paradise]".
Some poems encouraged militant activism. Imran ibn Hittan, whom the Arabist Michael Cooperson calls the greatest Kharijite poet, sang after Abu Bilal's death: "Abū Bilāl has increased my disdain for this life; and strengthened my love for the khurūj [rebellion]". The poet Abu'l-Wazi al-Rasibi addressed Ibn al-Azraq, before the latter became activist, with the lines: Your tongue does no harm to the enemy you will only gain salvation from distress by means of your two hands.
The government was often labelled as tyrannical and obedience to it was criticized. The Kharijite poet Isa ibn Fatik al-Khatti thus sang: You obeyed the orders of the stubborn tyrant but no obedience is due to oppressors.
Many poems were written to eulogize fallen Kharijite activists, and thus represent the romanticized version of actual historical events. The Muhakkima are thus valorized and remembered at many places. The poet Aziz ibn al-Akhnas al-Ta'i eulogized them in the following lines: I complain to God that from every tribe of people, battle has annihilated the best.
Similarly, Ali's assassin Ibn Muljam was exalted by the poet Ibn Abi Mayyas al-Muradi in the following: You upon whom be blessings, we have struck Ḥaydar ['the lion'; a nickname for Ali] Abū Ḥasan [Ali] with a blow to the head and he was split apart.
Kharijite poetry has survived mainly in the non-Kharijite sources, and hence may have been subject to alteration by its transmitters. Nevertheless, the historian Fred Donner believes that Kharijite poetry may have suffered a lesser and "different kind" of interpolation than the historical accounts about the Kharijites. According to Hagemann, poetry is seemingly "the only genuinely Khārijite material" in existence. A modern compilation of Kharijite poetry was published by Ihsan Abbas in 1974. | https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Kharijites |
Northern Cyprus | The share of the transport and communications industry in the GDP of Northern Cyprus is constantly varying; it decreased from 12.1% in 2008 to 8.5% in 2011, but rose again to 9.3% in 2012.
Air transport is a major route of entry into Northern Cyprus. The country is home to two airports, the Ercan International Airport and the Geçitkale Airport, of which only Ercan is currently functioning. The Ercan airport saw an important renovation in the 2010s that greatly increased its passenger traffic, it was used by 1.76 million passengers in the first seven months of 2014 alone. Non-stop flights are only available from multiple points in Turkey through a number of Turkish carriers. Direct scheduled and charter flights take place from other countries, but with mandatory stopovers in Turkey. 600 charter flights were scheduled for 2013. Scheduled destinations include cities such as London and Manchester, while charter flight destinations include cities such as Berlin and Ljubljana.
Direct flights to Northern Cyprus and the trade traffic through the Northern Cypriot ports are restricted as part of the embargo on Northern Cypriot ports. The airports of Geçitkale and Ercan are only recognised as legal ports of entry by Turkey and Azerbaijan. Direct charter flights between Poland and North Cyprus started on 20 June 2011. The seaports in Famagusta and Kyrenia have been declared closed to all shipping by the Republic of Cyprus since 1974. By agreement between Northern Cyprus and Syria, there was a ship tour between Famagusta and Latakia, Syria before the outbreak of the Syrian Civil War. Since the opening of the Green Line Turkish Cypriot residents are allowed to trade through ports recognized by the Republic of Cyprus.
With the lack of a railway system, the country's highways are used for transport between major cities. In the 21st century, these highways were upgraded into dual carriageways, with some roads in the Karpass area still being upgraded as of 2015. Northern Cyprus has around 7,000 kilometres (4,300 miles) of roads, with two thirds of these roads paved. Recent constructions included the construction of a Northern Coast Highway, which was hailed as a major incentive for economic development.
The electricity grid is connected to the Republic of Cyprus, and an interconnector with Turkey would decrease reliance on fossil fuels. | https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Northern_Cyprus |
Raqqa | In the 16th century, Raqqa again entered the historical record as an Ottoman customs post on the Euphrates. The eyalet (province) of Raqqa was created in 1586. However, the capital of the eyalet and seat of the Wāli was not Raqqa but Al-Ruha', which is about 160 kilometres (99 mi) north of Raqqa. In the 17th century the famous Ottoman traveler and author Evliya Çelebi only noticed Arab and Turkoman nomad tents in the vicinity of the ruins. The citadel was partially restored in 1683 and again housed a Janissary detachment; over the next decades the province of al-Raqqah became the centre of the Ottoman Empire's tribal settlement (iskân) policy. Between 1800 and 1803, the province was governed by the famous Milli Timur Paşa of the Kurdish Milli tribe.
From the 1820s, Raqqa was a place of wintering for the semi-nomadic Arab 'Afadla tribal confederation and was little more than its extensive archeological remains. It was the establishment in 1864 by the Ottomans of the Karakul Janissary garrison, in the south-east corner of the Abbasid enclosure, that led to the revival of the modern city of Raqqa.
The first families that settled in Raqqa were nicknamed ''The Ghul'' by the surrounding Arab semi-nomadic tribes from whom they bought the right to settle within the Abbasid enclosure, near the Janissary garrison. They used the ancient bricks of the enclosure to build the first buildings of modern Raqqa. They came under the protection of the surrounding Arab semi-nomadic tribes because they feared attacks from other neighboring tribes on their herds. As a result, these families formed two alliances. One joined Kurds of the Mîlan tribe, Arabs of the Dulaim tribe, and possibly Turkomans as well. Most of the Kurdish families came from an area called ''Nahid Al-Jilab'', which is 20 kilometres (12 miles) northeast of Şanliurfa. Prior to the Syrian Civil War, there were many families in Raqqa that still belonged to the Mîlan tribe such as Khalaf Al-Qasim, Al-Jado, Al-Hani and Al-Shawakh. They claimed the area west of the Ottoman garrison.
The Mîlan tribe had been in Raqqa since 1711. The Ottomans issued an order to deport them from the Nahid Al-Jilab region to the Raqqa area. However most of the tribe was returned to their original home as a result of diseases among their cattle and frequent deaths due to the Raqqa climate. In the mid-18th century, the Ottomans recognised the Kurdish tribal chiefs and appointed Mahmud Kalash Abdi as head of the iskân policy in the region. The tribal chiefs had the power to impose taxes and control over other tribes in the region.
Some of the Kurdish families were displaced to the northern countryside of Raqqa by the Arab 'Annazah tribe, after they began working with the French Mandate for Syria and the Lebanon.
The other alliance, Asharin, came from the town of Al-Asharah downstream. It included several Arab tribes of the Al-Bu Badran and Mawali tribes. They claimed the area east of the Ottoman garrison.
The Raqqa Museum is housed in a building that was built in 1861 and served as an Ottoman governmental building. | https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Raqqa |
Iraqi–Kurdish conflict | The first chapter of the Iraqi–Kurdish dispute followed the end of World War I and the arrival of British forces. Mahmud Barzanji began secession attempts in 1919 and in 1922 proclaimed the short-lived Kingdom of Kurdistan. Though Mahmud's insurrections were defeated, another Kurdish sheikh, Ahmed Barzani, began to actively oppose the central rule of the Mandatory Iraq during the 1920s. The first of the major Barzani revolts took place in 1931, after Barzani, one of the most prominent Kurdish leaders in Northern Iraq, succeeded in defeating a number of other Kurdish tribes. He ultimately failed and took refuge in Turkey. The next serious Kurdish secession attempt was made by Ahmed Barzani's younger brother Mustafa Barzani in 1943, but that revolt failed as well, resulting in the exiling of Mustafa to Iran, where he participated in an attempt to form the Kurdish Republic of Mahabad.
In 1958, Mustafa Barzani and his fighters returned to Iraq from exile, and an attempt was made to negotiate Kurdish autonomy in the north with the new Iraqi administration of Gen. Qasim. The negotiations ultimately failed and the First Iraqi–Kurdish War erupted on 11 September 1961, lasting until 1970 and inflicting 75,000–105,000 casualties. Despite the attempts to resolve the conflict by providing Kurds with a recognized autonomy in north Iraq (Iraqi Kurdistan), the negotiations failed in 1974, resulting in resumed hostilities known as the Second Iraqi–Kurdish War, which resulted in the collapse of the Kurdish militias and the reconquest of northern Iraq by Iraqi government troops. As a result, Mustafa Barzani and most of the KDP leadership fled to Iran, while PUK gained power in the vacuum, leading an insurgency campaign against the central Iraqi government. Since 1976 PUK and KDP relations quickly deteriorated, reaching the climax in April 1978, when PUK troops suffered a major defeat by KDP, which had the support of Iranian and Iraqi air forces. During this period, the Ba'athist authorities took the opportunity to perform large-scale displacement and colonization projects in North Iraq, aiming to shift demographics and thus destabilize Kurdish power bases.
The conflict re-emerged as part of the Iran–Iraq War, with the Kurdish parties collaborating against Saddam Hussein and KDP also gaining military support by the Islamic Republic of Iran. By 1986 Iraqi leadership grew tired of the strengthening and non-loyal Kurdish entity in north Iraq and began a genocidal campaign, known as Al-Anfal, to oust the Kurdish fighters and take revenge on the Kurdish population—an act often described as the Kurdish genocide, with an estimated 50,000–200,000 casualties. In the aftermath of the Persian Gulf War, a series of uprisings happened in the north and south of the country. This, combined with the enforcing of the no-fly zones by the United States, United Kingdom and France allowed the Kurds to attain de-facto autonomy. In the mid-1990s the conflict between the KDP and PUK erupted once again, resulting in a bloody civil war, which ended in 1997. Another critical event was the invasion of Iraq which resulted in the toppling of the Ba'athist regime and the adoption of federalism. Despite the recognition of the Kurdistan Region as a federal entity within the Republic of Iraq in the new constitution adopted in 2005, relations between Kurdistan Region and the Iraqi central government grew strained between 2011 and 2012 due to power-sharing issues and the export of oil. Following the failed Kurdish independence referendum in 2017, as well as the subsequent defeat of the Peshmerga at the hands of the Iraqi armed forces in the 2017 Iraqi–Kurdish conflict, Iraq has taken steps to weaken the Kurdistan Region and expand its own authorities in order to shift the political dynamics of the country towards a centralised political system, the one it had pre-2005. | https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Iraqi%E2%80%93Kurdish_conflict |
Sultan Isa Medrese | The long southern façade of the building is easily visible, arranged along a street on higher ground overlooking the city below. The other sides of the building are largely obscured by the sloping terrain around it. The two fluted domes of the complex, visible from the outside, correspond to the mosque and the mausoleum. Two buttresses on the southern façade, topped by small half-domes (also fluted like the main domes), reinforce each of the domed sections and are each located behind a mihrab (niche symbolizing the qibla or direction of prayer) of the chambers inside. A wall fountain is also located in the middle of the façade, below the portico of the courtyard (discussed below).
The building is entered through a monumental portal at the southeast corner, standing around 12 metres tall. The recessed portal is decorated with a muqarnas vault over the doorway. The wall right above the door is covered by zone of stone inlay, followed by a band of geometric decoration above it. In the area above this is a teardrop-shaped medallion carved with calligraphic motifs, while on the side walls to the right and left of this are circular medallions carved with intricate arabesques. The design of the teardrop medallion consists of a symmetrical calligraphic composition (known as muthannā or muṣanna) featuring the phrase tawakkulī 'alā Allāhi ta'ālā ("I place my trust in God, may He be exalted"), arranged around a vertical axis of symmetry and topped by a vegetal motif of palmettes. A band of text containing a Qur'anic verse (At-Tawbah, 9:18), in a form of thuluth script, wraps around this composition. Above these medallions is another horizonal inscription band running across the three inner walls of the portal, containing a long foundation text including a Qur'anic excerpt (part of 27:19 or 46:14), the name of the building's founder (Sultan Isa), some praise of the founder's piety, and the date (2nd Muharram 787 AH).
The front corners of portal's recess are carved into ornate engaged columns. Around the edges of the portal are several bands of ornamentation forming a decorative frame around the portal. A muqarnas cornice is accompanied by arabesque (vegetal) decoration bands. Inside this is another inscription band that consists of the same phrase found in the center of the teardrop medallion, except here it is repeated over and over in Kufic script. The top part of this decoration was restored in modern times.
