source stringclasses 9
values | text stringlengths 67 800 |
|---|---|
PSYOP 8.pdf | oups, each ofwhichhas its
own cultural values. And each of these groups has sub-
cultures with norms and values that are used to define
meanings and to specify needs and wants. Thus,individuals
respond uniquely to persuasive messages and appeals.
55
PSYCHOLOGICAL OPERATIONS
Persuasive messages in military PSYOP and in ... |
PSYOP 8.pdf | tionships thatdiffer from those found in the
United States.
While leading some university students on an industrial
tour of Japan in 1981, for example, I found that the food
distribution system there wasdifferentfrom that in the United
States. Japanese wholesalers, unlike theirUS counterparts,
are specialized sellers. ... |
PSYOP 8.pdf | ail outlets. Cultureis a major
influence on marketing and PSYOP.
Social Influences
The social groups to whichpeople belong or aspire -to belong
help explain why they buy certain types and brands of
products, shop in onetype of store and not another, accept
and believe certainideas andpersuasive messages, and spend
thei... |
PSYOP 8.pdf | ain way. Differentpersuasive
appeals, different copy, differentart, and different media may
be needed to promote the same product to different social
classes. An upper-middle-class wife maywant products,ideas,
and brands that are clear symbols ofhersocial status. She
may be highly susceptible topreselling through mass ... |
PSYOP 8.pdf | s
in aculture is to identify and targetopinionleaders. They are
chosen on the basis of expertise as well as social position.
Exposure to mass media is significantly greateramongopinion
leaders than among nonleaders-and mass media directly
influence opinion leaders. It is importantto note thatopinion
leaders are farmore... |
PSYOP 8.pdf | offeasily; it remains to
affect one's individual values, ideas, and behaviors. Even as
theadultindividual strives to acquire theprestigesymbols of
another class, latent family influences remain to sway
acceptance of ideas and products. Most buying decisions and
idea acceptances are made within a frameworkof experience
... |
PSYOP 8.pdf | ofever being
fullysatisfied; thus,PSYOP specialists and marketers do not
have tosatisfyone need before progressing on to other needs.
Several needs at severallevels can be presentconcurrently to
influence an individual's behavior, but this approach com-
plicates the prediction of behavior. Abraham H. Maslow
proposed a... |
PSYOP 8.pdf | ives and
evaluates one's own status in relation to others in the same
social class and reference groups-and to one's own levels of
aspiration-are prime forces in shaping one's self-concept. The
self-concept is learned; it emerges through experienceswith
theenvironment and through interactions with other people.
By obse... |
PSYOP 8.pdf | is self-concept throughthe consumption ofgoods
and theexpression ofideas as symbols, allowing aprediction
of events.
58
FINDLEY
Perceptions and Attitudes
Everything a person knows about the world and what it
contains comes from perceptions. Perception is the reception
of stimuli through the senses and the attachment of... |
PSYOP 8.pdf | erceptions are
highly selective and subjective; we see what we want to see
and hear what we want to hear. Further, if we do not like what
we perceive, we often distort or modifyit.
Mass-marketing messages and PSYOP messages arebased
on selective perception. Because alarge number of persuasive
messages are directed at d... |
PSYOP 8.pdf | cognitive (factual
information), affective (feelings and emotions), and behavioral
(tendencies to behave in a certain way). Attitudes affect both
perception and behavior, and people resist changes- in their
attitudes. The more closely an attitude is relatedto one's
self-concept, the greater will be one's resistance to... |
PSYOP 8.pdf | rawing
59
PSYCHOLOGICALOPERATIONS
conclusions for the target, repeating the message, and using
both one-sided and two-sided messages.
Successful and Unsuccessful
Business Marketing
Businesses spend several billions ofdollars each year on
marketing, a fact that indicates the importance they placeon it.
According to an A... |
PSYOP 8.pdf | nd Gillette's Nine Flags Cologne.
