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PSYOP 8.pdf | ons Of the truth, and is looked uponingeneral as a dirty
business with whichfew wishtobe associated.
2. Psychological operations cannot be scientifically evaluated
as to effectiveness. PSYOP activitiesthat cannotproduce fast,
measurable results are hardto sell. There are exceptions, of
course; for example, when tactica... |
PSYOP 8.pdf | taining full
qualification asa psychological operationsexpert ona specific
foreign country is a lifetime job, not unlike the type of
professionalism required ofa psychoanalyst.
4. Insurgency-threatened countries donot give enough
attention orimportance to psychological operations. They
oftenlackthe know-how to start an... |
PSYOP 8.pdf | on the content of
the message to ensure that the message achieves the desired
99
PSYCHOLOGICAL OPERATIONS
effect. The main burden of face-to-face education must be on
the shoulders of the indigenous government and people.
Another problem is that of convincing an insurgency-
threatened government to establish an uncomp... |
PSYOP 8.pdf | as the Vietcong
indoctrination claimed, that they might be shot.
After the low point at the end of 1964, the Chieu Hoi
program showed a steady increase in the number of Vietcong
returnees. In 1966 there were over 20,000 defectors, double
the number of the preceding year. Total defectionsof Vietcong
returning under thi... |
PSYOP 8.pdf | med Forces
The United States can and should give a higherpriority to
encouraging insurgency-threatened governments to develop a
professional psychological operations capability. This
capability must include personnel, both American and
indigenous, who can conduct face-to-face psychological
operations. Indigenous PSYOP ... |
PSYOP 8.pdf | developing countries, particularly in the
rural areas. Also, better results will be achieved in the remote
rural areas if the peasants know that an iron fist is underneath
the velvet glove of the communists' friendly persuasion.
(Changing the'ways ofpeasants is areal challenge.)
Every member of thosemilitary andpolicef... |
PSYOP 8.pdf | establishment of atwo-
way communication system to ensure that popular grievances
and good ideas get to the PSYOP planners and decision
makers at the top level-and that governmental PSYOPpolicy
guidance gets down to the lowest PSYOP level. This policy
guidance must be centralized and controlled at the top, but
impleme... |
PSYOP 8.pdf | m
generating revolutions out of grievances, hatreds, and social
injustices.
PSYCHOLOGICAL OPERATIONS
Conclusions
Inconclusion, insurgency-threatened governments can be
expected to heed US advice ifit is in the formoflessons
learned at great cost. Indigenousgovernments must puta high
priorityonpsychological operations, ... |
PSYOP 8.pdf | military can and should develop mature, fully
qualified, professional PSYOP experts who are experienced in
the language and the thinking ofa foreign people. Such
experts could help governments with PSYOP organization and
management, as well as providing support with our more
sophisticated mass media.Psychological oper... |
PSYOP 8.pdf | rogram would
be one ofthe cheapest andbest security investments the US
couldmake inthe developingworld.
Notes
1. This article consists of excerpts from "Neglected Deterrent: Psychologi-
cal Operationsin LiberationWars'," Transition, nos. 12and 13 (January
1968): 58-65. Reprinted withthe permission ofthe Foreign Affairs... |
PSYOP 8.pdf | China, Marshall said,
"China mighthave been saved by themassiveuse ofradio andmotion
pictures,on a scale hitherto unheardof." WilliamBenton, "How Strong Is
Russia? AndHowWeak?" New York TimesMagazine, 10 June 1956,70.
3. Robert Holt andRobert Van de Velde, StrategicPsychologicalOpera-
tions (Chicago: University ofChic... |
PSYOP 8.pdf | were important for
gettingthe Communistpartyline andotherinstructions to the leadership
and agitprop cadres in remote areas-information which otherwise would
have been delayedfor weeks. Broadcasts were made in allfive major
languagesused in Vietnam. Beginning in 1960,therewasan increaseinthe
useofalltypes ofmedia in an... |
PSYOP 8.pdf | einthe Vietnamese pro-
tractedconflict."
