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"http://www.am.lt/vi/index.php#a/12844 references",
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0a01c29b-8f61-431b-96e3-2b61281c12cf | https://cdn.climatepolicyradar.org/navigator/GBR/2023/united-kingdom-national-inventory-report-nir-2023_8122f7d823bf366105239091fb57ffd2.pdf | 2,023 | [
"data",
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"emissions",
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"environment"
] | cdn.climatepolicyradar.org | The RFT allocation process is critical to the methodology as the UK model applies assumptions regarding the farm management practices and investment in technologies/fertiliser use etc according to the RF T type; for example, a mixed farm with a small number of cattle and some cropland for arable will
Other Detailed Methodological Descriptions A3 UK NIR 2023 (Issue 1) Ricardo Energy & Environment Page 853 likely manage manure waste differently to a large farm that is predominantly beef or dairy and manage fertiliser use differently to a large arable farm. The RFT allocation enables the inventory to model farm management practices aligned to the relative economic importance of different The farm type of each holding is calculated using the method outlined in the EC typology handbook. | 9ce0b96e-2800-424e-bffb-cd8ba36e0902 | 413 |
0a07cae9-8c14-4c49-ab27-6f571e44c90d | https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/media/6424b2d760a35e000c0cb135/carbon-budget-delivery-plan.pdf | 2,023 | [
"carbon",
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"additional",
"plan"
] | www.gov.uk | Secondly, some of the measures relied upon are proposals at an early stage of development that may not be required at all if we are overachieving in meeting carbon budgets or that could be subject to significant change as part of the full policy development process. The mechanisms for implementing these proposals will depend upon technological developments, societal changes, stakeholder views, future spending arrangements and broader policy developments. The inclusion of proposals and policies at an early stage of development that require further design and development ensures we do not risk curtailing scientific and technological development through over-prescription, whilst still setting out a carefully- planned, long-term package that will enable carbon budgets to be met. The methodology adopted in this report 24. In order to assess the package of proposals and policies against carbon budgets, we first calculated the expected emissions savings for all proposals of analytical models, designed to represent the sectors described in this report, and analytical techniques were used to derive the estimates, using consistent assumptions on shared inputs (such as GDP and fuel prices), and set against an appropriate baseline for each sector. 25. Further detail on the methodological approach underpinning these estimates can be found in the Technical Annex. 26. The calculated savings assume the package of proposals and policies are delivered in full. We consider it is reasonable to expect this level of ambition -
having regard to delivery risks and the wider context, which give rise to both downside and upside risks (see further information on delivery risks below). 27. We then combined these savings with the baseline as described above, to calculate the position compared to the carbon budgets. We then considered the potential of unquantified policies, where we cannot currently quantify associated emissions savings, for example in relation to some early-stage proposals, where we are still assessing the available evidence. Consideration of the 2030 Nationally Determined Contribution 28. The government is committed to delivering its international commitments, including the 2030 Nationally Determined Contribution (NDC) under the Paris Agreement. The UK will report to the United National Framework Convention on Climate Change on progress towards meeting the 2030 NDC from 2024 and will report on progress every 2 years. 29. We have quantified emissions savings to deliver 88 Mt or 92% of the NDC. We are confident the delivery of emissions savings by unquantified policies detailed in this package will largely close this gap and the government will bring forward further measures to ensure that the UK will meet its international commitments if Conclusion on enabling carbon budgets to be met 30. As outlined, our quantified proposals and policies give us over 100% of savings required to meet Carbon Budget 4 and 5 and 97% of the savings required to 31. Whilst the savings deliverable from the proposals and policies are likely to exceed Carbon Budgets 4 and will substantially overdeliver against Carbon Budget 5, there is a judgement to be made whether the policies identified at this stage are sufficient to enable Carbon Budget 6 to be met. We are confident that Carbon Budget 6 can be met through a combination of the quantified and unquantified policies identified. Proposals and policies we expect to deliver additional carbon savings, beyond those currently quantified, is identified in the 32. Examples of areas where we expect some further savings are areas of future research in the Agriculture and Land Use, Land-use Change and Forestry (LULUCF) sectors, as well as policies to further improve the energy efficiency of buildings and place-based transport interventions that will reduce emissions 33. In addition, the package is further strengthened through the inclusion of a range of cross-cutting proposals and policies which will enable and support our other proposals and policies – whether through leveraging the investment needed for technological growth or delivering the green jobs needed for the transition. This
supports with de-risking delivery across the package. We also expect that some of these areas could lead to additional emissions savings beyond those we have currently for example our package of policies to drive innovation is likely to lead to new low-carbon technologies which will lower costs and accelerate the transition to net zero. 34. We have also considered wider factors, which will affect our ability meet carbon budgets. These include additional emissions reductions not related to central government policy, such as the action we know is being taken by local authorities and devolved administrations, and areas of wider uncertainty in our projections of emissions. Taken together, they could positively impact our ability 35. The full list of proposals and policies to enable carbon budgets to be met are presented in Appendix B. Figures are included at a UK level except in relation to land use policies which are England only. In setting out the total emission reductions, above, an assumption of overall emissions savings at UK level are Delivery risks to our package of proposals and policies 36. The context within which we are delivering this transition is inherently uncertain. There are a wide range of fluctuating external factors which drive changes in greenhouse gas emissions and therefore the amount of savings we subsequently need to deliver to achieve carbon budgets. Our EEP baseline is sensitive to macro-economic changes, changes to fossil fuel prices, behavioural shifts and much more. This creates uncertainty and both upside and downside risks, which we manage through regular monitoring and updating of our baseline and, if necessary, taking action to address. 37. Policies included in the EEP baseline have high delivery confidence as they are at an advanced stage of development and have either been implemented already or are planned policies where the funding has been agreed and the design of the policy is near final. 38. Non-EEP proposals and policies vary in their degree of delivery confidence. | 15a3290f-77f0-4f00-b9be-47c5b73d4f14 | 2 |
0a081890-04f6-4338-85cf-8f8178092085 | 2,025 | [
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] | HF-national-climate-targets-dataset | k) the implementation of other requirements provided for by the legislation of Georgia. Article 7 - Popularisation, promotion and implementation of programmes, measures and activities by the Ministry The Ministry shall make popular, promote and implement, in coordination with international and regional donor organisations, and through the mobilisation of funds, the following programmes, measures and activities in the sectors of buildings, industry, and energy production, transmission and distribution: | d03073df-27df-4fb7-aba2-72925530bbb7 | 0 | |
0a0955eb-1ce8-4125-9412-7131e94926bf | https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:52001PC0581&from=EN | 2,001 | [
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energy efficiency. Article 3
Definitions
For the purposes of this Directive the following definitions
shall apply
a cid145allowancecid146 means an allowance to emit one tonne of
carbon dioxide equivalent during a specified period valid
only for the purposes of meeting the requirements of this
Directive and which is transferable in accordance with the
provisions of this Directive
26.3.2002
EN
Official Journal of the European Communities
C 75 E35
b cid145emissionscid146 means the release of greenhouse gases into the
atmosphere from sources in an installation
c cid145greenhouse gasescid146 means the gases listed in Annex II
d cid145greenhouse gas emissions permitcid146 means the permit issued
in accordance with Articles 5 and 6
Article 6
Conditions for and contents of the permit
The competent authority shall
1. issue a greenhouse gas
emissions permit granting authorisation to emit greenhouse
gases from all or part of an installation if it is satisfied that
the operator is capable of monitoring and reporting emissions. e cid145installationcid146 means a stationary technical unit where one or
more activities listed in Annex I are carried out
A permit may cover one or more installations on the same site
operated by the same operator. f
cid145operatorcid146 means any person who operates or controls an
installation or, where this is provided for in national legis-
lation,
the
technical functioning of the installation has been delegated
economic power over
to whom decisive
g cid145personcid146 means any natural or legal person
h cid145the publiccid146 means one or more persons and, in accordance
legislation or practice, associations, organi-
with national
sations or groups of persons
i
cid145tonne of carbon dioxide equivalentcid146 means one metric
tonne of carbon dioxide CO2 or an amount of any
other greenhouse gas listed in Annex II with an equivalent
global warming potential. Greenhouse gas emissions permits
2. following
shall contain the
a the name and address of the operator
b a description of the activities and emissions from the instal-
lation
c monitoring requirements, specifying monitoring methodo-
logy and frequency
d reporting requirements and
Article 4
Greenhouse gas emissions permits
e an obligation to surrender allowances equal to the total
emissions of
the installation in each calendar year, as
verified in accordance with Article 15, within three
months following the end of that year. Member States shall ensure that, from 1 January 2005, no
installation undertakes any activity listed in Annex I resulting
in emissions of a greenhouse gas specified in relation to that
activity unless
issued by a
its operator holds a permit
competent authority in accordance with Articles 5 and 6. Article 5
Applications for permits
An application to the competent authority for a greenhouse
gas emissions permit shall include a description of
a the installation and its activities
Article 7
Changes relating to installations
The operator shall
inform the competent authority of any
change planned in the nature or functioning, or an extension,
the
of
installation which may require updating of
greenhouse gas emissions permit. Where appropriate,
the
competent authority shall update the permit. the
Where there is a change in the identity of the installations
operator, the competent authority shall update the permit to
include the name and address of the new operator. b the raw and auxiliary materials, the use of which is likely to
lead to emissions
c
the sources of emissions from the installation and
d the measures planned to monitor emissions, in accordance
with the guidelines adopted pursuant to Article 14. | 4b52ff6a-d3e9-44b7-a608-1c48d28dd49b | 4 |
0a0a408d-e75b-4853-8bea-cc4dcb88e45d | https://cdn.climatepolicyradar.org/navigator/GBR/2017/clean-growth-strategy_dbc3cb715f5549eb5b10b721c5c48304.pdf | 2,017 | [
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"Research And Development",
"Energy Supply",
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"energy",
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] | cdn.climatepolicyradar.org | Contribution of Working Group II to the Fifth Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate 303 IPCC (2014) Climate Change 2014: Synthesis Report Contribution of Working Groups I, II and III to the Fifth Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change 304 IPCC (2014) Climate Change 2014: Synthesis Report Contribution of Working Groups I, II and III to the Fifth Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change 305 IPCC (2014) Climate Change 2014: Synthesis Report Contribution of Working Groups I, II and III to the Fifth Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change 306 IPCC (2014) Climate Change 2014: Synthesis Report Contribution of Working Groups I, II and III to the Fifth Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change
95% confidence interval Temperature difference from 1850-1900 average HadCRUT4, Met Office1850 pre-industrial baseline (1850-1900) from 1850 to 2016 average temperature rise in excess of 2°C above pre-industrial levels, and possibly as much as 5°C for the highest emissions scenarios, by the end of this century 306. Additionally, continuing acidification of the oceans will pose substantial This growing level of global climate instability poses great risks to natural ecosystems, global food production, supply chains and economic development. It is likely to lead to the displacement of vulnerable people and migration, impact water availability globally, and result in greater human, animal and plant disease. Climate change can indirectly increase the risks of violent conflicts by amplifying drivers of conflicts such as poverty and economic shocks. For this reason the UN, Pentagon and UK’s National Security and Strategic Defence Reviews cite climate change as a stress multiplier. The UK is likely to feel the impact of climate change both directly and through impacts in other parts of the world which will affect our food and materials prices, trade, investments and security. In its recent UK Climate Change Risk 307 the Government endorsed the six key climate change risks for the UK identified in an independent review by the Adaptation flooding and coastal change; shortages in public water supply; risks to health, wellbeing and productivity from high temperatures; risks to natural capital and our ecosystems; risks to food security and trade; 307 HM Government (2017) UK Climate Change Risk Assessment 2017 308 CCC (2017) UK Climate Change Risk Assessment 2017 Evidence Report uk-climate-change-risk-assessment-2017/ccra-chapters/
2: Global temperature goals and our Scientific evidence shows that increasing magnitudes of warming increase the likelihood of severe, pervasive and irreversible impacts change risks increase rapidly above 2°C but some risks are considerable below 2ºC. This is why, as part of the Paris Agreement in 2015, 195 countries committed to hold “the increase in the global average temperature to well below 2°C above pre-industrial levels and to pursue efforts to limit the temperature increase to 1.5°C above pre-industrial levels, recognising that this would significantly reduce the risks and impacts of climate change”. The Agreement recognised that in order to achieve this goal, global emissions of greenhouse gases would need to peak as soon as possible, reduce rapidly thereafter and reach a net zero level in the second half of this century. As part of the Paris Agreement countries also committed to reduce or limit their greenhouse gas emissions. These are contained in their ‘Nationally Determined Contributions’ (NDCs). these commitments bring us to staying below 2°C, and estimate that if they were met we would be on a path to a global temperature rise of 2.7 to 3.7 °C above pre-industrial levels by 2100. It is worth noting that these assessments have different assumptions regarding both the extent to which countries meet their NDCs and, crucially, the actions that will be taken by countries to reduce their emissions after 2030, which will be a key determinant of whether the world will meet the long-term global These assessments show that NDCs represent a significant deviation from the 4 to 5°C temperature rise projected if there were no further policies to reduce emissions beyond those in place or planned today. Action would also provide other co-benefits such as limiting the rate of ocean acidification and improving air quality. Nevertheless it is clear that greater action is needed from all countries if we are to limit global temperature increases to well below 2°C. The UK’s current target is to reduce its greenhouse gas emissions by at least 80 per cent by the year 2050, relative to 1990 levels. This 2050 target was set to be consistent with keeping the global average temperature to around 2°C above pre-industrial levels with a 50 per cent likelihood. In October 2016 the Committee on Climate Change (CCC) said that the Paris Agreement target “is more ambitious than both the ambition underpinning the UK 2050 target and previous international agreements”, but that the UK should not set new UK emissions targets now, as it already has stretching targets and achieving them will be a positive contribution to global climate action. The CCC advised that the UK’s fair contribution to the Paris Agreement should include measures to maintain flexibility to go further on UK targets, the development of options to remove greenhouse gases from the air, and that its targets should be kept under 309 IPCC (2014) Climate Change (2014) Impacts, Adaptation, and Vulnerability, Summary for policymakers Part Global and Sectoral Aspects. Contribution of Working Group II to the Fifth Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change 310 For UNEP (2016) The Emissions Gap Report 2016 311 CCC press release (2016)
There will be an unavoidable level of climate change, regardless of future global emissions, because of the existing accumulation of greenhouse gases in the atmosphere. As a consequence, some level of adaptation will be necessary in the UK. | 97a59d0e-1bf2-4781-843d-e8366a799456 | 41 |
0a0c1239-5ea7-4203-a5d9-802e49f97556 | https://cdn.climatepolicyradar.org/navigator/GBR/2025/united-kingdom-national-inventory-report-nir-2025_3d22864cf237013c86452d4c6455250a.pdf | 2,025 | [
"emissions",
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] | cdn.climatepolicyradar.org | Trends in Greenhouse Gas Emissions 2 UK NID 2025 (Issue 1) Ricardo Page 97 2.2.2.2 Emission trends in Energy sub-sectors 2.2.2.2.1 Electricity generation There are several reasons for the decline in emissions from the power generation sector since • The UK power sector fuel mix has shifted towards use of Combined Cycle Gas Turbine (CCGT) stations rather than conventional steam stations burning coal or oil. CCGT stations operate at a higher thermal efficiency, for example in 2018 they operated on average at 48.9% efficiency, whilst coal -fired stations operated on average at 34.1% • The shift in fuel mix away from more carbon -intensive fuels such as coal and oils, to less carbon-intensive fuels such as natural gas; the calorific value of natural gas per unit mass carbon is higher than that of coal and oil; • There has been an increase in electricity generated from non -fossil fuel energy sources, due to increased use of wastes and renewable energy sources. | 95866fde-5b53-4214-b279-97a1078c466c | 224 |
0a1737a6-0630-40ed-a328-4bec4d20ca8b | https://cdn.climatepolicyradar.org/navigator/GBR/2023/united-kingdom-national-inventory-report-nir-2023_8122f7d823bf366105239091fb57ffd2.pdf | 2,023 | [
"data",
"energy",
"emissions",
"inventory",
"environment"
] | cdn.climatepolicyradar.org | The data and methods applied are consistent with IPCC and EMEP-EEA Energy sector inventory guidance, applying country-specific or default EFs to the activity data that are available from UK energy statistics. The agriculture model described here generates the emission estimates from sources that are as described within the AFOLU volume of the IPCC inventory guidance, i.e. | 9ce0b96e-2800-424e-bffb-cd8ba36e0902 | 273 |
0a25c6eb-c67b-4fc4-9773-33850bc0fcbb | http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX:32008L0001 | 2,008 | [
"General",
"Non-energy use"
] | eur-lex.europa.eu | (21)
Because best available techniques will change with time, particularly in the light of technical advances, the competent authorities should monitor or be informed of such progress. (22)
Changes to an installation may give rise to pollution. The competent authority or authorities should therefore be notified of any change which might affect the environment. Substantial changes to plant must be subject to the granting of prior authorisation in accordance with this Directive. (23)
The authorisation conditions should be periodically reviewed and if necessary updated. | f187d144-24af-4442-891a-cd8cbf1d1f2c | 2 |
0a2885f4-f815-42d1-a230-930f9b23fded | https://www.ecolex.org/details/legislation/felling-scotland-regulations-2019-ssi-no-49-of-2019-lex-faoc187264/?type=legislation&xsubjects=Mineral+resources&page=256 | 2,019 | [
"energy",
"development",
"article",
"management",
"protection",
"water",
"measure",
"environment",
"consist",
"resource"
] | ecolex.org | These Regulations make further provision for felling under Part 4 of the Forestry and Land Management (Scotland) Act 2018. They principally concern an application for felling permission (to be made to and decided by the Scottish Ministers), restocking directions, felling directions, remedial notices and claims for compensation for refusal of felling permission or stop notices. The Scottish Minsters may only impose conditions on a restocking direction or a remedial notice which relate to (a) avoidance or mitigation of the impact on communities or individuals, (b) avoidance or mitigation of the impact on the environment, biodiversity or protection of species, and (c) the retention of, or increase in, woodland cover. | ae5900e8-b241-4b27-ae30-ca37883a1895 | 0 |
0a29b9dd-fb65-47e9-978d-605f7d7e60fb | https://cdn.climatepolicyradar.org/navigator/GBR/2021/decarbonising-transport-a-better-greener-britain_0e5fa97fb3d78e19b69ccf8f78fdd0cc.pdf | 2,021 | [
"Transport",
"Co-benefits",
"Cycling",
"Climate Finance",
"Public Transport",
"Freight",
"EVs",
"Shipping",
"Aviation",
"Walking",
"transport",
"zero",
"emissions",
"emission",
"carbon"
] | cdn.climatepolicyradar.org | We have seen an increase in cycling and walking as a result of the pandemic and want to further embed and encourage more sustainable travel habits. While the reduction in use of public transport has been a short- term necessity, we want to ensure a speedy return to public transport and to support a growth in patronage as our rural areas, towns and cities return to life. | b1244f11-6485-47b2-ba2a-c8a54f51cd77 | 33 |
0a2c295f-ec14-47a6-9f9c-346b88a68d3d | http://arxiv.org/pdf/2209.05767v1 | 2,022 | [
"model",
"data",
"bayesian",
"time",
"iams"
] | arxiv.org | It stands out that it is fundamental to concentrate the mitigation efforts on the key drivers of climate change, and that without a broad strategy, a great cut of the emission is much more difficult to achieve. In conclusion, deterministic models, that produce forecasts coming from different research group, are important tools that could allow policy makers to better understand the processes they are called to make decisions on. | fb2cf143-cc5e-4887-aa4d-e7c043bedeb3 | 37 |
0a2dee8a-452e-4984-9726-b63a70eae826 | http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=uriserv%3AOJ.L_.2014.103.01.0015.01.ENG | 2,014 | [
"Transport",
"Energy efficiency"
] | eur-lex.europa.eu | SCHULZ
For the Council
The President
D. KOURKOULAS
(1)
OJ C 44, 15.2.2013, p. 109. (2) Position of the European Parliament of 25 February 2014 (not yet published in the Official Journal) and decision of the Council of 10 March 2014. (3) Regulation (EC) No 443/2009 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 23 April 2009 setting emission performance standards for new passenger cars as part of the Community s integrated approach to reduce CO2 emissions from light-duty vehicles (OJ L 140, 5.6.2009, p. 1). (4) Regulation (EC) No 715/2007 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 20 June 2007 on type-approval of motor vehicles with respect to emissions from light passenger and commercial vehicles (Euro 5 and Euro 6) and on access to vehicle repair and maintenance information (OJ L 171, 29.6.2007, p. 1). (5) Commission Regulation (EC) No 692/2008 of 18 July 2008 implementing and amending Regulation (EC) No 715/2007 of the European Parliament and of the Council on type-approval of motor vehicles with respect to emissions from light passenger and commercial vehicles (Euro 5 and Euro 6) and on access to vehicle repair and maintenance information (OJ L 199, 28.7.2008, p. | a421885f-773e-412c-92bd-4a3766f5ae66 | 10 |
0a327403-87e8-4327-82ff-2582aeeed5f4 | 2,025 | [
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] | HF-national-climate-targets-dataset | Table 38 - Key implementation measures (ODS and F gases) 8 9 10 11 12 approve vehicles equipped with an air conditioner that is labeled as using gases with a GWP greater than 150 (Directive 2006/40/EC, Article 5.4) Ensure that any producer, importer or exporter of fluorinated gases that produces, imports or exports fluorinated gases in larger quantities submits by March 31 of each year, an annual report to the Commission and the competent authority of the member state on the quantities produced, imported or exported for the past year. Ensure that importers/exporters importing/exporting more than one tonne of fluorinated gases annually report the quantities of each gas imported or placed on the EU market, indicating the main application categories (e.g. air conditioners, refrigeration, vehicle air conditioners, foams, aerosols, electrical equipment, solvents and firefighting equipment) in which the substance is used as well as the surroundings of any used gas imported for recycling, regeneration and destruction. Ensure that reporting is carried out in accordance with the requirements set out in Regulation (EC) No. 1493/2007. Each year by June 30, Member States shall report to the Commission in electronic format, for the previous year, the following: Quantities of methyl bromide permitted in accordance with Article 12(2) and (3), for various purposes of quarantine and pre-transportation treatment used in their territory, stating the purpose for which methyl bromide has been used and progress in the testing and use of alternatives; By means of installed halons, used and stored for use of critical importance in accordance with Article 13 (1) measures taken to reduce emissions, progress in testing and use of alternatives; Cases of illegal trade, especially those detected by inspection in accordance with Article 28. Based on the format given in Annexes 1-5 of Regulation 3008/2008, inform the Commission of: Names and contact details of certification bodies and bodies for attesting employees covered by Regulation 303/2008, 304/2008/, 305/2008, 306/2008 1307/2008 and titles of certificates or certificates of training for employees in accordance with prescribed requirements: Use of temporary deviations from the obligation to establish a body for | 8c0ec41a-6974-4457-b62f-87cd7fae6fdb | 0 | |
0a345416-1023-4273-9cef-b32e522d09a3 | https://cdn.climatepolicyradar.org/navigator/GBR/2020/national-infrastructure-strategy_fa784b6dcf5e13daefc608a72e25dcec.pdf | 2,020 | [
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] | cdn.climatepolicyradar.org | • Announces, multi-year funding commitments for key infrastructure programmes to back up its ambitions, with more details to come at the next Spending Review in 2021. It makes clear that where policy is devolved, the devolved administrations benefit from funding, through the Barnett formula, enabling their investment to support people and business in Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland. The Strategy also sets out the government’s plans to review the National Infrastructure Commission’s • Confirms the government’s commitment to fundamentally change the way it considers and delivers infrastructure across the whole of the UK. It matches the spirit and ambition of the NIC’s National Infrastructure Assessment, in many places exceeding their recommendations. However, this Strategy isn’t the final word on the government’s infrastructure plans – it instead represents the first step of a multi-year process to transform the UK’s infrastructure networks. The ambitions set out here will be further strengthened by the next Spending Review in 2021. This Strategy will also be enhanced by a series of related publications over the next 12 months, setting out further details on key areas of infrastructure policy, • The Union Connectivity Review • The Net Zero Review final report • The National Infrastructure and Construction Pipeline • Transforming Infrastructure Performance 2021 • A transport decarbonisation plan • The English Devolution and Local Recovery • An electric vehicle charging infrastructure strategy • A heat and buildings strategy • An industrial decarbonisation strategy • A refreshed Industrial Strategy Taken together, these documents will set out the full scope and scale of the government’s ambitions to level up and unite the country, decarbonise the economy, and revolutionise how the UK funds Much of the UK’s infrastructure was built at a time when the needs of disabled people were not sufficiently prioritised. The consequence has been decades of retrofitted solutions – often expensive, unattractive, and achieving only ‘accessibility’. It is vital that the UK’s future infrastructure is fully inclusive of everyone, including Britain’s 14.1 million disabled people. The government is determined to transform the lives of disabled people, who for far too long have encountered barriers to enjoying the day to day activities and opportunities that others can take for granted. Infrastructure is a key part of this, and in Spring 2021 the government will publish a National Strategy for Disabled People, expanding on the ways that the government will pursue inclusion and extend opportunities for disabled people across all aspects
The NIC’s exceptional analysis underpins many of the measures announced in this Strategy, and their National Infrastructure Assessment has influenced government decision making since its publication in 2018. Looking forward, the NIC will now begin preparations for the second ‘National Infrastructure Assessment’ due for publication in 2023. This new, comprehensive review of the UK’s evolving infrastructure priorities will have to take the ambitions and plans set out in this Strategy into account. It will also have to assess the longer-term impact of COVID-19 on economic infrastructure sectors, including any behaviour and technological changes catalysed by the pandemic. In the meantime, the government has identified new priorities for the NIC for 2021, and is commissioning a new study on greenhouse gas removal technologies which will report next summer. The NIC will provide recommendations to government • the technologies that should be deployed to deliver • the policies needed to incentivise the rollout • the timeline of decisions needed by government to enable the UK to use negative emission technologies to achieve net zero. The term of reference for this work have been published alongside this Strategy. The government is also committed to ensuring the NIC maintains its reputation as an impartial, expert body. Building on the new and re-appointments announced earlier this year,70 the government will shortly launch a competition to appoint several additional Commissioners. This will help strengthen the NIC’s expertise in key areas – including local government and environmental issues – and increase the diversity The government will also review the NIC’s role and responsibilities in 2021, including updating their Charter and Framework documents if necessary, to ensure the Commission can continue to shape and support this government’s infrastructure ambitions. This work will be carried out alongside a review of the NIC’s fiscal remit. Since the National Infrastructure Assessment was published in 2018, the NIC has also produced three separate on freight, economic regulation and resilience. The response to the NIC’s regulation recommendations has been provided in ‘Government response to NIC regulation study – Strategic investment and public confidence.’ The Department for Transport will also provide a formal response to the The NIC resilience report, ‘Anticipate, React, Resilient infrastructure systems’, published in May 2020, proposes a new framework for resilience and makes a series of recommendations to government to help ensure infrastructure operators can deliver and maintain truly resilient infrastructure. The current public health situation has shown that unpredictable ‘black swan’ events can and do happen, and that preparedness for these shocks is vital. In light of COVID-19, and given the ever-present threat of climate change, there is a stronger case to talk about resilience of infrastructure – both in the context of the current pandemic and also the increasing risks from climate change and other threats. The government will therefore respond in full to the NIC report in early 2021. 1 Provisional Emissions, on a source basis, mapped to CCC sectors, Department for Business, Energy & Industrial Strategy, 2019 2 ‘Experimental comparisons of infrastructure across Europe’, ONS, May 2019. ‘The effect of the size and the mix of public spending on growth and inequality’, J Fournier and Å. Johansson, OECD Economics Department Working Papers No.1344, November 2016. | ded23dc5-701b-4e6b-9b05-8214c024cae2 | 32 |
0a37ee2b-0036-4ad6-b3fa-554888b05dad | https://cdn.climatepolicyradar.org/navigator/GBR/2023/united-kingdom-national-inventory-report-nir-2023_e2ed2f6c199088dc30a95fddf6e84c72.pdf | 2,023 | [
"emissions",
"data",
"inventory",
"energy",
"emission"
] | cdn.climatepolicyradar.org | Breed is associated with a role (dairy, beef, dual purpose). All dairy females are included in the dairy sector; bulls used in the dairy sector and replacements for adult bulls are not included because of the difficulties of differentiating them from the beef sector. This ensures complete reporting of total emissions from UK agriculture, with all bulls accounted for in the beef sector. Dual purpose animals are assigned as dairy or beef according to the majority cattle type on the specific holding. Each breed type is associated to one of the inventory categories of large, medium or small. For years prior to the introdu ction of the CTS in England, Scotland and Wales (1990 -2004), and for Northern Ireland for the entire timeseries, annual data were derived from the JAS at holding level. Monthly cattle numbers for these years are assumed to be equal to the annual JAS total. Dairy industry data were used to characterise the proportion of dairy cattle associated with each production system for pre -CTS years, i.e. 1990 to 2004. Breakdown of dairy cow breed types for 1990 was derived from Dairy Facts and Figures, 1992 (Milk Marketing Board), with the breeds being associated with the inventory production system categories. Data for 1991 to 2005 were interpolated between Dairy Facts and Figures for 1990 and CTS data for 2006 onwards. Straw use is a fixed quantity per head based on survey data. Beef cattle are disaggregated into 15 age bands, four breed types (Continental, lowland native, upland native and all dairy males) and six sub-categories by role, associated with different live weights, growth rates and management practices. The roles include heifers for breeding, beef females for slaughter, bulls for breeding, cereal fed bulls for slaughter, steers for slaughter and beef cows. Data from the CTS (BCMS, 202 2) are used to populate the inventory categories at a monthly resolution for England, Scotland and Wales from 2005 onwards. Prior to this date, JAS data are used with monthly population scalars applied as derived from the period 2005 to 2009 when both CTS and JAS data were available. For Northern Ireland, JAS data are used for the entire time series. Straw use is a fixed quantity per head based on survey
UK NIR 2023 (Issue 1) Ricardo Energy & Environment Page 337 Sheep are disaggregated into three production systems (hill, upland and lowland) associated with different livestock parameters and management practic es, and three types (ewe, lamb and ram) using data from the June Agricultural Survey (Defra, 2022a), the December Agricultural Survey (1993 to 2010), a specific survey on the disposal of lambs and their slaughter age from the United Kingdom sheep flock by Wheeler et al. (2012) and the occasional surveys of the Breeding Structure of the British Sheep Industry (Pollott, 1998; Pollott and Stone, 2006; Pollott, 2012; and Pollott and Boon, 2021). The ewe category includes replacement breeding sheep and cull ewe s, as well as the ewes and ewe lambs that were successfully lambed in the survey year. The lamb category includes slaughtered lambs and those retained for breeding. The proportions of replacement ewes that are first mated as ewe -lambs is based on an analys is of an extended time -series from the December Agricultural Census (1993 to 2010), that was verified against the latest Breeding Structure of the British Sheep Industry survey (Pollott and Boon, 2021). The June Agricultural Survey count of lambs is raised by between 1% (Scotland) and 5% (England) to account for the fraction of early spring lambs that are born, reared and marketed before the survey takes place (Pollott and Stone, 2006; Wheeler et al., 2012; Pollott and Boon, Animal numbers are split between hill, upland and lowland systems (associated with breed and management practices), based on holding location with respect to the Less Favoured Areas (LFA) weighted by survey data from Wheeler et al. (2012), and verified against historical records o f payments made under the Hill Livestock Compensatory Scheme (Agricultural Notebook, 2003). For each system, the proportions of lambs finished at grass, finished as stores, or used for breeding replacements, are derived from analyses of the survey data collected by Wheeler et al. (2012), and verified against the occasional surveys of the Breeding Structure of the British Sheep Industry (Pollott, 1998; Pollot and Stone, 2006; Pollot, 2012; Bedding straw use in housing is calculated from how much urine an individual sheep produces, and the quantity of straw that is required to absorb the urine, based on absorbance measurements reported by Misselbrook and Powell (2005) and Olsen (1940). Six categories of swine are (1) sows (including sows in pig, sows being suckled and dry sows being kept for further breeding); (2) gilts (including gilts in pig and gilts not yet in pig); (3) boars for service; (4) fattening swine >80 kg (including barren sows for fattening); (5) fattening swine 20-80 kg; (6) fattening swine <20 kg. Data are obtained from the JAS (Defra, 2022a) for England, Wales, Scotland and Northern Ireland, and where JAS categories do not match the inventory categories, consistent data translation rules are applied from the Defra AC0114 project (Defra, in prep). Eight categories of poultry are (1) growing pullets; (2) laying hens; (3) breeding flock; (4) broilers; (5) turkeys; (6) ducks; (7) geese; (8) all other poultry (exc. turkeys, ducks and geese). Data are obtained from the JAS (Defra, 2022a) for En gland, Wales, Scotland and Northern Ireland, and where JAS categories do not match the inventory categories, consistent data translation rules are applied from the Defra AC0114 project (Defra, in prep.). Data for England & Wales in 1996 were missing from t he agricultural census (holding level) data and have been recreated by scaling these at a holding-level with the 1995 census to national totals. | 70afacf8-8641-4466-819d-f4db8cad9d69 | 352 |
0a383900-5327-4785-a55f-63c5c69c3ed2 | https://www.odyssee-mure.eu/publications/archives/MURE-Overall-Policy-Brochure.pdf | 2,000 | [
"Industry",
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] | www.odyssee-mure.eu | The advantage of
this type of financing is that the means can be directed towards deep renovations. Table 3-5 Cumulative energy efficiency investments billion 2005 and energy savings
Note that the potentials mentioned are the remaining potentials for the period 2011-2020
13 For much more complete overviews see in particular BPIE 2012 and RezessyBertoldi 2010
24
Source EcofysFraunhofer ISI 2011
Energy Efficiency Policies in the European Union
Financing from state-like budgets, e.g. the use of income from the emission trading
scheme to finance energy efficiency investment. The drawback of this financing
source is that it is heavily dependent on the CO2 price, the advantage that is
independent from the direct state budget. | 0a44b68e-44b8-4fcc-b398-2ce2c8fbc626 | 37 |
0a3acf2e-f59e-4771-b4b5-efe46e194029 | 2,025 | [
"global temperature rise",
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] | HF-national-climate-targets-dataset | 1. The purpose of this Act is for Denmark to reduce greenhouse gas emissions in 2030 by 70% compared to the level of emissions in 1990, and for Denmark to achieve a climate-neutral society by 2050 at the latest, taking into account the Paris Agreement target of limiting the global temperature rise to 1.5 degrees Celsius. | 7a7fc2d3-269a-45d5-88eb-5aaac0cb2df8 | 0 | |
0a3b1cbc-0bd5-4f17-b12e-e0de2fc05667 | https://cdn.climatepolicyradar.org/navigator/GBR/2020/the-sixth-carbon-budget_2cb9fc7e21801940b0a9c50cbe4bc1ad.pdf | 2,020 | [
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"carbon",
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] | cdn.climatepolicyradar.org | In aggregate, the costs are low - but that must not hide the need to distribute the costs and the benefits fairly. Our recommended path heralds a major transition in the economy and jobs. There will be new low-carbon employment opportunities, but there will also be high-carbon
These impacts can be highly concentrated in some regions of the UK. We must prepare now for those changes. It is the government’s role to ensure we have the training and the skills that those changes require. National, regional, and local investment in low carbon industries is now an economic and social priority. Combatting climate change provides us with the means of levelling up as an essential part of our economic revival. In this endeavour, we will not be alone. The club of nations that has committed to Net Zero has grown significantly since our report last year. These new pledges, including those of China and the EU, South Korea and Japan, as well as the expected pledge from the US, offer mutual advancement. These are our markets of the future and, as low-carbon technologies and strategies develop around the world, we can be more assured of the global response to climate change and the widespread transitions that are underway in energy, transport, and industry. These will also mean that the reduction in our territorial emissions will be mirrored in the reduction of the carbon footprint of our imported goods and services. The signs point to a propitious moment for global climate ambition in Glasgow next year. But our international leadership, in the Presidency of COP26 and of the G7, must begin at home. Our influence in the wider world rests ultimately on strong For this we look to the framework provided by the UK’s Climate Change Act, which has governed the work of the Committee in producing this report. The basis of the British approach to tackling climate change is contained in the mix of responsibilities that the Act lays out so clearly. An independent body, the Climate Change Committee, advises on targets and delivery and measures progress. The long-term emissions goal is determined by the UK’s international obligations, themselves reflecting the scientific imperatives. Interim targets, expressed in the carbon budgets, are set in line with that long-term goal, stimulating short-term action. But the responsibility of meeting these carbon budgets – of actually delivering on the advice and the commitments – rests with Government. This Report gives the Government and Parliament the route map to meeting those This is the governance system that has served the UK well since 2008 and this Sixth Carbon Budget is its most complete expression. It is the product of an immense effort from my Committee and the talented team that supports it. I commend the advice strongly to Ministers and I urge the Government to legislate for the Sixth Carbon Budget as soon as possible. That would constitute the strongest statement of our ambition to tackle climate change. It is a decisive moment for global Britain. Chair of the Climate Change Committee
7 Sixth Carbon Budget – The path to Net Zero The Rt. Hon John Gummer, Lord Deben, Lord Deben was the UK’s longest -serving Secretary of State for the Environment (1993 to 1997). He has held several other high-level ministerial posts, including Secretary of State for Agricult ure, Fisheries and Food (1989 to 1993). Lord Deben also runs San croft, a corporate responsibility consultancy working with blue -chip companies around the world on environmental, social and ethical issues. Baroness Brown of Cambridge DBE FRS Baroness Brown of Cambridge DBE FREng FRS (Julia King) is an engineer, with a career spanning senior engineering and leadership roles in industry and academia. She currently serves as Chair of the CCC’s Adaptation Committee; non -executive director of the Offshore Renewable Energy Catapult; and Chair of the Keith Bell is a co-Director of the UK Energy Research Centre (UKERC), a Chartered Engineer and a Fellow of the Royal Society of Edinburgh. He has been at the University of Strathclyde since 2005, was appointed to the Scottish Power Chair in Smart Grids in 2013 and has been involved in energy system research in collaboration with many academic and industrial partners. Nick Chater is Pr ofessor of Behavioural Science at Warwick Business School. He has particular interests in the cognitive and social foundations of rationality, and applying behavioural insights to public policy and business. Nick is Co -founder and Director of Decision Technology Ltd, a research consultancy. Piers Forster is Director of the Priestley International Centre for Climate and Professor of Physical Climate Change at the University of Leeds. He has played a significant role authoring Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) reports, and has a coordinating lead author role for the IPCC’s sixth assessment report. Rebecca Heaton is responsible for Drax Group’s efforts to mitigate climate c hange, ensuring that sound science underpins climate change polices and business strategy. She is also responsible for developing sustainability and climate change research programmes. Rebecca has a 20-year global career working at the interface between business, science and policy . Paul Johnson is Director of the Institute for Fiscal Studies and a visiting professor at University College London (UCL). He is widely published on the economics of public policy, and he co-wrote the ‘Mirrlees review’ of tax system design. He was previously Chi ef Economist at the Department for Professor Corinne Le Quéré CBE FRS Corinne Le Quéré is Royal Society Research Professor of Climate Change Science at the Uni versity of East Anglia (UEA), where she conducts research on the interactions between climate change and the carbon cycle. Corinne is currently the Chair of the French Haut Conseil
