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08060ed7-3c3f-4f9c-b880-2309c946bfdc | http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/ALL/?uri=CELEX%3A32004L0008 | 2,004 | [
"Electricity and heat",
"Energy efficiency"
] | eur-lex.europa.eu | Subject to notification to the Commission, Member States may particularly facilitate access to the grid system of electricity produced from high-efficiency cogeneration from small scale and micro cogeneration units. Article 9
Administrative procedures
1. Member States or the competent bodies appointed by the Member States shall evaluate the existing legislative and regulatory framework with regard to authorisation procedures or the other procedures laid down in Article 6 of Directive 2003/54/EC, which are applicable to high-efficiency cogeneration units. Such evaluation shall be made with a view to:
(a) encouraging the design of cogeneration units to match economically justifiable demands for useful heat output and avoiding production of more heat than useful heat;
(b) reducing the regulatory and non-regulatory barriers to an increase in cogeneration;
(c) streamlining and expediting procedures at the appropriate administrative level; and
(d) ensuring that the rules are objective, transparent and non-discriminatory, and take fully into account the particularities of the various cogeneration technologies. 2. | 5a59558c-3909-4839-a1c6-c24b5de74196 | 26 |
080c173e-7da0-43b1-95b9-e031bdfc3815 | https://cdn.climatepolicyradar.org/navigator/GBR/2023/2023-green-finance-strategy_0895a38af9ea8d89570e1f7f4d06113a.pdf | 2,023 | [
"Finance",
"investment",
"finance",
"financial",
"green",
"climate"
] | cdn.climatepolicyradar.org | Whilst it is important that the market is able to innovate, there is a clear appetite for UK government action to ensure the market grows in a manner that provides assurance on integrity. This includes considering targeted regulatory interventions where these will help the market play a greater role in the transition to net zero and ensure companies are not incentivised to use credits as an alternative to taking action on their own internal emissions. 92. More is needed to build international consensus on VCMs, including their interactions with Article 6. The Voluntary Carbon Markets Initiative (VCMI) and the Integrity Council on Voluntary Carbon Markets (VCMI), created through international multistakeholder processes during the UK’s COP26 Presidency, are striving to tackle many of these challenges by providing greater clarity on the definition of high-integrity VCMs. Both initiatives will publish their guidance this year; the UK government will consider the potential for their outputs to serve as a basis for international best practice on market integrity, and the extent to which they could be incorporated within relevant regulatory regimes, including through the consultation set out in section 3.4.3. The UK government has confirmed its intention to position the UK as a global hub for trading in voluntary carbon markets, and is grateful for the work of the UK VCM Forum and its chair, Dame Clara Furse, to this end. 93. Nature markets enable farmers and natural resource managers to sell carbon and other ecosystem services – the benefits provided by nature – through sustainable management and nature restoration projects. Nature markets may be voluntary or driven by regulatory obligations. They include VCMs such as the UK Woodland Carbon Code and UK Peatland Code, and other emerging nature markets such as Biodiversity Net Gain in England. Further opportunities exist in markets still in development such as for blue 94. Nature markets need to grow rapidly to attract investment at the scale required to achieve our net zero and environmental targets. The UK government is committed to supporting the development of markets for carbon and other ecosystem services in the UK, guiding, and stimulating demand while also ensuring that they build trust and confidence. 95. We are supporting market participants to develop and converge around common, trusted standards and processes which will ensure integrity. With the right policy guardrails, the growth of nature markets can represent a triple delivering for the climate and the environment; providing vital revenue streams to finance farm businesses and nature recovery; and enabling responsible firms to meet their net zero and environmental obligations and commitments transparently and efficiently. 96. As announced at Budget 2023, the UK government is exploring elements of the tax treatment of ecosystem service markets and environmental land management. This includes a call for evidence published on the 15 March 2023 on the tax treatment of the production and sale of ecosystem service units. The aim is to understand the commercial operations and the areas of uncertainty in respect of taxation. The Peatland Code and UK Saltmarsh Code are voluntary certification standards for UK peatland restoration projects, providing a consistent approach for projects wishing to attract carbon finance. We recently funded the International Union for Conservation of Nature (IUCN), UK Centre for Ecology & Hydrology (UKCEH) and the James Hutton Institute to expand the Code to a significantly larger area of England’s peat. This will help facilitate more private investment into peatland 97. We are also supporting innovation to develop and pilot new nature markets. Our Natural Environment Investment Readiness Fund (NEIRF) is supporting the development of 86 nature projects across England to generate revenue from nature markets and operate on repayable private sector investment. Projects will either monetise the benefits of nature or develop tools or standards to help others to do so. We will consider options
for continuing our investment readiness support for nature projects beyond the current iteration of the NEIRF, drawing on the results of an independent Box 29: Supporting farmers to participate in nature markets As custodians of over 70% of UK land, farmers will be key to the success of nature markets, and we are committed to ensuring they can access these markets. A recent report from the GFI’s Farming and Finance working group on ‘Financing a Farming Transition’, identifies barriers and corresponding enablers under the themes of Data, Priority Environmental Outcomes, Environmental Markets Principles and Aggregation Models. The UK government will progress work in each of these areas, including through actions set out in this Strategy – and we have commissioned the GFI to develop an online toolkit this year to help farmers identify and navigate opportunities to access private sector investment to pay for nature positive outcomes. Environmental Farmers’ Group – a collaborative aggregation model Aggregating supply is key for attracting investment into natural capital. The Natural Environment Investment Readiness Fund (NEIRF) has awarded funding to the Environmental Farmers Group (EFG), a natural capital trading co-operative that operates across several farmer clusters in the Avon catchment. It aims to facilitate access for its 75 farmer members to private nature markets, providing a fair financial return on restoring their natural capital through the sale of biodiversity units, nutrient offsets and carbon credits. EFG’s aggregation model provides an opportunity for organisations looking for large-scale environmental trades to deal with a single body. In order to develop scale and ensure the inclusion of smaller farms, equalisation is built into the member contracts so that 88% of a trade will go to the member farm providing the ecosystem service/environmental outcome, while 9% is shared with the farms in the catchment area. The remainder pays for EFG’s operating costs. 3.4.3 Accelerating Market Development 98. The UK government will act to unlock the potential of high-integrity voluntary carbon and nature markets to contribute to net zero and wider environmental improvement. We will consult later this year on specific steps and interventions needed to mobilise additional finance through high- integrity voluntary markets and protect against the risk of greenwashing. | 6eb9d039-1897-4987-bfa9-ac3e1bf22f61 | 41 |
080fb39e-2df1-4369-9d0c-ce70fe40b609 | https://cdn.climatepolicyradar.org/navigator/GBR/2020/the-sixth-carbon-budget_2cb9fc7e21801940b0a9c50cbe4bc1ad.pdf | 2,020 | [
"Waste",
"Transport",
"Economy-wide",
"Energy",
"Adaptation",
"Carbon Pricing",
"Institutions / Administrative Arrangements",
"Energy Supply",
"Research And Development",
"Energy Demand",
"emissions",
"zero",
"carbon",
"budget",
"costs"
] | cdn.climatepolicyradar.org | Alongside our advice on the Sixth Carbon Budget we have developed a briefing note, published alongside this report, on how businesses in the UK can act to support the UK’s transition to Net Zero. This suggests th e following principles to guide business ambition in • Do the basics well – measure, disclose, target, act, adjust . Companies should a ccount for, and take action on, all emissions they are responsible for and be transparent about their objectives to reduce emissions, and how they plan to do it. • Adopt the highest possible ambition , acknowledging that some, particularl y large, businesses may be ab le to achieve Net Zero earlier than the UK’s national objective. • Address all emissions, and go beyond. In particular companies should look at the emissions that occur in their supply chains (‘Scope 3’ emissions), and go beyond this. In particular we identify two areas to advance – Companies can lead the transition to electric vehicles in the UK, and should switch their vehicle fleets to EVs over the 2020s – Companies should ensure corporate renewables procurement pays for new low-carbon electricity t o be installed, rather than just purchasing existing • Ensure Climate Change is addressed at the highest levels of corporate leadership , including ensuring climate action is given board level and CEO responsibility. • Minimise offsets, ph ase them out, and ensure only permanent emissions removals remain, in line with our recommendations around how the UK should meet its national CCC (2020) The role of business in delivering the UK's Net Zero ambition decisions on how to get there. Chapter 9: The shape of the emissions path to Net Zero 394 3. Making progress in every sector in the 2020s The scenarios we set out in Chapters 2 and 3 demonstrate that action is needed across the economy for the entire period from now through to 2050. The scale-up over the coming decade arguably will be the most challenging part of the programme, and the most fundamental to delivering the Net Zero 2050 target. Delivering that scale-up will depend on effective policy being developed in the coming year and rolled out over the rest of this Parliamentary term (to 2024). This Government must be the one to shift the UK decisively onto the path towards ending our contribution to global warming. The pathways to Net Zero laid out in this report broadly involve two distinct phases for UK climate policy, with the next decade being • The 2020s: scale-up. The UK must build supply chains and new markets for low-carbon consumer offerings (e.g. electric cars and heat pumps) so that these can scale from being niche offerings to dominate the market and fully push out high-carbon alternatives by 2030 or soon after. Alongside, we must develop and scale up new options for industrial decarbonisation such as carbon capture and storage (CCS), low-carbon hydrogen and engineered emissions removals. Tree planting rates must increase from 13,000 hectares per year today to 25,000 hectares per year by 2025 and • From the early 2030s to 2050: roll-out. Having scaled up the required markets, these will then take around 15 years to flow through the stock of vehicles and houses. Instruments driving implementation in industry and land use should be well developed and continue to drive roll-out at similar rates. But policy will be less about aiming to scale up markets, instead focusing on continuing achieved rates of roll-out, tackling emerging barriers and systems challenges and ensuring fairness across society. Our scenarios have been developed with a particular attention to the pace at which change is feasible, allowing time for supply chains to scale up and for consumer choices to change. They move in step with the natural turnover of long- lived assets like vehicles and boilers, avoiding increases in embedded emissions or This section considers three particular aspects of our analysis that have led to the pace of emissions reduction in the Balanced Net Zero a) Taking low-cost opportunities and realising co-benefits b) The need for progress by 2030 to reach Net Zero by 2050 c) Learning-by-doing, demonstrations and pathfinders Progress across every sector in conditions a re set for a mass
395 Sixth Carbon Budget – The path to Net Zero a) Taking low-cost opportunities and realising co-benefits There are opportunities to reduce greenhouse gas emissions that would be worth taking, even ignoring the climate benefits, because they save costs or have substantial co-benefits (e.g. to health). These opportunities might not have been taken previously, due to barriers to uptake, a lack of joined-up policy or the cost reductions only having occurred • Barriers. There remains considerable potential for reducing demand for energy and materials, much of which would also be cost-saving or have small net costs, but where barriers to date have stopped some of these – Improvements to home energy efficiency have stalled in the last eight years, despite remaining cost-effective potential, due to changes to policy that have failed to address barriers properly, including information and the cost of finance. – There are considerable opportunities to improve the resource efficiency of our economy, thereby reducing the need for carbon- intensive manufacturing, that are currently not being taken, even though they would reduce costs to consumers. These include designing products to last for longer and to be suitable for repair and re-engineering, increasing sharing of vehicles and appliances, and • Co-benefits. A range of measures that reduce emissions also bring co- benefits to society, most notably for people’s health. Many of these have small or negative financial costs, and would make sense to pursue even if considering either climate action or health in isolation. Measures that would bring overall net benefits to society when considering these wider benefits, include increases in walking and cycling, better diets, improving home insulation and measures that improve air quality. Chapter 5 contains a summary of the main co-impacts of our scenarios. | 083c769d-ace3-415a-9bbf-6c9f1540dcd7 | 129 |
08125c23-d0c5-440c-b312-6ca0dc208c1b | http://arxiv.org/pdf/2503.18433v1 | 2,025 | [
"West Nile Disease",
"WND",
"Risk Assessment",
"Probabilistic Approach",
"Spillovers",
"Compartmental Model",
"Differential Equations",
"Pathogen Spillovers",
"Forecasting",
"Long-term Forecasts",
"Short-term Forecasts",
"California",
"Orange County",
"Los Angeles County",
"Kern County",
"California Department of Public Health",
"2022-2024",
"Prediction Accuracy",
"Logarithmic Scoring",
"Predictive Models",
"Global Warming",
"High-risk Days",
"Epidemic Severity",
"Disease Transmission",
"Data Analysis",
"Model Validation",
"Effectiveness"
] | arxiv.org | For the infection to spread initially, a bird must survive the exposed phase, and the proportion of birds that survive is given by δ B δ + B µ B [. Following survival, the duration of time that] a bird remains infectious is crucial to the transmission of the pathogen. During this period, the bird is infectious and can spread the pathogen, with a mean duration equal to µ 1 M [(importantly, the lifetime of the mosquitoes is shorter than] the recovery time of the disease). An infectious bird during the period of time spent in the infectious phase infects the mosquitoes at the rate of β B→M and the number of all infected mosquitoes is obtained by multiplying MS . Applying the same logic to the mosquito fraction of R 0, to have a spillover from mosquitoes to birds, mosquitoes must survive the exposed phase, which its probability is P DRP DR + µ M [.] After survival, the average time it takes a mosquito to infect birds is µ 1 M [. During this infectious period, mosquitoes can] infect the bird population at a rate of β M →B, and the total number of infected birds is obtained by multiplying this rate by the susceptible number of the bird population BS . Although the mechanistic model is a useful tool for analyzing disease dynamics over time, it is evident that many factors influence the disease mechanism. Therefore, for risk assessment, it is reasonable to use a model that accounts for stochasticity. | 414fcd1c-22ea-4154-8429-039e9228171c | 6 |
0815d4bd-7df9-4ae2-ac9b-c65709e51192 | https://cdn.climatepolicyradar.org/navigator/GBR/2023/energy-act-2023_87896593a3bea76cf3ac89af17aba308.pdf | 2,023 | [
"Energy",
"Carbon Capture and Storage",
"section",
"regulations",
"person",
"force",
"document"
] | cdn.climatepolicyradar.org | (5) A person who commits an offence under this section is liable— (a) on summary conviction in England and Wales, to a fine; (b) on summary conviction in Scotland or Northern Ireland, to a fine not exceeding the statutory maximum; (c) on conviction on indictment, to a fine. (6) No proceedings may be instituted in England and Wales in respect of an offence under this section except by or on behalf of the Secretary of State or the economic regulator. (7) Regulations under subsection (3)(b) may make consequential, transitional, incidental or supplementary provision including— (a) amendments (or repeals or revocations) in any provision of this Act or any (b) provision modifying any standard conditions of licences or provision determining the conditions which are to be standard conditions for the purposes of licences authorising the undertaking of activities which are to (8) But regulations made by virtue of subsection (7)(a) may not make provision amending (or repealing or revoking) any provision of— (a) an Act of the Scottish Parliament, or an instrument made under such an Act, unless the Scottish Ministers have consented to the making of that provision; (b) a Measure or Act of Senedd Cymru, or an instrument made under such a Measure or Act, unless the Welsh Ministers have consented to the making of (c) Northern Ireland legislation, or an instrument made under Northern Ireland legislation, unless the Department for the Economy in Northern Ireland has consented to the making of that provision. (9) Regulations under subsection (3)(b) are subject to the affirmative procedure. Part 1 – Licensing of carbon dioxide transport and storage Chapter 1 – Licensing of activities Document 2024-10-14 This version of this Act contains provisions that are prospective. Changes to There are currently no known outstanding effects for the Energy Act 2023. (See end of Document for details) (10) For the purposes of this Part the person who “operates” a site for the geological storage of carbon dioxide is the person who carries on or (where different) controls activities I2 S. 2 in force at 26.12.2023, see s. 334(3)(a) 3 Consultation on proposals for additional activities to become licensable (1) Before making regulations under section 2(3)(b), the Secretary of State must give (a) stating that the Secretary of State proposes to make regulations providing for the means of transportation in question to become a licensable means of (b) specifying a reasonable period (of not less than 28 days from the date of publication of the notice) within which representations or objections may be made with respect to the proposal, and must consider any representations or objections duly made and not withdrawn. (a) by sending a copy of the notice to the economic regulator, the appropriate devolved authorities and any other body the Secretary of State considers (b) by publishing it in such manner as the Secretary of State considers appropriate for bringing it to the attention of persons likely to be affected by such (3) For the purposes of this section the “appropriate devolved authorities” are— (a) the Welsh Ministers, if the regulations contain provision that would be within the legislative competence of Senedd Cymru if it were contained in an Act of the Senedd (ignoring any requirement for the consent of a Minister of the Crown imposed under Schedule 7B to the Government of Wales Act 2006); (b) the Scottish Ministers, if the regulations contain provision that would be within the legislative competence of the Scottish Parliament if it were contained in an Act of that Parliament; (c) the Department for the Economy in Northern Ireland, if the regulations contain (i) would be within the legislative competence of the Northern Ireland Assembly if it were contained in an Act of that Assembly, and (ii) would not, if it were contained in a Bill in the Northern Ireland Assembly, result in the Bill requiring the consent of the Secretary of State under section 8 of the Northern Ireland Act 1998. I3 S. 3 in force at 26.12.2023, see s. 334(3)(a)
Part 1 – Licensing of carbon dioxide transport and storage Chapter 1 – Licensing of activities Document 2024-10-14 This version of this Act contains provisions that are prospective. Changes to There are currently no known outstanding effects for the Energy Act 2023. (See end of Document for details) 4 Territorial scope of prohibition Section 2(1) applies to activities in, above or below— (a) the territorial sea adjacent to the United Kingdom, or (b) waters in a Gas Importation and Storage Zone (within the meaning given by section 1 of the Energy Act 2008), as it applies to activities in the United Kingdom. I4 S. 4 in force at 26.12.2023, see s. 334(3)(a) (1) The Secretary of State may by regulations grant exemption from the prohibition (2) An exemption may be granted— (a) to a specified person, or persons of a specified class; (b) generally or to such extent as may be specified; (c) unconditionally or subject to such conditions as may be specified. | 4808927e-67c0-4e83-803d-e07fd0d4a019 | 1 |
0824858a-da66-4407-a18f-1fd466272bbb | http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/ALL/?uri=CELEX:32009L0073 | 2,009 | [
"Electricity and heat",
"Gas",
"Energy efficiency",
"Renewables",
"Other low-carbon technologies and fuel switch"
] | eur-lex.europa.eu | 3. When deciding on the derogations referred to in paragraph 1, the Member State, or the designated competent authority, and the Commission shall take into account, in particular, the following criteria:
(a)
the objective of achieving a competitive gas market;
(b)
the need to fulfil public-service obligations and to ensure security of supply;
(c)
the position of the natural gas undertaking in the gas market and the actual state of competition in that market;
(d)
the seriousness of the economic and financial difficulties encountered by natural gas undertakings and transmission undertakings or eligible customers;
(e)
the dates of signature and terms of the contract or contracts in question, including the extent to which they allow for market changes;
(f)
the efforts made to find a solution to the problem;
(g)
the extent to which, when accepting the take-or-pay commitments in question, the undertaking could reasonably have foreseen, having regard to the provisions of this Directive, that serious difficulties were likely to arise;
(h)
the level of connection of the system with other systems and the degree of interoperability of those systems; and
(i)
the effects the granting of a derogation would have on the correct application of this Directive as regards the smooth functioning of the internal market in natural gas. A decision on a request for a derogation concerning take-or-pay contracts concluded before 4 August 2003 should not lead to a situation in which it is impossible to find economically viable alternative outlets. Serious difficulties shall in any case be deemed not to exist when the sales of natural gas do not fall below the level of minimum offtake guarantees contained in gas-purchase take-or-pay contracts or in so far as the relevant gas-purchase take-or-pay contract can be adapted or the natural gas undertaking is able to find alternative outlets. 4. Natural gas undertakings which have not been granted a derogation as referred to in paragraph 1 of this Article shall not refuse, or shall no longer refuse, access to the system because of take-or-pay commitments accepted in a gas purchase contract. Member States shall ensure that the relevant provisions of Articles 32 to 44 are complied with. | 468e5f96-94f7-4694-bfed-829608c266ef | 62 |
0828f8d2-0531-4b6a-b6b6-b34dfc40075e | https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/HTML/?uri=CELEX:52021PC0554&from=EN | -1 | [
"Agriculture and forestry",
"Non-energy use"
] | eur-lex.europa.eu | The process of establishing the Forest Reference Levels for each Member State revealed the challenges behind the implementation of this complex accounting rule, and capacity building activities to support a large number of Member States in preparing for the implementation of the LULUCF Regulation highlighted the challenges behind the gaps in national monitoring and reporting systems. Stakeholder consultations
The Inception Impact Assessment was published for feedback on 29 October 2020 for four weeks, and received a total of 93 responses. Furthermore, in order to collect evidence and ensure greater transparency, the Commission organised a public consultation for each of the proposals from 13 November 2020 to 5 February 2021; the consultation on the revision of the LULUCF Regulation received 235 respondents. These indicated a preference for more ambitious removal targets for the LULUCF sector, an option selected by 45% of respondents (mostly, academia, EU citizens and NGOs). In second place, integrated targets for the land sector were preferred by 35% of the respondents, mostly from the private sector. A strengthening of flexibility with the ESR was the most preferred option among 20% of respondents, mostly public authorities. A detailed summary of the feedback to the Inception Impact Assessment and of the results of the public consultation are presented in Annex 2 of the Impact Assessment for this proposal. Collection and use of expertise
The quantitative assessment of the economic, social and environmental impacts is based on integrated economic land use modelling by IIASA with GLOBIOM and G4M. The policy scenario (MIX) takes into account likely biomass demands from other sectors and follows the assumptions of the 1.5TECH scenario of the EU long-term strategy
22
,
23
. The MIX scenario projects that the net LULUCF sink by 2030 will be at similar levels as in the period 2016-2018. The impact of specific measures for emission reduction or enhanced removals was modelled with marginal abatement cost curves. This analysis demonstrated that significant increases in the land sink can be achieved at relatively low costs (5-10 EUR/tonne of CO2). It also showed cost-efficient emission reductions require action on all land uses, such as improved forest management, afforestation, avoided deforestation for forest lands, set aside of land use on organic soils and improved cropland management strategies on agricultural land. Information on the contribution of the LULUCF sector to the Green Deal was gained through a service contract carried out by a consortium of external experts, which focused among other tasks on problems, objectives and options for the revision of the LULUCF Regulation and analysis of reports submitted by Member States under the LULUCF Decision (529/2013). Additional information was gathered through numerous external studies such as the LULUCF compliance study, Capacity building for greenhouse gas inventories, Carbon farming pilot study, etc. Impact assessment
The Impact Assessments for the different initiatives are based on integrated modelling scenarios that reflect the interaction of different policy instruments on economic operators, in order to ensure complementarity, coherence and effectiveness in achieving the 2030 and 2050 climate ambition. The Impact Assessment accompanying this proposal complements the analysis conducted in the 2020 impact assessment supporting the 2030 Climate Target Plan. This formed the analytical basis to set the objective of at least net 55% reduction in GHG emissions by 2030 compared to 1990, the climate neutrality objective in the land sector for 2035, and the Union-wide climate neutrality objective by 2050. Moreover, the Impact Assessment accompanying this proposal has been prepared and developed in line with the applicable Better Regulation guidance and recommendations of the Regulatory Scrutiny Board, who issued a positive opinion with reservations on 19 April 2021. The recommended improvements suggested by the Board were addressed in the final version. | 6305f6c7-4e72-4dc0-a09c-8e54d845c295 | 6 |
08342540-6309-4916-86e3-b4eccda75339 | http://aei.pitt.edu/1184/1/enegy_supply_security_gp_COM_2000_769.pdf | 2,000 | [
"General",
"Energy service demand reduction and resource efficiency",
"Energy efficiency",
"Renewables",
"Other low-carbon technologies and fuel switch"
] | aei.pitt.edu | These are very
and
modest amounts which do not amount to a real Community policy. 11.0 million for SAVE and
17.5 and
Experience with SAVE and ALTENER has shown that limited results have been obtained
with the exception of selective measures
55
Energy certification of buildings billing of heating and cooling costs according to consumption third-
party financing in the public sector thermal insulation of new buildings regular inspection of boilers
and energy audits of energy-intensive industries
65
A comprehensive strategy for improved energy efficiency for domestic appliances e.g. the technical
refrigerators, washing machines, and ovens. The preparation of
requirements for labels and standards has been done with studies supported by the SAVE
programme. Actions include the labelling Directive for appliances and the minimum
efficiency standards Directives
the
implementation of the Directives has been crucial for their success and was done by
SAVE projects such as the Cool Labels Study dealing with refrigerators. Refrigeration
appliances offered for sale today consume about 27 less energy than equivalent
appliances sold in 1992, much as a result of labelling and standards. refrigerators and boilers. Monitoring of
for
The ALTENER project AFB-NET V in Finland in the field of biomass. Biomass has a very
large potential in the renewables sector. This network has triggered extensive European
the research and development sector and energy
level co-operation among industry,
authorities. The project evaluates among other issues international biomass trade and
provides price comparisons. The experience demonstrates that labelling directives on appliances and efficiency standards
on refrigerators and boilers have proved to be very effective where properly implemented. Latest estimates56 calculate out of the huge technical potential for improved energy efficiency
estimated at 40 of current energy consumption considerable economic potential for cost-
effective improvements in energy efficiency of at least 18 of current energy consumption. This potential is equivalent to over 160 Mtoe, roughly the final energy demand of Austria,
Belgium, Denmark, Finland, Greece and the Netherlands combined. The non-realisation of
that potential is a result of market barriers which prevent the satisfactory diffusion of energy-
efficient technology and the efficient use of energy. In some sectors there are extreme
potentials the Study on European Green Light for example has shown that between 30 and
50 of electricity used for lighting could be saved by investing in the most efficient lighting
systems. Similar levels of efficiency can be achieved through more efficient energy saving
stand-by mechanisms in computers, office equipment and household TVs, video recorders
etc. The Action Plan on Improved Energy Efficiency in the European Community which was
adopted by the Commission in April 2000 proposes an indicative target for improvement of
energy intensity by an additional one percentage point per year above the estimated forecast. This can realise two-thirds of the available cost-effective saving potential by the year 2010,
equivalent to over 100 Mtoe, avoiding CO2 emissions of almost 200 Mtyear. These need to
be developed in an energy efficiency scenario
Meeting the Community-wide target of doubling the use of co-generation to 18 of EU
electricity production by 2010 is expected to lead to additional avoided CO2 emissions of
over 65 Mt CO2year by 2010. The potential for co-generation is, however, much greater and
with the right framework in the liberalised market it has been estimated that CHP could triple
by 2010 leading to an additional reduction of CO2 of around 65 Mt per year. Particularly promising developments that could contribute to the de-coupling of energy
demand from economic growth is the development of initiatives on Integrated Resource
Planning SAVE study and energy services
56
MURE model. 66
More recent work in the framework of the European Climate Change Programme57 has
confirmed these economic potential. | 38718611-1d0b-4acc-9e32-dcd1a80039ac | 69 |
0837612e-ad3b-4d93-86a9-1e97a6e00231 | http://arxiv.org/pdf/2505.02989v1 | 2,025 | [
"Opinion dynamics",
"social networks",
"social media",
"dyadic interactions",
"graph models",
"temporal hypergraphs",
"group dynamics",
"conversational threads",
"climate change",
"Reddit",
"opinion formation",
"stance",
"individual users",
"large language models",
"ground truth",
"simulations",
"empirical validation",
"microscopic dynamics",
"online spaces",
"collective change",
"information flow."
] | arxiv.org | Although our findings represent progress in modeling these complex social systems, significant challenges remain in fully capturing the nuances of opinion dynamics in online spaces. 9
Limitations: To ensure the construction validity of our findings, we considered the California wildfires of 2021 and 2022 as a significant exogenous event that generated extensive discussion on Reddit, analyzing the most active subreddits on this topic. While this dataset provides valuable insights into our specific use case, we acknowledge thatit may not fully represent the broader spectrum of online communities, potentially limiting the generalizability of our results. | 04410014-9af0-41b0-bd63-440c99ee8296 | 23 |
083f1f52-8fa4-42ae-81da-3fb5358e1800 | https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/871799/Budget_2020_Web_Accessible_Complete.pdf | 2,020 | [
"government",
"budget",
"support",
"million",
"public"
] | assets.publishing.service.gov.uk | The Budget announces a Carbon Capture and Storage (CCS) Infrastructure Fund to establish CCS in at least two UK sites, one by the mid-2020s, a second by 2030. To encourage more environmentally-friendly ways of heating homes and other buildings, the government will also introduce a Green Gas Levy to help fund the use of greener fuels, increase the Climate Change Levy that businesses pay on gas, and reopen and extend the Climate Change Agreement scheme by two years. Road transport is responsible for 91% of domestic transport emissions, and around a fifth of overall UK emissions. To support drivers to move away from polluting vehicles, the Budget announces investment in electric vehicle charging infrastructure, which will ensure that drivers are never more than 30 miles from a rapid charging station, provides £532 million for consumer incentives for ultra-low emission vehicles, and reduces taxes on zero emission vehicles. In addition, the government will promote air quality improvement by removing the entitlement to use red diesel except for agriculture, fish farming, rail and non-commercial heating. The government will tackle air pollution by providing £304 million to help local authorities reduce nitrogen dioxide emissions and improve air quality. The government will also invest in the natural environment, planting enough trees to cover an area the size of Birmingham, restoring peatlands, and providing more funding to protect the UK’s unique plants and animals. The government will also go further to tackle the scourge of plastic waste by introducing a Plastic Packaging Tax, as well as providing further funding to encourage producers to make their packaging more recyclable. provides further information on the fiscal impact of the Budget. 2019-20 2020-21 2021-22 2022-23 2023-24 2024-25 Total spending policy decisions -355 -19,255 -40,185 -45,640 -48,780 -49,440 Total tax policy decisions +960 +1,355 +3,755 +7,110 +7,625 +7,520 Total policy decisions +605 -17,900 -36,430 -38,530 -41,150 -41,920 1 Costings reflect the OBR’s latest economic and fiscal determinants. Government spending and revenue to be around £928 billion in 2020-2021. Social protection £285 billion Public order and safety £38 billion Other (including EU transactions) Figures may not sum due to rounding. Illustrative allocations to functions are based on HMT analysis including capital consumption figures from the Office for National Statistics. Office for Budget Responsibility and HM Treasury calculations. expected to be about £873 billion in 2020-2021. National Insurance contributions Excise duties £48 billionCorporation tax £58 billion Figures may not sum due to rounding. Other taxes includes capital taxes, stamp duties, vehicle excise duties and other smaller tax receipts. Other non-taxes includes interest and dividends, gross operating surplus and other smaller non-tax receipts. Office for Budget Responsibility and HM Treasury calculations. 1.1 The UK economy has many a globally competitive tax system, some of the best universities in the world, is home to many highly innovative firms, and its economic prospects are underpinned by a strong macroeconomic framework. Since 2010, the economy has grown faster than France, Italy and Japan. Employment is at a record high and the unemployment rate is the joint-lowest since 1975. In common with other advanced economies, the UK faces economic challenges. In the near term, the outbreak of COVID-19 is expected to have a significant but temporary effect on the economic outlook. Productivity remains weak and is distributed unevenly across the country; and the transition to a net zero economy by 2050 will require radical changes in every sector. 1.2 The Budget announces a plan to support the economy over the short term in response to the COVID-19 outbreak. This includes measures to support public services, individuals 1.3 The Budget builds on the UK’s economic strengths and takes steps to address the UK’s long-standing structural challenges. The government is committed to levelling up across the UK in order to raise productivity and growth in all nations and regions, creating opportunity for everyone and addressing disparities in economic and social outcomes. 1.4 Since 2010, the government has restored the public finances to health after inheriting debt that had nearly doubled in two years. The deficit has been reduced by four fifths from a post-war peak of 10.2%1 of GDP in 2009-10 to 1.8% of GDP in 2018-19. 1.5 With historically low borrowing costs and the public finances in a more secure position, the government can now increase borrowing for investment without compromising fiscal sustainability. The Budget provides significant levels of funding for public services to meet the economic challenges and priorities of today, and to address the long-term challenge of low 1.6 This increase in spending, which provides the envelope for the upcoming CSR, has been delivered while meeting a set of fiscal rules that ensures the government is only borrowing to invest over the medium term, with the current budget in surplus, and that limits public sector net investment to an average of 3% of GDP , to keep control of borrowing and debt. To ensure the fiscal framework remains appropriate for the current macroeconomic environment HM Treasury will undertake a review over the summer and announce any changes by Autumn 1 Details of the sources of all numerical references, including National Statistics, used in this section can be found in ‘Spring Budget 2020 data sources’. 1.7 The OBR’s economy forecast was closed for new data when the spread of COVID-19 was at a much earlier stage. As such, the OBR’s forecast includes an estimate of the impact on global growth, based on the assumption that the spread of the virus would be relatively limited. The forecast does not reflect the now global spread of COVID-19 or an outbreak in the UK. 1.8 The International Monetary Fund (IMF) estimates that the global economy grew by 2.9% The COVID-19 outbreak is expected to reduce global growth this year. The OBR forecasts that annual global GDP growth will be 3.0% in 2020, down from 3.6% in its Spring Statement 2019 forecast. | b949ddd7-ed23-4181-af48-f39c5b360ff9 | 3 |
08437409-b25f-47a0-b606-e07fc88e755a | http://arxiv.org/pdf/2310.16490v2 | 2,023 | [
"households",
"food",
"productivity",
"consumption",
"climate"
] | arxiv.org | Thus, for poorer households the absolute income loss from the change in the return is small to zero, as they have very little or no asset holdings at all. The second component r * Dam ∆a i t describes the change in income that is associated with adjusting the asset holdings at the new return. As previously discussed, in the presence of idiosyncratic risk all households want to increase their savings. This term captures the the actual ability of households to increase their savings. The results indicate that in the baseline analysis most of the households are able to increase their asset holdings, albeit at different scale. In detail, for the richest quintile the change in asset holdings is the largest, while the poorest quintile still has zero asset holdings. In the middle of the distribution, households are able to increase their asset holdings as well. When we study the demand-induced general equilibrium effects of climate-related food price changes, most households are able to increase their savings. The underlying driver are increases in labor income. Thus, poorer households benefit from higher wage income, because in the presence of idiosyncratic risk capital accumulation becomes more attractive. The aim of the present exercise is not to imply that climate impacts increase wages of the poorest households, but to isolate the impact of demand changes in the presence of incomplete markets and idiosyncratic risk. Depending on the strength of the precautionary savings motive and the size of the price increase, wage and capital income may change differently depending on the position in the distribution. However, higher incomes do not relate to higher consumption and thus welfare. Higher consumption expenditures in a world with climate impacts and thus higher food prices seems intuitive. To understand how welfare is affected across the distribution, it is useful to study consumption dynamics in more detail. Therefore, we turn next to the welfare analysis including a comparison to the partial equilibrium outcome. The aim of this section is to compare the previously discussed to the short-term, direct impact of higher food prices. The benefits are twofold. First, we can isolate the strength of the general equilibrium channel. Furthermore, one can study welfare changes across the distribution for different metrics. For the evaluation of the direct impact of higher food prices on can use the can use the steady state without damages to evaluate the direct effect of higher food prices. For the partial equilibrium outcome the total consumption expenditures of each household are kept constant. Given the new prices, households can re-evaluate how they will split it up between food and non-food consumption. As we keep the total consumption expenditures for each household constant, the underlying model allows for deriving these dynamics analytically. Recall that the demand functions for food f and non-food consumption c are given by:
Taking the partial derivative of the demand functions for food and non-food consumption with respect to food prices yields:
For increasing food prices both derivatives are strictly negative. Thus, the immediate response of households to higher food prices is to consume less of both food and non-food goods. While the decrease of non-food consumption is the same across the expenditure deciles, the decline in food consumption is not. The decline increases with the level of total consumption expenditures. Richer households reduce their food consumption more strongly than poor households. Consequently, households end up adjusting differently their share of total consumption expenditures spent on food:
This emphasizes the role of non-homothetic preferences. Poorer households spend a larger share of their total consumption expenditures on food and are closer to the subsistence level. The direct impact on consumption of food and non-food consumption is larger than the observed changes including general equilibrium effects. Notably, the difference between the partial and general equilibrium analysis is largest for the poorest households. While this is an indication that changes in total consumption expenditures matter for these households, the consumption pattern cannot be translated directly to welfare. Thus, we next compare changes in welfare across the distribution for the partial and the general equilibrium outcome. Figure 3 shows the welfare outcome in partial equilibrium in terms of consumption equivalent variation.9 In partial equilibrium, poor households suffer the most from lower food prices, as they are closer to the subsistence level of food consumption and initially spend a larger share on food. Households at the bottom of the distribution are sensible to changes in wages due to their dependence on labor income. These households do not own any wealth, they are insensitive to changes in the interest rate. For the poorest households, the large real income decrease from the direct effect is dampened by an increase in labor income. The higher labor income is due to a higher wage rate in the new steady state. Even if the increase in the wage rate is small, it has an impact on the poorest households given their very low total income level. While poor households can consume less for a given level of consumption expenditures (partial equilibrium effect), they are partly able to cope with this by increasing their total consumption expenditures due to higher wage income. Similar to the poor, the welfare impact for households in the middle of the distribution differs in partial and the general equilibrium. The difference is driven by changes in total consumption expenditures. Households in the middle of the distribution increase their consumption expenditures to cope with higher food prices. While these households benefit too from higher wage income, these households additionally receive capital income. In contrast to the poorest households, households in the middle of the distribution are able to increase their capital holdings. Thus, the difference in welfare between partial and general equilibrium for these households is lower, as they increase not only their total consumption expenditures, but also their capital holdings due to a higher precautionary savings motive. For the richest households, the difference in welfare between partial and general equilibrium is negligible. | b4417c30-a420-467d-b884-bca4bd2f126b | 6 |
084e60c5-3e1c-48ed-b618-ddaeecc39f74 | 2,025 | [
"natural resources",
"climate change",
"land",
"action plan",
"decision makers"
] | HF-national-climate-targets-dataset | management of natural resources (land, water, forests). Such a development path would reduce exposure to the dangers of climate change and mitigated its consequences. This action plan is a resource for decision makers working on projects and policies that are | 4a576333-d237-4683-9857-b8325f7329ea | 0 | |
0850391c-3880-4b6f-aec3-8eeb731bc118 | https://cdn.climatepolicyradar.org/navigator/GBR/2023/united-kingdom-national-inventory-report-nir-2023_8122f7d823bf366105239091fb57ffd2.pdf | 2,023 | [
"data",
"energy",
"emissions",
"inventory",
"environment"
] | cdn.climatepolicyradar.org | per region/locality, per livestock or crop sub-category, per waste management stream, per mitigation action and so on). Other Detailed Methodological Descriptions A3 UK NIR 2023 (Issue 1) Ricardo Energy & Environment Page 832 The inventory outputs are applied within analytical tools across Government, including the Defra Scenario Modelling Tool (SMT) which enables policy analysts to test mitigation strategies as the UK seeks to achieve N ational Emission Ceiling Reduction targets in 2030 and beyond for ammonia (NH3) alongside developing Net Zero GHG pathways for the sector in each region of A 3.3.7.3 National and Local Circumstances The model is designed to be sensitive not only to changes i n key activity data such as livestock numbers and crop areas, but also to changes in UK farming practices and the uptake of mitigation measures, and at a local level to reflect local (i.e. | 9ce0b96e-2800-424e-bffb-cd8ba36e0902 | 264 |
085fd3d7-6599-46a7-8111-b04d19b1b653 | https://www.gov.uk//guidance/china-prosperity-fund-bidding-round | 2,016 | [
"China Prosperity Fund",
"Tender",
"Invitation to Tender",
"2017",
"2018",
"Projects",
"Procurement",
"UK Aid",
"Inclusive Economic Growth",
"Poverty Reduction",
"International Development",
"Infrastructure",
"Financial Services",
"Rule of Law",
"Energy",
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"China",
"Strategic Defence and Security Review",
"Stakeholder Relationships",
"Business Opportunities",
"Programme Design",
"Policy Objectives",
"2016",
"2021."