9. Thetask ofdefecting aVietcong in the Chien Hot Program was
primarily apsychologicaloperations task. However, AidforInternational
Development (AID) Vietnamplayed an importantrole, sinceAIDfurnished
the resources formost ofthefood, housing, and allowances given to the
ChieuHot.... |
PSYOP 8.pdf | wnname ofRandy Dicks, the other
apresident of the United States with the well-known name of
RichardMilhous Nixon.
Randy wrotethe president:
I thinkthat your statement at yourrecent press conferencethat
"under nocircumstances" willyou be affected by the impending
antiwar protests in connectionwiththeVietnam moratoriumis... |
PSYOP 8.pdf | democraticprocess. Itwouldgivethe decision not to the majority and
not tothose with the strongest arguments, but tothose with the
loudest voices.
Introduction
What is the role-the actual and proper role-ofpublic opinion
in international security affairs? And how, if public opinion
does and should count, is majority opi... |
PSYOP 8.pdf | ory, when a sense of the
importance ofpublic opinion hasbecome more self-conscious
than it used to be, there have been unbelievers. Harry
Truman, whom I nevertheless admire as one of our great
presidents, was one of them. When Mr Truman faced a
problem, hb would find a principle involved, often a moral
principle, and t... |
PSYOP 8.pdf | rovingly, that Americans have a "Narcissus
psychosis." "An American," he wrote, "is apt tostare like
Narcissus at hisimage in the pool of what he believes to be
world opinion." Aftermaking the point that the only honest
answer people generally could give to questions about the
specifics offoreign policywouldbe a "don't... |
PSYOP 8.pdf | of importance to foreign
relations and international security affairs? Your own
instinctive answer tothese questions may be an unqualified
106
FREE
"yes" or an unqualified "no," butafteryears ofexperience in
the public opinion field, my own answer is very equivocal-
namely, it alldepends.
Definitions and Assumptions
To... |
PSYOP 8.pdf | ies and
our attitudes springfrom these "realities." They aretheresult
ofan interplay ofour assumptions, as shaped and modified by
experience. In a very real sense, if an individual has no
assumptions concerning a givensubject, or that are capable of
being related to that subject, he can have no attitudes-and
hence no o... |
PSYOP 8.pdf | tates, not to mentionthe underdeveloped areas ofthe
world, have no assumptions, attitudes, or informationabout
international affairs.
Let me cite from a study I did in this country a few years
ago. One-quarter ofthe American public hadnever heard or
read ofNATO,only 58 percent knew thatthe United States is a
member ofN... |
PSYOP 8.pdf | and
only about one-fourth are really adequately informed. The
situation inmost other countries ofthe world is farworse,
particularly in underdeveloped areas. For pollsters to ask
these uninformed people about specifics offoreign policy is
obviously an exercise infutility. Looked at in this perspective,
onecan begin to ... |
PSYOP 8.pdf | " day-to-day decisions on
specifics, public opinion usually has no effect. Either the
public has no opinions on the matter or people do not know
that decisions are being made. On a broad range ofmatters
that are publicly known, there is usually an educated elite who
do have meaningful opinions,invarying degrees ofinten... |
PSYOP 8.pdf | United States, but also in
the underdeveloped areas. The people maylack meaningful
opinions on a wide range of specifics about international
matters, buttheir broader assumptions may come into play at
certain times and places to make agiven internationalissue a
matter ofpublic concern. Oftenthis applies only to a minor... |
PSYOP 8.pdf | the
attention paid by members ofCongress totheir mail is out of
all proportion to its significance as abarometer of public
opinion.)
But, increasingly, more extrememanifestations of public
action-demonstrations, picketing, andrioting-reflect attitudes
thatare strongly held by at least some segments ofthe public.