Newspapers account forthe largest annual advertising
expenditure ($31.2million in 1988). Other 1988 expenditures:
television ($26.1), direct mail ($21.2), radio ($7.7), and maga-
zines ($6.1). Use ofadvertising, however, does notguarantee
success even ifit is planned and implemented we... |
PSYOP 8.pdf | Volkswagen's "Lemon," Marlboro's "Country," and Coca-Cola's
"Real Thing." Aside from getting commitments from dealers to
carry the product, the Coca-Cola ad was successfulbecause it
capitalized on the affective domain and the unsystematic
emotional responses of people. A critical conclusion for PSYOP
specialists and ma... |
PSYOP 8.pdf | er Chefdidnot
realize that economic conditions are major factors, did not
adapt tochanging consumer preferences, and didnotmeet
target market expectations. Coorsdid notrecognizechanges in
the environment thatnecessitated adjustments inmarketing
strategies' anddid not take the time to continue developing an
image of qua... |
PSYOP 8.pdf | ss that a consumer might experience in
buying products or accepting ideas. PSYOP specialists and
marketers can anticipate effective messages if they understand
theprocess throughwhich buyers can progress. They can
then address those messages to bring about the desired
change in behavior. My buyerdecision model is like ... |
PSYOP 8.pdf | gins the
planned search forspecific,relevant, andidentical information
on all possible products. Buyers must weighthe pros and cons
ofthe various products based on a set ofcriteria during this
third stage. In the next stage, they make the decisionthat best
meets their needs and wants, and that satisfies the
61
PSYCHOLO... |
PSYOP 8.pdf | pecific expected objectives that are measurable.Print,
broadcast, and audiovisual media should also have specific
objectives. Marketing objectives should meetcertain criteria and
should be built ona solid foundation ofresearch that reveals
whatthe targets wantto buy. The objectives should bestated in
terms oftarget ben... |
PSYOP 8.pdf | aling? Isitimproper todesign products and
appeals that enhance abuyer's self-concept in ordertogain a
sale? Some observers arguethatembellishment and distortion
are legitimate and socially desirable activities and that
illegitimacy enters the picture only ifthere is falsification with
larcenous intent.
That argumentnot... |
PSYOP 8.pdf | loped. It includes selecting a target,
determining conditionsthat affect the target, analyzingtarget
vulnerabilities, specifying target susceptibilities, formulating
the persuasive objective, determining target effectiveness, and
assessing campaign impact indicators. Once the conditions
and vulnerabilities ofthe Iraqi ... |
PSYOP 8.pdf | estions for improved business
marketing and military psychological operations. They
emphasize the transfer ofproven marketing and promotion
strategies, concepts, and techniques from the civilian business
marketing system to themilitary PSYOPsystem.
" Aprimary recommendation is to accept themarketing
orientation (as opp... |
PSYOP 8.pdf | ation. This relates to the function of
PSYOPasaforce multiplier in all types of military activity.
" Anotherrecommendation is to ensure that marketingand
PSYOP supportall operations, to include production and
finance in business or conventional and special operations in
themilitary. This supportshould be for all levels... |
PSYOP 8.pdf | ampaign; under-
capitalization may dooman otherwise promising organization
tofailure.
" The business community and the military services must
accept culture as the most basicenvironmental determinant of
individualpehavior, andtheymustgather sufficient quanti-
tative and qualitative information about it. Individualjudg-... |
PSYOP 8.pdf | ke maximum utilization offamily
influence; research shows that itplays thestrongest rolein
basic valueand attitude formation.
" The PSYOPspecialist andthe business marketer must
know the various needs ofindividuals andthe corresponding
specific persuasive appeals that can be employed to influence
eachneed.
" Marketing ... |
PSYOP 8.pdf | l operations (as
a unique weapons system). Also, managers and specialists
64
FINDLEY
already employed in the field need tactical training. The pro-
fessional military education service school system should
include courses designed to improve the awareness and
understanding of PSYOP. The primary goal would be to
enhance... |
PSYOP 8.pdf | ." Canadian
Defense Quarterly. Summer 1987, 30-33.
Boone, Louis E., andDavidL. Kurtz. Contemporary Marketing.
Chicago, Ill.: Dryden Press, 1989.