] | gov.uk | The China Prosperity Fund Programme is now inviting tenders for projects in 2017 to 2018 under 4 key thematic strands
There will be no call for proposals. All procured projects are expected to be completed by 31 March 2018. Global Prosperity Fund
The 2015 Strategic Defence and Security Review announced the cross-government Prosperity Fund that will last from 2016 to 2021. The Funds primary objective is to promote inclusive economic growth and poverty reduction, in accordance with Official Development Assistance rules and the International Development Act. As well as contributing to a reduction in poverty in recipient countries, the Funds secondary objective is to create opportunities for international business including UK companies. The UK government is looking to identify and support programmes and projects which meet both the Funds primary and secondary objectives. The role of the Fund is also set out in the UK aid strategy, Tackling Global Challenges in the National Interest. China Prosperity Fund Programme 2017 to 2018
China has been identified as a potential recipient country for Prosperity Fund programming. Subject to Ministerial approval, the Embassy is now designing a new multi-sector, multi-year programme, building on the successful outcomes of projects supported by Strategic Programme Fund. The China Prosperity Fund Programme is expected to include projects in at least four thematic areas Infrastructure Alliance Financial Services Rule of Law for Businesses and Energy and low carbon. Other thematic areas may be included at a later date. Subject to approval, we expect the multi-year programme to be launched in 2018 the exact timing is not yet known. This tender process is for a series of projects, to be carried out during 2017 to 2018, aimed at delivering additional scoping studies to inform and support the design and development of the multi-year programme, whilst also maintaining key stakeholder relationships and building on the results of recent project work. Change from call for proposal to invitation to tender
In 2017 to 2018, in order to align with the procurement requirements for the upcoming multi-year programme, the China Prosperity Fund Programme will not be launching a call for proposals. Instead, the majority of projects will be procured through an invitation to tender. We will use FCOs common procurement system, Bravo. Each projects terms of reference will be uploaded to the Bravo online platform. Tendering launch dates and submission deadlines will vary from project to project, so we strongly encourage you to check the system frequently. Tendering opportunities can be accessed on Bravo by clicking view opportunities. | ed33060a-18dc-4c22-b420-0c19d7b0d228 | 0 |
0869a0e8-1da7-4792-86b5-e234c9eca030 | http://arxiv.org/pdf/2505.02989v1 | 2,025 | [
"Opinion dynamics",
"social networks",
"social media",
"dyadic interactions",
"graph models",
"temporal hypergraphs",
"group dynamics",
"conversational threads",
"climate change",
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"individual users",
"large language models",
"ground truth",
"simulations",
"empirical validation",
"microscopic dynamics",
"online spaces",
"collective change",
"information flow."
] | arxiv.org | In this context, analyzing online conversations has become essential for understanding offline behavioral patterns. The research on opinion diffusion models accounting for group dynamics is still in early stages (see Section VI Related Work). However, the lack of ground-truth stance data has hindered these models’ ability to replicate real-world opinion dynamics accurately. Our work contributes to this line of research by providing empirical evidence for both the presence and significance of high-order interactions in online discussions. Our findings address two key research questions. First, regarding RQ 1, the higher performance of our temporal hypergraph model, which abstracts conversational threads, suggests its ability to capture subtle group dynamics that form during topic discussions. This outcome indicates that modeling specific conversational dynamics within local segments of conversations can lead to abetter understanding of opinion evolution. Second, addressing RQ 2, our results suggest thatincorporating high-order social dynamics produces more realistic diffusion modeling. Specifically, the hypergraph model consistently outperforms graph-based approaches in predicting both initial opinion changes and final opinions of users who modified their views across all datasets. This advantage persists across various time window configurations, with the hypergraph model showing greater sensitivity in detecting first opinion changes and more accurately predicting final opinions. Importantly, we found that the granularity of the observation of these interactions significantly impacts prediction accuracy. These results represent an important step toward bridging the gap between theoretical models of opinion dynamics and real-world validation. We empirically showed that highorder interactions significantly influence opinion dynamics in online discussions, with evidence of group dynamics affecting opinion formation across different subreddits. However, we must acknowledge a critical aspect: all models’ predictions deviate substantially from our synthetic ground-truth data, indicating that significant work is still required to develop opinion diffusion models that accurately reflect social media opinion evolution. | 04410014-9af0-41b0-bd63-440c99ee8296 | 18 |
086f75e9-6569-4f70-8f81-0d24adec3f45 | https://cdn.climatepolicyradar.org/navigator/GBR/2023/financial-services-and-markets-act-2023_932920a8d8da4ed5a2456d9109b47a62.pdf | 2,023 | [
"Finance",
"changes",
"force",
"section",
"financial",
"services"
] | cdn.climatepolicyradar.org | I179 S. 77 in force at Royal Assent, see s. 86(1)(f) 78 Politically exposed review of guidance (1) The FCA must review its guidance on politically exposed persons (“PEPs”) given under section 139A of FSMA 2000 and in compliance with the requirements under regulation 48 of the Money Laundering, Terrorist Financing and Transfer of Funds (Information on the Payer) Regulations 2017 ( S.I. 2017/692) (“the 2017 (2) The review required under subsection (1) must include— (a) an assessment of the extent to which the guidance is followed by those persons to whom it is given under regulation 48 of the 2017 Regulations, and (b) in the light of that assessment, consideration as to whether the guidance remains appropriate or whether it should be revised. (a) before the end of 3 months beginning with the day on which this section comes into force, publish an update on the FCA’s plan for the review required under (b) before the end of 12 months beginning with the day on which this section (i) publish the conclusions of the review, and (ii) where the FCA concludes that the guidance should be revised, publish draft revised guidance for consultation. (4) Publication as required by subsection (3) must be in the way appearing to the FCA to be best calculated to bring the publication to the attention of persons likely to be (5) The FCA is not required under this section to publish any information whose publication would be against the public interest. Financial Services and Markets Act 2023 (c. 29) CHAPTER 3B – Unauthorised co-ownership AIFs Document 2025-04-01 This version of this Act contains provisions that are prospective. Changes to Financial Services and Markets Act 2023 is up to date with all changes known to be in force on or before 01 April 2025. There are changes that may be brought into force at a future date. Changes that have been made appear in the content and are referenced with annotations. (See end of Document for details) View outstanding changes (a) “domestic PEP” means a politically exposed person entrusted with prominent public functions by the United Kingdom; (b) the following terms have the same meaning as in regulation 35(12) of the 2017 “politically exposed person” or “PEP”; I180 S. 78 in force at Royal Assent, see s. 86(1)(g) 79 Forest risk review (1) The Treasury must carry out a review to assess the extent to which regulation of the UK financial system is adequate for the purpose of eliminating the financing of the use of prohibited forest risk commodities. (2) In subsection (1) the reference to “prohibited” forest risk commodities is a reference to forest risk commodities, or products derived from forest risk commodities, the use of which is prohibited by paragraph 2 of Schedule 17 to the Environment Act 2021. (3) Having carried out a review the Treasury must lay before Parliament, and publish, a (a) the conclusions of the review, and (b) the steps the Treasury consider it appropriate to take to improve the effectiveness of the regulation of the UK financial system for the purpose (4) Subsection (3) must be complied with before the end of 9 months beginning with the day on which the first regulations under paragraph 1 of Schedule 17 to the Environment Act 2021 are made. “forest risk commodities” has the same meaning as in Schedule 17 to the “UK financial system” has the same meaning as in FSMA 2000 (see I181 S. 79 not in force at Royal Assent, see s. 86(3) I182 S. 79 in force at 29.8.2023 by S.I. 2023/779, reg. 4(yy)
110 Financial Services and Markets Act 2023 (c. 29) CHAPTER 3B – Unauthorised co-ownership AIFs Document 2025-04-01 This version of this Act contains provisions that are prospective. Changes to Financial Services and Markets Act 2023 is up to date with all changes known to be in force on or before 01 April 2025. There are changes that may be brought into force at a future date. Changes that have been made appear in the content and are referenced with annotations. (See end of Document for details) View outstanding changes “domestic law” means the law of England and Wales, Scotland or Northern “enactment” means an enactment whenever passed or made and includes— (a) an enactment contained in any Order in Council, order, rules, regulations, scheme, warrant, byelaw or other instrument made under (b) an enactment contained in, or in an instrument made under, an Act of (c) an enactment contained in, or in an instrument made under, a Measure (d) an enactment contained in, or in an instrument made under, Northern (e) any [F18assimilated direct] legislation; “FCA” means the Financial Conduct Authority; “FSMA 2000” means the Financial Services and Markets Act 2000; “modify” includes amend, repeal or revoke (and related expressions are to “Payment Systems Regulator” means the body established under section 40(1) of the Financial Services (Banking Reform) Act 2013; “PRA” means the Prudential Regulation Authority; (b) an Act of the Scottish Parliament, (c) an Act or Measure of Senedd Cymru, or (d) Northern Ireland legislation; “subordinate legislation” means— (a) any Order in Council, order, rules, regulations, scheme, warrant, byelaw or other instrument made under any Act, or (b) any instrument made under an Act of the Scottish Parliament, a Measure or Act of Senedd Cymru or Northern Ireland legislation, and includes any Order in Council, order, rules, regulations, scheme, warrant, byelaw or other instrument made on or after IP completion day under any [F18assimilated direct] legislation. F18 Words in s. 80(1) substituted (1.1.2024) by The Retained EU Law (Revocation and Reform) Act 2023 (Consequential Amendment) Regulations 2023 (S.I. 2023/1424), reg. 1(2), Sch. para. 107(9)(a) F19 Words in s. 80(2) omitted (1.1.2024) by virtue of The Retained EU Law (Revocation and Reform) Act 2023 (Consequential Amendment) Regulations 2023 (S.I. 2023/1424), reg. 1(2), Sch. para. 107(9)(b)
Financial Services and Markets Act 2023 (c. 29) CHAPTER 3B – Unauthorised co-ownership AIFs Document 2025-04-01 This version of this Act contains provisions that are prospective. | 60620217-7ea8-4d25-b12c-cbbb5bd7a3f3 | 49 |
087824d7-4a36-4774-b78e-3553a2f94e27 | 2,025 | [
"energy efficiency labeling",
"household cooling devices",
"novine"<",
"standardized product information",
"televisions"
] | HF-national-climate-targets-dataset | Rulebook on energy efficiency labeling of household cooling devices ("Narodne novine", No. 101/11), - Rulebook on marking the energy efficiency of televisions ("Narodne novine"<, No. 101/11), - Rulebook on reporting energy consumption and other energy-related product resources using labels and standardized product information ("Narodne novine", No. 101/11), | ff7bbe73-2f7a-4c02-847a-17e28be5e8cf | 0 | |
087e2515-a456-4716-a0f5-85ca529d5b3e | https://www.odyssee-mure.eu/publications/archives/MURE-Overall-Policy-Brochure.pdf | 2,001 | [
"Buildings",
"Energy efficiency"
] | www.odyssee-mure.eu | Energy Efficiency Policies in the European Union
i
Energy Efficiency Policies in the European Union
ii
Energy Efficiency Policies in the European Union
Acknowledgements
This publication on energy efficiency and policy monitoring was prepared within the
ODYSSEE-MURE project coordinated by ADEME. It is financed under the Intelligent Energy
Europe Programme with the support of 29 national institutions from 25 EU Member States,
Norway and Croatia, generally with co-funding from their own governments. This study would
not have been possible without the active participation of the national teams and their
associated partners in terms of data supply. This brochure was prepared by Barbara Schlomann and Wolfgang Eichhammer from the
Fraunhofer Institute for Systems and Innovation Research Fraunhofer ISI. All the
information on energy efficiency indicators is taken from the MURE database and website,
managed by ISIS in Italy and Fraunhofer ISI in Germany. This synthesis report draws on
three sectoral reports written by MOTIVA industry, AEA Technology Transport and
Fraunhofer ISI buildings. Among the many participants in the ODYSSEE-MURE network, particular thanks are due to1
Reinhard Jellinek AEA, Austria, Yvonne Baillot and Francis Altdorfer Econotec, Belgium,
Ludmil Kostadinov EEA, Bulgaria, Helena Bozic, Branko Vuk and Dino Novosel EIHP,
Croatia, Kyriatos Kitsios CIE, Cyprus, Jiri Spitz Enviros, Czech Republic, Peter Dal DEA,
Denmark, Sulev Soosaar TUT, Estonia, Martin Howley and Emer Dennehy SEAI, Ireland,
Pier Giorgio Catoni and Giulia Iorio ENEA, Italy, Saara Elväs and Lea Gynther Motiva,
Finland, Gregory Chedin ADEME, France, Lazlo Elek ENCEN, Hungary, Barbara
Schlomann and Wolfgang Eichhammer Fraunhofer ISI, Germany, Minas Iatridis CRES,
Greece, Gaidis Klavs IPE, Latvia, George Cassar MRA, Malta, Joost Gerdes and Piet
Boonekamp ECN, the Netherlands, Eva Rosenberg IFE, Norway, Ryszard Wnuk KAPE,
Poland, Grazyna Berent-Kowalska and Szymon Peryt GUS, Poland, Antonio Almeida
ADENE, Portugal, Maria Rugina Icemenerg, Romania, Jan Magyar SIEA, Slovak
Republic, Fouad Al Mansour JSI, Slovenia, Pilar de Arriba Segurado IDAE, Spain, Linn
Stengård, Helen Lindblom, and Annika Persson STEM, Sweden, Anne Wagner AEA
Technology, United Kingdom. The author wishes to give special thanks to Joost Gerdes, Pilar de Arriba Segurado, Francis
Altdorfer, Grazyna Berent-Kowalska, , Emer Dennehy, Joost Gerdes, Lea Gynther, Martin
Howley, Reinhard Jellinek, Gaidis Klavs, Szymon Peryt and Sulev Soosar for their valuable
comments and review of the draft of the report. Finally, we extend our thanks to Timothée Noel from the Intelligent Energy for Europe
Programme IEE for his support and belief in this project and his encouragement and
advice. Didier Bosseboeuf
Project leader
1 Alphabetic order of countries
iii
Energy Efficiency Policies in the European Union
iv
Energy Efficiency Policies in the European Union
Key Questions and Messages
This publication presents and analyses the policies implemented in the buildings, transport
and industry sector in the European Union, its Member States and Croatia and Norway. It
mainly relies on the MURE database with policy measures on energy efficiency, covering all
EU countries plus Croatia and Norway and also includes the quantitative impact of the
measures www.muredatabase.com. The tool can be used to support energy policy
formulation by the European Commission, e.g. as part of the monitoring and evaluation of the
National Energy Efficiency Actions Plans submitted under the Directives on End-use Energy
Efficiency and Energy Services ESD and under the new Energy Efficiency Directive EED. This section lays out the key questions and messages from a cross-cutting view on energy
efficiency in the EU and from the three sectoral reports. Energy Efficiency Policy in the EU
The EU has considerably further developed over the past years the frame for energy
efficiency policies. | 122a6704-bce7-4e62-9bc9-5e1516956bc0 | 0 |
08818a1c-8cfc-4f53-b7a8-0c253f67030c | https://cdn.climatepolicyradar.org/navigator/GBR/2023/united-kingdom-national-inventory-report-nir-2023_e2ed2f6c199088dc30a95fddf6e84c72.pdf | 2,023 | [
"emissions",
"data",
"inventory",
"energy",
"emission"
] | cdn.climatepolicyradar.org | In accordance with UNFCCC reporting requirements, the UK GHGI reports emissions and activity relating to due to fuel combustion in international aviation and shipping as a ‘memo item’ in CRF Table1.D, and the methodology is presented in MS 7 and MS 13, but these are not included in national totals. The UK does not make specific estimates of, or report emissions of sources that occur on international journeys other than fuel combustion and lubricant use. | 70afacf8-8641-4466-819d-f4db8cad9d69 | 193 |
0885be57-1dd5-4097-9632-68b1f4535bda | https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/media/643583fb877741001368d815/mobilising-green-investment-2023-green-finance-strategy.pdf | 2,023 | [
"strategy",
"green",
"finance",
"published"
] | www.gov.uk | A recent report from the G F I ’s Farming and Finance working group on “Financing a Farming Transition”, identifies barriers and corresponding enablers under the themes of Data, Priority Environmental Outcomes, Environmental Markets Principles and Aggregation Models. The U K g overnment will progress work in each of these areas, including through actions set out in this Strategy – and we have commissioned the G F I t o develop an online toolkit this year to help farmers identify and navigate opportunities to access private sector investment to pay for nature positive outcomes. Environmental Farmers’ Group – a collaborative aggregation model Aggregating supply is key for attracting investment into natural capital. The Natural Environment Investment Readiness Fund (N E I R F ) has awarded funding to the Environmental Farmers Group (E F G ), a natural capital trading co-operative that operates across several farmer clusters in the Avon catchment. It aims to facilitate access for its 75 farmer members to private nature markets, providing a fair financial return on restoring their natural capital through the sale of biodiversity units, nutrient E F G ’s aggregation model provides an opportunity for organisations looking for large- scale environmental trades to deal with a single body. In order to develop scale and ensure the inclusion of smaller farms, equalisation is built into the member contracts so that 88% of a trade will go to the member farm providing the ecosystem service/ environmental outcome, while 9% is shared with the farms in the catchment area. The remainder pays for E F G ’s operating costs. 3.4.3 Accelerating Market Development 98. The U K g overnment will act to unlock the potential of high-integrity voluntary carbon and nature markets to contribute to net zero and wider environmental improvement. We will consult later this year on specific steps and interventions needed to mobilise additional finance through high-integrity voluntary markets and protect against the risk of greenwashing. This will be guided by the principles a. Interventions across Government and the private sector should create a cohesive regime for unlocking capital, with voluntary markets effectively integrated into the long-term strategy for financial disclosure and transition planning; b. Regulatory responsibilities should be clarified, and regulations introduced in a proportionate manner where there is clear evidence that doing so would improve the integrity and scale of the U K m arket; and c. High-integrity voluntary markets should be encouraged, with the right principles and transparency to protect investors and consumers, ensure additionality towards net zero and the environment, and where appropriate seek to maximise synergies between carbon and nature markets. 99. This consultation will respond to key recommendations of the independent Net Zero Review and the findings of the C C C ’s report on Voluntary Carbon Markets and Offsetting. Recognising the interconnectedness of global carbon markets, it will build on the work of key international initiatives (see section 3.4.1) to develop guidance for best practice in the international market and consider how their findings should be applied in the context of the U K m arket and regulatory regime, including to ensure a coherent approach across carbon and other nature markets. 100. The Transition Plan Taskforce will provide clarity on the use of high-integrity V C M s within its framework, aligning with international best practice. We will continue to work with leading stakeholders to address remaining uncertainties on the interface between V C M s and Article 6 and promote consensus on best practice for high- integrity V C M s through multilateral international fora. 101. We are publishing alongside this Strategy the first Nature Markets Framework. This sets out principles and priorities for the development of mechanisms for investment in ecosystem services - including carbon removal and storage, biodiversity and water quality - and aims to clarify how farmers and natural resource managers can engage in nature market to unlock these opportunities. 102. At the core of this framework is the principle of environmental integrity. It builds on experience and lessons learned from the development of the U K W oodland Carbon Code and U K P eatland Code as well as emerging international best practice, such as that being developed by V C M I a nd V C M I . It also provides further details on how revenue streams from multiple nature markets and public grants such as Environmental Land Management schemes can be combined or ‘stacked’ to make it easier to finance genuinely ambitious, multifunctional land use patterns. 103. The Framework also sets out our plans for the British Standards Institution to work with business, finance, farming and environmental experts to develop a comprehensive suite of nature investment standards. 104. Finally, we recognise the integrity offered by the U K E T S c ould unlock investment at scale in the U K ’s greenhouse gas removal sector by proving an integrated market where businesses can make economically efficient choices on how to decarbonise or remove their emissions. We will work with the U K E T S A uthority to consider options for integrating greenhouse gas removals in the U K E T S , subject to the outcomes of last year’s U K E T S c onsultation, a robust Monitoring, Reporting and Verification regime being in place, and the management of wider impacts - including market stability and the permanence of the emissions stored by the greenhouse gas removal technologies. Further detail will be provided in the Government Response to the
Box 30: Blue carbon - opportunities to boost investment in our Certain marine and coastal habitats capture and store carbon dioxide. These blue carbon habitats are richly biodiverse ecosystems that provide a crucial buffer from coastal flooding, benefit long term fish stocks and improve water quality. The U K Government supports the development of blue carbon and ecosystem markets as one means to help mobilise the finance required for blue carbon habitat creation and restoration. | 56ee4d88-2ab4-4059-810e-e3d833392a95 | 43 |
089430d9-6dfd-4b26-a6d1-6d4249c75953 | http://arxiv.org/pdf/2503.24324v1 | 2,025 | [
"price",
"climate",
"volatility",
"model",
"agricultural"
] | arxiv.org | This two-step approach combines financial time series modelling with meteorological data, providing a reliable framework for forecasting volatility across various time horizons and different climate scenarios. In this study, MSP is conceptualized as a European put option, where the government guarantees a minimum price for agricultural produce, shielding farmers from market downturns. This analogy allows us to apply the Black-Scholes model [18][19][20] , providing a structured approach to estimating the premium of a crop insurance scheme designed to hedge against the financial burden of MSP. The price of a corresponding put option based on put-call parity is:
where:
Here, P is the put option price, S 0 is the current asset price (spot price of the crop), K is the strike price (MSP), T is time to maturity (duration of MSP policy), r is the risk free interest rate, σ is the volatility (predicted using SARIMAX) and Φ(.) is the cumulative distribution function of the standard normal distribution. The premium is calculated from the SARIMAX volatility estimates and its trend-line is plotted in Fig 5. This section presents and interprets the key findings of our analysis as shown in figures 1-5. The crop price and MSP time series as given in figure 1 illustrates the relationship between them for soybean in Madhya Pradesh, rice in Assam and cotton in Gujarat. In the case Assam (rice), the majority of paddy farmers are smallholders with limited market influence. As a result, the MSP remains significantly lower than the prevailing market price, reflecting the farmers' weaker bargaining power and the predominance of local procurement dynamics. Conversely, in Gujarat (cotton) and Madhya Pradesh (soybean), the presence of well-organized farmer unions has played a crucial role in ensuring that MSP remains closer to or even hovers around the market price. Figure 2 showcases the historical maximum temperature and precipitation trends in Madhya Pradesh, Assam, and Gujarat, with their future projections that increasingly diverge under two climate scenarios: SSP2-4.5 (moderate emissions) and SSP5-8.5 (high emissions). Figure 3 illustrates the conditional volatility estimates for soybean, rice and cotton modelled using EGARCH. Notably, rice prices exhibit relatively lower volatility compared to soybean and cotton except for the period of 2011-12 when prices increased erratically 31 . Figure 4 shows the conditional volatility estimates of the SARIMAX model when maximum temperature and precipitation are taken as exogenous variables. The volatility prediction for rice in Assam is lower, relative to soybean and cotton. Figure 5 portrays the smoothed crop insurance premiums under both scenarios for all three crops. The premiums of the 2 scenarios diverge after 2060 for soybean, 2080 for rice and 2030 for cotton. Tackling the challenges of MSP and Crop Insurance India's Minimum Support Price (MSP) system plays a crucial role in stabilizing farmers' incomes by guaranteeing a minimum price for certain crops. However, this policy has an unintended drawback: it reduces the incentive for farmers to purchase crop insurance. Since they are assured a baseline price, many see additional coverage as unnecessary, making them less likely to use private risk mitigation tools. While MSP has effectively supported farmers in the past, increasing agricultural market volatility, largely driven by climate change, makes it difficult for the government to sustain this financial burden alone. If MSP continues to serve as the primary risk management tool without complementary mechanisms, it could place immense pressure on public resources, potentially endangering long-term food security. One viable approach to easing this burden is for the government to use crop insurance as a financial safeguard. With climate variability increasing the costs of maintaining MSP, an insurance-backed strategy could help offset risks associated with the program. Without a structured risk-sharing model, the growing expense of MSP could become unsustainable, straining both state and central budgets. For instance, if annual MSP expenditure currently stands at INR 9 million, the government could set a legal cap at INR 10 million. Any costs exceeding this limit could be covered by an insurance policy, ensuring that sudden price swings do not destabilize public finances. By adopting this forward-thinking approach, policymakers could continue supporting farmers while mitigating financial risks in an increasingly unpredictable agricultural landscape. The government should take a more active role in managing agricultural price fluctuations. The current system disincentivizes insurance adoption because farmers are already assured of a minimum price. Instead, by purchasing large-scale crop insurance policies, the government could shield itself from extreme market volatility while ensuring the long-term sustainability of MSP. This strategy would also lessen dependence on taxpayer funds, as insurance mechanisms could absorb excess costs beyond a predefined threshold. By shifting financial risks to insurers, the government could maintain agricultural stability while reducing budgetary strain. Well-designed insurance policies could cover both price differences between market rates and MSP as well as weather-related losses. This would create a more robust and fiscally responsible risk management system, ensuring that MSP remains viable even as climate uncertainties grow. To make this model financially sustainable, the government could establish a dedicated crop insurance fund, sourcing capital from public revenues, green bonds, and international development assistance. Collaborating with private insurers and global reinsurance companies would further distribute risk efficiently, reducing the direct financial burden on the government. A comprehensive risk-sharing framework would help stabilize MSP-related expenditures while strengthening India's agricultural resilience. By assuming responsibility for crop insurance at a national level, the government could better manage long-term agricultural risks. Large-scale insurance purchases would allow for predictable public spending while still guaranteeing fair prices for farmers. Additionally, this strategy would enhance climate risk mitigation efforts, making Indian agriculture more adaptive to unpredictable environmental changes. In summary, the impact of climate variability on agricultural price fluctuations was examined, and a data-driven method for managing financial risks was introduced. Traditional models often ignore meteorological factors, reducing their accuracy. | 3eea6f24-c164-4628-848b-5a230d5fb24f | 2 |
0898d8ec-bcb1-42a5-a6ce-1c2001329cd8 | https://www.itf-oecd.org/sites/default/files/docs/01shortsea.pdf | 2,001 | [
"Transport",
"Shipping",
"Other low-carbon technologies and fuel switch"
] | www.itf-oecd.org | This ensures that public funds are used efficiently and that financial resources
will be available for other projects. 71
Moreover, transport seems to be one area that shows how our societies are developing towards
economies based on the flow of information and on new skills. The development of logistics services calls
for such new skills. In order to establish a favourable climate for maritime transport and integrate it more
closely into logistics chains, support should be provided for initiatives to train personnel who need to
develop their logistics skills and to familiarise them with current best practice. At present, training
initiatives are essentially the province of maritime sector co-ordination bodies. They could be particularly
useful for the countries of Central and Eastern Europe and the New Independent States, inasmuch as
improving skills is a key factor in achieving the balanced development of transport and logistics systems
and practices on a Europe-wide scale. | 0efe3d52-645b-46f1-9661-6cfad3222525 | 62 |
089f1d25-871a-4ff7-87c7-befb41c14942 | http://arxiv.org/pdf/2108.03722v2 | 2,021 | [
"adaptation",
"technologies",
"patents",
"mitigation",
"climate"
] | arxiv.org | Distinguishing between applied and basic research following Persoon et al. (2020), we find that science-intensive CCATs (agriculture, health, and indirect adaptation) rely mostly on basic research, while adaptation technologies with a low science-intensity (coastal, water, and infrastructure) build to a higher extent on applied research. | e7c5ec21-08e6-4ef3-84cf-6a259e7f7c53 | 42 |
08a16de3-6189-494a-a878-9e532b37bc10 | https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/autumn-statement-2016-documents/autumn-statement-2016 | 2,015 | [
"government",
"growth",
"billion",
"investment",
"rate"
] | www.iea.org | This will mean that employees swapping salary for benefits will pay the same tax as the vast majority of individuals who buy them out of their post-tax income. Arrangements in place before April 2017 will be protected until April 2018, and arrangements for cars, accommodation and school fees will be protected until April 2021 (20)
Valuation of benefits in kind – the government will consider how benefits in kind are valued for tax purposes, publishing a consultation on employer-provided living accommodation and a call for evidence on the valuation of all other benefits in kind at Budget 2017
Employee business expenses – the government will publish a call for evidence at Budget 2017 on the use of the income tax relief for employees’ business expenses, including those that are not reimbursed by their employer
New tax allowance for property and trading income – As announced at Budget 2016, the government will create two new income tax allowances of £1,000 each, for trading and property income. Individuals with trading income or property income below the level of the allowance will no longer need to declare or pay tax on that income. The trading income allowance will now also apply to certain miscellaneous income from providing assets or services. Reforms to the taxation of non-domiciled individuals – Individuals who live in the UK and make use of public services should pay their fair share of tax. The following reforms to the taxation of non-domiciled individuals make the tax system fairer for everybody:
as previously announced, the government will end the permanency of non-domiciled tax status. From April 2017, non-domiciled individuals will be deemed UK-domiciled for tax purposes if they have been UK resident for 15 of the past 20 years, or if they were born in the UK with a UK domicile of origin. As previously announced, non-domiciled individuals who have a non-UK resident trust set up before they become deemed-domiciled in the UK will not be taxed on income and gains arising outside the UK and retained in the trust
from April 2017, inheritance tax will be charged on UK residential property when it is held indirectly by a non-domiciled individual through an offshore structure, such as a company or a trust. This closes a loophole that has been used by non-domiciled individuals to avoid paying inheritance tax on their UK residential property
the government will change the rules for the Business Investment Relief (BIR) scheme from April 2017 to make it easier for non-domiciled individuals who are taxed on the remittance basis to bring offshore money into the UK for the purpose of investing in UK businesses. The government will continue to consider further improvements to the rules for the scheme to attract more capital investment in British businesses by non-domiciled individuals
Inheritance tax reliefs – From Royal Assent of the Finance Bill 2017-18, inheritance tax relief for donations to political parties will be extended to parties with representatives in the devolved legislatures, as well as parties that have acquired representatives through by-elections. This will ensure consistent and fair treatment for all national political parties with elected representatives. Gift Aid digital – As announced at Budget 2016, the government will give intermediaries a greater role in administering Gift Aid, simplifying the Gift Aid process for donors making digital donations. (40)
The government has provided considerable support to savers in recent years, with the result that 98% of adults currently pay no savings tax. As previously announced, the government will continue to support saving by increasing the
ISA
limit from £15,240 to £20,000 in April 2017. Starting rate for savings – The band of savings income that is subject to the 0% starting rate will remain at its current level of £5,000 for 2017-18. Money Purchase Annual Allowance – The Money Purchase Annual Allowance will be reduced to £4,000 from April 2017. The government does not consider that earners aged 55 and over should be able to enjoy double pension tax relief, such as relief on recycled pension savings, but does wish to offer scope for those who have needed to access their savings to subsequently rebuild them. The government
. (21)
Foreign pensions – The tax treatment of foreign pensions will be more closely aligned with the UK’s domestic pension tax regime by bringing foreign pensions and lump sums fully into tax for UK residents, to the same extent as domestic ones. The government will also close specialist pension schemes for those employed abroad (“section 615” schemes) to new saving, extend from 5 to 10 years the taxing rights over recently emigrated non-UK residents’ foreign lump sum payments from funds that have had UK tax relief, align the tax treatment of funds transferred between registered pension schemes, and update the eligibility criteria for foreign schemes to qualify as overseas pensions schemes for tax purposes. (28)
The government believes the best way to support business is through a strong, stable economic climate that supports investment and growth. The government’s decision at the Autumn Statement to prioritise high value infrastructure and innovation will support businesses across the UK. The government is also taking significant steps to support businesses to grow and create jobs through the regulatory and tax systems. Since 2010, the government has eased the regulatory burden on businesses and reduced the corporation tax rate from 28% to 20% with onshore tax receipts increasing by over 20% over the same period. – To continue providing the certainty that businesses need to make their long-term investments, the government is recommitting to the business tax road map and the principles that it sets out. This includes cutting the rate of corporation tax to 17% by 2020 and reducing the burden of business rates by £6.7 billion over the next 5 years. Tax deductibility of corporate interest expense – Following consultation, the government will introduce rules that limit the tax deductions that large groups can claim for their UK interest expenses from April 2017. | 6d972199-135c-4575-be8a-8e25ed895919 | 10 |
08a9d6b5-e095-4e27-9ec9-98a6cb79848e | 2,025 | [
"government",
"potential mechanisms net",
"sector",
"transition",
"hm treasury"
] | HF-national-climate-targets-dataset | which government their could consider to enable deployment. A Summary of Responses to the Call for Evidence has been published alongside this Strategy. 5. In December 2020, BEIS and HM Treasury jointly launched a Call for Evidence on GGRs, which invited views on the role of GGRs in reaching net zero and potential mechanisms Net zero transition and opportunities for the sector | caf10348-314b-4d69-a2dd-f088ac263384 | 0 | |
08ad899a-32c8-4db5-8ed1-7f4ceef51541 | http://projects.mcrit.com/foresightlibrary/attachments/Technologies_Zero_Emission_Platform.pdf | 2,005 | [
"Electricity and heat",
"CCS",
"Other low-carbon technologies and fuel switch"
] | projects.mcrit.com | Suess, Siemens AG
Jean-Michel Gires, TOTAL SA
Stephan Singer, WWF International
Roberto Garosi, Ansaldo Energia S.p.A. Charles Soothill, ALSTOM Power
Gardiner Hill, BP
Antonio Valero, Fundación CIRCE
Jozef Dubinski, CMI
Johannes Lambertz, RWE Power AG
Iain Miller, Mitsui Babcock
Frederic Hauge, The Bellona Foundation
Hakon Mosbech, ENERGI E2 AS
Harry Lampenius, Foster Wheeler Power Group Europe
Arve Thorvik, Statoil
Foreword
Experts agree that CO2 capture and storage technology CCS,
together with improved energy conversion efficiency, is a near-
term solution to reducing carbon dioxide emissions from fossil
fuel power generation on a massive scale. Its immediate
deployment is therefore vital if we are to avoid the catastrophic
consequences of climate change we are facing today. Yet despite most of the technology elements being available, CCS is still not deployed for two
key reasons
1. The costs and risks still outweigh the commercial benefits
2. The regulatory framework for CO2 storage is not sufficiently defined. Following the priority given to zero emission power generation in the Sixth Framework Programme
FP6, industrial stakeholders and the research community therefore united to form the European
Technology Platform for Zero Emission Fossil Fuel Power Plants ZEP. Its brief? To identify and
remove the barriers to creating highly efficient power plants with zero emissions, which would
drastically reduce the environmental impact of fossil fuel use, particularly coal. In the autumn of 2005, the Advisory Council and Coordination Group along with the Working
Groups and Mirror Group were established. The Technology Platform was officially launched in
December and a Vision Paper was published the following May. In August 2006, the Technology Platform then published two key documents the Strategic
Deployment Document SDD and the Strategic Research Agenda SRA. | 47b4d90f-e8d1-49e1-8a0f-f210bed8e35f | 1 |
08af26e6-0006-4928-8332-c56133cc8b07 | https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/1009448/decarbonising-transport-a-better-greener-britain.pdf | 2,021 | [
"transport",
"zero",
"emissions",
"emission",
"carbon"
] | assets.publishing.service.gov.uk | The roads also carry more than three-quarters of freight traffic, and of course nearly all pedestrian, cycling, bus and coach journeys. Continued high investment in our roads is therefore, and will remain, as necessary as ever to ensure the functioning of the nation and to reduce the congestion which is a major source of carbon. | 8f0273a5-decd-4a43-ab49-4f3473699e66 | 247 |
08c62d09-632a-4f7d-836e-b9e226494474 | https://cdn.climatepolicyradar.org/navigator/GBR/2025/united-kingdom-national-inventory-report-nir-2025_3d22864cf237013c86452d4c6455250a.pdf | 2,025 | [
"emissions",
"data",
"inventory",
"emission",
"used"
] | cdn.climatepolicyradar.org | • Data acquisition, processing, and reporting; and, • Delivery of NID (including associated CRT tables) to time and quality. The Inventory Agency has formal systems in place to ensure that staff working on the inventory are well trained and able to carry out their duties effectively and efficiently. | 95866fde-5b53-4214-b279-97a1078c466c | 101 |
08cb4600-eba7-4da8-8c07-917a732f220a | http://arxiv.org/pdf/2506.13994v1 | 2,025 | [
"CMIIP",
"global climate models",
"GCMs",
"climate models",
"intercomparison",
"climate change",
"climate assessment",
"research",
"science",
"data",
"projections",
"atmosphere",
"ocean",
"Earth system",
"models",
"analysis",
"prediction",
"warming",
"greenhouse gases"
] | arxiv.org | Taking into account the above considerations, Scafetta proposed modeling the global surface tem perature record, T ( t ), using the following equation:
T ( t ) = TA ( t ) + TV ( t ) + TS ( t ) + ξ ( t ) = TAVS ( t ) + ξ ( t ),
where T ( t ) is derived from four components: anthropogenic, TA ( t ) ; volcano, TV ( t ) ; solar, TS ( t ) ; plus a fast fluctuating component, ξ ( t ), simulating fast fluctuations such as the ENSO signal. The three main contributors can be estimated using a 0-D energy balance equation with a given time response, which can be generally modeled as:
C [dT] [(] [t] [)]
S − σε T ( t ) + G . 4
[(] [t] [)]
= [ −] [a] dt 4
On the left side, T ( t ) is the mean global temperature in Kelvin, C represents the effective heat capacity of the
Earth’s surface and atmosphere. On the right side, in the first term a denotes the albedo, Sis the incoming solar radiation adjusted for the planetary sphericity; the second term represents the outgoing longwave radiation, which depends on the temperature itself; finally, G incorporates the effect of the greenhouse gases. By redefining the constants and simplifying the formulation, the above equation can be approximated for each forcing component using differential equations based on the temperature anomalies, ∆ T ( t ) = T ( t ) − T 0,
which are relative to a given mean temperature T 0 :
∆ TA ( t ) − ∆ TA ( t − ∆ t )
= α A · FA ( t ) − β · ∆ TA ( t − ∆ t ) τ
∆ TA ( t − ∆ t ) = k A FA ( t ) − ∆ TA ( t − ∆ t )
∆ t τ
∆ TV ( t − ∆ t ) = k V F V ( t ) − ∆ TV ( t − ∆ t )
∆ t τ
∆ TV ( t ) − ∆ TV ( t − ∆ t )
= α V · F V ( t ) − β · ∆ TV ( t − ∆ t ) τ
∆ TS ( t ) − ∆ TS ( t − ∆ t )
= α S · F S ( t ) − β · ∆ TS ( t − ∆ t ) τ
∆ TS ( t − ∆ t ) = k S F S ( t ) − ∆ TS ( t − ∆ t )
∆ t τ
Here, FA ( t ), F V ( t ), and F S ( t ) represent the anthropogenic, volcanic, and solar effective forcings, respectively. The coefficients α A = k A / τ, α V = k V / τ, α S = k S / τ, and β = 1/ τ depend on the sensitivity parameters k A,
k V and k Sand the characteristic time response τ, which is directly related to the Earth’s effective heat capacity. For simplicity, τ is assumed constant for all forcings. Under equilibrium conditions, the temperature change ∆ T 2 × CO 2, with corresponds to doubling atmo spheric CO 2 concentration, is the equilibrium climate sensitivity
ECS = ∆ T 2 × CO 2 = k A ∆ F 2 × CO 2 = 3.7 k A . For the transient climate response (TCR), which is defined as the temperature average over 20 years around the time of CO 2 doubling under a linear increase scenario, the calculation gives:
TCR = 3.7 k A −
70
1 − e [−] [τ] [�] = ECS 1 − [τ] 70 [k] [A] [τ] � � 70
1 − e [−] [τ] [��] . �
By iterating, these equations can be reformulated as:
∆ T ( t ) − ∆ T ( t − ∆ t ) = α A · FA ( t ) + α V · F V ( t ) + α S · F S ( t ) − β · ∆ T ( t − ∆ t ),
∆ t where ∆ t is set to 1 year. Using multilinear regression analysis, the regression coefficients ( α A, α V, α Sand β )
can be evaluated, and can be used to reconstruct the climatic signatures of each forcing and compute ∆ TAVS ( t ),
the deterministic component of T ( t ) . Unlikely Eq. 1, the model expressed by Eq. | c118d41e-0f6f-4d15-bab3-659618775684 | 43 |
08ccd479-512d-4746-bcaa-bcac34d49100 | https://cdn.climatepolicyradar.org/navigator/GBR/2021/decarbonising-transport-a-better-greener-britain_0e5fa97fb3d78e19b69ccf8f78fdd0cc.pdf | 2,021 | [
"Transport",
"Co-benefits",
"Cycling",
"Climate Finance",
"Public Transport",
"Freight",
"EVs",
"Shipping",
"Aviation",
"Walking",
"transport",
"zero",
"emissions",
"emission",
"carbon"
] | cdn.climatepolicyradar.org | Decarbonising Transport Projection Short-term COVID-19 Uncertainty * Historic emissions are from published Her Majesty’s Government (HMG) GHG statistics. Our projections are produced using a range of models, including the National Transport Model (road transport), and Traction Decarbonisation Network Strategy (rail), and Aviation model, adjusted for decarbonising transport measures. | b1244f11-6485-47b2-ba2a-c8a54f51cd77 | 98 |
08d2e4b2-e95f-43d8-9626-ff227bd7d18b | http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:L:2008:199:0001:0136:EN:PDF | 2,008 | [
"Transport",
"Light-duty vehicles",
"Energy efficiency"
] | eur-lex.europa.eu | power take-off operation or unit means an engine-driven
output provision for the purposes of powering auxiliary,
vehicle mounted, equipment
32. small volume manufacturers means vehicle manufacturers
whose worldwide annual production is less than 10 000
units. L 1994
EN
Official Journal of the European Union
28.7.2008
Article 3
Requirements for type-approval
The manufacturer shall ensure that for the Type 3 test set
8. out in Annex V, the engines ventilation system does not permit
the emission of any crankcase gases into the atmosphere. | d3fc6859-41cb-4ee2-997b-90ebc4f9b481 | 7 |
08d67339-7d29-412f-a2e4-c6be44aea4fb | https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX%3A32023R0851 | 2,023 | [
"Transport",
"Light-duty vehicles",
"Other low-carbon technologies and fuel switch",
"Renewables"
] | eur-lex.europa.eu | It must therefore be ensured that the transition is just and inclusive, leaving no one behind. (4)
The Union committed to reducing the Union s economy-wide net greenhouse gas emissions by at least 55Â % compared to 1990 levels by 2030 in the updated nationally determined contribution submitted to the UNFCCC Secretariat on 17Â December 2020. (5)
Through the adoption of Regulation (EU) 2021/1119 of the European Parliament and of the Council (8), the Union has enshrined the objective of reducing emissions to net zero at the latest by 2050 and the aim of achieving negative emissions thereafter in legislation. That Regulation also establishes a binding Union domestic reduction target for net greenhouse gas emissions (emissions after deduction of removals) of at least 55 % compared to 1990 levels by 2030. (6)
All sectors of the economy are expected to contribute to achieving those emissions reductions, including the road transport sector. The transport sector is the only sector where emissions have been on the rise since 1990. This includes road transport by light-duty and heavy-duty vehicles, which together account for over 70 % of total transport emissions. To achieve climate neutrality, a 90 % reduction in transport emissions is needed by 2050. (7)
The digital and green transitions should also address the importance of the social dimension to ensure that mobility is affordable for and accessible to all, especially commuters without access to quality public transport or other mobility solutions. More ambitious CO2 standards for passenger cars and light commercial vehicles are expected to accelerate the uptake of zero-emission vehicles, increase their affordability and also accelerate the decarbonisation of the second-hand market in all segments, with greater benefits for low- and middle-income consumers. When adopting those standards it is also important to take into account the significant economic and social consequences of the digital and green transitions and the need to safeguard employment and preserve the competitiveness of Union industry. (8)
The measures set out in this Regulation are necessary as part of a coherent and consistent framework that is indispensable for achieving the overall objective of the Union to reduce net greenhouse gas emissions, as well as to reduce the Union s dependence on imported fossil fuels. It is essential that the Commission work together with Member States and industrial stakeholders to secure the supply chain in the critical raw materials needed for zero- and low-emission vehicles. This will also support the competitiveness of Union industry and strengthen the Union's strategic autonomy. (9)
In order to achieve a reduction in net greenhouse gas emissions by at least 55 % compared to 1990 levels by 2030, it is necessary to strengthen the reduction requirements set out in Regulation (EU) 2019/631 of the European Parliament and of the Council (9) for both passenger cars and light commercial vehicles. A clear pathway also needs to be set for further reductions beyond 2030 to contribute to achieving the climate-neutrality objective by 2050. Without ambitious action on greenhouse gas emissions reductions in road transport, higher emissions reductions would be needed in other sectors, including sectors where decarbonisation is more challenging. (10)
The strengthened CO2 emissions reduction requirements should encourage an increasing share of zero-emission vehicles to be deployed on the Union market while providing benefits to consumers and citizens in terms of air quality, strengthening energy security and efficiency, and the associated energy savings, as well as ensuring that innovation in the automotive value chain can be maintained. Within the global context, the Union automotive value chain must be a leading actor in the ongoing transition towards zero-emission mobility. The strengthened CO2 emissions reduction standards are technology neutral in reaching the fleet-wide targets that they set. Different technologies are and remain available to reach the zero-emission fleet-wide target. Zero-emission vehicles currently include battery electric vehicles, fuel-cell and other hydrogen powered vehicles, and technological innovations are continuing. | 8c61c8d0-fc6c-478d-9006-4918824d70a1 | 1 |
08d970a3-793d-4c62-909d-6dcb1ac1d470 | https://cdn.climatepolicyradar.org/navigator/GBR/2021/england-peat-action-plan_f6dfdab245da0598921474216dd6fa4f.pdf | 2,021 | [
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"peat",
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] | cdn.climatepolicyradar.org | A new licensing regime is being created which would permit landowners, who still retain consents, to apply for a licence to burn where land is inaccessible to cutting equipment, for a conservation purpose or to prevent the risk of wildfire. Landowners will have the option to seek a multi-annual licence covering a plan for several years where appropriate. The new requirements will protect approximately 142,000 hectares of England’s upland deep peat from further damage by managed burning, which represents approximately 40% of all blanket bog in England. The government will keep under review the environmental and economic case for extending the approach to additional areas of blanket bog after assessing how the new regime works in practice. Wildfires can cause significant damage to peatlands, especially when they are severe enough to burn into the peat layers. The summer of 2018 saw significant wildfires on Winter Hill and Stalybridge Moor covering 1,800 hectares. These wildfires burnt for three weeks, damaging both a Special Area of Conservation and a Site of Special Scientific Interest. Not only were greenhouse gases released, depleting the carbon that had been stored for thousands of years in the peat, but the fire also left areas of bare peat exposed 20 Douglas, D. J.T., Buchanan, G. M., Thompson, P., Amar, A., Fielding, D. A., Redpath, S. M., and Wilson, J. D. (2015). Vegetation burning for game management in the UK uplands is increasing and overlaps spatially with soil carbon and protected areas. Biological Conservation 191, 243–250. 21 Thacker, J.I., Yallop, A.R., Clutterbuck, B. (2015). IPENS 055 Burning in the English Uplands. Natural 22 Glaves, D.J., Morecroft, M., Fitzgibbon, C., Lepitt, P., Owen, M., Phillips, S. (2013). Natural England Review of Upland Evidence 2012 - The effects of managed burning on upland peatland biodiversity, carbon and water. Natural England Evidence Review, Number 004.