Thesef... |
PSYOP 8.pdf | ab-Israeli conflict.Anticommunistviolence
inIndonesia strengthened the hand ofthe army againstthe
Communist party in a struggle that has had profound
international implications. Anti-Vietnam protests in the United
States unquestionably affected the calculations ofthe North
Vietnamese,notto mentionthoseofourAmerican lea... |
PSYOP 8.pdf | himwin the election in
1916; and GenDwight D. Eisenhower's promise to go to Korea
109
PSYCHOLOGICAL OPERATIONS
increasedhis landslide victory in 1952. In fact, it is almost
axiomatic that wheneverwar or peace seems to be atissue,
the public in almost every country will exhibit deep concernin
ways thathave political mea... |
PSYOP 8.pdf | ons well-nigh universal condemnation of
the Israeli-British-French invasion ofEgypt was supported by
what can only be called a consensus of world opinion-a
consensus shared even by many people in both the United
Kingdom andFrance.
A similarconsensus ofcondemnation seems to have existed
over the Soviet Union's occupatio... |
PSYOP 8.pdf | iet Union and the United States just about
equally in terms ofpower and importance in those days, an
enormous contrast from thedays before 1957.
This perceived equality contributed, along with other
developments, to the idea that a stalemate existed-a notion
that affected the foreign policies ofmost of the world'snatio... |
PSYOP 8.pdf | raeli "set" ofthe Arab world and,
fortunatelyfor us, the anti-Chinese bias in much of Southeast
Asia.
In addition, there are many situations where there is a
meaningful consensus of public opinion in particular
countries. One example is the almost universalaspirationthat
the West Germans held forGermany'sreunification.... |
PSYOP 8.pdf | are spending too much on
defense. In a related vein, almost six out of 10 Americans
thinkthe US "should take all necessarysteps to prevent the
spread ofcommunism to any other partsofthefree world, no
matter where." Anticommunismis,in fact, clearly one ofthe
strongest factors in Americans' ideas aboutUS international
se... |
PSYOP 8.pdf | inionis either in agreement, nonexistent, divided, or lacking
in intensity, anything is acceptable. Although policymakers
sometimes appear blind to the fact, the achievement of
many-ifnot most-ofthe international security objectives
adoptedby the United States presupposes certain perceptions,
attitudes, beliefs, and be... |
PSYOP 8.pdf | n the successor failure ofUS policies. Frequently,
the opinions of peoples as groups are important, either
because popular supportor cooperation is necessary or
because the people show their concern by way ofprotests,
demonstrations, or elections.
Often, psychological factors are critical to the success ofUS
policies. ... |
PSYOP 8.pdf | to mention the French-made this goal
impossible.
In another aspect ofFrench international security affairs, it
was public opinion, more than anything else, thatforced the
French militarytofighttheIndo-Chinese warwith one hand
tied behind its back; victory was impossible. The French
people wouldnot condone the necessar... |
PSYOP 8.pdf | ered when the trends ofAmericanopinion about the war
inVietnam werestillpretty obscure.
Our ownGovernmentwillundoubtedly now havetofaceuptothe fact
thatthe American people are sick and tiredofthe war. Itis my
consideredjudgment as aso-called "expert" thatweare in the early
stagesofan inexorable tideinfavorofpulling out... |
PSYOP 8.pdf | edhawks. Infact, hawkish sentimentincreased in the
immediate sense after the Tet offensive, favoring further
escalation ofthe war. One-quarter ofthe American people
advocated gradual escalation and no less than 28 percent
optedfor "an all-out crash effort in the hope ofwinning the
war quickly, even atthe riskofChina or... |
PSYOP 8.pdf | sending
troops to right inVietnam" had risen from 25 percent (in
March of 1966) to 56 percent. About one-half ofthe people
now favored withdrawal, either immediatelyoratleast byJuly
1971.
PSYCHOLOGICAL OPERATIONS
Policymakers and Public Opinion
There is a real question about the sensitivity ofour policy-
makers to psy... |
PSYOP 8.pdf | is spotty at best. However, recent
presidents have shown an awareness of the importance of
psychologicalfactors.
Oddly enough,the supreme example ofsensitivityto public
opinion-and ofconsummate ability toinfluence it-came in
the earliest days ofscientifically conductedpolling.Themanof
the hour wasFranklin D. Roosevelt... |
PSYOP 8.pdf | hepolls with great
interest-particularly charts of American public opinion
specially prepared for him by Mr Cantril, who had conducted
surveys throughout this period.
