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PSYOP 8.pdf | athas a centralized data
bank, the core ofwhich is a set ofover 1,600 foreign area data
descriptors, and thatpermits retrieval oftwo types ofreports:
annotatedbibliographic material and narrative summaries of
subject data; and
" provide for continuous and rapidupdating ofPSYOP
foreign area information.
The compwter sys... |
PSYOP 8.pdf | ies and actions. Timely, accurate reporting on the
purpose (objectives and tasks) offriendly PSYOP programs is
essential, as are facts aboutthe distribution and intensity of
efforts expended on specific target audiences. Although hostile
PSYOP activities and actions usually do not directly affect
friendly messages, sys... |
PSYOP 8.pdf | rograms and strategies
so that the successes and failures ofstrategic andtactical
programs can be measured. PEAS was therefore designed to
provide thefollowing:
140
KATZ/MeLAURIN/ABBOTT
" uniform (institutionalized) procedures andmethods for
reporting and describingall PSYOP activities in a theater of
operations;
" rap... |
PSYOP 8.pdf | o friendly
military and civilian populations; and
" data needed for an independent auditand assessment of
military PSYOPbythejoint orotherappropriate command.
To accomplish the above, PEAS was designed to accept, store,
and process data inputsintothreecomputerriles.
The ACTH file ofPEAS was designedto institutionalize ... |
PSYOP 8.pdf | amount ofeffort allocated to each channel ofcommuni-
cation (suchas print, radio, and loudspeaker). Also available is
information about psychological actions such as showofforce,
exploitation ofnew weapons, and supply drops.
Much basic data isneeded for making evaluations: Towhat
extent are our messages directed tospec... |
PSYOP 8.pdf | respondent's (suchasPOW) reaction
to anelectronicorprinted message or action. In the first step
(of the interrogation process), the respondent is required to
select fromacatalogue ofPSYOP messages that hehas seen or
heard. TheIMPACT datarecord is then completed for those
messages identified bythe respondent.
Itis beyon... |
PSYOP 8.pdf | sage asobvious propaganda?
" Influence: Did the message influence the respondentto
act in a wayfavorable tothe sponsorofthe message?
" Irritation: Did the language, symbolism, or other aspect of
the message irritatethe audience?
Statistical analysis ofsuch datashould reveal the specific
themes and messages that were su... |
PSYOP 8.pdf | OPprograms.
The POLWAR file ofPEAS provides uniform proceduresand
methods for reporting and analyzing hostile propagandaand
actiondirectedtoUSmilitary-and other friendly-populations.
Datafrom this file allowforthe continuous monitoring of
hostile POLWARactivities at the tactical command level. It is
thisfileofthe PEAS ... |
PSYOP 8.pdf | ofcross-cultural communication, noted
above, emphasized the systematic use ofmultichannel,
multistep flo* ofcommunication, and a strategy in which
communication isbyboth deed and word.
Propagandamustbe total. A modern psychological operation
must utilize all ofthe technical meansatits disposal-the press,
radio,TV, mov... |
PSYOP 8.pdf | does notprovoke the same reactions as a leaflet. The
veryfact thatthe effectiveness ofeach medium islimited toone
particulararea clearly shows the necessity ofcomplementing it
with othermedia. A wordspoken on the radio isnot the sameas
the identical wordspoken in private conversation or inapublic
speech. Nor doesa wor... |
PSYOP 8.pdf | ctive totalitarian regimes have aclearunderstanding of
the psychological aspects ofmilitary actions. These regimes
143
PSYCHOLOGICAL OPERATIONS
employ propaganda for psychological impact every day, and
propaganda is fully institutionalized within the political and
military structure ofthese states. Furthermore, these r... |
PSYOP 8.pdf | these aims
without their working at cross-purposes has not been
found-a factmade quite evident by the awkwardness that
characterizes US PSYOP efforts athomeand abroad.
Psychological operations can be among the mostsuitable and
effective weapons in pursuit ofUS national objectives in this
unstable and sometimes threaten... |
PSYOP 8.pdf | ated,
sustained effort. Itdemands a broadandthoroughknowledge
ofa wide variety ofpsychological, sociological, andcultural
factors.It also requires planning well in advance ofevents.It
must, at all times, serve under an appropriate form of
centralized direction withtrained personnel and dedicated
resources. Contemporary... |
PSYOP 8.pdf | tion,
see Robert A.Jervis, Perception andMisperceptionin InternationalPolitics
(Princeton,N.J.: PrincetonUniversityPress, 1976).