Exterior and entrance portal | https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Sultan_Isa_Medrese |
Ibn al-Bawwab | The sole surviving Qur'an penned by Ibn al-Bawwab, housed at the Chester Beatty Library, is the earliest example of a paper-based Qur'an manuscript. Representing a transition from Kufic or semi-Kufic Qur'ans transcribed on parchment or vellum, the Chester Beatty manuscript is written fully in rounded, cursive script on paper. Though the art of paper-making had arrived in Baghdad in the 9th century via the Silk Road, the thinner and more consistent texture of Ibn al-Bawwab's manuscript indicates that the development of finer paper, worthy of transcribing God's word, was a factor in the move from parchment to paper.
The manuscript itself contains 286 folios and originally measured 14x19cm. Additionally, the text is fully vocalized with both vowels and consonants written in the same color ink. It is notable for its fine illumination, using the traditional blue, gold, and sepia on the main pages containing text and further incorporating brown, white, red and green in the opening and closing pages. Given Ibn al-Bawwab's background, it is not surprising to find that the illumination was done by calligrapher himself, indicated in some sections by the use of a reed pen rather than a brush as well as the same ink used for the text.
Apart from the use of paper, the Chester Beatty manuscript is notable for several innovations to Qur'anic calligraphy which heavily influenced the art for centuries. This paper Qur'an, unlike its parchment and vellum predecessors, was oriented vertically rather than horizontally. Breaking from tradition, Ibn al-Bawwab's Qur'an does not use the Kufic script which dominated Islam's first three centuries, instead utilizing more legible cursive scripts. Naskh is used in the main text while the related thuluth script appears in the opening pages as well as the Sura headings and statistical pages containing verse-count. These statistical folios, which began to appear in the semi-Kufic Qur'ans preceding Ibn al-Bawwab, were here expanded to include additional information such as the total word and letter count of each Sura, the word count of the entire manuscript, and even the number of dotted and undotted letters.
Two additional style innovations adopted by Ibn al-Bawwab involve spacing. Whereas previous calligraphers had used symmetrical spacing in the Bismala, Ibn al-Bawwab here relies upon asymmetry, extending one letter to create a large gap between words, drawing the reader's eyes across the page and clearly demarcating a new section. With regard to his spacing of the verses, he left no spaces between individual verses, marking them instead with small, triangular clusters of blue dots. Every fifth and tenth verse, however, does include spacing which is filled with the standard gold markers. | https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ibn_al-Bawwab |
Sayf al-Dawla | Sayf al-Dawla has remained to modern times one of the best-known medieval Arab leaders. His bravery and leadership of the war against the Byzantines, despite the heavy odds against him, his literary activities and patronage of poets which lent his court an unmatched cultural brilliance, the calamities which struck him towards his end—defeat, illness and betrayal—have made him, in the words of Bianquis, "from his time until the present day", the personification of the "Arab chivalrous ideal in its most tragic aspect".
Sayf al-Dawla's military record was, in the end, one of failure: he lost much of his territory to the Byzantines and, soon after his death, the rump emirate of Aleppo became a Byzantine vassal and an object of dispute with the Fatimids. In retrospect, the Hamdanids' military defeat was inevitable, given the disparity of strength and resources with the Empire. This weakness was compounded by the failure of Nasir al-Dawla to support his brother in his wars against Byzantium, by the Hamdanids' preoccupation with internal revolts, and the feebleness of their authority over much of their domains. As Whittow comments, Sayf al-Dawla's martial reputation often masks the reality that his power was "a paper tiger, short of money, short of soldiers and with little real base in the territories he controlled". The defeat and expulsion of several Arab tribes in the great revolt of 955 also had unforeseen long-term consequences, as it left the Kilab as the dominant tribe in northern Syria. Associating themselves with the Hamdanids as auxiliaries, the Kilab managed to infiltrate the local cities, opening the path to their takeover of the emirate of Aleppo under the Mirdasid dynasty in the 11th century.
Several distinguished officials served as his viziers, starting with Abu Ishaq Muhammad ibn Ibrahim al-Karariti, who had previously been in Abbasid employ. He was succeeded by Abu Abdallah Muhammad ibn Sulayman ibn Fahd, and finally by the celebrated Abu'l-Husayn Ali ibn al-Husayn al-Maghribi. In the position of qadi of Aleppo, the Hamdanid emir dismissed the incumbent, Abu Tahir Ahmad ibn Muhammad ibn Mathil, and appointed Abu Husayn Ali ibn Abdallah al-Raqqi in his stead. When the latter was killed by the Byzantines in 960, Ibn Mathil was restored, and later succeeded by Abu Ja'far Ahmad ibn Ishaq al-Hanafi. Though fiscal and military affairs were centralized in the two capitals of Aleppo and Mayyafariqin, local government was based on fortified settlements, which were entrusted by Sayf al-Dawla to relatives or close associates.
The picture presented by his contemporaries on the impact of Sayf al-Dawla's policies on his own domains is not favourable. Despite the Hamdanids' origins among the Arab Bedouin, the Hamdanid emirate of Aleppo was a highly centralized state on the model of other contemporary Islamic polities, relying on a standing, salaried army of Turkic ghilman and Daylamite infantry which required enormous sums. This led to heavy taxation, as well as massive confiscation of private estates to sustain the Hamdanid military. The 10th-century chronicler Ibn Hawqal, who travelled the Hamdanid domains, paints a dismal picture of economic oppression and exploitation of the common people, linked with the Hamdanid practice of expropriating extensive estates in the most fertile areas and practising a monoculture of cereals destined to feed the growing population of Baghdad. This was coupled with heavy taxation—Sayf al-Dawla and Nasir al-Dawla are said to have become the wealthiest princes in the Muslim world—which allowed them to maintain their lavish courts, but at a heavy price to their subjects' long-term prosperity. According to Kennedy "even the capital of Aleppo seems to have been more prosperous under the following Mirdasid dynasty than under the Hamdanids", and Bianquis suggests that Sayf al-Dawla's wars and economic policies both contributed to a permanent alteration in the landscape of the regions they ruled: "by destroying orchards and peri-urban market gardens, by enfeebling the once vibrant polyculture and by depopulating the sedentarised steppe terrain of the frontiers, the Hamdanids contributed to the erosion of the deforested land and to the seizure by semi-nomadic tribes of the agricultural lands of these regions in the 11th century". | https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Sayf_al-Dawla |
Battle of Uhud | A group of approximately 1,000 Muslim men set out northward from Madinah toward Mount Uhud late on Friday, 21 December 624. Early the next morning, they took a position on the lower slopes of the hill of Uhud. Shortly before the battle commenced, 'Abdallah ibn Ubayy, chief of the Khazraj, along with 300 other men, withdrew their support for Muhammad and returned to Medina, with reports suggesting Ibn Ubayy's discontent with the plan to march out from Medina to meet the Meccans. Ibn Ubayy and his followers would later receive censure in the Qur'an for this act.
What ye suffered on the day the two armies met, was with the leave of Allah, in order that He might test the believers. And in order that He might test the Hypocrites also, these were told: "Come, fight in the way of Allah, or (at least) drive (The foe from your city)." They said: "Had we known how to fight, we should certainly have followed you." They were that day nearer to Disbelief than to Faith, saying with their mouths what was not in their hearts but Allah hath full knowledge of all they conceal. (They are) the ones that say, of their brethren slain, while they themselves sit (at ease): "If only they had listened to us they would not have been slain." Say: "Avert death from your own selves, if ye speak the truth."
The Muslim force, now numbering around 700 encamped on the slopes of Uhud, facing Madinah, with their back protected by the mountain. Before the battle, Muhammad had assigned 50 archers on a nearby rocky hill at the west side of the Muslim camp. This was a strategic decision in order to shield the vulnerable flanks of the outnumbered Muslim army; the archers on the hill were to protect the left flank, while the right flank was to be protected by the Mount of Uhud situated on the east side of the Muslim camp. Protecting the flanks of the Muslim army meant that the Meccan army would not be able to turn around the Muslim camp, and thus the Muslim army wouldn't be surrounded or encircled by the Meccan cavalry, keeping in mind that the Meccan cavalry outnumbered the Muslim cavalry with 50-to-1. Muhammad ordered the Muslim archers to not leave their positions on the hill unless ordered to do so by him, making it clear by uttering these words to the archers, "If you see us prevail and start to take spoils, do not come to assist us. And if you see us get vanquished and birds eat from our heads, do not come to assist us." | https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Battle_of_Uhud |
Apostasy | The term atrocity story, also referred to as an atrocity tale, as it is defined by the American sociologists David G. Bromley and Anson D. Shupe refers to the symbolic presentation of action or events (real or imaginary) in such a context that they are made flagrantly to violate the (presumably) shared premises upon which a given set of social relationships should be conducted. The recounting of such tales is intended as a means of reaffirming normative boundaries. By sharing the reporter's disapproval or horror, an audience reasserts normative prescription and clearly locates the violator beyond the limits of public morality. The term was coined in 1979 by Bromley, Shupe, and Joseph Ventimiglia.
Bromley and others define an atrocity as an event that is perceived as a flagrant violation of a fundamental value. It contains the following three elements:
moral outrage or indignation;
authorization of punitive measures;
mobilization of control efforts against the apparent perpetrators.
The term "atrocity story" is controversial as it relates to the differing views amongst scholars about the credibility of the accounts of former members.
Bryan R. Wilson, Reader Emeritus of Sociology of the University of Oxford, says apostates of new religious movements are generally in need of self-justification, seeking to reconstruct their past and to excuse their former affiliations, while blaming those who were formerly their closest associates. Wilson, thus, challenges the reliability of the apostate's testimony by saying that the apostate
must always be seen as one whose personal history predisposes him to bias with respect to both his previous religious commitment and affiliations
and
the suspicion must arise that he acts from a personal motivation to vindicate himself and to regain his self-esteem, by showing himself to have been first a victim but subsequently to have become a redeemed crusader.
Wilson also asserts that some apostates or defectors from religious organisations rehearse atrocity stories to explain how, by manipulation, coercion or deceit, they were recruited to groups that they now condemn.
Jean Duhaime of the Université de Montréal writes, referring to Wilson, based on his analysis of three books by apostates of new religious movements, that stories of apostates cannot be dismissed only because they are subjective.
Danny Jorgensen, Professor at the Department of Religious Studies of the University of Florida, in his book The Social Construction and Interpretation of Deviance: Jonestown and the Mass Media argues that the role of the media in constructing and reflecting reality is particularly apparent in its coverage of cults. He asserts that this complicity exists partly because apostates with an atrocity story to tell make themselves readily available to reporters and partly because new religious movements have learned to be suspicious of the media and, therefore, have not been open to investigative reporters writing stories on their movement from an insider's perspective. Besides this lack of information about the experiences of people within new religious movements, the media is attracted to sensational stories featuring accusations of food and sleep deprivation, sexual and physical abuse, and excesses of spiritual and emotional authority by the charismatic leader.
Michael Langone argues that some will accept uncritically the positive reports of current members without calling such reports, for example, "benevolence tales" or "personal growth tales". He asserts that only the critical reports of ex-members are called "tales", which he considers to be a term that clearly implies falsehood or fiction. He states that it wasn't until 1996 that a researcher conducted a study to assess the extent to which so called "atrocity tales" might be based on fact. | https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Apostasy |
Israeli disengagement from Gaza | The disengagement began with Operation "Yad l'Achim" (Hebrew: מבצע יד לאחים, "Giving brothers a hand").
The aim of the operation was to give the Gush Katif settlers the option to leave voluntarily. IDF soldiers helped the settlers who chose to do so by packing their belongings and carrying them. During the operation, soldiers went into settlers' homes and presented them with removal decrees. In addition, the IDF arranged crews of social nurses, psychologists, and support to youths.
On April 8, 2005, Defense Minister Shaul Mofaz said that Israel should consider not demolishing the evacuated buildings in the Gaza Strip, with the exception of synagogues (due to fears of their potential desecration, which eventually did occur), since it would be more costly and time-consuming. This contrasted with the original plan by the Prime Minister to demolish all vacated buildings.
On May 9, the beginning of the evacuation of settlements was officially postponed from July 20 until August 15, so as to not coincide with the Jewish period of The Three Weeks and the fast of Tisha B'Av, traditionally marking grief and destruction.