to erosion and further degradation. It is estimated the full cost of restoration of these two significant 2018 wildfires, could be £2.8 million.23 Given the significant impact wildfire can have on peatland, Defra undertook a review of wildfire and the management of upland peatland habitats in England. The objective was to identify what changes to current land management policy could limit the risk presented by wildfire. The implementation of this Action Plan will take forward actions from Defra’s review that relate directly to peatland management. Further details of our Wildfire Review can be found in Annex B. In addition, the Uplands Management Group (UMG) were commissioned by Defra to compile advice and guidance to land manager to mitigate against the risk presented by wildfire; their recommendations can also be found in It is clear that there is a significant gap in our knowledge of wildfire in England. Although we know that almost all UK wildfires are started by people, either on purpose or accidentally, we only have sparse data on whether wildfires are caused by discarded cigarettes, BBQs or arson. This makes it difficult to prioritise policies and identify how changes in management can mitigate wildfires. Many landowners are unhappy with the current warning system used in the UK because it doesn’t predict the likelihood of a wildfire, it only predicts the severity if a wildfire were to occur, this makes it difficult for them to plan for and mitigate wildfire events. For many peatland habitats, their degraded state means that they are less resilient to the risk and impact of wildfires, but it is also the case that poorly managed land with excessive woody vegetation is at greater risk once a fire starts. That is why land management techniques and the licensing regime have an ● We have introduced legislation to bring an end to managed burning on protected blanket bog unless covered by a license issued by the Secretary of State. ● As outlined in this Action Plan, we will take continued action on peatland restoration. Wet and well-functioning peatland increases resilience and reduces the risk of severe damage by wildfire. produce detailed mapping of peatland. This will be made available to land managers and the Fire and Rescu e Service for inclusion in wildfire management planning, and to help tackle emergencies. ● We will ensure land managers implement a Wildfire Management Plan and explore the embedding of these practices into agri-environment schemes, in particular supporting land managers with access to expertis e in areas at high risk of wildfire. ● We will support and engage with the Wildfire Forums across the country, demonstrating leadership cross government to embed good practice. ● Work with stakeholders to develop customised wildf ire training for land managers, g expertise and thereby rais ing practitioner understanding of the risks, and available mitigation measures. 23 Based on restoration costs per hectare associated with Defra’s current Capital Grant restoration scheme. 24 Uplands Management Group Moorland Wildfire Risk Assessment and Management Planning Recommendations
Future planning & development We want to ensure that the value of peatlands is taken into account when development is considered, including through biodiversity net gain. Some areas of peatland are potentially susceptible to development pressure and it is vital that planning policies reflect the importance of managing peatlands and avoid detrimental climate, water and biodiversity Biodiversity net gain is already promoted within the National Planning Policy Framework and will, when it becomes mandatory through the Environment Bill, require development to deliver at least a 10% improvement in “biodiversity value”. The biodiversity metric used for biodiversity net gain recognises the ecological value of peat, giving it very high or high distinctiveness; this means that there is a strong incentive for development to retain peatland habitats and to avoid damage to them in the first place (in line with the mitigation hierarchy). Any unavoidable losses or damage to non-irreplaceable habitat would need to be compensated for, ideally on site or locally. | 1f93a236-e681-4ebd-8657-883e7b824d73 | 7 |
08dcfd26-ad7e-441e-a5ec-78d6810fc497 | https://cdn.climatepolicyradar.org/navigator/GBR/2020/financial-conduct-authority-rules-on-tcfd_c5672d817ae6d757a4474fa19381e57a.pdf | 2,020 | [
"Finance",
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] | cdn.climatepolicyradar.org | We note the strong support for our proposal to bring the rule into effect for accounting periods beginning on or after 1 January 2021. We are therefore maintaining the implementation date as originally proposed. We acknowledge that our extension of the consultation period to 1 October 2020 has meant that we are finalising our rule with only limited lead time before it comes into effect. We also recognise the challenges for many in-scope listed companies arising from the coronavirus pandemic and the end of the Implementation Period for EU withdrawal. However , we agree with those respondents who observe that the nature of the TCFD’s recommendations and the compliance basis of our rule will afford companies sufficient flexibility to refine their disclosures over time where Delaying the effective start date of the rule to an accounting period beginning later in 2021 would result in our missing a significant number of companies’ accounting periods which begin on 1 January. Accordingly, many reports would then not be available until 2023. Allowing such a delay would not meet the urgency of the climate challenge and the strong demand for enhanced climate-related
Proposals to enhance climate-related disclosures by listed issuers and clarification of existing disclosure obligations 3.95 We requested views from respondents on the cost benefit analysis (CBA) for our new Do you agree with the conclusion and analysis set out in our cost benefit analysis (Annex 2)? 3.96 We received 22 responses on our cost benefit analysis. The majority were supportive of our analysis, agreeing both with our approach and our conclusion that in the long term the benefits would far outweigh the costs. 3.97 3 respondents disagreed with the conclusions of our CBA. One commented that we may have underestimated the staff time required to prepare disclosures, noting also that costs will vary by industry. 1 commented that some of the TCFD’s recommendations are already mandatory in UK law. The third commented that the assessment of benefits should consider that many companies already disclose in line with the TCFD’s recommendations. 3.98 4 respondents commented that compliance costs would be likely to vary by issuer, depending on factors such as size, sector and geography. A further 3 respondents considered that we may have underestimated some of the costs of compliance, including the incremental cost of sourcing data. However, we were not provided with additional cost estimates to consider. 3.99 Other comments included the observation that, in the short term, costs might be a more important consideration due to the impact of coronavirus. A majority of respondents that commented on the CBA did not raise any We agree with the observation that the costs of compliance are likely to vary by sector and various other company characteristics. The approach we had taken in the CBA was to calculate costs for a ‘representative’ issuer (as set out in paragraph 46 of Annex 2 in CP 20/3). We acknowledged that costs might be higher for some in-scope companies. However , they may equally be lower for others, depending on the size, sector and complexity of their business, including the characteristics of their fixed asset base, their cross-border operations and their supply chain. For the purposes of the CBA, we also assumed that all companies would comply, rather than explain. We considered that this would provide a conservative assessment of costs. The CBA acknowledged that some of the TCFD’s recommendations are already mandatory in UK law. This was reflected in our baseline assumptions of current disclosure practices, underpinning our estimates
Proposals to enhance climate-related disclosures by listed issuers and clarification of existing disclosure obligations Given the support for our CBA conclusions, and in the absence of more granular cost data, we consider that our approach provides an adequate and reasonable basis for our CBA and that our rule is
Proposals to enhance climate-related disclosures by listed issuers and clarification of existing disclosure obligations 4.1 We asked the following question to gather views from respondents on the T echnical Note that we consulted on alongside the proposed new rule. The T echnical Note aims to clarify existing disclosure obligations in our handbook and in legislation that may already require disclosures on climate change and other ESG matters, under certain Do you agree with the guidance provided in the draft T echnical Note set out in Appendix 2? Are there any changes that you would suggest? If so, please describe. 4.2 We received a small number of comments on the T echnical Note. These were generally supportive, with several stakeholders welcoming the FCA’s intention to set out where issuers may already be required to disclose ESG matters in complying with the LRs, 4.3 The comments we received on the T echnical Note touched on the • Respondents requested that we include a discussion of how to determine the materiality of the ESG information under the various rules and legislation covered in the T echnical Note. Some also requested examples of the types of ESG-related ‘inside information’ that should be announced as soon as possible under MAR. • 1 respondent recommended that further clarity should be provided as to the scope of issues involved in ESG matters. The same respondent also asked us to comment on the link between the broader ESG scope of the guidance and the narrower climate focus of the proposed rule. • A further comment reflected that the T echnical Note could usefully set out existing requirements under the Companies Act and related Regulations, as well as links to the FRC’s guidance on the Strategic Report. Others highlighted the need to update the T echnical Note to reflect recent developments, including the new Listing Rule • 1 respondent considered that the T echnical Note would benefit from a more expansive discussion of the different ESG considerations of investors in equity securities and those in non-equity securities. While equity investors would be focused on long-term value creation for the company, non-equity investors would be primarily focused on the credit of the issuer/guarantor . | 59faa840-f1ed-4537-b177-8d43f9798bf9 | 12 |
08dde84a-6588-477a-8df6-df4f4c8350f7 | https://committees.parliament.uk/publications/30146/documents/174873/default/ | 2,022 | [
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] | parliament.uk | How should the Government consider the balance between, or sequencing of, approaches to behaviour change focused • encouraging changes to individual behaviour; • regulatory approaches focused on individuals and/or businesses which restrict • fiscal measures (including taxation)? K. How should Government policy on behaviour change reflect the influence of monetary costs and the wider environment (e.g. | 97670d98-0334-481c-acbc-cc321a917f87 | 64 |
08e1ebdc-7589-4cc1-b2c7-2a120e8fcecb | https://cdn.climatepolicyradar.org/navigator/GBR/2023/united-kingdom-national-adaptation-plan-nap3_5fe848c63d8d53eb88129bb189320aee.pdf | 2,023 | [
"climate",
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] | cdn.climatepolicyradar.org | FCDO and DESNZ will seek to reduce the risk of successful legal challenges to climate change policies and provide adaptation and resilience support to the most vulnerable between 2023 and 2025. They will engage early and often in multilateral fora such as the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change and the UN Security Council, to ensure policies are defensible to challenge and widely supported internationally. 2. FCDO and DESNZ will lead on climate diplomacy internationally between 2023 and 2025 to progress climate actions under the UN Framework 3. FCDO will contribute to multilateral fora – for example, the International Court of Justice and the UN General Assembly – to ensure the rights of people impacted by climate change are considered. 4. FCDO will continue to work with partners until at least 2026 to improve how developing countries access climate finance, so they can better respond to the impacts of climate change. This will help address the risk of sovereign defaults in emerging economies due to climate impacts. 1. Post COP presidency actions and initiatives, including engagement with UN climate negotiations, COP28, COP29 and COP30, and the building of networks among likeminded allies (Actions 1 and 2) 2. Climate Resilient Debt Clauses and the Taskforce on Access to Climate 3. Engagement with international human rights processes (Action 3)
ID6 – Opportunities from climate change (including Arctic sea ice melt) for international trade routes Consider the CCRA3 advice on ID6. 1. DfT will continue to engage with the International Maritime Organization between 2023 and 2025 to ensure effective governance and environmental protections are in place to regulate ships operating in Arctic waters. 2. FCDO will continue to coordinate UK engagement with the Arctic Council’s Working Groups during the current Norwegian Chairship (2023 to 2025) to promote safe, responsible and sustainable activity related to Arctic shipping. 1. International Maritime Organization (Action 1) 2. Arctic Council Working Groups (Action 2)
ID7 – Risks associated with international trade Minimise the risk of climate-related disruption to the UK’s critical international supply 1. DBT will publish a new strategy on supply chains and imports in autumn 2023 to provide a coherent overview of the UK’s priorities and drive specific action by government and business in response to any threats and hazards, including climate change, to the critical imports for the UK’s national security 2. DBT will continue to develop and share analysis, including through mapping climate vulnerabilities and monitoring disruptive events, to drive evidence- based decision making throughout and beyond 2023. This will help government and businesses respond to climate change risks posed to critical supply chains in line with government priorities. 3. DBT will support and advise relevant teams within government and businesses to develop policies and interventions to guide both public and private sector organisations actions to mitigate climate change risks and vulnerabilities in supply chains. The success of this will be monitored through quarterly internal reviews from 2023. 4. DBT will engage with business, seeking industry views on a new supply chains and imports strategy in summer 2023, to enable information sharing on how climate-related disruption affects supply chains between government and 5. DBT will incorporate climate considerations in relevant critical supply chain stress tests by the end of 2024, including with international partners, to understand the resilience of critical supply chains to climate-related 6. DBT will support UK companies to target sustainable infrastructure solutions and systems in vulnerable countries throughout 2022 to 2024 to enhance industry awareness of financing and promote delivery of critical infrastructure 7. DBT will encourage insurance solutions and improve climate forecasting and infrastructure investment from 2022 to 2024 to minimise the risk of uninsured losses to the UK finance sector from climate change and protect supply 1. A new strategy on supply chains and imports (Actions 1 and 4) 3. DBT Global Supply Chains and Economic Security Directorate (Actions 3 and
4. Business of Resilience Taskforce (Actions 6 and 7)
ID8 – Risks to the UK finance sector from climate Prevent climate risks originating from overseas causing a systemic failure of the UK 1. The government will use the UK’s influence to continue to push for the global adoption of the International Sustainability Standards Board’s standards following the release of the final standards (expected in summer 2023) to ensure the system discloses and responds to climate risks. 2. HMT, working with the PRA and FCA, will monitor climate risks in insurance markets including Lloyd’s of London through the NAP3 implementation period to 2028 and beyond to ensure continued government awareness of the impact of climate change on insurance markets. 3. HMT will monitor the availability and affordability of different lines of insurance through the NAP3 implementation period to 2028 and beyond to ensure continued government awareness of the impact of climate change on 4. The government will shape policy and work with regulators, such as the FCA, PRA, the Pensions Regulator and the Financial Reporting Council (FRC) through the NAP3 implementation period to 2028 and beyond to ensure that financial sector participants have consistent, accurate information to help manage their exposure to climate risks and achieve greater transparency in the market. Work this year will include setting out further detail on the implementation of Sustainability Disclosure Requirements (SDRs), consulting on the UK Green Taxonomy and launching a formal assessment mechanism for the International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS) Sustainability 5. HMT will support transition plan disclosure requirements on financial market participants through the NAP3 implementation period to 2028 and beyond to address systemic climate-related financial risk across the financial system. HMT established the Transition Plan Taskforce (TPT) to develop a standard for transition plans, including how wider financial risks arising from adaptation should be reported within an overall risk management disclosure. 6. HMT will work with international partners to support the interoperability and standardisation of financial market participants’ plans to adapt to climate risks and to a low -carbon economy throughout the NAP3 implementation period to 2028 and beyond. | daa6054e-a061-4a6e-abc6-3fa1147f5608 | 45 |
08e98d71-7caf-4307-8076-bfa38cc41807 | https://cdn.climatepolicyradar.org/navigator/GBR/2021/heat-and-buildings-strategy_02fc3928ede4b3542ff4749b01d7ecf3.pdf | 2,021 | [
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] | cdn.climatepolicyradar.org | We will look into using regulations and standards to ensure that ventilation is improved hand-in-hand There are approximately 1.7 million non-domestic (commercial, industrial and public) properties in England and Wales223, from small businesses to global conglomerates. Of these, 17% are situated in areas with no connections to the gas grid.224 Non-domestic buildings account for around one-third of UK emissions from the building stock.225 Buildings in the private commercial and industrial sector have a wider range of uses including shops, factories, and offices. This means they have greater variation in heat demand. Public sector buildings account for 9% of UK building emissions.226 Public buildings, like commercial and industrial buildings, are very diverse and include hospitals, schools, and government buildings, each of which has different heating needs. The five largest non-domestic energy users are offices, retail, industry, health, and hospitality, which together account for approximately 71% of non-domestic building energy consumption in England and Wales.227 However, energy use also varies greatly within these sectors. It is ( ouseholdprojectionsforengland). 221 Estimate based on statistics for England. DLUHC (2020), ‘English Housing Survey 2018: energy 222 BEIS (2018), ‘Heat overview of current evidence base’ ( 223 BEIS (2020), ‘Non-domestic National Energy Efficiency Data-Framework’ ( 224 BEIS (2020), ‘Non-domestic National Energy Efficiency Data-Framework (ND-NEED) 2020’ ( 2020), geographical annex data tables. 225 ONS (2021), 'Final UK greenhouse gas emissions national 1990 to 2019' ( Includes indirect and direct emissions but excludes international aviation and shipping. 226 BEIS (2021) 'Final UK greenhouse gas emissions national 1990 to 2019' ( 227 BEIS (2016), ‘Building Energy Efficiency Survey (BEES)’, figures 3.1 and 3.10 (
therefore important to build flexibility into how buildings with different uses can decarbonise, while maintaining overarching targets to set direction and keep us on track for Net Zero. The ownership and individuals using a building determines who may be incentivised to decarbonise, and when changes to energy efficiency and their source of heat will be least disruptive. There are four main Of the existing homes in England, in 2019 the largest proportion were in the owner-occupier sector (64%), with a much smaller proportion being socially-rented (17%), or privately-rented There are some correlations between building ownership and tenure and building energy performance. For example, the privately-rented sector has the highest concentration of fuel poor households (26.8%)229 and privately-rented properties cost over £6 billion in energy bills in 2019, and produce greenhouse gas emissions of around 11 MtCO2e per year.230 Socially- rented housing typically have higher energy efficiency (in 2019, about 60% of socially-rented homes in the UK were rated EPC band C and above), whereas owner-occupied buildings have the lowest EPC rating on average (with more than 60% rated EPC band D and below).231 228 Estimate based on statistics for England. DLUHC (2020), ‘English Housing Survey 2019 to 2020: headline-report). The English Housing Survey and refers to England only. We note that the proportion of owner- occupied, private- and social-rented properties varies across different regions of the UK and therefore the targeting of policies specific to that area may differ. poverty-statistics). In our policy paper on ‘Sustainable protecting vulnerable households in England’, BEIS (2021) ( in-england), we announced an update to the fuel poverty metric (from Low Income High Cost to Low Income Low 230 BEIS analysis using 'Energy Consumption in the UK 2020' ( consumption-in-the-uk), Consumption Data Tables C1, EHS (English Housing Survey) and National Energy Efficiency Data-Framework ( data-framework-nd-need-2020) 2018 data, tables 9, 10, 27 and 28. (
socially-rented homes in the UK were rated EPC band C and above in 2019, only about 40% of the total housing stock were EPC band C and above. 232 Our approach to decarbonising homes must be conscious of the different trigger points for each of these tenures. Incentives and opportunities for homeowners and landlords are different. Therefore, our approach should be tailored based on their tenure-type; using natural trigger points to improve buildings’ energy performance, such as when it is most cost-effective and least disruptive to occupants and owners. Our approach must also be conscious of the complexity in multi-tenure, multi-use buildings, where occupants – and even the owner – may be limited in the changes they can make. For example, there are particular challenges for leasehold property owners, who will have legal restrictions on what they can do to their property. We are exploring how to prevent this from acting as a barrier to upgrading homes. For these types of buildings, upgrading or treating the whole building at once can be more efficient and cost-effective, but the balance of costs and benefits may differ for different occupants. Around 40% of all energy consumed in commercial and industrial buildings in England and Wales is in the rented sector, placing more responsibility on landlords to make energy efficiency and heating improvements.233 The remaining 60% of energy consumed in commercial and industrial buildings are attributed to owner-occupied buildings. Owner- occupied buildings tend to be larger than rented buildings and therefore tend to use more ( 233 BEIS (2016), ‘Building Energy Efficiency Survey (BEES)’ 234 BEIS (2016), ‘Building Energy Efficiency Survey (BEES)’ ( tables 3.11 and C.1. We are developing policies and measures that cause minimum disruption by tapping into key trigger points. This includes considering the role of mortgage providers and other lenders and what appropriate requirements need to be met before commencing a new tenancy for a rented property. Making changes to the energy performance of buildings between tenants means that tenants are not disturbed and access is easier. Owners might be indirectly compensated for disruption associated with energy performance improvements, for example, through value added to their property, improved comfort, and lower running costs. The size of a building may impact which heat distribution system will be most effective and the scale of energy efficiency savings. For the majority of buildings, a combination of increased efficiency and low-carbon heating, plus more efficient energy-using products, will deliver Net Zero emissions most cost-effectively. The size of non-domestic buildings varies considerably compared to domestic homes. | b8329f55-e910-4cba-837e-a676c43b4822 | 29 |
08ed97e2-f711-4f79-8156-fe58bd45a4ff | https://committees.parliament.uk/publications/28682/documents/172676/default/ | 2,022 | [
"energy",
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] | parliament.uk | Energy Supply Company Special Administration Regime – Bulb Energy Limited Thank you for your letter of 28 June 2022 notifying me of replacement contingent liabilities arising from the initiation of the Energy Supply Company Special Administration Regime to provide the continuation of energy supplies to Bulb's customers. On the basis of the information contained in your letter, I can confirm that I have no issues to raise on the contingent liabilities arising. I am copying this letter to the Chair of the Business, Energy and Industrial Strategy Chair of the Committee of Public Accounts Minister of State for Energy, Clean Growth and Climate Department for Business, Energy & Industrial Strategy By handsg@parliament.uk | 87ee0c61-263f-4329-be85-67ebfb246bb3 | 0 |
08f54386-3f77-4eb2-9d69-bf95c4bf2d01 | https://cdn.climatepolicyradar.org/navigator/GBR/2021/carbon-budget-delivery-plan_19fa3072ff04d7abab9199e50abfb92c.pdf | 2,023 | [
"Economy-wide",
"policy",
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"emissions",
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] | cdn.climatepolicyradar.org | b) We are a world leader in the production and use of low carbon fuels, with independent analysis conducted for Sustainable Aviation forecasting the potential for 65,000 jobs to be created by a UK SAF industry by 2050, and £1.9bn of direct GVA c) The sector will see accelerated growth in the number of zero-emission vehicles on the road following implementation of the ZEV mandate and investment in charging infrastructure across the country. d) In 2021, domestic transport emissions were around 109 MtCO2e making up around 25% of total UK net GHG emissions (including international aviation and shipping). Road transport makes up the vast majority of emissions. Domestic transport emissions have decreased by 11% since 2019 and 15% since 1990, though 2021 emissions were impacted by COVID-19 and resultant restrictions on movement. e) In line with the sectoral breakdown of the indicative pathway set out in the NZS, compared to 2021 emissions levels, GHG emissions for domestic transport could fall by 2% to 8% on average over 2023-27, 27% to 39% by 2030 and 61% to 73% on f) International aviation and shipping were significantly impacted by COVID-19 and resultant restrictions on movement. In 2021, international aviation and shipping emissions were around 20 MtCO2e making up around 4% of total UK net GHG emissions (including international aviation and shipping). In 2019, international aviation and shipping emissions were around 44 MtCO2e making up around 9% of total UK net GHG emissions (including international aviation and shipping). g) For IAS, in line with the sectoral breakdown of the indicative pathway set out in the NZS, compared to 2019 emissions levels due to severely depressed demand in 2021, GHG emissions could fall by 11% or rise by 5% on average over 2033-37. Natural Resource, Waste & F-Gases 14. P&Ps will maximise co-benefits for climate and nature alongside other priority outcomes, including biodiversity, water quality, climate adaptation and economic growth. The package will ensure that from 2024, we will be paying farmers to provide a range of public goods, including actions to reduce emissions. The package will also lead to improved capture of data and evidence, with increased funding for R&D, increased engagement with external stakeholders to support waste policy and water management plans. P&Ps will also result in greater clarity on how we can deliver multifunctional landscapes that are resilient to our changing climate whilst meeting our needs for net zero, food production, environmental recovery, housing and infrastructure. a) Decarbonising agriculture and land use sectors and increasing carbon sequestration from land will provide opportunities for economic growth across rural communities. b) Unlocking private investment into nature-based solutions such as afforestation and peatland restoration will contribute to our goal to attract at least £1 billion of private finance into nature's recovery per year by 2030. c) In 2021, agriculture and other land use emissions were around 49 MtCO2e making up around 11% of total UK net GHG emissions (including international aviation and shipping). Livestock (particularly cattle) currently make up the largest share of these emissions. Agriculture and other land use emissions have decreased by 2% since 2019 and 25% since 1990. The largest factor in this long-term fall has been an increase in the sink provided by forest land, with an increasing CO2 uptake by trees as they reach maturity, in line with the historical planting pattern. In line with the sectoral breakdown of the indicative pathway set out in the NZS, compared to 2021 emissions levels, GHG emissions could fall by 1% to 12% on average over 2023-27, 11% to 24% by 2030 and 19% to 37% on average over 2033-37.