3. HaroldD. Lasswell, "The StructureandFunction ofCommunicationin
Society," in L.Bryson,ed., TheCommunication ofIdeas (New York:Harper
andRow, 1948).
4. Indeed, thefour principal figures in t... |
PSYOP 8.pdf | 4.
7. Historicalliterature dealingwith US PSYOP is farfromrich.It in-
cludes the following: W. E. Daugherty andMorris Janowitz, eds. A
PsychologicalWarfareCasebook (Baltimore,Md.: JohnsHopkins University
Press, 1958); M. Dyer, The Weapon on theWall (Baltimore, Md.: Johns
Hopkins University Press, 1959); Harold D.Lasswe... |
PSYOP 8.pdf | teeon Public Information, createdby United
States PresidentWoodrow Wilson aftertheUnited States enteredWorldWar
1. Substantialwritingon the committee appeared intheinterwar period.
Even abouttheSecond WorldWarit couldbe saidthat "U.S.propaganda
agencies createdduring [the war] were more theresult of trialanderror
plann... |
PSYOP 8.pdf | ts in Persuasion (New York: Academic
Press, 1967).
12. C. I. Hovland, The Order ofPresentation in Persuasion (New Haven,
Conn.: YaleUniversityPress, 1957).
13. HovlandandJanis.
145
PSYCHOLOGICALOPERATIONS
14. Tanaka,50-54.
15. In the summer of 1942 Russian Lt GenAndrei A. Vlasov was
capturedby the Germans. The Germans ... |
PSYOP 8.pdf | emoirsofGeneralReinhardGehlen
(New York:TheWorldPublishingCompany, 1972), 84.
17. TheChienHotprogramwas thecampaign to encourage "ralliers" (Hot
Chanh) to come over to theRepublic ofVietnam side. Only SouthVietnam-
ese NO werejeligible. Substantial publicitywas givento theact of "rallying"-
to themotivationsandaspirati... |
PSYOP 8.pdf | rom
USIA,butforthepresent thetieremains.
23. OtherUS institutions principallyinvolved on acontinuing basis in-
clude theNational Security Council, theDOS, theAgency forInternational
Development, andtheDOD.
24. Amajor source on USIA is J. Henderson, The UnitedStates
InformationAgency (New York: Praeger, 1969); M. G.Laws... |
PSYOP 8.pdf | lling Uncle Samin the
Seventies," TheAnnals oftheAmerican Academy ofPolitical andSocial
Science 398 (1971): 113-23.
'75 T T Manner The EffectsofMass Communication (Glencoe,Ill.:Free
Press, 1960).
26. B. H. Cooper, Jr., "The UndenouncedIntervention," inRalph D.
McLaurin et al., ed., TheArtandScienceofPsychologicalOperat... |
PSYOP 8.pdf | throughtheIron Curtain:TheRadioFree
Europe Story (New York:Dodd, Mead, andCompany, 1963); andJ.R. Price,
RadioFree Europe -A Survey andAnalysis (Washington, D.C.: Congres-
sional Research Services, 1971).
30. J. C. Whelan, RadioLiberty-A StudyofIts Origins, Structure, Policy,
Programming, andEffectiveness (Washington, ... |
PSYOP 8.pdf | y.)
35. J. A. Koch, The Chieu HoiProgram in South Vietnam (1963-71)
(Washington, D.C.: DOD, Advanced Research Projects Agency, R-1172-
ARPA,January 1973).
36. SeePhilip P.Katz, Communicatingwith the Vietnamese through
Leaflets (Saigon: JointUS PublicAffairs Office, 1968).
37. Ibid., 66.
38. Ibid., 68.
39. Ibid.
40. Phi... |
PSYOP 8.pdf | D. D. Smith, "SomeEffects ofRadioMoscow's North American
Broadcasts," Public OpinionQuarterly 34 (1970-71): 539-51.