On July 13, Sharon signed the closure order of Gush Katif, making the area a closed military zone. From that point on, only residents who presented Israeli ID cards with their registered address in Gush Katif were permitted to enter. Permits for 24–48 hours were given to select visitors for a few weeks before the entire area was completely sealed off to non-residents. Despite this ban, opponents of the disengagement managed to sneak in by foot through fields and bare soil. Estimates range from a few hundred to a few thousand people for those there illegally at that time. At one point, Sharon contemplated deploying Israel Border Police (Magav) forces to remove non-residents, but decided against it, as the manpower requirement would have been too great.
At midnight between August 14 and 15, the Kissufim crossing was shut down, and the Gaza Strip became officially closed for entrance by Israelis. The evacuation by agreement continued after midnight of the August 17 for settlers who requested a time extension for packing their things. The Gush Katif Municipal Council threatened to unilaterally declare independence, citing the Gaza Strip's internationally disputed status and Halacha as a foundation. Meanwhile, on August 14, Aryeh Yitzhaki proclaimed the independence of Shirat HaYam as "The Independent Jewish Authority in Gaza Beach", and submitted appeals for recognition to the United Nations and Red Cross.
On August 15, the evacuation commenced under the orders of Maj. Gen. Dan Harel of the Southern Command. At 8 a.m., a convoy of security forces entered Neve Dekalim and began evacuating residents. Many settlers chose to leave peacefully, others were forcibly evicted, and some attempted to block buses and clashed with security forces. The evacuations of six settlements then commenced as 14,000 Israeli soldiers and police officers forcibly evicted settlers and "mistanenim" (infiltrators). They went house to house, ordering settlers to leave and breaking down the doors of those who did not. There were scenes of troops dragging screaming and sobbing families from houses and synagogues, but with less violence than expected. Some of the soldiers were also observed sobbing, and there were instances of soldiers joining settlers in prayer before evicting them. Some settlers lit their homes on fire as they evacuated so as to leave the Palestinians nothing. Settlers blocked roads, lit fires, and pleaded with soldiers to disobey orders. One West Bank settler set herself on fire in front of a Gaza checkpoint, and in Neve Dekalim, a group of fifteen American Orthodox Jews barricaded themselves in a basement and threatened to light themselves on fire.
Kfar Darom was next evacuated. Residents and their supporters strung up barbed wire fences around the area, and security forces cut their way in. Some 300 settlers barricaded themselves in the local synagogue, while another group barricaded themselves on the roof with barbed wire, and pelted security forces with various objects. Police removed them by force after negotiations failed, and there were injuries to both settlers and officers. On August 17, the settlement of Morag was evacuated by 200 police officers.
On August 18, Shirat HaYam was evacuated by military and police forces, after infiltrators had been removed and the settlement's speaker system was disabled after settlers used it to call on troops to disobey orders. Youth placed obstacles made of flammable materials and torched tires and garbage dumpsters. Fires spread to Palestinian areas, and IDF bulldozers were deployed to put them out. A number of people also barricaded themselves in the synagogue and public buildings and on a deserted rooftop. Aryeh Yitzhaki defended his home with an M16 rifle, and dozens of settlers barricaded themselves inside or on the roof of his home, with at least four of those on the rooftop being armed. A brief stand-off with security forces ensued, and snipers were deployed after Yitzhaki threatened to fire at troops. Security forces stormed the rooftop and arrested settlers without any violence. IDF and police forces evacuated the home after Yitzhaki surrendered weapons and ammunition belonging to his group, but were met with bags of paint and whitewash thrown by settlers, and Yitzhaki's wife and another right-wing activist initially refused to evacuate and lay on the ground holding their infants.
Bedouin citizens of Israel from the village of Dahaniya, situated in the no-man's land on the Israel–Gaza Strip border, were evacuated and resettled in Arad. The village had a long history of cooperation with Israel, and the residents, who were viewed in Gaza as traitors, had asked to be evacuated due to security concerns.
On August 19, The Guardian reported that some settlers had their children leave their homes with their hands up, or wearing a Star of David badge, to associate the actions of Israel with Nazi Germany and the Holocaust. Some protestors said that they would "not go like sheep to the slaughter", a phrase strongly associated with the Holocaust. On August 22, Netzarim was evacuated by the Israeli military, completing the withdrawal.
The evacuation of the settlers was completed by August 22, after which demolition crews razed 2,800 houses, community buildings and 26 synagogues. Two synagogues, whose construction allowed for them to be taken apart and reassembled, were dismantled and rebuilt in Israel. The demolition of the homes was completed on September 1, while the Shirat HaYam hotel was demolished later.
On August 28, the IDF began dismantling Gush Katif's 48-grave cemetery. All of the bodies were removed by special teams of soldiers supervised by the Military Rabbinate and reburied in locations of their families' choosing. In accordance with Jewish law, all soil touching the remains was also transferred, and the dead were given second funerals, with the families observing a one-day mourning period. All coffins were draped in the Israeli flag on the way to reburial. The transfer was completed on September 1.
The IDF also pulled out its forces in the Gaza Strip, and had withdrawn 95% of its military equipment by September 1. On September 7, the IDF announced that it planned to advance its full withdrawal from the Gaza Strip to September 12, pending cabinet approval. It was also announced that in the area evacuated in the West Bank the IDF planned to transfer all control (excluding building permits and anti-terrorism) to the PNA – the area will remain "Area C" (full Israeli control) de jure, but "Area A" (full PNA control) de facto.
When the disengagement began, Israel had not yet decided on whether or not to withdraw from the Philadelphi Route, a narrow strip of land serving as a buffer zone along the border between the Gaza Strip and Egypt. Although Sharon was initially opposed to withdrawing from the Philadelphi Route, he relented after legal advisers told him that it was impossible to declare Israel had fully withdrawn from the Gaza Strip so long as it controlled the border with Egypt. On August 28, the Israeli government approved the Philadelphi Accord, under which Egypt, which was prohibited from militarizing the Sinai without Israeli approval as per its peace treaty with Israel, was authorized to deploy 750 border guards equipped with heavy weaponry to the Philadelphi Route. The agreement was approved by the Knesset on August 31. On September 12, the IDF withdrew all forces from the Philadelphi Route.
The Israeli Supreme Court, in response to a settlers' petition to block the government's destruction of the synagogues, gave the go-ahead to the Israeli government. Sharon decided not to proceed with their demolition, however. On September 11, the Israeli cabinet revised an earlier decision to destroy the synagogues of the settlements. The Palestinian Authority protested Israel's decision, arguing that it would rather Israel dismantle the synagogues. On September 11, a ceremony was held when the last Israeli flag was lowered in the IDF's Gaza Strip divisional headquarters. All remaining IDF forces left the Gaza Strip in the following hours. The last soldier left the strip, and the Kissufim gate was closed on the early morning of September 12. This completed the Israeli pullout from the Gaza Strip. However, an official handover ceremony was cancelled after the Palestinian Authority boycotted it in response to Israel's decision not to demolish the synagogues. On September 21, Israel officially declared the Gaza Strip to be an extraterritorial jurisdiction and the four border crossings on the Israel-Gaza border to be international border crossings, with a valid passport or other appropriate travel documents now required to cross through them. | https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Israeli_disengagement_from_Gaza |
Faifi language | The consonant inventory of Faifi is as follows according to both Alfaifi & Behnstedt (2010), Alfaife (2018) and Alaslani (2017); allophones are in parentheses and phonemes attested only in Alaslani (2017) are in brackets:
Some important features regarding consonant inventory of Faifi include:
The phoneme /ðˤ/ is attested in both the Upper and Lower dialects as a variant of [θˤ] and is suspected to be a byproduct of contact with Arabic. In the Upper variety of Faifi the phoneme is typically pronounced as /f/ or /θ/ while both the pharyngealization and place of articulation is preserved in the Lower dialect and in Minnabih.
The phoneme /t͡s/ appears to be a variation of the phoneme [t͡ʃ] in the Upper dialect although it can vary between speakers; it is [t͡ʃ] in both Minabbih and the Lower dialect. The phoneme [t͡ʃ] is a reflex of both historical *k and *ɮˤ in both areas, similar to Razihi.
Alfaifi & Behnstedt (2010) describes the phoneme /ʃ/ as apical-alveolar in the Lower dialect and apical-palatal in the Upper dialect, while in Minabbih it is pronounced as [ç] by some speakers. Behnstedt originally described it as a sound similar to a retroflexed ich-Laut, which he later clarifies as incorrect.
The phoneme /d͡ʒ/ is a dialectal variation of [ʒ].
Faifi is well known for having the segment /st/ as a reflex of historical *sˤ in environments where the phoneme is not restricted from this change. While Behnstedt & Alfaifi (2010) assume that this reflex is evidence towards an earlier affricate *t͡sˤ a more recent thesis, Alfaifi (2022), claims that in the Central dialect of Faifi it is demonstrable that this reflex is bisegmental and hence may be the result of a loss of emphasis.
The vowel phonemes of Upper Faifi per Alfaife (2018) are as follows:
Some important features regarding the vowel phonemes of Upper Faifi include:
The phonemes /i/, /a/, /u/ become [ɪ], [ə], [ʊ] in closed syllables with the schwa being present as well at the end of words if there is an absolute pause, otherwise the /a/ is maintained.
The status of the long vowel /uː/ is unclear being that it is not reported to be phonemically contrastive with /u/; the phoneme can only appear in the first open syllable of a word in a closed syllable word medially.
In contrast to Razihi, Faifi in all of its varieties maintains the diphthongs /aj/ and /aw/ but has a tendency towards monophthongization such as in the words /t͡ʃeːf/ 'how?' (Minabbih) and /θoːbin/ 'gown' (Faifi).
== References == | https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Faifi_language |
Women in Islam | While Islam has sometimes been lauded for a historically more progressive portrayal of women, there are differing viewpoints on the fairness of its personal status laws and criminal code as they pertain to women. Islam's patriarchal values continue to be a subject of debate, with the understanding that these values exhibit variations within the diverse contexts of different countries with Muslim majorities. Generally, however, male and female rights differ according to Islamic personal status laws. Some Islamic legal traditions allow men to engage in polygamy and marry non-Muslim women, while women are generally restricted from having multiple husbands and marrying non-Muslim men. Additionally, female inheritances are typically half of their male siblings'. Islamic criminal jurisprudence also relies heavily on witness testimony, and female testimonies alone are often not considered sufficient to convict a murderer, requiring a male testimony for validation.
Although the Quran doesn't explicitly require Muslim women to cover their faces or heads, the observance of sexual modesty and plain dress for both Muslim men and women is prescribed by the ḥadīth literature and sunnah (deeds and sayings attributed to the Islamic prophet Muhammad and his companions); the practice of mandatory veiling is perceived in certain areas as a reflection of gender-related separation. The practice of mandatory veiling is not due to any universal Islamic code; rather, the practice has risen under different contextual circumstances. The dress codes imposed in the Islamic Republic of Iran and in Afghanistan under the Taliban regime, and Islamic schools that require girls to wear a headscarf, have all been cited as examples of mandatory veiling. These policies of forced veiling have been criticized as coercive instruments for gender segregation that deny female autonomy and agency. However, objections to this argument suggest that forced veiling does not constitute gender apartheid and that social constructions of the veil have wrongfully made it a symbol of gender inequality. During the five-year history of the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan, the Taliban regime interpreted the Sharia law in accordance with the Hanafi school of Islamic jurisprudence and the religious edicts of Mullah Omar. Women were banned from working, girls were forbidden to attend schools or universities, were requested to observe purdah and to be accompanied outside their households by male relatives; those who violated these restrictions were punished. Men were forbidden to shave their beards and required to let them grow and keep them long according to the Taliban's principles, and to wear turbans outside their households. Among other things, the Taliban also forbade both male and female participation in sport, including football and chess, as well as recreational activities such as kite-flying.