9 Sixth Carbon Budget – The path to Net Zero Chapter 1 – Introduction and key messages 35 2. Context – uncertain and urgent times 40 3. COP26 and international leadership 42 4. | 083c769d-ace3-415a-9bbf-6c9f1540dcd7 | 1 |
0a40706f-e07b-4abb-8a86-e9413e6c7793 | https://cdn.climatepolicyradar.org/navigator/GBR/2023/financial-services-and-markets-act-2023_932920a8d8da4ed5a2456d9109b47a62.pdf | 2,023 | [
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] | cdn.climatepolicyradar.org | (See end of Document for details) View outstanding changes 6 In the cross-heading before section 184 (recognition order), after “systems” insert I439 Sch. 6 para. 6 in force at 29.8.2023, see s. 86(2)(a) 7 In the heading to section 184 , after “order” insert “: payment system”. I440 Sch. 6 para. 7 in force at 29.8.2023, see s. 86(2)(a) 8 In section 184, in subsection (4), after “constituting” insert “or connected with”. I441 Sch. 6 para. 8 in force at 29.8.2023, see s. 86(2)(a) “184A Recognition DSA service provider (1) The Treasury may by order (“recognition order”) specify a DSA service provider as a recognised DSA service provider for the purposes of this Part. (2) A recognition order under this section must specify in as much detail as is reasonably practicable the services provided. (3) The Treasury may not specify a DSA service provider operated solely by the I442 Sch. 6 para. 9 in force at 29.8.2023, see s. 86(2)(a) 10 In the heading to section 185 (recognition criteria) after “criteria” insert “: payment I443 Sch. 6 para. 10 in force at 29.8.2023, see s. 86(2)(a) “185A Recognition DSA service provider (1) The Treasury may make a recognition order in respect of a DSA service provider only if satisfied that any deficiencies in the services provided by the service provider, or any disruption to the provision of those services, would
Financial Services and Markets Act 2023 (c. 29) SCHEDULE 6 – Digital settlement assets Document 2025-04-01 This version of this Act contains provisions that are prospective. Changes to Financial Services and Markets Act 2023 is up to date with all changes known to be in force on or before 01 April 2025. There are changes that may be brought into force at a future date. Changes that have been made appear in the content and are referenced with annotations. (See end of Document for details) View outstanding changes (a) to threaten the stability of, or confidence in, the UK financial system, (b) to have serious consequences for business or other interests throughout the United Kingdom. (2) In considering whether to specify a DSA service provider the Treasury must (a) the value of the services in relation to payment systems that the DSA service provider presently provides or is likely to provide in (b) the nature of the services in relation to payment systems that the DSA service provider provides, (c) whether those services or their equivalent could be provided by (d) the relationship between the DSA service provider and— (i) operators of payment systems that use digital settlement (ii) other DSA service providers.” I444 Sch. 6 para. 11 in force at 29.8.2023, see s. 86(2)(a) 12 (1) Section 186 (procedure) is amended as follows. (2) In the opening words of subsection (1) after “system” insert “or a DSA service (3) After subsection (1)(a) insert— “(aa) in the case of a recognition order in respect of a DSA service (4) In subsection (1)(b), after “system” insert “or the DSA service provider (as (5) In subsection (2)(a), for “the operator of which” substitute “or a DSA service provider, where the operator of the system or the provider”. (6) In subsection (2)(b), after “operator” insert “or provider”. (7) In subsection (3), after “system” insert “or a DSA service provider”. I445 Sch. 6 para. 12 in force at 29.8.2023, see s. 86(2)(a) 13 (1) Section 186A (amendment of recognition order) is amended as follows. (2) After subsection (2)(a) insert— “(aa) in the case of a recognition order in respect of a DSA service
174 Financial Services and Markets Act 2023 (c. 29) SCHEDULE 6 – Digital settlement assets Document 2025-04-01 This version of this Act contains provisions that are prospective. Changes to Financial Services and Markets Act 2023 is up to date with all changes known to be in force on or before 01 April 2025. There are changes that may be brought into force at a future date. Changes that have been made appear in the content and are referenced with annotations. (See end of Document for details) View outstanding changes (3) In subsection (2)(b), after “system” insert “or the recognised DSA service provider (4) In subsection (3)(a), for “the operator of which” substitute “or a DSA service provider, where the operator of the system or the provider”. (5) In subsection (3)(b), after “operator” insert “or provider”. (a) after first “system” insert “or by a recognised DSA service provider”, (b) after second “system” insert “or provider,”. I446 Sch. 6 para. 13 in force at 29.8.2023, see s. 86(2)(a) 14 (1) Section 187 (de-recognition) is amended as follows. (a) the words after “satisfied” become paragraph (a), (b) after that paragraph insert “, or (b) that the criteria in section 185A are met in respect of the recognised DSA service provider.” (3) After subsection (3)(a) insert— “(aa) in the case of a recognition order in respect of a DSA service (4) In subsection (3)(b), after “system” insert “or the recognised DSA service provider (5) In subsection (4)(a), for “the operator of which” substitute “or a DSA service provider, where the operator of the system or the provider”. (6) In subsection (4)(b), after “operator” insert “or provider”. (7) In subsection (5), after “system” insert “, or by a recognised DSA service provider”. I447 Sch. 6 para. 14 in force at 29.8.2023, see s. 86(2)(a) 15 (1) Section 188 (principles) is amended as follows. (a) the words after “publish” to the second “systems” become paragraph (a); (b) after that paragraph insert “, (b) principles to which recognised DSA service providers are to have regard in the provision of services to payment systems (whether or not recognised),”; (c) the words after “and” become paragraph (c); (d) at end insert “or to such DSA service providers”. Financial Services and Markets Act 2023 (c. 29) SCHEDULE 6 – Digital settlement assets Document 2025-04-01 This version of this Act contains provisions that are prospective. | 60620217-7ea8-4d25-b12c-cbbb5bd7a3f3 | 82 |
0a46a8ae-9b3e-4beb-aedd-0e2f7aeddac6 | 2,025 | [
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"... | arxiv.org | Lastly, Autonomy represents an intrinsic desire to have control over one’s life and to act in accordance with own values. We mapped the gamified elements of the app and their motivation to the three psychological needs defined in Self-Determination Theory (SDT), as shown in Table 4. Table 4. Gamified features of the application
Feature Rationale SDT
Points, Levels Users earn points scanning products. Users’ awareness levels up based on the points they
earn. Mission A mission has a specific objective, e.g., identifying five products with a smaller environmental footprint in the soft drinks category. Badges When users complete a specific mission they earn a badge. Badges are displayed on the user’s profile. Competence
Competence, Autonomy
Competence, Relatedness
Leaderboard, Users can share their progress and grocery list Relatedness User profile items with other players. Table 5. Activity transformation scenarios
Maria, knowing that she can find suggestions for quickly creating a grocery list, decides to try the application with the proposed interface. Now she can see the environmental footprint of each product as she puts items into her basket. When Maria has to choose between two products of the same price, she chooses the one with the lowest food footprint. Olivia, a conscientious shopper, consistently ranks at the top of the leaderboard for users who make environmentally conscious purchasing decisions based on the food footprint of each product. Olivia publicly shares the choices that have allowed her to rank at the top of the leaderboard with other users. 4.5 Scenarios transformation
An app that assists users with grocery lists may help consumers make more environmentally conscious choices. Since all consumers are familiar with smartphones for other tasks, the development of a mobile application seems to be an appropriate direction. The idea behind the application has led to a transformation of the scenario reported in Table 5. (a) Maria’s behavior. (b) Olivia’s behavior. Fig. 2. Stationary distribution of the Markov chain before and after adoption of the application with the proposed interface. As for the Markov analysis process, the transition diagrams depicted in Fig. 1 undergo an evolution through the inclusion of the state S3, which is described in Table 3. Specifically, in Fig. 1a, we have updated the following transitions: P = 0 . 80, P = 0 . 10, P = 0 . 70, P = 0 . 15, and P = 0 . 15. | 4189d085-5bc2-4c9a-8fa6-40be385e62fd | 5 |
0a4c5f7f-bef1-4347-bcd0-050d3aca175b | https://www.gov.scot/binaries/content/documents/govscot/publications/strategy-plan/2017/12/scottish-energy-strategy-future-energy-scotland-9781788515276/documents/00529523-pdf/00529523-pdf/govscot%3Adocument/00529523.pdf | 2,017 | [
"energy",
"scotland",
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] | www.gov.scot | As the UK is now a net importer of oil and gas, a balanced approach where we reduce our reliance on imported fossil fuels, where practical to do so, can help reduce exposure to cost and supply fluctuations – minimising our vulnerability to security of supply risks. This is supported by analysis produced by the Committee on Climate Change under the UK’s fifth carbon budget. There are still significant opportunities in the North Sea, with up to 20 billion barrels of oil equivalent remaining – which could sustain production for at That is why we continue to support Maximising Economic Recovery from the North Sea. We will go on working constructively with the industry, to encourage new exploration in the North Sea and to enhance the capacity and competiveness of our world leading supply chain. Oil and gas also has a role as a destination fuel within the power sector and heavy industry – for use in CCS, for example, as well as heating and transport, through conversion to clean hydrogen. Expertise gained through 40 years’ experience of operating in the North Sea, such as vital subsea skills, can help overcome the engineering and innovation challenges presented by moving to a low carbon future. For example, Scotland’s oil and gas industry has developed a cluster of companies with expertise in underwater engineering which is among the strongest in the world. Approximately half of the subsea installations in the world today are in the North Sea. This is a strength that we want to build upon
Scottish Energy Strategy 62/63 We have an opportunity to extend those skills and knowledge into other sectors. We can do this by ensuring that the appropriate investments are made – into our supply chain to keep it competitive, and into our infrastructure to ensure that we have the appropriate research and testing. We also need investments into technologies applicable to both oil and gas and other subsea areas, including The skills and expertise in our oil and gas sector could also assist other sectors in overcoming the technical and engineering challenges of our future energy system. So far, our Transition Training Fund has helped over 2,800 individuals, which is due to close in 2018-19, to retrain and secure new jobs or opportunities in the oil and gas sector and wider economy. We will continue to work with Skills Development Scotland to deliver this fund, keeping its focus on key opportunities within the The Scottish supply chain is already capturing a large share of the value of the decommissioning contracts available and underway from some North Sea operators, from well plugging and abandonment through to onshore dismantling We are supporting investment in decommissioning capacity across Scotland – with in the region of £2.5 million likely to be allocated in this financial year through the Decommissioning Challenge Fund. 27 Subsea Engineering Action publication/oil-gas-subsea-action-plan Our latest Programme for Government commits a further £7.5 million towards establishing a deep water port in Scotland which is compatible with the largest decommissioning vessels and highest New and innovative ways of using hydrocarbons are already emerging, and will continue during Rising demand for alternative hydrocarbon resources in the form of LNG (Liquefied Natural Gas), LPG (Liquefied Petroleum Gas) and CNG (Compressed Natural Gas) could potentially reduce emissions – especially when derived from bio-sources. The marine, power generation, industrial, road transport and residential sectors could all play a part in pushing up demand for We support the uptake of these energy streams, where the current infrastructure is able to meet the expected growth in demand. Investment could support economic development, safeguarding and creating jobs in the energy The Scottish Government may choose in some cases not to support particular technologies or fuel sources. Underground Coal Gasification and Unconventional Oil and Gas (see box overleaf)
The Scottish Government has undertaken one of the most far reaching investigations of any government, anywhere, into unconventional oil and gas. This work began in 2013 with the establishment of an Independent Expert Scientific Panel to examine the evidence on unconventional oil and gas, including hydraulic fracturing, or ‘fracking’, and coal bed methane extraction. The Expert Panel reported its findings in July 2014. After carefully considering its findings, the Scottish Government introduced a moratorium on onshore unconventional oil and gas in January 2015. This created space to explore the specific issues and evidential gaps identified by the Panel, and to undertake a comprehensive period of public engagement and dialogue. In early 2016, the Scottish Government commissioned a further suite of independent research reports to address the evidential gaps identified by the Expert Panel. The reports, covering health, economic and environmental matters (including analysis of climate change impacts), allowed for the consideration of further independent expert scientific advice, including from the British Geological Survey, Health Protection Scotland, and the UK Committee on Climate In January 2017 the Scottish Government launched a four-month public consultation on unconventional oil and gas, Talking “Fracking”, which received more than 60,000 responses. Approximately 99% of responses who expressed a view were opposed to fracking. Responding to the publication of the consultation responses in early October 2017, the Minister for Business, Innovation and Energy announced that the Scottish Government does not support the development of unconventional oil and gas in Scotland and that the Directions which gave effect to the moratorium in January 2015 will remain in place indefinitely. In late October 2017, the Scottish Parliament voted overwhelmingly in favour of the Scottish Government’s preferred position of not supporting unconventional oil and gas. The Scottish Government’s preferred policy position will be subject to a Strategic Environmental Assessment. Once finalised, the policy on unconventional oil and gas in Scotland will also be reflected in the next iteration of the National Planning Framework. Further information, including links to the parliamentary statements, the research reports, and the consultation responses, can be found
Scottish Energy Strategy 64/65 Hydrogen is flexible, and could help to decarbonise heat and transport while providing wider energy system benefits. | 679d47a0-85c7-43df-8c6e-b43d114f552a | 19 |
0a4d9909-9b89-4dc6-80c4-da1189e3789e | https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/1009448/decarbonising-transport-a-better-greener-britain.pdf | 2,021 | [
"transport",
"zero",
"emissions",
"emission",
"carbon"
] | assets.publishing.service.gov.uk | Securing investments in battery cell manufacturing – gigafactories – is a priority, alongside investments related to motors, drives, power electronics and fuel cells. It also includes £1.3 billion to accelerate the roll out of charging infrastructure and £582 million
A zero emission fleet of cars, vans, motorcycles, and scooters We are already seeing progress. | 8f0273a5-decd-4a43-ab49-4f3473699e66 | 196 |
0a4ec289-9667-4f61-81ad-3baa9796e3b3 | https://cdn.climatepolicyradar.org/navigator/GBR/2020/finance-act-2020_c9466068e740c31be6b3860aa3962da6.pdf | 2,020 | [
"Energy",
"Finance",
"Carbon Pricing",
"section",
"paragraph",
"company",
"period",
"amount"
] | cdn.climatepolicyradar.org | (6) Where an individual has been given a joint liability notice, HMRC may by further notice to the individual vary an amount specified— (a) under paragraph 2(9)(a) or (10), paragraph 3(11)(c) or paragraph 5(8)(a) if it seems to them that the amount so specified is, or has become, too much or not (7) Subject to sub-paragraph (8), a joint liability notice that is withdrawn under this (8) Where a joint liability notice is withdrawn under sub-paragraph (1)(b) or (3), the withdrawal of the notice does not give the individual a right to recover any amount that the individual has already paid to HMRC in response to the notice. (a) an individual is given a joint liability notice or a notice under paragraph 2(10) (b) before the end of the permitted period the individual communicates to HMRC written acceptance of the offer of a review contained in the notice, HMRC must review the decision to give the notice. (2) For the purposes of this paragraph “the permitted period” begins with the day on which the notice mentioned in sub-paragraph (1)(a) is given, and ends— (a) with the 30th day after that day, or (b) if HMRC give the individual a further notice specifying a later day (an “extension notice”), with that day. (a) must be given before the permitted period would (but for the notice) have (b) must specify a day that is at least 30 days after the date of the extension (c) may be given even if one or more extension notices have already been given. (4) If the individual does not accept the offer of a review within the permitted period, HMRC must nevertheless review the decision in question if— (a) after the end of the permitted period, the individual gives HMRC a notice requesting a review out of time, and (b) HMRC are satisfied that the individual had a reasonable excuse for not accepting the offer within the permitted period, and that the individual made the request without unreasonable delay after the excuse ceased to apply. (5) HMRC are not required to undertake or continue a review under this paragraph if the individual appeals under paragraph 13 against the notice in question. SCHEDULE 13 – Joint and several liability of company directors etc Document 2023-04-25 This is the original version (as it was originally enacted). 12 (1) This paragraph applies where HMRC are required to undertake a review under (2) The nature and extent of the review are to be such as appear appropriate to HMRC (3) HMRC must, in particular, have regard to steps taken before the beginning of the (a) by HMRC in reaching the decision, and (b) by any person in seeking to resolve disagreement about the decision. (4) The review must take account of any representations made by the individual at a stage which gives HMRC a reasonable opportunity to consider them. (5) But it is not open to the individual to challenge the existence or amount of any tax liability of a company to which the joint liability notice in question relates. (6) At the conclusion of the review— (a) HMRC must set aside the notice to which the review relates if it appears to (i) any of the relevant conditions were not met when the notice was (ii) it is not necessary for the protection of the revenue for the notice to (b) HMRC must set aside the notice or vary an amount specified under paragraph 2(9)(a), 3(11)(c) or 5(8)(a), or (as the case may be) paragraph 2(10) or 5(9), if it appears to HMRC that the amount specified (c) otherwise, HMRC must uphold the notice. (7) HMRC must give the individual notice of the conclusions of the review and their (a) within the period of 45 days beginning with the relevant date, or (b) within any other period that HMRC and the individual may agree. (8) In sub-paragraph (7) “relevant date” means— (a) the date on which HMRC received the individual’s notification accepting the offer of a review (in a case falling within paragraph 11(1)), or (b) the date on which HMRC decided to undertake the review (in a case falling (9) Where HMRC do not give notice of the conclusions within the time period specified (a) the notice to which the review relates is treated as upheld, and (b) HMRC must notify the individual accordingly. (10) Where a joint liability notice is set aside under sub-paragraph (6)(a)(ii), the setting aside of the notice does not give the individual a right to recover any amount that the individual has already paid to HMRC in response to the notice. SCHEDULE 13 – Joint and several liability of company directors etc Document 2023-04-25 This is the original version (as it was originally enacted). 13 (1) An individual who has been given— (a) a joint liability notice, or (b) a notice under paragraph 2(10) or 5(9), may appeal against the notice to the First-tier Tribunal. (2) An appeal under this paragraph must be made before— (a) the end of the period of 30 days beginning with the day on which the notice (b) if later, the end of the permitted period (within the meaning given by This is subject to sub-paragraphs (3) to (5). (3) Where HMRC are required to undertake a review under paragraph 11 in respect of a notice, any appeal in respect of that notice must be made within the period of 30 days beginning with the date of the notice under paragraph 12(7) communicating the conclusions of the review (“the conclusion date”). | ca3b9b92-77db-4231-8c6a-3d8df4630cf3 | 71 |
0a50dd88-4f47-44d8-b4c9-e74ba2e60470 | https://cdn.climatepolicyradar.org/navigator/GBR/2020/the-sixth-carbon-budget_2cb9fc7e21801940b0a9c50cbe4bc1ad.pdf | 2,020 | [
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] | cdn.climatepolicyradar.org | We note that, should the UK set up its own ETS to follow on from the EU ETS, the Government has committed to setting the cap from 2023, following the Committee’s advice on a suitable trajectory. It has also committed to review the scope of the trading system in 2023 with a view to potentially including additional sources of emissions shortly thereafter. The Committee will review the arrangements to follow the UK’s exit from the EU ETS
437 Sixth Carbon Budget – The path to Net Zero b) The path for ‘traded sector’ emissions The path to Net Zero entails further sharp reductions in power sector emissions by 2030, strong reductions in point-source industry emissions and the deployment at scale of low-carbon hydrogen production, while engineered removals start to be • Power sector emissions continue to fall sharply to 2030 under the Balanced Net Zero Pathway, reaching a carbon-intensity of just under 50 gCO2/kWh by that date due to large-scale deployment of renewables and nuclear and the emergence of decarbonised back-up generation on the path to phasing out unabated fossil generation entirely by 2035. • Traded-sector industry emissions fall significantly between 2020-2030, reducing by 49% compared to those in 2019 due to the potential for solutions such as carbon capture and storage and hydrogen to be deployed at large sites and industrial clusters. • Aviation emissions from domestic and intra-EU flights are currently traded in the EU ETS. After recovery from COVID-19, passenger numbers stay relatively flat during the 2020s. Emissions gradually fall between 2023-2030 to around 9 MtCO2/year by 2030, due to efficiency improvements and initial uptake of • Fossil fuelled hydrogen production facilities are currently part of the EU ETS, so we would expect the new methane reformation facilities in our scenarios to submit emissions allowances for any CO2 not captured by CCS. In our scenarios these facilities produce 8 TWh of low-carbon hydrogen in 2030, releasing 0.1 MtCO2/year at 95% CO2 capture rate. • Removals. Deployment of bioenergy with CCS (BECCS) starts in 2027 and rises to 5 MtCO2 per year by 2030. On this basis, we recommend the level of traded sector emissions consistent with our Balanced Pathway is used as the basis for a UK emissions trading system cap from 2023 to 2030,* with the cap on emissions falling to 61 MtCO2 per year by 2030 if excluding greenhouse gas removals or 57 MtCO2 per year if they are included Traded sector emissions in 2023 -30, based on current scope plus potential inclusion of engineered removals MtCO2e 2023 2024 2025 2026 2027 2028 2029 2030 Electricity supply 39 39 36 26 21 18 16 14 Industry (manufacturing, construction & Domestic and intra -EU aviation 10 10 10 10 10 10 9 9 Proposed ETS cap (for currently traded Engineered removals 0 0 0 0 -1 -1 -4 -5 * The Government has committed to aligning the cap of the scheme to the CCC’s proposed pathway from as early as January 2023. See HMG (2020) The future of carbon pricing. Chapter 10: Recommendations on the Sixth Carbon Budget 438 As set out in our previous advice on the UK ETS, carbon trading and the resulting carbon price should be used as one policy lever within a wider policy package to drive emissions down. Chapter 10 considers the broader policy requirements across We will return in future advice to the question of whether the scope of the UK ETS should be widened. If other sectors are added, the cap should be adjusted in line with their emissions trajectories set out in our Balanced Pathway. c) Sectoral contributions to emissions reduction The Climate Change Act requires the Committee to advise on the contribution to meeting carbon budgets from sectors not covered by emissions trading. Currently that covers emissions from transport, buildings, agriculture, land, waste, F-gases and less-energy-intensive industry. Our expectation for those sectors is also that they contribute in line with the Balanced Pathway. Overall, we expect them to deliver proportionately smaller reductions than the traded sector by 2035, by when we expect their share of UK emissions to have increased to over 85%, from 75% in 2019 (Figures 10.4 and 10.5). BEIS (2020) Provisional UK greenhouse gas emissions national statistics 2019; CCC analysis. Traded sector abatement for manufacturing, construction and supply is calculated by a split of non- However, it is currently unclear
439 Sixth Carbon Budget – The path to Net Zero the Fifth Carbon Budget and Sixth Carbon Budget BEIS (2020) Provisional UK greenhouse gas emissions national statistics 2019; CCC analysis. 5CB pathways have been adjusted to account for inventory changes in the non-traded sector. 6CB pathways are for the Balanced Net Zero Pathway. Non-traded emissions are initially lower in the Fifth Carbon Budget pathway in 2020 as traded emissions from aviation are not included, as well as a lack of policy action in
Chapter 10: Recommendations on the Sixth Carbon Budget 440 5. Next A Net Zero plan and monitoring of progress Following this advice, the Government must set the Sixth Carbon Budget in law by the end of June 2021. This must be followed, as soon as is practicable, by a set of policies and proposals to meet the budget. We recommend that both these steps are taken without delay, in the first half of 2021. That would demonstrate the UK’s climate credentials as president of COP26 and is necessary given the limited time available to accelerate emissions reductions as needed to meet the budget. We expect to report on the Government’s strategies in our next annual Progress Report in June 2021. This section sets out our expectations for the Government response, and the evolving role of the CCC after this advice. a) The Government respon se to this advice The Climate Change Act (sections 13 and 14) requires that the Government develop policies and proposals that would ‘enable’ the carbon budgets and 2050 target to be met. | 083c769d-ace3-415a-9bbf-6c9f1540dcd7 | 147 |
0a580be6-befd-4e8b-beaf-7a4d974fc857 | https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/ALL/?uri=CELEX%3A32000R1980 | 2,000 | [
"Buildings",
"Appliances",
"Energy efficiency"
] | eur-lex.europa.eu | The following provisions shall apply:(a) in evaluating the comparative improvements, consideration shall be given to the net environmental balance between the environmental benefits and burdens, including health and safety aspects, associated with the adaptations throughout the various life stages of the products being considered. The evaluation shall also take into account the possible environmental benefits related to the utilisation of the products considered;(b) the key environmental aspects shall be determined by identifying the categories of environmental impact where the product under examination provides the most significant contribution from a life cycle perspective, and among such aspects the ones for which a significant potential for improvement exists;(c) the pre-production stage of the life-cycle of goods includes extraction or the production and processing of raw materials and energy production. Those aspects shall be taken into account, as far as is technically feasible.Article 4Eco-label criteria and assessment and verification requirements1. Specific eco-label criteria shall be established according to product groups. These criteria will set out the requirements for each of the key environmental aspects mentioned in Article 3, which a product must fulfil in order to be considered for the award of an eco-label, including requirements relating to the product's fitness in meeting the needs of the consumers.2. The criteria shall seek to ensure a selectivity basis on the following principles:(a) the product's prospects of market penetration in the Community shall, during the period of validity of the criteria, be sufficient to effect environmental improvements through consumer choice;(b) the selectivity of the criteria shall take into account the technical and economic feasibility of adaptations needed to comply with them within a reasonable period of time;(c) the selectivity of the criteria shall be determined with a view to achieving the maximum potential for environmental improvement.3. Requirements for assessing the compliance of specific products with the eco-label criteria and for verifying the conditions for the use of the eco-label referred to in Article 9(1), shall be established for each product group together with the eco-label criteria.4. The period of validity of the criteria, and the assessment and verification requirements, shall be specified within each set of eco-label criteria for each product group.The review of the eco-label criteria as well as of the assessment and verification requirements related to the criteria shall take place in due time before the end of the period of validity of the criteria specified for each product group and shall result in a proposal for prolongation, withdrawal or revision.Article 5Working planIn accordance with the objectives and principles set out in Article 1, a Community eco-label working plan shall be established by the Commission within one year from the entry into force of this Regulation, following prior consultation of the European Union Eco-Labelling Board (hereinafter referred to as the EUEB) provided for in Article 13, in accordance with the procedure laid down in Article 17. The working plan shall include a strategy for the development of the Scheme, which should set out for the subsequent three years:- objectives for the environmental improvement and the market penetration which the scheme will seek to achieve,- a non-exhaustive list of product groups which will be considered as priorities for Community action,- plans for coordination and cooperation between the Scheme and other eco-label award schemes in Member States.The working plan shall take particular account of the development of joint actions to promote products awarded the eco-label and the creation of a mechanism for the exchange of information on existing and future product groups at national and at European Union level.The working plan shall also provide measures for the implementation of the strategy and shall include the planned financing of the Scheme.It shall also outline the services to which the Scheme is not applicable, taking into account the Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council allowing voluntary participation by organisations in a Community eco-management and audit system (EMAS).The working plan shall be reviewed periodically. The first review of the working plan shall include a report on how the plans for coordination and cooperation between the Community system and the national environmental labelling systems have been implemented.Article 6Procedures for the setting of eco-label criteria1. The conditions for awarding the eco-label shall be defined according to product group.The specific ecological criteria for each product group and their respective periods of validity shall be established in accordance with the procedure laid down in Article 17 following consultation of the EUEB.2. The Commission shall begin the procedure on its own initiative or at the request of the EUEB. | 314479ac-5956-4a00-8a10-c21910b1bead | 2 |
0a59feb5-9985-4dee-84cd-5dfbd0bf9403 | https://civitas.eu/sites/default/files/civitas_guide_for_the_urban_transport_professional.pdf | 2,001 | [
"Transport",
"Energy service demand reduction and resource efficiency",
"Energy efficiency",
"Renewables",
"Other low-carbon technologies and fuel switch"
] | civitas.eu | perspective as well as a European perspective. Measures that are clearly funded because of an
All CIVITAS measures described were funded by
essential government responsibility have a greater
start-up subsidies from the CIVITAS programme. This
chance of success politically motivated measures
of course is also a form of funding from governmental
can be in danger after political change. origin, be it out of a different budget. By funding measures, the government saves costs
There is a fundamental difference between the cit-
on other responsibilities. Measures on behavioural
ies own resources and similar external funding. Exter-
change marketing campaigns are usually very
nal funding has different objectives from internal fund-
cost-effective, because some costs may be saved
ing, such as experimentation because the measure is
on infrastructure development. Measures that
innovative, dissemination because the funder finds
clearly save costs on other government tasks have
good practice must be followed, or contributing to su-
a good chance of success. per-local policy objectives. In each of these situations,
Initial funding is necessary for start-up, because
there is a second objective to the measure that must be
initial investment is high and revenues are yet un-
met, which adds to the complexity of planning, imple-
certain. Without funding there would be no activity
mentation, etc. External funding also creates opportu-
at all, so the governments responsibility is to initi-
nities otherwise impossible. The downside of external
ate and stimulate. Income may be generated later,
funding for essential government responsibilities is of
but there is not enough experience for a feasible
course dependency upon, if not addiction to, external
business model yet. | a20264eb-0ca9-4fb5-983a-e64bfbff96ce | 105 |
0a5bef35-6ad8-4d6e-9d2f-27a6d8f1c809 | https://ec.europa.eu/environment/ecolabel/documents/personal.pdf | 1,999 | [
"Buildings",
"Appliances",
"Energy efficiency",
"Energy service demand reduction and resource efficiency"
] | ec.europa.eu | The European Ecolabel for Personal Computers
The official EU mark for Greener Products
Choose the EU Ecolabel for your Personal Computers if you
want to show your commitment to a better environment. Once its on your products,
the EU Ecolabel guarantees
Reduced energy consumption during
use and stand-by
Limited use of substances harmful to
the environment and health
Reduced use of natural resources by
encouraging recycling
Extended product lifetime through
easy up-grades
Reduced solid waste production
through take-back policy
It can be awarded to personal computers with a
system unit, display and keyboard combined in a
single case which can be used with an internal bat-
tery. This product group also covers devices
equipped with touch screen keyboard. Meet your customers demand
Consumers are today more sensitive
to the protection of the environment. Four out of five European consumers
would like to buy more environmen-
tally friendly products, provided they
are properly certified by an inde-
pendent organisation. With the EU
Ecolabel on your products you offer
them a reliable guide to easily iden-
tify the good environmental perform-
ers available on the market. For a quick test, use the check list on the back! Give your Personal Computers a credible sign of
environmental excellence... Apply for the EU Ecolabel! They said it! 15 million computers are sold each year in Europe. Whether these computers are PCs or laptops, this corresponds to thousands potential
tones of waste per year. The EU Eco-label criteria encourage easy dismantling for easier recycling, thus mini-
mising the environmental impacts of computer waste. Moreover, if only 5 of these computers sold every year in Europe were EU Eco-
labelled personal computers, the energy savings would lead to avoid the emissions of
11220 t of CO2 per year. This is equivalent to the emissions of a car going 1700 times
round the Earth! The EU Eco-label, a high value for your products! Sources the Direct and Indirect Benefits of the EU Eco-label, AEAT, 2004. Ademe, 2005
For more information
on the scheme, its feature, the actors involved, the application process
httpec.europa.euenvironmentecolabel
... | ac70c3d8-02b5-4ccd-ba3c-e69e9a735b41 | 0 |
0a5c9fcb-4940-4353-bbcb-3742cd2c98f3 | https://cdn.climatepolicyradar.org/navigator/GBR/2023/energy-act-2023_87896593a3bea76cf3ac89af17aba308.pdf | 2,023 | [
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] | cdn.climatepolicyradar.org | (2) In paragraph 4 (time limit for representations and observations)— (a) in sub-paragraph (1), for the words from “fifteen working days” to the end substitute “the relevant period”; (b) after sub-paragraph (1) insert— “(1A) “The relevant period” means— (a) 15 working days following the day of the making of the application for permission to bring the appeal, or (b) such longer period following that day as an authorised member of the CMA may allow.”; (c) in sub-paragraph (2), for “that period of fifteen working days” substitute “the (3) In paragraph 6 (timetable for determination of appeal)— (a) in sub-paragraph (1), for “thirty working days” substitute “4 months”; (i) for “thirty working days” substitute “4 months”; (ii) for “ten more working days” substitute “1 month”. I588 Sch. 14 para. 11 not in force at Royal Assent, see s. 334(1) I589 Sch. 14 para. 11 in force at 10.9.2024 by S.I. 2024/890, reg. 2(b)(x) I584 Sch. 14 para. 9 not in force at Royal Assent, see s. 334(1) I585 Sch. 14 para. 9 in force at 10.9.2024 by S.I. 2024/890, reg. 2(b)(x) I586 Sch. 14 para. 10 not in force at Royal Assent, see s. 334(1) I587 Sch. 14 para. 10 in force at 10.9.2024 by S.I. 2024/890, reg. 2(b)(x) I588 Sch. 14 para. 11 not in force at Royal Assent, see s. 334(1) I589 Sch. 14 para. 11 in force at 10.9.2024 by S.I. 2024/890, reg. 2(b)(x)
Schedule 15 – Competitive tenders for electricity projects Document 2024-10-14 This version of this Act contains provisions that are prospective. Changes to There are currently no known outstanding effects for the Energy Act 2023. (See end of Document for details) (i) after “7”, insert “or 7AC”; (ii) after “transporters” insert “or code manager licence”; (b) in subsection (1)(c), after “7” insert “or 7AC”. I590 Sch. 14 para. 12 not in force at Royal Assent, see s. 334(1) I591 Sch. 14 para. 12 in force at 10.9.2024 by S.I. 2024/890, reg. 2(b)(x) 1 The Electricity Act 1989 is amended as follows. I592 Sch. 15 para. 1 in force at Royal Assent, see s. 334(2)(i) “6BA Meaning of “relevant electricity project”, “relevant licence” and (1) In this Part, “relevant electricity project” means a project— (a) that relates to the total system, an electricity interconnector or a multi-purpose interconnector, and (b) in relation to which criteria specified in regulations made by the Secretary of State are satisfied. (2) In subsection (1)(a), “the total system” means all transmission systems and distribution systems in Great Britain and offshore waters. (3) In this Part, “relevant licence” means— (a) a transmission licence that does not authorise the licence holder to co-ordinate and direct the flow of electricity as described in (b) a generation licence, a distribution licence, an interconnector licence (4) In this Part, “relevant contract” means a contract, entered into by a person with the holder of a transmission licence, a system operator electricity licence or a distribution licence (referred to in this Part as a “contract counterparty”), for the carrying out of a relevant electricity project. Schedule 15 – Competitive tenders for electricity projects Document 2024-10-14 This version of this Act contains provisions that are prospective. Changes to There are currently no known outstanding effects for the Energy Act 2023. (See end of Document for details) (5) Regulations under this section may make different provision for different (6) Before making regulations under this section, the Secretary of State must (b) such holders of relevant licences as the Secretary of State considers (c) such other persons as the Secretary of State considers appropriate. 6BB Designation of a delivery body (1) The Secretary of State may by regulations designate a person for the purposes of this section; and a person so designated is referred to in this Part (2) The designation of a person for the purposes of this section has effect subject to any conditions imposed by the Secretary of State in the regulations (3) More than one person may be designated for the purposes of this section at (4) Regulations under this section may designate different persons for different (5) The Secretary of State may by regulations revoke a person’s designation if the person ceases to meet any condition subject to which the designation has (6) The Secretary of State may make indemnity payments to a delivery body (7) An indemnity payment is a payment in respect of costs or expenses incurred by a delivery body in connection with judicial review proceedings in relation to anything done, or omitted to be done, in the exercise (or purported exercise) of functions conferred on the body by regulations under section 6C. (8) An indemnity payment may be made subject to such conditions as may be determined by the Secretary of State. (9) Subsection (6) does not authorise the making of a payment to the Authority (where it is designated under subsection (1)).” I593 Sch. 15 para. 2 in force at Royal Assent, see s. 334(2)(i) 3 For sections 6C and 6D substitute—
Schedule 15 – Competitive tenders for electricity projects Document 2024-10-14 This version of this Act contains provisions that are prospective. Changes to There are currently no known outstanding effects for the Energy Act 2023. (See end of Document for details) (1) The Authority may by regulations (“tender regulations”) make such provision as appears to it to be appropriate for facilitating the making by a (a) a decision whether to hold a tender exercise in relation to a relevant (b) in prescribed circumstances, a determination on a competitive basis of any of the matters listed in subsection (2). (a) the person by whom a relevant electricity project is to be carried out; (b) the person to whom a relevant licence is to be granted (whether for the purposes of a relevant electricity project or otherwise); (c) the person to whom a relevant contract is to be awarded. | 4808927e-67c0-4e83-803d-e07fd0d4a019 | 156 |
0a60a4c4-8c6a-42ac-820a-ab0197144daf | https://cdn.climatepolicyradar.org/navigator/GBR/2020/national-infrastructure-strategy_fa784b6dcf5e13daefc608a72e25dcec.pdf | 2,020 | [
"Economy-wide",
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] | cdn.climatepolicyradar.org | UK-wide roll-out is a major civil engineering project, requiring enough cabling to go around the Earth more than ten times.17 The total level of investment required is in the region of £30 billion. Through the government’s ambitious strategy, rapid increases in the rate of digital infrastructure deployment are already being seen and the UK is expected to see record speeds of deployment in the coming years. Current market data suggests that operators are on track to deliver new full fibre coverage to 2.5 million premises in 2020, up from around 750,000 in 2018.18 The government expects this build rate to increase even further, creating thousands Mobile connectivity is also crucial to allowing people to stay connected on the move. That is why the government is investing £500 million, matched by industry, to deliver high-quality 4G mobile coverage from at least one operator across 95% of the UK by 2025, through the Shared Rural Network. Through this ground-breaking partnership between government and industry, each operator has individually committed to reach 90% of the UK’s landmass by 2026, and collectively the Shared Rural Network will provide additional coverage to 280,000 premises and 16,000 kilometres of roads by 2026. This will have major benefits in rural areas, and for Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland nations in particular. The Shared Rural Network will not only improve coverage, but also increase consumer choice. Currently, only 67% of the UK has good quality coverage from all four operators, and that will improve to 84% by the end of the programme.19 This will mean far fewer people in rural areas will find themselves locked-in to the only mobile network with good The government will continue its pioneering 5G Testbeds and Trials Programme, with £50 million in 2021-22 to support demonstration projects across rural, urban and industrial settings. These projects show the exciting potential for 5G to transform the lives of consumers and businesses, and are a key part of ensuring the benefits of 5G can be felt in every nation It is also vital that digital infrastructure networks are secure and resilient. That is why the government is introducing the Telecommunications (Security) Bill which sets out a new regulatory regime for telecoms security. The government will also publish the 5G Supply Chain Diversification Strategy to ensure the UK’s 5G networks are not over reliant on a single supplier, committing £250 million to start this journey. The strategy will set out a clear and ambitious plan to grow the telecoms supply chain and ensure it is resilient to future trends, to shape global standards, and to make significant investments in research and development to bring through new technology. The government will seek the advice of the Telecoms Diversification Task Force in developing specific programmes under this strategy. 2018 National Infrastructure and Construction pipeline 0% 20%10% 40%30% 60%50% 80%70% 100%90% Percentage of premises in local authority which are uncommercial Department for Digital, Culture, Media & Sport. Estimated percentage of premises in a local authority which are uncommercial for gigabit-capable roll-out Ofcom 2020 Summer Update Connected Nations