Bovee, Courtland L., andWilliamArens. Advertising. Homewood,
Ill.: R. D. Irwin, 1982.
Clausewitz, Carl von. On War. Edited and translated by Michael
Howard and Peter Paret. Pr... |
PSYOP 8.pdf | ent ofDefense. Headquarters 2dPSYOPGroup, US Army.
Psychological Operations. Washington,D.C.: GPO, 1989.
Findley, Benjamin F. "USSOCOM's Foreign Internal.Defense
MissionIs Real andCritical." United States SpecialOperations
Command Update. Spring 1990, 6-7.
Garth, S. Jowett, and Victoria O'Donnell. Propaganda and
Persua... |
PSYOP 8.pdf | p. "PSYOPand Communications Theory," in TheArt
andScience ofPsychological Operations: Case Studies of
Military Application. Washington, D.C.: Department of the
Army, 1976.
. 'Tactical PSYOP in Support of Combat Operations," in
Ron D. McLaurin Military Propaganda Psychological Warfare
and Operations. New York: Frederick... |
PSYOP 8.pdf | ting.
Homewood, Ill.: R. D. Irwin, Inc., 1987.
McLaughlin, Mark W. "The Future of Psychological Operations."
Perspectives. Spring 1991.
McLaurin, Ronald D. "Perceptions, Persuasion, and Power."
Military Propaganda:Psychological Warfare and Operations.
New York: Frederick Praeger Publishers, 1982.
Office of the Secretar... |
PSYOP 8.pdf | hington,
D.C.: NDUP, 1982.
Pedersen, Judith. Fundamentals Of Modern Marketing. New
York: American ManagementAssociation, 1978.
67
PSYCHOLOGICAL OPERATIONS
Pressley, Milton M. Marketing Planning. New Orleans, La.:
Marketing Management andResearch Institute, 1978.
Reppert, John C. "Psychological Operations: TheOldest Wea... |
PSYOP 8.pdf | 989, 44-52.
Stanley, Richard E. Promotion. Englewood Cliffs, N.J.:
Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1982.
Stanton, William J. Fundamentals ofMarketing. NewYork:
McGraw-Hill Book Company, 1987.
Sun Tzu. TheArtof War. Translated by Samuel B. Griffith.
Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1963.
Volkogonov, D. A. The Psychological War. Mo... |
PSYOP 8.pdf | t psychological
issues and roles informulating and implementing our national
policy, objectives, and strategy. The authors explain historical
and contemporary elements ofthe national policy process in
PSYOP and the framework within which nationalPSYOP policy
is formulated, administered, and implemented.
Dr Carnes Lord ... |
PSYOP 8.pdf | d analyzes the influences ofAmerican
cultural inhibitions and the mediaonpsychological conflict.
Michael A. Morrisreminds us thatnational policy objectives
mustbe clearly defined so that military objectives and strategy
can be precise. He emphasizes that clarification ofpolitical
objectives is the responsibility ofpoli... |
PSYOP 8.pdf | t line ofinternal defense-the Vietnam lesson.
He also wants more recognition of PSYOP as a major
instrument oflow-intensity conflictand the elevation ofPSYOP
planners to "first-team" status.
Lloyd A. Free examines the role ofpublic opinion and the
psychological dimension ininternational security affairs. He
believes th... |
PSYOP 8.pdf | ess that intelligence is the most commonly
overlooked prerequisite to effective PSYOP.Their focus on
evaluating the effectiveness of PSYOP challenges the reader to
systematically concentrate on results. Thisarticle is clearly a
historical piece that sets the groundwork for producing
effective PSYOP.
The Psychological D... |
PSYOP 8.pdf | cal in the contemporary
world.
Totalitarian regimes that employed modern communications
technologies to specialize in ideology and subversion
constituteda qualitatively newstrategic problemforthe West.
The postwar years witnessed an outpouring of academic
studies in this area, most of which took for granted the
necessi... |
PSYOP 8.pdf | olitical action in peacetime. The
deteriorating political situation in WesternEurope inthe late
1940s; createdurgent objectives for the CIA's covert action
directorate.