Mahnaz Afkhami writes that the Islamic fundamentalist worldview "singles out women's status and her relations to society as the supreme test of the authenticity of the Islamic order." This is symbolized by the institutions of purdah (physical separation of the sexes) and awrah (concealing the body with clothing). As in much of the world, institutions suppressing women were becoming less powerful until the resurgence of Islamic fundamentalism at the end of the 20th century. Walid Phares writes that Marxism in the Soviet Union and China, as well as "secular anticlericalism" in Turkey forced women to "integrate themselves into an antireligious society" resulting in a backlash of "gender apartheid" by Islamic fundamentalists. He notes that other religions also have "witnessed similar historical struggles." | https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Women_in_Islam |
Hiran, Somalia | Somalia's civil war started around 1990. Since 1994, the Sharia law has been increasingly applied in Hiran.: 20
In June 1995, Mohamed Farrah Aidid declared himself president of Somalia and attempted to rule Hiran, but was ousted by local clans in late 1995.: 8
According to a 1998 report, Hiran is considered a relatively stable region within Somalia. However, banditry has flourished in the past. The governor lives in Beledweyne, and the use of militias has reduced the incidence of fighting, with the exception of Mataban District.: 14
In June 1999, flooding in south-central Somalia caused extensive damage in Hiran.
In November 2001, the Quran School was attacked by an armed group, killing 18 students.
In August 2006, the Xawaadle and Murusade clans, who had been fighting in the Maxaas of Hiran, reconciled. However, the agreement was violated and the conflict resumed, so a peace conference was held again in October 2007.
In November 2007, militants attacked government forces near Beledweyne in Hiran. In January 2008, militants attacked an Ethiopian military base near Beledweyne.
In September 2010, the establishment of a local government called Dooxada Shabeelle was proclaimed in Kalabayr, Hiran, led by C/fataax Xasan Afrax.
In March 2011, a bombing by Al-Shabaab occurred in Beledweyne.
In December 2011, Ethiopian troops and Ahlu Sunna Waljama'a completely retook the city of Baladweyne from al-Shabaab.
In May 2013, Governor Hiran decided to send deserter soldiers from al-Shabaab who are hiding, and asked the local population for help in sending them to rehabilitation facilities.
In November 2013, a disease outbreak killed 40 people in Ceel-Cali, Hiran.
In March 2014, Hiran's executive government asked foreign charities for help, saying that healthcare was in crisis after the withdrawal of a Swiss hospital last year.
In October 2014, the AMISOM base in Hiran was attacked.
In May 2015, at a meeting in Beledweyne, a proposal was made to divide Hiran into two regions.
In December 2015, the Somali government replaced Governor Hiran for his involvement in the murders in Beledweyne. In the same month, the Somali President visits Beledweyne.
In January 2016, three people were killed in a clan war in Hiran.
In August 2016, Somalia's interior minister rejected a local request to divide Hiran into two regions.
In October 2016, Somali government and Ethiopian troops withdrew from the Halgan District of Hiran and were replaced by al-Shabaab. The withdrawal of Ethiopian troops is reportedly related to a state of emergency declaration issued in response to anti-government protests in Ethiopia.
In December 2016, Governor Hiran destroyed more than 50 charcoal burning facilities in Mataban District to prevent illegal logging and arrested more than 20 people.
In November 2017, the Hiran government declared a halt to the use of Somali shillings because villages controlled by al-Shabaab refused to accept high denomination 1,000 Somali shilling bills and because of the influx of counterfeit bills from Puntland, which caused massive inflation. United States dollars were to be used for transactions.
In October 2019, Beledweyne was severely damaged by the flooding of the Jubba and Shebelle Rivers. In November 2019, the African Union Commission assisted flooded Beledweyne with $87,000 worth of relief supplies.
In March 2020, President Mohamed Abdi Ware of Hirshabelle State dismisses Hiran Governor Ali Mohamed Arale and reappoints his predecessor Ali Jeyte Osman, but Arale refuses.
In June 2022, a clan attacked the al-Shabaab base in Booco. | https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Hiran,_Somalia |
List of inventions in the medieval Islamic world | 15th century
Iznik pottery: Produced in Ottoman Turkey as early as the 15th century AD. It consists of a body, slip, and glaze, where the body and glaze are "quartz-frit." The "frits" in both cases "are unusual in that they contain lead oxide as well as soda"; the lead oxide would help reduce the thermal expansion coefficient of the ceramic. Microscopic analysis reveals that the material that has been labeled "frit" is "interstitial glass" which serves to connect the quartz particles.
Standing army with firearms: The Ottoman military's regularized use of firearms proceeded ahead of the pace of their European counterparts. The Janissaries had been an infantry bodyguard using bows and arrows. During the rule of Sultan Mehmed II they were drilled with firearms and became "the first standing infantry force equipped with firearms in the world."
16th century
Firearm kneeling position: At the Battle of Mohács in 1526, the Janissaries equipped with 2000 tüfenks (usually translated as musket) "formed nine consecutive rows and they fired their weapons row by row," in a "kneeling or standing position without the need for additional support or rest." The Chinese later adopted the Ottoman kneeling position for firing.
Marching band and military band: The marching band and military band both have their origins in the Ottoman military band, performed by the Janissary since the 16th century.
Matchlock volley fire: Volley fire with matchlocks was first implemented in 1526 when the Ottoman Janissaries utilized it during the Battle of Mohács.
Parallel rulers: Invented by Taqi ad-Din Muhammad ibn Ma'ruf and used at the Constantinople Observatory of Taqi ad-Din (1577–1580).
Practical impulse steam turbine: A practical impulse steam turbine was first described in 1551 by Taqi al-Din, a philosopher, astronomer and engineer in 16th century Ottoman Egypt, who described a method for rotating a spit by means of a jet of steam playing on rotary vanes around the periphery of a wheel. A similar device for rotating a spit was also later described by John Wilkins in 1648.
Steam jack: A steam-powered roasting jack was first described by the Ottoman polymath and engineer Taqi al-Din in his Al-Turuq al-samiyya fi al-alat al-ruhaniyya (The Sublime Methods of Spiritual Machines), in 1551 CE (959 AH). It was an impulse steam turbine with practical applications as a prime mover for rotating a spit, predating Giovanni Branca's later impulse steam turbine from 1629. | https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_inventions_in_the_medieval_Islamic_world |
Sin (mythology) | A number of sources attest the existence of a tradition in which Sin was regarded as the sole head of the Mesopotamian pantheon or a deity equal in rank to the traditional kings of the gods, Anu and Enlil. According to Wilfred G. Lambert, most of the evidence for this view postdates the reign of Meli-Shipak II, and indicates it might have been particularly popular in Harran. An Old Babylonian literary composition written in Sumerian describes Sin as the head of the divine assembly (Ubšu’ukkin),with Anu, Enlil, Inanna, Utu, Enki and Ninhursag serving as his advisers. Two of his titles known from the god list An = Anum, dUkkin ("the assembly") and Ukkin-uru ("mighty assembly"), might reflect this portrayal. Some Old Babylonian theophoric names might also be connected to the view that Sin was the head of the pantheon, namely Sîn-bēl-ili ("Sin is the lord of the gods"), Sîn-šar-ili ("Sin is the king of the gods") or Sîn-il-ili ("Sin is god of the gods"). Lambert notes that while similar names invoking other gods, for example Shamash and Adad, are also known, Sîn-bēl-ili is ultimately the most common.
Examples of texts elevating Sin's rank are known from Ur from the period of the Neo-Assyrian governor Sîn-balāssu-iqbi's reign. The moon god was in this case seemingly reinterpreted as a "local Enlil”, acting as the king of the gods in Ur. It has been argued that the view that Sin was the supreme god was later particularly enthusiastically supported by the last Neo-Babylonian ruler, Nabonidus. In one of his inscriptions from Harran Sin is described as the "lord of the gods" who possessed "Enlilship", "Anuship" and "Eaship". However, Melanie Groß stresses that Nabonidus' devotion should for the most part not be treated as an unusual phenomenon, save for the fact that Harran was not the center of his empire. She notes that the elevation of city deities significant for specific rulers to the top of the pantheon of the respective states is well documented for example in the case of Marduk and Ashur. Aino Hätinen points out that in Harran similar formulas were used to refer to Sin by Ashurbanipal, and are thus not unique to Nabonidus and do not necessarily indicate elevation of this god during his reign. She suggests both Nabonidus and Ashurbanipal relied on so-called "Theology of the Moon", a concept well attested in explanatory texts from the first millennium BCE according to which Sin possessed divine powers (Sumerian ĝarza, Akkadian parṣū) equal to these of Anu, Enlil and Ea during the first half of the lunar month. | https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Sin_(mythology) |
Ba'ath Party | The disillusionment felt among party members on the pan-Arab project, led to the radicalization of the party's interpretation of socialism. Yasin al-Hafiz, a former member of the Syrian Communist Party, was an early frontrunner for the party's radicalization. While he didn't oppose the pan-Arab project, he wanted to turn the concept of Arab socialism into a scientific and revolutionary socialist ideology which adapted Marxism to local conditions. Jamal al-Atassi, who had been a moderate socialist for most of his life, called for the renunciation of Arab socialism in 1963 and the adoption of a "virtually Marxist concept of socialism" by claiming that class struggle was the moving force in society.
Hammud al-Shufi became the leader of the party's Marxist faction during his short stint as Syrian Regional Secretary, literally the head of the Syrian Regional Organization. Shufi was able, due to his position as head of the Organization Bureau of the Regional Command, to recruit several Marxist or Marxist-leaning members to the top of the Syrian Regional party hierarchy. Radical socialists led by Ali Salih al-Sadi took control of the Iraqi Regional Branch in 1963, which led to the official radicalization of the party's ideology.
The delegates at the 6th National Congress elected an Ideology Committee that was responsible for writing a charter about the party's ideology. The end result was the document Points of Departure. The document, which was approved by the 6th National Congress, relegated Arab unity to a secondary role and gave socialism prominence. Marxist concepts were used interchangeably alongside Ba'athist ones; however, the document was reluctant in explicitly admitting that certain ideas were of Marxist origins. The 6th National Congress borrowed key Marxist-Leninist tenets such as "people's democracy" and emphasized the need of a socialist vanguard in-order to:
"play the role of mediator and leader (even if it is in power) that acts to direct the journey of the masses towards the socialist future in a scientific way and in a democratic style".
While the Points of Departure didn't create a break with the party's traditional ideology, it criticized the party's old guard for giving Arab unity primacy over socialism and their failure to turn Ba'athism into a comprehensive theory. While the documents says Arab unity is progressive, the reason for it being important changed. The document stated: "Arab unity is an indispensable basis for the construction of a socialist economy." Aflaq also believed that Arab unity was only an intermediate goal, but it stood at the centre of classical Ba'athism. In the Points of Departure, despite not firmly stating it, the goal of creating a socialist society seemed to be both an immediate goal and the main goal of the party.
The concept of Arab socialism, accused of being narrow-minded and nationalistic, was replaced with the "Arab road to socialism" concept. The Points of Departure criticized the classical Ba'athist view regarding private ownership. Classical Ba'athists supported private ownership as a way to recruit into the party many petty bourgeois elements. The document called for nationalization of the commanding heights of the economy, the slow incorporation of the petty bourgeoisie into the socialist economy and the elimination of the national bourgeoisie and its allied classes. To safeguard the party from evolving into one supporting state capitalism, the socialist economy would be controlled by a vanguard party together with popular participation from the toiler masses. Major policies in the "Arab road to socialism" included:
The nationalization of the major branches of the economy with the participation of the toiling masses in the management of the economy, and for the creation of collective farms to effect the revolution necessary for the peasants...the Congress stipulated that the changes be directed by a "revolutionary vanguard", the final aim being to establish a "popular democracy" that was to guarantee freedom to the classes which constitute the true people and ensure the country's rapid development. This regime was to center on the party, leading the popular organizations and councils and operating according to the principle of "democratic centralism" | https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ba%27ath_Party |
Italian Libya | In 1939 some Libyans were granted special (though limited) Italian citizenship by Royal Decree No. 70 on 9 January 1939. This citizenship was necessary for any Libyan with ambitions to rise in the military or civil organizations. The recipients were officially referred to as Moslem Italians. Libya had become "the fourth shore of Italy" (Trye 1998). The incorporation of Libya into the Italian Empire gave the Italian Army a greater ability to exploit native Libyans for military service. Native Libyans served in Italian formations from the beginning of the Italian occupation of Libya. On 1 March 1940, the 1st and 2nd Libyan Divisions were formed. These Libyan infantry divisions were organized along the lines of the binary Italian infantry division. The 5th Italian Army received the 2nd Libyan Infantry Division, which it incorporated into the 13th Corps. The Italian 10th Army received the 1st Libyan Infantry Division, which it incorporated into the reserve. The Italian Libyan infantry divisions were colonial formations ("colonial" in the sense of consisting of native troops). These formations had Italian officers commanding them, with Libyan NCOs and soldiers. These native Libyan formations were made up of people drawn from the coastal Libyan populations. The training and readiness of these divisions was on an equal footing with the regular Italian formations in North Africa. Their professionalism and 'esprit de corps' made them some of the best Italian infantry formations in North Africa. The Libyan divisions were loyal to Italy and provided a good combat record.