Expanding economic opportunity means little for a place – and the people who live and work there – if the infrastructure supporting it is not resilient to potential hazards. Many rural communities and economies across the UK have experienced the devastating impacts of flooding, which can cause significant damage to homes and businesses lasting much longer than the floods themselves. The government is committed to harnessing the opportunities of rural landscapes to increase the resilience of rural communities to flooding. The government will do this by maximising good land management and implementing nature-based solutions through the next £5.2 billion flood and coastal defence programme starting in 2021, a doubling of the current programme. Further details The government recognises that different places across the UK have different • Regional cities are not as productive or as connected, as they should be. The government’s long-term ambition is for UK cities to be globally competitive. The government will support them to improve their productivity through strengthened • Many towns have lost out from structural changes – facing economic and social deprivation. The government’s long-term ambition is for every town to be an excellent place to live and work – offering opportunity to those who live there. The government will drive the regeneration of towns, including through investing in infrastructure. Making cities the engines of future growth The government shares the National Infrastructure Commission’s (NIC’s) view on the importance of strong regional cities; the vital organs of the UK economy. Cities drive economic growth through agglomeration effects; they encourage specialisation, drive competition and spread ideas and innovation faster than other places. London is one of the most productive cities in the world, and many other UK regional cities can also play a similarly important role in the UK economy. However, the NIC noted that many of the UK’s largest cities have below average productivity relative to their size and population, in part due to high congestion and poor local transport links. They are not producing agglomeration economies to the degree that they could. This in turn has an impact on the success of nearby towns, as strong cities can act as an anchor for growth across a wider region. A well-designed public-transport network is fundamental to the operation of any city. London is the only city in Europe where you can access more local services by public transport than by car.20 But the story is different in regional cities, where access to those same services by public transport lags behind continental peers. This is why the government will invest in the North, Midlands and South West to help rebalance the UK economy, and devolved administrations will receive funding to enable public transport investment in Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland. Levelling up the rest of the UK does not mean levelling London down. | ded23dc5-701b-4e6b-9b05-8214c024cae2 | 10 |
0a66014d-bcb9-434c-8e6a-c748a8c49f1d | https://cdn.climatepolicyradar.org/navigator/GBR/2023/united-kingdom-national-inventory-report-nir-2023_8122f7d823bf366105239091fb57ffd2.pdf | 2,023 | [
"data",
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"emissions",
"inventory",
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] | cdn.climatepolicyradar.org | Lower uncertainty than diesel vehicles because consumption dominated by only one vehicle type. 1A3d Gas/Diesel Oil 20.00% 130.00% 20.00% 130.00% Uncertainty in AD due to uncertainty in getting domestic/international split from bottom-up method. | 9ce0b96e-2800-424e-bffb-cd8ba36e0902 | 110 |
0a6b5ae5-d11b-458f-b355-52654acb37ae | https://cdn.climatepolicyradar.org/navigator/GBR/2023/united-kingdom-national-inventory-report-nir-2023_8122f7d823bf366105239091fb57ffd2.pdf | 2,023 | [
"data",
"energy",
"emissions",
"inventory",
"environment"
] | cdn.climatepolicyradar.org | The outputs from the agriculture invento ry complement the work in other sectors to generate comprehensive UK inventories of anthropogenic emissions to atmosphere for GHGs and air quality pollutants, for onwards reporting to the UNFCCC, UNECE and other international organisations. Where necessary to ensure internal consistency, the agriculture inventory experts liaise directly with the inventory compilers of other sectors including for Land Use, Land Use Change and Forestry (LULUCF) and Waste Management. | 9ce0b96e-2800-424e-bffb-cd8ba36e0902 | 303 |
0a781d87-9d3d-4071-8c56-7dfdccb90955 | https://ec.europa.eu/environment/archives/natres/pdf/final_report_wg1.pdf | 2,000 | [
"General",
"Energy service demand reduction and resource efficiency",
"Energy efficiency",
"Renewables",
"Other low-carbon technologies and fuel switch",
"Non-energy use"
] | ec.europa.eu | This will trigger imagination, innovation, the development
of new services and products for the global markets and of the the use of substitutes. Poverty on the basis of World Bank data46, poverty developed over the 1987 1998 period,
the population living on less than 2 per day having increased from 2.5 to 2.8 billion. Poverty
is frequently a powerful driver for environmentally destructive behaviours, since any movable
natural asset is likely to be exploited with no regard for the natural systems and
sustainability, for the poor may have no choice but to satisfy their most immediate vital
needs. Therefore, the fight against poverty, through the EU development policy, will have an
important impact on the way natural resources are gained in developing countries. R 17
A component of the future Thematic Strategy should be to support developing countries in
fostering more sustainable resources gaining activities. EUs development aid, although the
largest international source of grants, represented a modest 0.35 in 200347, far from
reaching the initial commitment of 0.7 of the EU GNI, taken at the UN. Support is provided
in certain resources management areas agriculture, forests and water48. Although the
mineral resources received some limited resource management capacity building support
through the Sysmin instrument, this instrument has been discontinued and no new sectoral
capacity building projects are programmed within the Country Strategy Papers defining the
country-level priorities for the programming of the 9th European Development Fund. Knowledge Awareness - Ignorance and poor environmental performance are fostered by
a series of factors such as
o poor awareness of environmental issues, of existing regulations, of sources of
knowledge and support
o lack of scientific knowledge backed by reliable data
o lack of transparent and easy accessible good quality information
o
o fragmentation of the European research area
o limited integration of sensitisation to sustainability issues in educational curricula starting
at the youngest age
o too much or to little information
46
47
48
World Bank Poverty Net www.worldbank.orgpovertydatatrendsincome.htm
OECD Development Assistance Committee webpapges
httpwww.oecd.orgdocument220,2340,fr_2649_33721_31504022_1_1_1_1,00. html
with the recent essential European Water Initiative launched at the Johannesburg World summit on
Sustainable Development www.euwi.net
Page 51
o personal disinterest for sustainable development issues which citizens wrongly or not
feel unable to address at their individual levels
o ordinary egoism
o corruption and bad governance
o lack of financial incentives with respect to sustainable performance
o lack of access to knowledge and limited institutional capacities in the developing
countries. In addition, a growing number of persons are living in cities and have a very
limited exposure to resources gaining activities, and very limited interest for
these activities. What is the percentage of persons who have at least some
understanding of the production processes in agriculture, forestry or mining
and of the related business environments? The fight against ignorance and awareness raising is a long-term undertaking,
to be targeted inter alia at children through education, and or at all the
components of the supply chain starting with the customer, whose purchasing
choices are of importance, to the various businesses implied in the value-
adding chain down to the initial resource producer. The latter category of
action should be, of course, focused, on value adding chains generating
particularly high impacts. R 18
The final choice of the customer is of utmost importance, as well as the
sustainability ethics of the businesses involved in the supply chain. If the sole
criteria of the consumer is ever more product for an ever cheaper price there
is no doubt that businesses will need to maintain their profitability through
production cost reduction strategies. They can be based on more efficient
production processes49 and innovation, but they can also be based on shifting
the production, through direct delocalisation andor via subcontractors
sometimes a cascade of subcontractors to countries offering a convenient
mix of stability, low labour costs, low taxes and permissive environmental
standards or good but ineffective standards. The Thematic Strategy should
address this. | a5fe6535-9c80-4d16-a22c-92e1e4ed7d30 | 66 |
0a79bc92-4dc5-4f1f-b55f-3af808edcbd3 | https://cdn.climatepolicyradar.org/navigator/GBR/2025/united-kingdom-national-inventory-report-nir-2025_3d22864cf237013c86452d4c6455250a.pdf | 2,025 | [
"emissions",
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"inventory",
"emission",
"used"
] | cdn.climatepolicyradar.org | Volcanic eruptions that inject substantial amounts of SO2 gas into the stratosphere are the dominant natural cause of externally forced climate change on annual and multi-decadal time scales41. A reduction in SO2 emissions leads to more warming. | 95866fde-5b53-4214-b279-97a1078c466c | 185 |
0a822b79-0ad9-4149-81b5-51f7ea0edbbf | https://cdn.climatepolicyradar.org/navigator/GBR/2020/energy-white-paper_0cd02a608db5fd9fbe071391540a23a7.pdf | 2,020 | [
"Energy",
"Fossil Fuels Curbing Measures",
"Fossil Fuel Phase Out",
"energy",
"electricity",
"system",
"support",
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] | cdn.climatepolicyradar.org | Sir Peter is expected to publish his final recommendations in summer 2021. As we decarbonise across transport, energy requirements will change in many sectors, from trains, to boats and planes. This will create new demands on our energy systems. Accelerating the shift to zero emission vehicles could support around 40,000 new jobs by 2030. More details on ensuring all modes of transport are on a pathway to net zero will be set out in the forthcoming Transport Decarbonisation Plan. Delivering our net zero target means largely eliminating emissions from domestic and ` Drive greatly improved energy performance in both existing and new buildings to reduce consumption and help keep bills affordable ` Support the transformation of heating for homes and workplaces from oil and gas to clean energy sources ` Use the switch to clean energy
We need the energy we use to heat or cool our homes and workplaces to be reliable and affordable, and support comfortable, healthy surroundings But emissions from homes and from commercial and public sector buildings account for 19 per cent of total UK greenhouse gas emissions.128 It makes buildings the second largest source of emissions after transport. Buildings also indirectly contribute to power sector emissions through electricity-
Our challenge is to transform how buildings use energy in line with our net zero target. We need to minimise the disruption to consumers as we go through this change and keep bills affordable, while safeguarding the quality of the environment in our building stock. Almost 90 per cent of homes in England currently use fossil fuels, predominantly for heating but also for cooking and hot water.130 The vast majority of these homes, some 85 per cent, are connected to the gas grid. 131 Those that are not connected use mostly oil, liquified propane gas or electricity, or are connected to a shared heat network. While proportions differ between Scotland, Northern Ireland, Wales and England, fossil fuels dominate heating across the UK. 132 The installation of energy efficiency measures and tighter building regulations have improved the energy performance of buildings, lowering consumption and helping to reduce household dual fuel bills by an average of £30 to £40 per year over the last 10 years.133 Emissions from buildings across the UK have fallen by 18MtCO 2e, 17 per cent, over the last 30 years.134 But we need to go further and secure a reduction in emissions by 2050 five times greater than we have achieved over this period. Energy Performance Certificates (EPCs) are required in the UK to provide a prospective owner or tenant with information on the energy performance of a building and recommendations for improvement. EPCs for homes use an A-G rating scale based on the modelled energy bill costs of running the building. The energy performance of too many existing homes is not good enough. Around 16 million homes in England, 66 per cent of the total, are at Energy Performance Certificate D or worse.135 In the private rental sector, existing legislation requires that all buildings have a minimum standard of energy performance only of Band E at the point of rental. The modelled annual energy cost of the average Band C rated home is around £750 less than the average Band E rated home, assuming both homes are There are about 1.8 million non-domestic properties in England and Wales. 137 Buildings in the commercial and public sectors account for around a third of the total final energy consumed for buildings purposes (i.e. excluding industrial, agricultural or transport).138 Large premises of 1,000 square meters or larger represent only 10 per cent of commercial and industrial buildings but emit over half of all the carbon from the building stock.139 Public awareness is low about the connection between climate change and how we heat homes and workplaces. Research by BEIS suggests that the majority of the population has not heard of low- carbon heating technologies.140 Almost a third of gas-users stated they were on ‘environmentally-friendly heating’, suggesting a general under-appreciation of what the transition to low-carbon heating could mean in practice. Encouragingly, however, the survey shows that there is strong support for carbon reduction policies. Almost 90 per cent of respondents said it is important or very important that the UK makes a full transition towards greener heating systems. Tackling emissions from buildings will take many years to deliver but it is a journey which must start now. The 2020s must be a decade of action to put the country on the path to net zero emissions by 2050. Depending on fossil fuels for heat or tolerating wasteful loss of energy in poorly insulated buildings is not sustainable. Action now will put us on a pathway to affordable, green and healthier buildings. Inaction will mean more disruption when we do eventually address the challenge, as well as higher bills and a lower quality of life in our homes and places of work. This white paper builds on our Manifesto commitment to invest £9.2 billion in the energy efficiency of homes, schools and hospitals. It sets out concrete actions to reduce how much energy we use and to support the move to low-carbon heat. We will publish a dedicated Heat and Buildings Strategy in early 2021 which will set out our ambitious plans in further detail, including the suite of policy levers that we will use to encourage consumers and businesses to make the transition. Ensuring our homes and workplaces use energy efficiently makes good financial sense, as well as supporting Energy efficiency measures help bill payers to reduce consumption and keep bills affordable. The asset value of homes can increase based on improved energy performance. Conversely, poor energy performance means that too many bill payers pay more than they should to heat or cool their homes and workplaces comfortably. In November 2020, the Prime Minister announced £1 billion of funding to continue our support for the decarbonisation of buildings through improved energy efficiency. | 7ddb340e-1bee-46f8-b3fb-be45b01d49ae | 26 |
0a84e83a-0329-4b37-a76a-d46b0c38b84b | https://cdn.climatepolicyradar.org/navigator/GBR/2023/net-zero-growth-plan_bc80184b303c710cf0e5f7f4fe3afe83.pdf | 2,023 | [
"Energy",
"Economy-wide",
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] | cdn.climatepolicyradar.org | • Develop long term funding plans for cycling and walking infrastructure and behaviour change programmes up to 2025. • Aim to complete the review of the National Networks National Policy Statement during 2023, taking account of the Government's legal net zero target. Powering Up Britain – The Net Zero Growth Plan Natural Resources, Waste & F-Gases Maximising co-benefits for climate and nature is vital to supporting net zero alongside other priority outcomes, including biodiversity, water quality, climate adaptation and economic growth. The Independent Review of Net Zero demonstrated that decarbonising land use sectors and sustainably managing natural resources and broader ecosystems can create sizeable economic opportunities. Delivering on these has the potential to leverage growing demand for investment opportunities in natural capital, supporting the market frameworks needed in this emerging area. We have made progress on key Net Zero Strategy commitments, publishing updates on how environmental land management (ELM) schemes will pay farmers to provide a range of public goods, including actions to reduce GHG emissions.54 We have also set a legally binding target for tree coverage in England. Our ambitious agriculture measures build on historical progress in reducing emissions. For example, the dairy sector increased milk production by 11% between 2000-2020, with 21% fewer cows and 12% less GHG We will build on progress in reducing emissions from agriculture and will set out how farmers will be supported to understand their emission sources through carbon audits by 2024 and take further actions to decarbonise their businesses, including through ELM schemes. We will shortly publish a Government Response to our
Powering Up Britain – The Net Zero Growth Plan call for evidence exploring the role of robust monitoring, reporting, and verification of GHG emissions on farms.55 Utilising these findings and additional evidence from ongoing research projects, we will develop a harmonised approach for measuring carbon emissions from farms, helping unlock new financial opportunities through carbon markets. We also anticipate entry of high efficacy methane suppressing products to the UK market from 2025 and will explore the role of industry and government to maximise uptake of such products for suitable cattle farm systems at pace, through a phased approach. This will include the ambition to mandate the introduction of products with proven safety and efficacy in compound feeds for cattle as soon as practically possible in England. We have also made considerable progress reducing emissions from waste, as we drive forward action to deliver the collection and packaging reforms from the Net Zero Strategy. The Climate Change Committee has recognised the effectiveness of the Landfill Tax in diverting waste from landfill and consequently reducing emissions. We will shortly issue a call for evidence to support the near elimination of biodegradable waste being sent to landfill by 2028. We will publish an addendum to the Resources and Waste Strategy in the summer, which will focus on net zero. We welcome the recommendations made by the Review and CCC’s 2022 Progress Report to Parliament, including as we prepare to publish our Land Use Framework for England later this year. Taking a systems approach, the Land Use Framework will help set out how we can deliver multifunctional landscapes that are resilient to our changing climate whilst meeting our needs for net zero, food production and environmental recovery. For example, the agricultural sector plays an important role in supporting on- shore renewable energy generation, aiding delivery of the British Energy Security Strategy, whilst maintaining domestic food production security. We agree with the Independent Review of Net Zero’s recommendation that we ensure a pipeline on investable nature-based solutions projects. We have established the Natural Environment Investment Readiness Fund with the Environment Agency to develop a pipeline of 86 projects across England to monetise the benefits of nature and develop enabling tools or standards. Our 2023 Green Finance Strategy sets out how we will meet HMG’s goal of mobilising at least £500 million per year of private finance into nature’s recovery by 2027, and more than £1 billion per year by 2030. Indicative emissions pathway to 2037 In 2021, agriculture and other land use emissions were around 49 MtCO2e making up around 11% of total UK net GHG emissions (including international aviation and shipping). Livestock (particularly cattle) currently make up the largest share of these emissions. Agriculture and other land use emissions have decreased by 2% since 2019 and 25% since 1990. The largest factor in this long-term fall has been an increase in the sink provided by forest land, with an increasing CO2 uptake by trees as they reach maturity, in
Powering Up Britain – The Net Zero Growth Plan line with the historical planting pattern. In line with the sectoral breakdown of the indicative pathway set out in the NZS, compared to 2021 emissions levels, GHG emissions could fall by 1% to 12% on average over 2023-27, 11% to 24% by 2030 and 19% to 37% on average over 2033-37. Please see the Carbon Budget Delivery Plan for details of our proposals and policies for meeting the carbon budgets. In 2021, waste and F-gas emissions were around 30 MtCO2e making up around 7% of total UK net GHG emissions (including international aviation and shipping). The largest emissions sources include landfill and air conditioning and refrigeration. Waste and F-gas emissions have decreased by 11% since 2019 and 66% since 1990. The reduction since 1990 is primarily due to reductions in emissions from landfill and halocarbon production. In line with the sectoral breakdown of the indicative pathway set out in the NZS, compared to 2021 emissions levels, GHG emissions could fall by 23% to 31% on average over 2023-27 43% to 51% by 2030 and 56% to 65% on average over 2033-37. | 42fe6f14-0789-4e19-af61-6079611d2b41 | 23 |
0a85658c-235b-47b7-badf-856059cc87e5 | https://unfccc.int/sites/default/files/resource/UK%20Net%20Zero%20Strategy%20-%20Build%20Back%20Greener.pdf | 2,021 | [
"zero",
"carbon",
"emissions",
"energy",
"government"
] | unfccc.int | It is also bringing forward the requirement for all homes to be upgraded to meet at least EPC C standards or equivalent by 2033 with the majority meeting this standard by 2030. Subject to devolved competence, the Scottish Government has committed to phasing out the need to install new or replacement fossil fuel boilers, in off gas areas from 2025 and in on gas areas from 2030, subject to technological developments and decisions by the UK Government in reserved areas. It is currently developing regulations which will require new buildings receiving a warrant from 2024 to use zero emissions heating Net Zero Build Back Greener
A phased programme is planned to uplift Northern Ireland’s building regulations, taking developments in other administrations into account, to provide ultra-high energy efficient building fabric and services with low carbon heating standards for new buildings as soon as is practicable and no later than 2026/27. Consideration may be given to earlier uptake of requirements for low carbon heating solutions from 2022/23, if deemed feasible following consultation with industry. There are several schemes currently available to support energy efficiency improvements and the installation of lower carbon heating, including the Boiler Replacement Scheme, Affordable Warmth, and the Northern Ireland Sustainable Energy Programme (NISEP). A new Northern Ireland Energy Strategy is expected to be published by the end of 2021, which will provide further information on proposals to phase out coal and solid fuels, along with fossil fuel home heating oil. The Energy Strategy will also provide further information on proposals to decarbonise the natural gas network, including through future injection of biomethane and potential hydrogen blending. Further detail will also be provided on the transition to low carbon heating options, such as heat pumps, and future proposed support schemes, including energy efficiency and low carbon heating pilot schemes, which are intended to be launched Chapter 3 – Reducing Emissions across the Economy
Setting the pace for greener, better transport • End the sale of new petrol and diesel cars and vans from 2030; from 2035, all new cars and vans must be zero emission at the tailpipe. • Introduce a zero emission vehicle mandate setting targets for a percentage of manufacturers’ new car and van sales to be zero emission each year from 2024. • Take forward our pledge to end the sale of all new, non-zero emission road vehicles by 2040, from motorcycles to buses and HGVs, subject to consultation. • Ensure the UK’s charging infrastructure network is reliable, accessible, and meets the demands of all motorists. Later this year, we will publish an EV infrastructure strategy, setting out our vision for infrastructure rollout, and roles for the public and private sectors in achieving it. • Building on the £1.9 billion from Spending Review 2020, the Government has committed an additional £620 million to support the transition to electric vehicles. The funding will support the rollout of charging infrastructure, with a particular focus on local on-street residential charging, and targeted plug-in vehicle grants. • Build a globally competitive zero emission vehicle supply chain and ensure our automotive sector is at the forefront of the transition to net zero. • Lead by example with 25% of the government car fleet ultra low emission by December 2022 and all the government car and van fleet zero emission by 2027. • Take action to increase average road vehicle occupancy by 2030 and reduce the barriers to data sharing across the transport sector. • Maximise carbon savings from the use of low carbon fuels, including by increasing the main Renewable Transport Fuel Obligation (RTFO) target. • Increase the share of journeys taken by public transport, cycling and walking. • Support decarbonisation by investing more than £12 billion in local transport systems over the current Parliament. • Invest £2 billion in cycling and walking, building first hundreds, then thousands of miles of segregated cycle lane and more low-traffic neighbourhoods with the aim that half of all journeys in towns and cities will be cycled or walked by 2030. As announced in the Transport Decarbonisation Plan, we will create at least one zero Net Zero Build Back Greener
• Invest £3 billion in the National Bus Strategy, creating integrated networks, more frequent services, and bus lanes to speed journeys, and support delivery of 4,000 new zero emission buses and the infrastructure needed to support them. • Electrify more railway lines as part of plans to deliver a net zero rail network by 2050, with the ambition to remove all diesel-only trains by 2040. • Plot a course to net zero for the UK domestic maritime sector, phase out the sale of new non-zero emission domestic shipping vessels and accelerate the development of zero emission technology and infrastructure in the UK. We will engage with industry to explore establishing a UK Shipping Office for Reducing Emissions (UK- SHORE) to transform the UK into a global leader in the design and manufacturing of • Become a leader in zero-emission flight, kick-starting commercialisation of UK sustainable aviation fuels (SAF), and developing a UK SAF mandate, to enable the delivery of 10% SAF by 2030, and we will be supporting UK industry with a £180m funding to support the development of SAF plants. 1. Domestic transport has the largest share of UK greenhouse gas emissions of any sector across the economy, at 23% in 2019. The majority (55%) of these emissions are from passenger cars, contributing 68 MtCO This is followed by heavy goods vehicles and light goods vehicles contributing 19 MtCO (16%) and 19 MtCO2e (16%) respectively. The remaining emissions in domestic shipping, road transport, rail, and domestic aviation contribute a combined further 2. We must deliver a step change in the breadth and scale of our ambitions and, to this end, in July 2021 we published our world leading Transport Decarbonisation Plan. This covered all areas of transport and set out an ambitious but deliverable pathway to reaching net zero and delivering against carbon budgets along the way. | 44870195-36a9-4258-b046-ac522bc94ef6 | 44 |
0a8b562e-4b62-458c-bb9f-88141c4827ed | https://www.gov.scot/binaries/content/documents/govscot/publications/strategy-plan/2017/12/scottish-energy-strategy-future-energy-scotland-9781788515276/documents/00529523-pdf/00529523-pdf/govscot%3Adocument/00529523.pdf | 2,017 | [
"energy",
"scotland",
"scottish",
"government",
"carbon"
] | www.gov.scot | The first review report is due in March 2018, providing an opportunity to establish whether the National Marine Plan reflects the priorities set out in Marine Scotland also produces “Sectoral Marine Plans” to support the development of offshore renewable energy, and is currently beginning the identification of potential areas for new offshore wind energy sites. This work will culminate in a Sectoral Marine Plan for Offshore Wind in deeper Crown Estate Scotland, the body which manages the leasing of Scotland’s seabed on behalf of Scottish Ministers, has now begun to consider the potential case for and approach to issuing new leasing rights for commercial-scale offshore wind projects. Crown Estate Scotland will be speaking to local, Scottish and UK stakeholders during 2018 and asking for views on their proposed approach. There is huge industrial and economic potential attached to offshore wind development. Our offshore wind supply chain is strengthening and expanding – building on Scotland’s established oil and gas expertise and experience. Scotland has the necessary competitive advantage and the building blocks – a skilled, committed workforce, excellent port infrastructure and a strong innovation hub. 17 Scotland’s National Marine
That innovation is being spearheaded by Offshore Renewable Energy Catapult, whose cost-cutting activities we are pleased to support and host through their Glasgow headquarters and their operations at Levenmouth. The same can be said of the activity taking shape at the European Offshore Wind Deployment Centre near Aberdeen. We are determined to continue supporting and growing this sector in Scotland – creating more opportunities for Scottish manufacturers and our supply chain from the developments taking place in our waters and The UK Government’s Industrial Strategy rightly points to the achievements of the offshore wind industry, and the potential that it represents. We will continue to work with the UK Government to ensure that its approach under the proposed offshore wind Sector Deal takes Scotland’s offshore wind potential and opportunity fully into account. The Scottish Government and our partners have pressed the UK Government consistently for a long period over the need to support remote island wind. That means providing a distinct and meaningful opportunity for large wind developments on the Western Isles, Shetland and Orkney to compete for long-term contracts, through the UK Government’s Contracts for Difference (CfD) process. We have welcomed the UK Government’s recent confirmation that it will provide this access as part of the next CfD auction round, subject to consultation. But that means getting the details and the design right, and providing confirmation and certainty as quickly as possible. We will continue to work with our partners, and with the UK Government, to
Scottish Energy Strategy 46/47 Scotland continues to lead the world in developing and supporting wave and tidal energy technologies. That is due partly to consistent and committed support from the Scottish Government and its enterprise agencies, but mainly due to the passion, expertise, investment and Although securing further cost reductions and a route to market remain big challenges, Scotland continues to deliver world firsts. • Scotrenewables – developer of the world’s most powerful floating tidal turbine – is exporting an impressive amount of power to the • Nova Innovation successfully deployed a third turbine at the Shetland Tidal Array earlier this year and has more than doubled its • The first phase of the MeyGen tidal project is now operating at full • The European Marine Energy Centre (EMEC) has tested 30 different wave and tidal energy devices to date – more than any other single Our Wave Energy Scotland (WES) technology programme – funded entirely by the Scottish Government – has supported over 60 projects, engaged 170 organisations from industry and academia, and made over £25 million available so far to support innovation. The sector is already integrating storage, grid management and transport solutions into demonstration projects. It has also developed an impressive Scottish supply chain, providing high value jobs and creating diversification opportunities for Scotland’s world class marine services, subsea and oil and gas sectors. The Minister for Business, Innovation and Energy has agreed to chair a new short life industry working group. This group is working to agree the priorities for securing the future growth of the sector in light of changes in UK Government energy policy and EU exit. Solar PV can make an increasing contribution to Scotland’s energy needs. There is enough capacity in Scotland to power the equivalent of over 50,000 homes, and potential for the sector to provide low cost energy, system stability (e.g. through storage) and create jobs. Solar will play an important role in a low carbon energy system, helping meet Scotland’s renewable generation ambitions. Combining storage with wind and solar assets presents a valuable solution for the energy system as a whole, offering the potential for demand to be managed locally. This kind of flexibility and control will be important as electric vehicles become an integral part of the transport system. The Scottish Government is considering, as part of the Planning Review, the potential to expand permitted development (PD) rights for certain renewable installations (removing the need to apply for planning permission for certain developments). Solar will also be considered under the forthcoming review of energy standards within building regulations. Scottish Energy Strategy 48/49 Biomass provides almost all (90%) of existing renewable heat in Scotland, with biogas also used to produce heat . We will continue to engage with stakeholders as we develop our Bioenergy Action Plan. Our approach will apply the following guiding • Policies to support bioenergy are consistent with the ambitions laid out in this Strategy, and with Scotland’s Climate Change Plan and • Bioenergy schemes deliver greenhouse gas emission reductions that help meet Scotland’s climate change targets. • Bioenergy schemes represent good value for money, deliver benefits for communities, and help tackle fuel poverty. • Biomass is produced and managed in a sustainable way, and should be used in heat-only or combined heat and power schemes to exploit available heat and local supply. | 679d47a0-85c7-43df-8c6e-b43d114f552a | 13 |
0a8d30b1-febf-45c6-85ad-46d647ef3911 | https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX:31998L0069 | 1,998 | [
"Transport",
"Energy service demand reduction and resource efficiency",
"Energy efficiency",
"Renewables",
"Other low-carbon technologies and fuel switch"
] | eur-lex.europa.eu | (29) The month of publication will be completed in due course. (30) The reference fuel used to approve a vehicle against the limit values set out in row B of the table in section 5.3.1.4 of Annex I to this Directive shall have a maximum aromatics content of 35 % v/v. The Commission will as soon as possible, but no later than 31 December 1999, bring forward a modification to this Annex reflecting the market average for fuel aromatics content in respect of the fuel defined in Annex III of Directive 98/70/EC. (31) The fuel may contain oxidation inhibitors and metal deactivators normally used to stabilise refinery gasoline streams, but detergent/dispersive additives and solvent oils must not be added. (32) The actual oxygen content of the fuel used for the Type I and IV tests shall be reported. In addition the maximum oxygen content of the reference fuel used to approve a vehicle against the limit values set out in row B of the table in section 5.1.3.4 of Annex I to this Directive shall be 2,3 %. The Commission will as soon as possible, but no later than 31 December 1999, bring forward a modification to this Annex reflecting the market average for fuel oxygen content in respect of the fuel defined in Annex III of Directive 98/70/EC. (33) The actual sulphur content of the fuel used for the Type I test shall be reported. In addition the reference fuel used to approve a vehicle against the limit values set out in row B of the table in section 5.1.3.4 of Annex I to this Directive shall have a maximum sulphur content of 50 ppm. The Commission will as soon as possible, but no later than 31 December 1999, bring forward a modification to this Annex reflecting the market average for fuel sulphur content in respect of the fuel defined in Annex III of Directive 98/70/EC. (34) Lambda formula: see Annex I, section 5.3.7.3, footnote 1. | 282d51c7-9418-4d78-8dce-aec1567a8b80 | 73 |
0a9022e2-7feb-45e1-a5a2-4450586a5b79 | http://register.consilium.europa.eu/pdf/en/08/st03/st03740-re01.en08.pdf | 2,009 | [
"Transport",
"Renewables"
] | register.consilium.europa.eu | All sectors will need to contribute to these goals. 1
2
3
OJ L 350, 28.12.1998, p. 58. OJ L 242, 10.9.2002, p. 1. OJ L 152, 11.6.2008, p. 43. PE-CONS 3740108 REV 1
PAWfc
DG I
2
EN
4
One aspect of greenhouse gas emissions from transport has been tackled through the
Community policy on CO2 and cars. Transport fuel use makes a significant contribution to
overall Community greenhouse gas emissions. Monitoring and reducing fuel life cycle
greenhouse gas emissions can contribute to helping the Community meet its greenhouse
gas reduction goals through the decarbonisation of transport fuel. 5
The Community has adopted regulations limiting pollutant emissions from light and heavy
duty road vehicles. The fuel specification is one of the factors that influences the ease with
which such emission limits can be met. 6
Derogations from the maximum summer petrol vapour pressure should be limited to those
Member States with low ambient summer temperatures. It is therefore appropriate to
clarify in which Member States a derogation should be permitted. These are, in principle,
those Member States where the average temperature for a majority of their territory is
below 12 ºC for at least two of the three months of June, July and August. PE-CONS 3740108 REV 1
PAWfc
DG I
3
EN
7
Directive 9768EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 16 December 1997
on the approximation of the laws of the Member States relating to measures against the
emission of gaseous and particulate pollutants from internal combustion engines to be
installed in non-road mobile machinery1, sets emission limits for engines used in non-road
mobile machinery. Fuel enabling the proper functioning of these engines needs to be
provided for the operation of this machinery. 8
The combustion of road transport fuel is responsible for around 20 of Community
greenhouse gas emissions. One approach to reducing these emissions is through reducing
the life-cycle greenhouse gas emissions of these fuels. This can be done in a number of
ways. In view of the Communitys ambition to further reduce greenhouse gas emissions
and the significant contribution that road transport makes to those emissions, it is
appropriate to establish a mechanism requiring fuel suppliers to report the life-cycle
greenhouse gas emissions of the fuel that they supply and to reduce them
from 2011 onwards. The methodology for the calculation of life-cycle greenhouse gas
emissions from biofuels should be identical to that established for the purposes of the
calculation of greenhouse gas impacts under Directive 2009EC of the European
Parliament and of the Council of ... | 2fa2bb5b-29b7-44c6-b6e0-944c288ed7be | 1 |
0a93a4e0-fd1b-4b47-a70d-3fe78487fe2e | http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:L:2008:199:0001:0136:EN:PDF | 2,008 | [
"Transport",
"Light-duty vehicles",
"Energy efficiency"
] | eur-lex.europa.eu | . 1 Delete where not applicable
L 199110
EN
Official Journal of the European Union
28.7.2008
Appendix 2
MODEL EC TYPE-APPROVAL CERTIFICATE
Maximum format A4 210 mm 297 mm
EC TYPE-APPROVAL CERTIFICATE
Stamp of administration
Communication concerning the
EC type-approval 1,
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .,
extension of EC type-approval 1, . . | d3fc6859-41cb-4ee2-997b-90ebc4f9b481 | 360 |
0a9610ce-1571-47fd-a8c8-0bbc468641bc | https://unfccc.int/sites/default/files/resource/UK%20Net%20Zero%20Strategy%20-%20Build%20Back%20Greener.pdf | 2,021 | [
"zero",
"carbon",
"emissions",
"energy",
"government"
] | unfccc.int | But we cannot tackle climate change alone. We will take a coordinated approach, working across local and national government, the Devolved Administrations, and with businesses and civil society organisations. And we will make it easier and fairer for individuals, businesses and households to decarbonise, so that our whole society can work together to reduce emissions. This strategy demonstrates how the UK is leading by example, with a clear Secretary of State for Business, Energy & Foreword from the Secretary of State for Business, Energy & Industrial Strategy
Net Zero Build Back Greener
What is net zero and why do we From heating our homes to filling up our cars, burning fossil fuels releases the greenhouses gases that increase global temperatures. We are already seeing the effects here in the UK, with devastating floods in the West Midlands in January and torrential downpours submerging London Underground stations People are rightly concerned, with the latest IPCC report showing that if we fail to limit global warming to 1.5°C above pre-industrial levels, the floods and fires we have seen around the world this year will get more frequent and more fierce, crops will be more likely to fail, and sea levels will rise driving mass migration as millions are forced from their homes. Above 1.5°C we risk reaching climatic tipping points like the melting of arctic permafrost – releasing millennia of stored greenhouse gases – meaning we could lose control of our climate for good. But the good news is that there is, still, a path to avoid catastrophic climate change. The science could not be by the middle of this century the world has to reduce emissions to as close to zero as possible, with the small amount of remaining emissions absorbed through natural carbon sinks like forests, and new technologies like carbon capture. If we can achieve this, global emissions of greenhouse gases will be ‘net zero’. Delivering this requires urgent global action, including ending coal fired power generation, retiring petrol and diesel engines from all cars, and halting deforestation. These are the steps that the UK is calling for at COP26, the global climate change talks in Glasgow next month. Net Zero Build Back Greener
Since 1990 the UK has almost halved our greenhouse gas emissions. Thanks to the efforts of successive governments, we are almost half-way to ending the UK’s domestic contribution to man-made climate change, and in 2019 the UK became the first major economy in the world to legislate to finish the job with a binding target to reach net zero We are proud to lead the world in ending our own contribution to climate change, not just because it is the right thing to do, but because we are determined to seize the unprecedented economic opportunity it brings. We want to build back better from the pandemic by building back greener and levelling up our country with new high skilled, high wage, sustainable jobs in every part of Removing dirty fossil fuels will require the transformation of every sector of the global economy. It means no longer burning fossil fuels for power or heating; it means new ways of making concrete, cement, steel; it means the end of the petrol and diesel engine. These changes are already beginning to happen. Renewable energy is now the cheapest source of power across two-thirds of the globe. Clean, cheap power is already driving the decarbonisation of heavy industry around the world. Almost all major car companies are now developing or producing zero emissions vehicles as battery technology improves The question is whether the new clean machinery of the net zero future will be “made elsewhere” or “made in Britain”. By moving first, the UK can get ahead of the pack and make the birthplace of the industrial revolution the home of the new Green Indeed, as we produce more of our own electricity – from wind farms in the North Sea and state-of-the-art British nuclear reactors – families will be much better protected from energy price spikes caused by volatile international fossil fuel markets. At the same time, by getting ahead of the curve in driving down the costs of the latest clean technology, more consumers will enjoy more efficient cars and heating systems sooner. Furthermore, by accelerating the deployment of cheap renewable power, and rolling out further energy efficiency measures, government decarbonisation policies mean that the average consumer energy bill in 2024 will likely be cheaper than it would otherwise have been. We have shown the world that green and growth go hand in hand, and as a result other countries are already following our lead with their own net zero targets. When the UK was confirmed as host of COP26, less than 30% of global GDP was signed up to net zero or carbon neutrality targets. Today, in part again
The Ten Point Plan for a Green Last year, the government kick-started its mission to get ahead of the pack, by setting out a Ten Point Plan for a Green Industrial Revolution. Our ambition was to create the conditions for the private sector to invest with confidence, unleashing the unique creativity of capitalism to generate and grow new We mobilised £12 billion of government investment, shared some of the risks of pioneering new industries, and began to introduce regulations to assure industry of the future demand for green products – such as through our decision to end the sale of new petrol and diesel cars by 2030. We have also invested in the skills the British workforce will need for these new high wage green jobs, though our Lifetime Skills Guarantee, and we are helping investors to access capital for green projects by making the City of London the global centre of Green Finance. At the Global Investment Summit in October 2021, the Prime Minister announced a package of 18 deals worth £9.7 billion that will support green growth and create an estimated 30,000 UK jobs. | 44870195-36a9-4258-b046-ac522bc94ef6 | 1 |
0a96d410-2ee0-48cf-8b27-3a11c96f14fd | https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/1011283/UK-Hydrogen-Strategy_web.pdf | 2,021 | [
"hydrogen",
"carbon",
"energy",
"production",
"support"