President Eisenhower
PresidentDwight D. ("Ike") Eisenhower was less consciously
interested in domestic public opinion polls than Roosevelt had
been. This... |
PSYOP 8.pdf | notread
documents is ridiculous; everysingle report I submittedto him
through Rockefellerwas read-and annotated-by thefollowing
morning. And this goes even for a 67-page document,
single-spaced, which Iknow he read in full because he corrected
a typographicalerror in hisown hand on the next-to-last page!)
On more than... |
PSYOP 8.pdf | ism helped to create receptivity to an
idea that Rockefellerhad advanced and which had been
cold-shouldered-namely, the "Open Skies" inspection
proposal. When Eisenhower finally propounded Open Skies, it
had as great a psychological impact as any one-shot
propaganda move since WorldWarII.
President Kennedy
Jerome Wisen... |
PSYOP 8.pdf | ted that certain surveys be
made-especially in LatinAmerica.
In the aftermath ofthe Bay ofPigs, USIA found that Fidel
Castro was little known in LatinAmericaand was generally
viewed by the publicwith considerable allergy. Subsequently,
PSYCHOLOGICAL OPERATIONS
the Kennedy administration adopted arelatively low-keyed
ap... |
PSYOP 8.pdf | e of 1962, Attitudes, Hopes andFears ofthe Dominican
People. It showed that the Dominicans, as of then at least,
were the most pro-American, anticommunist, anti-Castro
people we had found in any part ofthe world. Not only did
President Johnson read the report; the White House had it
duplicated and distributed at the hi... |
PSYOP 8.pdf | ged
"by the skin ofmy teeth" to get a public opinion study done in
Cuba. It showed that Castro was overwhelmingly popular with
the Cuban people. There was a small opposition, but it was
confined almost entirely to the city ofHavana. Thus, whatever
the expectations of those who planned the invasion, it came as
no surpri... |
PSYOP 8.pdf | onsidering
the questionofinvading Cuba.
Although called a "success" when submitted to President
Johnson after the Dominican intervention in 1965, a
Dominicanstudyconducted after thefall ofTrujillo foundthat
the invasion had been a "failure" when the results were
originally made available to the government in 1962. The
... |
PSYOP 8.pdf | findings demonstrates afact
which has become crystal clear to me from my years of
experience within the State Department and my subsequent
observations as a researcher and government consultant.A
considerable proportion of our government, with particular
reference to the State Department and the Foreign Service,
tends... |
PSYOP 8.pdf | chuyler Foster, whom some ofyou probably
know,was discontinued in the latter half ofthe 1950s.)
As to psychological factorsabroad, more than one ambassa-
dor has echoed the wordsof one oftheircolleagues: 'To hell
with public opinionl I'mhere to deal with the government, not
with the public!" He said this, incidentally,... |
PSYOP 8.pdf | ent should
slavishly follow publicopinion or that US foreign policy should
be based exclusively, or even primarily, upon courting
momentary popularity at home or abroad. Often, governments
that deserv4 the adjective "responsible" will have to fly squarely
in the face of domestic opinionwhileattempting to change it.
Bil... |
PSYOP 8.pdf | us to do, how couldwe be sure that
we should do it?"
Anygovernment worthy ofits name has to do what it thinks
necessaryfor the good of the country, butits course canbe
greatly eased if it has public opinion on its side. Decision
making demands a knowledge ofhowthe people are thinking
and feeling-andwhy.
Even more ofte... |
PSYOP 8.pdf | andit should be incurred knowingly,
afterboth acarefulassessment ofthe benefits and risks and a
calculated attempt to devise ways to minimize unfavorable
impacts andmaximize favorable ones.
FREE
Afterthe Tet offensive, Gen William C.Westmoreland saidthat
the results were psychological, not real. Well, he and his
collea... |
PSYOP 8.pdf | eign policies and enun-
ciating interfiational positions. The psychological requirements
for achieving US objectives need to be carefully calculated
from the start, and every effort mustbe made, through
leadership, persuasion, and public diplomacy, tosecure their
fulfillment.