After the enlargement of Italian Libya with the Aouzou Strip, Fascist Italy aimed at further extension to the south. Indeed Italian plans, in the case of a war against France and Great Britain, projected the extension of Libya as far south as Lake Chad and the establishment of a broad land bridge between Libya and Italian East Africa. During World War II, there was strong support for Italy from many Muslim Libyans, who enrolled in the Italian Army. Other Libyan troops (the Savari [cavalry regiments] and the Spahi or mounted police) had been fighting for the Kingdom of Italy since the 1920s. A number of major battles took place in Libya during the North African Campaign of World War II. In September 1940, the Italian invasion of Egypt was launched from Libya.
Starting in December of the same year, the British Eighth Army launched a counterattack called Operation Compass and the Italian forces were pushed back into Libya. After losing all of Cyrenaica and almost all of its Tenth Army, Italy asked for German assistance to aid the failing campaign
With German support, the lost Libyan territory was regained during Operation Sonnenblume and by the conclusion of Operation Brevity, German and Italian forces were entering Egypt. The first Siege of Tobruk in April 1941 marked the first failure of Rommel's Blitzkrieg tactics. In 1942 there was the Battle of Gazala when the Axis troops finally conquered Tobruk and pushed the defeated British troops inside Egypt again. Defeat during the Second Battle of El Alamein in Egypt spelled doom for the Axis forces in Libya and meant the end of the Western Desert Campaign.
In February 1943, retreating German and Italian forces were forced to abandon Libya as they were pushed out of Cyrenaica and Tripolitania, thus ending Italian jurisdiction and control over Libya.
The Fezzan was occupied by the Free French in 1943. At the close of World War II, the British and French collaborated with the small new resistance. France and the United Kingdom decided to make King Idris the Emir of an independent Libya in 1951.
Libya would finally become independent in 1951. | https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Italian_Libya |
Bullfighting | In Bolivia, bulls are not killed nor injured with any sticks. The goal of Bolivian toreros is to provoke the bull with taunts without getting harmed themselves.
In El Seibo Province of the Dominican Republic bullfights are not about killing or harming the animal, but taunting and evading it until it is tired.
In Canada, Portuguese-style bullfighting was introduced in 1989 by Portuguese immigrants in the town of Listowel in southern Ontario. Despite objections and concerns from local authorities and a humane society, the practice was allowed as the bulls were not killed or injured in this version. In the nearby city of Brampton, Portuguese immigrants from the Azores practice "tourada a corda" (bullfight by rope).
Jallikattu is a traditional spectacle in Tamil Nadu, India as a part of Pongal celebrations on Mattu Pongal day. A breed of bos indicus (humped) bulls, called "Jellicut" are used. During jallikattu, a bull is released into a group of people, and participants attempt to grab the bull's hump and hold onto it for a determined distance, length of time, or with the goal of taking a pack of money tied to the bull's horns. The goal of the activity is more similar to bull riding (staying on).
Savika is a zebu-wrestling sport found in Madagascar, particularly among the Betsileo people.
American freestyle bullfighting is a style of bullfighting developed in American rodeo. The style was developed by the rodeo clowns who protect bull riders from being trampled or gored by a loose bull. Freestyle bullfighting is a 70-second competition in which the bullfighter (rodeo clown) avoids the bull by means of dodging, jumping, and use of a barrel. The bullfighter is then scored points based on his performance.
In California's Central Valley, the historically Portuguese community has developed a form of bullfight in which the bull is taunted by a matador, but the lances are tipped with fabric hook and loop (e.g. Velcro) and they are aimed at hook-and-loop covered pads secured to the bull's shoulder. Fights occur from May through October around traditional Portuguese holidays. While California outlawed bullfighting in 1957, this type of bloodless bullfighting is still allowed if carried out during religious festivals or celebrations.
In Tanzania, bullfighting was introduced by the Portuguese to Zanzibar and to Pemba Island, in modern Tanzania, where it is known as mchezo wa ngombe. Similar to the Portuguese Azorean tourada a corda, the bull is restrained by a rope, generally neither bull nor player is harmed, and the bull is not killed at the end of the fight.
In Japan, bullfighting is bull wrestling, with a history of at least from the 12th century, as the Emperor Go-Toba was recorded to have been entertained by bullpushing when he was exiled to the Oki Islands.
In Zhejiang, China, guanniu is a traditional form of bullfighting in which contestants attempt to physically wrestle a bull to the ground. | https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Bullfighting |
Islamic banking and finance | The Islamic Interbank Money Market was established by Bank Negara Malaysia on 3 January 1994, and has developed instruments to manage the liquidity needs of the Islamic financial institutions – "funding and adjusting portfolios over the short term".
The Islamic Financial Services Board was founded on 3 November 2002 at Kuala Lumpur by central banks of Bahrain, Iran, Kuwait, Malaysia, Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, Sudan along with the Islamic Development Bank, AAOIFI, and IMF.
As of April 2015, the 188 members of the IFSB comprise 61 regulatory and supervisory authorities, eight international inter-governmental organisations, and 119 market players (financial institutions, professional firms and industry associations) operating in 45 jurisdictions. From 2002 to 2012 it issued 17 standards, guiding principles and notes.
Its objective is to standardize and harmonize the operation and supervision of Islamic financial institutions, standards and capital adequacy, risk management and corporate governance in consultation with a wide array of stakeholders and after following a lengthy process. It complements the task of the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision. As of 2015 it had published 17 standards and six guidance notes.
The Islamic International Ratings Agency started operations in July 2005 in Bahrain. It is sponsored by 17 multilateral development institutions, banks and other rating agencies.
The Dow Jones Islamic Market Index (DJIMI) was established in 1996. The Index has been approved by Fiqh Academy of the OIC. It uses three levels of screening—eliminating businesses involved in activities not allowed by Islamic law (alcohol, pork, gambling, prostitution, pornography, etc.); eliminating companies whose total debts divided by their 12-month average market capitalization are 33% or more of their total sources of funds; eliminating companies that have 'impure income or expenditure' (including, of course, interest) of more than 5–10 per cent of their income or expenditure (eliminating businesses with any 'impure income' being considered impractical).
In 2006, Citigroup launched the Dow Jones Citigroup Sukuk Index. The sukuk making up the Index must be at least $250 million in size, have a maturity of at least one year and a minimum rating of BBB-/Baaa3. In 1998, the FTSE Global Islamic Index was launched. It has 15 Islamic indices for various regions.
In 2007, the MSCI Islamic Index series was launched, one of the "MSCI 'Faith-Based' Indexes". It is constructed from the conventional MSCI country indices and covers 69 developed, emerging and frontier markets, including regions such as the Gulf Cooperation Council and Arabian markets. | https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Islamic_banking_and_finance |
Shia Islam in the Indian subcontinent | To make sense of the continuous, systematic and multi-dimensional persecution of the Shias of Pakistan, Abbas Zaidi has applied model of genocide to the phenomena, what he terms as a slow-genocide, a term used by Nobel Laureates Professor Amartya Sen and Desmond Tutu for describing the plight of the Rohingya. In 1996, Gregory Stanton, the president of Genocide Watch, presented a briefing paper called "The 8 Stages of Genocide" at the United States Department of State. In it he suggested that genocide develops in eight stages that are "predictable but not inexorable".
The political Islamist movements in Pakistan have always had an intent to destroy, in whole or in part, the Shia community which they termed as a Jewish conspiracy against Islam, that is morally corrupt and dangerous for the Sunni majority. The South Asian ideologue of anti-Shi'ism, Shah Abd al-Aziz, presents a conspiracy theory to explain the origins of Shi'ism, in which the conquered Jews, led by a Sherlock Holmes type character, Abdullah ibn Saba, planned to take revenge from Islam and joined the ranks of Ali as his partisans. He intentionally ignores the emergence of the Shia-Sunni split right after the death of the Prophet, over the question of Caliphate. He also doesn't point towards the activism of Abu Dhar al-Ghifari, whose was the first major protest movement against the Umayyad domination. The sayings of Muhammad mentioning the term "Shias of Ali", and the presence of a group of the companions of Prophet known for their reverence to Ali were also excluded from his painting of Shia history. This deviation from the real origins of Shia Islam and the anti-semitic, ahistorical narrative has been an ideological basis for the crimes of genocidal nature against Shias. He also advises Sunnis to humiliate the Shias. His book targeting Shia history and beliefs, Tauhfa Ithna Ashari, is widely taught in Sunni seminaries of modern South Asia.
Like all genocidal narratives, Shias are presented as traitors and morally corrupt. Most of the negative Muslim characters of South Asian history are painted as Shias. Mushirul Hasan notes:
"There was in addition, a concerted move to discourage Shia-Sunni marriages, portray Shias as sexually promiscuous, describe them as heretics and depict them as traitors to the country and as enemies of Islam. Frequently cited examples were Mir Sadiq, diwan of Tipu Sultan; Mir Alam, divan of Hyderabad; Mir Jafar, diwan of Siraj ud-Daula, or the Bilgrami family. They were chided for being in league with British or Indian governments against their Sunni overlords".
While Mir Sadiq and Mir Alam belonged to the Sunni sect of their respective rulers, Mir Jafar was actually a Shia but so was Siraj-ul Daula, whom he deserted for political benefits. Shia personalities of the past who are perceived as heroes, like Jinnah in Pakistan and Siraj-ul Daula, are painted as Sunnis.
In Urdu literature, many famous Sunni novelists and drama writers depict Shias as sex workers, hypocrites and criminals. One such example is the famous Inspector Jamshaid Series of crime novels by Ishtiaq Ahmad. In novels of Bano Qudsia, lady sex worker have Shia names and alam-i Abbas erected on their place of work house, which is actually a Shia symbol erected on Imambargahs.
This anti-Shia narrative of popular history and literature has implications: In 2007, Tahir Ashrafi, an advisor of the Punjab government, visited the detained members of the banned Lashkar-i Jhangvi. He says:
"some of them showed me religious decrees issued in the printed form that said: women of Shias and Qadiyanis are your slaves, their properties are halal and their killing is a religious necessity".
One pamphlet circulated by Lashkar-e-Jhangvi in Pakistan's province of Balouchistan reads:
"All Shia are worthy of killing. We will rid Pakistan of unclean people. Pakistan means "land of the pure" and the Shia have no right to live in this country. We have the edict and signatures of revered scholars, declaring the Shia infidels. Just as our fighters have waged a successful jihad against the Shia Hazara in Afghanistan, our mission in Pakistan is the abolition of this impure sect and its followers from every city, every village, and every nook and corner of Pakistan.
As in the past, our successful jihad against the Hazara in Pakistan and, in particular, in Quetta is ongoing and will continue in the future. We will make Pakistan the graveyard of the Shia Hazara and their houses will be destroyed by bombs and suicide-bombers. We will only rest when we will be able to fly the flag of true Islam on this land of the pure. Jihad against the Shia Hazara has now become our duty."
The killers of Shias are well organised. The organisations targeting the Shia community in Pakistan have functional units in all major cities and towns, where they spread hate against Shias; and train and motivate their members to carry out assassinations and suicide bombings. Shia civilians in the country are regularly killed on a daily basis by the takfiri Deobandi terrorist organisations such as Sipah-e-Sahaba Pakistan, Lashkar-e-Jhangvi, Jaish-e-Mohammed, Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan, Harkat-ul-Jihad al-Islami, Lashkar-e-Taiba and others. The Pakistani governments turn a blind eye.