45. L. John Martin, "Effectiveness ofInternationalPropaganda," TheAn-
nals oftheAmericanAcademy ofPoliticalandSocialScience 398(1971):
61-70.
46. Ibid.
147
(cid:9)
PSYCHOLOGICAL OPERATIONS
47. D. D. Robi... |
PSYOP 8.pdf | e addresses purportedly for give-
aways orothercontacts. All mail arriving at theseaddresses is then analyzed
forbackground data-location, age, and sex ofcorrespondent.
53. McLaurin,chaps. 8 and9.
54. Philip JP. Katz, PSYOP AutomatedManagementInformationSystem
(PAMIS):ForeignMediaAnalysis (Kensington, Md.: American Ins... |
PSYOP 8.pdf | , tactical, operational, and othertypes of PSYOP. Inall
forms, PSYOP primarily supports the attainmentofnational
policy and objectives. The keyto all US PSYOP is credibilityof
the message. Evaluation is based on changing perceptions,
attitudes,and behaviors.
Certainly, the ideology ofa government playsarole in its
PSYO... |
PSYOP 8.pdf | PSYOPthreat and possiblerelated weaknesses.
Lev Yudovichreveals the significantthreat and impact ofthe
Soviet military doctrine ofcultivating hate in their soldiers.
This doctrine was designed to make Soviet soldiers psycho-
logically prepared to act indangerous situations and to believe
in victory.
DrJoseph S. Gordon ... |
PSYOP 8.pdf | program thatfaithfully relies on the
individual tomakeright decisions.
Lt ColJohn Ozaki, USA, addresses the planning and
coordination ofsuccessfuldefector programsasanother formof
combat power. He emphasizes the characteristics and techniques
ofa sound program to defeat insurgencymovements.
Ronald D. McLaurin emphasiz... |
PSYOP 8.pdf | onal Department (ID) ofthe Central Committee of the
Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU), Section A ofthe
first chiefdirectorate ofthe KGB, and the propaganda
department (PD) of the Central Committee.
The ID is the coordinating center for Soviet active measures.
Its lineage can be traced directly to Lenin's forma... |
PSYOP 8.pdf | bear on any
area-political, military, or economic-that would aid or abet
Soviet policy. At the same time, itsought to denigrate and
undermine the policies of the noncommunist world, particularly
those ofthe United States. More politically realistic than its
Leninist ancestor, the ID's purpose was to manipulate public
o... |
PSYOP 8.pdf | ars as Soviet ambassadorto Canada.
The propaganda department employed dual courses of
action. It orchestrated the line ofthe party, utilizing Soviet and
bloc media, and overtly replayed disinformation generated by
the active measures apparatus. Since the PD embodied the
former international information department ofthe... |
PSYOP 8.pdf | res.
These efforts included disinformation operations, the
placement of forgeries, and the managing and directing of
knowing and unknowing agents ofinfluence-professionals in
sensitive positions, both private and public-whose activities
werefrequently of great valuein the Politburo's plan to gain
acceptance ofits posit... |
PSYOP 8.pdf | elect Committee onIntelligence, House ofRepresentatives, he
gavethe following appraisal.
The size oftheovertandcovert activemeasures is massive ...Ican
tell you from an insider's vantage pointthat the ID and the KGB
receive alltheresources and personnel needed to carryoutthis
massive effort.Thereareneverany shortages. ... |
PSYOP 8.pdf | in this lastarea that the crafting andplacement of
forgeries was conducted by section A of the first chief
directorate ofKGB.KGB's managementofforgeries was global,
andwas linked to the use ofSoviet assets inwhatever locale
the particular forgery was tobe surfaced. The KGB's purpose
inplacing fdrgeries was to undermine... |
PSYOP 8.pdf | ge (summer 1985) a purported letter from a US Army
medical doctor at Walter Reed Research Institute written toa
supposed superior at the Pentagon. The substance ofthe
forgery indicated that US and SouthAfrican scientists were
secretly working on psychotropic chemicalweapons and
so-called ethnic weapons that wouldkill o... |
PSYOP 8.pdf | thatthe US governmentis vicious, racist, and scientifically
willing to pursue inhuman ends. That KGB effort to arouse
blackAfrica failed-the forgerywas not picked up by other
African newspapers and outlets. However, one ofthebasic
155
PSYCHOLOGICAL OPERATIONS
consistencies ofthe activemeasures apparatus was thatof
repe... |
PSYOP 8.pdf | ut also disinformation byclandestine radiostations.