The coming ofthe Korean War stimulated improvements in
US overt capabilities as well. In 1950, President Harry S
Truman createdthePsychological Strateg... |
PSYOP 8.pdf | the various involved agencies.2 President
Dwight D. Eisenhower moved to create the US Information
Agency (USIA) as an autonomous agency reporting directly to
the National Security Council.3
It canbe questioned whetherthe US government as awhole
was able, in the 1950s, to develop an effective doctrine and
organizational... |
PSYOP 8.pdf | ent that larger issues ofgovernmental
organization and national style or culture also figured critically
in this development. It should have been clear that the
assignment ofpolitical warfare responsibilities to new agencies
wouldnot eliminate-and in certain respects would probably
fortify-the sources of bureaucratic r... |
PSYOP 8.pdf | on abroad of America's
political identity and values.
Any attemptto rethink the role ofpolitical andpsychological
warfare in US strategy today must take account of these
fundamental and persisting obstacles. Before turning to
consider them more systematically, however, it is necessary to
sketch briefly thebasic feature... |
PSYOP 8.pdf | th weapons that are not truly distinctive.
Thereare indeed distinctive psychological instruments-radio
broadcasting, publications of various kinds, and educationaland
cultural prpgrams-that are capable of communicating
information andideas. Butbecausethese capabilities are easier
to conceptualize, andto handle bureaucr... |
PSYOP 8.pdf | ons.Yet the conceptis in fact seriously
misleading. Psychological-political warfare is also about
cultural and political symbols, perceptions and emotions,
behavior ofindividuals and groups understress, and cohesion
of organizationsandalliances.
Using the term warfare to describe US psychological-
political strategy in... |
PSYOP 8.pdf | ration, the term public diplomacyhas
gained considerable currency in Washington. Public diplomacy
appears to encompass three distinct though closely related
functions: international information, international political
75
PSYCHOLOGICAL OPERATIONS
action (or what may be called overtpolitical warfare), and
public affairs... |
PSYOP 8.pdf | not intended to be comprehensive. Covert
political warfare wasexcluded from its purview from the
beginning. Nor does it have any clear relationship to military
psychological operations, to educational and cultural affairs,
or to the range of US government activities that may be
grouped under the general label of intern... |
PSYOP 8.pdf | ers to a rangeofactivities, includingcertain
kinds ofmultilateral diplomacy, support for foreign political
parties or forces, and support foror work with international
associationsof various kinds.? Coercive diplomacy refers to
diplomacy presupposing the use or threatened use ofmilitary
force to achieve political objec... |
PSYOP 8.pdf | andcovertactivities in both peacetime and war, and
itsscope canvary from thetactical battlefield to the operational
76
LORD
and strategic levels of conflict. Historically, however, US
military interest in PSYOPhas focused heavily on tactical
applications in wartime. Battlefield PSYOP is sometimes
distinguished from con... |
PSYOP 8.pdf | nd international educational and cultural affairs.
USIA performs this range of functions, though other
organizations-in particular, "Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty"
but also the Departments of State and Defense-perform
informationfunctions of political or strategicimportance as
well.11
A further general category is in... |
PSYOP 8.pdf | y scattered and
very largely autonomous, they have a very important
psychological-political component. Whetherintentionally or
otherwise, they serve as significant instruments ofUS foreign
policy andnational strategy.
Finally, to repeat what was said earlier, a psychological-
political componentis inherent in every use... |
PSYOP 8.pdf | ry strength creates political
weight that can be exploited in a variety of ways to advance
the national interest.
The impetus for rethinking the role of political and
psychological factors in US national strategy has come
primarily from the renewed attention given these matters by
the Reagan administration. IZ Since 19... |
PSYOP 8.pdf | h an effort
are as strong as-or strongerthan-ever. In addition to a kind
of generic resistance to such activities on the part ofAmericans
as Americans, there has been a wholesale loss of understanding
and support of them among American elites in recent years.