Abbas Zaidi in his detailed study of media coverage of the crimes against Shias of Pakistan, argues that both the state and the private media houses have adopted a policy of justification and denial. He says:
"the media reports Shia killing in one of three ways: denial, obfuscation, and justification. By denial I mean that the media explicitly or implicitly claims that not Shias but "people", "men", "pilgrims", or ethnic "Hazaras" are being killed. This happens when the media either does not report Shia killing at all or deliberately hides Shia victims’ sectarian identity. By obfuscation I mean that the media portrays Shia killing in terms of a Shia–Sunni binary in which both sects are shown to be equally involved in violence. By justification I mean that the media portrays the Shias as heretics, blasphemers, and agents provocateurs operating on behalf of foreign powers and thus deserving of violence being done to them".
Khaled Ahmed argues that it is because the owners of the media houses and the manpower employed there is overwhelmingly Sunni, and that there is a 'sense of shame' that stops them from openly talking about the problem. | https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Shia_Islam_in_the_Indian_subcontinent |
Shia Islam | The Idrisids (Arabic: الأدارسة) were Arab Zaydī Shias whose dynasty, named after its first sultan, Idris I, ruled in the western Maghreb from 788 to 985 CE. Another Zaydī State was established in the region of Gilan, Deylaman, and Tabaristan (northern Iran) in 864 CE by the Alavids; it lasted until the death of its leader at the hand of the Samanids in 928 CE. Roughly forty years later, the Zaydī State was revived in Gilan and survived under Hasanid leaders until 1126 CE. Afterwards, from the 12th to 13th centuries, the Zaydī Shias of Deylaman, Gilan, and Tabaristan then acknowledged the Zaydī Imams of Yemen or rival Zaydī Imams within Iran.
The Buyids were initially Zaydī Shias, as were the Banu Ukhaidhir rulers of al-Yamama in the 9th and 10th centuries. The leader of the Zaydī community took the title of caliph; thus, the ruler of Yemen was known by this title. Al-Hadi Yahya bin al-Hussain bin al-Qasim ar-Rassi, a descendant of Ḥasan ibn ʿAlī, founded the Zaydī Imamate at Sa'dah in 893–897 CE, and the Rassid dynasty continued to rule over Yemen until the middle of the 20th century, when the republican revolution of 1962 deposed the last Zaydī Imam. (See: Arab Cold War). The founding Zaydī branch in Yemen was the Jarudiyya; however, with increasing interaction with the Ḥanafī and Shāfiʿī schools of Sunnī jurisprudence, there was a shift from the Jarudiyya group to the Sulaimaniyya, Tabiriyya, Butriyya, and Salihiyya. Zaydī Shias form the second dominant religious group in Yemen. Currently, they constitute about 40–45% of the population in Yemen; Jaʿfaris and Ismāʿīlīs constitute the 2–5%. In Saudi Arabia, it is estimated that there are over 1 million Zaydī Shias, primarily based in the western provinces.
Currently, the most prominent Zaydī political movement is the Houthi movement in Yemen, known by the name of Shabab al-Mu'mineen ("Believing Youth") or Ansar Allah ("Partisans of God"). In 2014–2015, Houthis took over the Yemeni government in Sana'a, which led to the fall of the Saudi Arabian-backed government of Abd Rabbuh Mansur Hadi. Houthis and their allies gained control of a significant part of Yemen's territory, and resisted the Saudi Arabian-led intervention in Yemen seeking to restore Hadi in power. (See: Iran–Saudi Arabia proxy conflict). Both the Houthis and the Saudi Arabian-led coalition were being attacked by the Sunnī Islamist militant group and Salafi-jihadist terrorist organization ISIL/ISIS/IS/Daesh. | https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Shia_Islam |
Houthi movement | In course of the Yemeni Civil War, the Houthis developed tactics to combat their opponents' navies. At first, their anti-ship operations were unsophisticated and limited to rocket-propelled grenades being shot at vessels close to the shore. In the fight to secure the port city of Aden in 2015, the Yemeni Navy was largely destroyed, including all missile-carrying vessels. A number of smaller patrol craft, landing craft, and Mi-14 and Ka-28 ASW helicopters did survive. Their existence under Houthi control would be brief, as the majority of them were destroyed in air attacks during the Saudi-led intervention in Yemen in 2015. As a result, the Houthis were left with AShMs (anti-ship missiles) stored ashore, but no launchers, and a smattering of small patrol ships. These, along with a number of locally manufactured small craft and miscellaneous vessels, were to form the foundation of the new naval warfare capabilities.
Soon after the Houthis took over Yemen in 2015, Iran sought to strengthen the Houthis' naval capabilities, allowing the Houthis, and thus Iran, to intercept Coalition shipping off the Red Sea coast, by providing additional AShMs and constructing truck-based launchers that could easily be hidden after a launch. Iran also anchored the Saviz intelligence vessel, disguised as a regular cargo vessel, off the coast of Eritrea, that provided intelligence and updates on Coalition ship movements to the Houthis. The Saviz served in this capacity until it was damaged in an Israeli limpet mine attack in April 2021, when it was replaced by the Behshad. The Behshad, like the Saviz, is based on a cargo ship.
Meanwhile, in Yemen, the Houthis, presumably with the assistance of Iranian engineers, converted a number of 10-meter-long patrol craft donated by the UAE to the Yemeni Coast Guard in the early 2010s into WBIEDs (water born improvised explosive devices). In 2017, one of these was used to attack the Saudi frigate Al Madinah. In the years since, three more WBIED designs have been built: the Tawfan-1, Tawfan-2, and Tawfan-3. 15 different types of naval mines were also produced. These are being increasingly deployed in the Red Sea, but have yet to be successful against naval vessels. The delivery of 120 km-ranged Noor and 200 km-ranged Qader AShMs, 300 km-ranged Khalij Fars ASBMs, and Fajr-4CL and "Al-Bahr Al-Ahmar" anti-ship rockets by Iran, which were unveiled during a 2022 Houthi parade, was arguably the most significant escalation in support. They combine long range, low cost, and high mobility with various types of guidance to create a weapon well-suited to the Houthi Navy.
Though the Houthis' ASBM arsenal has yet to be tested, the Houthi Navy has had notable success with AShMs. On October 1, 2016, it was able to hit the UAE Navy's HSV-2 Swift hybrid catamaran with a single C-801/C-802 AShM fired from a shore battery. Although the ship managed to stay afloat, the damage was so severe that it had to be decommissioned. The US Navy then sent two destroyers and an amphibious transport dock to the area to ensure that shipping could continue unabated. These vessels were then attacked with AShMs on three separate occasions, with no success.
Though these attacks demonstrated the Houthis' limited ability to threaten vessels in Yemen's surrounding seas, the threat posed by them has since evolved significantly. Armed with a variety of anti-ship ballistic missiles and rockets that can be notoriously difficult to intercept and cover large areas, the next round of maritime clashes with the navies of the United Arab Emirates, Saudi Arabia, and the United States could have a completely different outcome. The Houthis have also hinted at using their extensive arsenal of loitering munitions against commercial shipping in the Red Sea, a tactic similar to recent Iranian tactics in the Persian Gulf.
Patrol boats were fitted with anti-tank guided missiles, about 30 coast-watcher stations were set up, disguised "spy dhows" were constructed, and the maritime radar of docked ships used to create targeting solutions for attacks. One of the most notable features of the Houthis' naval arsenal became its remote-controlled drone boats which carry explosives and ram enemy warships. Among these, the self-guiding Shark-33 explosive drone boats originated as patrol boats of the old Yemeni coast guard. In addition, the Houthis have begun to train combat divers on the Zuqar and Bawardi islands. | https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Houthi_movement |
Sibawayh | In a story from the debate held by the Abbasid vizier Yahya ibn Khalid of Baghdad on standard Arabic usage, Sibawayh, representing the Basra school of grammar, and al-Kisa'i, one of the canonical Quran readers and the leading figure in the rival school of Kufa, had a dispute on the following point of grammar, which later became known as المسألة الزنبورية al-Mas’alah al-Zunbūrīyah ("The Question of the Hornet").
The discussion involved the final clause of the sentence:
Arabic: كُنْتُ أَظُنُّ أَنَّ ٱلْعَقْرَبَ أَشَدُّ لَسْعَةً مِنَ الزُّنْبُورِ، فَإِذَا هُوَ إِيَّاهَا.
kuntu ʾaẓunnu ʾanna l-ʿaqraba ʾašaddu lasʿatan min az-zunbūri, fa-ʾiḏā huwa ʾiyyā-hā.
"I have always thought that the scorpion was more painful in stinging than the hornet, and sure enough it is."
Both Sibawayh and al-Kisa'i agreed that it involved an omitted verb, but disagreed on the specific construct to be used.
Sibawayh proposed finishing it with fa-'iḏā huwa hiya (فإذا هو هي), literally "and-thus he [is] she", using "he" for the scorpion (a masculine noun in Arabic) and "she" for "stinging, bite" (a feminine noun), arguing that Arabic does not need or use any verb-form like is in the present tense, and that object forms like ('iyyā-)hā are never the main part of a predicate.
Al-Kisa'i argued instead for fa-'iḏā huwa 'iyyā-hā (فإذا هو إياها), literally "and-thus he [does] onto-her", supporting the object pronoun -hā ("her") with the particle 'iyyā-. The grammatical constructions of the debate may be compared to a similar point in the grammar of modern English: "it is she" vs. "it is her", which is still a point of some disagreement today.
To Sibawayh's dismay, al-Kisa'i soon ushered in four Bedouins who had "happened" to be waiting near the door. Each testified that huwa 'iyyā-hā was the proper usage and so Sibawayh's was judged incorrect. After this, he left the court, and was said to have returned in indignation to Shiraz where he died soon, apparently either from upset or illness.
A student of Sibawayh's, al-Akhfash al-Asghar (Akhfash the Younger), is said to have challenged al-Kisa'i after his teacher's death asking him 100 questions on grammar, proving al-Kisa'i's answers wrong each time. When the student revealed who he was and what had happened, al-Kisa'i approached the Caliph Harun al-Rashid and requested punishment from him knowing he had had a share in "killing Sibawayh." | https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Sibawayh |
Printemps | The first Printemps store, now commonly known as "Printemps Haussmann", was opened on 3 November 1865 under the name "Grands Magasins du Printemps" (abbreviated as "Au Printemps") by Jules Jaluzot his wife Augustine Jaluzot and Jean-Alfred Duclos. The store was located on the corner of Rue du Havre and Boulevard Haussmann in Paris, France. In 1874 the store had a large expansion and elevators (some of the first) from the 1867 Universal Exposition were installed.
The policies of Printemps revolutionised retail business practices. The store marked items with set prices and eschewed the haggling based on customer appearance that had previously been standard in retail shopping. Like other grands magasins (lit. 'big stores', department stores), Printemps used the economies of scale to provide high quality goods at prices that the expanding middle class could afford. They also pioneered the idea of discount sales to clear outdated stock, and later the use of window models to display the latest fashions. Printemps was noted for its branding innovations as well, handing out bouquets of violets on the first day of spring and championing the new Art Nouveau style, with its nature inspired motifs.
In 1881 the store caught on fire causing the entire building to be destroyed, but after the fire the store was rebuilt with the new building designed by architects Jules and Paul Sédille. The store also became the first to use electric lighting with the rebuild and customers were even able to observe the power station behind a glass wall.
The store became one of the first department stores with direct metro access when the Métro was connected in 1904. Also in 1904 a near collapse of the business led to the resignation of Jules Jaluzot with this he was succeeded by Gustave Laguionie, who announced the construction of a second store in 1905. The second store designed by architect René Binet, the store was opened five years later and dominated by a glass domed hall 42 meters in height and an Art Nouveau staircase which was later removed in 1955.
The first store outside of Paris was opened in 1912 in Deauville.
Pierre Laguionie, the son of Gustave, took the helm of the store in 1920, rebuilding it after another large fire in 1921.
In 1923 with the reconstruction of the Haussmann store an elaborate cupola was installed above the main restaurant.
Pierre Laguionie was the first president of the International Association of Department Stores in from 1928 to 1930, a position he held again in from 1937 to 1938 and 1952 to 1953. Jean Vignéras held the position from 1962 to 1963 and Jean-Jacques Delort was president from 1981 to 1982.
In the 1930 a store opened in Antananarivo, Madagascar, the store was later converted into a Prisunic.
In 1931, Printemps created the discount chain Prisunic.
In 1939 to avoid the risk of the cupola being destroyed in bombing attacks it was dismantled and stored at Clichy. It was restored in 1973 by the grandson of its original designer, using plans that had been kept in the archives of the family business. In 1975, the façade and cupola of the building were registered as historical monuments.