d) In 2021, waste and F-gas emissions were around 30 MtCO2e making up around 7% of total UK net GHG emissions (including international aviation and shipping). The largest emissions sources include landfill and air conditioning and refrigeration. Waste and F-gas emissions have decreased by 11% since 2019 and 66% since 1990. The reduction since 1990 is primarily due to reductions in emissions from landfill and halocarbon production. In line with the sectoral breakdown of the indicative pathway set out in the NZS, compared to 2021 emissions levels, GHG emissions could fall by 23% to 31% on average over 2023-27 43% to 51% by 2030 and 56% to 65% on average over 2033-37. e) The near elimination of biodegradable municipal waste being sent to landfill. f) Optimisation of current wastewater processes to reduce greenhouse gas emissions. 15. P&Ps will capitalise on the economic benefits from this emerging sector by scaling-up First of a Kind technologies to deliver new export opportunities and high-quality green jobs across the UK, supporting energy security and levelling- 16. The package will provide clarity on innovation funding, business models, monitoring, reporting and verification. Successful delivery will see the sector mature and grow significantly through the mid-to-late 2020s. This will be both in terms of a growth in the evidence base of the emerging technologies, and in terms of industry and public confidence in the long-term prospects of the deployment of GGRs at-scale in the UK. a) Funding a variety of innovative GGR technologies, including several first-generation Direct Air Capture (DAC) technologies through the DAC and Greenhouse Gas Innovation Programme. This programme will produce several operational pilot plants by 2025, and will also realise investment, jobs, skills and technology in this nascent b) £100m innovation investment in key technologies, will help to move nascent technologies from prototype stage through to demonstration and deployment. c) One example of a project being funded is a consortium led by Sizewell C, who are developing an innovative heat-powered Direct Air Capture (DAC) demonstrator plant designed to capture low carbon waste heat from a nuclear power plant. This technology could offer increased efficiency and less reliance on electricity, therefore reducing the cost of removing carbon dioxide from the atmosphere. A scaled-up DAC plant linked to Sizewell C could utilise around 400 MW of heat from the nuclear power plant to capture 1.5 million tonnes of CO2 per year. | f1206e39-e30b-4828-a2d4-296506ac6fd1 | 50 |
08f815ab-d8de-4314-9066-b59a8d6c3a3f | https://cdn.climatepolicyradar.org/navigator/GBR/1900/united-kingdom-biennial-report-br-br-4_3ed9930a9ceb3d956a389f73b35d0ba4.pdf | 2,021 | [
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] | cdn.climatepolicyradar.org | The land use categories which have the greatest effect on the net LULUCF emissions/removals are forest land (a net sink), cropland (a net source), settlement (a net source) and grassland (a net sink). Forest land is currently a decreasing sink due to the decreasing average age of trees as a consequence of historically low rates of afforestation during the 1990s. Emissions from cropland have decreased by 25% since 1990. Net removals from grassland have increased by 24% since 1990 (i.e. more CO2 has been drawn down by grassland). 2.5.5 Industrial processes and product use The industrial processes sector contains all emissions from industry except for those associated with fuel combustion. Sources include metal production, mineral products (cement and lime) and chemical production. Industrial processes (end-use) emissions have decreased by an estimated 54% since 1990. The largest reductions are from the chemical manufacturing industry, most notably the abatement of N2O emissions from nitric and adipic acid manufacture in response to Integrated Pollution Prevention Control. The waste management sector includes emissions from waste disposed to landfill sites, waste incineration, and the treatment of waste water. Emissions from disposal of waste have decreased by an estimated 69% since 1990, primarily due to the decline in CH4 emissions. This decrease has been realised mainly due to tighter regulation of landfills, through fitting of CH4 recovery systems on landfills, and increasing diversion of biodegradable waste from landfill. There has also been more diversion away from landfills in response to the UK landfill tax and policies to meet the requirements of the EU Landfill Directive. The UK GHG inventory uses error propagation and Monte Carlo simulation methods to estimate uncertainties for GWP weighted emissions of all GHGs. The uncertainty estimates Estimated emissions of CO2, which dominate GWP weighted emissions, have a low uncertainty of around 3%. There are much larger uncertainties associated with emissions of other gases. The LULUCF, waste management and agriculture sectors are the sectors with
2. Information on GHG emissions and trends 25 1990 2017 Range of Percentage Range of likely % emissions3 emissions3 Uncertainty4 uncertainty in change change between GWP2 in 2017 2017 emissions between 1990 and 20175 (thousand tonnes emissions 2.5 97.5 1990 and 2.5 97.5 CO2 equivalent) percentile percentile 2017 percentile percentile Methane 25 133,145 51,927 17% 44,414 61,752 -60% -70% -50% Nitrous oxide 298 48,331 20,680 18% 17,585 24,828 -56% -70% -42% HFCs 12 – 14,800 14,394 14,197 9% 12,883 15,490 -1% -17% 19% PFCs 7,390 – 17,340 1,652 372 24% 291 469 -77% -82% -72% 1990-2017 final UK GHG emissions statistics10 1. Figures include emissions for the UK, Crown Dependencies and the Overseas Territories. Uncertainties are not calculated for different geographical coverages but would be expected to be similar. 2. The GWP (Global Warming Potential) of a GHG measures its effectiveness in global warming over 100 years relative to carbon dioxide. The GWPs used in these statistics are from Working Group 1 of the IPCC Fourth Assessment Climate Change 2007. 3. 1990 and 2017 estimates, and the percentage change, are presented as the central estimate from the model. These differ from the 4. Expressed as a percentage relative to the mean value 2017 emissions. Calculated as 0.5*R/E where R is the difference between 2 .5 and 97.5 percentiles and E is the mean. 5. Equivalent to a 95 per cent probability that the percentage change between 1990 and 2017 is between the 2 values shown. Values include uncertainties for Overseas Territories data. 6. CO2 emissions are net emissions. Total emissions minus removals. on total UK GHG emissions, which is 3% in 2017. The analysis of the uncertainties for N2O is particularly difficult because the sources are diverse and there is little data available to form an assessment of the uncertainties in each source. To put this into context the central estimate of N2O emissions was 21 MtCO2e, the uncertainty analysis resulted in a 95% confidence interval The likely percentage change between 1990 and 2017 lies between -39% and -45%, with a central estimate of -42%. The uncertainty in the trend of emissions is smaller than the overall uncertainty on the emissions total in a given year. The uncertainty in the trend between years (as a percentage change) is likely to be less than the uncertainty in a given year because the methodology used is consistent throughout the time-series. Therefore, there is more certainty in the trend in emissions than the absolute emissions themselves. This gives more confidence in assessing compliance with percentage reduction targets, where it is the trend
26 UK’s Fourth Biennial Report 2.6 Changes since the last Biennial Report Since the publication of the UK’s Third Biennial Report in December 201712, various updates and revisions to methodologies have been implemented in the UK’s GHG inventory that have impacted on the time-series of emissions. The most significant changes have been Revision to upstream oil and gas combustion estimates, and method change for Energy from Waste plant using revised UK 1.3% increase to emissions estimates from energy industries New installation data for upstream oil and gas fugitive estimates 1.4% increase to emissions estimates from fugitive emissions Revisions to natural gas use in off-road material 0.5% increase to emissions estimates from manufacturing 48% increase in emissions from non-energy products from fuel Revision to all shipping gas oil and fuel oil activity data and 5% increase to transport emissions Reconciliation of harvest volume and forest age data 157% decrease in emissions from harvested wood products UK GHG Inventory Annual Report for Submission1. A full list of revisions can be found therein in tables 10.1-10.15. The indirect GHGs emitted in significant volumes in the UK consist of nitrogen oxides (NOX), carbon monoxide (CO), Non-Methane Volatile Organic Compounds (NMVOC) and sulphur dioxide (SO2). Of these, NOX, CO and NMVOC can increase tropospheric ozone concentration and hence radiative forcing. SO2 contributes to aerosol formation in the atmosphere. This is shows emissions from these gases since 1990. | 025a518f-ffd4-4f95-b5a2-b6052b167c0d | 6 |
09003472-5234-4aa3-8401-7df088593f0a | http://arxiv.org/pdf/2506.05555v1 | 2,025 | [
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] | arxiv.org | the Politician role affecting decisions). Results are shown in Fig. 2 with three visualisations. An individual point of note is that 81% of games ended in survival, significantly higher than the survival rates in recent human PoM studies. The recent experiments were performed in an online environment in contrast to which was a card game. Possible explanations include: 1) LLM players may exhibit inherently prosocial behaviour that SVO prompting cannot fully override, or 2) our framework ensures consistent communication, which corresponds with findings in that groups that survived communicated more, a factor we explore in Sec. | fe27d16e-0d3b-4d9d-ae39-0c07432b4202 | 13 |
09013676-5a31-4e8d-90d5-6e111b5af89c | https://cdn.climatepolicyradar.org/navigator/GBR/2023/environmental-improvement-plan-2023_b63089e656c9dc7d7685d25d071d24a1.pdf | 2,023 | [
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] | cdn.climatepolicyradar.org | Plans by water companies will be produced on a non-statutory basis by May 2023, and Defra will put in place the relevant legislative provisions to make them statutory. • Support Water UK’s Net Zero Route Map and further develop research to understand process emissions
Reduce nutrient pollution to enable sustainable We are committed to tackling nutrient pollution at source to restore our protected sites and support sustainable development. Therefore, working closely together , Defra and the Department for Levelling Up, Housing and Communities (DLUHC) have introduced a package of measures. This includes action set out in the wastewater treatment section • Introducing a new Nutrient Mitigation Scheme, established by Defra, to facilitate building thousands of homes while creating new wetland habitat. DLUHC and Defra have provided up to £30m of pump priming investment to kickstart the scheme. • Enhancing local capacity to enable sustainable development with tools and guidance, £100,000 for new catchment officers in each area, nutrient advisers in the Planning Advisory Service and additional • Provisions in the Levelling Up and Regeneration Bill that will require water companies to upgrade wastewater treatment works to the highest nutrient removal standards in priority catchments affected by excess nutrients. This will significantly reduce pollution from existing homes in sensitive areas. • Setting a stretching interim target to reduce nitrogen, phosphorus and sediment pollution from agriculture to the water environment in catchments containing protected sites in unfavourable condition due to nutrient pollution, requiring a 15% reduction by 31 January 2028, to drive the particular need to focus and front load our interventions in these areas. The government is committed to rapidly increasing the supply of mitigation credits, to speed up planning permissions and enable the building of new homes. It is also committed to working with local planning authorities, Natural England and the development industry to ensure that sustainable development can be unlocked across the
In August 2022, we also published the Storm Overflows Discharge Reduction Plan. This Plan will require water companies to deliver the largest infrastructure programme in water company history - £56 billion of capital investment by 2050. The Storm Overflows Discharge Reduction Plan requires water companies to achieve the following • By 2035, to have protected all our designated bathing waters and the majority of our most sensitive and protected habitats from storm sewage discharges. • By 2050, to have eliminated all adverse ecological • By 2050, to have ensured all storm overflows discharge less than an average of 10 rainfall events per year . We will ensure Event Duration Monitors are installed on all storm overflows by the end of 2023. This is up from only 5% Water companies are investing £3.1 billion from 2020 to 2025, including £1.9 billion on the Thames Tideway Tunnel (which is due for completion in 2025). Water companies are delivering over 800 storm overflow improvements investigations across England over the 2020 to 2025 period. We expect that a combination of regulation and public and private schemes will contribute at least 80% of the progress required to deliver our target to reduce nitrogen, phosphorus and sediment pollution from agriculture into the water environment. We expect the remainder will be met through other improvements made by the farming and environmental land management sector , such as developments in soil and nutrient management. We also expect the farming sector to improve water storage and management, and therefore the resilience of industry,
as part of helping to meet our target to reduce the use of public water supply. These improvements will be made through changes to abstraction and water licensing, as well as through offering grant funding, as set out in this chapter . We aim to increase the percentage of water storage used by the agriculture and horticulture sectors by 66% by 2050, to contribute towards this water demand target. Incentivise best practice through our new • Pay farmers to adopt more sustainable farming practices that can improve water quality through accelerated and enhanced funding, by offering at least six new Sustainable Farming Incentive standards which will pay farmers for in-field flower-rich strips, companion cropping and grassy field corners, and for measures to protect watercourses through • Co-finance the significant investment that is required to bring farm slurry management and storage up to date and prevent pollution. This is a short-term intervention to help farmers bring their systems up to date, after which we will step up our enforcement in this area to maintain compliance and prevent pollution • Fund research and development of innovative technologies and techniques to enable the increased effective use of manure and slurry as resources rather • Complete Diffuse Water Pollution Plans to identify the specific pressures affecting water dependent Increase investment in proactive measures to increase regulatory compliance • Increased funding for farm inspectors to allow over 4,000 site inspections per year , particularly targeting
inspections in catchments where protected sites are in • Provided £1.3m per year between 2021 and 2025 to the EA to pilot methods to improve farmer compliance and environmental outcomes, through our Testing Approaches to the Regulation of Agriculture project (Project TARA). These methods range from the use of remote monitoring (for example through drones) to better identify and target potential sources of pollution, to the development of local networks between the EA and key farming stakeholders to improve understanding of the regulations. • Expanded the successful Catchment Sensitive Farming programme with over £30 million of extra funding to cover all farmland in England to offer advice and guidance on mitigating pollution. • Launched the £10 million Water Management grant scheme to support on-farm reservoirs and investments in best practice irrigation application equipment. • Launched the Slurry Investment Grant providing up to £13m this year to support investment in covered slurry stores in the highest priority areas of England. We have also committed to reviewing our farming regulations to make sure they are fit for purpose, and are effective at delivering our outcomes and preventing water pollution. | 5fca7948-556a-402c-afe1-93234c8be5cb | 27 |
0909aa87-892c-4998-bbf9-ca0e7f53d73a | https://cdn.climatepolicyradar.org/navigator/GBR/2020/the-sixth-carbon-budget_2cb9fc7e21801940b0a9c50cbe4bc1ad.pdf | 2,020 | [
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] | cdn.climatepolicyradar.org | As set out in Chapter 7, there are levers available to the UK to influence these emissions and we noted that around 75% of the UK’s consumption emissions are, or soon will be, covered by Net Zero targets, while 45% of imported emissions are in the supply chains of UK firms. We do not recommend that the UK set a legal target for consumption emissions comparable to carbon budgets at this • Territorial emissions remain the agreed international approach to setting emissions targets and map most closely to UK levers of influence. • Estimates of consumption emissions are considerably more uncertain and only available with a significant lag (the latest current estimates are for 2017). Estimates are more prone to changing with changes in assumptions or as a result of changes that do not reflect UK policy. However, there are strong arguments in favour of monitoring consumption emissions and considering policies to address imported as well as territorial • The UK’s consumption emissions are estimated to be around 50% higher than its territorial emissions. • Poor policy could lead to imported emissions increasing while territorial emissions fall, especially as the UK strengthens policy targeting sectors producing traded goods (e.g. manufacturing and agriculture). The carbon budgets should not be met by exporting our emissions and shutting down • The UK does have levers to affect imported emissions as well as territorial emissions (see Chapter 7). Some of these and other levers could even extend beyond the UK’s consumption emissions and help to encourage reductions in emissions outside the UK that are not imported to the UK. • Consumption emissions are recognised internationally. Demonstrating that the UK is considering them and taking action to reduce them can strengthen the UK’s credibility internationally and ability to encourage others to adopt high ambition. We therefore propose to track consumption emissions as a regular part of our progress monitoring in future. We set out an illustrative Paris-aligned trajectory in Chapter 7. If UK territorial emissions are reduced to Net Zero and UK trading partners reduce their emissions in line with the Paris Agreement, we estimate that UK consumption emissions would be around 90% below 1990 levels in 2050. We will further develop our analysis of consumption emissions with a view to developing indicators to provide more timely assessments of progress and to consider policies to address imported emissions (e.g. in trade agreements and
Chapter 10: Recommendations on the Sixth Carbon Budget 446 1 House of Commons Hansard (12 June 2019) Net Zero Emissions Target, Volume 661, Columns 673 2 HMG (2020) The future of carbon pricing 3 CCC Expert Advisory Group report on cross-cutting Sensitive Intervention Points to achieve net-zero emissions published on the CCC website
447 Sixth Carbon Budget – The path to Net Zero This page is left intentionally blank. 151 Buckingham Palace Road London | 083c769d-ace3-415a-9bbf-6c9f1540dcd7 | 150 |
090a35f0-ac52-4bf9-9ed8-f6e637df4aa6 | http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:L:2008:199:0001:0136:EN:PDF | 2,008 | [
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excluding M1G
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1.1.2012
31.12.2012
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1.1.2013
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31.12.2013
N1 class II
N1 class III, N2
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1.9.2011
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31.8.2015
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1.1.2014
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31.8.2016
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1.1.2014
31.8.2016
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31.12.2013
31.12.2013
31.8.2015
31.8.2016
31.8.2016
W
Euro 6b
Euro 6
M, N1 class I
PI, CI
1.9.2014
1.9.2015
28.7.2008
EN
Official Journal of the European Union
L 19955
Character
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OBD
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Engine
Implementation
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date new
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Last date of
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Y
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1.9.2015
1.9.2016
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1.9.2015
1.9.2016
Key
Euro 5a emissions standard excludes revised measurement procedure for particulates, particle number standard and flex fuel vehicle low temperature emission testing
with biofuel. Euro 6a emissions standard excludes revised measurement procedure for particulates, particle number standard and flex fuel vehicle low temperature emission testing
with biofuel. Euro 5 OBD standards includes relaxed in use performance ratio IUPR, NOx monitoring for petrol vehicles and tightened PM threshold limits for diesel. Euro 6- OBD standards relaxed diesel OBD threshold limits, no in use performance ratio IUPR. Euro 6- plus IUPR OBD includes relaxed diesel OBD threshold limits and relaxed in use performance ratio IUPR
Note Article 47 only permits type-approvals according to characters W, X and Y to be performed once Euro 6 OBD thresholds have been introduced. 2. | d3fc6859-41cb-4ee2-997b-90ebc4f9b481 | 230 |
090ba7bf-44b0-447f-bb23-a9b78239d2e8 | https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/1009448/decarbonising-transport-a-better-greener-britain.pdf | 2,021 | [
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] | assets.publishing.service.gov.uk | e will lead by example with 25% of the government car fleet ultra low emission by December 2022 and 100% of the government car and van fleet Government will ensure one in four of the central government car fleet is ultra low emission by 2022 and achieving a fully zero emission car and van fleet by 2027 . Government is leading the way here, going further and faster and again demonstrating that ZEVs are credible for fleet users across the UK. | 8f0273a5-decd-4a43-ab49-4f3473699e66 | 227 |
09115050-1e7c-4873-86ba-2a4666a0e1a0 | http://arxiv.org/abs/2308.06355v1 | 2,023 | [
"climate change",
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] | ArXiv | Sometimes they have been sent out to do their job with proven mechanisms in place to reduce Australia's CO 2 pollution, like the emissions reduction scheme former PM Julia Gillard promised in the 2010 election, and legislated successfully. At other times Australia has sent Foreign Ministers out into the world with their arms tied behind their back. Australia must have a consistent and effective Australian policy, and a good time to start is -now. . . . 1,2 1 i, 203 , i, i, i 2 i i , ii i -i, i, ii, i , , i ii i ii i. i , i i , i ii CO 2 , . i 1.5 deg C i i . i : i i, i , i . . . 1,2 1 i, 203 , i, i, i 2 i i , ii i -i, i, ii, i , , i ii i ii i. i , i i , i ii CO 2 , . i 1.5 deg C i i . i : i i, i , i | c30f9c43-7692-44f4-9a38-fc30b027ab66 | 1 |
0913a0b7-e8f0-4608-b533-446a2b283dd0 | http://arxiv.org/pdf/2504.18837v3 | 2,025 | [
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] | arxiv.org | This approach enables sentiment tracking across the timeline of an event and supports temporal and causal modeling of emotional trajectories. Misinformation and Disinformation : In climate discourse, the line between fact and fiction can often be blurred. Misinformation refers to false or misleading information spread without harmful intent, whereas disinformation denotes the deliberate spread of such content to manipulate or deceive. Both phenomena can significantly distort sentiment analysis outcomes by influencing public perception and emotional response to climate events. | 91b2dec7-5189-49a8-8121-8f787cee90eb | 3 |
09168479-3daf-4173-9664-25322d26fd66 | https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX:31998L0069 | 1,998 | [
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] | eur-lex.europa.eu | The chamber must be checked as in 2.3. If the propane mass does not agree with the injected mass to within ± 2 % then corrective action is required. 2.2. Determination of chamber background emissions
This operation determines that the chamber does not contain any materials that emit significant amounts of hydrocarbons. The check must be carried out at the enclosure's introduction to service, after any operations in the enclosure which may affect background emissions and at a frequency of at least once per year. 2.2.1. Variable-volume enclosures may be operated in either latched or unlatched volume configuration, as described in 2.1.1 Ambient temperatures must be maintained at 308 oK ± 2 oK (35o ± 2 oC) [309 oK ± 2 oK (36o ± 2 oC)|, throughout the 4-hour period mentioned below. 2.2.2. Fixed volume enclosures must be operated with inlet and outlet flow streams closed. Ambient temperatures must be maintained at 308 oK ± 2 oK (35o ± 2 oC) [309 oK ± 2 oK ( 36o ± 2 oC)] throughout the four-hour period mentioned below. 2.2.3. The enclosure may be sealed and the mixing fan operated for a period of up to 12 hours before the four-hour background sampling period begins. 2.2.4. The analyser (if required) must be calibrated, then zeroed and spanned. 2.2.5. The enclosure must be purged until a stable hydrocarbon reading is obtained, and the mixing fan turned on if not already on. 2.2.6. The chamber is then sealed and the background hydrocarbon concentration, temperature and barometric pressure are measured. These are the initial readings CHC,i, Pi and Ti used in the enclosure background calculation. 2.2.7. The enclosure is allowed to stand undisturbed with the mixing fan on for a period of four hours. 2.2.8. At the end of this time the same analyser is used to measure the hydrocarbon concentration in the chamber. The temperature and the barometric pressure are also measured. These are the final readings CHC,f, Pf and Tf. | 282d51c7-9418-4d78-8dce-aec1567a8b80 | 44 |
0919cf77-2c76-4496-b00f-0289390a8f68 | https://cdn.climatepolicyradar.org/navigator/GBR/1900/united-kingdom-biennial-reports-br-br-3-national-communication-nc-nc-7_dabcc5bcde8c5a69cb06295558ac6b22.pdf | 2,017 | [
"climate",
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Brief Description Start Year of Greenhouse Gas Saving (ktCO2 eq) Expired The Energy Company Obligation (ECO) is a statutory obligation 250,000 domestic customers and delivering over a certain amount reductions in carbon emissions or achieve heating cost savings in domestic households. ECO focuses on insulation measures, and also income and vulnerable households. It ran until March 2017. ECO initially ‘ECO1’), although was extended in April 2014 to March 2017(‘ECO2’). Implemented The 2015 Spending Review replaced with a new, lower cost scheme that will run for 5 years (to March 2022) and will tackle the root causes of fuel poverty. The 5 year extension will take place in the two phases, with the ECO Extension (April 2017 - Sept 2018) acting as a bridge between the expired ECO scheme and the new fuel poverty will run from Oct 2018 to March Planned The 2015 Spending Review replaced with a new, lower cost scheme that will run for 5 years (to March 2022) and will tackle the root causes of fuel poverty. The 5 year extension will take place in the two phases, with the ECO Extension (April 2017 - Sept 2018) acting as a bridge between the expired ECO scheme and the new fuel poverty will run from Oct 2018 to March
Brief Description Start Year of Greenhouse Gas Saving (ktCO2 eq) Economic Expired Warm Front installed heating and insulation measures to make homes warmer and more energy efficient for private sector households in England vulnerable to fuel poverty. The scheme offered a package of heating and insulation measures of up to £3,500 (or £6,000 where oil central heating or other alternative technologies are recommended). Regulatory Expired Energy Efficiency Commitment I (EEC I): GB wide regulation that required all electricity and gas a combined energy saving of 62 their customers to install energy- EEC II - energy suppliers with more than 50,000 domestic customers required to deliver a total of 130 TWh lifetime energy use reductions in GB households, primarily through the promotion of energy efficiency that required all domestic energy suppliers with a customer base 4,627 2,987 2,476 2,293 2,258 Regulatory Expired CERT extension - increased the targets originally set under CERT by 20% and required domestic energy suppliers with a customer base in excess of 50,000 (later increased to 250,000) to make savings in also refocused subsidy towards insulation measures and away from electricity saving measures such as low energy lighting - and introduced a super priority group (households in receipt of certain means-tested benefits) to make energy reductions 1,914 1,680 1,420 1,317 1,247
Brief Description Start Year of Greenhouse Gas Saving (ktCO2 eq) Regulatory Expired Community Energy Saving regulation that targeted households across Great Britain, in areas of efficiency standards, and reduce fuel bills. CESP was funded by an obligation on larger energy suppliers and also the larger, Expired Energy Performance Certificates building is sold, rented out or constructed, and sometimes after information on a building’s energy efficiency in a sliding scale from ‘A’ (very efficient) to ‘G’ (least efficient) Energy Performance Certificates building is sold, rented out or constructed, and after refurbishment undertaken to a building and the modifications change the number of parts designed or altered for provision or extension of any fixed services for heating, hot water, air-conditioning and mechanical ventilation. EPCs give information on a building’s energy efficiency in a sliding scale from ‘A’ (very efficient) to Adopted Extension of the EPBD requirement for public buildings to display Energy Performance Certificates to include buildings over 250m2 from Planned "The Government is required to report to the European Commission by June 2017 to demonstrate that UK building standards for energy performance remain ‘cost optimal’. Brief Description Start Year of Greenhouse Gas Saving (ktCO2 eq) Implemented From the 1 April 2018 there will be a requirement for any properties rented out in the private rented sector to have a minimum energy Energy Performance Certificate (EPC). The regulations will come into force for new lets and renewals of tenancies with effect from 1 April 2018 and for all existing tenancies on 1 April 2020 (1 April 2023 for non-domestic properties). It will be unlawful to rent a property which breaches the requirement for a minimum E rating, unless there is to achieving energy efficiency Economic Implemented The Public Sector Energy Efficiency Loans Scheme, managed by Salix Finance Ltd, provides interest-free loans in England to public sector organisations for energy efficiency schemes. These loans are intended to provide the capital cost of energy efficiency retrofit work and other measures to be installed. These loans have a payback period of five years (eight for schools) during which the repayments are met with the energy bill savings from the energy efficiency measures. Thus, once the loan has been paid off, the organisations continue to benefit from energy savings for the lifetime of these measures. This funding is then recycled once it has been returned to the Scheme and once again loaned out. BEIS provides the most amount of funding to the funding from Scotland, Wales and to achieving energy efficiency Economic Expired The Carbon Trust provided interest free loans of £3,000 - £400,000 businesses to invest in energy efficiency equipment and renewable technologies. These loans were designed so that in most cases the forecast reduction in energy costs would be similar to the total
Brief Description Start Year of Greenhouse Gas Saving (ktCO2 eq) energy-intensive industries to Implemented Climate Change Agreements offer participating energy-intensive industries a discount from the for meeting targets for energy reductions. From 2013 these are a 90% discount for electricity and a 65% discount for other fuels. From 2019 this will increase to a 93% discount for electricity and 78% Implemented A mandatory energy assessment scheme for all large undertakings requirements contained Article 8 of the EU Energy Efficiency Directive (2012/27/EU). | c6207828-d0f1-4adb-9ed1-c6b8e81a528f | 140 |
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"section"
] | HF-national-climate-targets-dataset | Our Minister concerned shall be authorised to apply executive coercion to enforce the provisions laid down by or pursuant to the Act concerned in cases where: Section 18.4 | 7216f9e0-c5bc-408d-a351-4f0dd34e9c2d | 0 | |
091b50a1-fd74-42e5-9517-5e75f9ce98af | https://www.gov.scot/binaries/content/documents/govscot/publications/strategy-plan/2020/12/securing-green-recovery-path-net-zero-update-climate-change-plan-20182032/documents/update-climate-change-plan-2018-2032-securing-green-recovery-path-net-zero/update-climate-change-plan-2018-2032-securing-green-recovery-path-net-zero/govscot%3Adocument/update-climate-change-plan-2018-2032-securing-green-recovery-path-net-zero.pdf | 2,019 | [
"scotland",
"climate",
"change",
"plan",
"emissions"
] | www.gov.scot | Outcome 3: Scotland secures maximum economic benefit from the continued investment and growth in electricity generation capacity and support for the new and innovative technologies which will deliver our decarbonisation goals. Press the UK Government to further reform and maintain the CfD mechanism in a manner which better captures the economic benefits and total value added for the Scottish and Introduce new requirements for developers to include supply chain commitments when applying to the ScotWind leasing process run by Crown Estate Scotland. Identify and support major infrastructure improvements to ensure that Scotland’s supply chain companies and facilities can benefit from the continued growth of renewable energy. Update to the Climate Change Plan | Annexes 215 Outcome 1: The heat supply to our homes and non-domestic buildings is very substantially decarbonised, with high penetration rates of renewable and zero emissions heating Outcome 2: Our homes and buildings are highly energy efficient, with all buildings upgraded where it is appropriate to do so, and new buildings achieving ultra-high levels of fabric efficiency Energy Company Obligation (ECO) requires obligated energy supply companies to deliver energy efficiency measures in homes – mainly insulation-based measures and boiler Energy Efficient Scotland Delivery Ħ Area Based Schemes and Warmer Homes Scotland. Ħ Home Energy Scotland Advice Service and Loans. Ħ Home Energy Scotland cashback scheme for zero emissions heating technologies and energy efficiency measures - Ħ SME Advice Service and Loans. Ħ SME cashback scheme for zero emissions heating technologies and energy efficiency measures - boosted. We will review existing Scottish Government funding schemes to ensure that they support the deployment of low and zero emissions heat. We will expand the provision of loans to the SME sector, and enhance the wider energy efficiency and heat advice service and provision of tailored start-to-end support. Procure a new national delivery scheme, to replace the existing Warmer Homes Scotland contract, to open in 2022. Energy Efficiency Standard for Social will be met by social landlords by 2020. Maintained 2024 New Build Zero Emissions from Heat requiring new buildings to have zero emissions heating systems. 216 Update to the Climate Change Plan | Annexes Review of energy standards within building regulations. The review investigates the potential for further, significant improvement on 2015 standards and how building standards can support other carbon and energy policy outcomes, including our decarbonisation of heat agenda. Heat in Buildings Put in place regulation to increase uptake of zero emissions heating systems and improve energy efficiency standards across all tenures, prioritising the raising of standards for households living in fuel poverty. Re-introduce revised regulations to the Scottish Parliament requiring mandatory minimum energy efficiency standards for the Private Rented Sector, to come into force from 2022. Low Carbon Infrastructure Transition Programme (LCITP) - supports investment in decarbonisation of business and the Expanded £1.6bn Heat in Buildings capital funding over the next parliament Building on the Low Carbon Infrastructure Transition Programme (LCITP) and existing energy efficiency and zero emissions heat support programmes. Non Domestic Public Sector Energy Efficiency (NDEE) A four year framework launched in March 2016, designed to support public and third sector organisations to procure Energy Efficiency retrofit work. The Framework will continue for a further four years commencing in 2020. NDEE Support Unit accelerates the number of projects and delivery timescales of public sector energy efficiency projects using the NDEE Framework and supports our wider ambitions around energy demand reduction. The Renewable Heat Incentive (RHI) - a GB-wide scheme created by the UK Government (with the agreement of the Scottish Government). UK Government is extending both the domestic and non-domestic RHI out to 2022. UK Green Gas Support Scheme - a GB-wide Green Gas Scheme is planned to come into force in 2022, stimulating biomethane UK Clean Heat Grant - a GB-wide Clean Heat Grant is planned to come into force in 2022, supporting uptake of heat pumps (and limited biomass boilers) via up-front grants. Support for Heat the District Heating Loan Fund helps address the financial and technical barriers to district heating projects by offering low interest loans. Update to the Climate Change Plan | Annexes 217 Implement the provisions of the Heat Networks (Scotland) Bill to create a strong regulatory framework to support delivery by Continue to support the Heat Network Partnership - a collaboration of agencies focused on the promotion and support of district heating schemes in Scotland. Net Zero Carbon Public Sector Buildings Standard will be introduced in 2021 and progressively rolled out across the public sector, as announced in the Programme for Government Local Heat and Energy Efficiency Strategies (LHEES) will be in place by the end of 2023, setting out preferred heat solutions zones, guiding building owner decision making about replacement heating systems, and forming the basis for local delivery plans targeting heat and energy efficiency investment. Assessment of Energy Performance and Emissions Regulations (Non-Domestic Buildings) - The Assessment of Energy Performance of Non-domestic Buildings (Scotland) Regulations 2016 require assessment of the energy performance and emissions of larger non-domestic buildings (those over 1,000 m²). A review programmed for 2021 will investigate and consult upon amended scope of standards and more challenging improvement targets to create a viable pathway for all existing non-domestic buildings to deliver the level of energy demand and emissions reductions needed. Support for community low and zero emissions heat projects Salix financing facility to support investment in non-domestic buildings retrofit. Maintained Work with social landlords to bring forward the review of the existing Energy Efficiency Standard for Social Housing (EESSH2) with a view to strengthening and realigning the standard with net-zero requirements. | 9e89f3e7-5608-4a69-bc95-89195cd33085 | 59 |
09204b77-fe57-4126-87c4-4124d90f3a6e | http://arxiv.org/pdf/2304.08049v1 | 2,023 | [
"damage",
"tvar",
"function",
"variability",
"climate"
] | arxiv.org | At the end of this century, the GDP levels under the SSP2 and SSP1 are very similar, but economic growth is faster during midcentury in the SSP1. Due to the combinations of warming and growth rates, the SCC value is slightly higher under the SSP1-2.6 scenario reaching about US$38.76/tCO2 (US$30.79/tCO2) using the S&Tvar (None) damage functions; for the SSP2-4. The SCC was decomposed into 15 sectors, which add up only approximately to the SCC totals described in the previous paragraph due to differences in warming between the various months and annual warming (Table S13). A sensitivity analysis of the discount rate is presented in Tables S14-S15. Figure 4b shows the results for the SSP5-8.5 scenario obtained using the four sets of monthly sectoral damage functions (results for all SSPs considered are shown in Figure S5). The sector with the highest SCC value is Health (S&Tvar: US$15.96/tCO2 ; None: US$11.89/tCO2) which represents about 20% of the total SCC, followed by Amenity (S&Tvar: US$13.92/tCO2; None: US$10.37/tCO2; about 18% of total SCC), Catastrophe (S&Tvar: US$10.35/tCO2; None: US$8.22/tCO2; about 13% of total SCC) and Water (S&Tvar: US$8.50/tCO2; None: US$7.42/tCO2; about 12% of total SCC), while the only sector with negative SCC value is Time use (S&Tvar: -US$12.06/tCO2; None: -US$8.98/tCO2). These estimates allow to identify that about 60% of the total SCC comes from impacts on four sectors (Health, Amenity, Water, and Ecosystems). Most of the damages occur in the winter and summer, and that damages in 3 of these sectors would exceed 0.1% of global GDP per month during this decade (Figure S4). This suggests prioritizing adaptation in these sectors and seasons is key for reducing climate change impacts. For some sectors, the SCC values obtained from the Svar damage functions are greater than those from the S&Tvar functions (Agriculture, Forestry, Water and Air pollution; Tables S13-S15). In these sectors, the SCC values from the Tvar damage functions are smaller than those obtained from the damage functions that consider no variability (None). Similar to what is discussed in the previous section, these results are produced in sectors that have strong seasonal dependence and in which at least some of the relevant months show lower warming than the annual mean warming. Using modified versions of the damage functions from the RICE model (Methods; Table S16), the global SCC estimates were decomposed into 12 world regions. Figure 4c shows the SCC values for the SSP5-8.5 while Tables S17-S19 show the results for the SSP370, SSP245, SSP126 and SSP119, and three discount rates (4%, 3%, and 1.5%) The damages produced by an extra ton of CO2 are distributed in a highly heterogeneous way, concentrating in the most vulnerable regions. The highest SCC values occur for India (S&Tvar: US$14.28/tCO2; None: US$11.35/tCO2), Africa (S&Tvar: US$14.25/tCO2; None: US$11.32/tCO2), and China (S&Tvar: US$11.55/tCO2; None: US$9.17/tCO2) . These three regions account for about 45% to 51% of the global SCC value, depending on the SSP scenario. In contrast, the SCC values are about one order of magnitude lower for Eurasia (S&Tvar: US$0.99/tCO2; None: US$0.79/tCO2), Russia (S&Tvar: US$1.07/tCO2; None: US$0.85/tCO2) and Japan (S&Tvar: US$1.55/tCO2; None: US$1.23/tCO2). The SCC for the most developed regions (US, WEU, OHI) represents 22% to 25% of the global SCC value. Most IAMs and economic assessments of the impacts of climate change rely on the assumption that changes in the mean of a chosen index (e.g., global mean annual temperature) provide an adequate representation of the effects of this phenomenon on natural and human systems. Although this assumption helps keeping IAMs as simple and tractable as possible, it has two important limitations. First, it fails to take advantage of the advancement that climate modelling has had over the last 30 years in producing spatially explicit projections with better representation of low-and highfrequency variability 37 , and of the development of methods to emulate the output of complex climate models with much simpler and low computing costs 17,38 . Second, as is shown here, this simplification produces nontrivial biases in the estimated costs. Contrary to past studies which have focus on evaluating the effects temporal variability, here we show that omitting spatial variation produces large downward biases on the estimates of the costs of climate change, and that the interaction between temporal variability and spatial variation increases these biases. We show that current IAMs can be easily extended to account for these limitations and provide a more accurate representation of the effects of changes in climate both in the mean and its variability. We develop a set of damage functions that are able to account for temporal and spatial variability in temperature change. Moreover, annual, seasonal and monthly sectoral damage functions are proposed to fully take advantage of seasonal and spatially explicit temperature change projections. Results show that accounting for variability in warming affects the expected level of losses, and not only the risk premium, as proposed in previous publications. Spatial variation and temporal variability together always lead to higher present value of losses and SCC estimates when aggregated across sectors. However, for sectors in which there is a strong seasonal dependence and in which the warming in months that a relevant for the sector is lower than the annual average, economic losses can be smaller than under the assumption of no seasonal variability in warming. We show that traditional damage functions that rely on annual mean global temperature change may severely underestimate the expected losses from climate change. Under the SSP585 scenario, by 2100 global annual losses are projected to be about US$17-US$28 trillion dollars higher when spatial variation and temporal variability are accounted for, in comparison to commonly used damage functions that ignore warming variability. Similarly, the corresponding present value of losses during this century (2020-2100) is about US$47-US$66 trillion dollars higher using the S&Tvar damage functions. It is important to underline that the reported estimates are based on conservative calibrations of global damage functions and a relatively high discount rate is used (4%) for the main estimates. Comparing with previous estimates from Calel et al. | baedfd0c-702b-4ff4-9fd9-023461c07a93 | 3 |
0920728b-473c-4ecf-b667-2f660814131d | https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/media/6482f5aa5f7bb7000c7fa775/tfpp-uk-international-climate-finance-strategy-2023.pdf | 2,023 | [
"climate",
"finance",
"additional",
"international"