] | assets.publishing.service.gov.uk | Further scale up of low carbon hydrogen post-2030 would yield even larger emissions savings, and will play an important role in delivering CB6, to be set out in more detail in the government’s forthcoming Net Zero Strategy. Our 5GW ambition would also mean the creation of a thriving new hydrogen industry, which could support over 9,000 jobs and £900 million of GVA by 2030.9 Government investment in hydrogen to de-risk early projects could unlock over £4 billion of private sector co-investment up to 2030.10 Our ambition also sets us on a promising pathway post-2030. Our analysis shows that, under a high hydrogen scenario, up to 100,000 jobs and £13 billion of GVA could be generated from the UK hydrogen economy by 2050.11 Many countries around the world have signalled the importance of low carbon hydrogen in reducing emissions, and there is an expectation that a global market for trade in hydrogen will develop in the long term. However, it is unlikely that market will be mature by 2030, meaning that the UK cannot, and would not want to, rely solely on low carbon hydrogen imports. An over-reliance on imports could create risks around the security of supply for hydrogen and associated investment in the wider value chain. It would also reduce opportunities for UK companies to leverage domestic capabilities and strengths and translate these into clean growth opportunities. In contrast, moving quickly to develop a strong UK hydrogen economy by 2030 can help ensure security of supply and wider investment, create high-quality and sustainable jobs, and position UK companies to take advantage of opportunities in international markets. We aspire to take a leading global role in developing low carbon hydrogen technologies and markets, working with our international partners including through existing initiatives for collaboration. This will be particularly important in the lead up to the UK hosting COP26 later this year, as we seek to turbo-charge the development and deployment of low carbon technologies that will help countries achieve their clean energy transitions – but will continue beyond COP26, as we pursue opportunities to work with other leading global hydrogen nations in helping to build a global hydrogen economy. 1.5 A strategic framework for the UK Hydrogen In developing a UK hydrogen economy, it will be important that we set clear and consistent direction to give industry and investors confidence and certainty, whilst remaining flexible to ensure that we act on learning from early projects and can take decisions which offer the greatest decarbonisation and economic value in the long term. Our strategic framework informs the policy direction and commitments set out in this strategy, and will guide our actions over the course of the 2020s to provide a coherent long term approach. Our vision is that by 2030, the UK is a global leader on hydrogen, with 5GW of low carbon hydrogen production capacity driving decarbonisation across the economy and clear plans in place for future scale up towards Carbon Budget 6 and net zero, supporting new jobs and clean growth across the UK. Our principles will guide future policy decisions and government action, providing clarity on future policy direction for investors and • Long term value for money for taxpayers and To deliver value for UK taxpayers and consumers we will seek to minimise the cost of action, and drive down costs over the long term, as we reach for our 5GW ambition and • Growing the economy whilst cutting We will harness opportunity to create new, high-quality jobs to support levelling up, including in transition from existing high carbon sectors. We will ensure that the actions we take are aligned to our net zero target, recognising that hydrogen production will need to become increasingly low carbon over time. • Securing strategic advantages for the We will nurture UK capabilities and technological expertise to grow new industries of the future, so that UK companies can position themselves at the forefront of the growing global hydrogen market. We will support private sector innovation, develop policy to mobilise private investment and promote UK export opportunities. • Minimising disruption and cost for consumers and We will build on our successful hydrogen research and innovation to date to reduce costs, address risks and provide safety and technical assurance of technologies at commercial readiness, focusing on ‘learning by doing’ in the 2020s to minimise disruption and cost for consumers and households, and prime the UK • Keeping options open, adapting as the market There are uncertainties around the role of hydrogen in 2030 and out to 2050, including the likely split of production methods and scale of demand. We will seek to ensure optionality to deliver a number of credible pathways to 2050, bringing forward a range of technologies that could support our 2030 ambition and CB6 and • Taking a holistic We will focus on what needs to be done across the whole hydrogen system, supporting coordination across all those who need to play their part, and ensuring we stay in step with developments in the wider energy system as the UK drives to net zero. Chapter 1: The case for low carbon hydrogen We recognise that there may be trade-offs within and between some of these principles at any point in time. For example, the levelised cost of hydrogen using electrolytic production technology is higher today than for CCUS-enabled hydrogen, and it will take time for production to reach industrial scale. That said, with the right support today, this technology presents a genuine opportunity for export of UK expertise and technology, and there is also significant potential for longer-term cost reduction with continued innovation, scale up of manufacture and access to increased amounts of low-cost renewable electricity. | 96babf55-7373-4dee-b481-d10889d10207 | 5 |
0aa057d5-e1b3-49bc-a758-ce0b92ed033b | https://www.odyssee-mure.eu/publications/archives/MURE-Overall-Policy-Brochure.pdf | 2,001 | [
"Buildings",
"Energy efficiency"
] | www.odyssee-mure.eu | Ragwitz, M. 2006 Eckpunkte für die
Entwicklung
zur Marktdurchdringung
erneuerbarer Energien im Wärmemarkt. Project on behalf of the German Federal
Ministry of the Environment,
budgetunabhängiger
und Einführung
httpwww.erneuerbare-energien.deerneuerbare_energiendownloadsdoc 43282.php
Neme, Ch. and Cowart, R. 2012 Energy Efficiency Feed-in-Tariffs Key Policy and Design
Considerations, Regulatory Assistance Project RAP, April 2012. OPW 2011 The particular needs and issues for central government buildings. Presentation
at the Conference Financing Retrofit Public Sector New Instruments for Delivering
Energy Efficiency Targets. | 122a6704-bce7-4e62-9bc9-5e1516956bc0 | 96 |
0aae1a5d-1244-40b5-909b-dbfb2957f8a2 | http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:32014L0094&from=EN | 2,014 | [
"Transport",
"Renewables",
"Other low-carbon technologies and fuel switch"
] | eur-lex.europa.eu | They should encourage exchanges of best practices in alternative
fuels infrastructure deployment and management between local and regional development initiatives and, to this
end, they should promote the use of the European Structural and Investment Funds, in particular the European
Regional Development Fund and the Cohesion Fund. 19 Support measures for alternative fuels infrastructure should be implemented in compliance with the State aid
rules contained in the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union TFEU. Member States may consider it
necessary to provide support to operators affected by this Directive in accordance with the applicable State aid
rules. Any national support measures for alternative fuels infrastructure notified to the Commission should be
assessed without delay. 20 The Trans-European Network for Transport TEN-T guidelines recognise that alternative fuels serve, at least
partly, as a substitute for fossil oil sources in the energy supply to transport, contribute to its decarbonisation and
enhance the environmental performance of the transport sector. The TEN-T guidelines require, with regard to
new technologies and innovation, that the TEN-T is to enable the decarbonisation of all transport modes by
stimulating energy efficiency as well as by introducing alternative propulsion systems and the provision of corre
sponding infrastructure. | 47d41edb-e6e8-4edf-a97f-3da2efd8b5a1 | 5 |
0ab2adeb-0686-4043-8b91-91c850a9489c | https://web.archive.org/web/20121030153548/
http://ec.europa.eu/energy/res/legislation/doc/comm2001-547-en.pdf | 2,001 | [
"Transport",
"Other low-carbon technologies and fuel switch",
"Renewables"
] | web.archive.org | Few people
would be ready to compromise much on any of the advantages offered by todays car. Freight transport has different criteria. As an economic sector subject to strong internal
competition, cost and reliability are key factors. Any alternative fuel or engine technology
will have to be made competitive in order to penetrate the market. On the other hand, long
2
distance road transport is a single functional activity and refuelling points need not to be as
close together as for passenger transport. However, their geographical coverage throughout
Europe is essential. The penetration potential for any alternative fuel for the future has to be evaluated against
these criteria. Different alternatives will require different types and levels of investment in
infrastructure and equipment. Replacing a few percent of diesel or gasoline with biodiesel or
ethanol is the simplest, establishing plants to produce such alternative fuels being the only
long term investment. Fuel cells fuelled by hydrogen are the most complicated alternative,
requiring alternative engine technology, as well as large investment in plants to produce the
hydrogen and a totally new distribution system. Shifting to a hydrogen-based transport system
is a major decision, which will only make sense as part of a large-scale, long-term strategy, in
principle extending even beyond the EU. The driving force behind long-term substitution of conventional diesel and gasoline is the
need partly to improve the security of energy supply, partly to reduce the environmental
impact, especially climate change, from the transport sector. Any long-term solution will, as a
minimum, have to offer a reduction in oil dependency and a reduction in greenhouse gas
emissions, compared to the most fuel-efficient vehicles running on conventional fuel. In
addition, it must be required that such alternatives permit a continued reduction in emission of
conventional air pollutants from the vehicles. The combined requirement of comfort and performance of the car, security of supply of the
fuel, low environmental impact and high level of safety and continued low overall cost of
driving can in no way be fully met at any time. Future policy development will have to give
higher priority to security of energy supply and fuel efficiency lower greenhouse gas
emission. | 8d0815c6-dbd1-45de-b2d9-f36fee1ad512 | 3 |
0ab4f724-7f87-4ee6-bd2b-554c9a9ff6f0 | http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:L:2008:199:0001:0136:EN:PDF | 2,008 | [
"Transport",
"Light-duty vehicles",
"Energy efficiency"
] | eur-lex.europa.eu | 6. MONITORING NOx EMISSIONS
6.1. 6.2. As an alternative to the monitoring requirements in section 4 and 5 manufacturers may use exhaust gas sensors
directly to sense excess NOx levels in the exhaust. The manufacturer shall demonstrate that use of these sensors and any other sensors on the vehicle, results in the
activation of the driver warning system as referred to in section 3, the display of a message indicating an appropriate
warning e.g. emissions too high check urea, emissions too high check AdBlue, emissions too high check
reagent., and the driver inducement system as referred to in section 8.3, when the situations referred to in sec-
tion 4.2, 5.4.or 5,5 occur. | d3fc6859-41cb-4ee2-997b-90ebc4f9b481 | 403 |
0ab7f371-44b5-4a2f-95b5-595ab51a0198 | 2,025 | [
"green taxation",
"renovation projects",
"electricity market",
"building stock",
"wider public sector"
] | HF-national-climate-targets-dataset | Most businesses claim that energy efficiency is of high priority to them. However, smaller businesses are faced with a challenge to identify and/or implement adequate energy saving opportunities because they lack expert knowledge on the topic and / or due to high costs and lack of funding. It is important to note that electricity in Cyprus is expensive relative to the EU average, despite a relatively smaller proportion of taxes and VAT, which hampers business competitiveness. Component 2.1 Climate neutrality, energy efficiency and renewable energy penetration includes measures which contribute to Cyprus transition to climate neutrality, through the achievement of the national targets in energy efficiency and renewable energy for 2030. Specifically, the component aims to improve the environment policy through measures relating to green taxation, the opening-up of the electricity market and the facilitation of licensing of renewable energy and renovation projects. It aims to improve the energy efficiency of the building stock and other infrastructure, and support green investments in SMEs, housing, the wider public sector and Contribution of various components | bee805f5-0694-4295-9e3e-40e283e29619 | 0 | |
0ac6151c-c61e-4796-a833-2198f5f72cc5 | https://www.gov.uk/government/news/18-billion-awarded-to-boost-energy-efficiency-and-cut-emissions-of-homes-and-public-buildings-across-england | 2,023 | [
"energy",
"million",
"public",
"decarbonisation",
"sector"
] | www.gov.uk | £1.8 billion awarded to boost energy efficiency and cut emissions of homes and public buildings across England - GOV.UK
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News story
Government awards £1.8 billion through Social Housing Decarbonisation Fund, Home Upgrade Grant and Public Sector Decarbonisation Scheme to upgrade social homes and public buildings. From:
,
and
Published
22 March 2023
This was published under the
2022 to 2024 Sunak Conservative government
£409 million also awarded to reduce carbon emissions of hospitals, schools, museums, universities and other public sector buildings across England
The money will go towards improvements to vulnerable households and off-gas grid homes with an
EPC
rating of D or below and could save tenants between £220 and £400 a year on energy bills. These schemes could also support around 20,000 jobs in the construction and home retrofit sectors, helping to deliver on our promise to grow the economy and create better paid jobs, whilst supporting families across the country. On top of this, a further £409 million has been granted through the Public Sector Decarbonisation Scheme to help public sector buildings such as schools and hospitals drive down their carbon emissions. Upgraded heating systems, powered by cleaner, cheaper, renewable energy, will reduce the use of fossil fuels exposed to volatile global energy prices – supporting thousands of jobs and saving taxpayers hundreds of millions of pounds. Secretary of State Grant Shapps said:
We know this is a difficult time for families, which is why the government is covering around half a typical household’s energy bill this winter. This is a huge investment that will help households save hundreds on energy bills and see them heat their homes for less, and stay warm for longer. Lord Callanan, Minister for Energy Efficiency and Green Finance, said:
The UK is truly a world-leader when it comes to reducing carbon emissions and the progress we’ve made over the last decade has been remarkable. But we can’t rest on our laurels and must continue to drive forward progress, setting a standard for other countries to follow. Energy cutting and cost saving measures provided through the schemes include exterior wall insulation, cavity wall insulation, loft insulation, new windows and doors and draft proofing measures, as well as heat pumps and solar panel installation. The schemes form part of the government’s commitment to reduce overall UK energy demand by 15% by 2030, as well as supporting the ambition for the UK to move towards greater energy independence. The Home Upgrade Grant is supporting over 25,000 low-income homes across England by installing energy efficiency measures and low carbon heating. Those being aided are typically the worst quality, off-grid homes most in need of upgrading, with an
EPC
rating of D to G. Improving these homes comes with the added benefit of supporting 7,000 jobs. Aliye Galloway lives in social housing in Northamptonshire with her partner and 5 children. Through the Social Housing Decarbonisation Fund her home was fitted with an air source heat pump, solar panels and more efficient doors and windows. She said that even with the recent energy price rises, the family’s energy bills are significantly lower since the work has been completed. Aliye explained:
Already we are seeing a massive change with our energy consumption and energy costs and already that’s having a positive impact on us a family. We are very happy with how it all works. We would recommend it to any tenant who is approached by the scheme. It will have a huge positive outcome. It’s supposed to be more eco-friendly too so I’m very happy we managed to get rid of the gas to be honest. We are literally just electric now. We are going to massively save. Even though the prices have gone up, we are still putting in less than we were before. Emma Pinchbeck, Chief Executive of Energy UK said:
Improving the energy efficiency of Britain’s draughty homes and buildings is the best way to cut energy bills permanently, while also boosting the UK’s energy security and reducing carbon emissions. Today’s announcement will rightly prioritise those who need support the most like low- income households, social housing and public buildings. Industry will work with government to build on these vital schemes and to remove any barriers that prevent households and businesses from saving money on their bills by reducing heat loss and conserving energy. The government has also announced today that over £400 million has been allocated to public sector bodies across England to help reduce their carbon emissions. 144 public sector organisations responsible for hospitals, schools, leisure centres, museums and universities will benefit from this support. The Scheme aims to support the government’s commitment to reduce emissions from public sector buildings by 75% by 2037, compared to 2017 levels, as first set out in the 2021 Heat and Buildings Strategy. The commitment follows significant progress the UK has already made towards reaching net zero - cutting all emissions by 48% between 1990 and 2021, which is faster than any other G7 country. Decarbonising the public sector with low carbon heating and energy efficiency measures is also expected to save the public sector an estimated £650 million per year on average to 2037. Salix Finance Chief Executive Annie Shepperd OBE, said:
There is a huge amount of passion and expertise in the green energy sector, and Salix is proud to be supporting the hundreds of decarbonisation projects that have been made possible through the Public Sector Decarbonisation Scheme. Each one represents the best evidence of government and public bodies working together to achieve great things. | 13a3b6ca-5df0-42d8-844b-de77e367dbd3 | 0 |
0ac9ec2f-e5f9-4d8d-b442-d209fc2387bc | https://cdn.climatepolicyradar.org/navigator/GBR/2021/uk-hydrogen-strategy_71ae84e43ea4b64faa9ef572b29f1b34.pdf | 2,021 | [
"Buildings",
"Energy",
"Industry",
"Transport",
"Hydrogen",
"hydrogen",
"carbon",
"energy",
"production",
"support"
] | cdn.climatepolicyradar.org | We will share these with – and learn from – expertise elsewhere, and capitalise on our world-leading academic and industrial research Government will work to bring together the various existing and emerging businesses critical to enabling the hydrogen economy. Some of these will be well-established firms
in the transport, industrial and oil and gas sectors; others will be emerging innovators designing and building fuel cells, electrolysers, and new components for the distribution We want to see UK companies at the forefront of the growing global hydrogen market, and we are developing policy that will attract and secure investment in a pipeline of British projects, driving rapid progress to foster our exportable strengths and get ahead in the Analysis79 suggests that in 2030 the UK hydrogen economy could be worth £900m and support over 9,000 jobs. Around a quarter of these jobs could be driven by British By 2050, under a high hydrogen scenario, the hydrogen economy could be worth up to £13 billion and support up to 100,000 jobs, with exports growing in 3.1 Building a world class supply chain Government will work to promote the growth of world-class, sustainable supply chains to underpin the deployment of early commercial scale UK hydrogen projects over the 2020s, and to be ready to support expansion of the sector from the 2030s. The UK is well positioned to grow and develop supply chains across the full low carbon hydrogen value chain, from production, through to transportation, distribution and storage, and across various end uses in industry, power, heat and transport. These supply chains will be vital to underpinning our vision of growth in the hydrogen economy across the 2020s, and to position it for significant ramp up in the 2030s in line with CB6 and net zero. To make sure that the UK can capitalise on these opportunities, we have carried out an initial assessment of current UK low carbon hydrogen supply chain capability and strengths, to identify opportunities and barriers to companies being able to thrive and support the full We will work with industry, academia and other stakeholders to build on insights from other energy sectors to assess what actions government, industry and the research and innovation community could take to seize the supply chain opportunities presented by the early development of a low carbon hydrogen economy, and for UK businesses to position themselves at the forefront of the hydrogen economy. We will set out more detail in a Hydrogen Sector Development Action Plan by early 2022. We will learn lessons from the development of the UK’s world-leading oil and gas sector, driven in part through measures introduced in the 1970s. Similarly, we will draw on the expansion of other low carbon sectors, such as offshore wind, where early opportunities for UK investment, regional growth and job creation were not built in and capitalised on from the start, even while the UK has become a world leader in deployment. Chapter 3: Realising economic benefits for the UK Early 2020s Mid 2020s Late 2020s onward • Throughout, the breadth of the hydrogen value chain offers opportunity to seize on UK expertise in other sectors, such as high-end manufacturing, oil and gas, renewables, chemicals, safety, engineering, procurement and construction management (EPCm) and our functional strengths of planning, legal, professional and financial services. In doing so, we will also focus on developing the next generation of technologies that will help fill the gaps in the supply chain, reduce costs and put the UK on a footing to grow at This work will include supply chains that currently support high carbon industries, which have the opportunity to pivot and build on their base capabilities and expertise to meet the needs of the UK hydrogen sector, as well as internationally. This will not be limited to CCUS-enabled hydrogen but will include strengths in process engineering, offshore engineering and re-purposing of offshore assets, and gas safety management. The new UK Energy Supply Chain Taskforce80 will focus on ensuring UK supply chain companies can take advantage of clean growth opportunities in the UK and overseas. The oil and gas sector’s voluntary commitment through the North Sea Transition Deal to aim towards 50 per cent local content across the lifecycle of projects, including for hydrogen, will help safeguard long-established UK supply chains – and world-leading skills, capabilities, and innovation – that will be crucial to realising both the decarbonisation and economic benefits of the UK’s transition to net zero. We will seek to introduce economic benefit assessments into the Net Zero Hydrogen Fund and Hydrogen Business Model. Consultations on the NZHF and the Hydrogen Business Model are taking place alongside the publication of this strategy. Our expectation is that hydrogen developers across the full value chain will work to ensure that competitive UK companies, including SMEs, are in a fair position to bid into hydrogen projects. In establishing these assessment criteria, we will recognise that the hydrogen market is in its infancy and that intervening too firmly for first-of-a-kind projects could stifle cost- competitive growth. Over time, however, we anticipate that hydrogen will follow in the footsteps of established sectors like offshore wind and oil and gas to be able to put in place bold commitments to UK content. Such measures might follow along the lines of the changes to the renewables supply chain plans being introduced through the Contract for Difference (CfD) allocation process. These will require a supply chain plan to be submitted to the Secretary of State before participation in CfD auctions, building on the offshore wind sector’s voluntary commitment to 60 per cent local content through the Offshore Wind Sector Deal. We will actively monitor the extent to which competitive UK businesses are benefitting as the hydrogen sector matures. If necessary, we will consider what options are open to ensure a fair playing field that includes UK businesses. We will set out more detail on this in our Action Plan. | ac51fb39-e78a-494b-9e13-bdfbc5170f0c | 31 |
0acc4614-e437-4297-b93a-da2ed41b96ce | http://arxiv.org/pdf/2105.07867v1 | 2,021 | [
"climate",
"change",
"risk",
"perceptions",
"predictors"
] | arxiv.org | It is associated with reduced CC awareness, belief in its human cause and risk perceptions. While the relation to risk perception is logical, the negative effect of trust on awareness and belief in human causation is surprising. Further research should address the possible mechanisms behind these findings. Demographic variables such as gender, age or race have trivial overall importance. We only find an important gender gap for CC awareness. Women are less likely to be aware of climate change, as previous case studies in Africa had suggested [35,60]. Except for that, demographics are not among the most important predictors, in line with anterior research [10,11,13]. Moreover, although religion has been found to shape CCP in other settings [37,38], we find religion and religiousness to be mostly insignificant to predict CCP in Africa. | d5026bed-bfa6-42f7-abf1-a222e0c6a4b7 | 3 |
0acf04bc-4f15-4e2f-9e80-989a0dea0acd | http://projects.mcrit.com/foresightlibrary/attachments/Technologies_Zero_Emission_Platform.pdf | 2,005 | [
"Electricity and heat",
"CCS",
"Other low-carbon technologies and fuel switch"
] | projects.mcrit.com | Indeed, each is considered capable subject to substantial RD and economies of scale of
delivering future zero emissions power at electricity prices of 45-55MWh for coal and around
60MWh for gas with CO2 avoidance costs of 15-25t CO2 for coal and 50-60t CO2 for
natural gas calculated with current fuel prices and excluding CO2 transport and storage costs. 8
IPCC Special Report on Carbon Dioxide Capture and Storage, 2005
16 European Technology Platform for Zero Emission Fossil Fuel Power Plants ZEP
3
Demonstrating the safety of
CO2 geological storage
The existence of suitable geological storage capacity is clearly prerequisite and no shortage of storage
options is anticipated on land or offshore. Their relative order-of-magnitude potential may be
expressed, very simply, as follows
1000 Deep saline aquifer storage saltwater-bearing rocks
100 Oilgas field use and storage
10
1
Deep unmineable coal bed use and storage
Mineral sequestration
FactoryPower Station
CO2 Capture
Facility
N2, O2, H2O
2
O
C
2
O
C
2
O
C
2
O
C
CO2Stored in DeepSalineAquifer
CO2DisplacesMethane FromCoal
CO2Stored in DepletedOilGasReservoir
CO2Displaces TrappedOilEnhancedOilRecovery
e
n
a
h
t
e
M
2
O
C
d
n
a
l
i
O
There is a wide variety of options for CO2 underground storage available
Source www.co2captureproject.org
Why research is needed
For any geological formation, research is needed to improve capacity assessment and ensure that
CO2 can be stored safely for a long period of time. This includes developing proper modelling and
monitoring tools, together with knowledge on trapping mechanisms, rock and fluid properties,
stabilityintegrity and CO2 mobility. It also means establishing a European leakage laboratory
sites in order to study leaks and their consequences in a controlled environment. | 47b4d90f-e8d1-49e1-8a0f-f210bed8e35f | 11 |
0ad74845-6afa-4471-8840-6f7de6a5921e | https://committees.parliament.uk/publications/7784/documents/81028/default/ | 2,021 | [
"million",
"energy",
"zero",
"heat",
"support"
] | parliament.uk | Energy, Clean Growth and Climate Chair, Business, Energy and Industrial Strategy Committee Publication of the Net Zero Strategy Today we are publishing the Net Zero Strategy, which sets out our vision for how we will transform our economy and society to be cleaner, greener, and more innovative as we strive to achieve net zero by 2050. We have achieved a lot already, decarbonising faster than any other G7 country with a 44% reduction in emissions between 1990-2019, while growing the economy by 78%. But we know we must go further and act now on climate change. In doing so we must embrace the opportunities of the new green industrial revolution, getting a head start which will generate jobs and attract investment across the UK to level up Britain and build back better. The Net Zero Strategy builds on the Prime Minister’s Ten Point Plan, and other key publications and sets out a clear path for the changes we need to secure our energy, create jobs and new industries, and end our contribution to climate change. Throughout we have and will be guided by the following • We will work with the grain of consumer no one will be required to rip out their existing boiler or scrap their current car. • We will ensure the biggest polluters pay the most for the transition through fair carbon pricing once current gas price spikes subside. • We will ensure that the most vulnerable are protected through Government support in the form of energy bill discounts, energy efficiency upgrades, and more. • We will work with businesses to continue delivering deep cost reductions in low carbon tech through support for the latest state of the art kit to bring down costs for consumers and deliver benefits for businesses. We recognise that this is not just an environmental transition but an economic one. So the Strategy sets a clear direction for busine sses, giving them the certainty they need to invest, grow, and make UK home to new ambitious projects. It • Level up our country supporting 190,000 green jobs in the mid-2020s and around 440,000 jobs across net zero sectors in 2030. • Build a secure, home-grown energy sector which ends our dependency on volatile foreign gas prices, which will help protect consumers and businesses. • Leverage up to £90 billion of private investment by 2030, levelling-up our former industrial heartlands. This will build on the investment secured through the Prime Minister’s Ten Point Plan for example Siemens Gamesa investing £186 million to expand offshore wind blade manufacturing in Hull; Nissan and Envision will invest £1 billion to create an electric vehicle manufacturing hub and Gigafactory in the North East. • Take a credible approach to cutting our climate emissions, keeping us on track to meet our carbon reduction targets , including our Nationally Determ ined Contribution (68% reduction by 2030) and Carbon Budget 6 (78% by 2035). Our Strategy gives businesses and industries the certainty they need to invest, grow, and put the UK at the forefront of innovation that will help tackle climate change. It shows how government is working with them to bring down the costs of key technologies to give the UK a competitive edge. It exp lains how we will use public finance to leverage the private investment we need to pull through technologies and infrastructure from innovation to market. Buildings are responsible for around 30% of our national emissions but more importantly decarbonising our homes provides with an unparalleled opportunity for job creation and innovation. That is why our Heat and Buildings Strategy, also published today, will signal a step change in improving the energy efficiency of our buildings and how we heat them, supporting 240,000 green skilled jobs by 2035 and delivering £6 billion additional GVA by From 2035, all new heating systems installed in UK homes will either use low-carbon technologies, such as electric heat pumps, or will support new technologies like hydrogen- ready boilers, where we are confident we can supply clean, green fuel. Under plans, no-one will be forced to remove their existing fossil fuel boilers, but with industry confident that electric heat pumps will be as cheap to buy and run as gas-fired appliances by 2030, homeowners will be able to easily make these choices when the time comes to replace their old boiler. To encourage consumers to install low-carbon alternatives in the meantime, a new £450 million three-year Boiler Upgrade Scheme will see households offered grants of £5,000 for low-carbon heating systems. The scheme will open in April 2022. To ensure electric heat pumps will be no more expensive to run than gas boilers, ministers want to reduce the price of electricity by shifting levies away from electricity bills over the next decade. A call for evidence is expected to be published with decisions made in Spring 2022. Implementation would happen over many years. Alongside th e Net Zero Strategy and Heat and Buildings Strategy , we are a response to the Climate Change Committee’s Progress in Reducing Emissions annual progress report, meeting our statutory duty under the Climate Change Act; and the Net Zero Review, an analytical report that explores the key issues as the UK decarbonises. I will place copies of the Phasing Out Fossil Fuel Heating Systems in Businesses and Public Buildings off the Gas Grid consultation, Phasing Out Fossil Fuel Heating in Homes off the Gas Grid consultation, Market Mechanism for Low -Carbon Heat consultation , and the Government response to the ‘Future Support for Low Carbon Heat’ Boiler Upgrade Scheme (BUS) in the Libraries of the House. Annex Headline Announcements • Commitment to decarbonise the UK’s electricity system by 2035, by building a secure, home-grown energy sector that is not reliant on fossil fuels and exposure to volatile global wholesale energy prices. | b3fa9afc-82d7-4d3a-9725-6fa3a3246b52 | 0 |
0ada0694-fccd-460f-9093-cd181a141b0a | http://arxiv.org/pdf/2411.09856v3 | 2,024 | [
"climate",
"companies",
"investors",
"mitigation",
"company"
] | arxiv.org | In the ideal case where all investors are highly ESG-conscious, one leading mitigating company attracts the majority of the investment, which is consistent with the pattern shown in Figure 6a. To ground the agents in real-world data, we seeded company agents' actions with real-world corporate behaviors. According to Gardiner & Associates (2023); European Investment Bank (2023); Partners (2024), approximately 50% of large companies are currently investing in climate mitigation. Globally, about 1% of GDP is allocated to climate finance annually (Buchner, 2023). Since GDP can be roughly viewed as the counterpart of a company's sales, and based on data from an NYU database (Damodaran, 2024b), which estimates the average sales-to-capital ratio across sectors to be between 0.8 and 1.28, we approximate sales and capital to be of similar magnitudes. Consequently, we seeded 50% of companies to invest between 0.5% and 1% of their total capital into mitigation, reflecting real-world investment levels. As shown in Figures 12a,12b, and 12c, when seeded with real data, the total corporate mitigation efforts and resulting climate risk levels eventually align closely with the baseline scenario. In reality, the decision-making processes of both companies and investors can be less flexible than modeled, where companies and investors update their strategies annually. To reflect the capital inflexibility, we implemented a 5-year lock-in period for agent decisions. This approach allows the climate to evolve more rapidly than agents can respond. Despite this constraint, the results remain consistent with the directional findings presented in the main text, as illustrated in Figures 12d,12e and 12f, suggesting that agents would achieve similar results using a macro-action reinforcement learning approach (Durugkar et al., 2016). However, the learning curves for the locked-in investment cases exhibit greater volatility and slower convergence compared to the default case, indicating that capital inflexibility indeed increases the challenges of addressing climate change. Given the significant uncertainty surrounding the economic damages of climate change (Farmer et al., 2015), we conducted additional experiments where companies' resilience parameters, L Ci t , representing economic losses from extreme climate events, were modeled as Gaussian random variables L Ci t ∼ N (µ, σ) clipped within the range [0,1], varying across both events and companies. This randomness allows for extreme climate damages, including the potential bankruptcy of some companies, which could incentivize risk-averse strategies where companies engage in greater mitigation efforts. Conversely, the randomness complicates the ability of company agents to learn the long-term benefits of mitigation, potentially encouraging short-sighted behaviors or greenwashing. Figures 13a to 13c illustrate the effects of uncertain climate event damage compared to the default mandate case, where no investors are ESG-conscious, and company actions are restricted to mitigation only. Both scenarios result in similar levels of total mitigation and climate risk. However, agents in the uncertain damage scenario require more time to learn the optimal mitigation level due to the increased uncertainty in the environment. Despite the similarities, the uncertain damage scenario results in significantly lower total market wealth due to potentially some high-tail losses in early years. When considering the wealth discrepancy, companies in the uncertain damage scenario ultimately adopt a more aggressive mitigation strategy relative to their capital. This behavior suggests that the high uncertainty may have prompted risk-averse strategies. Uncertain climate event damage also incentivizes the companies to focus more on short-term benefits by attracting investments, compared to the case with fixed damage when the companies first explore greenwashing strategy and then settle down on doing little greenwashing. As shown in 13d to 13g, when threatened with uncertain climate event damage, companies increase their greenwashing amount to attract immediate investments from ESG-consciouns investors. Additionally, to make our model more enriched, we implemented a more strict bankruptcy mechanism for company agents: if a company agent has a margin worse than negative 10% for 3 consecutive years, a red flag signaling potential financial distress, is deemed as bankrupt (Shi & Li, 2019). As shown in the comparison between orange and pink lines in 13h, 13i and 13j, the new bankruptcy mechanism does not cause significant difference in the level of mitigation from the status quo with mandate case. Given that the market growth rate is high, companies are not severely threatened by bankruptcy despite that the new bankruptcy mechanism is in place, and therefore refrain from investing in climate mitigation. However, when the stricter bankruptcy mechanism is combined with uncertain climate event damage, as depicted by the green lines in Figures 13h and13k, a significant increase in mitigation and more bankruptcies are observed. This indicates that the combination of uncertain climate event damage and the bankruptcy mechanism creates an immediate risk of bankruptcy for company agents, thereby strongly incentivizing their mitigation efforts. Figure 14 shows a few supplemental plots which may be of interest. Figure 14a to 14c reveal how investor investments concentrate in mitigating companies as they become increasingly more ESGconscious. In Figure 14d, we examine the impact of varying the number of companies under the status quo scenario with 5 companies and 3 investors who have zero ESG-consciousness, while maintaining an initial wealth distribution of 50-50 between companies and investors. In the absence of ESG-conscious investors, the ending system climate risk increases as the number of companies grows. This is likely because a higher number of companies results in each company having less capital, requiring them to allocate a larger proportion of their resources to achieve the same mitigation effect. To evaluate the effectiveness of ESG disclosure mandates in incentivizing emissions mitigation by companies, we conduct three experiments: (1) Status Quo: All agents are profit-motivated, and no ESG scores are released; (2) Status Quo with Mandate: ESG scores are disclosed, but investors remain profit-driven (α = 0); (3) Mandate with ESG-Conscious Investors: ESG scores are disclosed, and investors are ESG-conscious (α > 0). Github repo: https://github.com/yuanjiayiy/InvestESG
https://www.epri.com/l2rpn
Since company actions are continuous, we selected 0.5% as a benchmark for illustrating the social dilemma structure in the Schelling diagram. | 0c42e364-98b1-41ef-a05c-69a1345f5993 | 7 |
0ae051b1-aaef-4a36-bd02-35676f5bf348 | http://arxiv.org/pdf/2309.02323v1 | 2,023 | [
"marine",
"change",
"fisheries",
"biomass",
"species"
] | arxiv.org | In addition to the catch data, partnerships have made possible extensive fisheries economics data that cover all fisheries globally. These data include the global ex-vessel price database (Tai et al., 2017), the cost of fishing database (Lam et al., 2011), fisheries subsidies data (Sumaila et al., 2010;Sumaila, et al., 2016), and country level expenditure on MPAs. The combination of these allow large-scale analyses of MPAs when combined with corollary data on the effects of MPAs on fish biomass and catches. Projected changes in the distribution of commercially important marine species under climate change were modeled for each of the MPA regions using a dynamic bioclimate envelope model (DBEM) (Cheung et al. 2009). Climate change variables were modeled from three earth system models: The Geophysical Fluid Dynamics Laboratory ESM 2M (GFDL) (www.gfdl.noaa.gov), the Institute Pierre Simon Laplace Climate Model 5 (IPSL-CM5) (www.http://icmc.ipsl.fr/), and the Max Planck Institute for Meteorology Earth System Model (MPI) (https://www.mpimet.mpg.de/en/science/models/). The model ran one IPCC-Representative Concentration Pathways: 8.5 (RCP8.5) representing a high emission scenario since it is the current 'business as usual' scenario (Nature Paper: Geographical limits to speciesrange shifts are suggested by climate velocity (Burrows et al., 2014;Moss et al. 2010). The DBEM algorithm integrates ecophysiology, habitat suitability with spatial population dynamics of exploited fish and invertebrates to project shifts in biomass and maximum catch potential under climate change. The algorithm uses depth range, latitudinal range, habitat preferences and an index of species association with major habitat types to estimate changes in biomass distribution over a 0.5° latitude x 0.5° longitude grid of the world oceans (Cheung et al. 2009). For each grid cell and time step, the model simulates the species carrying capacity from sea surface temperature, salinity, oxygen content, sea ice extent (for polar species) and bathymetry. It then incorporates the intrinsic population growth, settled larvae, and net migration of adults from surrounding cells using an advection-diffusion-reaction equation. Finally, the model also simulates how changes in temperature and oxygen content would affect the growth of the individuals (Lam et al. 2016;Pauly and Cheung 2018). We analyzed the grid cells immediately adjacent to a protected cell, i.e. grid cells in an MPA and directly adjacent to the MPA (Palacios-Abrantes et al, 2023) for both biomass and revenue. We calculated the biomass percentage change between two time periods, 2020 A.D. and midcentury (2020-2060) under RCP 8.5. Our data analysis was conducted with the statistical software R version 3.6.2 (2019-12-12). The findings from the case studies as they were analyzed through the economic methods. Biomass: Palau's MPA will see decreases in biomass for all relevant species and areas in the mid-century. Biomass (within the MPA, adjacent cells, and open ocean) is expected to decrease more towards the equator compared to the northern portion of the MPA. In terms of the percentage change in biomass from present to midcentury, all commercial species are predicted to decrease in biomass with tuna and billfishes decreasing by 48.8% (industrial sector) and perch-likes decreasing by 86.8% for the subsistence sector and 35.5% for the artisanal sector. Revenue: Palau's industrial sector is primarily reliant on tuna-based fisheries, which will see a decrease in revenue by 47.5% towards the midcentury. Palau's artisanal sector is heavily reliant on different reef-associated fisheries, accounting for nearly 90% of their catches and value of their catches. Artisanal revenue from reef-species is expected to decrease by 20.9% by the midcentury. Finally, the subsistence sector is also heavily reliant on reef fishes for ~88% of their catches with some additional catches (5% of their total) from medium sized demersal fishes and by the midcentury revenue from reef fish is expected to decrease by 64.4% for this sector. Thus, these projected declines in reef fishes threaten not only the artisanal sector, but the food security provided by the subsistence sector as well. Due to the greater diversity of species targeted by the artisanal sector, the change in revenues for this sector is less than that experienced by the subsistence fisheries (-20% compared to -65%) where the relative biomass of the perch-like fishes (reef-associated species) is expected to decline by 86.8% (see above). Economic data on the recreational sector of Palau was not available. Biomass: Overall changes in biomass of important marine species for the fishery sector in the Great Barrier Reef will remain somewhat stable until the midcentury. However, the Northern and North-Western parts of the MPA will likely suffer from a decrease of fish biomass while increases are expected in the southern region (Figure 2). In terms of the percentage change in biomass from present to midcentury, all commercial species are predicted to remain close to the baseline (Figure 3.1). This is specifically the case for tuna and billfishes which are projected to experience a 0.7 % increase in biomass within the region by midcentury. The biomass of perch-like species, which is the most important commercial group for the industrial, artisanal, recreational, and subsistence fishery sectors in the region, is also predicted to increase by ~-.01%, ~10%, ~8%, and ~18% respectively. The differences between these sectors can be explained by the types of perch-likes that are most commonly caught by each sector. In fact, the industrial sector fishes mostly for large pelagics, the artisanal sector for large demersals, the recreational sector for the large demersals and medium reef fish, while subsistence fishermen look mostly for medium reef fish and medium pelagics Finally, crustaceans, which are relevant species for the industrial and subsistence sectors will decrease by about ~ 3% and ~5% respectively (Figure 3.1). Revenue: Predicted revenue from perch-likes will see an increase under climate change while revenue from crustaceans will decrease for all fishery sectors by the mid-21st century. The increase of perch-likes is substantial for the entire fishery sector in the Great Barrier Reef area, as this species is the dominant commercial group in this region according to the baseline revenue. The industrial, artisanal, recreational, and subsistence sector will see an increase in revenue from perch-likes of ~8%, ~22%. ~21%, and ~21% respectively. | fa2fab16-21e2-406f-a286-3a404f8f0a87 | 1 |