But perhaps equally troublesome is the resistance stemming
f... |
PSYOP 8.pdf | n this kind of conflict.It is essential
because Americans tendto assume that people everywhere are
much like themselves, with similar fundamental motivations
and views of the world. But blindness to differences in national
characteristics is apt to be a fatal handicap for anyone
attempting to affect the psychological o... |
PSYOP 8.pdf | in a country as fundamentally idealistic as the
United States whilethe importance the Soviets attributed to
ideological factors stands in some tension with the materialistic
basis of Marxism.
Connected with this emphasis on material considerations is
the fact that Americans, unlike many peoples, are uncomfortable
with... |
PSYOP 8.pdf | s are under challenge. Furthermore, American notions of
fair playand due process are subject to serious misinterpre-
tation abroad.Americans' insistence on apresentation of both
sides of any argument is frequently seen as reflecting a lack of
self-confidence. In general, the openness and penchant for
self-criticism in ... |
PSYOP 8.pdf | epresentation or
deception is in any case far from the truth. (The conveying of
purely factual information under certain circumstances can
havepowerful psychological effects.)
Military psychological operations, such as battlefield
broadcasting, have astheir primary purpose the saving of
lives-enemy as well as friendly ... |
PSYOP 8.pdf | e
is the essenceofa rational approach to war. 14 Failureto attain
such competence within the limits ofone's possibilities is a
failure that is all toolikely to be paid forin blood.
As importantas the effect ofthese general cultural biases is
theroleofthe American media. Developments inthe culture
and operating style of... |
PSYOP 8.pdf | ime tended to adopt thenational
cause and to accept broad responsibility not only for
protecting sensitive information but also for safeguarding the
morale both ofthe troops at the frontandofciviliansat home
SinceVietnam, there has been a dramatic change. 15 In the
general wreck of the national foreign policy consensus... |
PSYOP 8.pdf | ournalism inaugurated by the prestige press.
Most significantly, the media ended their deference to and
informal cooperation with an incumbentadministration in
favor ofa posture ofneutral observer or critic. Oneresult of
this shift has been a general refusaltotake responsibility for
the consequences of media coverage's... |
PSYOP 8.pdf | ublicizing information that demoralizes American troops,
reveals aspects ofAmerican intelligence ormilitaryplanning,
undermines American diplomatic initiatives, or gives psycho-
logical aid and comfortto the enemy. This obligation isdenied
even though the ultimate effect ofsuch disclosure maybe to
prolong military oper... |
PSYOP 8.pdf | y disingenuous. The information contentofTV pictures is
typically low or nonexistent, and the emotions such pictures
arouse are more likely to defeat than to promote rational
discussion. The rapidjuxtaposition ofdeathand destruction
images tornout of anyintelligible context, so common in
television coverage ofwar, inev... |
PSYOP 8.pdf | urpose. The immediate danger tomorale and the effect on
allied and enemy perceptions are only partofthe costs ofsuch
behavior. Asin the case ofmedia obsession with the families of
terrorist victims, the effect isto pander toprivate concerns and
emotions and to mobilize them in a way that greatly com-
plicatesthe pursui... |
PSYOP 8.pdf | e relatively
low, the pressures for preserving peacetime rules ofmedia
engagement are difficult to resist. Yet itis precisely these
conflicts in which the political andpsychological element in
war is predominant.Theseconflicts are therefore mostdirectly
susceptible toinfluence bymediareporting. Devising acceptable
arra... |
PSYOP 8.pdf | y the
general cultural climate these mediahavereflected. Objectivity
and balance as understood by the newjournalism have
become the standards for these radios as well. The point here
isnot that a balanced treatment ofAmerican or Soviet virtues
andvices is notin some sense desirable, but rather thatthe
domestic cultural... |
PSYOP 8.pdf | use the instruments of
psychological-political conflict arenot altogetherdistinctive,
this arenarequiresfully integratedplanning and coordinated
operations throughout virtually the entirenational security
bureaucracy.
We need notdwell at length on the causes ofthe resistance
to psychological-politicalwarfare throughout... |
PSYOP 8.pdf | tion with technology,
major weapon systems, and the big war-tend to neglect
low-cost approaches to enhancing operational effectiveness,
especially at the lowerend oftheconflict spectrum; and they
tend to regard psychological-political warfare as someone
else's busindss.20
The failure ofboth the StateDepartment and the ... |
PSYOP 8.pdf | gency role can only
jeopardize more importantinstitutional equities.