Simply put, psychological datais essential ... |
PSYOP 8.pdf | etired
Ronald D. McLaurin
Preston S. Abbott
i
In an era during which it has become very fashionable to
discuss the psychological aspects ofinternational relations
and during which the study ofthat field has been greatly
influenced by psychological theories and research, particularly
in America, little attention has bee... |
PSYOP 8.pdf | nt-to-people persuasion techniques.
Properly defined, PSYOP is the planned orprogrammed use of
human actions to influence the attitudes and actions of
friendly, neutral, and enemy populations that are important
to national objectives.) The critical variable is, then, the
perceptions offoreign populations.2 Propaganda i... |
PSYOP 8.pdf | defined on the basis of
what,in which channel, and with what effect. Psychological
operations, then,is atruly interdisciplinary phenomenon, lying
inthe interstices ofpsychology, sociology, communication, and
political and military sciences.4.5 PSYOPiscommunication that
"embraces the study ofpersuasiveness,onthe one han... |
PSYOP 8.pdf | thors of
the Declaration ofIndependence and other brilliant psycho-
logical operations, werefar from unfamiliar with this tradition.$
The process ofpsychological operationsremainsessentially what
it was when Gideon defeatedthe Midianitesbut,likemany other
humanenterprises, it has become infinitely more complex. The
dev... |
PSYOP 8.pdf | azisorchestrated the use ofradio, the
press, demonstrations, group meetings abroad, agents,
displays, fifth-column terrorism, and, once the attack started,
122
KATZ/MeLAURIN/ABBOTT
screaming dive bombers (the memory of which is terrifying to
many). The Nazis gave the firstfull-dress demonstration of
what psychological ... |
PSYOP 8.pdf | anization and resources
developed during the war were quickly reduced following its
conclusion. There was some effort to studythe lessons learned
from PSYOP programs, but the analyses were disseminated
unevenlyin the government and military services.The civilian
Office of War Information (OWI) was disestablished and th... |
PSYOP 8.pdf |
Information Agency (USIA).During this period, which was
characterized by a political more than a military conflict,
channels such as "Radio Free Europe," "Radio Liberation"
(later "Radio Liberty"), "Radio in the American Sector" (RIAS),
and the "Voice ofAmerica" (VOA) wereprimary PSYOP agents.
They communicated news, ... |
PSYOP 8.pdf | nflicts. However, the
growth ofdetente and the apparent failure of PSYOP in Vietnam
contributed to acontinuation of the pattern whereby persuasive
123
PSYCHOLOGICALOPERATIONS
communications resources are drastically reduced whenthere
isnolonger a perceived immediate needfor them.
General Principles
Effective psychologi... |
PSYOP 8.pdf | pal constraint on
communication effects. Although studies have been conducted
on source attractiveness, trustworthiness, and background, it is
the audience's perceptions ofcredibility thatcount. 11 Explora-
tions ofthe phrasing, ordering, and otherpresentation factors
continue toshowthat the critical variables indeterm... |
PSYOP 8.pdf | ptimally affect the audience in all its diversity. 14 Information
must betimely, thorough, and systematic.
Organizationis important because it must unifythe diverse
parts ofthe complex process ofintercultural communications.
Without sound organization, no single aspect oftheprocess
can contribute efficiently tothe syst... |
PSYOP 8.pdf | ort the
attainment of national objectives.
To implement PSYOP plans, the program must extend
beyond words to actions-and actions must be an extension of
words. An effective program ofpersuasive communications
draws on real action attributes and elaborates a realistic and
concrete future course. Political and military a... |
PSYOP 8.pdf | In this section, we emphasize the
essential functions of psychological operations and explain
how these functions are currently managed in the United
States.