] | www.gov.uk | Leadership at the local level, including access to finance and the meaningful engagement of civil society organisations such as women’s rights, indigenous groups and Organisations of Persons with Disabilities (OPDs) is fundamental to ensuring action is effective in building resilience efforts that leave no one behind. Adapting and building resilience is about planning for and doing development differently; systematically taking account of climate risks in all policy, investment, spending and programming decisions and as part of this considering the roles that protection and enhancement of nature can play. As the Paris Agreement and Glasgow Climate Pact make clear, adaptation action should follow a country-driven, gender-responsive, disability inclusive participatory and fully transparent approach. Adaptation action provides opportunity for new green sectors and jobs. Our work will support countries to plan and identify climate risks, to be less reliant on sectors that are vulnerable to the effects of climate change and to increase people's capacity to withstand climate and nature-related In the UK, we are developing a third National Adaptation Programme, for publication in July 2023. Our objective is to build a society which makes timely, far-sighted, and well-informed decisions to address the risks posed by a changing climate in order to save lives, protect livelihoods and reduce vulnerability to the impacts of climate change across societies. Working with domestic stakeholders,
such as the Environment Agency and delivering an ambitious National Adaptation Programme will create opportunities for synergy and mutual learning between national and international approaches. By 2030, this pillar of ICF will contribute to • Helping millions of people adapt and build resilience to cope with the effects of climate change and biodiversity loss including those living in poverty, women and girls, people with disabilities, indigenous and local communities, marginalised and crisis-affected people. • Making a billion people safer from disasters through improving accessible ear ly warning systems and preparations as well as developing the capacity to act on the risks identified and strengthening the delivery mechanisms that enable effective early action to reach those who • Supporting small-s cale agricultural producers in low- and middle-income countries to enhance their resilience to a changing climate, including climate shocks and extreme events, increase household incomes and food security and reverse ecological decline. • Supporting the development of more resilient systems t o ensure effective and continued delivery of basic services, such as health, nutrition, social protection, education, infrastructure including transport, water supply and sanitation; including to particularly vulnerable groups • Strengthening capacity (at government, regional and community levels) to understand climate isks and integrate resilience into planning, policy, and investment decisions, across all affected areas of societies and economics, including through nature-based approaches. • Progress towards the achievement of SDG 1 (end poverty) SDG 2 (zero hunger) and SDG 6 ailability and sustainable management of water and sanitation for all). • Supportin g government, investment actors, civil society and private sector to understand and capitalise on economic opportunity that adaptation action can create. UK ICF will achieve this through • Maintaining a balance between mitigation and adaptation finance, recognising the ontributions that protection and enhancement of nature can provide to both and tripling our funding for adaptation from 2019 levels to £1.5bn in 2025. • Working with government partners and other key institutions – i n line with the principles for locally-l ed adaptation, to overcome political, financial, technical and other barriers to embed adaptation and resilience through all aspects of public policy, strategy and service delivery. This includes consideration of reaching and empowering women and girls, people with disabilities and the most vulnerable, enabling their leadership and meaningful participation in • Catalysing low-c arbon, sustainable and inclusive economic development that helps the poorest and most vulnerable to adapt to climate change whilst continuing to exit poverty. • Scaling up and targeting public and private investment to protect more people from the mpacts of disasters including through disaster risk finance (DRF) and development insurance and climate resilient debt clauses (CRDCs) which automatically pause debt repayments when
a climate shock or natural disaster hits. Increasing the financial resilience of climate vulnerable countries and ensuring that money is available to respond quickly after a disaster means that responses are faster, more dignified, more effective and can pre-empt damage. This work is part of the UK’s pledge of £120 million of new support for DRF made at Carbis Bay in June 2021 and will help deliver the G7 V20 Global Shield against climate risks esponsive and inclusive approaches into the design, delivery and assessment of ICF programming and investing in research and evidence on the impacts of climate change on women and girls, indigenous and local communities, people with disabilities and marginalised groups, including best practice for gender-responsive apacity in countries and international organisations to use research effectively to inform climate resilient development so that adaptation measures are designed based on robust scientific basis and the latest research and evidence on what works. • Developing national capacity to forecast and forewarn, act early and prepare based on risk nformation and shock-responsive social protection mechanisms, preventing hazards from • Working with countries to avert, minimise and address loss and damage. geographical regions will include Sub-Saharan Africa, South and Southeast Asia, Fragile and Conflict Affected States and Small Island Developing States. We will focus adaptation and resilience resources on the most vulnerable, considering ability to deliver and comparative UK advantage. Case The Climate and Resilience Framework Programme (CLARE) COP26 by the UK and Canada, the CLARE initiative aims to enable socially inclusive and sustainable action to build resilience to climate change and natural hazards, especially for the most vulnerable. | 449b84d7-e172-4b27-a508-5c79f1300e76 | 9 |
092bb75b-4eec-4b2f-8c20-904b5fdb4107 | http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:L:2008:199:0001:0136:EN:PDF | 2,008 | [
"Transport",
"Light-duty vehicles",
"Energy efficiency"
] | eur-lex.europa.eu | In paragraph 3, the reference to paragraph 5.3.1.4 shall be understood as reference to the applicable table of Annex I
to Regulation EC No 7152007. L 19928
EN
Official Journal of the European Union
28.7.2008
Appendix 3
MODEL
INFORMATION DOCUMENT No
relating to EC type-approval of a vehicle with regard to emissions and access to vehicle repair and
maintenance information
The following information, if applicable, must be supplied in triplicate and include a list of contents. Any drawings must be
supplied in appropriate scale and in sufficient detail on size A4 or on a folder of A4 format. | d3fc6859-41cb-4ee2-997b-90ebc4f9b481 | 77 |
092cb306-b0b1-4da2-bd59-eac91faeade2 | https://ec.europa.eu/environment/system/files/2021-11/COM_2021_706_1_EN_ACT_part1_v6.pdf | -1 | [
"Agriculture and forestry",
"Forestry",
"Non-energy use"
] | ec.europa.eu | Article 9
Information requirements
1. Operators shall collect information, documents and data demonstrating that the
relevant commodities and products are compliant with Article 3. For this purpose,
the operator shall collect, organise and keep for 5 years the following information
relating to the relevant commodities or products, supported by evidence
a
description, including the trade name and type of relevant commodities and
products as well as, where applicable, the common name of the species and its
full scientific name
b quantity expressed in net mass and volume, or number of units of the relevant
commodities and products
c
identification of the country of production
d geo-localisation coordinates, latitude and longitude of all plots of land where
the relevant commodities and products were produced, as well as date or time
range of production
e
f
name, email and address of any business or person from whom they have been
supplied with the relevant commodities or products
name, email and address of any business or person to whom the relevant
commodities or products have been supplied
EN
39
EN
2. 3. 1. g
h
adequate and verifiable information that the relevant commodities and products
are deforestation-free
adequate and verifiable information that the production has been conducted in
accordance with relevant legislation of the country of production, including
any arrangement conferring the right to use the respective area for the purposes
of the production of the relevant commodity
The operator shall make available to the competent authorities upon request the
information, documents and data collected under this Article. The Commission may adopt delegated acts in accordance with Article 33 to
supplement paragraph 1 concerning further relevant information to be obtained that
may be necessary to ensure the effectiveness of the due diligence system. Article 10
Risk assessment and risk mitigation
Operators shall verify and analyse information collected in accordance with Article 9
and any other relevant documentation, and on this basis carry out a risk assessment to
establish whether there is a risk that the relevant commodities and products intended
to be placed on or exported from the Union market are non-compliant with the
requirements of this Regulation. If the operators cannot demonstrate that the risk of
non-compliance is negligible, they shall not place the relevant commodity or product
on the Union market nor export it. | fdc8afd5-2a2d-4946-a4da-be36ebf11749 | 54 |
092ee5cf-6b11-4f73-bd1a-6b8df700ab01 | http://arxiv.org/pdf/2412.03598v1 | 2,024 | [
"geoengineering",
"methane",
"climate",
"would",
"global"
] | arxiv.org | Between 2000 and 2019, it is estimated that almost 5 million deaths were associated with temperature extremes, and those associated with cold were 9 times more numerous than those associated with extreme heat (Zhao et al. 2021). From 2000-2003to 2016-2019, the number of cold-related deaths fell considerably, even as some heat-related deaths rose. Overall, the number of people dying from temperature-related causes decreased. It is estimated that Russia's temperature-related mortality is projected to decrease by 89 deaths per 100,000 people by the end of the century, among the greatest decreases out of any country in the world (Stevens 2023). In a geoengineered world, this decrease in death rate would be significantly lower, and depending on the amount of geoengineering undertaken, Russia could see even more cold-related deaths in the future. A decrease of 89 deaths per 100,000 people by the end of the century, considering Russia's population of around 144 million, would constitute a decrease of around 128,000 deaths. If it is assumed that "moderate" geoengineering could decrease the rate of warming in half, one could see geoengineering as indirectly killing Russian citizens. Every human interaction that attempts to reduce the global temperature by 1°C could lead to tens of thousands more cold-related deaths in Russia within a decade. If the world undertakes aggressive geoengineering, lowering global temperatures, Russia would likely see an increase in the number of temperature-related deaths on a massive scale. These tens of thousands of additional cold-related deaths from geoengineering could be construed by Russia as an attack on its population and thus give it a reasonable self-defense argument for undertaking countergeoengineering. In a country which faces an aging population and the burden of demographic decline, minimizing temperature-related mortality is especially important. In addition to lessening the demographic issue, global warming has also expanded Russia's growing season and access to ports in Arctic regions. Climate change is predicted to "positively affect" agriculture in Russia by expanding the growing season in the central and northern regions of the country, even as the southern region may be negatively impacted by a drier climate (Kiselev et al. 2013). Perhaps climate change's biggest benefit for Russia is a warming Arctic Ocean, which is a currently untapped route for shipping due to frozen waters for large parts of the year. With rising temperatures, the Arctic may become a year-round shipping route, which provides great commercial promise for Russia. Additionally, it is estimated that up to 16% of the world's oil and 30% of the world's natural gas is currently lying underneath the Arctic Ocean, a vast portion of which is under Russian control, and an ice-free Arctic would provide much easier access to the untapped wealth of the ocean (Gatopoulos 2022). Potential benefits of global warming are not exclusive to Russia, but it is perhaps the country with the greatest capacity to counteract potential geoengineering solutions. There are many different strategies that a country looking to counteract geoengineering can take to keep global temperatures on an upward trajectory. Heyen et al. (2019) explores some of these different approaches to countering geoengineering, focusing its analysis on their implications for the implementation of solar geoengineering, ultimately arguing that the possibility of counter-geoengineering arising from differing temperature preferences may help reduce the "freedriver" problem associated with the unilateral deployment of stratospheric aerosols. The different strategies to enact counter-geoengineering are extensively detailed in Parker et al. (2018), which also provides the basis for the analysis of Heyen et al (2019). Two different broad approaches to counter-geoengineering exist: "countervailing" approaches, which seek to introduce warming agents into the atmosphere, and "neutralizing" approaches, which seek to remove the SRM agents from the atmosphere or remove their cooling effects. Potential neutralizing approaches may include adding a "base" to the stratosphere that could counteract sulfate aerosols and potentially reduce SRM's radiative forcing or trailing aircraft deploying stratospheric aerosols and releasing neutralizing agents into the "near-field high-concentration plume" (Parker et al. 2018). Another such approach could be the release of aerosols that could deplete black carbon and titanium oxide in the atmosphere, as both substances are cooling agents. Countervailing approaches, which are much more commonly discussed, include the release of greenhouse gasses and stratospheric heating molecules such as sulfur hexafluoride and many different chlorofluorocarbons and hydrochlorofluorocarbons. Potential candidates also include sulfuryl fluoride, HFC-152a, and difluoromethane. Many of these greenhouse gases have very high global warming potentials, meaning a small release could be enough to counteract geoengineering. It is noted in Parker et al. (2018), however, that there are not many plausible greenhouse gasses for counter-geoengineering as those with strong global warming potentials tend to have long lifetimes, making them less appealing as agents of countering geoengineering. This is because their impacts would last for much longer than those of sulfur aerosols, which tend to have lifetimes in the scale of several years as opposed to several centuries or millennia. Alternatively, solid particles with high radiative efficiency are also potential candidates for counter-geoengineering, as they tend to have higher radiative forcing per unit mass and shorter atmospheric lifetimes, though their cost at the moment may be prohibitive. In this paper, we focus on methane in our discussion of potential counter-geoengineering, as countries already have the capacity to release large amounts of methane into the atmosphere, it has a relatively short lifetime (around 12 years in the atmosphere, as opposed to around 3,000 years for sulfur hexafluoride, for example), and generally has no negative health effects. Crucially, large amounts of methane can be released in a very short time at a low cost and start warming the atmosphere immediately. The stockpile of methane that already exists makes it a virtually unpredictable agent of counter-geoengineering. Although methane is not as powerful a warming agent as many of the other options discussed in Parker et al. (2018), it can have strong warming effects in the short-term. In the first year after deployment, its warming capacity is up to 120 times carbon dioxide's (Lawton 2021). | 4691bdce-3829-401f-9e93-50ed134fec30 | 3 |
093319d4-1d69-47f9-8908-3d3d65b5116e | http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/ALL/?uri=CELEX:32009L0073 | 2,009 | [
"Electricity and heat",
"Gas",
"Energy efficiency",
"Renewables",
"Other low-carbon technologies and fuel switch"
] | eur-lex.europa.eu | 2. The provisions of paragraph 1 shall not apply to ancillary services and temporary storage that are related to LNG facilities and are necessary for the re-gasification process and subsequent delivery to the transmission system. 3. In the case of negotiated access, Member States or, where Member States have so provided, the regulatory authorities shall take the necessary measures for natural gas undertakings and eligible customers either inside or outside the territory covered by the interconnected system to be able to negotiate access to storage facilities and linepack, when technically and/or economically necessary for providing efficient access to the system, as well as for the organisation of access to other ancillary services. The parties shall be obliged to negotiate access to storage, linepack and other ancillary services in good faith. Contracts for access to storage, linepack and other ancillary services shall be negotiated with the relevant storage system operator or natural gas undertakings. The regulatory authorities where Member States have so provided or Member States shall require storage system operators and natural gas undertakings to publish their main commercial conditions for the use of storage, linepack and other ancillary services by 1 January 2005 and on an annual basis every year thereafter. When developing the conditions referred to in the second subparagraph, storage operators and natural gas undertakings shall consult system users. 4. In the case of regulated access, the regulatory authorities where Member States have so provided or Member States shall take the necessary measures to give natural gas undertakings and eligible customers either inside or outside the territory covered by the interconnected system a right to access to storage, linepack and other ancillary services, on the basis of published tariffs and/or other terms and obligations for use of that storage and linepack, when technically and/or economically necessary for providing efficient access to the system, as well as for the organisation of access to other ancillary services. The regulatory authorities where Member States have so provided or Member States shall consult system users when developing those tariffs or the methodologies for those tariffs. The right of access for eligible customers may be given by enabling them to enter into supply contracts with competing natural gas undertakings other than the owner and/or operator of the system or a related undertaking. Article 34
Access to upstream pipeline networks
1. Member States shall take the necessary measures to ensure that natural gas undertakings and eligible customers, wherever they are located, are able to obtain access to upstream pipeline networks, including facilities supplying technical services incidental to such access, in accordance with this Article, except for the parts of such networks and facilities which are used for local production operations at the site of a field where the gas is produced. The measures shall be notified to the Commission in accordance with the provisions of Article 54. | 468e5f96-94f7-4694-bfed-829608c266ef | 45 |
0933ca65-7019-474a-9d70-3ddc25d0c39e | http://arxiv.org/pdf/2301.03354v1 | 2,023 | [
"deforestation",
"project",
"average",
"control",
"cover"
] | arxiv.org | Average project impacts on deforestation (i.e., average treatment effects on the treated; ATT) in Peru, Colombia, and Africa (DRC, Tanzania, and Zambia) were estimated with the generalized SC (GSC) method (Fig. 3, upper panels). Cambodian projects were excluded from this analysis, due to the limited sample size. Unlike the individual project evaluations, the GSC analyses were based exclusively on annual deforestation rates and time-variant covariates. Such a distinction between the two methods increases the robustness of our results. The GSC analyses were based on two independent sets of selected control areas for each region: in the first set, only the donors selected for the construction of the individual SCs were considered, whereas in the second set, controls were selected based on a genetic matching technique (Diamond and Sekhin, 2013), independent of the SC analyses. For the former set of selected controls, the average impact of the Peruvian projects on forest loss was -0.22% or 686 ha year -1 (p-value = 0.10; Table S4). A similar ATT size was found for the African projects (-0.20% or 412 ha year -1 ; Table S5), whereas a smaller effect was associated with the Colombian projects (-0.02% or 49 ha year -1 ; Table S6). However, the estimates for both the Colombian and African projects were not significant (p-values of 0.61 and 0.26, respectively). Even assuming the estimated average reductions in deforestation to be significant in all three countries (a plausible assumption given our small sample sizes; Tables S4⎼S6), they would still be substantially lower than the average baseline deforestation rates adopted by the projects from Peru (3661 ha year -1 ), Colombia (2550 ha year -1 ), and Africa (2700 ha year -1 ) through 2020. The Peruvian projects on average reduced deforestation in the REDD+ sites within the first four years following REDD+ implementation in comparison to the GSC (Fig. 3, lower panels). The GCSs indicate no significant reductions from projects in Colombia and the combined African countries. These results are robust to using control areas selected with the genetic matching technique. Based on those controls, we estimate ATTs of the Peruvian, Colombian, and African REDD+ sites as -0.42% (1269 ha) year -1 , -0.05% (137 ha) year -1 , and -0.13% (258 ha) year -1 , respectively (Tables S7-S9 & Fig. S6, upper panel); again, only the Peruvian estimate was significant (p-values of 0.01, 0.34, and 0.33, respectively). Also similarly, the GSCs suggests that some average reduction in deforestation was achieved in Peru, but again restricted to the first four years of the project (Fig. S6, lower panels), with no significant reductions observed in Colombia or in the African countries. Finally, results from the comparison between already operational and "not-yet-operational" project sites corroborate the findings from the GSC analyses. The average REDD+ impacts on deforestation ranged from -0.06% year -1 to 0.10% year-1 (or -92 ha year -1 to 103 ha year -1 ), across all model settings, but none of the estimates were statistically significant (Fig. S7). Figure 3. Estimated average impacts of REDD+ projects from Peru, Colombia, and Africa on annual deforestation, using the generalized synthetic control (GSC) method and selected controls from the individual synthetic control analyses. Upper panels display the average treatment effect on the treated (ATT) project sites. Lower panels display projects' (solid red line) and counterfactuals' (dashed blue line) deforestation averages. Shaded red areas represent bootstrapped 95% confidence intervals around the projects' deforestation average. We investigated the implications of our findings for the environmental integrity of the credits issued by the REDD+ projects. These implications are based on the 18 out of 27 sampled projects with sufficient publicly available information about baseline deforestation rates (Table S10; Fig. ). According to the projects' ex-ante estimates, up to 89 million carbon offsets could potentially have been generated by the REDD+ projects from our sample until 2020. Yet, 63.2 million of these offsets (71%) would have originated from projects that have not significantly reduced deforestation (and emissions) compared to their SCs. The remaining 25.8 million offsets (29%) would have originated from projects likely associated with some avoided deforestation, but not to the extent expected by the project developers. If we replace the ex-ante baselines adopted by the projects with the deforestation observed from the SCs, our estimates suggest that only 5.5 million (6.2%) of the 89 million ex-ante offsets from the REDD+ projects would likely be associated with additional carbon emission reductions. As of November 2021, those 18 REDD+ projects have issued 62 million carbon-offset credits (Table S2). Out of those, at least 14.6 million (24%) have already been used by individuals or organizations around the world to offset their greenhouse gas emissions. Thus, according to our SC-based estimates, these projects have already been used to offset almost three times more carbon emissions than their actual contributions to climate change mitigation-with another 47.4 million carbon offsets being readily available in the market. Overall, the weight of evidence suggests that voluntary REDD+ projects in our sample across six tropical countries achieved much less avoided deforestation than anticipated by project developers. Only a few projects achieved significant reductions in comparison to the ex-post counterfactuals. Our findings corroborate prior studies questioning the additionality, and thus environmental integrity, of this type of carbon-offset intervention (Badgley et al., 2021;Calel et al., 2021;Cames et al., 2016;Haya et al., 2020;Kollmuss et al., 2015;Seyller et al., 2016). Exaggerated baseline scenarios are the biggest part of the underlying problem; unexpressive conservation performance by the REDD+ projects supplements the picture. In an evaluation of REDD+ projects in the Brazilian Amazon, West et al. (2020) pointed to the potential confounding effect created by Brazil's post-2004 policy interventions to control deforestation, triggering a substantial reduction in forest loss between 2004 and 2012 (West and Fearnside, 2021). As a result, the high regional deforestation rates observed prior to 2004, used to inform the Brazilian project baselines, likely led to an overestimation of the projects' performance. | 015d96f4-a614-47fe-a421-b1c2d9589340 | 1 |
0937b428-9c46-4fba-b491-be2f8741ccbc | https://cdn.climatepolicyradar.org/navigator/GBR/2023/united-kingdom-national-inventory-report-nir-2023_e2ed2f6c199088dc30a95fddf6e84c72.pdf | 2,023 | [
"emissions",
"data",
"inventory",
"energy",
"emission"
] | cdn.climatepolicyradar.org | CRF sector Comments on methods 1A • Basic combustion module (fuel use * emission factor); • Transport models (see MS 6 to MS 10); and, • Carbon balance approach (See MS 4). 1B • Carbon Balance approach (See MS 4); • BEIS EEMS inventory (See Annex 3.1.2.2); and, • Gas leakage data from network operators (See MS 19). 2A • Cement IPCC Tier 2 approach (see Section 4.2.2); • Lime Approach is comparable to IPCC Tier 2, although the Tier 1 default factor is used in the reporting of emissions; • IPCC Tier 2 approach, UK-specific factors from UK and EU ETS; • IPCC Tier 2 approach, UK-specific factors from UK and EU • Other carbonates – Tier 1 approach for earlier part of time-series, Tier 2 for years covered by UK and EU ETS. 2B • Emissions calculated based on emissions data from industry, UK and EU ETS, and the environmental regulators’ inventories, except • Use of EU and other MS statistics to estimate methanol manufactured in the • Use of IPCC default factors for CH4 from ethylene oxide, acrylonitrile, carbon black in years where no environmental regulators’ inventories data available; • Use of IPCC default factor for CO2 from ethylene dichloride across full time- 2C • Iron and Steel - 2 stage carbon balance and UK and EU ETS/operator carbon factors for carbonate use and arc furnaces (see MS 4); • Spreadsheet model and operator reported emissions for aluminium and • Tier 1 approach for non-ferrous metal production. 2D • Emissions calculated based on IPCC defaults for non-energy use of fuels; • IPCC method based as a proportion of the amount of fuel consumed for urea consumption in road transport. 2E, 2F • Spreadsheet models to estimate emissions of F-gases. 2G • Spreadsheet models to estimate emissions of F-gases; • NHS research into anaesthetic use; • Pollution inventory data for other uses of N2O; and, • Statistics on cream consumption and Danish inventory assumptions for N2O as a propellant for whipped cream. UK NIR 2023 (Issue 1) Ricardo Energy & Environment Page 62 CRF sector Comments on methods 3A • Emissions calculated based on animal population data and appropriate EFs. 3B • Emissions calculated based on animal population data and appropriate EFs. 3D • Emissions calculated based on animal population data, fertilizer data and 3F • Emissions calculated based on IPCC methodologies and USEPA EFs. 3G • Tier 1 approach for liming. 4 • Mathematical models used to estimate emissions and removals from Land- • CARBINE model used to estimate emissions and removals from Forestry, 5A • The Methane Emissions from Landfill model (MELmod). 5B • UK waste activity data and IPCC default emission factors. 5C • Country specific emission factors, partially based on Pollution Inventory data and IPCC default/other literature emission factors. 5D • IPCC default method using country specific activity data for all N2O and CH4 from private waste-water management systems and industrial waste-water • Data from operator returns to the regulator for water company waste-water The sources of data used are documented in the relevant sections of this NIR. Much of the Relevant activity data contained in the source Digest of UK Energy Statistics (UK Department for Energy Security and Net Zero, formerly Department for Business, Energy, and Industrial • Energy statistics for the UK (imports, exports, production, consumption, demand) of liquid, solid • Calorific values of fuels and conversion factors. (UK ETS regulatory agencies in the UK; data supplied via UK Department for Business, Energy, and Industrial • Emissions from installations and characteristics of • Energy data are aggregated by sector and used to inform inventory estimates; and, • Fuel quality data are used to derive up to date carbon emission factors for major fuels in energy • The UK was part of the EU ETS up until 2020, and from 2021 onwards formed the UK ETS. Both
UK NIR 2023 (Issue 1) Ricardo Energy & Environment Page 63 Relevant activity data contained in the source sources are used across the time series within the inventory, and therefore there are references to • Vehicle km according to vehicle type and road type; • Vehicle licensing statistics (split in vehicle km by • Selected domestic and international civil aviation Northern Ireland Inventory of Statutory Releases, transport data (NI Department of Agriculture, the Environment and Rural Affairs, NI Department for Regional Development) • Traffic count and vehicle km data for Northern • Information on regulated processes in NI. • Detailed domestic and international civil aviation (Environment Agency and Natural • Information on emissions from regulated processes Scottish Pollutant Release Inventory (Scottish Environment Protection • Information on regulated processes in Scotland. United Kingdom Petroleum Industry • Lead and sulphur contents of fuels, benzene content of petrol, RVP of petrol. Environmental Emissions Monitoring • Detailed inventory of oil and gas emissions. UK Iron and Steel Industry Annual (International Steel Statistics Bureau) • Energy production and consumption in the Iron and • Other statistics regarding the Iron and Steel United Kingdom Minerals Yearbook • Statistical data on minerals production,
UK NIR 2023 (Issue 1) Ricardo Energy & Environment Page 64 Relevant activity data contained in the source • Automatic Number Plate Recognition (ANPR) data used to help define fleet composition on different Key data sources within the Energy sector are further elaborated in Annex 3. These include the annually updated data sets EEMS, the PI, SPRI and ISR listed above, and other one -off studies that are used across several source categories (Baggott et al., 2004 and Scarborough et al., 2017). DUKES is described in more detail in Annex 4. Key categories are defined as the sources of emissions that have a significant influence on the year, derived from the IPCC Approach 1 and 2 key category analyses. Tables are included for the analysis with and without LULUCF and for the base year and most recent year estimated. Details of the key source category analysis are given in Annex 1. | 70afacf8-8641-4466-819d-f4db8cad9d69 | 13 |
09392af2-4eeb-4315-a697-456d98764cac | https://cdn.climatepolicyradar.org/navigator/GBR/2021/net-zero-strategy-build-back-greener_0fdb5eb8c251d8c2a37a5a1cb4c57f3f.pdf | 2,023 | [
"Economy-wide",
"zero",
"carbon",
"emissions",
"energy",
"government"
] | cdn.climatepolicyradar.org | We will seek to establish a robust market framework, with arrangements to ensure additionality, transparency, and traceability of carbon credits, so that regulators and the public can be confident that carbon savings are verified and also guaranteed against future issues such as forest fires or disease. Additionally, we continue to consider the impact that climate change will have on the suitability of our land for different uses, such as the impact of hotter, drier summers and warmer, wetter winters on agriculture, habitat creation and restoration, and forestry. 15. Biomass will also be an important component of our pathway to net zero. It is likely that the UK will be producing more domestic perennial energy crops (such as miscanthus and short rotation coppice) and short rotation forestry than today, but the exact role is yet to be determined. The Biomass Strategy, due in 2022, will look to address this. The sustainability, and wider environmental impact of growing and using biomass, including on air quality, will be key factors in establishing its role. Resources and waste, and F-gases 16. By 2050, we will have met the 25 Year Environment Plan (25YEP) commitments to eliminate all avoidable waste, including plastic, and to double resource productivity.81 A circular economy will be part of everyday reusing, repairing, and remanufacturing goods will be standard practice. Goods will be designed to last for longer and be more efficient. At end of life, the vast majority of products will be sent for recycling, with food, garden, and dry materials collected separately and used as lower carbon inputs for new products. Producer responsibility schemes will be embedded across the economy. Any non-recyclable residual waste will be treated to enable the processing of waste into valuable outputs, such as energy. Where possible, these processes would include carbon capture and storage. (See the Power chapter for more on energy from waste.) Only where no such treatment is possible may landfill be permitted. 17. By 2050, current F-gas use will have been predominantly replaced by alternative gases or technologies. HFC importers, equipment manufacturers and servicing technicians will have taken steps to reduce their use in favour of alternatives, not only in line with the current phasedown, but also with further measures implemented following the F-gas Regulation review and future international changes. Net Zero Build Back Greener
18. Protecting, restoring, and sustainably managing other natural resources such as soils or blue carbon habitats like saltmarsh and seagrass, can provide benefits for biodiversity and climate adaptation, as well as for carbon sequestration. We do not currently have the required data to include these habitats in the UK GHG Inventory or to accurately quantify their potential contribution to net zero but are doing further work to close Reducing emissions while balancing other climate and While reducing emissions, we must also adapt to the inevitable changes in our climate, ensuring that policies supporting net zero are resilient to current and future climate risks, and preventing locking in future vulnerabilities or maladaptation. The second National Adaptation Programme sets out how we are addressing, and will address, climate risks between 2018 and 2023 and further detail on adaptation is included in the Climate Science Delivering net zero creates opportunities to benefit other environmental objectives too. For example, climate change and biodiversity loss are closely related, and policies to tackle climate change can help to improve biodiversity. Likewise, net zero policies can support further environmental goals, such as water quality, natural beauty, and the delivery of the 25YEP . For example, we will ensure afforestation across England and that the right species of tree is planted in the right place, benefitting flood management, soil health and biodiversity, while also sequestering carbon. In some cases, however, we know it will be important to manage potential for example, ammonia emissions from digestate, a by-product from the process of anaerobic digestion, can negatively impact human health and cause biodiversity loss. We are working to mitigate ammonia emissions through the Green Gas Support Scheme, which will require participants to take additional steps to mitigate ammonia emissions, and by researching technologies that can help reduce the negative environmental impacts of digestate. The relationship between net zero and wider environmental objectives, including air quality, is set out in more detail in the Chapter 3 – Reducing Emissions across the Economy
The UK has a limited amount of land and delivering net zero will require changes to the way this land is used, for example, for afforestation, biomass production, and peat restoration. Opportunities for land to be used for multiple purposes, such as agroforestry will help to make sure land use for decarbonisation purposes is balanced with other demands, such as housing development and food production. These changes are likely to have varying effects on wider environmental outcomes and may completely alter the character of some landscapes and rural livelihoods (see section below). Land use change must be designed in a systemic, geographically targeted way with appropriate local governance and delivery structures which consider the complex range of interacting social, economic, and demographic factors. To support this, government is developing a Net Zero Systems Tool which aims to allow key decision makers to gain new insights and understanding, by highlighting dependencies and trade-offs within the land use system, as well as by demonstrating the knock-on effects of proposed policies. In addition, through the Environment Bill, the Government is introducing Local Nature Recovery Strategies (LNRS), a spatial planning tool for nature, allowing local government and communities to identify priorities and opportunities for nature recovery and nature-based solutions across England. The Bill includes a specific duty on all public authorities to “have regard” to relevant LNRSs and the spatial information they provide will support the development of local plans and other land use change incentives. Delivery of priorities and opportunities identified in LNRS will be supported by a range of delivery mechanisms including our environmental land management schemes, and in particular, the Local Nature Recovery scheme. | 368033f1-d04a-48ea-83c6-9602b66f0e37 | 52 |
0939cfdb-3d22-4012-aa59-e5126a790215 | https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX%3A32018R0956 | 2,017 | [
"Transport",
"Low-emissions mobility",
"Heavy-duty vehicles",
"Light-duty vehicles",
"Energy efficiency"
] | eur-lex.europa.eu | 3. The Commission shall prepare the analysis with the support of the European Environment Agency. Article 11
Amendment of the Annexes
1. The Commission is empowered to adopt delegated acts in accordance with Article 13 with a view to amending the Annexes for the purpose of:
(a)
updating or adjusting the data requirements specified in Part A and Part B of Annex I, where this is deemed necessary in order to provide for a thorough analysis in accordance with Article 10;
(b)
completing the starting years in point 1 of Part B of Annex I;
(c)
updating or adjusting the ranges set out in Part C of Annex I to take into account changes in heavy-duty vehicle design and ensure that the ranges remain relevant for information and comparability purposes;
(d)
adjusting the monitoring and reporting procedure set out in Annex II in order to take into account the experience gained from the application of this Regulation. 2. | dcf8b728-01c2-4912-9703-30bf665b839c | 9 |
093bdb12-f3a8-404c-98e1-782c130eb01e | https://cdn.climatepolicyradar.org/navigator/GBR/2023/financial-services-and-markets-act-2023_932920a8d8da4ed5a2456d9109b47a62.pdf | 2,023 | [
"Finance",
"changes",
"force",
"section",
"financial",
"services"
] | cdn.climatepolicyradar.org | “critical third party” means a person designated under (a) a recognised clearing house; (c) a recognised investment exchange which is not an overseas (d) a recognised payment system under section 184 of the Banking (e) a person specified as a service provider in relation to a recognised payment system under section 206A of the Banking “relevant service provider” means— (a) an electronic money institution as defined by regulation 2(1) of the Electronic Money Regulations 2011 (S.I. 2011/99); (b) an authorised payment institution, small payment institution or registered account information services provider as defined by regulation 2(1) of the Payment Services Regulations 2017 (S.I. 28 Financial Services and Markets Act 2023 (c. 29) PART 5A – Designated activities CHAPTER 3C – Critical third parties Document 2025-04-01 This version of this Act contains provisions that are prospective. Changes to Financial Services and Markets Act 2023 is up to date with all changes known to be in force on or before 01 April 2025. There are changes that may be brought into force at a future date. Changes that have been made appear in the content and are referenced with annotations. (See end of Document for details) View outstanding changes (1) A relevant regulator may make such rules imposing duties on critical third parties in connection with the provision of services to authorised persons, relevant service providers and FMI entities as appear to the regulator to be necessary or expedient for the purpose of advancing any of its objectives. (2) The reference in subsection (1) to a relevant regulator’s objectives is a (a) where the regulator is the FCA, one or more of its operational (b) where the regulator is the PRA, one or more of its objectives; (c) where the regulator is the Bank, the Bank’s Financial Stability (3) In the application of Part 9A to rules made by the FCA or the PRA under this section, the following provisions apply with the modifications specified (a) section 137T (general supplementary powers) applies as if— (i) the reference in paragraph (a) to “authorised persons, activity or investment” were a reference to “critical third parties or (ii) in paragraph (b) for the words from “as” to the end there were substituted “or the Bank, or standards issued by any other person, as those rules or standards have effect from time to (b) section 138B (publication of directions) applies as if subsection (4) (c) section 138F (notification of rules) applies as if subsections (1A) and (d) section 138I (consultation) applies as if the reference in subsection (1) (a) to the “PRA” were a reference to the “PRA and the Bank”; (e) section 138J (consultation) applies as if the reference in subsection (1) (a) to the “FCA” were a reference to the “FCA and the Bank”. (1) A relevant regulator may, if it appears to the regulator to be necessary or expedient for the purpose of advancing any of its objectives, direct a critical (a) do anything specified in the direction, or (b) refrain from doing anything specified in the direction. (2) A direction under this section— (a) must be given by notice in writing, (b) may be expressed to have effect during a specified period or until (c) may specify the way in which, and the time by which, a thing is to
Financial Services and Markets Act 2023 (c. 29) PART 5A – Designated activities CHAPTER 3C – Critical third parties Document 2025-04-01 This version of this Act contains provisions that are prospective. Changes to Financial Services and Markets Act 2023 is up to date with all changes known to be in force on or before 01 April 2025. There are changes that may be brought into force at a future date. Changes that have been made appear in the content and are referenced with annotations. (See end of Document for details) View outstanding changes (3) Subsection (4) applies if a direction is given to a critical third party for the purpose of resolving or reducing a threat to the stability or integrity of the UK (4) The critical third party (including the critical third party’s officers and staff) has immunity from liability in damages in respect of action or inaction in accordance with the direction. (5) A direction given for the purpose mentioned in subsection (3) must— (a) include a statement that it is given for that purpose, and (b) inform the critical third party of the effect of subsection (4). (6) An immunity conferred by this section does not extend to action or inaction— (b) in contravention of section 6(1) of the Human Rights Act 1998. (7) A relevant regulator may at any time revoke a direction under this section by giving notice in writing to the critical third party to which the direction relates. (8) The revocation of the direction does not affect the validity of anything previously done in accordance with it. (9) For the purposes of this section the objectives of a relevant regulator are as (1) If a relevant regulator proposes to give a direction under section 312N, or gives such a direction with immediate effect, it must give written notice to the critical third party to which the direction is given (or is to be given) (the “relevant critical third party”). (2) A direction under section 312N takes effect— (a) immediately, if the notice under subsection (1) states that this is the (b) on such other date as may be specified in the notice, or (c) if neither paragraph (a) or (b) applies, when the matter to which the notice relates is no longer open to review. (3) A direction may be expressed to take effect immediately, or on a specified date, only if the relevant regulator reasonably considers that it is necessary for the direction to take effect immediately or on that date. | 60620217-7ea8-4d25-b12c-cbbb5bd7a3f3 | 12 |
093dccb9-a180-47ab-b092-9c532d02e009 | http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/en/TXT/?uri=CELEX%3A32008L0050 | 2,008 | [
"General",
"Energy service demand reduction and resource efficiency",
"Energy efficiency",
"Renewables",
"Other low-carbon technologies and fuel switch",
"Non-energy use"
] | eur-lex.europa.eu | Macroscale siting of sampling points
1. Protection of human health
(a)
Sampling points directed at the protection of human health shall be sited in such a way as to provide data on the following:
the areas within zones and agglomerations where the highest concentrations occur to which the population is likely to be directly or indirectly exposed for a period which is significant in relation to the averaging period of the limit value(s),
levels in other areas within the zones and agglomerations which are representative of the exposure of the general population,
(b)
Sampling points shall in general be sited in such a way as to avoid measuring very small micro-environments in their immediate vicinity, which means that a sampling point must be sited in such a way that the air sampled is representative of air quality for a street segment no less than 100 m length at traffic-orientated sites and at least 250 m à 250 m at industrial sites, where feasible;
(c)