What, then, wouldbe involved in arevitalization of US
psychological-political warfare capabilities? The foregoing
discussionis notmeant to suggest thatfundamentalchange is
a hopeless proposition-only that it is essential for us to be
conscious of the ... |
PSYOP 8.pdf | eated as a
subspecialty of special operations is a good indication of the
conceptual and operationallimitations under which it has long
labored.21 Of course, the very identification of PSYOP as a
special forces missionhas tended toisolate it from normal
military activities and bring it under a certain suspicion,
83
PSY... |
PSYOP 8.pdf | outside theArmy, which
owns most PSYOP assets), notto speakofother US government
organizations.
This situation is now beginning to change as a result of
renewedinterest within the militaryas well as at thenational
level. The rethinking ofPSYOP roles and missions is still at an
earlystage, however, and basicdoctrinalan... |
PSYOP 8.pdf | us on the role of
PSYOP at the strategic levelor in peacetime.
The tendency to think ofPSYOP in terms of direct verbal
communication is a strong one, andit reflects the nature of
tactical PSYOPas historically practicedby the United States.
However, this is a tendency that must be resisted if thefull
potential of nontac... |
PSYOP 8.pdf | ped in variousways to strengthen its
deterrenteffect.22
Even if one accepts that it would be difficultto shape
Russian and Chinese perceptions ofUS power, a strong case
can be made for the potentially high payoffs ofefforts to shape
84
LORD
perceptions in thirdworld countries.Within the thirdworld,
decision making is a... |
PSYOP 8.pdf | tary forces dedicated specifically to a psychological-
political mission, PSYOP measuresshade into traditional
coercive diplomacy. With activities such as naval port visits
andpresence,missions have generallynotbeen understood as
belongingwithin the PSYOP frameworkand do notappear to
have been approachedin a systematic... |
PSYOP 8.pdf | rtant functionfor the United
States. In general, a compelling case can be made forreviewing
and enhancingthe psychological-political componentofUS war
planning andnational-level crisis management operations.
The entire area of strategic war planning is of critical
importance in this context, since it is the point atwhi... |
PSYOP 8.pdf | regoing discussion highlights the part ofthis fieldthat
is the most neglected and at the same time the most
85
PSYCHOLOGICAL OPERATIONS
susceptible to immediate improvement. In low-intensity
conflict theaters such as CentralAmerica, there is scope for
application of, the fullrange ofUS psychological-political
capabilit... |
PSYOP 8.pdf | e.
Notes
I. See, forexample,PaulLinebarger, Psychological Warfare (Washington,
D.C.: Infantry JournalPress, 1948); Leonard Doob, Public Opinionand
Propaganda (NewYork: HenryHoltand Co., 1948);Daniel Lerner, ed.,
Propaganda in Warand Crises (New York: Stewart, 1950); William
Daugherty andMorris Janowitz, eds., A Psychol... |
PSYOP 8.pdf | , is now
available inDepartmentofState (DOS), Foreign Relations of the United
States, 1952-1954, vol. 2, pt. 2 (Washington, D.C.: GovernmentPrinting
Office [GPO], 1984), 1795-1867. Hereafterreferredtoas ForeignRelations.
4. Ibid., 1836-60. According tothe Jacksoncommittee report,
the nationalinformationprogram hassuffe... |
PSYOP 8.pdf | ndexecution ofday-to-day
operations (1840).
For pertinent remarks onthe confusion regarding the mission ofUS
informationagencies, see pages 1836-38; also ofinterest is thisremark
concerningthe military role:
86
LORD
Thecontributionofthe armedforces to politicalwarfarehas been
limitedby thelack of definition ofthemilita... |
PSYOP 8.pdf | ategy Board on the committee's
recommendation, apparently on the groundsthatpsychological-political
warfarewas tooclosely boundup with US policy orstrategy generally for
such an arrangementto workeffectively.