Printemps alongside Åhlén & Holm, Au Grand Passage (Geneva), Bon Marché (Brussels), Grands Magasins Jelmoli, L'Innovation (Lausanne), Rinascente, S.A.P.A.C. (Printemps purchasing association) and Selfridges founded the Intercontinental Group of Department Stores which they have been a member of since.
The figures of the Four Seasons on the façade were sculpted by French sculptor Henri Chapu. | https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Printemps |
Middle Ages | The average annual temperature began declining c. 1200, gradually introducing the Little Ice Age. Climate anomalies caused agricultural crises, culminating in the Great Famine of 1315–1317. Starving peasants slaughtered their draft animals, and survivors had to make extraordinary efforts to revive farming. This was followed in 1346 by the Black Death, a pandemic that spread throughout Europe and killed about one-third of the population. As plague continued to strike Europe until 1400, its total population fell by about 50 percent.
The trauma of the plague led to pogroms against the Jews and the self-mortification of flagellants. Peasants who survived the pandemic paid lower rents to landlords, but demand for agricultural products declined and lower prices barely covered their costs. Urban workers received higher salaries, but were heavily taxed. Governments occasionally tried to raise rural rents or keep urban salaries low, provoking popular uprisings which included the Jacquerie in France, the Peasants' Revolt in England, and the Ciompi Revolt in Florence. Conflict polarised ethnic groups, and local statutes prohibited intermarriage and limited guild membership along ethnic lines. Private feuds were almost permanent in politically-fragmented regions, and local skirmishes often escalated into full-scale warfare.
Labour services owed by peasants for their land tenure were often changed into cash rent, providing landlords with a stable source of income. Landlords joined to extort privileges from their governments, but royal administrations began to protect the interests of the poor. Serfdom was officially abolished in many places, although in other regions (primarily central and eastern Europe) it was imposed on tenants who had been free. The rise of banking continued, fuelled partly by the cross-border movement of papal revenues with the mediation of large merchant houses. They also loaned money to warring royalty at great risk, and some were bankrupted when kings defaulted on loans.
The Jewish communities were permanently expelled from France and, provisionally, from most German cities and principalities. In contrast, Hungarian and Polish rulers encouraged the immigration of Jewish moneylenders. Massive pogroms led to the mass conversion of Spanish Jews in 1391. The "new Christians" were suspected of heresy, and the Spanish Inquisition was established to test their faith. Jews who refused to convert were exiled from Spain in 1492, and from Portugal in 1497. Most Spanish Jews left for the Ottoman Empire. | https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Middle_Ages |
Yemeni Armed Forces | When the Republican Government took power in a coup much of the stability and any remaining professionalism in the army was destroyed. The new government had to build a new army to fight the royalist insurgents. First training centers and recruitment offices were established in every province. The Egyptians played a remarkable role in the process of building a modern national army through serving as advisers and giving Yemeni officers the chance to study in Egyptian academies. With help from the Egyptians four full infantry brigades were formed. These consist of the Revolution brigade, the Nasr brigade, the Unity brigade and the Al Araba brigade. One problem in the young Yemeni army was a lack of strong leadership. Egyptian advisers needed to form a unified military command, so the following bodies were established:
Army management authority
Logistics authority
General military armament authority
War operations room led by Captain Abdul Latif Deifallah.
Post-civil war recovery of North Yemen proved extremely problematic. Badly damaged by years of fighting, the economy was in tatters. The military ate up to 50 percent of the national budget, totalling only some £9 million, which was hopelessly insufficient for the circumstances. Controlled by the government, the military's logistical system was not only dependent on Sana'a's trust in the loyalty of local commanders, but also subject to graft and corruption. The Soviets, who wholeheartedly helped during the siege of Sana'a, proved ever more reluctant with the provision of spares and support equipment: Moscow preferred cooperation with the PRY, the government of which was ideologically closer to the USSR, and thus found little incentive in supporting the problematic Northerners. Before long, the lack of Soviet support seriously affected the combat capability of the North Yemeni military. It also had negative impacts upon the morale of the military in general, and began causing rifts between Sunni and Zaidi personnel. In an attempt to improve the situation, the commander-in-chief of the North Yemeni armed forces, colonel Hassan Al-Amri, visited Prague to request military aid. As so often before, the Czechoslovaks denied all such requests because they were certain that Yemen could not pay. Instead, Czech officials offered obsolete arms - including old rifles, sub-machine guns, anti-armour rockets and uniforms. It remains unclear whether Amri accepted this offer. By January 1971, dissent within the 30,000-strong armed forces reached a level where Amri was forced to dismiss several hundred army officers with Sunni backgrounds, apparently because they were in opposition to the government's decision for rapprochement with Saudi Arabia. Later the same year, right-wing officers began plotting a coup with the intention of imposing a military regime, while dozens of left-wing officers were arrested and accused of conspiring with possible Soviet and Iraqi support. Fearing another coup attempt, Amri then reorganised the military so that control over combat units was exercised by corps commanders for infantry, armour and artillery - irrespective of their geographic area of responsibility. He also created the General Reserve Force under the command of Colonel Ibrahim Al-Hamdi, and the Republican Guard, both of which consisted of about 7,000 troops of acknowledged loyalty to the government. Personnel-related problems persisted, nevertheless. In January 1971, a plot was uncovered - supposedly organised by Soviet advisers - under which several pilots intended to defect with their aircraft to Aden. In another attempt to improve the situation, President Iryani visited Moscow and requested additional military aid, including deliveries of MiG-17 fighter-bombers, in December 1971. However the Soviets also refused. The only improvement the North Yemeni air force experienced during this period was the expansion of Al-Daylami air base, undertaken during the same year. | https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Yemeni_Armed_Forces |
Iraqi Armed Forces | The Iraqi Army, officially the Iraqi Ground Forces (Arabic: القوات البرية العراقية), is the ground force component of the Iraqi Armed Forces. It was known as the Royal Iraqi Army up until the coup of July 1958.
The Iraqi Army in its modern form was first created by the United Kingdom during the inter-war period of British control of Mandatory Iraq. Following the invasion of Iraq by U.S. forces in 2003, the Iraqi Army was rebuilt along U.S. lines with enormous amounts of U.S. assistance at every level. After the Iraqi insurgency coalesced shortly after the invasion, the Iraqi Army was redesigned as a counter-insurgency force. After the withdrawal of U.S. troops in 2010, Iraqi forces assumed full responsibility for the country's security. A New York Times article suggested that, between 2004 and 2014, the U.S. had provided the Iraqi Army with $25 billion in training and equipment in addition to an even larger sum from the Iraqi treasury.
The Iraqi Army was designed as a counter-insurgency force that was developed under United States Army tutelage from 2003 to 2009. The force generation plan as of November 2009 includes 14 divisions, each consisting of 4 brigades. The Iraqi Army was described as the most important element of the counter-insurgency fight. The tactic is to provide security and other services on a local level by using infantrymen on dismounted patrols. As insurgents lose passive or active support from the local population, they will more easily be defeated, it was believed.
Light infantry brigades are equipped with small arms, machine guns, RPGs, body armor and light armored vehicles. Mechanized infantry brigades are equipped with T-54/55 main battle tanks and BMP-1 infantry fighting vehicles. The Hungarian Defence Forces donated 77 Soviet-made T-72 tanks from their own arsenal. The tanks were refurbished by Hungarian specialists and were delivered in fully battle-ready condition in 2004. Training of personnel was also provided to the newly forming Iraqi Army. Iraq was planned to receive 280 M1A1M tanks from 2010 and 2013.
The Army extensively collaborated with Iraqi Popular Mobilization Forces during anti-ISIL operations.
From its creation in 1922 to 2003, the army suffered from a number of serious difficulties, junior tactical leadership among them. "Iraqi forces consistently had problems because of a dearth of technical skills and a limited exposure to machinery." However it also had significant strengths, particularly in two areas: logistics and combat engineering. Two impressive logistical accomplishments of the army included the ability to sustain an armoured corps in Syria during the Yom Kippur War/1973 Arab–Israeli War and their ability to move formations of corps size from one end of the country to another in days during the Iran–Iraq War. Since 2003, creation of combat forces has been the priority, and logistical support was initially supplied in one way or another by the coalition. As of mid 2008, logistical problems included a maintenance crisis and ongoing supply problems. Logistical capabilities have been developing, however, and the build-up of a nationwide logistical structure, with the Taji National Depot at its centre, is now well under way. | https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Iraqi_Armed_Forces |
State of Palestine | The defeat of the Ottoman Empire in World War I resulted in the dismantling of their rule. In 1920, the League of Nations granted Britain the mandate to govern Palestine, leading to the subsequent period of British administration. In 1917, Jerusalem was captured by British forces led by General Allenby, marking the end of Ottoman rule in the city. By 1920, tensions escalated between Jewish and Arab communities, resulting in violent clashes and riots across Palestine. The League of Nations approved the British Mandate for Palestine in 1922, entrusting Britain with the administration of the region. Throughout the 1920s, Palestine experienced growing resistance from both Jewish and Arab nationalist movements, which manifested in sporadic violence and protests against British policies. In 1929, violent riots erupted in Palestine due to disputes over Jewish immigration and access to the Western Wall in Jerusalem. The 1930s witnessed the outbreak of the Arab Revolt, as Arab nationalists demanded an end to Jewish immigration and the establishment of an independent Arab state. In response to the Arab Revolt, the British deployed military forces and implemented stringent security measures in an effort to quell the uprising.
Arab nationalist groups, led by the Arab Higher Committee, called for an end to Jewish immigration and land sales to Jews. The issuance of the 1939 White Paper by the British government aimed to address escalating tensions between Arabs and Jews in Palestine. This policy document imposed restrictions on Jewish immigration and land purchases, with the intention to limit the establishment of a Jewish state. Met with strong opposition from the Zionist movement, the White Paper was perceived as a betrayal of the Balfour Declaration and Zionist aspirations for a Jewish homeland. In response to the White Paper, the Zionist community in Palestine organized a strike in 1939, rallying against the restrictions on Jewish immigration and land acquisition. This anti-White Paper strike involved demonstrations, civil disobedience, and a shutdown of businesses. Supported by various Zionist organizations, including the Jewish Agency and the Histadrut (General Federation of Jewish Labor), the anti-White Paper strike aimed to protest and challenge the limitations imposed by the British government.
In the late 1930s and 1940s, several Zionist militant groups, including the Irgun, Hagana, and Lehi, carried out acts of violence against British military and civilian targets in their pursuit of an independent Jewish state. While the Grand Mufti of Jerusalem, Haj Amin al-Husseini, collaborated with Nazi Germany during World War II, into all Muslims supported his actions, and there were instances where Muslims helped rescue Jews during the Holocaust. In 1946, a bombing orchestrated by the Irgun at the King David Hotel in Jerusalem resulted in the deaths of 91 people, including British officials, civilians, and hotel staff. Menachem Begin and Yitzhak Shamir, who later became political leaders in the state of Israel, were behind these terrorist attacks. The Exodus 1947 incident unfolded when a ship carrying Jewish Holocaust survivors, who sought refuge in Palestine, was intercepted by the British navy, leading to clashes and the eventual deportation of the refugees back to Europe. During World War II, Palestine served as a strategically significant location for British military operations against Axis forces in North Africa. In 1947, the United Nations proposed a partition plan for Palestine, suggesting separate Jewish and Arab states, but it was rejected by Arab nations while accepted by Jewish leaders. | https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/State_of_Palestine |
Al-Walid I | According to the historian Giorgio Levi Della Vida, "The caliphate of al-Walīd saw the harvest of the seed planted by the long work of ʿAbd al-Malik". In the assessment of Shaban: Walīd I's reign (705–15/86–96) was in every way a direct continuation of his father's and was unruffled. Ḥajjāj remained in power, in fact he became more powerful, and the same policies were followed. The only difference was that the tranquillity of these years allowed Walīd to develop further the internal implications of the ʿAbdulmalik-Ḥajjāj policy.