An institutionalized structure is essential for the effective
implementation ofpsychological programs.Theremust be a
defined organizational structure with clear l... |
PSYOP 8.pdf | f clearly articulated PSYOP policy in supportof
political, social, economic, or militarygoals. The government
must establish realistic policy goals to ensure consistent and
credible operations. Credibility ofpolicy objectives is the core
125
PSYCHOLOGICALOPERATIONS
element in effective psychological programs. False or
... |
PSYOP 8.pdf | vironment. For
example, ifthe psychological objective is to induce enemy
defection atld/or surrender,appropriate actions must be taken
bymilitary commanders to ensure thatfriendlyforcesclearly
understand the surrender policy, will honorsafe-conduct
leaflets, andwill establish appropriate policy concerning the
good trea... |
PSYOP 8.pdf |
develop psychological policy for an international crisis, event,
or a US overseas program. This is an adhoc group, andpolicy
isdeterminedby consensus.
Inpeacetime, the US ambassador is responsible for imple-
menting PSYOP policy overseas. In the case ofVietnam, policy
was directedfrom Washington tothe USEmbassy in Sai... |
PSYOP 8.pdf | URIN/ABBOTT
Planning
By definition, a psychological operation is theplannedand
programmed use of communication media and/or other
actions to influence emotions, attitudes, and behaviors of
selected target audiences. Planning is the keyto psychological
operations (random and isolated actions cannot produce
consistent re... |
PSYOP 8.pdf | ity of
military,political, or economic operations.The PSYOP plan is
the crucial ingredientforintegratedand concertedoperations.
Generally, psychological plans should consistof(1) concept of
operations, (2) definition oftarget groups, (3) cleardefinition of
objectives, (4) general thematic guidance for each objective,
(... |
PSYOP 8.pdf | information/
cultural programs tailored for a particular country. The
Department of Defense (DOD) is responsible fordeveloping
psychological plans in support ofmilitary contingency
operations. Military plans are informally coordinatedwith the
DOS, USIA, andother appropriate agencies.
United States PSYOPplanning during ... |
PSYOP 8.pdf | military operations and selected
programs directed to target groups in NorthVietnam.Generally,
PSYOP plans were coordinated with the Republic ofVietnam
through its Ministry ofInformation and/or theVietnamese
JointMilitaryCommand.
Intelligence
Intelligence is the basis for understanding communications,
emotions,attitude... |
PSYOP 8.pdf | lected by the political ormilitary planner.
There arethree basic requirements for collecting, collating,
and analyzingPSYOP data. First, it is essential that managers
andmediapersonnel have athorough understandingof the
psychological aspects ofthetargetaudience. Anyone engaged
in communication and propaganda programs m... |
PSYOP 8.pdf | es,
orreinforce/changeneutral attitudes, when appropriate.
The second requirementis for timely and systematic
operational feedback. Specifically, information is needed
regarding the effort beingmade to supportPSYOPobjectives,
tasks, andthemes aimed atdefinitive target groups. These
128
KATZ/McLAURIN/ABBOTT
data are ess... |
PSYOP 8.pdf | 1966, a senior foreign service officer of the USIA listed a
number offactors that were inhibiting the effectiveness and
measurement of PSYOP programs in Vietnam.
1. We "fly by the seat of our pants" both in setting goals and
measuring our success.
2. Our assessment is superficial becauseweare not experts
and because r... |
PSYOP 8.pdf | lack orientation toward communications as a whole
and communications research in particular.
9. There is a communications gap between Washington and
the field, between media product and field need. 19
Weaknesses in measuring the effect of USIA programs were
stated by another senior officer.
1. The system is too simple ... |
PSYOP 8.pdf | cted
at the question ofresults.
5. Too much evaluation is being done by operators them-
selves.Theevaluation is therefore subjective.
6. In the rush ofday-to-day business, the hard questions
are often postponedindefinitely.20
No single government agency is responsiblefor thesystematic
collection ofPSYOP intelligence. T... |
PSYOP 8.pdf | elligence teams
generally do not possess the resources or the scope of
knowledge required to evaluatethepsychological environment
of potential target groups around theworld.
In Vietnam, as during the Korean War, an attempt was
made to overcome PSYOP deficiencies in intelligence by
sponsoring ad hoc studies andsurveys. ... |
PSYOP 8.pdf | rmation System (PAMIS), will be
discussed in subsequent sections ofthis essay.