5. Consider, forexample, John Franklin Campbell, TheForeignAffairs
FudgeFactory (New York: BasicBooks, 1971), 1... |
PSYOP 8.pdf | mson, "U.S. Multilateral
Diplomacyat theUnitedNations," Washington Quarterly, Summer 1986,
5-18. On theSoviet approach to politicalaction, see, forexample, James
Atkinson, ThePolitics ofStruggle:TheCommunistFrontandPolitical Warfare
(Chicago: Henry Regnery, 1966); andRoyGodson, Laborin Soviet Global
Strategy (Washingto... |
PSYOP 8.pdf | hard H. Shultz andRoy Godson, Dezinformatsia:Active
Measures in SovietStrategy (Washington, D.C.: Pergamon-Brassey's, 1984).
Soviet active measures (activnyye meropriatia) encompasswhat is here
called politicalaction aswell as covertpolitical warfare. Forageneral
discussion, seeAngelo Codevilla, "CovertAction andForeig... |
PSYOP 8.pdf | tionalBroadcasting andNational
Security (NewYork: National Strategy Information Center, 1983). For an
overview ofcurrentUS activities in this area, see United States Advisory
Commission on Public Diplomacy, 1986 Report (Washington, D.C.: GPO,
1986).Examples ofpublic diplomacy materials producedbyUS government
agencies ... |
PSYOP 8.pdf | ernational information policy re-
sulted inapresidential directive on this subject (NSDD 130) inMarch 1983.
See "rune#Up for TermTwo," ChronicleofInternational Communication,
July-August 1984, 1.
13. For some critical reviews by recent participants, see the remarks of
Alfred H.Paddock,Jr., andGifford D. Malone in Staar... |
PSYOP 8.pdf | he gross abuses involvedin media coverage ofthe VietnamWar
have been well documented. See PeterBraestrup, Big Story (New Haven,
Conn.: YaleUniversityPress, 1978); Robert Elegant, How to Lose aWar.- The
PressandViet Nam (Washington, D.C.: Ethics and Public Policy Center,
1982; originally published in Encounter, August 1... |
PSYOP 8.pdf | ns, in the form ofa special commissionofmilitary and media
representativesheaded by GenWinant Sidle. Although this commission
reached informal agreement on the principle of pressparticipation in all
military operations to the maximum degree consistent with operational
security, the DODhassinceindicated some reservation... |
PSYOP 8.pdf | tudies, 1984).
19. Pertinent observations on therole of theState Department inthe
currentadministration's public diplomacy effortsare offeredby Gifford
Malone in Staar, 132-37.
20. Consider the complaints ofFred W.Walker, "PSYOP IsaNasty
Term-Too Bad," AirUniversity Review 28 (September-October 1977),
71-76, as well as... |
PSYOP 8.pdf | ross Stein, Psychology andDeterrence (Baltimore: Johns
HopkinsUniversityPress, 1985).
When Are Political Objectives
Clearly Defined?
A Historical Perspective
Michael A. Moms
National policy objectives should be clearly defined.Whether
the goalsare strategic or tactical, they must bedelineatedand
articulated to thoseres... |
PSYOP 8.pdf | nature ofmilitary objectives and strategy-
which cannot be precise unless political objectives are clearly
defined.
Clarity in political objectivesis the responsibility ofpolitical
leaders rather thanmilitary authorities; therefore,the military
services cannot be expected to impose limits on their
operations ifthe poli... |
PSYOP 8.pdf | ts our national purpose. They point out that limited
objectives determine the nature and extent ofUS involvement
in limited wars orinterventions. Some authors add thatclear
91
PSYCHOLOGICALOPERATIONS
political objectives also need to be flexible so they can be
adjusted to meet changingconditions.
These statements about... |
PSYOP 8.pdf | they may actually
encompass and conceal considerable drift and indecision.
Thus, while flexibility is necessary for adapting to changing
circumstances, flexibility can also become largely synonymous
with drift and indecision.
Nevertheless, political objectives still may remain constant
in meaning over aperiod oftime a... |
PSYOP 8.pdf | stwar
peace. Ifthe objectives are clear in this sense, they can provide
adequatepolitical direction for the choice of military objectives
and strategy.