0aed536d-743e-440c-94ff-2ed11c577e4b | https://cdn.climatepolicyradar.org/navigator/GBR/2023/united-kingdom-national-inventory-report-nir-2023_8122f7d823bf366105239091fb57ffd2.pdf | 2,023 | [
"data",
"energy",
"emissions",
"inventory",
"environment"
] | cdn.climatepolicyradar.org | There may be limited gas oil use unreported by e.g. MODUs in latest year; base year notably higher as the inventory AD are derived from sector- wide reported data, to address known under-reports in DUKES. | 9ce0b96e-2800-424e-bffb-cd8ba36e0902 | 40 |
0aedbbc4-ea92-4933-ab10-bb9f3988aefd | https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/1011283/UK-Hydrogen-Strategy_web.pdf | 2,021 | [
"hydrogen",
"carbon",
"energy",
"production",
"support"
] | assets.publishing.service.gov.uk | In doing so, we are aware that current early markets, for example road and depot-based transport, may differ from those where we expect hydrogen to play a more significant role in the longer term, such as in heavy industry. Our roadmap will help us design policy that encourages early use cases while bringing forward applications with the greatest strategic potential to support deep decarbonisation of the UK economy. The state of current technology development, characteristics of hydrogen in relation to other low carbon energy sources and potential for cost reductions provide some indication of how the use of hydrogen in the UK is likely to develop in the near- to medium-term. Our analysis suggest potential hydrogen demand of up to 38TWh by 2030 split across sectors, not including use of hydrogen for blending into the gas grid. This could rise to 55-165TWh BEIS analysis (see analytical annex). figures do not include blending
We expect that industry will form a lead option for both early hydrogen use and in the longer term, with demand from hydrogen fuel switching picking up from the middle of this decade and hydrogen playing a key role in further decarbonisation of industry by the mid-2030s under CB6 and on the pathway to net zero. Hydrogen is likely to play an important enabling role in a fully decarbonised power sector, through the system flexibility that electrolytic production and hydrogen storage can provide and the potential for flexible power generation using hydrogen as a fuel – helping to balance a more variable renewables-based electricity grid. We could see use of hydrogen in power in this way by the late 2020s with further scale up by the mid-2030s. Hydrogen could also provide an important low carbon alternative – alongside electrification – to the UK’s largely natural gas-based domestic heating sector, and government is supporting major studies and testing projects, including first-of-a-kind heating trials, to fill important evidence gaps on the costs, benefits and feasibility of using hydrogen for heating. This will be used to inform broader strategic decisions on heat decarbonisation in the middle of this decade. We are also exploring the option of blending hydrogen into the gas grid, with a decision to be taken in 2023 following testing of the safety, technical and economic case (see gas blending box in Chapter 2.5). Finally, hydrogen is likely to be fundamental to achieving the full decarbonisation of transport, with particular potential in areas of heavy transport ‘that batteries cannot reach’. Hydrogen buses are already in use in some UK towns and cities, and feasibility studies are underway for the use of hydrogen and other zero emission technologies in heavy goods vehicles (HGVs) with the aim of undertaking future years trials (subject to funding). We expect hydrogen to play a significant role in decarbonising international shipping and aviation, with demonstration and trials already underway, potential for early stage uses in shipping and aviation by the end of the decade, and an increasing role from the 2030s. Given the wide range of applications and the strategic enabling role that hydrogen can play in an increasingly decarbonised economy, the 2020s will be critical to developing, testing and scaling up the use of low carbon hydrogen in the UK. The following sections set out how government and industry will work together to unlock the potential that hydrogen holds to decarbonise these important UK sectors. 2.4.1 Use of hydrogen in industry It is clear that UK industrial sectors will play a vital role in developing a hydrogen economy over the next decade. Industry produced 16 per cent of UK emissions in 2018,43 and hydrogen will be critical to decarbonise industrial processes that would be hard to abate with CCUS or electrification. The Industrial Decarbonisation Strategy published earlier this year sets out the policy and technology principles to decarbonise industry by 2050, including the installation of deep decarbonisation infrastructure such as hydrogen and Our industrial heartlands will likely lead the way for large scale low carbon hydrogen supply, and industrial users are expected to provide the most significant new demand for hydrogen by 2030 through industrial fuel switching. Today’s hydrogen economy will need to scale up from its current base in the oil refining and chemical sectors, to enter other
Chapter 2: Scaling up the hydrogen economy parts of industry and the wider energy system. We will develop policy to support and deliver this change, and to drive the decarbonisation of existing industrial hydrogen use. Decarbonising current hydrogen production and use in industry To meet our net zero ambition and develop the new low carbon hydrogen economy, we need to decarbonise existing industrial production of carbon intensive hydrogen. Today, hydrogen is mainly produced by steam methane reformation (without CCUS) for use as a feedstock, or as a by-product of other industrial processes. The most appropriate option to decarbonise existing production will vary for different types of industrial sites and will depend on factors such as the life cycle of current assets and the production method used. As the oil refining and chemical sectors are today often both producers and consumers of hydrogen, they could be important drivers of the transition to a low carbon We will support hydrogen producers to decarbonise through, for example, the Industrial Carbon Capture and Hydrogen Business Models. Furthermore, we will finalise the design elements of a UK standard for low carbon We will also publish within a year a call for evidence to explore with industry the further interventions needed to phase out carbon intensive hydrogen and transition to low carbon production methods and sources, at the required pace Switching to low carbon hydrogen as an industrial fuel Low carbon hydrogen can also provide an alternative to natural gas and other high carbon fuels currently used for industrial heating. This includes both indirect heating applications,
for example, using hydrogen to fuel steam boilers and combined heat and power (CHP) systems, and direct heating processes, such as melting glass in a furnace. | 96babf55-7373-4dee-b481-d10889d10207 | 17 |
0af10c90-2a6c-4953-882e-c9173fb181f7 | https://cdn.climatepolicyradar.org/navigator/GBR/2021/budget-2021_c28084dfc4b588504fe4c17a6d60205c.pdf | 2,021 | [
"Cross Cutting Area",
"Finance",
"Banking",
"Green Bonds",
"Central Bank",
"government",
"support",
"billion",
"million",
"public"
] | cdn.climatepolicyradar.org | This exposure is managed partly by maintaining a sizeable proportion of long-dated debt in the portfolio, which reduces the need to refinance debt frequently. Relatedly, all else equal, this also reduces the government’s exposure to interest rate risk in the near term. The government is particularly mindful of risks, including interest rate risk, in light of the significant increase in the debt stock that has taken place during 2020, as detailed in Box [1.D]. Green gilts and retail savings product B.5 In November 2020, the Chancellor announced the government’s intention to issue its inaugural green gilt in 2021. The Budget announces further details, including that the government will issue its first green gilt in the summer, with a further issuance to follow later in 2021, as the UK looks to build out a ’green curve‘. Planned green gilt issuance for the financial year 2021-22 will total a minimum of £15 billion. The green gilt framework, to be published in June 2021, will detail the types of expenditures that will be financed to help meet the government’s environmental objectives. The government also commits to reporting on the contributions of green gilt-financed spending towards social co-benefits such as job creation
B.6 The Budget also announces plans for a green retail product to be offered through NS&I later in 2021. Proceeds from this product will not contribute towards NS&I’s 2021-22 B.7 At Budget 2018 – and as part of the government’s responsible approach to fiscal risk management – the government announced that it would look to reduce the proportion of index-linked gilt issuance in a measured fashion over the medium term as a means of reducing its inflation exposure in the debt portfolio. Consistent with this, index-linked gilts are currently planned to account for 11.1% of the government’s gilt issuance in 2021-22.1 B.8 As announced in September 2019, UKSA intends to bring the methods and data sources of the Consumer Price Index including owner occupiers’ housing costs (CPIH) into RPI. On 25 November 2020, the government and the UK Statistics Authority (UKSA) published the response to the consultation on UKSA’s proposal to address the shortcomings of the RPI measure of inflation. The Chancellor announced that, while he sees the statistical arguments of UKSA’s intended approach to reform, in order to minimise the impact of reform on the holders of index-linked gilts, he will be unable to offer his consent to the implementation of such a proposal before the maturity of the final index-linked gilt to be specifically affected, which will B.10 The Office for Budget Responsibility’s (OBR’s) March 2021 ‘Economic and fiscal outlook’ forecast for the 2021-22 central government net cash requirement (excluding NRAM ltd, Bradford & Bingley and Network Rail), which is referred to as CGNCR (ex NRAM, B&B and NR), is £240.4 billion. This measure is used in the financing arithmetic as it reflects the forecast cash requirement of the Exchequer. The relationship between public sector net borrowing and CGNCR (ex NRAM, B&B and NR) is set out in the OBR’s March 2021 ‘Economic and fiscal outlook’. B.11 The net financing requirement (NFR) for the Debt Management Office (DMO) CGNCR (ex NRAM, B&B and NR) plus any financing for gilt redemptions, and other adjustments, less the net contribution to financing from NS&I and any other in-year contributions to B.12 The NFR for 2021-22 is forecast to be £297.7 billion, • the forecast for CGNCR (ex NRAM, B&B and NR) of £240.4 billion • gilt redemptions of £79.3 billion • a planned short-term financing adjustment of -£16.0 billion resulting from unanticipated • a net contribution to financing from NS&I of £6 billion £295.9 billion. In addition, it is expected that Treasury bills will also make a small net positive contribution to debt financing in 2021-22 of £1.8 billion. 1 This percentage may change subject to transfers from the unallocated portion of issuance. Gilt issuance by method, type and maturity B.14 Decisions on the skew of gilt issuance are made annually with reference to the government’s debt management objective, as set out in the ‘Debt management report B.15 Auctions will remain the government’s primary method of gilt issuance. It is anticipated that £237.9 billion (80.4%) of total gilt sales will be issued by auction in 2021-22, and around £30.0 billion (10.1%) will be issued by syndication. The government will continue to use gilt tenders to supplement issuance by auction and syndication. B.16 Issuance by auction and syndication is currently planned to be split by maturity and type • £87.0 billion of short conventional gilts (29.4% of total issuance) • £65.4 billion of medium conventional gilts (22.1% of total issuance) • £82.8 billion of long conventional gilts (28.0% of total issuance) • £32.7 billion of index-linked gilts (11.1% of total issuance) B.17 The financing plans of the DMO include an initially unallocated portion of issuance through which gilts of any maturity or type may be issued, subject to prior notification. This unallocated portion is set at £28.0 billion (9.5% of total issuance). The unallocated portion is used in such a way as to respond appropriately to evolving market conditions in-year. In 2021- 22 the unallocated portion will be used additionally to account for the issuance of green gilts. Once an initial green gilt offering has been executed, the proceeds from that transaction (and B.18 Treasury bills for debt management purposes are forecast to constitute £60.0 billion of the total debt stock at the end of 2020-21. It is currently anticipated that net issuance of Treasury bills for debt management purposes in 2021-22 will be £1.8 billion. B.19 NS&I will have a net financing target of £6 billion in 2021-22, within a range of £3 billion to £9 billion. This target reflects NS&I’s requirement to balance the interests of its savers, the taxpayer, and the wider financial services sector. Illustrative future gross financing requirement 2022-23 to 2025-26, using the OBR’s March 2021 forecast for CGNCR (ex NRAM, B&B and NR) and taking into account current planned gilt redemptions. | 51e4a741-ced6-4d30-9268-128e174fffe6 | 39 |
0af8965a-0fd2-4cf6-b17f-0009b4c81144 | http://arxiv.org/pdf/2108.03722v2 | 2,021 | [
"adaptation",
"technologies",
"patents",
"mitigation",
"climate"
] | arxiv.org | This gives insights into policies for transferring adaptation technologies to regions in need. Local universities and public research institutions equipped with relevant scientific knowledge base (e.g., biochemistry and molecular biology for science-intensive CCATs) can be key actors in facilitating technology transfer, as they contribute to the regional absorptive capacity for science-intensive technologies. | e7c5ec21-08e6-4ef3-84cf-6a259e7f7c53 | 101 |
0afca264-f979-4eca-9e38-f283c6e81988 | https://cdn.climatepolicyradar.org/navigator/GBR/2020/agriculture-act-2020_89bf740371b886d403c833463a2d589f.pdf | 2,020 | [
"regulations",
"section",
"provision",
"made",
"regulation"
] | climate-laws.org | (2) The legislation within this subsection is— (a) Regulation (EU) No 1305/2013 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 17 December 2013 on support for rural development, (b) Regulation (EU) No 1310/2013 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 17 December 2013 laying down certain transitional provisions on support (c) any EU regulation, EU decision or EU tertiary legislation relating to support for rural development that preceded the Rural Development Regulation (i) Council Regulation (EC) No 1698/2005 of 20 September 2005 on support for rural development, (ii) Council Regulation (EC) No 1257/99 of 17 May 1999 on support for (iii) Council Regulation (EEC) No 2080/92 of 30 June 1992 instituting a Community aid scheme for forestry measures in agriculture, (iv) Council Regulation (EEC) No 2078/92 of 30 June 1992 on agricultural production methods compatible with the requirements
16 Agriculture Act 2020 (c. 21) CHAPTER 3 – Other financial support after EU exit Document 2023-04-25 This is the original version (as it was originally enacted). of the protection of the environment and the maintenance of the (v) Council Regulation (EEC) No 1096/88 of 25 April 1988 establishing a Community scheme to encourage the cessation of farming), (d) any legislation made under the legislation in paragraphs (a) to (c), and (e) so far as relating to support for rural development— (i) Regulation (EU) No 1303/2013 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 17 December 2013 laying down common provisions on the European Regional Development Fund, the European Social Fund, the Cohesion Fund, the European Agricultural Fund for Rural Development and the European Maritime and Fisheries Fund etc, and (ii) any legislation made under that Regulation. (3) The legislation within this subsection is— (a) Articles 32 to 38 of the CMO Regulation, which make provision about aid for fruit and vegetable producer organisations (“producer organisations aid”), (b) so far as relating to producer organisations aid, Commission Delegated Regulation (EU) 2017/891 of 13 March 2017 supplementing the CMO Regulation with regard to the fruit and vegetable, and processed fruit and (c) so far as relating to producer organisations aid, Council Implementing Regulation (EU) 2017/892 of 13 March 2017 laying down rules for the application of the CMO Regulation with regard to the fruit and vegetable, and processed fruit and vegetable, sectors. (4) The legislation within this subsection is— (a) Articles 55 to 57 of the CMO Regulation (provision about aid for apiculture), (b) any legislation made under that legislation. (5) The legislation within this subsection is the following, so far as it relates to producer organisations aid, apiculture or support for rural development— (a) Regulation (EU) No 1306/2013 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 17 December 2013 on the financing, management and monitoring of the (b) any legislation made under that Regulation, and (c) any EU regulation, EU decision or EU tertiary legislation relating to the financing, management and monitoring of the common agricultural policy that preceded Regulation (EU) No 1306/2013 (including— (i) Commission Regulation (EU) No 65/2011 of 27 January 2011 laying down detailed rules for the implementation of Council Regulation (EC) No 1698/2005 , as regards the implementation of control procedures as well as cross-compliance in respect of rural (ii) Commission Regulation (EC) No 1975/2006 of 7 December 2006 laying down detailed rules for the implementation of Council Regulation (EC) No 1698/2005 , as regards the implementation of control procedures as well as cross-compliance in respect of rural development support measures, and (iii) Council Regulation (EC) No 1258/1999 of 17 May 1999 on the financing of the common agricultural policy). PART 2 – Food and agricultural markets Document 2023-04-25 This is the original version (as it was originally enacted). (6) The legislation within this subsection is— (a) Regulation (EU) No 1144/2014 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 22 October 2014 on information provision and promotion measures concerning agricultural products implemented in the internal market and in (b) Commission Delegated Regulation (EU) 2015/1829 of 23 April 2015 supplementing Regulation (EU) No 1144/2014 of the European Parliament and of the Council on information provision and promotion measures concerning agricultural products implemented in the internal market and in (c) Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) 2015/1831 of 7 October 2015 laying down rules for application of Regulation (EU) No 1144/2014 of the European Parliament and of the Council on information provision and promotion measures concerning agricultural products implemented in the internal market and in the third countries. 19 Duty to report to Parliament on UK food security (1) The Secretary of State must, on or before the relevant day and at least once every three years thereafter, prepare and lay before Parliament a report containing an analysis of statistical data relating to food security in the United Kingdom. (2) The data analysed in a report under this section may include (among other things) data (b) supply sources for food (including the range of supply sources and the availability to the public of food from domestic and other sources); (c) the resilience of the supply chain for food (including in response to disruptions in, or significant price increases for, the supply of energy); (d) household expenditure on food (including in comparison to expenditure on (e) food safety and consumer confidence in food. (3) In this section “relevant day” means the last day before 25 December 2021 which is a sitting day for both Houses of Parliament. 18 Agriculture Act 2020 (c. 21) PART 2 – Food and agricultural markets CHAPTER 2 – Intervention in agricultural markets Document 2023-04-25 This is the original version (as it was originally enacted). | 78f8c6bc-c906-4ba1-b960-a996ce3f3a28 | 6 |
0b01a152-0896-4fbf-9c29-ece588748c27 | https://cdn.climatepolicyradar.org/navigator/GBR/2023/energy-act-2023_87896593a3bea76cf3ac89af17aba308.pdf | 2,023 | [
"Energy",
"Carbon Capture and Storage",
"section",
"regulations",
"person",
"force",
"document"
] | cdn.climatepolicyradar.org | I270 S. 219 in force at Royal Assent, see s. 334(2)(l) 220 Regulations made by Secretary of consultation with devolved authorities (1) This section applies where— (a) the Secretary of State proposes to make regulations under section 219 by virtue of any of Parts 3, 4, 5, 7, 8, 10, 11 and 12 of Schedule 18, and (i) in the case of regulations made by virtue of Part 3, 4, 7, 8, 10, 11 or 12 of Schedule 18, provision within Scottish devolved competence; (ii) in the case of regulations made by virtue of Part 5 of Schedule 18, provision within Welsh devolved competence. (2) Before making the regulations, the Secretary of State must give notice— (a) stating that the Secretary of State proposes to make the regulations, (b) setting out or describing— (i) so far as the regulations are made as mentioned in subsection (1)(b)(i), the provision within Scottish devolved competence, (ii) so far as the regulations are made as mentioned in subsection (1) (b)(ii), the provision within Welsh devolved (c) specifying the period (of not less than 28 days from the date on which the notice is given) within which representations may be made with respect to and must consider any representations duly made and not withdrawn. (3) A notice under subsection (2) must be given to each relevant devolved authority, that (a) the Scottish Ministers, if the regulations are made as mentioned in subsection (1) (b)(i) and contain provision within Scottish devolved (b) the Welsh Ministers, if the regulations are made as mentioned in subsection (1) (b)(ii) and contain provision within Welsh devolved (4) The Secretary of State need not wait until the end of the period specified under subsection (2)(c) before making regulations if, before the end of that period, each relevant devolved authority to which the notice was given has confirmed that it has
Chapter 1 – Regulation of heat networks Document 2024-10-14 This version of this Act contains provisions that are prospective. Changes to There are currently no known outstanding effects for the Energy Act 2023. (See end of Document for details) made any representations it intends to make with respect to the provision referred to in subsection (2)(b)(i) or (ii) (as the case may be). (5) The Secretary of State must, if requested to do so by a relevant devolved authority, give the authority a statement setting out whether and how representations made by the authority with respect to the provision referred to in subsection (2)(b)(i) or (ii) (as the case may be) have been taken into account in the regulations. (6) For the purposes of this section, provision— (a) is within Scottish devolved competence if it would be within the legislative competence of the Scottish Parliament if it were contained in an Act of that (b) is within Welsh devolved competence if it would be within the legislative competence of Senedd Cymru if it were contained in an Act of the Senedd (ignoring any requirement for the consent of a Minister of the Crown imposed under Schedule 7B to the Government of Wales Act 2006). I271 S. 220 in force at Royal Assent, see s. 334(2)(l) 221 Heat networks other provision about procedure (1) The first regulations to be made by the Secretary of State under section 219 are subject (2) The following regulations made by the Secretary of State are also subject to the (a) regulations under section 219 which are made by virtue of— (i) paragraph 12(1) of Schedule 18, (ii) paragraph 23(1) of Schedule 18, (iii) paragraph 32 of Schedule 18, (iv) any provision of Part 8 or 9 of Schedule 18, or (v) paragraph 56 of Schedule 18; (b) regulations under section 219 which create an offence or provide for an increase in the penalty for an existing offence; (c) regulations under section 219 which amend or repeal any provision of legislation mentioned in section 219(5). (3) Any other regulations made by the Secretary of State under section 219 are subject (4) The power of the Department to make regulations under section 219 is exercisable by statutory rule for the purposes of the Statutory Rules (Northern Ireland) Order 1979 (5) The first regulations to be made by the Department under section 219 may not be made unless a draft of the regulations has been laid before and approved by a resolution of the Northern Ireland Assembly. (6) Regulations made by the Department under section 219 containing any of the following regulations (whether alone or with other regulations) may not be made
Chapter 1 – Regulation of heat networks Document 2024-10-14 This version of this Act contains provisions that are prospective. Changes to There are currently no known outstanding effects for the Energy Act 2023. (See end of Document for details) unless a draft of the regulations has been laid before and approved by a resolution of the Northern Ireland Assembly— (a) regulations under section 219 which are made by virtue of— (i) paragraph 12(1) of Schedule 18, (ii) paragraph 32 of Schedule 18, (iii) any provision of Part 8 or 9 of Schedule 18, or (iv) paragraph 56 of Schedule 18; (b) regulations under section 219 which create an offence or provide for an increase in the penalty for an existing offence; (c) regulations under section 219 which amend or repeal any provision of (7) Any other regulations made by the Department under section 219 are subject to negative resolution within the meaning of section 41(6) of the Interpretation Act (Northern Ireland) 1954 (c. 33 (N.I.)). I272 S. 221 in force at Royal Assent, see s. 334(2)(l) 222 Recovery of costs by GEMA and NIAUR (1) The conditions of a licence under section 7, 7ZA, 7A or 7AB of the Gas Act 1986 or section 6 of the Electricity Act 1989 may require payment by the licence holder of sums relating to costs within subsection (2). | 4808927e-67c0-4e83-803d-e07fd0d4a019 | 81 |
0b06673c-65f1-4c9b-bfbc-a904efd3a4d8 | http://arxiv.org/pdf/2503.13416v1 | 2,025 | [
"correlation",
"thus",
"probability",
"climate",
"independent"
] | arxiv.org | The larger this uncertainty regarding correlations is, the less attractive these strategies become. Our results in Section 3 lead the way to modeling aversion towards correlation uncertainty by pinning down the maximal extent of correlation uncertainty PpΩ; p 1 , . . . , p n q over the state space Ω in full generality, hereby clarifying the scope of possible correlations among the subspaces. Section 4.1 clarifies axiomatically when probabilistic information on the subspaces is consistently aggregated, see Proposition 3. Theorem 2 axiomatizes the important benchmark case where behavior is consistent with the subspaces being completely independent, i.e., the probabilistic assessment of the uncertainties on Ω is represented by the independent product p 1 b . . . b p n . In Section 4.4, we provide a decision-theoretic characterization of correlation aversion. We introduce a logical comparative notion of "more correlation averse", allowing tracking down the above described behavioral phenomena. Example 2 (insurance). This example demonstrates that, in an insurance market, asymmetry in beliefs regarding the correlation of events can lead to undesired consequences such as unfair prices and market failure, even if the marginal beliefs regarding the payoff-relevant events coincide for all agents. Consider a company that offers house insurance (the "insurer") as well as a house owner who considers buying such an insurance for her house near the coast (the "insuree"). For simplicity, we assume that both are risk-neutral. The insuree faces the risk of the house being destroyed through fire as well as being destroyed due to a storm tide flooding. The payoff relevant states for these two events of damage are modeled as follows. Let Ω 1 " pBpurnq, N poqBpurnqq model the uncertainty associated with the house being burnt down, Ω 2 :" tF ploodq, N poqF ploodqu models the uncertainty associated with the house being destroyed by flooding. The overall state space is Ω " Ω 1 ˆΩ2 . If either B or F happens, the house is completely destroyed. The house is worth v ą 0. Without any insurance, the payoff to the insuree is ´v in case either F or B happens and 0 if neither happens. The insurer offers full insurance against fire at cost c ą 0. If the state pB, F q is realized, i.e. both events of damage occur, the insurer pays fraction x P p0, 1q of the damage.7
The insuree faces the problem of whether to buy insurance or not. The payoffs for both cases are illustrated in Table 2 for the insurer and in Table 3 the insuree. We assume that both agents have probabilistic beliefs over Ω. The insurer has belief p P ∆pΩq, the insuree has belief p P ∆pΩq. Let p i " p Ωi and pi " p Ωi be the marginals on Ω i , i P t1, 2u. We assume that these marginals coincide,
Insurance against B i.e. p 1 " p1 and p 2 " p2 . This reflects that agents agree on the individual likelihoods of the states in Ω 1 and Ω 2 . In particular, insurer and insuree agree on the likelihood of F as well as B. However, we do allow for different beliefs regarding the correlation of these events, i.e., p ‰ p is not ruled out. Let V p and V p reflect the expected returns of the insurer and insuree, respectively, given their beliefs p and p. For the insurer we have V p pNo insuranceq " 0 V p pInsurance against Bq " c ´vpxp 1 pBq `p1 ´xqppB, N F qq. For the insuree we have V ppNo insuranceq " ´vp1 ´ppN B, N F qq V ppInsurance against Bq " ´c ´vpp1 ´xqp 2 pF q `xppN B, F qq. The minimum price at which the insurer is willing to offer insurance is c " vpxp 1 pBq `p1 ´xqppB, N F qq. The maximum amount that the insuree is willing to pay for the insurance is c " vpxp 1 pBq `p1 ´xqppB, N F qq. This shows that when p " p, these reservation prices coincide. Thus agreeing on the correlation necessitates the existence of a unique price c ˚" vpxp 1 pBq `p1 ´xqppB, N F qq. Note that if these beliefs are in addition correct, the insurer makes zero expected profit, i.e., the contract is fair. We now allow for p ‰ p. We assume that p, the belief of the insurer, correctly reflects the correlation structure of the relevant events. 8 For any price c in the interval rvpxp 1 pBq `p1 ´xqppB, N F qq, vpxp 1 pBq `p1 ´xqppB, N F qqs, both the insurer and the insuree are willing to sign the contract. Thus, recalling p 1 pBq " p1 pBq, such a price exists whenever ppB, N F q ď ppB, N F q, which in turn is equivalent to ppB, F q ě ppB, F q. This happens whenever the insuree underestimates the correlation of F and B. He assigns a too low probability to the "good state" pB, N F q in which full compensation for the damage due to the event B is paid. The insurer can thus charge the price c " vpxp 1 pBq`ppB, N F qq, resulting in a positive expected profit of vp1´xqpppB, N F q´ppB, N F qq. Assume now that the interval rvpxp 1 pBq`p1´xqppB, N F qq, vpxp 1 pBq`p1´xqppB, N F qqs is empty, i.e., ppB, F q ă ppB, F q. The insuree overestimates the correlation of B and F . This incorrect belief thus leads to a market failure as no contract will be signed.9 Note that a particularly interesting scenario is where the insuree ignores the possible correlation of B and F altogether. That is, his prior p coincides with the independent product p1 b p2 . According to the above analysis, a positive correlation of B and F , i.e. | b9c13c1e-2b60-4a7f-b89d-b3db7eefa061 | 2 |
0b0b07fd-307b-4d06-905b-ad6f274bc1a3 | https://ec.europa.eu/environment/system/files/2021-11/COM_2021_706_1_EN_ACT_part1_v6.pdf | -1 | [
"Agriculture and forestry",
"Forestry",
"Non-energy use"
] | ec.europa.eu | 1. 34
Directive EU 20182001 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 11 December 2018 on the
promotion of the use of energy from renewable sources OJ L 32882, 21.12.2018, p. 82209. EN
41
EN
diligence. Operators shall keep record of updates in the due diligence systems for
5 years. Unless otherwise provided by other EU legislative instruments that lay down
requirements regarding sustainability value chain due diligence, operators which are
not SMEs shall, on an annual basis, publicly report as widely as possible, including
on the internet, on their due diligence system including on the steps taken by them to
implement their obligations as set out in Article 8. Operators falling also within the
scope of other EU legislative instruments that lay down requirements regarding value
chain due diligence may fulfil their reporting obligations under this paragraph by
including the required information when reporting in the context of other EU
legislative instruments. Operators shall keep for at least 5 years all documentation related to due diligence,
such as all relevant records, measures and procedures pursuant to Article 8. They
shall make them available to the competent authorities upon request. Article 12
Simplified due diligence
When placing relevant commodities or products on the Union market or exporting
them from it, operators are not required to fulfil the obligations under Article 10
where they can ascertain that all relevant commodities and products have been
produced in countries or parts thereof that were identified as low risk in accordance
with Article 27. However, if the operator obtains or is made aware of any information that would
point to a risk that the relevant commodities and products may not fulfil the
requirements of this Regulation, all obligations of Article 9 and 10 have to be
fulfilled. Chapter 3
Obligations of Member States and their competent authorities
Article 13
Competent authority
Member States shall designate one or more competent authorities responsible for
carrying out the obligations arising from this Regulation. By three months after the date of entry into force of this Regulation, Member States
shall notify the Commission of the names, addresses and contact details of the
competent authorities designated pursuant to paragraph 1. Member States shall
inform the Commission without undue delay of any changes to this information. The Commission shall make the list of the competent authorities publicly available
on its website. The Commission shall regularly update the list, based on relevant
updates received from Member States. 2. | fdc8afd5-2a2d-4946-a4da-be36ebf11749 | 57 |
0b104fd5-6e2f-4779-8d62-f44d6101da32 | https://cdn.climatepolicyradar.org/navigator/GBR/2023/net-zero-growth-plan_a58bbc49b2590d31e4fb1adc0a9ccfbc.pdf | 2,023 | [
"Energy",
"Economy-wide",
"emissions",
"carbon",
"policies",
"savings",
"sector"
] | cdn.climatepolicyradar.org | Downstream carbon savings from the policies and proposals, linked to the displacement of natural gas with biomethane, are estimated using emissions factors provided in the HMT Green Book supplementary guidance.xxiv Full methodology and assumptions for AD deployment emissions savings can be found in the final stage impact assessment for the Green Gas Support Scheme. Gasification emission savings were calculated based on estimated deployment of gasification to grid deployment and the associated natural gas displacementxxv, based on market intelligence and historic and planned Energy from Waste (EfW) deployment. UK Scaling to Heat and Policy responsibility in heat and buildings is a mix of reserved and devolved responsibilities across HMG and the Devolved Administrations. To generate estimates of emissions reductions at the UK level, where it is reasonable to assume policy action is ongoing or planned in the Devolved Administrations, scalars are applied to the emission savings estimated for England, England and Wales or GB policies, and are included in the savings of each relevant policy line. The value of the scalar varies according to the nature of the policy, reflecting relative population or household numbers, or share of UK gas demand. Domestic The policies and proposals set out in the Carbon Budget Delivery Plan for domestic transport cover road transport, rail, domestic shipping and domestic The quantified savings for road transport reflect a variety of policy mechanisms which are estimated to deliver carbon savings from road transport, based on our understanding of how these policy interventions will change behaviour and encourage the uptake of new technologies to facilitate a switch away from existing carbon-intensive modes of transport. This includes measures to increase the sale of zero emission vehicles (ZEVs), and limit emissions from non-ZEVs – for example, the car and van ZEV mandate, and further measures to accelerate the replacement of the oldest vehicles in the fleet. The modelled effect of these measures is to reduce the sales and accelerate the replacement of fossil fuel vehicles, changing the carbon-intensity of the vehicle fleet over time, and thereby reducing transport emissions. It also includes measures which encourage alternative (low or zero carbon) modes of transport or greater vehicle utilisation – for example, investment in active travel. The modelled effect of these interventions is to reduce the required amount of road transport trips, compared to the baseline without these measures, thereby 11 This model is based on historic RHI data. 12 These are consistent with those used to compile the 1990-2019 National Atmospheric Emissions Inventory
The modelling of vehicle sales and vehicles in the fleet is undertaken using the Road Carbon and Fuel Fleet model (RoCaFF). It uses DfT licensing statistics to define the current vehicle fleet, and to estimate vehicle scrappage rates(i). It also uses licensing statistics to estimate new vehicle emissions (gCO2 per km) as measured on test cycles. These are then adjusted to real world emissions estimates based on ICCT data(ii). Demand for road transport vehicles is projected using the National Transport Model (NTM) (iii), which projects road transport demand (i.e. vehicle km) based on socio-economic variables including GDP, population growth and fuel prices. Outputs from NTM runs have been adjusted to reflect fuel prices aligned with EEP 2021-2040 and updated evidence on real world emissions including from Plug-in Hybrid Electric Vehicles. ZEV policy is designed to deliver a stated ZEV sales trajectory, which is then used to estimate the emissions savings for these policies (e.g. car and can ZEV mandate). For measures that encourage alternative modes of transport, estimates ae made of the reduction in mileage consistent with the intervention. The vehicle mileage projections are then modified accordingly, reducing emissions. Road transport measures are modelled sequentially to ensure that overlaps are accounted for and that carbon savings are not double counted. The quantified rail savings were modelled by the Great British Rail Transition Team. The modelling assesses proposals and polices to electrify some lines, enabling carbon emissions reductions by replacing diesel trains with electric trains. It also assesses the replacement of diesel trains with bi-mode or zero emission train technologies on The quantified savings presented for domestic aviation and shipping align with the approaches developed for international aviation and shipping – see below for further International Aviation and The quantified savings for international aviation are estimated using the evidence base developed for the Jet Zero Strategy, aligned with the “high ambition” scenario, but with updated assumptions on GDP and passenger growthxxvi. International and domestic carbon savings are estimated using the same DfT Aviation model and assumptions. This model is an established suite of interrelated components used to produce forecasts for aviation demand at the national level, and the associated passenger numbers, aircrafts and CO2 emissions from flights departing from UK airportsxxvii. Three abatement measures are considered within the modelling; system efficiencies, sustainable aviation fuels (SAF), and zero emission aircraft. The policy interventions set out in the Carbon Budget Delivery Plan, such as the SAF mandate, are designed to facilitate the deployment of these abatement measures, which, by reducing the carbon-intensity of aviation, deliver carbon savings. The quantified savings for domestic and international shipping set out in the Carbon Budget Delivery Plan, are based on research commissioned by the DfT.xxviii For both sub- sectors, the estimates from this research are adjusted to align them with the latest UK greenhouse gas emissions national statistics (2020). Therefore, the emission projections for domestic shipping and international shipping are consistent with the definitions of domestic shipping and international shipping used in these national statistics.13 Given the emerging nature of zero emission shipping fuels, the quantified savings set out for domestic shipping and international shipping should be interpreted as reflecting one abatement pathway for meeting the government’s commitment to zero maritime emissions, with policies to be designed to meet this ambition, enabling the deployment of the necessary emissions reduction options. The emissions savings reflect the reduction or substitution of existing carbon-intensive fuels by the uptake of efficiency improving technologies and/or operating practices, and the use of lower emissions fuels (e.g. | bff69e7d-0a39-4bcc-b446-41882979776a | 10 |
0b1265a5-2cc2-4df6-88ca-754cf3409861 | http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/ALL/?uri=CELEX%3A32010L0030 | 2,010 | [
"Industry",
"Buildings",
"Appliances",
"Industrial energy related",
"Energy efficiency"
] | eur-lex.europa.eu | 18.6.2010
EN
Official Journal of the European Union
L 153/1
DIRECTIVE 2010/30/EU OF THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND OF THE COUNCIL
of 19 May 2010
on the indication by labelling and standard product information of the consumption of energy and other resources by energy-related products
(recast)
(Text with EEA relevance)
THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND THE COUNCIL OF THE EUROPEAN UNION,
Having regard to the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, and in particular Article 194(2) thereof,
Having regard to the proposal from the European Commission,
Having regard to the opinion of the European Economic and Social Committee (1),
After having consulted the Committee of the Regions,
Acting in accordance with the ordinary legislative procedure (2),
Whereas:
(1)
Council Directive 92/75/EEC of 22 September 1992 on the indication by labelling and standard product information of the consumption of energy and other resources by household appliances (3) has been substantially amended (4). Since further amendments have to be made, it should be recast in the interests of clarity. (2)
The scope of Directive 92/75/EEC is restricted to household appliances. The Commission Communication of 16 July 2008 on the Sustainable Consumption and Production and Sustainable Industrial Policy Action Plan has shown that the extension of the scope of Directive 92/75/EEC to energy-related products which have a significant direct or indirect impact on energy consumption during use could reinforce potential synergies between existing legislative measures, and in particular Directive 2009/125/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 21 October 2009 establishing a framework for the setting of ecodesign requirements for energy related products (5). This Directive should not prejudice the application of Directive 2009/125/EC. Together with that Directive and other Union instruments, this Directive forms part of a broader legal framework and, in the context of a holistic approach, brings about additional energy savings and environmental gains. (3)
The Presidency conclusions of the European Council of 8 and 9 March 2007 emphasised the need to increase energy efficiency in the Union so as to achieve the objective of saving 20Â % of the Union s energy consumption by 2020, set targets for the EU-wide development of renewable energies and the reduction of greenhouse gas emissions and called for a thorough and rapid implementation of the key areas identified in the Commission Communication of 19 October 2006 entitled Action Plan for Energy Efficiency: Realising the Potential . The action plan highlighted the enormous energy savings opportunities in the products sector. (4)
Improving the efficiency of energy-related products through informed consumer choice benefits the EU economy overall. (5)
The provision of accurate, relevant and comparable information on the specific energy consumption of energy-related products should influence the end-user s choice in favour of those products which consume or indirectly result in consuming less energy and other essential resources during use, thus prompting manufacturers to take steps to reduce the consumption of energy and other essential resources of the products which they manufacture. It should also, indirectly, encourage the efficient use of these products in order to contribute to the EU s 20Â % energy efficiency target. | d590a97e-c289-408e-8e2c-6ff11a2439f4 | 0 |
0b1d40ab-a288-4355-bdd9-6c4cc24dc8b0 | http://arxiv.org/abs/2403.06915v2 | 2,024 | [
"water monitoring platform",
"littoral zones",
"devastating floods",
"polar ice caps",
"serverless compute service"