Operations
Within the US government, the USIA is responsible for
educational, cultural, and informational programs and
130
KATZ/McLAURIN/ABBOTT
operations overseas. Its operations in Washington (for
overseas audiences) include a broadcast se... |
PSYOP 8.pdf | ivities of the USIS are
dependenton various protocols and agreements between
Washington and the hostnation.
The US military services have theirown PSYOP units and,
when authorized by the president, can support USIA
operations overseas. Military PSYOP unitsare composed of
various teams thatcan be put together to accompl... |
PSYOP 8.pdf | supported by USIA, DOD, and USAID (US Agency forInter-
national Development). Thedirector ofJUSPAO (minister/
councillor to the ambassador) issued policy directives (toboth
military and civilian agencies) and conducted the full range of
strategic and tactical operations. At its peak JUSPAO was
composed ofabout 250 US o... |
PSYOP 8.pdf | that Vietnam representedthe largestpost-
WorldWarII American venture into psychological operations,
the magnitude and breadth of the US effort there makes
SoutheastAsia an atypical example ofAmerican communi-
cations programs-evenif arich source ofperspectives.
The major continuing US effort in this fieldis thatofUSIA,... |
PSYOP 8.pdf | munications have marginal value as opinion
changers but are much more effective in attitude rein-
forcement.25
Pre-Vietnam
Specific efforts mounted by US psychological operations
before Vietnam include, most prominently, campaigns in
Lebanon (1958,26 196227) and the Dominican Republic
(196528), and American efforts con... |
PSYOP 8.pdf | lyantirevolutionary, frequently supporting unpopular
regimes in the name of stability.33 In some cases (e.g.,
Lebanon) theprograms were reasonably effective, but psycho-
logical effort success is difficultto separate from the nature
and success of theoverall political ormilitary activity.
132
KATZ/McLAURIN/ABBOTT
Vietn... |
PSYOP 8.pdf | 1965 JUSPAO was established to coordi-
nate the US policies and personnel involved in psychological
operations. A major portion of the new US PSYOP effort was to
be devoted too the Chieu Hoi returnee program (an attempt to
win over and makeuseofthe VC). There was to be optimum
coordination and integration ofboth US and... |
PSYOP 8.pdf | lized policy planningand decentralized
operational planning. Execution was assigned to the local
level. Development and mass production of PSYOP materials
were done by JUSPAO in accordance with tactical needs
determined by the field. In addition to JUSPAO, MACV (the 4th
USArmy PSYOP Group) operated an extensive program... |
PSYOP 8.pdf | Americans,
knew the modus operandiof the enemy and were apart ofthe
indigenous culture.
133
PSYCHOLOGICAL OPERATIONS
The leaflet-distributedfrom aircraft and by hand-proved
to be themost practicalmeans ofdisseminatingthe Chieu Hoi
message. The ubiquitous "safeconductpass," whichliterally
blanketed South Vietnam, was pr... |
PSYOP 8.pdf | en to rally to the
GVN [Goverment of the Republic of Vietnam] under its
amnesty program." 38
No discussion of the factors motivating defection is complete
without mention of the carefully structured program of
rewards givento those who rallied and indeed even to those
who influenced a VC to rally. The ChieuHoi weapons ... |
PSYOP 8.pdf | Republic ofVietnam or
its allies wouldhave been required to effect the same result
through military action.39
Besides the safe conduct leaflet and rewards program,
testimonials from Hoi Chanh (former VC)proved to be effective
inthetotal psychological process ofattitude change. It was
determined that the Hoi Chanh testi... |
PSYOP 8.pdf | ormer unit and address some ofhis former
comrades by name. He should tell enough abouthimselfto
convince the recipients ofthe message that he is in fact alive
and well. The operative word in all Hoi Chanh testimonials
was credibility. Themes were suggested to the returnee, but
the language was his own. In many instance... |
PSYOP 8.pdf | andbehavior, must be preceded by propaganda that
is indirect in character, slow and general in nature. It should
seek to create an atmosphere of favorable preliminary
attitudes. No direct psychological operations can be effective
without a proper foundation. Safe conduct passes and
testimonials are one type of foundati... |
PSYOP 8.pdf | veintheleaflets
becauseIwas told by the cadres that the government wanted to cheat
Frontpeople by itsChienHoiprogram. Although Ididn'tbelievewhat
theleaflets said, Ihadsomethingin my mind aboutleaving theFront.