Urban background locations shall be located so that their pollution level is influenced by the integrated contribution from all sources upwind of the station. The pollution level should not be dominated by a single source unless such a situation is typical for a larger urban area. Those sampling points shall, as a general rule, be representative for several square kilometres;
(d)
Where the objective is to assess rural background levels, the sampling point shall not be influenced by agglomerations or industrial sites in its vicinity, i.e. sites closer than five kilometres;
(e)
Where contributions from industrial sources are to be assessed, at least one sampling point shall be installed downwind of the source in the nearest residential area. Where the background concentration is not known, an additional sampling point shall be situated within the main wind direction;
(f)
Sampling points shall, where possible, also be representative of similar locations not in their immediate vicinity;
(g)
Account shall be taken of the need to locate sampling points on islands where that is necessary for the protection of human health. 2. Protection of vegetation and natural ecosystems
Sampling points targeted at the protection of vegetation and natural ecosystems shall be sited more than 20Â km away from agglomerations or more than 5Â km away from other built-up areas, industrial installations or motorways or major roads with traffic counts of more than 50Â 000 vehicles per day, which means that a sampling point must be sited in such a way that the air sampled is representative of air quality in a surrounding area of at least 1Â 000Â km2. A Member State may provide for a sampling point to be sited at a lesser distance or to be representative of air quality in a less extended area, taking account of geographical conditions or of the opportunities to protect particularly vulnerable areas. Account shall be taken of the need to assess air quality on islands. C. Microscale siting of sampling points
In so far as is practicable, the following shall apply:
the flow around the inlet sampling probe shall be unrestricted (free in an arc of at least 270°) without any obstructions affecting the airflow in the vicinity of the sampler (normally some metres away from buildings, balconies, trees and other obstacles and at least 0,5 m from the nearest building in the case of sampling points representing air quality at the building line),
in general, the inlet sampling point shall be between 1,5 m (the breathing zone) and 4 m above the ground. Higher positions (up to 8 m) may be necessary in some circumstances. Higher siting may also be appropriate if the station is representative of a large area,
the inlet probe shall not be positioned in the immediate vicinity of sources in order to avoid the direct intake of emissions unmixed with ambient air,
the sampler's exhaust outlet shall be positioned so that recirculation of exhaust air to the sampler inlet is avoided,
for all pollutants, traffic-orientated sampling probes shall be at least 25Â m from the edge of major junctions and no more than 10Â m from the kerbside.,
The following factors may also be taken into account:
interfering sources,
security,
access,
availability of electrical power and telephone communications,
visibility of the site in relation to its surroundings,
safety of the public and operators,
the desirability of co-locating sampling points for different pollutants,
planning requirements.,
D. Documentation and review of site selection
The site-selection procedures shall be fully documented at the classification stage by such means as compass-point photographs of the surrounding area and a detailed map. | 124a1686-01af-40ad-bbdc-ec8b802ec514 | 30 |
093f2a06-8721-474e-beb8-2080efd44786 | https://cdn.climatepolicyradar.org/navigator/GBR/2023/net-zero-growth-plan_bc80184b303c710cf0e5f7f4fe3afe83.pdf | 2,023 | [
"Energy",
"Economy-wide",
"zero",
"energy",
"plan",
"government",
"carbon"
] | cdn.climatepolicyradar.org | • To support local authorities' access to funding and increase investment, we have worked across government to ensure economic growth funding contains a net zero principle; and that
Powering Up Britain – The Net Zero Growth Plan clean growth and green job opportunities are highlighted. This includes for example, the £2.6 billion UK Shared Prosperity Fund which states that investment made under this Fund should demonstrate the extent of contribution to net zero and nature • Government-funded research through 3Ci and Innovate UK is helping to identify opportunities for local areas and local government to work with the private sector to finance the net zero transition. Proposals to develop work on blended finance are set out in the accompanying publication, the 2023 Green Finance • We are supporting Freeports in England, Wales and Scotland to Engagement • We have established a Local Net Zero Forum to strengthen our partnership with local government. Alongside the Forum, we have also established the Net Zero Places Stakeholder group to engage directly with non-governmental organisations who work • We continue to fund our five Local Net Zero Hubs which build capacity and capability in local government, The Hubs support local authorities across England to develop net zero projects and attract commercial investment. • The UK Infrastructure Bank is building its local advisory function to a steady state through 2023, and will also lend up to £4 billion to local authorities at a preferential rate for high value and strategic projects of at least £5 million. • We are funding Net Zero Go, the UK's free-to-use net zero delivery platform for local authorities. It is a one-stop shop which brings together the support and practical tools local authorities need to develop, deliver, and evaluate locally focused net zero Sectoral Support • We are working closely with Local Authorities to deliver practical policy measures across a range of different sectors. For − As outlined in the Transport Decarbonisation Plan, the new Local Transport Plan (LTP) guidance will provide updated
Powering Up Britain – The Net Zero Growth Plan strategic guidance for the development of LTPs and will support places to quantify local transport carbon emissions and assess the carbon impact of planned interventions in their LTP. − The Government's 'Help to Heat' schemes ensure homes will be warmer and cheaper to heat. Working with Local Authorities, the Government will deliver upgrades to over half a million homes in the coming years through our Social Housing Decarbonisation, Home Upgrade Grant Schemes and Energy Innovation • We are supporting place-based energy system innovation through Innovate UK's £60 million Net Zero Living Programme. There have been two rounds of funding announced to date. This − Net Zero Pathfinders for UK registered businesses and local authorities to apply for a share of up to £2 million to plan for a place-based demonstration of ways to accelerate progress − Fast Followers for local authorities to apply for a share of up to £6 million to build skills and capabilities to accelerate local Community Energy • Through our Local Net Zero Hubs we are supporting local authorities and community energy groups to work together, this includes funding a pilot programme which provides local authorities with direct support to develop community-led energy groups and projects. We have also established a Community Energy Contact Group to increase engagement with the sector. • We will continue to invest £5 million/year in the Local Net Zero Hubs Programme and progress our ongoing projects, such as Net Zero Go, to support delivery at the local • We will continue to support the UKIB to build its local advisory function and to work closely with the Local Net Zero Hubs. • We will support work to promote net zero investment in Freeports. Powering Up Britain – The Net Zero Growth Plan • We will pilot a devolved approach to buildings' retrofit from 2025 in the devolution deals with Greater Manchester Combined Authority and West Midlands Combined • Green business sectors are one of the five priority sectors for the Government's Investment Zone programme announced in the Budget and all Investment Zones will be required to demonstrate how they support the Government's net zero and
Powering Up Britain – The Net Zero Growth Plan Empowering the Public and Business to Make Green Choices By choosing green products, services and goods, the public can help grow the green economy and support progress towards reaching net zero. Many of the commitments set out in the Net Zero Strategy will require the public to make green choices, with the installation of heat pumps and purchase of electric vehicles playing a particularly important role. As an example of how we will make these green choices easier, we will continue to deliver energy advice to the public on how to reduce their energy use, and in doing so their bills, and explore the case to expand this further, including our digital We recognise that supporting the public and businesses with green choices must address multiple barriers, e.g., cost, convenience, awareness, and that everyone - government, industry, businesses, and civil society - must work together to achieve net zero to gain the economic benefits and ensure the environment is in a state for future generations. As the CCC acknowledged in their report, we have already included in the Net Zero Strategy a clear set of principles for how we will engage and empower the public Across net zero sectors, we are introducing measures which support these six • Principle 1 - Minimise the ‘ask’ from the public by ‘sending clear regulatory signals.’ • Principle 2 – Make the green choice the easiest. • Principle 3 – Make the green choice affordable. • Principle 4 – Empower people and businesses to make their own choice. • Principle 5 – Motivate & build public acceptability for major changes. | 42fe6f14-0789-4e19-af61-6079611d2b41 | 35 |
09489086-31ca-4555-a326-71a4fcf912a6 | http://arxiv.org/pdf/2111.00987v1 | 2,021 | [
"electricity",
"model",
"market",
"energy",
"learning"
] | arxiv.org | We use a genetic algorithm approach to find an optimal set of price curves predicted by generation companies (GenCos) that adequately model observed investment behaviour in the real-life electricity market in the United Kingdom. Similar techniques can be employed for other countries of various sizes [129]. We measure the accuracy of projections for our improved ABM with those of the UK Government's Department for Business, Energy and Industrial Strategy (BEIS) for the UK electricity market between 2013 and 2018. In addition to this, we compare our projections from 2018 to 2035 to those made by BEIS in 2018 [53]. We select five years for the calibration and validation period as we believe that the transition from coal to gas in this period reflects the kind of dynamics that ElecSim must capture over the long-term. Whilst it can be argued that a five year period is too short a time to adequately model a long-term energy model, it is argued here that long-term validation is unfeasible due to the large amount of difficult to capture features over the long-term. In other words, a long-term model provides scenarios and not forecasts, where each of the scenarios could feasibly occur, but it is not feasible to predict which of these scenarios will occur due to the stochastic nature of the real-world in which we are attempting to model. We use numerical validation in this case to reduce the complexity required for theoretical validation. Theoretical validation requires the validation of many complex processes, and even after this process, we would not know the complex whether the interaction of these processes are realistic. We argue in this thesis, that both numerical and theoretical validation are required. Through this validation process, we are able to adequately model the transitional dynamics of the electricity mix in the United Kingdom between 2013 and 2018. During this time there was an ∼88% drop in coal use, ∼44% increase in Combined Cycle Gas Turbine (CCGT), ∼111% increase in wind energy and increase in solar from near zero to ∼1250MW. We are therefore able to test our model in a transition of sufficient magnitude. We show in this chapter, that agent-based models are able to mimic the behaviour of the UK electricity market under the same specific scenario conditions. Concretely, we show that under an observed carbon tax strategy, fuel price and electricity demand scenario, the model, ElecSim, closely matches the observed electricity mix between 2013 and 2018. We achieve this by determining an exogenous predicted price duration curve using a genetic algorithm to minimise the error between observed and simulated electricity mix in 2018. The predicted price curve is an arrangement of all price levels in descending order of magnitude. The predicted price duration curve achieved is similar to that of the simulated price duration curve in 2018, increasing confidence in the underlying dynamics of our model. In addition, we compare our projections to those of the BEIS reference scenario from 2018 to 2035 [53]. To achieve this, we use the same genetic algorithm optimisation technique as during our validation stage, optimising for predicted price duration curves for calibration. Our model demonstrates that we are able to closely match the projections of BEIS by finding a set of realistic price duration curves which are subject to investment cycles. Our model, however, exhibits a more realistic step-change in nuclear output than that of BEIS. This is because, whilst BEIS projects a gradual increase in nuclear output, our model projects that nuclear output will grow instantaneously at a single point in time as a new nuclear power plant comes online. This allows us to verify the scenarios of other models, in this case, BEIS' reference scenario, by ascertaining whether the optimal parameters required to achieve such scenarios are realistic. In addition to this, we are able to use these parameters to analyse 'what-if ' questions with further accuracy. As part of this work, we contribute a validated open-source agent-based model called ElecSim. Whilst we have used the United Kingdom as a use-case for this thesis, ElecSim is able to model decentralised markets of various sizes, and can therefore be used to model other countries. To improve our results as well as making the execution time tractable, we increased the temporal granularity of the model using a k-means clustering approach to select a subset of representative days for wind speed, solar irradiance and electricity demand. This subset of representative days enabled us to approximate an entire year and only required a fraction of the total time-steps that would be necessary to model each day of a year independently. We show that we are able to provide an accurate framework, through this addition, to allow policymakers, decision-makers and the public to explore the effects of policy on investment in electricity generators. We demonstrate that with a genetic algorithm approach, we are able to optimise parameters to improve the accuracy of our model. Namely, we optimise the predicted electricity price, the uncertainty of this electricity price and nuclear subsidy. We validate our model using the observed electricity mix between 2013-2018 through a process of calibration. That is, we find the predicted electricity price, uncertainty of this electricity price and nuclear subsidy which match with the stated scenario. We then use these values to project further. A major contribution of this work is to demonstrate that it is possible for agent-based models to accurately model transitions in the UK electricity market. This was achieved by comparing our simulated electricity mix to the observed electricity mix between 2013 and 2018. In this time, a transition from coal to natural gas was observed. We demonstrate that a high temporal granularity is required to accurately model fluctuations in wind and solar irradiance for intermittent renewable energy sources. In this Section, we detail how the architecture of ElecSim has been designed. ElecSim is made up of six parts:
• GenCos which are made up of agents. • Power plants. • A power exchange, which controls an electricity spot market. | d602c796-019d-4603-b326-d7f62c6a33dd | 16 |
094d8f3c-8aea-4749-9bfa-830a7bae1cb5 | https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/1009448/decarbonising-transport-a-better-greener-britain.pdf | 2,021 | [
"transport",
"zero",
"emissions",
"emission",
"carbon"
] | assets.publishing.service.gov.uk | A rail freight growth target will help provide private operator investment confidence and galvanise action across local partners and industry. We will work closely with industry partners We will incentivise the early take up of low carbon
The emissions benefits of network electrification can only be delivered by using compatible electric locomotives. | 8f0273a5-decd-4a43-ab49-4f3473699e66 | 181 |
094eba80-a842-42f3-b506-3603d67f46fc | https://cdn.climatepolicyradar.org/navigator/GBR/2021/carbon-budget-delivery-plan_19fa3072ff04d7abab9199e50abfb92c.pdf | 2,023 | [
"Economy-wide",
"policy",
"carbon",
"emissions",
"energy",
"support"
] | cdn.climatepolicyradar.org | 12 Power Local Partnerships for The government will consult on developing local partnerships for onshore wind in England so that those who wish to host new onshore wind infrastructure can benefit from doing so – a commitment made in the British Energy Security Strategy. The government is due to launch a new consultation to seek views on how to improve the system of engagement and benefits in England. The proposals in the consultation may help to indirectly reduce delays and improve the consenting of onshore wind planning applications by introducing policies to improve community support for onshore wind projects in England. However, the consultation does not include any policies that will directly drive the deployment of onshore wind. The cross-government, Defra-led Marine Spatial Prioritisation programme aims to support strategic planning of renewables and other sea uses by optimising use of the marine space, maximising coexistence between different sea users and balancing this with restoring and protecting the marine 14 Power Solar Taskforce and In line with the Skidmore Review recommendation, and to provide certainty to investors in the solar industry, the government will publish a solar roadmap setting out a clear step by step deployment trajectory to achieve a fivefold increase (up to 70GW) of solar by 2035. Government will also establish a government/industry taskforce, covering both ground mounted and rooftop solar to drive forward the actions needed by government and industry to make this ambition a reality. # Sector Policy Name Policy Description The government has supported the rollout of rooftop projects by removing VAT on solar panels installed on residential accommodations, and introducing capital allowances for rooftop solar panels until March 2027. This policy will incentivise residential solar deployment and therefore help to de-risk the delivery of solar capacity and support the government's ambition to deliver up to 70GW solar by 2035. 16 Power Permitted Development The government is currently consulting on changes to permitted development rights. The proposed changes seek to simplify planning processes for larger commercial rooftop installations and introduce a new permitted development right for non domestic solar canopies. The consultation was published on 28 17 Power Low-cost Finance for To meet the demand for rooftop solar, the government is looking at facilitating low-cost finance from retail lenders for homes and small business premises, aligning with recommendation in the Skidmore Net Zero The joint government/industry Green Jobs Delivery Group is developing an action plan which will address key emerging workforce challenges for solar and other renewables. The solar sector is also working with training partners, certification scheme providers and local bodies such as Mayor of London to provide grants, learning tools, and training and placement programmes. DESNZ expect that the new solar taskforce will consider further actions to build supply chain resilience and strengthen skills capability. This policy is key to ensuring the relevant skills and supply chain needed to build solar capacity are available, enabling the delivery of solar capacity. 19 Power Consultation on Future The government will explore how it can continue to drive onsite renewable electricity generation, such as solar panels, where appropriate in new homes and buildings. Bringing forward new renewables generation is a key component of decarbonising the power system. Recognising that onshore wind is an efficient, cheap and widely supported technology, government has consulted on changes to planning policy in England for onshore wind to deliver a localist approach that provides local authorities more flexibility to respond to the views of their local communities. We will respond to the NPPF consultation in due course. # Sector Policy Name Policy Description 21 Power Advice and Guidance The government will publish guidance to support the installation of solar technology on the Central government and wider public sector estate. This will incentivise and enable the deployment of solar 22 Power Biomass Strategy The government has committed to publishing a Biomass Strategy, which is due in 2023. The Strategy will set out how sustainable biomass could be best utilised across the economy to help achieve the government’s net zero and wider environmental commitments while also supporting energy security. The Strategy will also establish the role which BECCS can play in reducing carbon emissions across the economy and set out how the technology could be deployed. The government is exploring expanding the UK ETS to waste incineration and EfW by the mid-late This would incentivise the development and uptake of decarbonisation technologies and practices to reduce emissions from waste incineration and EfW, principally by strengthening long-term investment incentives. For example, the scheme could enhance the pre-treatment of waste before it is incinerated to reduce fossil plastic in the waste stream. This is otherwise a costly and intensive process. The expansion of the UK ETS would also incentivise investment into Carbon Capture and Storage (CCS) to reduce CO2 emissions from EfW, depending on wider availability of the technology and infrastructure, and cost-benefit to the plant. Due to biogenic content present in waste streams, in future operators may be able to generate ‘negative emissions’ by applying CCS equipment to EfW plants, depending on the level of biogenic CO2 captured. As per the consultation in March 2022 in Developing the UK ETS, we propose to explore expanding the UK ETS to waste incineration and EfW by the mid-late 2020s i.e. around the end of CB4. Government will respond to this consultation shortly and will set out more detail on the intended timing 24 Power Power Bioenergy with The government is developing a first of a kind (FOAK) business model for power Bioenergy with Carbon Capture and Storage (BECCS) to incentivise negative emissions and low carbon electricity generation. Power BECCS is expected to play an important role in helping the UK to achieve net zero and to contribute significantly to the ambition to deliver five million tonnes of GGRs by 2030, whilst also delivering low-carbon electricity to contribute toward security of supply within Great Britain. | f1206e39-e30b-4828-a2d4-296506ac6fd1 | 11 |
095403a1-110a-49bc-bc57-f8ea73db0765 | https://cdn.climatepolicyradar.org/navigator/GBR/2023/united-kingdom-national-inventory-report-nir-2023_8122f7d823bf366105239091fb57ffd2.pdf | 2,023 | [
"data",
"energy",
"emissions",
"inventory",
"environment"
] | cdn.climatepolicyradar.org | 1A4 Natural Gas 2.80% 3.00% 2.00% 3.00% (As for 1A2) 1A4 Other Bituminous Coal 3.00% 10.00% 3.00% 10.00% Chosen 3% activity uncertainty as we know that there are some limitations on the coal allocation to small-scale users. UK NIR 2023 (Issue 1) Ricardo Energy & Environment Page 720 1A4 Other Kerosene 3.00% 2.00% 3.00% 2.00% Low AD uncertainty as tax data helps establish residential use. | 9ce0b96e-2800-424e-bffb-cd8ba36e0902 | 69 |
095d60f5-b6ec-4cbb-999d-24f99217b3de | http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:L:2008:030:0001:0020:EN:PDF | 2,008 | [
"Transport",
"Air",
"Energy efficiency",
"Other low-carbon technologies and fuel switch"
] | eur-lex.europa.eu | 3. An Advisory Board shall be established as appropriate by the Joint
Undertaking to advise, and issue recommendations to, the Clean Sky
Joint Undertaking on managerial, financial and technical topics. Article 6
Governing Board
1. The Governing Board is the governing body of the Clean Sky Joint
Undertaking. 2. Composition
The Governing Board shall be composed of named representatives of the
following parties
a
the European Community represented by the Commission
b
the ITD Leaders
c
one Associate per ITD, as laid out in Article 8, 4f of these
Statutes. L 3010
EN
Official Journal of the European Union
4.2.2008
3. Decision making
Each individual member of the Governing Board shall have one equal
vote. h
actions against defaulting ITD Leaders and Associates andor
reaching terms of compromise in disputes between the Clean Sky
Joint Undertaking and any of its Members
The Governing Board shall make decisions by a two-thirds majority of all
eligible votes. | 18a4f9cc-e026-4676-8d2a-c1ac126533bc | 14 |
095e2f51-18fc-4a73-8fff-873d1055c62f | 2,025 | [
"sustainable renovations",
"integrated national energy",
"buildings sector",
"final energy",
"centralised heating systems"
] | HF-national-climate-targets-dataset | In February 2020, the Integrated National Energy and Climate Plan of the Republic of Slovenia was adopted which lays down objectives, policies and measures in the field of buildings by 2030 (with a view to 2040). At the end of 2019, the Republic of Slovenia has started to prepare the Long-Term Climate Strategy, which provides the main guidelines and vision in individual sectors by 2050. The vision of both documents is approximately net-zero emissions in the buildings sector by 2050 by maintaining a high level of energy renovations of buildings, by converting the heating systems to centralised heating systems and RES technologies. The renovations and new constructions are directed towards achieving almost zero emissions in their life cycle and other construction and renovation objectives. Sustainable renovations of buildings will be encouraged, i.e. to renovate a building from other aspects as well (e.g. earthquakes, fire, radon). The NECP sets the objective of reducing the use of final energy in buildings by 20% by 2030 compared to 2005 and reducing the emissions by at least 70% in the same period. | 86312603-dd51-45b8-baaa-a6f5b657027d | 0 | |
095f6cf2-98a0-4663-b97a-08aa3023e201 | https://cdn.climatepolicyradar.org/navigator/GBR/2021/decarbonising-transport-a-better-greener-britain_0e5fa97fb3d78e19b69ccf8f78fdd0cc.pdf | 2,021 | [
"Transport",
"Co-benefits",
"Cycling",
"Climate Finance",
"Public Transport",
"Freight",
"EVs",
"Shipping",
"Aviation",
"Walking",
"transport",
"zero",
"emissions",
"emission",
"carbon"
] | cdn.climatepolicyradar.org | market for zero emission buses and is expected to provide a boost to UK bus manufacturing, helping to secure thousands of green manufacturing jobs and apprenticeship opportunities across the country, including in Scotland, Northern Ireland and the north of England. We will consider both battery electric and hydrogen fuel cell buses when rolling out the 4,000 In 2021-22 we will invest up to £120 million in zero emission buses through the Zero Emission Bus Regional Areas scheme, which could support the introduction of up to 500 zero emission buses and the infrastructure needed to support them. | b1244f11-6485-47b2-ba2a-c8a54f51cd77 | 138 |
09642d45-e940-4682-a42a-0a974f4d43ed | 2,025 | [
"energy actions e1.2.1.1",
"agriculture sector",
"energy efficiency consultancy",
"legislation",
"trainings"
] | HF-national-climate-targets-dataset | AGRICULTURE SECTOR AND FOOD SECURITY OBJECTIVE E1.2. Develop the capacity for energy efficiency by 2015 Action Area Action Area E1.2.1. Delivering trainings and raising awareness an energy Actions E1.2.1.1. Reviewing the existing legislation so as to increase the efficiency of energy efficiency consultancy (EEC) companies, supporting EECS and increasing their numbers Time Peri 2011-2012 E1.21.2. Evaluating the awareness-raising activities using the energy efficiency awareness 2011-2022 index" method and announcing the results | e02c2977-a30f-4c51-befa-b0145bedb7e9 | 0 | |
09652d1f-897d-47b8-9482-d4975f2edfe5 | https://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=COM:1998:0246:FIN:EN:PDF | 1,999 | [
"General",
"Energy efficiency"
] | eur-lex.europa.eu | 4. Existing Measures for Energy Efficiency
Future measures have to build on existing initiatives, overcoming weakness and
pursuing successful experiences. It is important to underline that initiatives, with
varying degrees of effectiveness, have been undertaken at Community level since the
late 1970s. However, by the late 1980s the Commission concluded that the different
energy efficiency instruments passed by Council in the 1970s and early 1980s had not
fulfilled expectations. More effort was then required from the Member States. In
1986, the Council adopted a Resolution concerning new Community energy
objectives, which inter alia, called for a 20 improvement in energy intensity of final
demand by the year 19953. A 1987 Communication entitled Towards a continuing
policy for energy efficiency in the European Community COM87233 final
proposed 14 energy efficiency measures to Member States to help achieve the 1995
target. In the 1990 SAVE proposal which followed, it was recognised that this
Communication had had no appreciable effect, and it was necessary for the
Commission to act at Community level. The Commissions proposal of 13 November 1990 COM90365final for a Council
Decision concerning the promotion of energy efficiency in the Community stated that
Community action in this field is revived in the light of changes in economic trends
for energy and the need for greater environmental protection. In the energy policies
pursued by,most Member States, energy efficiency generally has become a lesser
priority. The 1990 proposal stated further that the majority of Member States have
reduced or even completely abolished their programmes which directly support
energy efficiency-linked investments. This conclusion led, among other things, to the
approval in 1991 of the multi-annual SAVE Programme for energy efficiency. In spite of SAVE, for the Community as a whole, the overall rate of decrease in
energy intensity was not significant. By 1995, the improvement was only 12 , far
short of the target of 20 . Even more alarming was the fact that the pace of
improvement had slowed down to only -0.6 per year between 1990 and 1995,
compared to -2.0 per year between 1985 and 19904. An important factor underlying the slow penetration of energy efficiency measures
continues to be the relatively low priority attributed to energy saving by Member
States, despite the Community efforts in this direction as described below. There has been recognition at Community level, that technological programmes can
play an important role m providing the basis for energy efficient technologies. In the
JOULE-THERMIE programme launched in 1995 as a specific programme of the
Fourth Framework Programme for RTD, 280 MECU were devoted to energy
efficiency, representing 27 of the total budget and contributing to substantial
achievements, especially in the reduction of energy intensity in buildings, transport
and the process industries. A recent evaluation of THERMIE indicates that this
Community programme is very well known amongst stakeholders on Community
3 Council Resolution of 16 September 1986 concerning New Community Energy Policy Objectives for
1995 and Convergence of the Policies of theMember States. OJC 241 of 25 September 1986. | ad532131-9dd4-4738-9c63-5139bce2852c | 4 |
0966fba2-d7cf-46c2-bccf-071203d7b75d | http://arxiv.org/pdf/2504.20620v1 | 2,025 | [
"Climate change",
"ocean conditions",
"sea level",
"Bay of Bengal",
"monsoon precipitation",
"marine productivity",
"Indian economy",
"Global Climate Models (GCMs)",
"shared socioeconomic pathways (SSPs)",
"climate projections",
"reanalysis data",
"root mean square error (RMSE)",
"sea surface temperature (SST)",
"dynamic sea level (DSL)",
"deep learning",
"bias correction",
"EquiDistant Cumulative Distribution Function (EDCDF)",
"climate model",
"historical data",
"future projections",
"2015-2024",
"2021-2023",
"variability",
"dynamics",
"projections",
"2100."
] | arxiv.org | 5 [◦] C in the central and southern bays, providing enhanced surface support for cyclone development during this season. Warming intensifies through the mid- and far-future periods, with the far-future showing a UNet-corrected SST exceeding 31 . 5 [◦] C across most of the bay. This substantial warming, particularly in the central bay, where cyclogenesis occurs frequently, could significantly affect the characteristics of the cyclones. The increased warming along the eastern boundary could also modify the moisture content and atmospheric instability patterns that typically support pre-monsoon cyclogenesis. In addition to an increase in cyclogenesis, the enhanced pre-monsoon warming predicted by the UNet-corrected SST in the far-future period could result in cyclonic systems becoming more frequent and severe. The eastern bay, traditionally a region of cyclogenesis during MAM, shows a particularly pronounced warming, which could alter the spatial patterns of cyclone formation. The reduced temperature gradients between coastal and offshore waters seen in the far-future UNet-corrected projections could affect cyclone tracks and intensification patterns). Furthermore, the warming of the northern bay could extend the spatial domain favorable to the intensification of cyclones, potentially allowing systems to maintain their strength further north than historically observed and the raw projections of CNRM-CM6. Overall, the UNet corrected projections indicate a possible rise in the number and strength of pre-monsoon cyclones, with the far-future period having conditions favoring quicker intensification and possibly more damaging systems. This is especially worrisome for coastal areas around the bay, as stronger pre-monsoon cyclones could elevate risks to
15 Data Driven Deep Learning for Correcting Global Climate Model Projections of SST and DSL in the Bay of Bengal human communities and coastal ecosystems. Even more worrisome is that the SSP3-7.0 and SSP5-8.5 pathways show more intense warming after the correction by our UNet model indicating an increased risk than the raw projections. 4.2.3 Monsoon Season
The mean monsoon SST in raw CNRM-CM6 projections show temperatures ranging from ≈ 28 . 5 [◦] C in the northern bay to ≈ 30 [◦] C in the southern region). This mean pattern reflects monsoon-induced cooling, with relatively cooler temperatures throughout the bay due to cloud cover and rainfall during the monsoon. However, the UNet-corrected projections reveal weakened monsoon cooling, with higher temperatures throughout the bay, particularly in the northern and central regions, where temperatures are ≈ 1 [◦] C warmer than the raw CNRM-CM6). Along the western coast (Indian coast), the raw projections show temperatures of ≈ 29 − 29 . | cb237f9d-c52c-449c-8a9f-c1b42185806d | 17 |
0967bc18-10c1-42bc-aa58-7fb2ea541dfc | http://arxiv.org/abs/1609.05878v3 | 2,016 | [
"climate change",
"carbon budget",
"intergenerational justice"
] | ArXiv | Global temperature is a fundamental climate metric highly correlated with sea level, which implies that keeping shorelines near their present location requires keeping global temperature within or close to its preindustrial Holocene range. However, global temperature excluding short-term variability now exceeds +1 deg C relative to the 1880-1920 mean and annual 2016 global temperature was almost +1.3 deg C. We show that global temperature has risen well out of the Holocene range and Earth is now as warm as it was during the prior (Eemian) interglacial period, when sea level reached 6-9 meters higher than today. Further, Earth is out of energy balance with present atmospheric composition, implying that more warming is in the pipeline, and we show that the growth rate of greenhouse gas climate forcing has accelerated markedly in the past decade. The rapidity of ice sheet and sea level response to global temperature is difficult to predict, but is dependent on the magnitude of warming. Targets for limiting global warming thus, at minimum, should aim to avoid leaving global temperature at Eemian or higher levels for centuries. Such targets now require "negative emissions", i.e., extraction of CO 2 from the air. If phasedown of fossil fuel emissions begins soon, improved agricultural and forestry practices, including reforestation and steps to improve soil fertility and increase its carbon content, may provide much of the necessary CO 2 extraction. In that case, the magnitude and duration of global temperature excursion above the natural range of the current interglacial (Holocene) could be limited and irreversible climate impacts could be minimized. In contrast, continued high fossil fuel emissions today place a burden on young people to undertake massive technological CO 2 extraction if they are to limit climate change and its consequences. Proposed methods of extraction such as bioenergy with carbon capture and storage (BECCS) or air capture of CO 2 have minimal estimated costs of 89-535 trillion dollars this century and also have large risks and uncertain feasibility. Continued high fossil fuel emissions unarguably sentences young people to either a massive, implausible cleanup or growing deleterious climate impacts or both. The United Nations 1992 Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC, 1992) stated its objective as "...stabilization of GHG concentrations in the atmosphere at a level that would prevent dangerous anthropogenic interference with the climate system." The 15 th Conference of the Parties (Copenhagen Accord, 2009) concluded that this objective required a goal to "...reduce global emissions so as to hold the increase of global temperature below 2 deg C...." The 21 st Conference of the Parties (Paris Agreement, 2015), currently ratified by 120 nations representing 80% of today's greenhouse gas emissions, aims to strengthen the global response to the climate change threat by "[h]olding the increase in the global average temperature to well below 2 deg C above the pre-industrial levels and pursuing efforts to limit the temperature increase to 1.5 deg C above the pre-industrial levels." Global surface temperature has many merits as the principal metric for climate change, but additional metrics, such as atmospheric CO 2 amount and Earth's energy imbalance, help refine targets for avoiding dangerous human-made climate change. Paleoclimate data and observations of Earth's present energy imbalance led Hansen et al. (2008Hansen et al. ( , 2013aHansen et al. ( , 2016) ) to recommend reducing CO 2 to less than 350 ppm, with the understanding that this target must be adjusted as CO 2 declines and empirical data accumulates. The 350 ppm CO 2 target is moderately stricter than the 1.5 deg C warming target. The near planetary energy balance anticipated at 350 ppm CO 2 implies a global temperature close to recent values, i.e., about +1 deg C relative to preindustrial. We advocate pursuit of this goal within a century to limit the period with global temperature above that of the current interglacial period, the Holocene. 1 Limiting the period and magnitude of temperature excursion above the Holocene range is crucial to avoid strong stimulation of slow feedbacks. Slow feedbacks include ice sheet disintegration and thus sea level rise, which is probably the most threatening climate impact, and release of greenhouse gases (GHGs) via such mechanisms as thawing tundra and loss of soil carbon. Holocene climate stability allowed sea level to be stable for the past several millennia (Kopp et al., 2016) as civilizations developed. But there is now a danger that temperature rises so far above the Holocene range that slow feedbacks are activated to a degree that continuing climate change will be out of humanity's control. Both the 1.5 deg C and 350 ppm targets require rapid phasedown of fossil fuel emissions. Today, global fossil fuel emissions continue at rates that make these targets increasingly improbable . On a per capita historical basis the U.S. is 10 times more accountable than China and 25 times more accountable than India for the increase of atmospheric CO 2 above its preindustrial level (Hansen and Sato, 2016). In response, a lawsuit [Juliana et al. vs United States, 2016, hereafter J et al. vs US, 2016] was filed against the United States asking the U.S. District Court, District of Oregon, to require the U.S. government to produce a plan to rapidly reduce emissions. The suit requests that the plan reduce emissions at the 6%/year rate that Hansen et al. (2013a) estimated as the requirement for lowering atmospheric CO 2 to a level of 350 ppm. At a hearing in Eugene Oregon on 9 March 2016 the United States and three interveners (of Manufacturers, and the American Fuels and Petrochemical Association) asked the Court to dismiss the case, in part based on the argument that the requested rate of fossil fuel emissions reduction was beyond the court's authority. Magistrate Judge Coffin stated that he found "the remedies aspect of the plaintiff's complaint [to be] troublesome", in part because it involves "a separation of powers issue." | 46f0f077-7b8a-4605-ac51-40cbeda0f25d | 0 |
09680210-de68-467f-816e-2ad61a445150 | https://cdn.climatepolicyradar.org/navigator/GBR/2023/energy-act-2023_87896593a3bea76cf3ac89af17aba308.pdf | 2,023 | [
"Energy",
"Carbon Capture and Storage",
"section",
"regulations",
"person",
"force",
"document"
] | cdn.climatepolicyradar.org | (See end of Document for details) (5) Zones regulations which make provision of the kind described in section 229(1)(c) or (4)(c) or 230(2)(c) or (4) (and no other provision) are subject to the negative (6) If, apart from this section, a draft of an instrument containing zones regulations would be treated for the purposes of the standing orders of either House of Parliament as a hybrid instrument, it is to proceed in that House as if it were not such an instrument. I277 S. 226 in force at Royal Assent, see s. 334(2)(l) Heat Network Zones Authority and zone coordinators 227 Heat Network Zones Authority (1) Zones regulations may designate a person to act as the Heat Network Zones Authority (referred to in this Chapter as “the Authority”). (2) The purpose of the Authority is to carry out functions in relation to heat network zones conferred on it by zones regulations. (3) The Secretary of State may, but need not, be designated for the purposes (4) Zones regulations may provide for the Authority to delegate any of its functions to persons specified in the regulations. I278 S. 227 in force at Royal Assent, see s. 334(2)(l) (1) Zones regulations may make provision about zone coordinators. (2) The purpose of zone coordinators is to carry out functions conferred on them by zones regulations in relation to particular heat network zones. (3) Regulations made by virtue of subsection (1) may— (a) make provision for, or in connection with, the designation of a person as a zone coordinator by a local authority for its area, or a part or parts of its area (including the local authority designating itself); (b) make provision for, or in connection with, the designation of a person as a zone coordinator by two or more local authorities for their areas or parts of their areas (including the local authorities designating one of themselves); (c) make provision for, or in connection with, the establishment of a body by one or more local authorities which is intended to be designated as a zone coordinator in accordance with regulations made by virtue of paragraph (a) (d) make provision about the funding of zone coordinators;
Chapter 2 – Heat network zones Document 2024-10-14 This version of this Act contains provisions that are prospective. Changes to There are currently no known outstanding effects for the Energy Act 2023. (See end of Document for details) (e) make provision about the governance of zone coordinators; (f) make provision about zone coordinators cooperating with the Regulator in relation to zone coordinators’ functions or the Regulator’s functions; (g) make provision for the Authority to perform any function of a zone coordinator in circumstances, and subject to requirements, specified by the (h) make provision for the Authority to direct a zone coordinator to perform any of its functions in the manner the Authority considers appropriate in circumstances, and subject to requirements, specified by the regulations. (4) Regulations made by virtue of subsection (3)(a) and (b) may make provision for the (a) to require a local authority, or two or more local authorities, to designate a person as a zone coordinator in circumstances, and subject to requirements, (b) to designate a person as a zone coordinator where a local authority (or local authorities) fail to comply with a requirement imposed by virtue of (5) In this section, “local authority” means— (a) a county, district or parish council in England; (c) the Common Council of the City of London; (d) the Council of the Isles of Scilly; (e) a combined authority established under section 103 of the Local Democracy, Economic Development and Construction Act 2009; (f) another body or person specified by zones regulations. I279 S. 228 in force at Royal Assent, see s. 334(2)(l) Identification, designation and review of zones 229 Identification, designation and review of zones (1) Zones regulations may make provision for, or in connection with— (a) the identification by the Authority and zone coordinators of areas which are appropriate for the construction and operation of one or more district heat (b) the designation of those areas as heat network zones by zone coordinators or (c) the review by zone coordinators, or the Authority, of the designation of areas (2) Regulations made by virtue of subsection (1) (a) must require the identification of areas to be carried out in accordance with the zoning methodology established (3) Regulations made by virtue of subsection (1)(b) may—
Chapter 2 – Heat network zones Document 2024-10-14 This version of this Act contains provisions that are prospective. Changes to There are currently no known outstanding effects for the Energy Act 2023. (See end of Document for details) (a) make provision about the variation or revocation of designations by zone coordinators or the Authority; (b) make provision about procedure; (c) make provision about the publication of designations (and the variation or (d) require zone coordinators to notify the Authority of designations (and the variation or revocation of designations); (e) make provision for, or in connection with, the maintenance by the Authority of a register of areas designated as heat network zones. (4) Regulations made by virtue of subsection (3)(a) may, in particular— (a) specify the circumstances in which a zone coordinator or the Authority may (b) specify the factors a zone coordinator or the Authority may or must take into consideration in determining whether to vary or revoke a designation; (c) impose on zone coordinators or the Authority requirements as to consultation. (5) Regulations made by virtue of subsection (1)(c) may— (a) make provision about the circumstances in which reviews must be carried out (b) set out the criteria against which the designation of areas as heat network (c) impose on zone coordinators or the Authority requirements as to consultation; (d) make provision requiring reports of reviews to be published. | 4808927e-67c0-4e83-803d-e07fd0d4a019 | 83 |