] | ArXiv | Hence, the relevance of such inquiries extends beyond the efficacy of the apparatus, encompassing the substantive import of extensive data acquisition and protracted analytical scrutiny. Consequently, a decision was made to deposit and scrutinize the amassed data in the Amazon Web Services (AWS) cloud service. Moreover, the improvements of the main board structure involved a shift from using two Arduino boards to a single Arduino. This change has been made possible by a new circuitry arrangement aimed at ensuring reliable results and energy efficiency. Ensuring electrical isulation among voltagebased sensors was also a key focus in the updated version of SENSWICH. These significant modifications collectively enhance the establishment of a stronger and more effective environmental monitoring system. The peculiarity and heterogeneity of the Venice Lagoon, characterized by the presence of several micro-environments due to the convergence of multiple channels, the presence of various river mouths, and extensive salt marshes, makes the deployment a single large observatory buoy not effective to well characterize such a peculiar environment. In such scenarios, the deployment of a low-cost, easy-to-maintain monitoring system emerges as a more suitable alternative. The system we designed is composed of several low-cost lowpower floating sensors, named SENSWICH, deployed in the whole lagoon, able to collect and transmit water measurements for several consecutive days with high granularity in time and space. In order to lower the power consumption, the system is kept off most of the time, and switched on every 15 minutes, only for the time needed to acquire the measurements from the sensors and send them to shore. Four samples per hour is indeed considered to be sufficient to characterize the environment. The GPS of SENSWICH, that is the most power demanding component of the node, will always be maintained off: it will be turned on only when specifically required by the operator, that from shore can send a command to get the node position and verify if it is still located in its deployment site. Ideally, the distance between neighbor sensors will be around a few hundred meters, but a more dense deployment is envisioned in hot-spot areas. The high activity of sea life in the lagoon leads to water sensors becoming eventually encrusted with bio-fouling. This calls for periodic maintenance to clean the sensors: during this operation the battery will also be replaced. According to our previous knowledge, maintenance is required every sixty days, hence, we can dimension the battery capacity to provide an autonomy of about two months. We went through this solution instead of solar panels mainly for two reasons: extending the battery life for more than the time the sensors can be fully operational will only make the system more complex and expensive without providing any evident benefit; given the high number of fishermen, tourists and people moving across the lagoon, the use of floating systems should be as minimal as possible to discourage them them approaching it: the presence of a solar panel would easily attract the attention of people that may dangerously get close to it. To ensure extensive connectivity with a low-power transmitter, we opted to integrate a (LoRaWAN) transceiver into the sensor. This transceiver enables transmission to a shore gateway situated up to 10-15 km away from the sensor. This approach allows to effectively cover nearly the entire Venice lagoon with just three gateways. (Please, refer to Figure 2 for a visual representation of the coverage area.) The compendium of sensors comprises: Analog Industrial pH Sensor/Meter Pro Kit V2 (SEN0169-V2); /Meter K = 10 (DFR0300-H); Analog Turbidity Sensor (SEN0189); Waterproof DS18B20 Temperature Sensor Kit (KIT0021); / Meter Kit (SEN0237-A); (SEN0205). Together with these sensors, the system integrates also a TEL0094 GPS Module with Enclosure. Additionally, there is a shift from the previous model, now utilizing only one Arduino unit in the current setup. This decision is made to balance power conservation and circuit simplification. The chosen Arduino for essential tasks like data acquisition and transmission is the Arduino MKR WAN 1310 board. This device combines a SAMD21 Cortex-M0+ 32-bit low-power ARM MCU with a Murata CMWX1ZZABZ LoRa chip, working across the 433, 868, and 915 MHz frequency bands. The MCU, equipped with 7 Analog input pins and 8 Digital I/O pins, facilitates the efficient connection of all the sensors to a single board. In previous studies, we utilized two Arduinos instead of one, as detailed in [5]. To have an improvement in power consumption and also less complexity, we decided to reconfigure SENSWICH. After improving programmed codes and conducting electronic investigations, we wanted to be sure that there could be no interference between sensors inside a salty environment which may work as a conductor. To avoid having this type of interference, we started to investigate over different types of electrical isolators. To create electrical isolation in our circuit, we studied different solutions. Initially, we analyzed existing isolation and assessed their performance based on some features like the manufacturing companies, signal type, zero-load input current, sleep current, and price (Table I). As a result, we opted against using these power isolators due to three drawbacks listed as follows. 1) As indicated in Table I, the existing brands compatible with the SENSWICH circuit exhibited excessive power consumption, which is a critical consideration in our project [5]. Given that even tens of milliamperes are significant in this context, these isolators were deemed unsuitable. 2) Their efficiency did not meet our requirements, considering the high power consumption and the fact that they only separated electrical signals, a task achievable with alternative methods discussed later in this paper. 3) Some isolators consumed power even during sleep mode, which is unfavorable for SENSWICH, as biologists require measurements of various water parameters every few minutes (e.g., every ten or twenty minutes). | 1c262df5-fb43-4f96-9d21-bb781be180a2 | 2 |
0b202711-ff91-4fc5-a1b7-fff8f1ed5a97 | 2,025 | [
"environmental policy",
"economic instruments",
"market",
"clear sunset mechanisms",
"consistent message"
] | HF-national-climate-targets-dataset | POLICY: PROMOTE FURTHER USE OF MARKET-BASED INSTRUMENTS IN ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY Economic instruments will be developed on the basis of the following principles: • Instruments must be stable and predictable, giving certainty to investors and the right and consistent message to the market. Any assistance should have clear sunset mechanisms, so that it is phased out | a4301503-50a5-4139-aaea-6f43674ed8c7 | 0 | |
0b279fac-7a99-410b-b5a7-fbd54bfa918c | http://arxiv.org/pdf/2209.05767v1 | 2,022 | [
"model",
"data",
"bayesian",
"time",
"iams"
] | arxiv.org | Climate change is, by far, the biggest and most life-threatening challenge of the present time. Its consequences have the potential to change our society and to threaten the very existence of humankind on this planet. Due to its complex nature, climate change is, at its core, a multidisciplinary problem. It involves many different disciplines, in the natural, human and social sciences, specifically physics, chemistry, engineering, economics and sociology. Due to this intrinsic multidisciplinary nature, and to properly simulate and understand the complexities in the interaction between the different systems that constitute our society, and climate, a special class of models has been devised. To analyze climate change, in the last years the scientific community has implemented several integrated assessment models (IAMs), which are deterministic computer models, i.e. simulators, that, given the same inputs, produce the same outputs every time a run is repeated. These models are complex simulations that are able to take into account the multidisciplinary nature of the problem, and consequently mix the numerous ingredients coming from different fields. These kind of large scale computer simulations are widely used in modern scientific research to investigate, among others, physical phenomena that are too expensive or impossible to replicate directly (Fan et al., 2009;Textor et al., 2005). Often, the research interest is focused on quantifying how uncertainty in the input arguments propagates through the simulator and produce a distribution function over one or many outputs of interest, as well as how much uncertainty is introduced via the modelling effort. Generating the same outputs with several IAMs (namely, creating a model ensemble) allows to quantify both parametric and model uncertainty. Parametric uncertainty refers to the variability induced by how much are we uncertain with respect to the right set of model input parameters, while model uncertainty refers to the ability of each IAM to model correctly only a part of the reality, and to the differences in the model implementation and modelling choices. It is of paramount importance to disentangle the key drivers of uncertainty in emissions projections because this understanding can help design better climate hedging strategies. Moreover, IAMs diagnostics is a relatively nascent field that is growing in importance to help validate these kind of computational models. To properly address the fundamental parameter uncertainty in climate change mod-elling, the scientific community has adopted a scenario approach. Indeed IAMs use, as inputs, a set of so-called Shared Socio-economic Pathways (SSPs). Scenarios showing future greenhouse gas emissions are needed to estimate climate impacts and mitigation efforts required for climate stabilization. SSPs are part of a new framework that the climate change research community has adopted to facilitate the integrated analysis of future climate impacts, vulnerabilities, adaptation, and mitigation. Further information about the scenario process and the SSP framework can be found in Moss et al. (2010), Van Vuuren et al. (2014), O'Neill et al. (2014), Kriegler et al. (2014). An SSP consists in the discretization of a continuous plane of mitigation (i.e. reducing the modification in climate induced by human activitiy) and adaptation (i.e. how we adapt to the changing climate) to climate change (Riahi et al., 2017) as in Figure 1. 5 SSP scenarios have been identified. Three of them belong to the main diagonal, describing futures where the challenges for both climate change adaptation and mitigation are low (SSP1), intermediate (SSP2) and high (SSP3). In addition there are two asymmetric scenarios that do not belong to the main diagonal. In fact SSP4 has high challenges for adaptation combined with low challenges for mitigation, while the contrary holds for SSP5. We focus on the same application as in Marangoni et al. (2017), from which we take the data. As in Marangoni et al. (2017) we use only the SSP belonging to the main diagonal of the matrix represented in Figure 1. The IAMs output consist in projections of several variables, and the one that we consider here are the carbon dioxide emissions, since this is the most studied variable affecting the climate. For this reason data consist of 23 × 5 CO 2 global emission (ex-pressed in GtCO 2 ) profiles. Each CO 2 profile is time dependent, discretized with a ten-year frequency, to ease the computational burden of the IAMs. In fact, these massive simulations are expensive and demanding, and a higher frequency in the output could increase the general cost of the computation, as well as the time needed to run the model. Those emissions have been computed as the output of 5 different IAMs, using as input the same combinations of SSP variables, such as gross domestic product and fossil fuel availability. Learning from O'Hagan (2006), an important feature of this context that is worth stressing is that, the output of a simulator (in our case an IAM), which is a computer prediction of the real phenomenon, will inevitably be imperfect. Statistical analysis should be able to incorporate the model biased representation of the real process. It is of great interest to have one single fast statistical emulator (i.e. a model emulating the unknown outputs from the simulator) able to capture all the variability induced by the simulators (Kennedy and O'Hagan, 2001;Santner et al., 2003). In particular, there are certain aspects of CO 2 simulation scenarios, that can never be known with certainty, since we cannot run each model for an infinite length of time or with an infinite number of possible starting values of the simulations. Part of the uncertainty is also due to the inability to run the model for every possible choice of the input parameters. The aforementioned issues are those inducing uncertainty on the data coming from the runs performed. The quantification of uncertainty in this context, performing a run with all the combinations of the inputs variable in order to learn the input-output map, could be too expensive. Conversely, choosing the parameters from a sparse grid could be useless in learning key features. Ultimately, the weaknesses of this approach mainly originates by the model simplifications. | fb2cf143-cc5e-4887-aa4d-e7c043bedeb3 | 0 |
0b2f82d2-0f5c-48c5-980e-90fddd6c3c9b | https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/1009448/decarbonising-transport-a-better-greener-britain.pdf | 2,021 | [
"transport",
"zero",
"emissions",
"emission",
"carbon"
] | assets.publishing.service.gov.uk | Increasing cycling and walking Benefits of cycling and walking Physical inactivity costs the NHS up to £1 billion per annum, with further The new east-west and north-south cycle routes in London are moving 46% of the people in only 30% of the road space 20 minutes of exercise per day cuts risk of developing depression by 31% and increases productivity Up to 40% increase in shopping footfall by well-planned improvements By 2050, future active travel spending is expected to deliver gs from air quality improvements alone and provide opportunities to improve green space and biodiversity. Bike ma nufacture, distribution,
Part 2: The plan in commitments, actions, and timings In July 2020 the Prime Minister launched ambitious plans to boost cycling and walking, with a vision for half of all journeys in towns and cities to be walked or cycled by 2030. | 8f0273a5-decd-4a43-ab49-4f3473699e66 | 109 |
0b345732-75fa-4a33-b420-9b725ffea261 | https://committees.parliament.uk/publications/30146/documents/174873/default/ | 2,022 | [
"change",
"government",
"climate",
"behaviour",
"evidence"
] | parliament.uk | In his evidence to the Committee, Mr Hands noted the level of concern among the public regarding climate “We know that the public are keen to play their part. The BEIS Public Attitudes Tracker shows that 85 per cent of the public are concerned or, indeed, very concerned about climate change. That number has doubled since 2016.”50 46. Differences across the UK public in the degree of concern reported are smaller than they were, but most witnesses said they still exist. Dr Gray said that concern about climate change is now much more mainstream, but added socio-economic status still makes “a big difference” to people’s level of concern.51 Others noted high levels of concern in general but pointed to 45 Written evidence from the Office for National Statistics (ONS) ( CCE0074), Natural England (CCE0034), Green Alliance ( CCE0051), British Psychological Society ( CCE0090) and Picture Zero 46 Written evidence from the CAST Consortium ( CCE0048) 49 Written evidence from Dr Rachel Harcourt and Prof Suraje Dessai ( CCE0044)
differences in the strength of feeling by age, gender, socio-economic status, and political party affiliation. 52 47. Some witnesses highlighted emerging evidence of wider emotional responses to climate change and the environment. Dr Elizabeth Marks, Senior Lecturer at the University of Bath, and colleagues referred to recent surveys focused on children, young adults and other age groups where respondents reported feeling a range of challenging emotions regarding climate change, such as fear, anxiety and anger. 53 The Office for National Statistics (ONS) shared results from their October 2021 Opinions and Lifestyle Survey showing more than 40 per cent of UK adults reported feeling somewhat or very anxious about the future of the environment.54 48. We heard from Which?, the consumer organisation, that people “don’t always understand what they can most effectively do to reduce their own impact”.55 Other witnesses agreed.56 Dr Gray told “The evidence suggests that we tend to overestimate how much of a difference to carbon emissions lower-impact actions such as recycling and so on will make. We underestimate the impact of higher-impact actions that will make more of a difference to reducing carbon emissions in the UK, such as taking fewer flights or living car-free.” 57 Several other witnesses made the same point. 58 Witnesses singled out food as an area where there is especially low awareness of its impacts on climate change and the environment. 59 South Cambridgeshire District Council suggested the UK public’s predominant focus on recycling shows what has been achieved by “relatively clear and consistent messaging for decades on recycling backed up by the provision of physical assets (separate bins)”.60 They added that a similar level of awareness could be achieved for wider climate change action, “If similar messaging and practical aid could be provided.” 61 49. There is limited understanding of the scale of change that may be needed to address and adapt to climate change. Dr Jan Eichhorn, Senior Lecturer in Social Policy at the University of Edinburgh, explained that when asked about the impact of climate change on their lives by 2035 if no action were taken, 18 per cent of people in the UK surveyed thought their lives “would not be affected negatively at all” and 45 per cent of people thought their lives “would just change somewhat requiring some adaptation”. 62 Dr Gray told 52 Written evidence from NIHR Public Health Policy Research Unit ( CCE0024), the CAST Consortium (CCE0048), Prof Alison Anderson ( CCE0058) and Natural England ( CCE0034) 53 Written evidence from Dr Elizabeth Marks, Dr Panu Pihkala, Caroline Hickman and Elouise Mayall 54 Written evidence from the Office for National Statistics (ONS) ( CCE0074) 55 Written evidence from Which? ( CCE0039) 56 Written evidence from One Home ( CCE0045) and WRAP ( CCE0003) 58 Q 1 (Toby Park), Q 117 (Tim Lord) and written evidence from the CAST Consortium ( CCE0048) and Aldersgate Group ( CCE0113) 59 Q 99 (Henry Dimbleby), Q 60 (Dr Emily Gray) and written evidence from Which? ( CCE0039) and 60 Written evidence from South Cambridgeshire District Council ( CCE0105) 62 Written evidence from Dr Jan Eichhorn ( CCE0022)
“Awareness of the extent of the transformation that will be needed in 50. Most of the UK public support some form of action by the Government and other actors to address climate change and environmental issues. Dr Gray noted, “Around half of the UK public tell us that they would like the UK to get to net zero sooner than 2050,”64 while Dr Eichhorn told “The majority of people … wants action to be taken against climate change, but to a varying degree.” 65 As we discuss in Chapter 9, there is a widely-held perception, which is held by several students on the Committee’s youth engagement programme, that the Government should be taking a greater leadership role on climate change than is seen to be the case. 51. However, there is mixed evidence of people’s appetite to make changes themselves. The CAST Consortium told us, “People across the UK express a significant willingness to take on lower carbon lifestyles,” 66 and Dr Marks and colleagues referred to survey results suggesting that seven in ten people “see climate change and other environmental issues are large enough to justify significant changes to people’s lifestyle”. 67 They “A similar number indicate they are willing to make such changes to their own lifestyles.” 68 In contrast, Mr Lord “Most people think they do as much as they can at the moment to address climate change … they think they do enough but the rest of the public do not do enough.”69 52. While willingness or desire to make changes varies depending upon the behaviour in question, the evidence is mixed on which changes the UK public are most willing to make. The appetite for policies about behaviour change to meet climate and environmental goals also varies for different policies. 53. | 97670d98-0334-481c-acbc-cc321a917f87 | 6 |
0b3505a3-70ae-4b94-8ed5-aa1079663569 | https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/national-framework-for-water-resources-2025-water-for-growth-nature-and-a-resilient-future/appendix-b-water-resources-modelling-national-framework-for-water-resources-2025 | 2,025 | [
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] | GOV.UK Environment Agency | This is 122, 80 and 28 Ml/d reduction in water need for non-household consumption for Low, Central and High scenarios respectively. This is reflective of the non-household demand target under those scenarios. Demand from leakage is driving no additional need by 2055 under the Do Nothing scenario as the demand is assumed to be as per 2030. Under all other scenarios there is a reduction in demand from leakage when compared to the baseline, ranging from 260, 146 and 33 Ml/d for Low, Central and High scenarios respectively. Whilst not driving additional need, more water can be gained through an increased ambition in reducing leakage across the South East, moving from 50 to 60% leakage reduction could provide 114 Ml/d additional water. By 2055, no water companies in the South East plan to rely on supply side drought measures (drought permits), with no additional water provided through them. Demand side drought measures (demand savings from implementation of media campaigns and temporary use bans in drought), provide approximately 200 Ml/d , given 2050 policy targets of demand (110 l/h/d ) and WRMP24 population forecasts. The needs driven by the environment, climate and resilience across the Low and Central scenarios described above, are all met through a range of supply and demand management options, reflected in the surplus we observe. High, Central and Low scenarios assume WRMP24 supply options are delivered, this amounts to 777 Ml/d of additional water for WRSE . Deficits are already observed in High and Central scenarios, any risks to delivery of options (including delays and so on) has the ability to increase this deficit significantly. One strategic resource option ( SESRO ) accounts for 40% of the water provided through delivery of supply options. WRE Under the Do Nothing scenario the WRE region would face a deficit of 679 Ml/d . The region is also in deficit in 2055 under both High and Central scenarios, at 360 and 91 Ml/d respectively. Under the Low water needs future only do WRE see a surplus of 262 Ml/d . The biggest driver of additional water need under the Do Nothing, High and Central scenarios is the reduction in supply to meet environmental needs, with a figure of 415, 567 and 546 Ml/d respectively. Under the Low scenario environmental needs drives 447 Ml/d of additional need compared to baseline. Under High, Central and Low scenarios, the reduction in supply to meet environmental needs is higher than Do Nothing that reflects the WRMP reductions. Reductions in supply to meet environmental needs of the NF2 Environment Destination planning scenarios are estimated to increase from WRMP by up to 150 Ml/d . In the East, demand from household population growth under a Do Nothing scenario shows a 165 Ml/d of additional need compared to the baseline. Under the High needs and Central needs scenarios, the additional demand from household consumption is 120 Ml/d and 7 Ml/d respectively compared with the baseline. In a Low water needs future there is a reduction from the baseline for household demand of 201 Ml/d , driven by ambitious demand management actions. Assumed demand management actions are not enough to reduce household consumption in the High and Central scenarios. For the High scenario, this results in an additional need of 120 Ml/d , where additional demand related to the highest population forecasts exceeds demand management actions to reduce consumption (approximately 60% delivery of PCC targets). Climate change impacts by 2055 under a Do Nothing scenario are forecast to reduce supply by 26 Ml/d . This compares to 27 Ml/d under the Low water needs scenario and 112 Ml/d reduction compared to the baseline under the High water needs scenario. The move to a higher resilience standard drives 114 Ml/d of additional need under all scenarios. Demand from non-household population growth is driving no additional need by 2055 under the Do Nothing scenario as the demand is assumed to be as per 2030. Under all other scenarios there is a reduction in demand from non-household growth when compared to the baseline. This is 62, 39 and 12 Ml/d reduction in water need for non-household consumption for Low, Central and High scenarios respectively. This is reflective of the non-household demand target under those scenarios. Demand from leakage is driving no additional need by 2055 under the Do Nothing scenario as the demand is assumed to be as per 2030. Under all other scenarios there is a reduction in demand from leakage when compared to the baseline, ranging from 104, 77 and 49 Ml/d for Low, Central and High scenarios respectively. Whilst not driving additional need, more water can be gained through an increased ambition in reducing leakage across the East, moving from 50 to 60% leakage reduction could provide 28 Ml/d additional water. By 2055, no water companies in the East plan to rely on supply side drought measures (drought permits), with no additional water provided through them. Demand side drought measures (demand savings from implementation of media campaigns and temporary use bans in drought), provide approximately 30 Ml/d , given 2050 policy targets of demand (110 l/h/d ) and WRMP24 population forecasts. The additional needs driven by the environment, climate, resilience and in some cases, household demand, across the Low, Central and High scenarios described above, are all met through a range of supply and demand management options, reflected in the surplus we observe. High, Central and Low scenarios assume WRMP24 supply options are delivered, this amounts to 347 Ml/d of additional water for WRE . Deficits are already observed in High and Central scenarios, any risks to delivery of options (including delays and so on) has the ability to increase this deficit significantly. One strategic resource option (South Lincolnshire Reservoir) accounts for 49% of the water provided through delivery of supply options. WRW Under the Do Nothing scenario the WRW region would face a deficit of 1070 Ml/d . The West region also has a deficit in 2055 under the High water needs scenario of 340 Ml/d . | 12c9ac8c-ea3b-447b-9d2e-22d3373aad88 | 3 |
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Data used in all tables and figures in sixth Carbon Budget Impact Assessment MS Excel Spreadsheet, 203 KB
Policies and proposals to meet carbon budgets
In 2011, the government set out scenarios on how it is going to meet the first four carbon budgets from 2008-2027. Related information | 70cec6fd-34fb-4faf-a6c2-63ce71f745d1 | 1 |
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] | www.gov.uk | This will be supported by £260 million allocated to Local Authorities in 2021-22 for shovel- ready local transport schemes through the Integrated Transport Block, including public transport and active The government is also investing £310 million in 2021-22 in upgrading the road network, reducing congestion and making it better able to cope with demand by adding capacity. This will support investment in over 50 schemes in this Parliament such as North Hykeham relief road and crossings in both Lake Lothing and Great Yarmouth due to start construction shortly. Altogether, this means the government is investing £1.7 billion in local roads
Road-building alone cannot solve the UK also needs to use limited road space more efficiently. This forms part of the government’s broader agenda for driving improvements in local transport across the country through £5 billion for buses and cycling over this Parliament. Increasing cycling and walking can help tackle some of the most challenging issues facing UK improving air quality, combatting climate change, improving health and wellbeing, addressing inequalities and tackling congestion on the roads. There has already been progress in this space – despite fewer people travelling overall during the pandemic, in the summer there was around a 100% increase in weekday cycling, and on some weekends the increase has been around 200%, compared to early March, prior to the lockdown.11 In May, the government announced a £2 billion active travel package in order to make it easier and safer for people to walk and cycle. This investment will support the delivery of the priorities set out in Gear Change, the government’s new long-term walking and cycling strategy,12 which will ensure high design standards, and help integrate new cycling infrastructure into cities, alongside other road users, with thousands of miles of safe, continuous and direct cycling routes. This funding included £225 million in emergency funding in 2020- 21 for local authorities to help them create cycle lanes and more space for pedestrians. Buses are the workhorses of public transport, accounting for over 50% of journeys.13 Y et domestic bus use has been in decline, falling by over 10% since 2009-10 outside London.14 The government is investing to build back better by supporting local authorities and operators to work together to coordinate timetables and ticketing to meet shifting patterns of demand, deliver bus priority measures that tackle congestion, and employ open data and demand-responsive technologies to improve the customer experience. The Spending Review commits £300 million in 2021- 22 to drive transformation, maintain essential services as long as necessary, and support the industry through the COVID-19 recovery. This combination of measures will make trips smoother and faster than ever before. The UK is a nation that thrives on digital connectivity, with some of the highest rates of digital adoption in the world. The UK has the fifth largest number of broadband and mobile subscriptions in the OECD,15 and more people in the UK shop online than in any EU member state.16 The government wants to deliver high quality, reliable digital infrastructure that works across the UK, so that mobile calls do not drop, video calls don’t freeze, and people working from home can do their jobs and run their businesses with ease. Fast, reliable digital connectivity can deliver economic, social and well-being benefits for the whole of the UK. Never has this been more important than as the country deals with the impact of COVID-19, when digital infrastructure has enabled home working, home learning, and kept families in touch with each other in Digital infrastructure is particularly important for the UK’s rural communities in all four nations. Greater connectivity can help rural businesses innovate, grow, and create jobs. In doing so, it can help rural areas attract and retain young people and families, supporting thriving rural societies. Gigabit-capable broadband, such as full fibre, can provide speeds of over 1,000Mbps, over forty times faster than standard superfast broadband and fast enough to download an HD film in seconds. These speeds provide new opportunities across the UK, for consumers and businesses alike, and enable The government’s programme for gigabit-capable broadband has made dramatic progress. More than a third of UK premises now have access to gigabit-capable connections, up from 9% when the government took office in July 2019. By next year, more than half of all premises will have access. During the COVID-19 pandemic, operators have rightly focused on network resilience at a time of unprecedented need for good connectivity. The government has also announced restrictions on the use of Huawei equipment. The government is working with industry to target a minimum of 85% gigabit capable coverage by 2025, but will seek to accelerate roll-out further to get as close to 100% as possible. The government will continue to implement an ambitious programme of work to remove barriers to broadband deployment and maximise coverage in the hardest to reach areas Data uk-full-fibre-gigabit-coverage-thinkbroadband Gigabit-capable broadband coverage in the UK coverage defined as percentage of UK premises with access to FTTP and/or DOCSIS 3.1. Data as of 10 November 2020.Access to gigabit-capable broadband - % of UK premises
The government expects the private sector to deliver gigabit-capable broadband to around 80% of premises in the UK. The government will continue to support this through removing barriers to deployment, making it quicker and easier for operators to roll-out. However, around 20% of premises in the UK are expected to be the costs of connecting these premises outweigh the returns a company could make. These premises occur in varying concentrations throughout the UK, as shown by the map below. The government’s £5 billion UK Gigabit Programme will subsidise roll-out to ensure no area will be left behind. It will particularly benefit rural areas which tend to have a higher proportion of uncommercial premises. Percentage of premises in local authority which are uncommercial Department for Digital, Culture, Media & Sport. | 065e5061-603a-4613-810e-5fbe04701545 | 9 |
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] | cdn.climatepolicyradar.org | (2) The Secretary of State may only grant a gas transporter licence which authorises the conveyance of hydrogen through pipes for the purposes of the person’s designated (3) The Secretary of State may exercise the power under section 7(4) of the Gas Act 1986 (direction to extend licence) so as to extend a gas transporter licence where— (a) the licence is held by a designated person, and
Part 3 – Licensing of hydrogen pipeline projects Document 2024-10-14 This version of this Act contains provisions that are prospective. Changes to There are currently no known outstanding effects for the Energy Act 2023. (See end of Document for details) (b) the extension authorises the conveyance of hydrogen through pipes for the purposes of the person’s designated project. (4) The Secretary of State may exercise the power under section 7(4A) of the Gas Act 1986 (direction to restrict licence) so as to restrict a gas transporter licence where— (a) the licence is or was held by a designated person, and (b) the restriction is in connection with the revocation of the person’s designation in relation to a hydrogen pipeline project. (5) In its application for the purposes of subsections (1), (3) and (4), the Gas Act 1986 (a) in the following provisions, references to the GEMA were to the Secretary (iii) section 8(3), (4) and (5)(a); (b) in sections 7(6)(b) and 8(5)(b), references to the Secretary of State were to (c) in section 7B(4)(c), the reference to the GEMA included a reference to the Secretary of State, but only for the purpose of enabling the inclusion of conditions requiring the rendering of a payment on the grant of a licence; (d) section 7B(9) also required a copy of the licence to be sent to the GEMA. (6) When granting or extending a gas transporter licence by virtue of this section, the Secretary of State must have regard to— (a) costs, expenditure or liabilities of any description that the designated person may reasonably be expected to incur in carrying out its activities; (b) the need to secure that the designated person is able to finance its activities; (c) the need to secure that the designated person has appropriate incentives in relation to the carrying on of its activities; (d) such other matters as the Secretary of State considers appropriate. (7) References in subsection (6) to a designated person’s activities are to the person’s activities for the purposes of— (a) the designated project to which the grant or extension relates, and (b) in the case of an extension, any other designated project already authorised by the person’s gas transporter licence. (8) A gas transporter licence granted, extended or restricted by the Secretary of State by virtue of this section has effect for all purposes as if it had been granted, extended or I145 S. 134 in force at 26.12.2023, see s. 334(3)(c) 135 Applications for grant etc of gas transporter licence (1) The Secretary of State may by regulations make provision about the making, consideration and determination of relevant applications, including provision— (a) about the person to whom a relevant application must be made;
Part 3 – Licensing of hydrogen pipeline projects Document 2024-10-14 This version of this Act contains provisions that are prospective. Changes to There are currently no known outstanding effects for the Energy Act 2023. (See end of Document for details) (b) about the form and manner in which a relevant application must be made; (c) imposing timing requirements in relation to the making of a relevant (d) requiring a relevant application to be accompanied by such information and documents as may be specified in the regulations; (e) requiring a relevant application to be accompanied by such fee (if any) as may (i) specified in the regulations, or (ii) determined, by the person to whom the application is made, in accordance with the regulations; (f) about the matters to be taken into account in determining a relevant (g) requiring a determination to be accompanied by reasons; (h) requiring determinations to be published; (i) conferring functions on the Secretary of State or the GEMA (including functions involving the exercise of a discretion); (j) for anything falling to be determined under the regulations to be determined— (i) by the Secretary of State, the GEMA or another person specified in (ii) in accordance with such procedure and by reference to such matters and to the opinion of such persons as may be so specified. (2) “Relevant application” means an application within any of the following paragraphs (whether made to the Secretary of State or the GEMA)— (a) an application by a designated person for the grant of a gas transporter licence that authorises the conveyance of hydrogen through pipes for the purposes of the person’s designated project; (b) an application by a designated person for the extension of a gas transporter licence held by the person so that it authorises the conveyance of hydrogen through pipes for the purposes of the person’s designated project; (c) an application by a person who is or has been designated for the restriction of a gas transporter licence held by the person, in connection with the person’s designation in relation to a hydrogen pipeline project ceasing to have effect. (3) Provision made by virtue of subsection (1)(j)(ii) may in particular be made by reference to a document as amended from time to time. (4) Regulations under this section— (a) may provide for cases in which an application is not required; (b) may provide for a relevant application that has been rejected by one person to be dealt with afresh by another person. (5) Before making regulations under this section, the Secretary of State must consult the (6) Section 7B(1) to (2A) of the Gas Act 1986 does not apply to an application for the grant, extension or restriction of a gas transporter licence so far as the application is one to which regulations under this section apply. | 4808927e-67c0-4e83-803d-e07fd0d4a019 | 54 |
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] | cdn.climatepolicyradar.org | To date, the UK’s ICF has supported more than 34 million people to adapt to the • The UK is committed to an effective international climate finance architecture, and has been one of the largest contributors to major multilateral climate funds like the Green Climate Fund (£720 million) and the Climate Investment Funds (£2 billion). The UK has also supported multilateral development bank ambition as they scale up their activities towards their 2020 climate finance pledges. • The UK has supported international knowledge generating organisations such as the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change and has committed to global initiatives aimed at accelerating clean energy like Mission Innovation. 21 Financial years 2011/12 to 2014/15. 292 7th National Communication • In 2015, the UK, Germany and Norway (GNU) announced that they would provide up to $5 billion between 2015 and 2020 in finance to tackle deforestation, subject to ambitious and high quality proposals. • Through its ICF and other international action, the UK is continuing to scale up support towards the shared developed country goal of jointly mobilising $100 billion per year in climate finance for developing countries from a range of sources by 2020. Beyond this, the UK is focussed on helping developing countries put in place the conditions to align finance flows with low greenhouse gas and climate resilient development, including by creating the right conditions to unlock green investment for Nationally Determined Contributions (NDCs) and by phasing out the most polluting activities. Climate change is a global challenge requiring action from all countries. The UK has played a key role in demonstrating international leadership by reducing its own emissions and supporting other countries to do the same. This chapter will discuss the support and financial assistance that the UK provides to developing countries, where climate change represents the biggest challenge to long-term global poverty reduction, to help avert the worst outcomes of climate change and increase the resilience of the most vulnerable countries to a changing climate. The remainder of the section is structured as • An overview of the types of climate finance provided by the UK, centred around its International Climate Finance (ICF). • How climate finance has been allocated since the last Biennial Review, including adaptation and mitigation and with detailed examples of programming in UK priority areas of forestry, private finance and carbon markets. • How the UK is acting to promote, facilitate and transfer technology to • Other actions the UK is taking to help developing countries access finance, attract investment and align finance flows with low greenhouse gas and climate-resilient • How the ICF is using its monitoring and evaluation framework to apply lessons learned 6.3 Overview of UK Support and Channels The UK is among the largest contributors of public climate finance and is committed to providing support which is transparent, transformative and in line with the needs and priorities of developing countries. UK climate finance builds on a tradition of UK leadership in providing support to developing countries. UK climate finance is provided from the Official Development Assistance (ODA) budget which has consistently risen over time, from £7 .3 billion in 2009 to £13.4 billion in 2016. UK climate finance represents a new commitment which is additional to historic ODA levels and is not diverting or detracting from broader development spending. The UK has a dedicated ring-fence of its ODA budget for climate finance – the ICF – and uses this as a frame of reference to ensure our climate finance is separate from non-climate ODA. We can also track the amount of climate finance within the overall ODA spend and also the non-climate related ODA spend to ensure that non-climate ODA is not decreasing as our climate spend increases. Annex 1: Provision of financial, technological and capability-building support to developing countries 293 The UK remains committed to promoting climate smart development across the aid portfolio, consistent with the Global Goals and an essential condition for driving sustainable development A key objective of UK climate finance is to improve the effectiveness of the international climate finance architecture, including by building in-country support and enhancing country ownership for low carbon climate-resilient development. The UK has an extensive network of officials based in developing countries working for the Department for International Development (DFID) and Foreign and Commonwealth Office (FCO). This ensures close relationships with governments and key organisations in these countries and the development of bilateral programmes based on developing country needs. The UK also provides support through multilateral funds and multilateral development banks. The UK continues to encourage and support the use of these funds in response to projects and plans driven by the needs of developing countries and in line with nationally determined comprehensive plans. The UK is firmly committed to the joint developed country agreement to mobilise $100 billion of climate finance a year from a variety of sources by 2020. At COP21 in Paris, developed countries were asked to produce a ‘concrete roadmap’ to show how they would achieve this goal. The UK and Australia, working with other developed countries, produced this Roadmap and presented it at COP22 in Marrakech. The Roadmap indicated that based on current pledges, and building on the estimated level of $62 billion in climate finance mobilised in 2014, the $100 billion goal could be achieved with a modest increase in the rate of mobilisation of private finance. The UK continues to work with its international partners to implement the actions outlined in the Roadmap and make progress towards the goal, in line with developing Achieving the goals of the Paris Agreement will require a broad shift in finance flows to align the global economy with a pathway towards low greenhouse gas and climate resilient development. This transformational goal provides the basis for the UK’s approach to climate finance, and the UK acts through a number of bilateral and multilateral channels to ensure that support helps to build capacity and nurture lasting change, for instance through engagement of private investors. | c6207828-d0f1-4adb-9ed1-c6b8e81a528f | 122 |
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] | cdn.climatepolicyradar.org | Its accompanying Delivery Plan sets out a range of activities that raise awareness of the potential impact of climate change on forests and the role of forestry in adaptation. In Scotland, the Scottish Forestry Strategy (2006)23 identifies climate change as one of its seven key themes. The theme’s primary purpose in relation to adaptation is to ensure that Scotland’s woodlands and the forestry sector meet their full potential in facilitating ecological, economic and social adaptation to climate change. It sets out three key Improve understanding of climate change impacts on woodland ecosystems and silviculture, and implement precautionary measures, such as forest habitat network creation. • Maintain preventative measures and ensure readiness for pests, diseases and other threats, such as fire and wind. • Increase the role of forestry in environmental protection including sustainable flood and catchment management, and soil protection. • Early in 2013 Forestry Commission Scotland published a Climate Change The programme describes climate change predictions for Scotland, it explains what Forestry Commission Scotland will do to increase the contribution of forestry to Scotland’s climate change response, and focuses on what needs to be done both as early actions and to increase future preparedness. The focus for adaptation is • Plan and manage forests and woodlands in a way that minimises future risks from climate change, for example through the creation of forest habitat networks, and using different timber species, including hardwoods, or silvicultural systems. • Assist in environmental protection such as helping to tackle slope instability, reducing riverbank erosion, contributing to natural flood management and increasing the contribution of trees and woodland to climate control in urban areas. In order to ensure that forest management planning supports resilience-building in Scotland’s forests, Forestry Commission Scotland developed RESILIENT FORESTS, web-based resources for forest managers to raise their awareness to climate risks and opportunities. A variety of demonstration actions and adaptive management approaches are also being developed at the Scottish Research Forest at Queen Elizabeth Forest Park. Forestry Commission Scotland latest actions 157