Whenmy friend,Mr. Thiet, came totell me aboutthegovernment's
treatmenttoward theralliers,Ibelieved him.Ibelie... |
PSYOP 8.pdf | Vietnam called Long Me.
13 5
PSYCHOLOGICAL OPERATIONS
The primary target audience for- the magazine was the families,
friends,and sympathizers ofthe VC. The 62-page, full-color
magazine was distributed bimonthly to villages anddistricts
known to be sympathetic to the VC. It was distributed by
priests, merchants, school... |
PSYOP 8.pdf | sts in Vietnam believed inthe slow and
indirect approach. Many messages were harsh, explicit, and
direct; for example, this leaflet was prepared and disseminated
by anAmerican militaryunit:
The skysoldiers ofthe US 173dAirborneBrigadeare hereto destroy
you. We have killed hundreds ofyour comradeswith ourpowerful
bombs ... |
PSYOP 8.pdf | impregnation. PSYOP isnota stimulus that
disappears quickly; it consists ofsuccessive messages and
actions aimed at various emotions orthoughts through many
instruments ofcommunication. Effective psychological actions
should be continuous; assoonas the effect ofone message is
weakened, itshould bereinforcedby another.... |
PSYOP 8.pdf | systematic planning,
and the value ofcontinuous communications as facilitator
(even during periods of strategic security) were once again
ignored. 42
Effectiveness
Probably the most elusive single area in the analysis of
psychological operationsis the evaluation of PSYOP effective-
ness. How can effectiveness be measur... |
PSYOP 8.pdf | al attitudes only,not fundamental
ones.43 Our government's persuasive communications to
foreign audiences enjoyvery limited parameters ofonly
potential effect.44
The relatively small range ofimpact and the difficulty of
measurement are primary constraints in the evaluation of
effectiveness. The fundamental question is,... |
PSYOP 8.pdf | the critical moment. In fact, the vast
majority ofpropaganda and other instruments of PSYOP
consist ofwhat I,. John Martin has called facilitative com-
137
PSYCHOLOGICALOPERATIONS
munication (not persuasivecommunication). 45 Thatis, PSYOP
is designed to keep the lines open-maintain the channel and
its credibility-in p... |
PSYOP 8.pdf | sex, race, education-we mightincrease by a
statisticallysignificantfraction theproportion ofthoseinfluenced by a
message. Butwe would have no control over such factors as
personality~ and susceptibility to persuasion, existing values, beliefs
and opinions or attitudes toward the objects, subjects and situations
involv... |
PSYOP 8.pdf | only usedin international
propaganda.46
For lack ofa criterion,47 as wellasfor the inability to secure
direct access to the audience and the recognition ofthe
inherent limits ofpersuasive communications, the most
common evaluations ofeffectiveness have been output
measures, despite their notorious limitations.48 A seco... |
PSYOP 8.pdf | untries are strained, only some-or none-of
these may be practicable. In these cases, refugees 50 and
prisoners ofwar5l have been used to gather effects data.
However,suchgroups often have inherentdisadvantages as a
population-theymay not be a representative sample, and
138
KATZ/MeLAURIN/ABBOTT
identification of the rol... |
PSYOP 8.pdf | on
needed to support PSYOP organizational elements for the
planning, implementation, andevaluation ofPSYOP programs;
(2) to encourage (indeed, to enforce) methodologies to support
information-gathering programs; and (3) to provide an appro-
priate automatic data-processing system for the storage,
analysis, and utilizat... |
PSYOP 8.pdf | s;
the tone and intensity of mediacoverage related to domestic
themes, foreign governments, international organizations or
political movements; and propaganda techniques and tactics.
AnotherFMA objective is to provide clear-text abstracts on
important events, subjects, and persons as they are treated in
the public medi... |
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