096e1beb-a982-4b58-bb7e-2425ecfbe447 | https://cdn.climatepolicyradar.org/navigator/GBR/2023/united-kingdom-national-inventory-report-nir-2023_8122f7d823bf366105239091fb57ffd2.pdf | 2,023 | [
"data",
"energy",
"emissions",
"inventory",
"environment"
] | cdn.climatepolicyradar.org | AD uncertainty is moderate for 1A2, reflecting energy supplier reporting to DESNZ. 1A2 Other Kerosene 6.00% 2.00% 6.00% 2.00% (Minor fuel in sector context) 1A2 Other Other 5.00% 50.00% 5.00% 3.00% (Minor fuel in sector context) 1A2 Patent Fuel 10.00% 3.00% 10.00% 3.00% (Minor fuel in sector context) 1A2 Petroleum Coke 25.00% 15.00% 20.00% 15.00% EF uncertainty reflects range of petcock composition that may be used for fuel in 1A2. | 9ce0b96e-2800-424e-bffb-cd8ba36e0902 | 58 |
097407a3-37e0-4d1e-9ac7-204eded5e083 | https://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=COM:1998:0246:FIN:EN:PDF | 1,999 | [
"General",
"Energy efficiency"
] | eur-lex.europa.eu | 6. Next steps
A strong commitment and clear signals from all decision-makers and stakeholders
regarding the importance and priority of energy efficiency is needed if any significant
energy saving is to be made, particularly in the light of the Unions commitment,
undertaken in Kyoto, to reduce C02 emissions. Apart from a Community Strategy, Member States will need to develop their own
national strategies. In this context, consideration will need to be given to setting an
objective to reduce energy intensity at Community and national levels, as well as in
different sectoral activities. It has been estimated that if a basic package of measures such as those proposed
above, is implemented in an effective and co-ordinated fashion, it would have a
measurable impact on reducing energy intensity in the Community over and above the
trend of recent years -0.6 p.a.. If an additional annual reduction of energy
intensity of 1 were to be achieved with the win-win measures proposed which is
realistic, this must be regarded as an achievement against the background of expected
continuing low energy prices. The focus of our strategy over the next years has to be the full realisation of the
significant economic potential for the improvement in energy efficiency which exists
in the EU, estimated to be, by 2010, as much as 18 of 1995 energy consumption. This Communication is a first step in such a strategy. In the light of further discussion
and input on the basis of the ideas presented in this Communication, the Commission
intends to produce an Action Plan for Energy Efficiency. 16
Annex 1. Changes in Energy Intensity Total Final ConsumptionGDPtoeMECU 1990
1985
1990
1995
Austria
Belgium
Denmark
Finland
France
Germany
Greece
Ireland
Italy
Luxembourg
Netherlands
Portugal
Spain
Sweden
United Kingdom
wwifjij. 161.5
202.1
143.0
196.8
143.5
177.4
230.6
201.1
128.4
409.9
192.8
217.1
145.8
166.9
177.2
aao
Source 1997 Annual Energy Review, European Commission, September 1997. | ad532131-9dd4-4738-9c63-5139bce2852c | 17 |
09822f36-b130-449e-80b7-ebda7332bec3 | http://arxiv.org/abs/1707.04870v3 | 2,017 | [
"particular emissions reduction policies",
"non - producer regions",
"integrated model simulation",
"0.50$/litre",
"public procurement policy"
] | ArXiv | A high degree of consensus exists in the climate sciences over the role that human interference with the atmosphere is playing in changing the climate. Following the Paris Agreement, a similar consensus exists in the policy community over the urgency of policy solutions to the climate problem. The context for climate policy is thus moving from agenda setting, which has now been mostly established, to impact assessment, in which we identify policy pathways to implement the Paris Agreement. Most integrated assessment models currently used to address the economic and technical feasibility of avoiding climate change are based on engineering perspectives with a normative systems optimisation philosophy, suitable for agenda setting, but unsuitable to assess the socio-economic impacts of a realistic baskets of climate policies. Here, we introduce a fully descriptive, simulation-based integrated assessment model designed specifically to assess policies, formed by the combination of (1) a highly disaggregated macro-econometric simulation of the global economy based on time series regressions (E3ME), (2) a family of bottom-up evolutionary simulations of technology diffusion based on cross-sectional discrete choice models (FTT), and (3) a carbon cycle and atmosphere circulation model of intermediate complexity (GENIE-1). We use this combined model to create a detailed global and sectoral policy map and scenario that sets the economy on a pathway that achieves the goals of the Paris Agreement with >66% probability of not exceeding 2 deg C of global warming. We propose a blueprint for a new role for integrated assessment models in this upcoming policy assessment context. December 2015 saw a historical moment for climate policy in which, for the first time, almost all countries of the world adopted a formal agreement to reduce emissions in order to limit global warming to temperatures below 2 deg C [1]. 1 This event marked a change in efforts to develop climate policy: the agenda, whether or not to adopt measures to avoid climate change, was mostly set. What remained to be done was to find out how to achieve this objective with public policies, in every country that is party to the agreement. Developing climate policy is a complex process that could involve planning for dramatic societal changes and socio-economic impacts [2]. Policies can have unintended effects. The far-reaching consequences of adopting particular emissions reduction policies can be challenging to fully foresee, as they involve changes in many sectors and for many actors. For example, could adopting a high price of carbon to incentivise electrification increase electricity prices for consumers, thereby reducing access to modern energy for those who cannot afford it? Can biofuels policy lead to unintended land-use change, or lead to water or food scarcity? Could reducing the consumption of fossil fuels globally lead to high rates of unemployment in producer countries? Could a highly capital-intensive, low-carbon transition lead to excessive debt leveraging of government and/or firms, and result in a carbon bubble? In order to determine the impacts of specific policies, research must move from the agenda-setting stage to the actual impact assessment of policies. This corresponds to a different stage of the policy cycle, and requires analysing the impacts of detailed baskets of policies, as they are envisaged by policy-makers, with all the attendant political and legal complexities, rather than merely recommending -often unrealistic -policies that appear optimal. In the perspective of impact assessment (e.g. see [3]) the policy parameter space is too large to optimise, and individual policies can synergise or interfere [4]. The complexity of the impact assessment problem must account for the uncertainty over the knowledge of the modeller about the way in which decisionmaking actually takes place with agents [5], and how the heterogeneity of agents might influence policy outcomes [6,7]. Models based on representative agents have therefore insufficient resolution for carrying out realistic impact assessment [8]. It is more and more recognised that increasing the level of behavioural information in models enables them to represent more policy instruments and thus cover a wider policy space [9][10][11][12]. Climate policy analysis, in the agenda setting perspective (e.g. [13][14][15]), has focused primarily on total energy system cost, consumption loss and GDP loss as indicators to characterise the socioeconomic impacts. This is now insufficient, as policy-makers are increasingly requiring information on many other types of impact [16]. For example, questions arise over large-scale finance of technological change, and its impact on the macroeconomic system [17]. The choice of model type for this purpose pre-determines the results that can be reached [18]. Most equilibrium models of the economy used to analyse climate policy have restrictive assumptions over the functioning of the financial sector such that their outcomes are almost entirely determined by a debatable assumption, that re-allocating finance for technological change to reduce emissions takes away investment from other productive sectors of the economy, which automatically leads to loss of GDP ([19], see also [13] and references therein). In fact, research on innovation tends to suggest the reverse [20][21][22]. Following the financial crisis of 2008, the key question on the mind of many policy-makers is not how many percentage points of GDP loss climate policy might entail, but rather, whether securing large-scale investment is possible without leading countries to financial instability [23][24][25][26][27]. In this paper, we introduce the new integrated assessment model E3ME-FTT-GENIE1, which is designed to tackle the question of environmental impact assessment with the most realistic policy definition currently available, while enabling policy-makers to explore macro-financial issues that may arise from the introduction of such policy. We first describe the policy context that the model attempts to address, as well as the origin and history of economic thought behind its assumptions. We then describe its components: climatology, non-equilibrium macroeconomics and evolutionary technology modelling. We subsequently provide an example of environmental policy analysis under several socio-economic indicators. We conclude with an outlook for future research in the field of integrated assessment modelling. The modelling approach described in this paper is one of simulation. | d7303b50-3b44-460d-868e-141fb053b83d | 0 |
0985a502-08c8-4380-b13a-fefda106e7b1 | https://cdn.climatepolicyradar.org/navigator/GBR/2021/net-zero-strategy-build-back-greener_0fdb5eb8c251d8c2a37a5a1cb4c57f3f.pdf | 2,023 | [
"Economy-wide",
"zero",
"carbon",
"emissions",
"energy",
"government"
] | cdn.climatepolicyradar.org | The engineers, fabricators, and geologists currently working in industrial clusters and the oil and gas sector will be able to make use of local skills programmes such as Skills Bootcamps or Free Courses for Jobs to support new emerging industries in renewables, CCUS, and low carbon hydrogen to help build SuperPlaces. As the demand pulls through these lower carbon technologies, the costs fall. And these industrial clusters, our potential ‘SuperPlaces’, will foster and lead internationally on the development and roll out Fuel switching and carbon capture 20. Fuel switching to hydrogen is likely to be technically feasible for most industrial processes and our modelling indicates it is the least-cost option to decarbonise harder to electrify sites, processes, and sectors. 21. The IDS sets out that a low regret level of deep decarbonisation infrastructure should be installed in industrial clusters this decade. This will give industry the confidence to invest in switching to low carbon fuels, such as hydrogen. Industrial users located in clusters are therefore expected to provide the most significant new demand for hydrogen by 2030, with the greatest potential from chemicals and iron and steel sectors. A significant proportion of this demand could arise from a small number of sites acting as ‘pathfinders’, proving the viability of hydrogen at a commercial scale and fostering the initial market for low carbon hydrogen. 22. The UK Hydrogen Strategy indicated that in 2030 consumption of low carbon hydrogen as an industry fuel could range from around 10 TWh per year if supply is limited to clusters, and up to around 20 TWh per year if pipelines are connected to some dispersed sites. While supply is likely to come mostly from large scale cluster-based CCUS-enabled hydrogen production sites, there could also be industrial demand for low carbon hydrogen from electrolysis, which can be produced at a smaller scale on a more localised level. To stay on track for our Carbon Budget 6 delivery pathway, hydrogen demand from industry may need to increase up to 50 TWh by 2035. This increase would be driven by a growing number of sites having access to low carbon hydrogen, further technology development to enable an expanding range of processes to switch to hydrogen, and a shift in the associated costs, such as the price of carbon, to make hydrogen an increasingly competitive 23. The UK Hydrogen Strategy also set out the actions we are taking to support industry to realise the potential of this new technology. It is critical that we demonstrate fuel switching to low carbon hydrogen on industrial sites during the 2020s so we will provide further support for research and innovation through the Net Zero Innovation Portfolio and initiatives led by the Industrial Decarbonisation Research and Innovation Centre (IDRIC). Chapter 3 – Reducing Emissions across the Economy
24. Demand-side measures and carbon pricing could help to drive demand for hydrogen and will be supported by grant funding, such as the £55 million Industrial Fuel Switching Competition under our Net Zero Innovation Portfolio and the Phase 2 of the IETF, to support on-site fuel switches. Regulatory measures can also support industry to switch to low carbon hydrogen, with the Hydrogen Strategy announcing calls for evidence on hydrogen-ready industrial equipment and decarbonising existing high carbon hydrogen production. Alongside this, hydrogen production measures in the fuel supply chapter of this strategy will bring forward low carbon hydrogen supply for use across the economy and help make hydrogen a price competitive decarbonisation option to encourage end users to switch. 25. Carbon Capture, Usage & Storage (CCUS) will be an exciting new industry to capture the carbon we continue to emit and revitalise the birthplaces of the first Industrial Revolution. The Prime Minister’s Ten Point Plan established a commitment to deploy CCUS in a minimum of two industrial clusters by the mid-2020s, and four by 2030 at the latest. Our aim is to use CCUS technology to capture and store 20-30MtCO2 per year by 2030, forming the foundations for future investment and potential export opportunities. Developed alongside hydrogen, we can create these transformative ‘SuperPlaces’ in areas such as the Humber, North East, North West and southern England, as well as in 26. Developed alongside hydrogen, CCUS will be part of creating transformative “SuperPlaces” in areas such The Humber and North East, North West, and Southern England as well as in Scotland and Wales. Our £1 billion CCS Infrastructure Fund will provide industry with the certainty required to deploy CCUS at pace and at scale and will form part of a package of government support, which will also include the Industrial Decarbonisation and Hydrogen Revenue Support (IDHRS) scheme and the £240 million Net Zero Hydrogen Fund supporting both CCS-enabled ‘blue’ and electrolytic ‘green’ hydrogen. 27. Following the completion of Phase 1 of the Cluster Sequencing process, the Hynet and East Coast Clusters have been confirmed as track 1 clusters for the mid-2020s and will be taken forward into Track-1 negotiations. If the clusters represent value for money for the consumer and the taxpayer then subject to final decisions of Ministers, they will receive support under the government’s CCUS Programme. We are also announcing the Scottish Cluster as a reserve cluster if a back-up is needed; we will continue to engage with this cluster as well as the track 1 clusters, throughout the next stage of the process. This puts these places - Teesside, the Humber, Merseyside, North Wales and the North East of Scotland - among the potential early SuperPlaces which will be transformed over 28. We remain committed to helping all industrial clusters to decarbonise as we work to reach net zero emissions by 2050, and we are clear that CCUS will continue to play a key role in this process. Consequently, the government continues to be committed to Track-2 contributing capacity of 10Mt per year to help achieve our 2030 ambition. | 368033f1-d04a-48ea-83c6-9602b66f0e37 | 33 |
098be74d-13ab-4233-affa-e28b768bb5c8 | 2,025 | [
"non - ets emissions",
"european parliament",
"danish climate council",
"renewable energy",
"final approval"
] | HF-national-climate-targets-dataset | Greenhouse gas emissions will continue to decrease. Denmark is ready to contribute to the EU's reduction target of at least 40 per cent by 2030 (compared with 1990 levels) by taking on an ambitious 2030 targets for reducing emissions outside the quota system. In October 2017 Denmark agreed to a reduction in non-ETS emissions in the period 2021-2030, rising to 39% by 2030 relative to 2005, when the flexible mechanisms of the Effort Sharing Regulation are taken into account. The final approval by the European Parliament is still pending. In 2018, the government will prepare a cost-effective strategy for meeting Denmark's reduction target in 2030. The Government will among other things include recommendations from the Danish Climate Council. The EU has a target of 27 per cent renewable energy by 2030. This target has already been met by Denmark. Denmark will go further than that. The Government will therefore pursue a target of at least 50 per cent of Denmark's energy needs to come from renewable sources by 2030. | d1138a82-39c6-4b44-a55f-a93824b57e6c | 0 | |
0996469a-c231-4132-bd93-a86c9e029063 | https://www.bgs.ac.uk/download/bgs-science-strategy-2019-2023-gateway-to-the-earth/ | 2,018 | [
"energy",
"development",
"article",
"management",
"protection",
"water",
"measure",
"environment",
"consist",
"resource"
] | bgs.ac.uk | Created by the Geological Survey Act of 1845, the British Geological Survey's (BGS) mission is to provide impartial and independent geoscience advice and data through the observation, monitoring and characterisation of geological environments both nationally and internationally. The BGS also builds strategic partnership with academic institutions, governments, industry and the public to develop its work and share expertise.The Gateway to Earth Science Strategy for the BGS sets out three challenge areas: | ec5c3c0d-114b-44f5-abfd-f1c6632af7f2 | 0 |
099e6f36-d06f-40df-ac02-4689f6f747f9 | http://arxiv.org/pdf/2506.20105v2 | 2,025 | [
"temperature",
"growth",
"climate",
"provinces",
"effects"
] | arxiv.org | Without bias correction in the projected climate, province-level projections under both RCP4.5 and RCP8.5 emission scenarios show that climate change will negatively affect half of the Thai population in 2050. These negative impacts are statistically uncertain, with an average of 51-57% likelihood that climate change will have positive impacts. An increasing share of the Thai population is projected to be affected by a warming climate, while negative impacts are more certain as we approach the end of this century. In 2090, projections under the "business as usual" RCP8.5 emission scenario show that climate change will make 86% of Thai people poorer in per capita terms than they would be in the absence of climate change, while a more aggressive emission reduction RCP4.5, 63% are. These projections come with an average probability of 0.30-0.47 across provinces that climate change will have positive impacts. These results provide suggestive evidence that climate change will most likely affect Thailand's economy to a certain extent. Additional projections also show that the differences in the projected impact of a warming climate are mainly due to geographic heterogeneity in the baseline temperatures. In particular, the provinces in the Upper-North region, which are typically colder than other regions of Thailand, benefit more from increased average temperatures. The projections that account for the lagged effects of temperature over time, however, display substantially more negative impacts in all 77 provinces. Next, I examine the impacts, again, without bias-correction of climate change on Thailand's gross regional product (GRP) per capita. The point estimates are uniformly more negative in the higher average temperature regions (i.e., Central, East, South, and West). The damages are modest in colder regions, such as the Lower North and Northeast regions, while the Upper North region, which has the lowest average temperature, benefits the most from increased average temperatures. Then, I examine whether the region-level projections are sensitive to different combinations of emission scenarios, specifications, and output growth assumptions. The projections are broadly similar in structure for both the RCP4.5 and RCP8.5 emission scenarios. Projected impacts in models that allow the effects of temperature to persist on regional output growth are less uncertain whether high-and low-income provinces are assumed to respond identically or differently to temperature changes. In models that do not account for lagged effects, the projections become more uncertain whether high-and low-income provinces are assumed to respond identically or differently. Then, I project the impacts without bias-correction of climate change on Thailand's gross domestic product (GDP) per capita under the RCP8.5 emission scenario between 2023-2090 for four different historical growth-temperature response functions and three output growth assumptions combination. Similar to both provincial and regional projections, output growth assumptions likely have little impact on the projected change in GDP per capita under the RCP8.5 emission scenario. As also observed in the regional projections, projections are less uncertain and fall off steeply in earlier future years in models that allow the effects of temperature to persist on output growth because colder provinces also suffer large damages. In models that do not account for lagged effects, the projections are more uncertain whether high-and low-income provinces are assumed to respond identically or differently because colder provinces benefit somewhat from increased average temperatures, while hotter provinces remain worse off under a warming climate. I then examine the sensitivity of the projected impacts on Thailand's GDP under the emission stabilization scenario RCP4.5. Projections under both emission scenarios are broadly similar in structure but vary in magnitude. To examine the impacts of potentially upward biases in future climate projections, I then project the impacts on provincial output per capita using a bias-correction strategy. These corrected projections are substantially different from those without bias correction. Projections under both RCP4.5 and RCP8.5 emission scenarios show that climate change will substantially affect 89-94% of the Thai population in 2050. These projections come with an average probability of 0.10-0.20 that climate change will have positive impacts on any province. The climate-affected share of the Thai population is substantially high throughout the projected future period. Projections show that almost all Thai people will be negatively affected by climate change in 2090 under either the RCP4.5 or RCP8.5 emission scenarios, with an average probability of 0.06-0.07 that climate change will have positive impacts. In models that do not consider the delayed effects of temperature, whether high-and low-income provinces are assumed to respond identically or differently, median projections in all three output growth scenarios show that climate change reduces Thailand's output per capita by 57-63% under RCP4.5 and 80-86% under RCP8.5, relative to its GDP per capita in the absence of climate change. All models with delayed impacts project that Thailand will lose 94-100% of its output in the absence of climate change. All projections are certain with only 1-6% likelihood of positive impacts. Taken together, these results show that the projected impacts of climate change are sensitive to potential biases in future climate projections, particularly in models that do not account for lagged effects, in which the colder provinces somewhat benefit from increased average temperatures, while hotter provinces remain worse off under a warming climate. However, there are some important caveats to these projections. First, the projected impacts are likely overestimated because adaptability to permanent changes in climate is not considered. Second, the projections also reveal a certain degree of uncertainty caused by two distinct sources of uncertainty: climate projection uncertainty and economic pathway uncertainty. Future climate projections involve considerable uncertainty arising from an incomplete understanding of the Earth's physical systems. Similarly, predicting accurate economic growth in any economy is challenging because of a variety of factors that introduce complexity and uncertainty, particularly as financial systems become increasingly integrated. Third, these projected future damages rely on a number of strong assumptions, including that the climate projections are correct, the future growth of province-level output will remain constant in the baseline scenario or follow the growth paths that are projected by SSP3 and SSP5 pathways, and the demographics of the Thai population and their geographic distribution will remain unchanged. | 4408d360-ca63-40ba-8dff-2537ab627fe1 | 1 |
09a46179-f2f5-46f7-a5e8-dee54724d758 | http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/ALL/?uri=CELEX:52005DC0628 | 2,005 | [
"Transport",
"Electricity and heat",
"Renewables"
] | eur-lex.europa.eu | ANNEX 4 Environmental impacts
Biomass has three main environmental impacts:
- Avoidance of greenhouse gas emissions
The Commission estimates that the scenario in Annex 3, if achieved, would reduce greenhouse gas emissions by 209 million tonnes of CO2-eq per year. - Environmental impact of the production of raw materials
Agriculture can have significant effects on the environment, positive and negative. In general, the level of harmful effects varies with the intensity of the agriculture. This is true whether crops are used for food or energy purposes. It can be particularly harmful to bring previously uncultivated land (permanent grassland) into agricultural use. On the other hand, using grass cuttings from such land for biomass production can help to prevent the decline of biodiversity on species-rich grasslands due to land abandonment. Energy crop cultivation can help to improve the overall profitability of the farm business, contributing to the maintenance of farming in areas where this may be useful from an environmental (or wider sustainable development) perspective. This is important in a number of regions to improve soil stability and prevent irreversible landslide damage. Another potential positive aspect of energy crop production is its contribution to the establishment of new crop rotation systems that are more advantageous from a wider environmental point of view (for example, alternatives to the monoculture of maize). If energy crops are grown on agricultural land that was previously used for food production, the change in environmental pressure depends on which biomass crops are cultivated. The plantation of tree crops to enhance soil cover on degraded land can also have a globally positive impact. However this should not take place on steppic or mountain habitats that have a high biodiversity value. The use of wastes and residues for energy purposes often gives an environmental bonus compared with other means of disposal. For forest residues, the environmental impact depends on the local soil nutrient balance and the risk of erosion, which may require a certain amount of the residues (especially foliage) to be left on site. In some regions, however, their extraction help to reduce the risk of fire. - Environmental impact of the use of biomass
Like fossil fuels, biomass emits pollutants. Advanced emission control equipment can virtually eliminate this, however. Such equipment is already standard in transport and, increasingly, in electricity generation. The situation is less favourable with heating, particularly home heating. This analysis points to two priorities:
- the need to guarantee that site-specific environmental requirements are observed when producing biomass this will be addressed in the Commission s 2006 report on the implementation of the biofuels directive;
- improving the pollution performance of household biomass burning this will be addressed as part of the measures proposed in this action plan to develop biomass heating. The Commission will also take steps to improve understanding of the costs and environmental impacts of all transport fuels, including conventional biofuels. ANNEX 5 Renewable energy and the directive on the energy performance of buildings
The directive on the energy performance of buildings[44] requires Member States, when calculating the energy performance of buildings, to take into account the positive influence of \"heating and electricity systems based on renewable energy sources\". The relative importance attached to different kinds of renewable energy will be decided by the Member States in their transposition of the directive, allowing them, in principle, to attach substantial premia to the use of biomass in their calculation methods. Moreover, for new buildings larger than 1000 square meters, Member States are required to carry out technical, environmental and economic feasibility studies on the use of decentralised energy supply systems based on renewable energy, on CHP and on district or block heating or cooling. This also gives Member States considerable leeway to promote biomass. In many Member States, biomass heating is one of the most practical and cost-effective options. During 2006, taking into account comments received on the energy efficiency Green Paper[45], the Commission will decide how it thinks the directive should be further developed. The possibilities it will consider could include:
- amending the annex to the directive to ensure that calculation procedures allow greater weight and more active promotion to be given to biomass heating and other forms of renewable energy;
- reducing the thresholds in the directive so that many more new buildings would have to be considered for renewable energy before construction starts, and many more renovation projects would need to meet minimum efficiency requirements based on energy performance calculations that include the positive influence of renewable energy sources, including biomass;
- setting EU-wide minimum energy performance standards and criteria that could also promote the use of biomass where it is technically feasible and economically interesting. | 4d97d3b3-afe5-45f2-8123-6e37d1fdc0fe | 57 |
09af1c4a-5dcb-4676-9267-f75b9c034bc6 | https://cdn.climatepolicyradar.org/navigator/GBR/2025/united-kingdom-national-inventory-report-nir-2025_3d22864cf237013c86452d4c6455250a.pdf | 2,025 | [
"emissions",
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] | cdn.climatepolicyradar.org | For example, key substitutes for high GWP HFCs include hydrofluoroolefins and hydrocarbons, which typically have GWPs two orders of magnitude smaller than the HFC being replaced. It is estimated that in recent years total emissions from these pollutants exceed 0.1 Mt CO2e. | 95866fde-5b53-4214-b279-97a1078c466c | 176 |
09b17f36-f96a-4b62-ac31-204a7a356982 | https://cdn.climatepolicyradar.org/navigator/GBR/1900/united-kingdom-national-communication-nc-nc-8-biennial-reports-br-br-5_288d5f885869447df3e9910829b567a3.pdf | 2,022 | [
"climate",
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"support",
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] | cdn.climatepolicyradar.org | Five of the ten wettest years for the UK have occurred since 2000, in a series beginning in 1836. The largest increases in rainfall have been during the winter season, with the most recent decade (2012-2021) having winters 26% wetter than 1961-1990. This period includes the two wettest winters on record in 2013-2014 and 2015-2016, with winter 2019-2020 as the fifth wettest in a series from 1836. Summers of the most recent decade (2012-2021) have also been 15% wetter than 1961-1990 including the third wettest summer on record in 2012. 13
Chapter 1 National Circumstances 31 This changing trend in rainfall in the UK is a result of both human influence and large-scale natural variability in the climate system, which can occur over time periods of decades. Met State of the UK Climate 2021 Since 1900 sea level around the UK has risen by about 16.5 cm when corrected for vertical land movement, which is comparable to global sea level rise estimate of 20 cm. There is evidence from the observational records that the rate of sea level rise is increasing from a long-term estimate of 1.5 mm/yr, with the period 1993-2019 increasing by closer Sea surface temperatures around the UK for the most recent decade (2012-2021) have been on average 0.1 °C warmer than the 1991-2020 average and 0.7 °C warmer than 1961-1990. The 2018 UK Climate Projections (UKCP18) provide the most up-to-date assessment of how the UK climate is projected to change in the future. The climate information provided summarises key results, reports on the latest science reports and gives users advice and guidance, all underpinned by a suite of climate data obabilistic projections including extremes ojections for three spatial resolutions (60 km, 12 km and 2.2 km) • Projections of sea level rise, storm surge and waves. 32 8th National Communication One strand of the modelling projections is UKCP Local; the first time a climate model with a resolution similar to weather forecasting models has been used to explore national climate scenarios. This is a step forward in the ability of the climate model to simulate small-scale behaviour seen in the real atmosphere, particularly for the representation of the heavy rainfall associated with showers that affect flooding in summer. Continuing research and development of UKCP products includes provision of derived projections based on global warming levels, additional variable analysis (such as soil moisture) and climate indices (such as static weather patterns). In this section, UKCP information is used to summarise the projected effects on UK climate, both in terms of averages and extremes, and then goes on to be used in impact metrics. UKCP were used in the most recent UK Climate Change Risk Assessment and are being applied by the more than seven thousand registered users to quantify and manage physical climate risks. 1.6.2.1 UK future climate overview The headline findings of UKCP18 state that future UK climate change will result in warmer, wetter winters and hotter, drier summers. Annual temperatures for the UK using the 50th percentile (10th and 90th ranges) for a medium emissions scenario (RCP 4.5) from the UKCP Probabilistic Projections suggest warming of 2.3°C (1.1°C to 3.6°C) by the 2090s (2080- 2100) compared to the 1981-2000 baseline period. Warming is projected to be greater in summer (3°C; 1.3°C to 4.8°C) than in winter (2°C; 0.6°C to 3.5°C). UK-wide, summer precipitation decreases are expected to be -19% (-36% to -2%) while winter precipitation is projected to increase 10% (-2% to 25%) by the 2090s. The probabilistic projections provide a broad picture on uncertainties in future UK changes. However, many user applications are conducted using the ensembles of global (60km), regional (12km) and local (2.2km) climate model projections, provided to support detailed impacts studies. The global projections show similar ranges of change to the probabilistic projections and are available for the RCP2.6 and RCP8.5 scenarios. Results are provided below as anomalies to the 1981-2000 baseline period for the median ensemble member, with the spread of outcomes shown (in brackets) using the second lowest and second highest ensemble members. For the low emissions scenario, the median UK annual temperature increase by the 2090s is 1.7°C (0.6°C to 2.4°C) while for the high emissions scenario it is 4.2°C (2.4°C to 5.3°C). Summer warming is also greater than winter warming for both emissions scenarios in the UKCP global ensemble. In the low emissions scenario, summer temperatures increase by 2.2°C (0.5°C to 3.0°C) compared to 1.2°C (0.0°C to 2.0°C) in the winter. Stronger trends occur in the high emissions scenario with summer temperatures (5.5°C; 2.4°C to 6.6°C) increasing more than winter temperatures (3.4°C; 2.1°C to 4.4°C). Consistent with the UK overview, average summer precipitation decreases in summer and increases in winter in both scenarios. Under the high emissions scenario for the 2090s, summer decreases are projected to be -27% (-49% to -2%) and winter increases projected as 19% (7% to 31%). For the low emissions scenario these changes are for summer -5% (-13% to 8%), and for winter 4% (-5% to 12%). such as warming being greater in the summer compared to the winter are projected to occur across all regions of the UK for both emissions scenarios. Similarly, the majority of UK regions are projected to experience a decrease in summer precipitation and an increase in winter precipitation; however, this signal is stronger in the high emissions scenario. Across both seasons and emissions scenarios, regional variations are generally modest within each metric, with differences usually within 1°C or 10%, the high emissions scenario winter precipitation showing the greatest spread between regions. Chapter 1 National Circumstances 33 low emissions scenario RCP 2.6 (a-d) and the high emissions scenario RCP 8.5 (e-h) using the median ensemble member from Sea level is projected to rise around the UK compared to a 1981-2000 baseline period although the amount of sea level rise is higher in the south and increases with higher emissions scenarios. | e6994b55-18ee-49c8-92db-2261135aea96 | 7 |
09b48974-6379-474e-a238-869e231e9912 | https://cdn.climatepolicyradar.org/navigator/GBR/2023/financial-services-and-markets-act-2023_932920a8d8da4ed5a2456d9109b47a62.pdf | 2,023 | [
"Finance",
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] | cdn.climatepolicyradar.org | There are changes that may be brought into force at a future date. Changes that have been made appear in the content and are referenced with annotations. (See end of Document for details) View outstanding changes (c) may be expressed to have effect during a specified period or until (6) The FCA may at any time revoke a direction under this section by notice. (7) The revocation of a direction does not affect the validity of anything previously done in accordance with it. (8) A direction or notice under this section must be given in writing to the person or persons to whom it applies. (9) But if in the circumstances the FCA considers it appropriate, the FCA may, in addition to, or instead of, proceeding under subsection (8), publish the direction or notice in the way appearing to the FCA to be best calculated to bring it to the attention of persons likely to be affected by it. (10) Designated activity regulations may make provision for the exercise of the power under subsection (1) to be subject to such conditions as may be (11) Provision under subsection (10) may (among other things) require, where the exercise of the power relates to a PRA-authorised person, consultation with (12) The imposition of a requirement that expires at the end of a specified period does not affect the FCA’s power to impose a new requirement. 71P Designated liability (1) Designated activity regulations may make provision about liability and compensation in connection with this Part. (2) A contravention of a requirement under designated activity regulations or (a) does not, except as provided by designated activity regulations under section 71Q or by regulations under section 71R, make a person guilty (b) does not, except as provided by designated activity regulations— (i) make any transaction void or unenforceable, or (ii) give rise to any action for breach of statutory duty. (3) Designated activity regulations may in particular— (a) in cases where the regulations make provision for liability, make provision excluding civil liability (whether generally or to such extent (b) make provision for liability to be determined in accordance with (c) make provision so that a person being subject to a liability includes another person being entitled as against that person to rescind or (d) make provision for the purposes of subsection (1) by applying provisions of this Act with or without modifications. Financial Services and Markets Act 2023 (c. 29) PART 5A – Designated activities CHAPTER 2 – New regulatory powers Document 2025-04-01 This version of this Act contains provisions that are prospective. Changes to Financial Services and Markets Act 2023 is up to date with all changes known to be in force on or before 01 April 2025. There are changes that may be brought into force at a future date. Changes that have been made appear in the content and are referenced with annotations. (See end of Document for details) View outstanding changes 71Q Designated enforcement (1) Designated activity regulations may make provision about enforcement in (2) Provision about enforcement includes (among other things) provision— (a) requiring the supply of information; (b) about investigations (including the making of reports); (c) conferring powers of entry; (d) conferring powers of inspection, search and seizure; (e) conferring powers of censure; (f) imposing monetary penalties; (h) conferring functions (including functions involving the exercise of a (3) Designated activity regulations may in particular make provision for the purposes of subsection (1) by applying provisions of this Act with or without modifications, including any criminal offences created by this Act (and modifications made by virtue of this subsection may widen the scope of any (4) The power under this section includes power to amend or repeal provisions 71R Designated activities and connected amendments (1) The Treasury may by regulations make such modifications to provision made by or under this Act or any other enactment as the Treasury consider appropriate for purposes of, or connected with, any designated activity regulations or designated activity rules. (2) The power under subsection (1) may in particular be exercised for the purpose of removing or varying any requirement imposed by or under this Act so far as applying to the carrying on of any designated activity. (3) The power under subsection (1) includes power to modify any criminal offence created by this Act (including by widening the scope of any such (a) an enactment comprised in subordinate legislation (within the meaning given by section 21 of the Interpretation Act 1978), (b) an enactment comprised in, or in an instrument made under, a Measure or Act of Senedd Cymru, (c) an enactment comprised in, or in an instrument made under, an Act of the Scottish Parliament, and (d) an enactment comprised in, or in an instrument made under, “modify” includes amend, repeal or revoke. 14 Financial Services and Markets Act 2023 (c. 29) PART 5A – Designated activities CHAPTER 2 – New regulatory powers Document 2025-04-01 This version of this Act contains provisions that are prospective. Changes to Financial Services and Markets Act 2023 is up to date with all changes known to be in force on or before 01 April 2025. There are changes that may be brought into force at a future date. Changes that have been made appear in the content and are referenced with annotations. | 60620217-7ea8-4d25-b12c-cbbb5bd7a3f3 | 5 |
09b7215c-2a3d-44a4-a1eb-1383149da225 | https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/1009448/decarbonising-transport-a-better-greener-britain.pdf | 2,021 | [
"transport",
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] | assets.publishing.service.gov.uk | Decarbonisation requires a rethink of how we invest in transport, technology, and skills. One example is hydrogen, fundamental to achieving net zero in heavy transport applications and a major industrial opportunity. | 8f0273a5-decd-4a43-ab49-4f3473699e66 | 37 |
09b8ce8a-1dc3-4cdc-a432-bc4dcca0ba06 | https://cdn.climatepolicyradar.org/navigator/GBR/2024/united-kingdom-biennial-transparency-report-btr1_0e77f9e4d928e6e9d64ea26cd95945e1.pdf | 2,024 | [
"climate",
"change",
"emissions",
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] | cdn.climatepolicyradar.org | The UK employs a range of institutional structures – at national, sub-national and local level - to enable economy-wide emissions mitigation, as well as numerous policies and measures to underpin delivery. The UK consists of England, Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland, with aspects of government policy responsibility devolved to the democratically accountable governments within each, namely the Scottish government, the Welsh government and the Northern Ireland Executive. | 2ae0b548-ef04-451f-aba3-617d0f3c41f8 | 28 |
09bb0ae1-f5c6-440f-8e39-0e78a1b9d81c | https://cdn.climatepolicyradar.org/navigator/GBR/2021/net-zero-strategy-build-back-greener_0fdb5eb8c251d8c2a37a5a1cb4c57f3f.pdf | 2,023 | [
"Economy-wide",
"zero",
"carbon",
"emissions",
"energy",
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] | cdn.climatepolicyradar.org | Countries that are covered by a commitment to net zero or carbon neutrality now account for around 75% of global GHG emissions, and around 80% of global GDP . When the UK took the role of incoming COP Presidency in December 2019, coverage was less than 30% of world GDP . We have a unique opportunity to further this leadership through our G7 Presidency in 2021, and as the host and president of the COP26 summit, in partnership with Italy. The COP26 summit will bring together nearly 200 Parties to accelerate action towards the goals of the Paris Agreement and the UNFCCC, and our drive towards global net zero. 33. COP26 will be the forum to define the decisive decade of climate action and setting the path to global net zero emissions. The UK is urging all parties to demonstrate how they will reach net zero greenhouse gas emissions through near term 2030 NDC targets and Long-Term Strategies to 2050, protect people and nature from climate change impacts, fund climate action, and work together to deliver immediate steps to keep warming within 1.5℃. There will also be a renewed focus on accelerating near-term action in the top priority areas of coal phase out, zero-emission vehicles, climate finance, and 34. The four goals for the UK’s COP26 a. bring parties together to deliver commitments on mitigation. All countries should come forward with ambitious 2030 climate plans (Nationally Determined Contributions, or NDCs) and long-term strategies to reach net zero greenhouse gas emissions, with the aim of keeping the goal of limiting global warming b. establish a new consensus on protecting people and nature from climate change impacts. All countries should come forward with ambitious adaptation plans and communications to help their societies and economies adapt c. To deliver on our first two goals, developed countries must deliver on their promise to mobilise at least $100 billion in climate finance per year by 2020, and through to 2025, to help developing countries tackle and adapt to climate change. International financial institutions must play their part and we need work towards unleashing the trillions in private and public sector finance required to d. bring countries together to reach an outcome accelerating climate action and finalising the Paris Rulebook. Use the power of a fair and inclusive Presidency to enhance international collaboration among policy makers, investors, business, young people, indigenous peoples, and civil society. This can help to solve key challenges and accelerate the delivery of the Paris Agreement goals, adaptation and resilience, nature, clean energy and transport, and finance. Net Zero Build Back Greener