204 7th National Communication • The launch of a stand-alone Forestry Grant Scheme, as part of Scotland’s Rural Development Programme, in 2015. The scheme contributes towards the Scottish Government target of 10,000 hectares of new woodlands per year; and the sustainable management of existing woodlands and includes funding for new woodland creation and the management of existing forests. • The revision of the UK Forestry Standard and the associated Climate Change Guidelines that sets out legal and good practice requirements on dealing with both risks and opportunities presented by climate change. • Ongoing funding for tree health research and collaborative action. • New guidance for forest management on how to prepare long-term forest plans. • The launch of work to improve the condition and connectivity of native woodlands, for new native woodland planting, bracken control and protection with fencing. Forestry and Woodland Strategies aim to encourage a move towards planning and managing well-structured and diverse forests that can better withstand change and extreme events. Forestry and Woodland Strategies are updated by local authorities in order to reflect current National and local forestry policy. Climate Change considerations therefore need to be considered when developing Forest Plans and Woodland Creation projects. In addition we promote the benefits of habitat connectivity and habitat networks, including integrating forest and open habitat networks for biodiversity. In priority native woodland habitats FCS continues to promote actions to facilitate adaptation including encouraging natural regeneration, increasing native woodland creation and developing forest habitat networks. FCS also work to halt the loss and fragmentation of existing priority habitats. FCS continues to support research, trials and demonstration sites to identify appropriate species and provenance choices which take account of projected changes in climate. In Wales, responding to climate change is one of the key themes in the forestry strategy, Woodlands for Wales.25 This aims to increase the diversity (species, structure and genetics) of woodlands in Wales to make them more resilient to pests, diseases and drought. It also recognises that trees and the products they produce can be a way of reducing the effects of, and risks resulting from, climate change. Trees also provide shade and can be beneficial in reducing the effects of climate change in urban and rural areas. The accompanying Action Plan, which runs to 2020, includes action for the creation of new woodland in Wales by 2030 which will achieve multiple objectives such as mitigating the impacts of climate change, by locking up carbon emissions and reducing run-off after heavy rain. 5.4.5 Healthy and resilient communities The CCRA Evidence Report (2017) states that increasing temperatures, rising sea levels and modified rainfall patterns will change the climate-related risks in the UK. Climate Change will create new challenges for those working in planning, community development, the health and social care system, flood and water management, and emergency preparedness. Flooding and extreme hot weather pose the highest magnitude risks and the greatest need for action in the next five years. There are some potential benefits from reduced cold and opportunities from The health sector including the Department of Health, Public Health England, NHS England, the Sustainable Development Unit and local partners responsible for the delivery of health and social
Chapter 5 – Vulnerability assessment, climate change impact and adaptation measures 205 care play key roles in addressing the health risks associated with climate change, for example, through the implementation of the Heatwave Plan and Cold Weather Plan for England and the promotion of adaptation within wider Sustainable Development Management Plans. Public Health England publishes the Heatwave Plan for England to manage the risks of hot weather to public health. This is a key component of emergency planning that provides advice for professionals, organisations and individuals to enable them to plan for and respond to hot weather. Both the Heatwave and Cold Weather Plans for England are accompanied by public and professional supporting material and resources (e.g. a checklist for identifying and managing overheating in care homes). The Cold Weather Plan for England was independently evaluated in 2012-13. | c6207828-d0f1-4adb-9ed1-c6b8e81a528f | 80 |
0b564bfc-1293-4a66-a72e-0499f9268128 | https://cdn.climatepolicyradar.org/navigator/GBR/2021/decarbonising-transport-a-better-greener-britain_0e5fa97fb3d78e19b69ccf8f78fdd0cc.pdf | 2,021 | [
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"zero",
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] | cdn.climatepolicyradar.org | As demand for existing petrol and diesel blends decreases, these fuels will continue to support the decarbonisation of older road vehicles (and in niche applications with limited alternatives), including by increasing the low carbon fuel content where possible and in the longer term low carbon Priority 3: Decarbonising how we get our goods The UK will scale-up and roll-out new technology across the sector, including hydrogen, embracing innovation and capitalising on new industrial opportunities, as well as making best use of existing zero emission technologies and fuels. UK-based innovators will scale up and export efficient business models, creating regional and global leaders. | b1244f11-6485-47b2-ba2a-c8a54f51cd77 | 79 |
0b579628-941d-43cd-9e83-9fc163f0f93c | http://arxiv.org/pdf/1905.02674v1 | 2,019 | [
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] | arxiv.org | Active mobility research has established that individual, social and spatial factors need to be considered to design effective interventions (Götschi et al., 2017). The current paper adds to the literature by studying the local community dimensions using mixed qualitative and quantitative methods. Examining the concept of active mobility within the narratives of two distinct community areas reveals key factors for achieving equitable and sustainable transport policy at different geographic scales. The novel application of topic modeling and sentiment analysis to focus group discourse highlights the need for additional research incorporating the infusion of qualitative data with emerging quantitative techniques, for the purposes of building up the repertoire of people-centric transportation planning practices. In a general sense, while residents of different neighborhoods are bound to share common goals for improving society, there will be area-specific factors that should not be overlooked, particularly for the advancement of traditionally-disadvantaged populations (Lubin and Feeley, 2016). This research shows that, in the case of Humboldt Park and Evanston, there exists what one might call mobility tension; to expound, as technological innovation and concerns for the environment and well-being continue to grow in a sometimes disharmonious manner, conflict between different groups of travelers arises within multimodal environments, propelled by the need for individuals to re-learn certain travel habits for the sake of collective compromise. To help counter this tension, the ideas presented in this paper suggest that comparative analysis could assist policymakers in developing a framework for community areas to assess their 'readiness for' specific transportation investments. As pointed out by Weber (2014), literature on bicycle and pedestrian policy implementation in the U.S. is scarce, so there is a pressing need to explore novel conceptual frameworks to assist transportation planning efforts. For instance, stage theories of behavior change represent a psychology-based market segmentation strategy that could illuminate successful pathways for implementing tailored interventions (see, for instance, Bamberg et al. (2011)), but this approach often lacks a multilevel perspective. Creating a community-based stages-of-change framework that characterizes the acceptance of or resistance to emerging mobility cultures would introduce ideas related to measuring (a) dissonance between an individual and his or her community area (Schwanen and Mokhtarian, 2005) and (b) patterns of movement between stages over time to study the longitudinal effects of transportation innovation (Kroesen, 2014). Additionally, researchers should integrate metrics accounting for possible self-selection biases in order to disentangle built environment influences on travel behavior (Mokhtarian and Cao, 2008), although this might be a less severe problem when investigating populations exhibiting smaller degrees of social mobility. Adopting a strategy in accordance with this line of thinking would require a data collection effort that is mindful of cultural theories stemming from sociological research. To demonstrate, Hannerz (1992) explores the processes constituting cultural formation in modern society based on the following three principles: (1) ideas and modes of thought that relates to underlying concepts and values, (2) forms of externalization that function as physical place-making representations of the collective cognitive state, and (3) the spatial and social distributions of these fundamental elements of culture. In research that attempts to characterize populations in a homogeneous manner due to shared geopolitical boundaries (such as for community areas in the current study), it is critical for researchers to address the possibility of interacting subcommunities whose differences regarding the first two principles could induce tensions, due to perceived inequities in policy treatment. Therefore, although physical built environments and local knowledge conveyed through social networks might allow a certain degree of neighborhood-scale generalization when it comes to matters of transportation, there is bound to be significant heterogeneity in individual psychosocial attributes that must be addressed properly through any quantitative analysis. Returning to the idea of market segmentation, which has been explored in previous qualitative research on travel behavior (Nielsen et al., 2015), one possible direction would be to characterize subcommunities within a stage-of-change framework based on sociodemographic, life stage, and lifestyle information (Haustein and Hunecke, 2013), which could serve as input variables to latent class cluster analysis (McDonald et al., 2012). The overall research goal would be to capture heterogeneity across the stages regarding symbolic and affective meaning associated with new forms of mobility in the context of cultural integrity and preservation. Our research study is not without its limitations, though. Foremost among these is that focus group participants were recruited via convenience sampling through established networks rooted in the research team composition. As with most focus group work, representation is limited, although in our case the balance between men and women was precisely even across the whole sample. In Humboldt Park, focus group participants were all of Hispanic heritage and admittedly more informed on the topics than the average resident. Thus, it is erroneous to assume that Black residents, who comprise the majority of the population in the western half of the community area, and individuals who are not involved with educational programming originating from the Paseo Buricua district share the same perspectives. As for Evanston, participants were middle-aged and elderly white people; hence the discussion does not necessarily reflect the broader socio-demographic composition within the city limits, particularly members of the Millennial generation and racial/ethnic minority groups. Even though the findings are not truly generalizable, the utility of our novel methodological approach should be explored further in future research studies, particularly those that utilize larger sets of documents to improve the reliability of text mining results. Furthermore, the interpretation of findings still involves some subjectivity, although we argue it is less prevalent than in traditional content analysis. That being said, research that invites subjective interpretation is vital to promoting healthy dialogue between policymakers and neighborhood residents, especially when equity is a central issue. In summary, this comparative analysis of two community areas in the Chicago region illuminates an ideology of reduced car dependence that appears to be fairly independent of socioeconomic status. | 1b7d9dc7-8ca4-4496-b8fe-e79947d0a64f | 9 |
0b5ca8bc-7da4-4a8e-bb8b-82492acd9a94 | https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/changes-to-fuel-duty-rates/fuel-duty-rates-2022-23 | 2,022 | [
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] | gov.uk | In response to the global energy crisis, the UK government temporarily reduced rates of Fuel Duty for 12 months, from end March 2022.This includes cutting rates for diesel and unleaded and leaded petrol by GBP 0.05 per litre, with a proportionate percentage cut (equivalent to GBP 0.05 per litre from the main fuel duty rate of GBP 0.5795 per litre) in other lower rates and the rates for rebated fuels, where practical. | f846a53c-ef43-40a0-9e70-50b243541376 | 0 |
0b5f2779-c1c0-4fdb-80b4-57fa34848a76 | https://cdn.climatepolicyradar.org/navigator/GBR/1900/united-kingdom-updated-2030-ndc_c5fbbb52f2e6781bba1f8f32f5b44d29.pdf | 2,022 | [
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] | cdn.climatepolicyradar.org | It sets out the long-term vision for tackling the climate crisis and will be underpinned by the provisions of the recently passed Climate Change Act (Northern Ireland) 2022 with which it closely aligns. This longer-term Strategy will be delivered through a series of Climate Action Plans aligned to carbon budget periods, the first of which is to be developed by the end of 2023 and which will set out a series of policies and proposals to achieve the first carbon budget for the period 2023-27. The Green Growth Strategy is currently awaiting sign off by the NI Executive. Additionally, The Path to Net Zero44 is Northern Ireland’s current energy strategy and sets a long-term vision of net zero carbon and affordable energy for Northern Ireland by 2050. Local authorities play an essential role in driving action to tackle climate change with significant influence in energy, housing and transport. Across the UK, local authorities are actively driving progress on net zero. Local Government can also attract net zero private sector investment, which complements national approaches to attracting net zero HM Government works closely with local government and has provided support to help them contribute to delivering net zero. This • Establishing five Local Net Zero Hubs, each covering a region of England. The Hubs promote best practice and support local authorities to develop net zero projects and 43 Consultation on the draft Green Growth Strategy for Northern Ireland 44 Northern Ireland Energy Strategy - Path to Net Zero Energy
UK’s Nationally Determined Contribution – updated September 2022 attract commercial investment; • Funding work to develop business models to increase private sector investment in • Running the Local Net Zero Forum for national and local senior government officials to discuss local net zero policy and delivery issues. The UK recognises that women and girls – alongside other marginalised people – are disproportionately impacted by climate change and are also critical leaders and agents of change in climate action. The UK is dedicated to promoting equality and inclusion, including women’s empowerment, gender equality and the implementation of the UNFCCC Gender Action Plan. Public authorities must fulfil responsibilities set out under the UK’s Equality Act (2010)45, which covers a range of protected characteristics. The UK has agreed nuclear46 and offshore wind sector47 deals with specific targets established to increase workforce diversity. The UK also supports industry-led initiatives like POWERful women48 in order to address the lack of gender diversity in the green economy. The UK signed up to the Clean Energy Ministerial Clean Energy Education and Empowerment (C3E) Initiative49 in 2020. This initiative aims to advance women’s participation in the clean energy revolution and enable greater gender diversity in the clean energy professions. Under the UK’s G7 Presidency, G7 countries reaffirmed and strengthened their commitments under the Equal by 30 Campaign, the Clean Energy 45 UK Equality Act (2010) 46 Nuclear Sector Deal 47 Offshore Wind Sector Deal 48 POWERful women 49 C3E Initiative
UK’s Nationally Determined Contribution – updated September 2022 Ministerial campaign under which countries have committed to working towards equal pay, equal leadership and equal opportunities for women in the clean energy sector by 203050. The UK joined the International Energy Agency (IEA) Gender Advisory Council in 2021, which is intended to guide work on gender diversity and improve equal opportunities in the energy sector. It will help to take forward the IEA Gender Diversity Initiative and will strengthen collaboration with C3E and Equal by 30. During its COP26 Presidency, the UK sought to advance gender equality in its own climate action, to urge others to enhance gender-responsive climate action in their national contexts, and to learn from and amplify the good practices of other countries and observer organisations. The Glasgow Climate Pact resulted in strengthened language on gender and inclusion. The UK has provided funding and support to widen participation including the full, meaningful, and equal participation and leadership of women in all aspects of the UNFCCC. The UK continues to work with delivery partners to capture the impacts of International Climate Finance (ICF) programmes on certain groups of people and to embed gender mainstreaming into every stage of the programme cycle. The UK’s Climate Ambition Support Alliance (CASA)51 has provided funding for the active participation of women from Small Island Developing States (SIDS) in negotiations and has supported the European Capacity Building Initiative’s (ecbi) Women Negotiator Mentoring Initiative. The UK PACT (Partnering for Accelerated Climate Transitions)52 programme has developed gender equality and social inclusion (GESI) guidance53. This includes a requirement for applicants to state how their projects could support women and/or marginalised groups. As part of its commitments under 50 Equal by 30 Campaign 51 CASA 52 UK PACT 53 UK PACT GESI Guidance
UK’s Nationally Determined Contribution – updated September 2022 the Generation Equality Forum’s Action Coalition on Feminist Action for Climate Justice54, the UK will strengthen collection and use of data on gender, inclusion and climate. The UK is dedicated to supporting workers, communities and businesses to transition to net zero. HM Government convened the Green Jobs Taskforce55 to advise on the actions that government, industry and the education sector can take to create the skilled workforce to deliver net zero while supporting workers in high carbon sectors with the transition. It will also look to explore what actions can be taken across industry to improve diversity in the green economy, including improving data collection and transparency. Signed by over 30 major donor countries under the UK’s COP Presidency, the International Just Transition Declaration56 commits, for the first time, to embedding labour and human rights principles into overseas funding in developing and emerging economies. This supports a range of activities, from supporting social dialogues to investing in new, decent jobs for all. The Declaration also commits countries to ensuring that workers and communities in outgoing high-carbon supply chains are supported, and that procurement is made from green supply chains that adhere to minimum labour standards. | 66804fc0-e8e2-4615-a50d-cd3eaed0144f | 4 |
0b62a144-5781-4aa4-bac3-a14ca4e010c9 | https://cdn.climatepolicyradar.org/navigator/GBR/2023/united-kingdom-national-inventory-report-nir-2023_e2ed2f6c199088dc30a95fddf6e84c72.pdf | 2,023 | [
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] | cdn.climatepolicyradar.org | The ERT recommends that the Party include in the NIR (section 4.6.1 or 4.6.2, for example, in tabular or list format) the applications of CO2 that is recovered from ammonia production and sold to other industrial plants, clearly specifying for each application whether the associated emissions are reported under categories other than 2.B.1 (ammonia production), and if so, which categories. For the 2022 submission, in response to a reallocated a large part of the emissions occurring at integrated iron and steel plants from category 1.A.2.a (manufacturing industries and construction (iron and steel)) to category 2.C.1.b (iron and steel production (pig iron)). Specifically, all blast furnace gas and coke oven gas used at integrated iron and steel plants and all fuel used in blast furnaces were reallocated. The ERT noted that the description of the methodology to estimate emissions from iron and steel production in the NIR (pp.282285) has not been updated accordingly; in particular, on page 283, the Party states that emissions from the use of blast furnace gas and coke oven gas are reported by the process in which they are used (i.e. under category 1.A.2.a) rather than under category 2.C.1. The ERT noted the lack of consistency between the actual allocation of emissions to categories 1.A.2.a and 2.C.1.b (as reported in CRF tables 1.A(a)s2 and 2(I).AHs2 respectively) and the text explaining that allocation in the NIR (pp.282–285). During the review, the Party 2022 ARR I.14 Resolved. The text in Source Category 2C1 has been amended in the 2023 submission. Section 4.16
Recalculations and Improvements 10 UK NIR 2023 (Issue 1) Ricardo Energy & Environment Page 541 category/issue Recommendation made in previous review report Review report / paragraph Response Chapter / section noted the error on NIR page 283 identified by the ERT, but clarified that this reallocation of emissions between categories 1.A.2.a and 2.C.1.b is documented (NIR Method Statement 3, Method Statement 4 and p.517).The ERT recommends that the Party correct the text in the NIR (pp.282-–285 in the 2022 annual submission) regarding the allocation of emissions from the use of blast furnace gas and coke oven gas at integrated iron and steel plants to ensure that it reflects the allocation of these emissions between category 1.A.2.a (manufacturing industries and construction (iron and steel)) and category 2.C.1.b (iron and steel production (pig iron)). Recalculations and Improvements 10 UK NIR 2023 (Issue 1) Ricardo Energy & Environment Page 542 category/issue Recommendation made in previous review report Review report / paragraph Response Chapter / section emissions from lubricant use while it reported the AD for this category as “NO”. The Party reported AD on 2020). During the review, in response to a question raised by the ERT, the Party provided the ERT with the complete set of AD (amounts of lubricants used, in kt) covering the entire time series. The ERT recommends that the Party report AD on lubricant use UNFCCC Annex I inventory reporting guidelines. 2022 ARR I.15
Recalculations and Improvements 10 UK NIR 2023 (Issue 1) Ricardo Energy & Environment Page 543 category/issue Recommendation made in previous review report Review report / paragraph Response Chapter / section The ERT conducted an N balance check for manure management from the point of Nex entering MMS to the point of land application on the basis of data available in CRF tables 3.B(a)s2, 3.B(b) and 3.D. The amount of N leaving manure storage estimated by the ERT was lower than the reported amount of N applied to soils for 1990–2013 and higher than the amount reported for 2014–2020. During the review, the Party clarified that the values calculated by the ERT differ from the reported values owing to several factors not taken into account by the (1) consideration of emissions of N (dinitrogen/nitrogen gas) throughout manure management, (2) removal of poultry manure N going to incineration, (3) categorization of manure processed through anaerobic digestion as digestate when applied to land, with this manure therefore being included under category 3.D.2.c (other organic inclusion of bedding N in the N amounts reported in these factors into account, the ERT considers that the approach applied by the United Kingdom for calculating the N balance along the manure cascade is correct; however, it is not transparently described in the NIR. The Party also clarified that the structure of the CRF tables for reporting emissions from manure management do not align well with the more disaggregated nature of the United Kingdom’s agriculture model and stated that it will therefore provide more detailed output in the NIR and the annex to the NIR, including a full N balance check from the point of Nex entering MMS to the point of land application. The ERT recommends that the Party provide in the NIR information on all N flows from the point of Nex entering MMS to the point of land application in order to allow a transparent assessment of the N balance. 2022 ARR A.18 Resolved. A full balance check for manure management has been provided as a supplementary file to the NIR, including a full N balance check from the point of Nex entering MMS to the point of land application as requested by the previous ERT. Supplemental file
Recalculations and Improvements 10 UK NIR 2023 (Issue 1) Ricardo Energy & Environment Page 544 category/issue Recommendation made in previous review report Review report / paragraph Response Chapter / section During the review, in response to the issue raised by the ERT under ID# A.20 below, the Party noted that incorrect values for poultry Nex were entered in CRF throughout). The United Kingdom emphasized that this error has no impact on reported emissions for this category for those years. The ERT agreed that the reported emissions are not affected by the incorrect values for poultry Nex. The ERT recommends that the Party provide the correct values for poultry Nex in values have been corrected across the time series and the UK has strengthened its QAQC of the data submitted within the CRF. | 70afacf8-8641-4466-819d-f4db8cad9d69 | 422 |
0b634b12-0bd7-4af6-b520-82ef41e8a850 | https://cdn.climatepolicyradar.org/navigator/GBR/2023/united-kingdom-national-adaptation-plan-nap3_e883ae5eb9f5c4853101b85f93c01c4d.pdf | 2,023 | [
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] | cdn.climatepolicyradar.org | In addition, the fund used a novel bidding platform and a natural flood management modelling tool to rank bids from landowners with proposed measures during a live auction, supported Under the pilot 116 natural flood management interventions were implemented to hold back and temporarily store rainfall, successfully reducing flood risk and increasing the resilience of the road network. The interventions created additional storage of 6354m3 across the Irwell and Don catchments. Benefits from ‘avoided disruption costs’ associated with flooding were estimated at over £11 million for a 25-year evaluation period (source: National Highways, 2023 Alongside flood risk reduction, the interventions benefitted other ecosystem services such as increased biodiversity (an additional 12 units), carbon sequestration and greenhouse gas avoided emissions (an additional 22 tCO2e year), and co-benefits to air quality, water supply and water quality. These additional co-benefits were estimated to be worth over £200,000 for a 25-year evaluation period (source: National Highways, 2023 (internal)). The pilot project demonstrated the value that natural flood management interventions can have for delivering infrastructure resilience, and the benefits of partnership working. Lessons learnt from the pilot will be used to inform further similar initiatives by National Highways ensuring better social and environmental outcomes for communities and developing new strategies for
UK ports operate in a competitive market, servicing and supporting specific customers. Their success as businesses is dependent on them being able to respond and adapt to a changing economic and environmental landscape. They provide a crucial entry and exit point for goods and people arriving in or leaving the country so their resilience is particularly important for the integrity of supply chains and transportation of critical goods across the UK. Given their location, ports can be exposed to significant risk of coastal flooding, particularly along the east coast, which can disrupt not only the ports themselves but also the nearby road and rail networks used for onward transport of goods. High winds can also lead to the suspension of port and vessel operations. Adaptation can help to protect our ports from climate- • work with the ports sector to develop a regular monitoring survey to gather information on the frequency of disruption to port operations from weather, trialling this over the NAP3 implementation period • work with the ports sector including the British Ports Association, UK Major Ports Group and the UK Harbour Masters Association, to support their members to undertake the climate impact risk assessments and to embed their findings into business planning and operating procedures ahead of the fourth round of adaptation reporting Alongside other transport service operators across modes, port authorities are Category 2 responders under the Civil Contingencies Act 2004, so must cooperate and share information with other Category 1 and Category 2 authorities for the purposes of resilience and emergency response planning. DfT will continue to encourage ports to engage with LRFs effectively, to better understand how actions in response to the changing climate can support and benefit coastal communities, local The UK’s aviation sector operates in the private sector. Airports and airlines are diverse in their operations, each having their own business model to service and support specific customers. Their success as businesses is dependent on them being able to respond and adapt to a changing economic and environmental landscape. Climate change poses a range of risks to aviation, including runway
conditions, working conditions for ground staff facing heatwaves or storms, and the handling of aircraft by air traffic control. Understanding and responding to these risks can help to reduce disruption from climate change. • work closely with the aviation sector including airports and National Air Traffic Services (NATS) (who provide en-route air traffic control services within the UK) to encourage them to undertake climate impact risk assessments and to embed their findings into business planning and operating procedures ahead of the fourth round of adaptation reporting in 2024 Commercial airports and NATS • undertake regular monitoring programmes, which includes regular maintenance schedules of infrastructure and assets, and regular reviews of contingency and response plans to ensure the sector is resilient, continuing throughout the NAP3 DfT will support airports to coordinate with local stakeholders including LRFs, ground-handlers, airlines, NATS and the Civil Aviation Authority to build aligned plans for responding to emerging and current climate risks to the infrastructure and Data centres are important facilities that underpin our modern economy by processing, managing, storing and transacting digital data. Data centres enable retailers and banks to process financial payments, supermarkets to resupply, delivery companies to manage logistics and public authorities to deliver services and messaging. They depend on reliable power and water supply to maintain operations. While resilience-by-design is central to data centres’ business models, as this sector and the reliance of the wider economy on it grows so does its exposure to climate risk. This makes resilience of data infrastructure increasingly important. There are around 200 large sites run by commercial operators who provide data centre services to third parties. Within these sites, customers usually lease space for their own IT hardware which is located alongside the servers of other customers. These sites are geographically clustered, with around 70% of the UK market in and around the M25, concentrating the exposure of the sector to climate hazards. Some companies also run their own data centres (rather than using a third-party operator). This section does not include those in scope. The Department for Science, Innovation and Technology (DSIT) will develop a stronger risk management framework for the sector and will consult industry on this before the end of 2023, including consideration of the potential adverse effects from a range of hazards. DSIT will contribute to implementing commitments in the UK Government Resilience Framework, including the role of regulation and resilience DSIT will invite the industry trade body, TechUK, to participate in the fourth round of reporting under the Adaptation Reporting Power. | 1bfb3c10-e871-4dbe-bf9a-e8324f05946e | 10 |
0b6355c4-5877-4b66-9e07-ca9fb89fc724 | https://cdn.climatepolicyradar.org/navigator/GBR/2016/energy-act-2016-chapter-20_3630f8a413d5b29739d769ce6b96a95c.pdf | 2,016 | [
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] | cdn.climatepolicyradar.org | (2) After section 32LC (inserted by section 79 of this Act) insert— “32LD Onshore wind generating stations accredited, or additional capacity added, on or before the onshore wind closure date The circumstances set out in this section are where the electricity is— (a) generated by an onshore wind generating station which was accredited on or before the onshore wind closure date, and (i) the original capacity of the station, or (ii) additional capacity which in the Authority’s view first formed part of the station on or before the onshore wind 32LE Onshore wind generating stations accredited, or additional capacity added, in the year after the onshore wind closure grid or radar The circumstances set out in this section are where the electricity is— (a) generated using the original capacity of an onshore wind
(i) which was accredited during the period beginning immediately after the onshore wind closure date and ending with the first anniv ersary of the onshore wind (ii) in respect of which the grid or radar delay condition is (b) generated using a dditional capacity of an onshore wind (i) the station was accredited on or before the onshore wind (ii) in the Authority’s view, th e additional capacity first formed part of the station during the period beginning immediately after the onshore wind closure date and ending with the first anniv ersary of the onshore wind (iii) the grid or radar delay condition is met in respect of the 32LF Onshore wind generating stations accredited, or additional capacity added, on or before 31 March 2017: approved development condition The circumstances set out in this section are where the electricity is— (a) generated using the original capacity of an onshore wind (i) which was accredited on or before 31 March 2017, and (ii) in respect of which the approved development (b) generated using a dditional capacity of an onshore wind (i) the station was accredited on or before the onshore wind (ii) in the Authority’s view, th e additional capacity first formed part of the station on or before 31 March 2017, (iii) the approved development condition is met in respect of 32LG Onshore wind generating stations accredited, or additional capacity added, between 1 April 2017 and 31 March 2018: grid or radar delay The circumstances set out in this section are where the electricity is— (a) generated using the original capacity of an onshore wind (i) which was accredited during the period beginning with 1 April 2017 and ending with 31 March 2018, (ii) in respect of which the approved development (iii) in respect of which the gr id or radar delay condition is (b) generated using a dditional capacity of an onshore wind
(i) the station was accredited on or before the onshore wind (ii) in the Authority’s view, th e additional capacity first formed part of the station during the period beginning with 1 April 2017 and ending with 31 March 2018, (iii) the approved development condition is met in respect of (iv) the grid or radar delay condition is met in respect of the 32LH Onshore wind generating stations accredited, or additional capacity added, between 1 April 2017 and 31 January 2018: investment freezing The circumstances set out in this section are where the electricity is— (a) generated using the original capacity of an onshore wind (i) which was accredited during the period beginning with 1 April 2017 and ending with 31 January 2018, and (ii) in respect of which both the approved development condition and the investment freezing condition are (b) generated using a dditional capacity of an onshore wind (i) the station was accredited on or before the onshore wind (ii) in the Authority’s view, th e additional capacity first formed part of the station during the period beginning with 1 April 2017 and ending with 31 January 2018, and (iii) both the approved development condition and the investment freezing condition are met in respect of the 32LI Onshore wind generating stations accredited, or additional capacity added, between 1 February 2018 and 31 January 2019: grid or radar The circumstances set out in this section are where the electricity is— (a) generated using the original capacity of an onshore wind (i) which was accredited during the period beginning with 1 February 2018 and ending with 31 January 2019, (ii) in respect of which both the approved development condition and the investment freezing condition are (iii) in respect of which the gr id or radar delay condition is (b) generated using a dditional capacity of an onshore wind (i) the station was accredited on or before the onshore wind (ii) in the Authority’s view, th e additional capacity first formed part of the station during the period beginning with 1 February 2018 and ending with 31 January 2019,
(iii) both the approved development condition and the investment freezing condition are met in respect of the (iv) the grid or radar delay condition is met in respect of the 32LJ The approved development condition (1) This section applies for the purposes of sections 32LF to 32LI. (2) The approved development conditio n is met in respect of an onshore wind generating station if the documents specified in subsections (4), (5) and (6) were provided to the Authority with the application for (3) The approved development condition is met in respect of additional capacity if the documents specified in subsections (4), (5) and (6) were provided to the Authority on or before the date on which the Authority made its decision that the additional capacity could form part of an onshore wind generating station. | 76a3ebac-e043-439d-a229-7071f9f7d312 | 19 |
0b6747f7-91d9-4201-8368-3fd635d5dc14 | https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/1011283/UK-Hydrogen-Strategy_web.pdf | 2,021 | [
"hydrogen",
"carbon",
"energy",
"production",
"support"
] | assets.publishing.service.gov.uk | Chapter 2: Scaling up the hydrogen economy We will need to consider the type of commercial frameworks and ownership structures needed for end-to-end pipelines and for wider networks with many suppliers and end users. This will be particularly important when thinking about whether early commercial arrangements for the production and distribution of hydrogen will be sufficient to enable scale up of the hydrogen economy in the later 2020s, or whether changes are needed to support this. Issues related to regulating third-party access to infrastructure, monopolies and unbundling will need to be resolved to provide clarity to investors. Decisions on where CCUS infrastructure will be installed will impact the development of networks for CCUS-enabled hydrogen production and vice-versa. These two policy areas will need to be co-developed to ensure optimum outcomes in both areas are achieved. Decisions on heat and on the future of the existing gas network will have a significant impact on the size and design of hydrogen networks. While there may be efficiencies in repurposing parts of the gas network, this may not be appropriate for all parts of the We expect some non-pipeline distribution for areas without pipeline connections to emerge over the 2020s through trucks and other road transport, which could enable further use of hydrogen beyond production centres. We will need to understand the existing regulatory context for non-pipeline distribution and whether it is fit for purpose in an expanded hydrogen economy, as well as whether funding support would be needed. We recognise the need to put in place clear policies and supportive regulatory regimes and to build consumer acceptance to rapidly develop and deploy hydrogen networks. There is already a range of work ongoing to explore the development of hydrogen networks. A variety of joint government and industry research, development and testing projects are underway, designed to help determine the safety, feasibility, costs and benefits of converting the existing gas grid to carry 100 per cent hydrogen (see Chapter 2.4.3). This includes identifying and characterising the possible options to transition the gas grid, including repurposing the existing grid, building new networks, or transitioning parts of the grid. This work will support strategic decisions in the mid-2020s on the role of hydrogen for heating and linkages with the existing gas grid. Other projects, such as those set out below, will also help inform the evidence base for developing hydrogen network infrastructure. We will continue to support such research, development and testing projects to explore development of hydrogen network infrastructure. Exploring hydrogen network infrastructure Project Union explores the development of a UK hydrogen network which would join industrial clusters around the country, potentially spanning 2000km. This National Grid project would repurpose around 25 per cent of the current gas transmission pipelines and could carry at least a quarter of the UK’s current gas demand. The feasibility stage of the project is using net zero development funding to identify pipeline routes, assess the readiness of existing gas assets, and determine a transition plan for assets. The research will also explore how National Grid can start to convert pipelines in a H21 is a series of industry-led projects funded by Ofgem which test pure hydrogen in pipelines and connecting infrastructure to build the evidence base for hydrogen transport in dedicated pipelines. The findings from these programmes are being used to establish frameworks for pipeline safety which will be appraised by the HSE’s Science Division, and help inform government’s strategic decision on the longer-term role of hydrogen for heat by the mid-2020s (see Chapter 2.4.3). FutureGrid aims to create a representative transmission network to trial hydrogen. The network will be built from a range of decommissioned transmission assets and will allow for real-time testing and analysis of the network in operation. Blends of hydrogen up to 100 per cent will be tested at transmission pressures to assess how the re- purposed assets perform, with construction to launch this year and testing in 2022. FutureGrid will connect to Northern Gas Network’s existing H21 distribution network facility and the HyStreet homes to demonstrate that a complete ‘beach-to-meter’ network can be decarbonised. This £12.7million National Grid project is largely funded through Ofgem’s Network Innovation Competition (£9.1 million) with the remaining amount from project partners. To allow testing to be undertaken in a controlled environment with no risk to the safety and reliability of the existing gas transmission network, the hydrogen research facility will remain separate from the main National
Chapter 2: Scaling up the hydrogen economy Future Billing Methodology is a Cadent Gas project to explore a range of different options for future gas billing to prepare for potential changes to gas blends. Future consumer gas billing methodologies will need to reflect the differences in calorific value between methane, biomethane and hydrogen to enable blending of these gases into The Iron Mains Risk Reduction Programme decommissions gas distribution iron mains and replaces them with new plastic ones, which are potentially well-suited for transporting hydrogen within the existing gas grid over the long term. This project was introduced in 2002 and is regulated by the HSE. We will also consider whether the costs of small-scale distribution infrastructure and connecting to existing networks operated by third parties could be factored into overall project costs of production under the proposed hydrogen business model. We expect that this model is unlikely to be appropriate for large scale projects or pipelines which form part of a larger network infrastructure, and we will need to explore whether funding for these larger projects is appropriate and what that might look like. We will use the Hydrogen Business Model Consultation published alongside this strategy to seek views on a limited number of questions which will feed into the design of the business model and the hydrogen network review set out below. Beyond testing and evidence-building, we anticipate that work to explore investment signals and necessary amendments to legislation, regulatory frameworks and potential access to financing for hydrogen network projects in the early 2020s and the 2030s will be required. | 96babf55-7373-4dee-b481-d10889d10207 | 13 |
0b69469f-9a5a-4479-beb0-b1d93e379df0 | https://cdn.climatepolicyradar.org/navigator/GBR/2023/united-kingdom-national-inventory-report-nir-2023_8122f7d823bf366105239091fb57ffd2.pdf | 2,023 | [
"data",
"energy",
"emissions",
"inventory",
"environment"
] | cdn.climatepolicyradar.org | The UK inventory uses the RB209 (MAFF, 2000) soils classification, based on soil texture and depth to rock, with seven soil types (light sandy, shallow, medium, deep clay, deep fertile silty, organic, peaty). For each country, soil scientists from the James Hutton Institute (Scotland), National Soils Resources Institute University (England and Wales) and the Agri -Food and Biosciences Institute (Northern Ireland) applied the RB209 soil typology to national digital soils dataset s. The resulting United Kingdom map of RB209 soil types was spatially intersected with the reference 10 by 10 km grid to provide a statistical summary of the percent of the agricultural land area located on each of the RB209 soil types. | 9ce0b96e-2800-424e-bffb-cd8ba36e0902 | 341 |
0b6c26e5-fdd5-4e41-b2eb-de49620729d9 | http://arxiv.org/pdf/2310.14380v1 | 2,023 | [
"traffic",
"road",
"weather",
"speed",
"data"
] | arxiv.org | To this end, we employed the generalized additive model (GAM). GAM (Wood, 2003) is a semi-parametric generalized model that incorporates a linear predictor involving a series of additive non-parametric smooth splines of covariates (Wood, 2003). By utilizing different spline functions and link functions, GAM can accommodate various distributions and nonlinear effects within a unified framework (Wang et al., 2020b):