The historian Gerald Hawting comments that the combined reigns of al-Walid and Abd al-Malik, tied together by al-Hajjaj, represented in "some ways the high point of Umayyad power, witnessing significant territorial advances both in the east and the west and the emergence of a more marked Arabic and Islamic character in the state's public face". Domestically, it was generally a period of peace and prosperity. Kennedy asserts that al-Walid's reign was "remarkably successful and represents, perhaps, the zenith of Umayyad power", though his direct role in these successes is unclear and his primary accomplishment may have been maintaining the equilibrium between the rival factions of the Umayyad family and military.
By virtue of the conquests of Hispania, Sind and Transoxiana during his reign, his patronage of the great mosques of Damascus and Medina, and his charitable works, al-Walid's Syrian contemporaries viewed him as "the worthiest of their caliphs", according to the 9th-century historian Umar ibn Shabba. Several panegyrics were dedicated to al-Walid and his sons by al-Farazdaq, his official court poet. The latter's contemporary, Jarir, lamented the caliph's death in verse: "O eye, weep copious tears aroused by remembrance; after today there is no point in your tears being stored." The Christian poet al-Akhtal considered al-Walid to be "the caliph of God through whose sunna rain is sought".
Al-Walid embraced the formal trappings of monarchy in a manner unprecedented among earlier caliphs. He resided at several palaces, including in Khunasira in northern Syria and Dayr Murran. The considerable wealth in his treasury allowed him to spend extravagantly on his relatives. Expectations of such grants among the growing number of Umayyad princes continued under his successors. Their generous stipends and costly private constructions were resented by "nearly everyone else" in the caliphate and were "a drain on the treasury", according to the historian Khalid Yahya Blankinship. More significant were the costs to equip and pay the armies driving the conquests. The substantial expenditures under both Abd al-Malik and al-Walid became a financial burden on their successors, under whom the flow of war spoils, on which the caliphal economy depended, began to diminish. Blankinship notes that the enormous losses incurred during the 717–718 siege of Constantinople alone "practically wiped out the gains made under al-Walid". | https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Al-Walid_I |
Wars of Alexander the Great | The Battle of Issus took place in southern Anatolia on November 333 BC. After Alexander's forces defeated the Persians at the Battle of the Granicus, Darius took personal charge of his army, gathered a large army from the depths of the empire, and maneuvered to cut the Greek line of supply, requiring Alexander to countermarch his forces, setting the stage for the battle near the mouth of the Pinarus River and south of the village of Issus. Darius was apparently unaware that, by deciding to stage the battle on a river bank, he was minimizing the numerical advantage his army had over Alexander's.
Initially, Alexander chose what was apparently unfavorable ground. This surprised Darius who mistakenly elected to hold the wrong position while Alexander instructed his infantry to take up a defensive posture. Alexander personally led the more elite Greek Companion cavalry against the Persian left up against the hills, and cut up the enemy on the less encumbering terrain, thereby generating a quick rout. After achieving a breakthrough, Alexander demonstrated he could do the difficult thing and held the cavalry in check after it broke the Persian right. Alexander then mounted his beloved horse Bucephalus, took his place at the head of his Companion cavalry, and led a direct assault against Darius. The horses that were pulling Darius' chariot were injured, and began tossing at the yoke. Darius, about to fall off his chariot, instead jumped off. He threw his royal diadem away, mounted a horse, and fled the scene. The Persian troops, realizing they had lost, either surrendered or fled with their hapless king. The Macedonian cavalry pursued the fleeing Persians for as long as there was light. As with most ancient battles, significant carnage occurred after the battle as pursuing Macedonians slaughtered their crowded, disorganized foe.
The invading troops led by Alexander were outnumbered more than 2:1, yet they defeated the army personally led by Darius III of Achaemenid Persia. The battle was a decisive Macedonian victory and it marked the beginning of the end of Persian power. It was the first time the Persian army had been defeated with the King present on the field. Darius left his wife and an enormous amount of treasure behind as his army fled. The greed of the Macedonians helped to persuade them to keep going, as did the large number of Persian concubines and prostitutes they picked up in the battle. Darius, now fearing for both his throne and his life, sent a letter to Alexander in which he promised to pay a substantial ransom in exchange for the prisoners of war, and agreeing to a treaty of alliance with and the forfeiture of half of his empire to Alexander. Darius received a response which began "King Alexander to Darius". In the letter, Alexander blamed Darius for his father's death and claimed Darius was but a vulgar usurper, who planned to take Macedonia. He agreed to return the prisoners without ransom, but told Darius that he and Alexander were not equals, and that Darius was to henceforth address Alexander as "King of all Asia". Darius was also curtly informed that, if he wanted to dispute Alexander's claim to the Achaemenid throne, that he would have to stand and fight, and that if he instead fled, Alexander would pursue and kill him. By this, Alexander revealed for the first time that his plan was to conquer the entire Persian Empire. | https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Wars_of_Alexander_the_Great |
Deir Yassin massacre | In 1949, despite protests, the Jerusalem neighborhood of Givat Shaul Bet was built on what had been Deir Yassin's land, now considered part of Har Nof, an Orthodox area. Historian Tom Segev writes that "Several hundred guests came to the opening ceremony, including the Ministers Kaplan and Shapira, as well as the Chief Rabbis and the Mayor of Jerusalem. President Haim Weizmann sent written congratulations." Four Jewish scholars, Martin Buber, Ernst Simon, Werner Senator, and Cecil Roth, had written to Israel's first prime minister, David Ben-Gurion, asking that Deir Yassin be left uninhabited, or that its settlement be postponed. Writing that "The Deir Yassin affair is a black stain on the honor of the Jewish nation", and that it had become "infamous throughout the Jewish world, the Arab world and the whole world", they argued that "resettling Deir Yassin within a year of the crime, and within the framework of ordinary settlement, would amount to an endorsement of, or at least an acquiescence with, the massacre." Ben-Gurion failed to respond, though the correspondents sent him copy after copy. Eventually, his secretary replied that he had been too busy to read their letter.
In 1951, the Kfar Shaul Mental Health Center was built on the village itself, using some of the village's abandoned buildings. Currently, many of the remaining buildings, located within the hospital, are hidden behind the hospital's fence, with entry closely restricted. In the 1980s, most of the remaining abandoned parts of the village were bulldozed to make way for new neighborhoods, and most of the Deir Yassin cemetery was bulldozed to make way for a highway. Har HaMenuchot, a Jewish cemetery, lies to the north. To the south is a valley containing part of the Jerusalem Forest, and on the other side of the valley, a mile and a half away, lie Mount Herzl and the Holocaust memorial museum, Yad Vashem. There are no memorials or indicators of the Deir Yassin massacre at the site today. Palestinian historian Walid Khalidi wrote in 1992:
Many of the village houses on the hill are still standing and have been incorporated into an Israeli hospital for the mentally ill that was established on the site. Some houses outside the fence of the hospital grounds are used for residential and commercial purposes, or as warehouses. Outside the fence, there are carob and almond trees and the stumps of olive trees. Several wells are located at the southwestern edge of the site. The old village cemetery, southeast of the site, is unkempt and threatened by debris from a ring road that has been constructed around the village hill. One tall cypress tree still stands at the center of the cemetery. | https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Deir_Yassin_massacre |
Ons Jabeur | Jabeur participated in both tournaments of the Charleston Open, reaching the semifinal at the Volvo Car Open, and the final of the second, the MUSC Health Women's Open, which she lost to Australian Astra Sharma. She reached a career-high ranking of world No. 24 on 10 May 2021. Seeded 25th at the French Open, she took her revenge by defeating Sharma in the second round to advance to the third round of a major for a sixth straight time. She defeated Magda Linette to reach the fourth round for a second time in this major where she lost to 24th seed Coco Gauff. Seeded second, Jabeur reached her third final in her career and made history as the first Arab woman to win a WTA Tour title at the Birmingham Classic by defeating Daria Kasatkina. At the same tournament, partnering with Australian Ellen Perez, Jabeur also reached her first doubles final, losing to Marie Bouzková and Lucie Hradecká.
At Wimbledon, Jabeur, seeded 21st, defeated five-time champion Venus Williams to become the first Tunisian tennis player, first Arab woman, and the first woman representing an African country since Cara Black from Zimbabwe in 2005, to reach the third round (or quarterfinals) at Wimbledon. This also marked her seventh consecutive third-round appearance at a major. She continued her run when, despite vomiting at the side of the court when at match point, she defeated former Wimbledon champion and 11th seed, Garbiñe Muguruza, to reach the fourth round, coming back from a set down to reach the second week and round of 16 for the first time.
The day before, Tunisian supporters who flocked to Wimbledon burst into song — the national soccer team song, because there isn't one for tennis — and shouted her name after her fourth-round victory over 2020 French Open champion Iga Świątek. She defeated seventh seed Iga Świątek (making another comeback from the first set down) to reach the quarterfinals, where she lost to second seed and also first-time quarterfinalist Aryna Sabalenka. As a result, she reached a career-high ranking of world No. 22 on 26 July 2021.
To begin the US Open Series, Jabeur played the Canadian Open seeded 13th, beating Clara Burel, Daria Kasatkina, and defending champion Bianca Andreescu before losing in the quarterfinals to Jessica Pegula in three sets. With this result, she made her top 20 debut the week of 16 August 2021. At Indian Wells, Jabeur reached her first WTA 1000 semifinal by defeating Anett Kontaveit in the quarterfinals. With the win, she propelled herself into a career-high ranking, becoming the first Arab tennis player to reach the top 10 in either ATP or WTA rankings history. After the withdrawal of Emma Raducanu from the exhibition event World Tennis Championship, Jabeur was given her place. She won the tournament, defeating Belinda Bencic in the final. | https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ons_Jabeur |
World War I | Upon mobilisation, 80% of the German Army was located on the Western Front, with the remainder acting as a screening force in the East; officially titled Aufmarsch II West, it is better known as the Schlieffen Plan after its creator, Alfred von Schlieffen, head of the German General Staff from 1891 to 1906. Rather than a direct attack across their shared frontier, the German right wing would sweep through the Netherlands and Belgium, then swing south, encircling Paris and trapping the French army against the Swiss border. Schlieffen estimated that this would take six weeks, after which the German army would transfer to the East and defeat the Russians.
The plan was substantially modified by his successor, Helmuth von Moltke the Younger. Under Schlieffen, 85% of German forces in the west were assigned to the right wing, with the remainder holding along the frontier. By keeping his left-wing deliberately weak, he hoped to lure the French into an offensive into the "lost provinces" of Alsace-Lorraine, which was the strategy envisaged by their Plan XVII. However, Moltke grew concerned that the French might push too hard on his left flank and as the German Army increased in size from 1908 to 1914, he changed the allocation of forces between the two wings from 85:15 to 70:30. He also considered Dutch neutrality essential for German trade and cancelled the incursion into the Netherlands, which meant any delays in Belgium threatened the viability of the plan. Historian Richard Holmes argues that these changes meant the right wing was not strong enough to achieve decisive success and thus led to unrealistic goals and timings.
The initial German advance in the West was very successful and by the end of August, the Allied left, which included the British Expeditionary Force (BEF), was in full retreat. At the same time, the French offensive in Alsace-Lorraine was a disastrous failure, with casualties exceeding 260,000, including 27,000 killed on 22 August during the Battle of the Frontiers. German planning provided broad strategic instructions while allowing army commanders considerable freedom in carrying them out at the front; this worked well in 1866 and 1870 but in 1914, von Kluck used this freedom to disobey orders, opening a gap between the German armies as they closed on Paris. The French army, reinforced by the British expeditionary corps, seized this opportunity to counter-attack and pushed the German army 40 to 80 km back. Both armies were then so exhausted that no decisive move could be implemented, so they settled in trenches, with the vain hope of breaking through as soon as they could build local superiority.
In 1911, the Russian Stavka agreed with the French to attack Germany within fifteen days of mobilisation, ten days before the Germans had anticipated, although it meant the two Russian armies that entered East Prussia on 17 August did so without many of their support elements.
By the end of 1914, German troops held strong defensive positions inside France, controlled the bulk of France's domestic coalfields, and inflicted 230,000 more casualties than it lost itself. However, communications problems, combined with questionable command decisions, cost Germany the chance of a decisive outcome, while it had failed to achieve the primary objective of avoiding a long, two-front war. As was apparent to several German leaders, this amounted to a strategic defeat; shortly after the First Battle of the Marne, Crown Prince Wilhelm told an American reporter "We have lost the war. It will go on for a long time but lost it is already." | https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/World_War_I |
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