Drift occurs when political objectivesarenot continuous in
meaning or when they are so vague as to permit several
divergent strategies to appear to be adequate ways of ... |
PSYOP 8.pdf | t through
their vagueness.
This suggested definition ofclear political objectives needs
to be elaborated further by examining its relation to the
conceptofvital interests. Since clearpolitical objectivesmust
represent concern for the preservationofthesame specific
vital interest, it is then necessary that vital interes... |
PSYOP 8.pdf | yagainst
aggression refuted thesecriticisms; it was aclearandlimited
commitment. However, this clarity ofstrategy was due tothe
USpolicymakers' clarity ofpurpose and theircleargrasp ofUS
vital interests rather than to the clarity ofpublicly stated
political objectives.
Occasionally, vital interests maybe precisely form... |
PSYOP 8.pdf | in the
1950s.
93
PSYCHOLOGICAL OPERATIONS
Abstract Vital Interests
As the paradox ofabstract vital interests began to loom
largerin US policy inthe 1950sand 1960s, the need forclarity
ofpolitical objectives continuedand, perhaps, even increased
as the nature of the threat changed and became more
ambiguous. However, the... |
PSYOP 8.pdf | considered a
threat to US security,thegeneralrequirements ofcontainment
led to an increasing US response with no question as to the
precise relevance oftheVietnam War to US security. Osgood
argued that the growth ofmultipolarity and theincreasing
complexity of the communist threat necessitated more
precisionin determi... |
PSYOP 8.pdf | orary conditions and conflicts, and can be weakened by
increasing theclarity of political objectives; that is, clarifi-
cation of vital interests leads to clarification of political
objectives andvice versa. More precisevital interests make it
harder forpolitical objectives to equivocate in claiming they
are preserving... |
PSYOP 8.pdf | or more precise definitions ofvital
interests.
Guidelines
The peculiar characteristics ofvague political objectives
suggestseveral guidelines for distinguishing clearpolitical
objectives froru vague ones. Clarity ofpolitical objectives is
being achieved when the following questions can be answered
in the affirmative.
I... |
PSYOP 8.pdf | enefits ofattaining objectives that
primarily demand military action versus the costs and benefits
ofattaining objectives that are more closely related to
nation-building and internal security?
Are drift and indecision being reduced in our political
objectives, our conception ofour vitalinterests, and our choice
ofmili... |
PSYOP 8.pdf | ons,as a
firstline o+finternal defense.
The intent ofthis article isnot toproclaimPSYOP apanacea
for "wars ofliberation."' The intentisto focusattention on
psychological operations as a vital instrument in Ho/Mao-type
wars ofnational liberation, especially the early stages where
revolutions are hatched from grievances ... |
PSYOP 8.pdf | doctrine,
which requires the integration ofpolitical, economic,psycho-
logical, and militaryfactors ofpower. Aggressive nations can
successfully use PSYOP on acase-by-case basis in subversive
insurgency-threatened countries. PSYOP use, however, must
be carefully calculatedin policy and operations to reach the
grassroot... |
PSYOP 8.pdf | adio broadcasts were more
obvious thanthe workhorseofthe revolution: the agitprop cadre
who operated on a face-to-face basis in the rural villages and
hamlets. The US discounted the sophisticated mediainthe early
daysbecause itdid not seem to playan important role.5 Whatno
one understood at the time wasthatradiowas bei... |
PSYOP 8.pdf | end objective
ofstrengthening the Communist party and weakening the
opposition. The US didnot appreciate the magnitude ofthe
agitprop cadres-their numbers, theireffectiveness, orthe extent
towhichtheywere ableto get the people engaged infurthering
communist propaganda.
Douglas Pike, a notedexpert, claims that the vari... |
PSYOP 8.pdf | e "obsessed" with doing this. Pikefound thatthe morehe
studied the Vietcong, the more "it became evident that
everythingthe NLF did was anactofcommunication.°7 In
other words, everything theVietcong did was calculated to
gainthe optimum psychological effect.
98
JOHNSTON
Policymaker and Propagandist
In the communist wor... |
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