where 𝒀𝒀 is one of the six dependent variables, among which speed change and AUC are assumed to follow Gaussian distributions, while duration is assumed to follow a negative binomial (NB) distribution; 𝑔𝑔(. ) is the link function, with a logarithmic form for NB distribution and an identity form for Gaussian distribution; 𝛽𝛽 0 is the overall intercept; 𝛽𝛽 𝑘𝑘 is the coefficient of the k th variable 𝑿𝑿 𝑘𝑘 and 𝑁𝑁 𝐿𝐿 is the number of variables with linear effects; here we standardized all numeric variables by subtracting their mean and dividing by two times their standard deviation while leaving categorical variables unchanged (Gelman, 2008); 𝑓𝑓 𝑧𝑧 (𝑘𝑘) (. ) is the spline function of the k th variable 𝒁𝒁 𝑘𝑘 and 𝑁𝑁 𝑁𝑁 is the number of variables with nonlinear effects; 𝑠𝑠 𝑖𝑖,𝑗𝑗 is an nonlinear coordinate interactive term used to account for spatial autocorrelation; 𝜀𝜀 is the error term capturing the unexplained variation. This section offers a comprehensive comparison between crowdsourced and traditional data. This section summarizes the impacts of main weather events on traffic flow characteristics. Four distinct periods with significantly higher numbers of Waze users' reports are zoomed in and shown in Figure 6: the first two columns depict the two February winter storms, the third column represents the August flood, and the last column represents the December fog. As shown, the most drastic decrease in both volume and speed is observed during winter storms, followed by floods, while the impact of fog is relatively inconspicuous. Another visible pattern is that the duration of winter storm impact is much longer than that of floods, which aligns with the average recovery duration reported in Table 1 andTable 2: on average, road traffic takes approximately 11.20 hours to recover from the flood and requires 30.87 hours to recover from the winter storm. To quantify the difference, an unpaired t-test is employed to compare the mean value of hourly speed and volume among normal, minor, and heavy weather events, as shown in Table 3. Results reveal that at a network level, the weather impact intensifies as the weather level increases. Different weather events also exhibit varying impacts. Heavy winter storms have the most significant impact, leading to a 58.27% decrease in volume and a 12.55% decrease in speed, followed by heavy floods, leading to a 14.13% decrease in volume and a 4.60% decrease in speed. The impact of fog on traffic is limited; hence, it is excluded from the subsequent modeling process. Another noteworthy finding is that the weather impact on volume is considerably greater than that speed. However, one caveat here is that volume data come from 15 continuous traffic counters, primarily installed on high-class roads like freeways; thus, the volume change reported in this study is not as representative as the speed change obtained from network-wide crowdsourced data. -15.59, -9.51) Note: Light weather events are defined as the number of hourly Waze reports in the DFW area between 1 and 10, while heavy weather events are defined as the number of related reports exceeding 10. The spatial distributions of dependent variables are shown in Figure 7. As shown, speed change and AUC have similar patterns, while they exhibit an inverse pattern to event duration. This is plausible since more negative speed change, more negative AUC, and longer event duration are all indicative of more severe weather impacts. Another pattern is observed in the comparison between high-class roads (wider links in Figure 7) and local roads. High-class roads generally demonstrate greater speed reduction, longer duration, and more negative AUC, suggesting significant differences in weather impacts on traffic status across road types. The results of six cross-sectional GAMs are summarized in Table 4. The models consist of two parts: the parametric coefficients representing linear fixed effects and the nonparametric smooth terms representing nonlinear effects. In this study, the effects of most variables are considered linear since they are categorical. Only the spatial interaction terms are treated as nonlinear, and their estimated degrees of freedom (e.d.f.) are all significantly greater than 1, implying that the GAMs well captured the spatial nonlinear dependence. The goodness-of-fit, Deviance explained, longest recovery time and the greatest speed reduction, followed by arterials, collectors, and local streets. Compared to freeways, local streets experience 13.73% to 15.21% less speed reduction and require 53.46% (1 -𝑒𝑒 -0.765 ) to 56.91% (1 -𝑒𝑒 -0.842 ) less time for recovery. It is plausible since higher-class roads carry more traffic volume and are more prone to congestion when their capacity is curtailed. These findings also align with similar studies conducted in other cities under diverse weather conditions (Malin et al., 2019;Praharaj et al., 2021a). Lane Category: During winter storms, roads with 2-3 lanes experience the longest time to recover and undergo the greatest reduction in speed compared to roads with other lane numbers. This observation may be attributed to the fact that roads with 2-3 lanes often fall within a middle range in terms of capacity and importance. On the one hand, they receive relatively fewer resources and attention in recovery efforts, such as debris clearance and damage repair, when compared to higher-class roads with more lanes. On the other hand, compared to local streets with only one lane, roads with 2-3 lanes may endure greater traffic pressure shifting from affected higher-class roads whose capacity is substantially reduced during extreme weather. Divider Type, Intersection, and Frontage: The presence of dividers is not significantly associated with traffic resilience under floods. However, during winter storms, roads with physical dividers tend to recover faster and experience less speed reduction compared to roads without dividers. | 3a109c19-d5c7-4a98-80a0-2c24b5122be0 | 3 |
0b73a375-857e-4b11-9b55-abdea62a0d96 | https://cdn.climatepolicyradar.org/navigator/GBR/2023/united-kingdom-national-inventory-report-nir-2023_e2ed2f6c199088dc30a95fddf6e84c72.pdf | 2,023 | [
"emissions",
"data",
"inventory",
"energy",
"emission"
] | cdn.climatepolicyradar.org | skills gaps, continuity planning); • Task Managers/Sector Task managers (or sector experts) are responsible for the maintenance of task documentation (e.g. compiler manual, scope documents, quality checking records and correspondence) and task QA Pla n to definition of checking requirements; timeline delivery of work; coordination of task sign -off;
UK NIR 2023 (Issue 1) Ricardo Energy & Environment Page 80 identification of team training requirements and risk management. | 70afacf8-8641-4466-819d-f4db8cad9d69 | 55 |
0b78d3b4-851f-47bc-b548-bf0a2cea565d | https://cdn.climatepolicyradar.org/navigator/GBR/1900/united-kingdom-national-communication-nc-nc-8-biennial-reports-br-br-5_288d5f885869447df3e9910829b567a3.pdf | 2,022 | [
"climate",
"energy",
"support",
"emissions",
"carbon"
] | cdn.climatepolicyradar.org | Below are the key policies for Wales, more detail can be found in the Net Zero Wales Plan and in The Optimised Retrofit Programme (ORP) elsh Government’s ongoing development of retrofit policy and • Welsh Housing Quality Standard (WHQS) – Improving energy efficiency for elsh Government will continue to invest £108m per annum as a minimum, to support social landlords in meeting the new WHQS standard. Drawing on evidence from ORP the new WHQS 2022 standard will focus on Fabric First principles and seek to bring all social housing as close as feasible to EPC A or equivalent Part L of the Building Regulations provides guidance on the conservation of fuel and . It is Welsh Governments primary tool for raising minimum standards for new build housing and conversions. • Social Homes will lead by example being built to standards in elsh Government have made a commitment in its Programme for Government (PfG) and it will build 20,000 low carbon, social homes during this government term. • Developing Innovative construction techniques and increasing the use of While Part L sets the standard for what needs to be achieved in the construction of elsh Government have also invested £155m in the Innovative Housing Programme (IHP) over the last four years to work out how to best meet
Chapter 3 Policies and Measures 191 • Incentivising energy efficiency of homes through our Help to Buy – Wales chased using a Help to Buy Wales (HtBW) loan are market homes; they are not specifically developed for the scheme. This means builders will need to ensure all market homes meet new standards. Piloting Smart Flexible and Digitalised Systems to [maximise use of assets] elsh Government’s Smart Living (SL) initiative provides early support to develop place-based and innovative solutions to supply flexible, digital development Develop behaviour change interventions alongside our wider programmes elsh Government will continue to invest in specific behaviour change research relating to low carbon living. • Supporting the owner-occupied sector to improve energy efficiency and arm Homes Programme is the Welsh Governments key delivery mechanism in this area. Since 2011, Welsh Government has invested over £394m, benefitting more than 67,000 homes. It will continue to fund the current programme, before taking the new programme forward from 2023. The Department of Finance is planning a phased programme of uplifts to NI’s building regulations to provide ultra-high energy efficient building fabric and services with low carbon heating standards for new buildings as soon as is practicable and no later than 2026/27. Consideration may be given to earlier uptake of requirements for low carbon heating solutions from 2022/23, if deemed feasible. As an interim step to move towards net zero for 2050, a phase 1 uplift to new build standards took effect from 30 June 2022. A phase 2 discussion exercise will gather evidence, including whether an early introduction of requirements based on low carbon heating might be feasible in a phase 3 uplift in 2023. Full implementation of ‘net zero ready’ is anticipated by 2026/27. These phases will take into account developments in other administrations to address standards for work to existing buildings and in related areas, such as ventilation, overheating and, potentially in collaboration with the Department for Infrastructure (DfI), electric vehicle charge-point provisions. There is a need to remain alert to emerging developments in areas such as embodied carbon, fuel price assumptions and grid impacts. nergy Efficiency and Decarbonisation of Heating The Department for Communities (DfC) and the NI Housing Executive (NIHE) are working collaboratively to achieve the aim of mitigating the effects of climate change, reduce fuel poverty and improve health through a variety of projects, initiatives and strategies. There is a need for improved energy efficiency, decarbonisation of heating and transformational behaviour change through education and empowerment so that householders understand how to take full advantage of new sustainable technologies and solutions. There are a number of current initiatives ongoing as The Energy Efficiency in Social Housing project is a multi-million-pound investment programme to improve the energy performance of almost 1,900 homes. This has been made possible by funding of c. €23 million secured from the European Regional Development Fund
192 8th National Communication (ERDF) through its Investment for Growth and Jobs Programme for Northern Ireland 2014- 2020. A further €22 million of funding is being invested by NIHE. This six-year €45 million programme is expected to be completed by September 2023. The schemes no fines properties, improving thermal efficiency in aluminium bungalows through the provision of new external wall cladding, new double glazing and improved insulation measures. The Rural-Led Energy Transition (RULET) Pilot is a joint initiative between the NIHE and Ulster University, within SPIRE 2 – an EU funded project aimed at reducing or eliminating the risk of low-income households being left behind in the energy transition. RULET has evolved from the learning points of the HANDIHEAT 86 pilot project in County Fermanagh. RULET’s focus is on how domestic electrical heating systems, combined with energy storage, can be delivered and operated at scale. Another consideration is the potential to create significant system value by managing high levels of wind penetration into the electric network. Northern Ireland has world-leading levels of wind energy; however, when wind generation exceeds electricity demand, the output from wind turbines is dispatched down – ‘tuned off’. In 2020, 15% of available wind energy with a retail value of over £80m, was dispatched down. This has potential to benefit low The RULET project commenced on site in winter 2021 and monitoring will continue over the Through a 300 Unit Low Carbon Programme, NIHE will deliver a thermal improvement oved energy efficiency measures, oved householder education to effect behaviour change, The aim is to commence this programme in winter 2022/23, complete installations by winter 2023/24 and monitor until late 2024. The objective is to compile a comprehensive suite of data and key learning points to help inform a revised Decarbonised Heating Policy for the Landlord and the private grants sector. | e6994b55-18ee-49c8-92db-2261135aea96 | 75 |
0b853c7f-44a1-4b08-873f-bd9c0c89c766 | https://cdn.climatepolicyradar.org/navigator/GBR/2025/united-kingdom-national-inventory-report-nir-2025_3d22864cf237013c86452d4c6455250a.pdf | 2,025 | [
"emissions",
"data",
"inventory",
"emission",
"used"
] | cdn.climatepolicyradar.org | November 17, 2016. ni.gov.uk/articles/northern-ireland-countryside-survey DAERA (20192020) Agricultural Census in Northern Ireland 2018 2020 ni.gov.uk/articles/agricultural-census-northern-ireland DECC (2011) Submission of information on forest management reference levels by United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland in accordance with Decision 2/CMP.6. Available DECC (2016) The United Kingdom’s Initial Report under the Second Commitment Period of
UK NID 2025 (Issue 1) Ricardo Page 577 Defra, (2020), Structure of the agricultural industry in England and the UK at June. | 95866fde-5b53-4214-b279-97a1078c466c | 438 |
0b948645-7ad8-4836-9ac3-165df8a38e50 | http://arxiv.org/pdf/2108.03722v2 | 2,021 | [
"adaptation",
"technologies",
"patents",
"mitigation",
"climate"
] | arxiv.org | Nevertheless, short term mitigation benefits of this technology are strong and -assuming a positive mitigation impact-it also contributes to adaptation in the long run if it helps reduce the impact of climate change. We investigate the extent to which different mitigation and adaptation technologies build on a common knowledge base. | e7c5ec21-08e6-4ef3-84cf-6a259e7f7c53 | 74 |
0b9fc391-56e4-4626-8003-15d58be5da3b | http://arxiv.org/pdf/1902.01398v1 | 2,019 | [
"economy",
"business",
"world",
"people",
"social"
] | arxiv.org | This might seem well and good, an accepted norm of how things are, but the fact that all of these business models allow for the private distribution of profit and assets does something very damaging to the dynamics of the economy. In a healthy economy, wealth keeps circulating throughout the system, so that we all have enough to meet our needs. We call this the 'Wealth Circulation Pump'. Indeed, this is what happens in our economy. Much like a water circulation pump keeps hot water flowing through the pipes of a house, we take money in the form of wages and send money back out into the flow of the economy by spending it. If the wealth circulation pump is functioning properly, then money keeps flowing naturally around the economy to where it's needed. Theories of capitalism i say that the wealth circulation pump is primed mainly by capitalists investing in businesses. The idea is that the innate urge of investors and business owners to make more money compels them to reinvest their wealth in more business activities and this reinvestment benefits the economy, at large. It creates more jobs, which allows more people to participate in more economic activities. This has been called the Invisible Hand of the market. It is supposed to keep money constantly pumping through the economy It is clear that this is not what's happening in today's economy. So far, the 21 st century has been an age of extreme wealth inequality. 15,16 We can all sense that something is interfering with the Wealth Circulation Pump. What is it? We call it the 'Wealth Extraction Siphon'. This is how it works. For-profit businesses distribute surplus to owners, investors and shareholders. They then use their wealth primarily to invest in more business ownership (equity) to receive more profits and capital gains. They receive more wealth from the returns on their investments and use that new wealth to invest in more equity, and so it continues in a feedback loop. The people who own the most equity in businesses are the wealthiest people in society and their wealth allows them to buy even more equity in businesses (they don't need to go into debt to do this), so they are able to multiply their wealth like no one else. This does contribute to the wealth circulation pump to an extent, as the capitalists' businesses pay wages, allowing their employees to continue to buy the things they need. But their aim is to take out more than they put in and they do that very well. Thus, their activities extract more wealth than they circulate, which is why capitalism has an overall trend towards greater inequality. 17 The little amount of wealth that trickles down from the rich simply cannot compensate for the speed at which wealth is being extracted from the real economy. Recent studies show that the super-rich receive a large portion of their income from the real economy of goods and services, but rather than putting that wealth back into the real economy, they put most of it into the elite economy of luxury goods and services and financial assets. 18,19,20,21 We call this the elite economy because it is a speculative market that only those who have a certain amount of extra money can afford to participate in. As the incomes of the rich continue to rise while the average household income continues to drop, the elite economy becomes even less accessible to the average person. A recent Oxfam report found that the richest 1% of the world's population now own more than the other 99% combined. 22 Although this level of inequality rightly angers many people, it's very important to understand that wealthy people are simply doing what is considered rational in an economy that revolves around profit and the private accumulation of wealth. This is not a phenomenon of a few bad apples acting greedily and intentionally creating their own elite economy, despite economic rules that encourage contributing to the wider community. Instead, it is a natural outcome of a system that holds greed as the primary source of motivation. It's a fundamental feature of the for-profit economy. For-profit business acts as a siphon, sucking the surplus out of the real economy into the elite economy. Some people might ask, "But the wealthy are investing in the stock market. Isn't that part of the pump?" Most of us believe that the stock market serves primarily as a mechanism of investment -that when people buy shares in a company, they are investing in that company and providing it with the capital it needs to grow. However, this is only the case when a company offers shares on what's called the primary market for the first time, through an Initial Public Offering, or via a further stock issuance. The vast majority of stock market transactions happen in the secondary market (like the New York Stock Exchange), and do not give companies any capital or investment funds. 23 Rather this is the domain of pure speculation. When shares are traded after their initial sale, money just bounces between traders, never touching the company's bank account (or the real economy). The for-profit system encourages speculation and short-term thinking; two ingredients that have proven to be extremely destructive on a planet that we must all share and look after for future generations. When you buy stock in a company on Wall Street, you are more or less placing a bet, speculating that your chosen company will generate more profit than last year or, at the very least, it will not lose money. Just as when you bet on a horse or a dog at the racetrack, if the company gains money, so do you, as a speculator. If the company loses money, so do you. It is speculative. It is gambling. Big traders often make gains from the losses of smaller traders, who have less experience and knowledge about the stock market. | 7aa7f968-38f8-4177-8669-ac6d65db7e5a | 5 |
0ba36db4-7267-4621-bf48-401b49cc8e69 | http://arxiv.org/pdf/2412.03598v1 | 2,024 | [
"geoengineering",
"methane",
"climate",
"would",
"global"
] | arxiv.org | Figure 2 gives a good visualization of the drastic reduction in the effects of moderate geoengineering in a world where an additional 0.12 Gt of methane is released into the atmosphere each year. In the first couple of years, methane release is able to nearly eliminate SRM's radiative forcing. After 5 years, even as methane's warming potential starts to decline, additional leakage is still able to reduce the effects of SRM by around 90%. As the yellow line's departure from RCP 4.5 in Figure 2 suggests, in longer timeframes it is likely that geoengineering would eventually have a significant effect as the warming potential of methane declines over time. It may also be increasingly costly to maintain a high level of methane leakage. However, within 5 years it seems feasible for a country to eliminate the effects of geoengineering by deliberately increasing its methane leakage from natural gas production, which can have consequential effects for the initial rollout of geoengineering. An additional 25% leakage in natural gas production would significantly reduce Russia's earnings from natural gas, which may be costly as time goes on. However, in the short-term, drastic reductions in natural gas production would likely be feasible. Between 2020 and 2022, Russia's natural gas production fell by over 16%, and other areas of the world have seen larger falls in a similarly short period of time (Enerdata 2024). Although a 25% fall in natural gas production would be very significant, it may not pose enough of a cost in the short term to deter a counter-geoengineering response. Additionally, this calculation relies solely on methane, and likely overestimates the required amount of natural gas leakage to counteract SRM's radiative forcing as natural gas' non-methane components contain other warming agents. Other previously mentioned warming agents, such as chlorofluorocarbons, are dozens of times more potent than methane and could also aid in counter-geoengineering. Although they have much higher lifetimes than methane and are thus considered implausible as counter-geoengineering solutions, a very small release could have a very significant effect. Finally, we are conservative in our use of the higher end of SRM's estimated radiative forcing, further indicating that counter-geoengineering may be realizable in the short term. The viability of counter-geoengineering as a way to keep the world on its current warming trajectory in a "moderately" geoengineered world makes geoengineering an infeasible solution to climate change. More aggressive versions of geoengineering have already faced significant pushback due to their potential risks, and have consistently been rejected by global leaders (Civillini 2024, Limb 2024, and Tollefson 2024). Furthermore, large-scale geoengineering would likely provide even more incentive for aggressive response from countries like Russia due to a possible self-defense argument resting on a quantifiable increase in cold-related deaths. This paper shows that solutions deemed moderate, which may pose less risks, would have to contend with their own set of problems. It is all but certain that global adherence to the deployment of geoengineering would not be complete. Not only is this already suggested by the contentious nature of the solution in academic circles, but it is also supported by the fact that some countries stand to benefit economically and geopolitically from rising temperatures. The existence of a viable way to counteract moderate geoengineering poses an existential threat to the solution's achievability, as any effort to maintain the solution's effectiveness in a counter-geoengineered world would create great levels of geopolitical tension. In a world that lacks complete agreement on the deployment of geoengineering, it is virtually impossible to impose the solution on every country. This is especially true given that geoengineering with methane release is unpredictable and can be deployed at a moment's notice without warning. Countries implementing geoengineering would have to contend with governability issues inherent to solutions implemented on a planetary scale with worldwide consequences. In the case of geoengineering, concerns over the governability of its implementation have even prompted calls for an international non-use agreement (Biermann et al. 2022). The possibility of conflicts arising from geoengineering is a major threat to the solution's feasibility. These conflicts may pose significant security issues globally, with the risk of a collapse in global cooperation, and even the potential of war (Corry 2017). Conflicts may be even more likely with successful counter-geoengineering, as tensions rise between countries on different sides of the issue. Countries implementing a moderate version of geoengineering would have no plausible way of interrupting counter-geoengineering by other countries without a large global conflict, thus rendering their solution ineffective. An alternative to forceful adherence to geoengineering would be a ramp-up in stratospheric aerosol release, though, as widely discussed, greater levels of geoengineering pose much greater ecological and security risks that may not be worth taking. This analysis lends itself to a game theory approach. If we think of ourselves, under current mitigation measures, as in an equilibrium, geoengineering would represent a deviation that is at first positive for countries responsible for the solution and negative for others. Counter-geoengineering would then represent a retaliatory deviation that would benefit some countries as compared to a geoengineered world. This would lead the world into a new equilibrium, where both sets of countries are worse off than they were initially. The temperature remains the same due to the counteracting effects of sulfur and methane, but the world now relies on sulfur and methane release to keep that equilibrium. If an agreement is reached to stop both counter-geoengineering and geoengineering, there would be a much faster increase in worldwide temperatures than current rates as a result of the excess methane in the atmosphere that aerosols suddenly would not counteract. This makes for an even worse end-state scenario for geoengineering parties, as they would have to incur the costs of geoengineering with no way to make an agreement to leave the worse equilibrium state. | 4691bdce-3829-401f-9e93-50ed134fec30 | 5 |
0ba490dc-41be-462e-95cf-1edec4ef58e0 | https://www.gov.uk/guidance/woodland-carbon-guarantee
https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/843628/4.1.4_FC_A5_Leaflet_Woodland_Carbon_Guarantee_WEB_FINAL.pdf | 2,020 | [
"energy",
"development",
"article",
"management",
"protection",
"water",
"measure",
"environment",
"consist",
"resource"
] | gov.uk | The Woodland Carbon Guarantee is an incentive scheme to help accelerate woodland planting rates across
England. These new woodlands will permanently remove CO2 from the atmosphere. The guaranteed price for your CO2 is agreed with the government through an online reverse auction. In order to bid in the auction, the applicant need to calculate how much money will be needed(per tonne of CO2) to the planting project be viable and worthwhile. If the bid is successful in the auction, the government will buy the CO2 for the bid price. | a1db3b55-3ab9-4edd-bab7-b55c80504f7a | 0 |
0bbf1b39-98b0-477b-8de1-debbe0ff8aa1 | http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/AUTO/?uri=CELEX:31999L0094&qid=1448884429550&rid=1 | 2,000 | [
"Transport",
"Light-duty vehicles",
"Energy efficiency"
] | eur-lex.europa.eu | the information in the poster is easy to read;3. the passenger car models are grouped and listed separately according to fuel type (e.g. petrol or diesel). Within each fuel type, models are ranked in order of increasing CO2 emissions, with the model with the lowest official fuel consumption being placed at the top of the list;4. for each passenger car model in the list the make, the numerical value of the official fuel consumption and the official specific emissions of CO2 are given. The value of the official fuel consumption is expressed in either litres per 100 kilometers (l/100 km), kilometers per litre (km/l), or an appropriate combination of these, and is quoted to one decimal place. The official specific emissions of CO2 are quoted to the nearest whole number in grams per kilometre (g/km).Such values may be expressed in different units (gallons and miles) to the extent compatible with the provisions of Directive 80/181/EEC.A suggested format is shown below:>PIC FILE= \"L_2000012EN.002202.EPS\">5. the poster contains the following text regarding the availability of the guide on fuel economy and CO2 emissions: \"A guide on fuel economy and CO2 emissions which contains data for all new passenger car models is available at any point of sale free of charge;\"6. the poster contains the following text: \"In addition to the fuel efficiency of a car, driving behaviour as well as other non-technical factors play a role in determining a car's fuel consumption and CO2 emissions. CO2 is the main greenhouse gas responsible for global warming;\"7. the poster will be completely updated at least every six months. Between two updates, new cars will be added to the bottom of the list.ANNEX IVTHE PROVISION OF DATA ON FUEL CONSUMPTION AND CO2 EMISSIONS IN PROMOTIONAL LITERATUREThe Member States must ensure that all promotional literature contains the official fuel consumption and official specific CO2 emissions data of the vehicles to which it refers. This information should, as a minimum, meet the following requirements:1. be easy to read and no less prominent than the main part of the information provided in the promotional literature;2. | 918d42bc-8bce-45e1-8a04-8686083f8f22 | 8 |
0bc18906-7e8e-4cd9-ba0f-9833568870b2 | http://arxiv.org/abs/2104.11698v1 | 2,021 | [
"Bakun's effect",
"South Pacific Anticyclone",
"Coastal upwelling",
"Primary productivity",
"MODIS",
"ERA-Interim Model"
] | ArXiv | These analyses were implemented with the "mgcv" package (Wood, 2006) for R statistical computing version 3.4.0 (R Core Team 2019) and have been used before to analyse time series of hydrographical and biological variables (Harding et al., 2016). A linear fit was applied to the long-term trend component to obtain a time integrated slope or rate of change for wind stress, SST and Chl-a. In order to infer spatial patterns in temporal trends these slopes were calculated for each smoothed superpixel of 12 20 km in the case of MODIS data and for each 0.75 deg pixel in the case of ERA Interim wind stress estimates and represented in maps for the whole region. To examine the coherence of the long-term trends among seasons, especially during the period of maximum primary productivity in spring, linear trends for each season were performed separately for each wind stress pixel and MODIS superpixel. Seasonal means for each variable were obtained using the following periods: spring (September to November), summer (December to February), autumn (March to May) and winter (June to August). Seasonal slopes of these linear trends were also represented in maps for the whole region. Since previous studies have reported that poleward displacement of SPA has accelerated since 2007 (Schneider et al., 2017;Aguirre et al., 2018), mean seasonal sea level pressure maps for the periods 2003-2007 and 2008-2015 were compared in search of contrasting spatial patterns in the location of the SPA. We also calculated the difference in meridional wind stress, SST and Chl-a between the two periods for those coastal areas showing the most contrasting long term trends in Chl-a within the study domain. Chl-a and SST data were averaged for the first 100 km offshore at these coastal areas and the respective 0.75 deg pixels were selected to calculate the differentials of wind stress between the periods before and after 2007. These differentials were compared with those observed in previous studies further south at 36.5 deg S (Schneider et al., 2017;Aguirre et al., 2018). Time series of monthly SPA latitudinal position revealed strong seasonality, with the core of the anticyclone located at 29 deg S in austral winter (July and August) We observed highly significant positive long-term trends in sea-land thermal differences (i.e. Bakun effect), yet the temporal pattern showed a clear latitudinal discontinuity. North of about 30 deg S, a significant increase took place in both annual and spring sea-land pressure gradient, with a slope of about 0.08 deg C year -1 over the timespan considered. South of 30 deg S, annual pressure differential showed no trend and the slope remained close to 0, while spring pressure differential showed a non-significant positive trend at some latitudinal bands . On average, across the entire study region, long-term trends of meridional wind stress were mostly positive for the entire year at around 0.001 N m -2 year -1 , with slightly steeper trends north from 28 deg S and nearly null or even slightly negative trends (-0.0005 N m -2 year -1 ) close to shore between 30o-34 deg S. During the spring upwelling months, two contrasting regions in terms of trends in wind stress were clearly defined. Firstly, a region or domain north of 30 deg S, where marked increases in meridional wind stress took place at a rate of more than 0.002 N m -2 year -1 at 27 deg S. Secondly, a region or domain south of 30 deg S to 35 deg S, where meridional winds decreased at rates around 0.0015 N m -2 year -1 . Intensification of upwelling winds in the northern domain also took place during summer, while in autumn the increasing trend was only evident offshore (<100 km off the coast) in between 31o S to 34 deg S (S1). The response of SST yearly averages over the study period has been a coastal warming of around 0.05 deg C year -1 in the region south of ca. 29 deg S and down to 35 deg S , reaching maximum values of 0.1 deg C year -1 just north of Punta Lengua de Vaca (e.g. 30 deg S, Fig. 3B). Further north, around 27 deg S, yearly average temperatures have decreased at rates of 0.075 deg C year -1 . In austral spring months, long-term trends indicate a warming rate of 0.05 deg C year -1 along most of the domain, except for a coastal band north of about 28 deg S, where surface cooling has taken place . Similar cooling patterns were observed for austral winter months further offshore (>80 km offshore, S1). Long-term yearly trends in surface Chl-a emphasize the contrast between a northern domain, between 26 deg S and 30 deg S and a southern domain that extends to 35 deg S. Equatorward, yearly primary productivity has increased at rates of 0.4 mg m -3 year -1 , while in the poleward domain it has decreased at faster rates (-0.6 mg m -3 year -1 , Fig. 2C-D). A transition region of little or no temporal trends in overall Chl-a persisted around 30o-31 deg S . Spring months showed a broadly similar pattern marked by mesoscale spatial structure. Sharp long-term decreases in Chl-a with rates steeper than -1.2 mg m -3 year -1 were widespread in the southern domain, especially between 34o-35 deg S , while the northern domain showed increases of about 0.4 mg m -3 year -1 , for example between 29o-28 deg S, but other coastal areas show little or no change . Similar contrasting trends between the two latitudinal domains were observed for the rest of the seasons (S1). Daily time series of in situ Chl-a at ECIM were highly consistent with the pattern in primary productivity found at the southern domain from satellite data. Starting in 2008, the characteristic spring and fall blooms that were apparent in the time series between1999-2008, had all but disappeared , generating a marked long-term decrease in situ Chl-a concentration at this coastal site. | fb18a782-4282-4a70-aecb-2fa0f1cf44dc | 2 |
0bc60671-1bb9-4e02-9e9d-381cd049bbc3 | http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:L:2008:199:0001:0136:EN:PDF | 2,008 | [
"Transport",
"Light-duty vehicles",
"Energy efficiency"
] | eur-lex.europa.eu | 3.13. Technical requirements for a vehicle equipped with a periodically regenerating system
3.13.1. The technical requirements shall be those set out in section 3 of Annex 13 to UNECE Regulation No 83, with the
exceptions described in sections 3.13.2 to 3.13.4. 3.13.2. The reference to Annex 1, items 4.2.11.2.1.10.1 to 4.2.11.2.1.10.4 or 4.2.11.2.5.4.1 to 4.2.11.2.5.4.4 in sec-
tion 3.1.3 shall be understood as references to items 3.2.12.2.1.11.1 to 3.2.12.2.1.11.4 or 3.2.12.2.6.4.1
to 3.2.12.2.6.4.4 of Appendix 3 to Annex I of Regulation EC No 6922008. | d3fc6859-41cb-4ee2-997b-90ebc4f9b481 | 267 |
0bc85026-1a4e-47e6-aeab-4bc374202340 | https://cdn.climatepolicyradar.org/navigator/GBR/2020/agriculture-act-2020_89bf740371b886d403c833463a2d589f.pdf | 2,020 | [
"Agriculture",
"Meat",
"regulations",
"section",
"provision",
"made",
"regulation"
] | cdn.climatepolicyradar.org | (a) in subsection (2)(b), at the end insert “(unless any of subsections (2A) to (2C) (b) after subsection (2) insert— “(2A) The following regulations may not be made unless a draft of the instrument containing them has been laid before, and approved by a resolution of, each House of Parliament— (a) the first regulations made by the Secretary of State under section 74A(1) after the coming into force of this subsection which contain provision under section 74A(1A) to (1E); (b) any other regulations made by the Secretary of State under section 74A(1) which contain provision under section 74A(1A)(b) or (1E)(a)(i) or (ii). (2B) The following regulations may not be made unless a draft of the instrument containing them has been laid before, and approved by a (a) the first regulations made by the Welsh Ministers under section 74A(1) after the coming into force of this subsection which contain provision under section 74A(1A) to (1E); (b) any other regulations made by the Welsh Ministers under section 74A(1) which contain provision under section 74A(1A)(b) or (1E)(a)(i) or (ii). (2C) The following regulations made by the Scottish Ministers are subject to the affirmative procedure (as to which, see section 29 of the Interpretation and Legislative Reform (Scotland) Act 2010)— (a) the first regulations made by the Scottish Ministers under section 74A(1) after the coming into force of this subsection which contain provision under section 74A(1A) to (1E); (b) any other regulations made by the Scottish Ministers under section 74A(1) which contain provision under section 74A(1A)(b) or (1E)(a)(i) or (ii). (2D) The following regulations may not be made unless a draft of them has been laid before, and approved by a resolution of, the Northern (a) the first regulations made by a Northern Ireland department under section 74A(1) after the coming into force of this subsection which contain provision under section 74A(1A) (b) any other regulations made by a Northern Ireland department under section 74A(1) which contain provision under section 74A(1A)(b) or (1E)(a)(i) or (ii).” (6) In section 86 (modifications for Northern Ireland), in subsection (9), in the paragraph (b) treated as substituted for section 84(2)(b), after “1954” insert “(unless 34 Identification and traceability of animals (1) In the Natural Environment and Rural Communities Act 2006, after section 89 insert—
PART 4 – Matters relating to farming and the countryside CHAPTER 3 – Producer organisations Document 2023-04-25 This is the original version (as it was originally enacted). “89A Identification and traceability of animals (1) Where the Secretary of State makes or has made an order under section 87(1) (a) establishing a body, the functions that may be assigned to the body under section 87(1)(b) by the Secretary of State include functions that are exercisable in relation to England, Wales, Northern Ireland or Scotland and (a) collecting, managing and making available information regarding the identification, movement and health of animals, or (b) the means of identifying animals. (2) An order of the Secretary of State assigning functions under section 87(1)(b) by virtue of subsection (1) may only be made with the approval of— (a) the Welsh Ministers, if the functions are exercisable in relation to (b) the Department of Agriculture, Environment and Rural Affairs in Northern Ireland, if the functions are exercisable in relation to (c) the Scottish Ministers, if the functions are exercisable in relation to (3) Provision made by virtue of subsection (1) may not require or authorise the disclosure or use of information in contravention of the data protection legislation (within the meaning of section 3 of the Data Protection Act 2018). (4) In this section “animals” has the same meaning as it has for the purposes of section 8 of the Animal Health Act 1981.” (2) In the Animal Health Act 1981, in section 8 (movement generally)— (a) in subsection (1)(a), for “the marking of animals” substitute “— (i) in relation to England or Wales, the means of (ii) in relation to Scotland, the marking of animals,”; (b) after subsection (1) insert— “(1A) Provision made under subsection (1)(a) made by the Secretary of State or the Welsh Ministers may bind the Crown.” (3) In Regulation (EC) No 1760/2000 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 17 July 2000 establishing a system for the identification and registration of bovine (a) in Article 1 (member States to establish systems for the identification and registration of bovine animals), at the end insert— “3 This Title does not apply in relation to England or Wales.”, and (b) in Article 22 (compliance)— (i) in paragraph 1 at the end insert— “The fourth, fifth and sixth subparagraphs do not apply in relation (ii) in paragraph 2 at the end insert— “This paragraph does not apply in relation to England or Wales.”
34 Agriculture Act 2020 (c. 21) PART 4 – Matters relating to farming and the countryside CHAPTER 3 – Producer organisations Document 2023-04-25 This is the original version (as it was originally enacted). (4) In Council Regulation (EC) No 21/2004 of 17 December 2003 establishing a system for the identification and registration of ovine and caprine animals, in Article 1 (member States to establish systems for the identification and registration of ovine and caprine animals), at the end insert— “3 This Regulation does not apply in relation to England or Wales.” 35 Red meat payments between levy bodies in Great Britain (1) A scheme under this section (“the scheme”) may— (a) make provision for amounts of red meat levy collected by the levy body for one country in Great Britain to be paid to the levy body for another such (b) amend, suspend or revoke an earlier scheme made under this section. | 3e1dc126-b4c5-485a-9c8b-bd6fbde83f24 | 13 |
0bc8c76e-1328-4e6a-ba08-56ff12beb106 | https://cdn.climatepolicyradar.org/navigator/GBR/2024/clean-power-2030-action-plan_9a166355c3212349aff192a8697f8558.pdf | 2,024 | [
"Energy",
"Energy Supply",
"National Energy And Climate Plans",
"Energy Storage",
"Energy Transition",
"clean",
"power",
"energy",
"government",
"system"
] | cdn.climatepolicyradar.org | This includes working with Ofgem to explore the appropriateness of tightening the incentives and penalties on electricity transmission owners and distribution network operators to drive the acceleration of network delivery. The Scottish and Welsh Governments are considering how their planning and consenting regimes will also integrate with An improved planning and consenting environment will accelerate the expansion and upgrade of transmission and distribution networks. We will consult on expanding planning consent exemptions to include low-voltage connections and upgrades in England, and engage with M H C L G on opportunities to provide further flexibilities for the consenting of electrical substations. It is essential that we engage effectively and thoroughly with communities that will host new transmission network infrastructure, so they can be a part of the change to our The Scottish Government will shortly consult on the refresh of its Good Practice Principles for community benefits for onshore and offshore net zero energy infrastructure. The government’s view is that communities that host clean energy infrastructure should benefit from it. As a first step, we will publish guidance to increase the quantum and consistency of Community Funds and support the launch of industry public communications campaigns to encourage public awareness on the importance of networks infrastructure in With a prioritised grid queue, we can signal key projects for clean power and speed up planning and consenting processes across Britain. We will ensure communities directly benefit from hosting new clean energy infrastructure. We know that the majority of 2030 clean power projects are already in the pipeline, and so there is therefore a major opportunity in rewiring the planning system and unblocking bottlenecks to ensure projects can receive timely decisions so they We will do this first by upgrading the planning system itself, equipping organisations with the flexibility they need to manage the increased caseload it faces. This includes workforce reform and development as well as a commitment to reviewing resourcing Next, we will ensure the system can prioritise 2030-critical projects. We will make 2030 a core priority in updated planning policy vehicles and guidance. We have brought onshore wind back in to the Nationally Significant Infrastructure Project (N S I P ) regime. We will bring forward a Planning and Infrastructure Bill with measures to streamline the delivery of critical infrastructure in the planning process, and convene community, nature, and industry groups on complex projects to stress-test them prior to application. In line with Lord Banner’s recommendations, we will also progress work exploring changes to the legal challenge process for major We will ensure that a reformed planning system enhances the restoration of nature. We will do this by delivering the Marine Recovery Fund for Offshore Wind and are considering strategic mitigation approaches for onshore infrastructure in England. The U K government and the Scottish Government
are also working together to establish a similar Marine Recovery Fund for Devolved administrations are taking positive steps towards speeding up energy infrastructure planning and consenting too. In Wales, the Infrastructure (Wales) Act 2024 sets out the new consenting process for significant infrastructure projects, replacing multiple consenting processes in Wales with a single process. In Scotland, work is underway to secure the pipeline of future planners and increase skills and capacity within planning authorities. We are working closely with the Scottish Government on reform to deliver a streamlined and efficient legislative framework for electricity Renewable and nuclear project delivery Addressing blockages to networks, connections and planning progress will significantly help us deliver the renewable capacity we need for 2030. But there are The Contracts for Difference allocation process needs to meet our 2030 ambitions and put an end to the stop-start failures of recent years. We need high levels of renewables to protect consumers and they need to be secured at the best price. Offshore wind has a particularly important role as the backbone of the Following discussions with industry and subject to further assessment, we are minded to implement a package of targeted reforms. We will consider changes to the information the Secretary of State can use to inform the final budget for fixed-bottom offshore wind, an auction schedule to improve transparency and predictability, and review auction parameters, including our approach to the reference prices used to estimate the budgetary impact of bids. T o maximise the competitive process, we are also minded to relax eligibility criteria for fixed-bottom offshore wind projects so projects that have yet to obtain full planning consents can participate. We will consult on these changes We will leverage Great British Energy, and wider policy measures to support local and community-led renewable capacity, including for homes, businesses, public buildings and land, and shared spaces. Great British Energy will provide support to deliver the Local Power Plan, putting local authorities and communities at the heart of restructuring our energy economy. It will also align with NESO’s publications and the government’s response to identify locations for new generation projects on private land and undertake development on public land, unlocking scope for generation on Solar panels are already an eligible measure in existing programmes like the Warm Homes Local Grant and Warm Homes Social Housing Fund, and we will provide further details on how else solar could be supported in the Warm Homes Plan after the second phase of the Spending Review. We will also assess the potential to drive the construction of solar canopies on outdoor carparks through a call We are also committed to nuclear, including the lifetimes of existing nuclear projects where possible, and the development of emerging low carbon and renewable technologies that will play an important role beyond 2030, continuing to recognise that the policy of the Scottish Government is not to support new nuclear Reforming the electricity markets will support clean power generation and networks. Reform is vital in ensuring our market arrangements are fit for the 2030s and beyond. | c4d6a055-40d9-4657-a94a-ea085d0eaf26 | 2 |
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