35. In delivering net zero, the UK also has the opportunity to be at the forefront of large, expanding global markets and capitalise on export opportunities in low carbon technologies and services. This includes renewables, CCUS, hydrogen, smart energy systems and storage, Greenhouse Gas Removals (GGRs), Advanced Modular Reactors (AMRs), and transport. By leading the world in the transition to a net zero future, the UK will be well placed to benefit economically by leading in the export of sustainable technologies and solutions. 36. As the world economy moves to meet the Paris commitments, with over 80% of world GDP now committed to net zero, the UK will set a clear direction and give businesses the certainty they need to invest, grow, and develop the technologies of the future. Some commentators estimate global investment in energy supply and infrastructure to reach $92 trillion and $173 trillion over the next thirty years. To achieve this level, the global economy will need to more than double annual investments from around $1.7 trillion per year to between $3.1 and $5.8 trillion per 37. This strategy sets out our approach to reaching net zero emissions and securing the vast wider benefits as we transition to a greener, more sustainable future. We urge other countries to follow this example with ambitious commitments at COP26 and detailed plans to deliver on them. 15 BEIS (2021), ‘Second wind for the Humber, Teesside and UK energy industry’, [Press release], 16 Wind Europe (2021), ‘Offshore Wind in Europe, Key Trends and Statistics 2020’, exchange rate based on monthly average between Jan 2011 and Dec 2020, intelligence-platform/product/offshore-wind-in-europe-key-trends-and-statistics-2020/ 17 HM Treasury (2021), ‘Green Book supplementary wellbeing’, publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/1005388/ Wellbeing_guidance_for_appraisal_-_supplementary_Green_Book_guidance.pdf 18 IPCC (2021), ‘Working Group 1 contribution to the Sixth Assessment Report’, ipcc.ch/report/ar6/wg1/#FullReport 19 BEIS (2020), ‘The UK’s Nationally Determined Contribution under the Paris Agreement’, 20 The UK NDC is based on territorial emissions – greenhouse gases emitted from sources within the UK – so does not include emissions from international aviation and shipping. This is in line with international reporting requirements, international expectations, and advice from the 21 CCC (2020), ‘Sixth Carbon Budget’, 22 BEIS analysis (2021), Greenhouse Gas Inventories for England, Scotland, Wales & Northern 1990-2019 using AR5 with climate feedback Global Warming Potentials defra.gov.uk/reports/cat09/2106240841_DA_GHGI_1990-2019_Final_Issue1.2.xlsx 23 PBL (2020), Trends in Global CO2 and Total Greenhouse Gas Emissions; 2020 Report, 24 BloombergNEF (2021), ‘New Energy Outlook 2021’,
Net Zero Build Back Greener
1. Transforming the UK’s economy over the next three decades to reach net zero will be a journey of unprecedented opportunity and change. Our greenhouse gas emissions have fallen by more than two-fifths in the last thirty years, with particular progress in the decarbonisation of our electricity system, but we need to go further and faster in the next thirty years, right across the economy.1 It will mean developing and rolling out new, innovative, and climate resilient technologies; embracing new ways of doing things – from new ways of travelling, heating our homes, and using our land; and creating new industries and jobs through our green 2. The policies to drive these changes, and the opportunities arising for individuals and the UK economy, are set out across the remaining chapters of this Strategy. | 368033f1-d04a-48ea-83c6-9602b66f0e37 | 12 |
09bdff5c-b968-4b6d-909a-2f921b52820c | https://www.ecolex.org/details/legislation/north-wales-wind-farms-connection-order-2016-si-no-818-of-2016-lex-faoc157382/?type=legislation&xsubjects=Mineral+resources&page=612 | 2,016 | [
"energy",
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] | ecolex.org | This Order, made under the Planning Act 2008, provides for “development consent” for a large specific wind farm project. This project shall conform various environmental standards and plans. The undertaker of the project shall also have regard to various requirements regarding discharge of water and protection of water resources. The Order does not authorise any water discharge activities or groundwater activities for which a licence is required pursuant to regulation 12(1)(b) of the Environmental Permitting (England and Wales) Regulations 2010. The Order also concerns (environmental requirements for) the decommissioning of the project. | 75fb8a8b-07b6-4979-bb1d-fa9b7cfb0131 | 0 |
09c2b3e9-c72f-44da-a1b5-4e17f71bed75 | https://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=CELEX:32001L0080:EN:HTML | 2,001 | [
"Industry",
"Electricity and heat",
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] | eur-lex.europa.eu | In the case of plants with a multi-firing unit involving the alternative use of two or more fuels, when granting the licence referred to in Article 4(1) and (2), and in the case of such plants covered by Articles 4(3) or 10, the emission limit values set out in Annexes III to VII corresponding to each fuel used shall be applied. Article 9
Waste gases from combustion plants shall be discharged in controlled fashion by means of a stack. The licence referred to in Article 4 and licences for combustion plants covered by Article 10 shall lay down the discharge conditions. The competent authority shall in particular ensure that the stack height is calculated in such a way as to safeguard health and the environment. Article 10
Where a combustion plant is extended by at least 50 MW, the emission limit values as set in part B of Annexes III to VII shall apply to the new part of the plant and shall be fixed in relation to the thermal capacity of the entire plant. This provision shall not apply in the cases referred to in Article 8(2) and (3). Where the operator of a combustion plant is envisaging a change according to Articles 2(10)(b) and 12(2) of Directive 96/61/EC, the emission limit values as set out in part B of Annexes III to VII in respect of sulphur dioxide, nitrogen oxides and dust shall apply. Article 11
In the case of construction of combustion plants which are likely to have significant effects on the environment in another Member State, the Member States shall ensure that all appropriate information and consultation takes place, in accordance with Article 7 of Council Directive 85/337/EEC of 27 June 1985 on the assessment of the effects of certain public and private projects on the environment(14). Article 12
Member States shall take the necessary measures to ensure the monitoring, in accordance with Annex VIII(A), of emissions from the combustion plants covered by this Directive and of all other values required for the implementation of this Directive. Member States may require that such monitoring shall be carried out at the operator's expense. Article 13
Member States shall take appropriate measures to ensure that the operator informs the competent authorities within reasonable time limits about the results of the continuous measurements, the checking of the measuring equipment, the individual measurements and all other measurements carried out in order to assess compliance with this Directive. Article 14
1. In the event of continuous measurements, the emission limit values set out in part A of Annexes III to VII shall be regarded as having been complied with if the evaluation of the results indicates, for operating hours within a calendar year, that:
(a) none of the calendar monthly mean values exceeds the emission limit values; and
(b) in the case of:
(i) sulphur dioxide and dust: 97 % of all the 48 hourly mean values do not exceed 110 % of the emission limit values,
(ii) nitrogen oxides: 95 % of all the 48 hourly mean values do not exceed 110 % of the emission limit values. The periods referred to in Article 7 as well as start-up and shut-down periods shall be disregarded. 2. In cases where only discontinuous measurements or other appropriate procedures for determination are required, the emission limit values set out in Annexes III to VII shall be regarded as having been complied with if the results of each of the series of measurements or of the other procedures defined and determined according to the rules laid down by the competent authorities do not exceed the emission limit values. 3. In the cases referred to in Article 5(2) and (3), the rates of desulphurisation shall be regarded as having been complied with if the evaluation of measurements carried out pursuant to Annex VIII, point A.3, indicates that all of the calendar monthly mean values or all of the rolling monthly mean values achieve the required desulphurisation rates. The periods referred to in Article 7 as well as start-up and shut-down periods shall be disregarded. 4. For new plants for which the licence is granted pursuant to Article 4(2), the emission limit values shall be regarded, for operating hours within a calendar year, as complied with if:
(a) no validated daily average value exceeds the relevant figures set out in part B of Annexes III to VII, and
(b) 95 % of all the validated hourly average values over the year do not exceed 200 % of the relevant figures set out in part B of Annexes III to VII. The \"validated average values\" are determined as set out in point A.6 of Annex VIII. The periods referred to in Article 7 as well as start up and shut down periods shall be disregarded. | b1740270-b985-4879-9e7d-fe1209ab0db3 | 25 |
09c6392a-b86d-4dc6-a9c6-09bb6f1d283e | https://cdn.climatepolicyradar.org/navigator/GBR/1900/united-kingdom-biennial-reports-br-br-3-national-communication-nc-nc-7_dabcc5bcde8c5a69cb06295558ac6b22.pdf | 2,017 | [
"climate",
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"emissions",
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] | cdn.climatepolicyradar.org | The UK has a legally binding commitment to ensure that the net carbon account for the year 2050 is at least 80% lower than the 1990 baseline – further information is detailed in Chapter 3 – At the United Nations Conference on Climate Change in Paris in December 2015, 195 countries committed to adopt a global climate change Agreement. The Paris Agreement entered into force on 4 November 2016. It was ratified by the UK on 18 November 2016, during the United Nations Conference on Climate Change in Marrakesh. The EU and its Member States are committed to a target of at least a 40% domestic reduction in greenhouse gas emissions by 2030 compared to 1990 levels. The contribution of each EU Member State to this overall target will be set out in EU legislation (the Effort Sharing Regulation) which is currently being negotiated. This chapter shows trends in UK GHG emissions between 1990 and 2015, disaggregating overall emissions by gas, by source and end-use sector. The by-source basis includes emissions from the energy supply industry as a particular sector, whereas the end-user basis reallocates these emissions to the sectors that make use of the energy supplied. The
Chapter 2 – Greenhouse gas inventory information 53 inventory is also spatially disaggregated to provide geographical breakdown to England and the three devolved administrations (Scotland71, Wales72 and Northern Ireland73), and to 391 local authorities74 that make up the United Kingdom. Land use, land-use change and forestry (LULUCF) emissions and removals are reported in the UK’s GHG inventory in accordance with the rules for reporting this sector under the UNFCCC. The UNFCCC reporting basis includes an estimate of all anthropogenic sources minus sinks Common Reporting Format Tables used for reporting GHG emissions estimates to the UNFCCC are included as Annex B. Data from the GHG inventory are also used to monitor progress against the carbon budgets under the UK Climate Change Act 2008. A narrower definition of LULUCF emissions and removals is used to assess progress against the Kyoto target which includes only mandatory activities under Article 3.3 of the Kyoto Protocol, and forest management (formerly elective) has become mandatory for the second commitment period under the Kyoto Protocol. In the first commitment period of the protocol, the UK decided not to account for cropland or grazing land management or re-vegetation under Article 3.4. For the second commitment period of the Kyoto Protocol the UK elects Cropland Management, Grazing Land Management, and Wetland Drainage and Rewetting, as activities under Article 3.4. The UK does not elect Revegetation, as the eligible land area for Revegetation within the UK is estimated to be very small, and therefore the associated potential sink will be very small also. For calculation of the Kyoto Protocol Base Year deforestation emissions in 1990 are included in the base year total, as required by Article 3.7 of the Kyoto Protocol and subsequent decisions of the COP (Conference of the Parties). 2.3 National system for preparing the UK GHG inventory This section provides a summary of the national system the UK uses for preparing its GHG inventory. Section 1.2 of the National Inventory Report presents the full details of the institutional arrangements the UK has for inventory preparation. The UK’s GHG inventory is compiled under contract to BEIS by a consortium led by the environment consultancy Ricardo Energy and Environment.76 77 Ricardo Energy and Environment also compiles the UK’s Air Quality Pollutant Inventory, used for reporting emissions to other international agreements, including the Gothenburg Protocol and the UNECE Convention on Long Range Trans boundary Air Pollution. Most of the underlying information is held on common databases and this helps ensure consistency between these inventories. Emissions estimates from the energy supply sector, industrial processes sector and waste management sector are produced under the Ricardo Energy and Environment contract. Emissions from the agricultural sector are provided by Rothamsted Research under contract to Defra and emissions and removals in the LULUCF sector are produced on behalf of BEIS by the Centre for Ecology and Hydrology (CEH) and Forest Research. 71 Information on emissions in Scotland is available at 72 Information on emissions in Wales available at 73 74 local authority is a designation of local government used in the United Kingdom. 75 2015 UK National Inventory Report (NIR): 76 Department of Business, Energy and Industrial Strategy, 1 Victoria Street, London, SW1H 0ET, 020 7215 5000, climatechange.statistics@BEIS.gsi.gov.uk 77 Ricardo Energy and Environment, 30 Eastbourne Terrace, London, W2 6LA, +44 (0) 1235 753 000,
54 7th National Communication The GHG inventory is compiled annually according to Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) Guidelines and Good Practice Guidance (IPCC, 1996, 2000 and 2003) and with regard to the 2006 Guidelines (IPCC, 2006)78. Methodological improvements take account of new data sources, updated guidance from IPCC, relevant work by organisations such as CORINAIR (the European inventory system for certain air pollutants) and specific research programmes sponsored by government Departments including BEIS, Defra and Department for Transport (DfT) together with the Devolved Administrations. All methodological improvements are applied back to 1990 to ensure a consistent time series. The UK operates an established national system for GHG emissions estimation, reporting and archiving. There are a wide range of activities that take place as part of this system. These activities collecting and processing data from a wide range of sources; selecting appropriate emissions factors and estimation methods according to IPCC guidance; compiling the inventory; managing all aspects of inventory Quality Assurance (QA) and Quality Control (QC) including the Quality Control of raw and processed data and data management tools; documentation and archiving; prioritisation of methodology and data improvements; and completing uncertainty assessments. The methodologies and data sources used to create the GHG inventory are summarised in Section 1.4 of the NIR. The NIR, including Common Reporting Format (CRF) tables, is reported to the UNFCCC, and to the EU Monitoring Mechanism (EUMM), by the deadlines set. | c6207828-d0f1-4adb-9ed1-c6b8e81a528f | 12 |
09d33baa-73cd-4dfc-9a6f-aa392584a5d1 | https://cdn.climatepolicyradar.org/navigator/GBR/2023/financial-services-and-markets-act-2023_932920a8d8da4ed5a2456d9109b47a62.pdf | 2,023 | [
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] | cdn.climatepolicyradar.org | 2 in force at 1.1.2024 for specified purposes by S.I. 2023/1382, reg. | 60620217-7ea8-4d25-b12c-cbbb5bd7a3f3 | 53 |
09d3b58e-2524-4d83-8029-d16cb0f31762 | https://cdn.climatepolicyradar.org/navigator/GBR/2023/energy-act-2023_87896593a3bea76cf3ac89af17aba308.pdf | 2,023 | [
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] | cdn.climatepolicyradar.org | (3) For “CCS pipeline”, in each place it occurs, substitute “carbon storage network (4) In subsection (1), for “by order” insert “, on an application made by a relevant person, (5) After subsection (1) insert— “(1A) The Secretary of State must consult the Oil and Gas Authority before (a) whether to designate a pipeline under subsection (1); (b) whether to make a certification under subsection (3)(b).” (6) For subsection (2) substitute— “(2) An eligible carbon storage network pipeline qualifies for change of use relief (a) the Secretary of State has given a CCS-related abandonment programme notice to a person in relation to the abandonment of the (b) the trigger event has occurred in relation to the pipeline. (2A) In subsection (2) “CCS-related abandonment programme notice” means an abandonment programme notice under section 29 of the 1998 Act given at a time when the pipeline is used, or is to be used wholly or mainly— (a) for the purpose of disposing of carbon dioxide by way of geological (b) as a licensable means of transportation.” (7) For subsection (3) substitute—
Part 2 – Carbon dioxide capture, storage etc and hydrogen production, transport and storage Chapter 2 – Decommissioning of carbon storage installations Document 2024-10-14 This version of this Act contains provisions that are prospective. Changes to There are currently no known outstanding effects for the Energy Act 2023. (See end of Document for details) “(3) The trigger event occurs in relation to an eligible carbon storage network (a) a decommissioning fund (as defined in section 92(7) of the Energy Act 2023) has been established for providing security for the discharge of liabilities in respect of decommissioning costs in relation (b) the Secretary of State certifies by notice in writing (an “approval notice”) that one or more relevant persons have paid into the fund an amount or amounts the total of which is not less than the required (a) “relevant person” means a person of a description specified in regulations made by the Secretary of State; (b) “the required amount” means an amount determined by the Secretary of State in accordance with regulations made by the Secretary of State. (3B) Where the Secretary of State gives an approval notice in relation to an eligible carbon storage network pipeline, the Secretary of State must— (a) give a copy of the approval notice to every person to whom a notice has been given under section 29(1) of the 1998 Act in relation to the (i) specifies the pipeline, and (ii) states that the Secretary of State has given an approval notice under subsection (3)(b) in relation to it.” (8) In subsection (6), for “an order made” substitute “a notice given”. (9) After subsection (6) insert— “(6A) The Secretary of State must publish a notice given under subsection (1).” (a) for “and “CCS demonstration project” have the same meanings” substitute (b) omit the definition of “carbon storage facility”; (c) at the appropriate places insert— ““decommissioning costs” has the meaning given by section 92 of the “““geological storage”, in relation to carbon dioxide, has the same meaning as in Part 1 of the Energy Act 2023 (see section 55 of that “““licensable means of transportation” has the meaning given by section 2(3) of the Energy Act 2023;”; “““relevant person” means a person to whom a notice may be given under section 29(1) of the 1998 Act in relation to a submarine pipeline;”. I104 S. 97 in force at 26.12.2023, see s. 334(3)(b)
Part 2 – Carbon dioxide capture, storage etc and hydrogen production, transport and storage Chapter 3 – Strategy and policy statement Document 2024-10-14 This version of this Act contains provisions that are prospective. Changes to There are currently no known outstanding effects for the Energy Act 2023. (See end of Document for details) 98 Change of use supplementary (1) In the Energy Act 2008, after section 30B insert— “30C Relief under sections 30A and 30B: supplementary (1) The Secretary of State may by regulations make provision about the obtaining of information required, and sharing of information held, for the purposes of functions of the Secretary of State under sections 30A and 30B, including (a) for the Secretary of State to require the holder of a licence under section 7 of the Energy Act 2023, or a person who qualifies for change of use relief under section 30A or 30B, to provide information (b) authorising His Majesty’s Revenue and Customs (or anyone acting on their behalf) to disclose to the Secretary of State information held as mentioned in section 18(1) of the Commissioners for Revenue and (c) for the enforcement of any requirement imposed by virtue of the (2) For the purposes of subsection (1), a person “qualifies for change of use relief” (a) but for section 30A(6) they would be a person to whom a notice may be given under section 29(1) of the Petroleum Act 1998 in relation to a carbon storage installation, or (b) but for section 30B(4) they would be a person to whom a proposal may be made under section 29(1) of the Petroleum Act 1998 in relation to a submarine pipeline. “carbon storage installation” has the same meaning as in section 30 “submarine pipeline” has the same meaning as in Part 4 of the 1998 Act (see section 45 of that Act).” (2) In section 105 of the Energy Act 2008 (Parliamentary control of subordinate legislation), in subsection (2) omit paragraph (aa). I105 S. 98 in force at 26.12.2023, see s. 334(3)(b) 99 Designation of strategy and policy statement (1) The Secretary of State may designate a statement as the strategy and policy statement for the purposes of this Part (“the CCUS strategy and policy statement”)
Part 2 – Carbon dioxide capture, storage etc and hydrogen production, transport and storage Chapter 3 – Strategy and policy statement Document 2024-10-14 This version of this Act contains provisions that are prospective. Changes to There are currently no known outstanding effects for the Energy Act 2023. | 4808927e-67c0-4e83-803d-e07fd0d4a019 | 41 |
09d881ca-7c3e-4af4-9ab2-18cd1d08a6eb | https://cdn.climatepolicyradar.org/navigator/GBR/2023/energy-act-2023_87896593a3bea76cf3ac89af17aba308.pdf | 2,023 | [
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] | cdn.climatepolicyradar.org | (5) The notice under subsection (4) must be given— (a) to the economic regulator and any appropriate devolved authority, (b) where the Secretary of State is proposing to make regulations under subsection (1)(b) or (c), by serving a copy of it on the person to whom (c) where the Secretary of State is proposing to make regulations under subsection (2), by publishing it in such manner as the Secretary of State considers appropriate for bringing it to the attention of persons of the class of persons to whom the exemption was granted, and (d) where the Secretary of State is proposing to make regulations under subsection (3)(b) or (c), by serving a copy of it on the person from whom the Secretary of State proposes to withdraw the exemption. (6) For the purposes of subsection (5) the “appropriate devolved authorities” are— (a) the Scottish Ministers, if the regulations to which the notice relates contain provision that would be within the legislative competence of the Scottish Parliament if it were contained in an Act of that Parliament; (b) the Welsh Ministers, if those regulations contain provision that would be within the legislative competence of Senedd Cymru if it were contained in an Act of the Senedd (ignoring any requirement for the consent of a Minister of the Crown imposed under Schedule 7B to the Government of Wales Act (c) the Department for the Economy in Northern Ireland, if those regulations (i) would be within the legislative competence of the Northern Ireland Assembly if it were contained in an Act of that Assembly, and (ii) would not, if it were contained in a Bill in the Northern Ireland Assembly, result in the Bill requiring the consent of the Secretary of State under section 8 of the Northern Ireland Act 1998. Part 1 – Licensing of carbon dioxide transport and storage Chapter 1 – Licensing of activities Document 2024-10-14 This version of this Act contains provisions that are prospective. Changes to There are currently no known outstanding effects for the Energy Act 2023. (See end of Document for details) (7) Regulations under this section and section 5 are subject to the negative procedure. I6 S. 6 in force at 26.12.2023, see s. 334(3)(a) Grant and conditions of licences (1) The economic regulator may grant a licence authorising a person to carry on— (a) activities falling within section 2(2)(a); (b) activities falling within section 2(2)(b). (b) is to continue in force for such period as may be specified in or determined by or under the licence, unless previously revoked in accordance with any term I7 S. 7 in force at 26.12.2023, see s. 334(3)(a) 8 Power to create licence types (1) The Secretary of State may by regulations provide that different types of licence may be granted under section 7(1) in respect of different descriptions of activity falling (2) Regulations under this section may make consequential, transitional, incidental or supplementary provision including— (a) amendments (or repeals or revocations) in any provision of this Act or any (b) provision modifying any standard conditions of licences or provision determining the conditions which are to be standard conditions for the purposes of new types of licences. (3) Before making regulations under this section containing provision within devolved competence, the Secretary of State must give notice to each relevant devolved (a) stating that the Secretary of State proposes to make regulations under this (b) specifying the period (of not less than 28 days from the date on which the notice is given) within which representations may be made with respect to the provision within the relevant devolved competence, and must consider any representations duly made and not withdrawn. (4) For the purposes of this section “relevant devolved authority” means—
Part 1 – Licensing of carbon dioxide transport and storage Chapter 1 – Licensing of activities Document 2024-10-14 This version of this Act contains provisions that are prospective. Changes to There are currently no known outstanding effects for the Energy Act 2023. (See end of Document for details) (a) the Scottish Ministers, if the regulations contain provision within Scottish (b) the Welsh Ministers, if the regulations contain provision within Welsh (c) the Department for the Economy in Northern Ireland, if the regulations contain provision within Northern Ireland devolved competence; and “the relevant devolved competence”, in relation to a relevant devolved authority, is to be construed accordingly. (5) For the purposes of this section, provision— (a) is within Scottish devolved competence if it would be within the legislative competence of the Scottish Parliament if it were contained in an Act of that (b) is within Welsh devolved competence if it would be within the legislative competence of Senedd Cymru if it were contained in an Act of the Senedd (ignoring any requirement for the consent of a Minister of the Crown imposed under Schedule 7B to the Government of Wales Act 2006); (c) is within Northern Ireland devolved competence if it— (i) would be within the legislative competence of the Northern Ireland Assembly if it were contained in an Act of that Assembly, and (ii) would not, if it were contained in a Bill in the Northern Ireland Assembly, result in the Bill requiring the consent of the Secretary of State under section 8 of the Northern Ireland Act 1998; and references to provision being within devolved competence are to provision that is within Scottish, Welsh or Northern Ireland devolved competence. (6) Regulations under this section are subject to the affirmative procedure. | 4808927e-67c0-4e83-803d-e07fd0d4a019 | 3 |
09e309b9-c93a-42bb-aba2-9de107922666 | http://arxiv.org/pdf/2503.09239v1 | 2,025 | [
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] | arxiv.org | Table I compares the performance of Logistic Regression, XGBoost, and Long Short-Term Memory (LSTM) models across key metrics. Precision reflects the accuracy of positive B. Discussion
In this analysis, logistic regression emerged as the bestperforming model and has demonstrated a strong capability to distinguish between classes, even with the minority class accounting for less than 4% of the data. The coefficients for wet snow and autumn are the highest, signifying that these conditions substantially increase the probability of outages compared to others. Following these, wspd and the EVI have also shown relatively high coefficients, indicating that higher wind speeds or denser vegetation significantly elevate outage risks. Additionally, rainfall exhibits a positive relationship with outages, further highlighting the role of adverse weather conditions. The interaction term between wspd and EVI reveals a negative coefficient. When EVI values are low to moderate, wind speed exerts a stronger influence on outage risk. However, as EVI increases, denser vegetation appears to moderate the effect of wind speed, leading to a reduced combined impact. This simulation result suggests that the relationship between wind speed and vegetation density is not purely additive but instead reflects complex environmental dynamics. Coefficients of wind direction components ( cos wdir, sin wdir, wind x, wind y ) show that wind direction has a minor influence on outage risk. While certain directions may slightly reduce the likelihood of outages, their impact is secondary to dominant factors like wind speed and vegetation, likely depending on local environmental conditions. Overall, the logistic regression model captures these intricate relationships effectively and offers valuable insights into the interplay between weather, vegetation, and outage risk. These results have highlighted the importance of prioritizing key factors such as wet snow, wind speed, and vegetation density in mitigation strategies while considering effects of interactions and directional components. IV. CONCLUSION
This paper assesses the risk of distribution network outages by analyzing the impact of climate conditions and vegetation management. Using features engineered from historical outage data, meteorological indicators, and vegetation metrics, a logistic regression model was developed and compared against other models for both balanced and imbalanced datasets. The analysis identified wind speed, enhanced vegetation index (EVI), and snowstorms as key factors influencing outages. Additionally, interactions between wind speed and EVI revealed that vegetation density can moderate the impact of high winds on outages; however, their combined effect is not purely additive. The simulation results have provided valuable insights for managing outage risks under high-risk environmental conditions. Future work could integrate vegetation height and density from LiDAR data to enhance the model and explore alternative approaches to capture nonlinear relationships. The results in this paper have practical implications, which enable better preparation for high-risk conditions, particularly during weather events. The proposed model can be integrated into operational decision-making by supporting preventive measures to reduce disruptions and
5
enhance the resilience of power distribution networks. | 259a80c7-a04d-4e2c-ad70-896400332aec | 7 |
09e7fcb6-1740-458b-9bd8-d9cd26632b36 | http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:L:2008:199:0001:0136:EN:PDF | 2,008 | [
"Transport",
"Light-duty vehicles",
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] | eur-lex.europa.eu | 3.2.12.2.7.6.1. A description of the type and number of the pre-conditioning cycles used for the original type-approval
of the vehicle. 3.2.12.2.7.6.2. A description of the type of the OBD demonstration cycle used for the original type-approval of the vehicle
for the component monitored by the OBD system. 3.2.12.2.7.6.3. A comprehensive document describing all sensed components with the strategy for fault detection and
MI activation fixed number of driving cycles or statistical method, including a list of relevant secondary
sensed parameters for each component monitored by the OBD system. A list of all OBD output codes and
format used with an explanation of each associated with individual emission related power-train com-
ponents and individual non-emission related components, where monitoring of the component is used
to determine MI activation. In particular, a comprehensive explanation for the data given in service 05
Test ID 21 to FF and the data given in service 06 shall be provided. In the case of vehicle types that use
a communication link in accordance with ISO 15765-4 Road vehicles diagnostics on controller area net-
work CAN part 4 requirements for emissions-related systems, a comprehensive explanation for the
data given in service 06 Test ID 00 to FF, for each OBD monitor ID supported, shall be provided. 3.2.12.2.7.6.4. | d3fc6859-41cb-4ee2-997b-90ebc4f9b481 | 434 |
09fc0497-c519-46da-ba7f-1cd5ae81cb74 | https://cdn.climatepolicyradar.org/navigator/GBR/2021/net-zero-strategy-build-back-greener_0fdb5eb8c251d8c2a37a5a1cb4c57f3f.pdf | 2,023 | [
"Economy-wide",
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"emissions",
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] | cdn.climatepolicyradar.org | Increased deployment of storage and demand side flexibility could support up to 7,000 jobs, levelling up the power sector across Chapter 3 – Reducing Emissions across the Economy
Prioritising critical system enablers 22. Crucially, a whole system approach puts more emphasis on addressing critical system enablers. These measures will integrate different low carbon technologies into a coherent, single entity and optimise the system most efficiently and cost-effectively, in 23. This means adopting a new approach to developing and delivering electricity networks, both onshore and offshore, to ensure that new low carbon generation can be connected to growing sources of demand. The Offshore Transmission Network Review (OTNR) is transforming how the connections for offshore wind and other offshore transmission infrastructure is planned, designed, and delivered with changes being progressed across the near, medium, and long term. Coordination in how we connect offshore wind can potentially save consumers between £3-6 billion by 2050 and reduce the number of assets and onshore landing points by up to 50%.8 Ofgem has recently consulted upon regulatory changes to enable offshore coordination for in-flight projects, including potentially allowing anticipatory investment. BEIS is currently consulting on a new long-term policy regime for offshore networks. Onshore, we welcome electricity networks’ efforts to invest strategically ahead of need in new capacity, where it is efficient to do so, as well as Ofgem’s work to create a price control framework which allows and encourages this. In recognition of the essential role of electricity networks as an enabler of net zero, we will publish, jointly with Ofgem, an Electricity Network Strategy, which will set out how we will facilitate an agile, flexible onshore network that allows the rapid, transformational change required while responding to consumer and energy system needs. This will include our plans to introduce competition in the building, ownership, and operation of onshore network assets, on which we published a 24. We will look to deliver these changes whilst minimising the impacts on citizens and communities. Network companies work closely with local and transport authorities and are incentivised to deliver network upgrades as efficiently as possible both domestically and through the RIIO price control framework, for example by laying larger cables to avoid reopening roads twice. Connection upgrades are becoming increasingly digitalised for domestic customers looking to install a heat pump or electric vehicle chargepoints. In cases where network upgrades require a temporary power disruption, network companies are required to give notice to customers of planned outages. Advice and ongoing information is also provided including support for vulnerable customers, such as providing generators for customers who are medically dependent on electricity. 25. The deployment of smart technologies and flexibility will underpin our energy security and the transition to net zero. Flexibility from technologies such as energy storage, smart and bidirectional charging of electric vehicles, flexible heating systems, and interconnection could save up to £10 billion per year by 2050 by reducing the amount of generation and network needed to decarbonise.9 These technologies offset the need for more expensive capital investment in traditional infrastructure, as well as help optimise how efficiently the system operates by better integrating intermittent renewables into the system and reducing peak demand. Net Zero Build Back Greener
26. A key enabler for demand side flexibility will be smart meters, which enable innovative products and services such as smart time-of-use tariffs. These tariffs reward consumers financially for using energy outside peak times, when demand is low or when there is excess generation available. Technologies such as electric vehicles and smart appliances can be automatically programmed to take advantage of cheaper rates, cost-effectively integrating them with renewable energy sources and saving consumers money. At the end of June 2021, there were 25.2 million smart and advanced meters in homes and small businesses across Great Britain, representing 46% 27. The Smart Systems and Flexibility Plan sets out a vision, analysis, and actions for delivering a smart and flexible energy system. We will facilitate flexibility from consumers and remove barriers to flexibility on the grid, both for small-scale and large-scale long-duration electricity storage, as well as driving policy to increase interconnector capacity. The Plan also sets out actions to improve market design and coordination so that flexibility providers can secure revenues across multiple markets. Data and digitalisation are a core aspect of the future system; we have set out a strategic approach to digitalisation and opening data across the energy sector through the Energy 28. This transformation of the energy system means our approach to system governance needs to evolve to help the whole energy system achieve our net zero ambitions and meet consumers’ needs at the least cost. BEIS and Ofgem have jointly consulted on the future of system operation.11 We set out proposals for an expert and impartial Future System Operator (FSO) with responsibilities across both the electricity and gas systems, to drive progress towards net zero while maintaining energy security and minimising costs for consumers. These proposals set out how detailed expertise gained from system operation could be used to provide a whole energy system approach to coordination and planning while ensuring that market participants and government has confidence in the impartiality of the FSO’s advice and facilitation of markets, competition, and system development. We have also, jointly with Ofgem, consulted on the future governance of energy codes, which set out the detailed technical and commercial rules for the system, building on the government and Ofgem’s joint review of code governance and the work of the independent panel on 29. Significant progress towards net zero can happen, and is already happening, within our existing market framework. This combines markets for wholesale power, balancing, and system services with a Contracts for Difference scheme (CfD) for low carbon generation and a capacity market to ensure security of supply. We have recently published a Call for Evidence on actions to better align the capacity market with net zero,13 including potential actions to encourage the participation of more low carbon capacity. | 368033f1-d04a-48ea-83c6-9602b66f0e37 | 23 |
0a00370e-b27e-46d7-ac9f-ada9b03ff344 | https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/1011283/UK-Hydrogen-Strategy_web.pdf | 2,021 | [
"hydrogen",
"carbon",
"energy",
"production",
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] | assets.publishing.service.gov.uk | For example, we will support industry to work with the Environment Agency and other regulators to reduce the creation of nitrogen oxide (NOx) emissions that the combustion of hydrogen in an engine or boiler creates, helping to deliver on our air quality targets to deliver cleaner air for all. We recognise the need for targeted engagement going forward to understand and work through key priorities for industry, businesses, civil society and households to secure buy-in and enable the use of low carbon hydrogen across different parts of the energy system. To help with this, we have established the Hydrogen Advisory Council which reflects a cross section of expertise on low carbon hydrogen across the value chain. We are also engaging with a wide range of stakeholders outside of this forum, recognising the importance of different perspectives in shaping this nascent policy agenda. Broad and early stakeholder engagement allows for important public discourse on different aspects of our 2030 ambition and broader plans to deliver CB6 and reach net zero. We will continue to engage citizens and use the expertise of others to inform policy development by considering conclusions of citizen’s assemblies which provide feedback from a representative sample of the UK (such as Climate Assembly UK’s report, ‘The
Chapter 2: Scaling up the hydrogen economy This approach has already yielded important insights with technologies associated with low carbon hydrogen production. For example, in collaboration with UKRI and Sciencewise, last year we commissioned a public dialogue study to explore citizens’ perceptions towards CCUS at both a local and non-local level. Public engagement will help us to understand different perspectives towards the substantial infrastructural and behavioural changes that are needed to decarbonise our energy system over the next 30 years, including in relation to the potential role of hydrogen. While we recognise the crucial role that government can play in raising public awareness of the importance of decarbonising our energy system, including through low carbon hydrogen, we are mindful that this will be most effective carried out collaboratively with local communities to understand the priorities of and opportunities for different stakeholders. These groups are well placed to help us assess the fairness and affordability of different policy decisions to support the hydrogen economy as it grows. Regulators and industry will also be engaging in activity to raise awareness for potential new uses case for hydrogen. Through the safety workstream of the Hy4heat programme, government is working with HSE on a project to assess the safe use of hydrogen gas in certain types of domestic properties and buildings (detached, semi-detached and terraced houses of standard construction), as part of preparation for the first community trials using The Hy4heat programme, in collaboration with NGN and Cadent, is also supporting the construction of two unoccupied homes in Gateshead that will feature Hy4Heat-funded prototype boilers, hobs, cookers, fires and meters to showcase the potential use of 100 per cent hydrogen for domestic heating. Members of the public will be able to see how these appliances compare with like-for-like ones that run on natural gas. Building on this learning, we are delivering a programme of work to assess the feasibility, costs and consumer experience of 100 per cent hydrogen heating (see Chapter 2.4.3). These include consumer trials which will be key to understanding how consumers could experience The government sees this strategy as a significant step towards improving awareness, both of the potential role that hydrogen can play in decarbonising our energy system, and of the challenges involved in bringing this about. We will continue to explore opportunities for dialogue and information sharing on the challenges and opportunities for low carbon hydrogen, including in relation to other low carbon technologies. Public engagement is an important priority for government in the run up to COP26, and as we look to publish our forthcoming Net Zero Strategy. Chapter 3: Realising economic benefits for the UK • We will prepare a Hydrogen Sector Development Action Plan, including for UK • We will establish an Early Career Professionals Forum under the Hydrogen • We will support hydrogen innovation as one of the ten key priority areas in the £1bn Net Zero Innovation Portfolio. • We will work with the Hydrogen Advisory Council Research & Innovation Working Group to develop a UK hydrogen technology R&I roadmap. • We will deliver as one of the co-leads of Mission Innovation’s new Clean The UK’s geography, geology, infrastructure and expertise make it particularly suited to rapidly developing a low carbon hydrogen economy. This offers a great opportunity for companies, communities and individuals. This chapter sets out our plans to maximise the economic benefits to the UK from this shift – supporting jobs and regional growth, making the best of our research and innovation strengths, and ensuring that businesses across the country are in a position to tap into the growing global The hydrogen economy is in the very early stages of development in the UK and globally. This presents an opportunity to put a focus on economic benefits at the heart of our approach from the outset as we look to deliver our 2030 ambition and contribute to achieving our CB6 and net zero targets. We can draw on lessons from the development of other low carbon technologies to ensure that our companies, communities and individuals can be at the forefront of this opportunity – promoting world-class, sustainable supply chains and creating high value, skilled jobs. We will also make the UK an attractive place to invest in hydrogen and seek to maximise the export potential of our technologies and expertise. In doing so, we will support the government’s Plan for Growth, driving local and regional opportunities, and helping to level up across our industrial heartlands and throughout the UK. We will work in partnership with industry, the academic and research and innovation community, devolved administrations, local authorities, workers and civil society to harness the best of the UK’s skills and capabilities. | 96babf55-7373-4dee-b481-d10889d10207 | 30 |
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