One such KGB effort was mounted through "RadioHalgan,"
operated by acommunist-front group of Somali dissidents in
Addis Ababa, Ethiopia. The station reportedthat the president
ofSomalia was negotiating with the US commander ofCentral
Command to lease Somaliterritory n... |
PSYOP 8.pdf | own borders, the account took on a
distorted life ofits own. The falsestory,whichwas reprinted in
numerous publications throughout Africa, produced this
headline: "Africa a Global Dustbin for Nuclear Waste."
Soviet active measures operations, using forgeryand dis-
information, ran the gamut from clumsy and crudeto soph... |
PSYOP 8.pdf | nett. His letter toan unnamed
official was aforgery: "Your Excellency, I havereceived aletter
156
COPP
which contained [sic] information aboutyour country. Since I
am not an expert on the problemof the area inwhich your
country is located, Ihave decided to writetoyou and enclose
the attached letter." The attached lette... |
PSYOP 8.pdf | Europe. The forgeryelaborated on the deployment ofUS
nuclearweapons in Europe and their possible use in support
ofthepresident's strategicschemes.
Swiftaction on the part ofUSIA P/G, USIS Nicosia, and Sir
Bennettexposed the double forgeryfor what it was. Its
publication and Simerini:s failure to write a retraction
undo... |
PSYOP 8.pdf | on and
control oftheelection's outcome? Was its purpose to sway the
Indian public into believing thatthe CIA was responsible for
the assassinationofPrime Minister Indira Gandhi? Or wasits
purpose to "getaway with" themurder of269KAL passengers
by claiming that the civilian airliner was on an espionage
mission?
Perhaps ... |
PSYOP 8.pdf | sought to implantSoviet policy
positions into decisions made by international organizations
(suchas the UN) and governmental departments. They also
sought to influence congressional actions, public beliefs, and
national attitudes concerning world affairs. A case in point is
the former senior Norwegian government offici... |
PSYOP 8.pdf | , and perhaps of
greatest significance, there were more than 200 Soviet
journalists in WesternEurope. The CIA estimated that at least
one-thirdofthe nearly 2,500 Sovietand Sovietbloc diplomats
andrepresentatives (trade andcommercial) were either KGB or
GRU (Sovietmilitary) agents.
An unknownpercentage were engagedin po... |
PSYOP 8.pdf | ok ofhis own ego by a KGB operative, whoappeared to be
anything but, the unwitting agent was slowly and gently
played throughflattery and praise. He was given a chance to
contribute an article to a select group ofSoviet intellectuals,
after which more articles were accepted and he received
payment. Inside information w... |
PSYOP 8.pdf | up the totality of
Soviet active measures-the use ofwords as weapons in all
forms of media. Participants in this strategy were Soviet
internationalfronts: propaganda organizationsthatconducted
theiractivities under the semicovert direction and controlof
the ID. Leninreferred to the concept of fronts-groups that
denied... |
PSYOP 8.pdf | m
the Kremlin.
Months before General Secretary Gorbachev accepted
President Reagan's invitation to meet inGeneva in November
1985, the fronts had received their marching orders from the
ID. MeetinginHelsinki inAprilof that year, the leader ofthe
13 fronts drafted plans to launch an all-out campaign against
thestrategic... |
PSYOP 8.pdf | ublications,
demonstrations, andforums,thefronts churned out astream
159
PSYCHOLOGICAL OPERATIONS
ofdisinformation on SDI-neverpointing out, ofcourse,that
SDI is a nonnuclear system whose purpose is to destroy
missiles,notpeople.
A broad-gauged view ofthe campaign occurred in Prague in
July 1985 when the Christian Peac... |
PSYOP 8.pdf | ilitarization
ofspace. SDI was the promotion of an aggressive policy, aweb
of deception. SDI was a frightening expression of human
hubris.
The Soviet propagandaefforts did notsucceed in changing
President Reagan's strategic policy atthe Geneva Summit or,
nearly a year later, at Reykjavik. This lack of success,
however,... |
PSYOP 8.pdf | ose, some
fronts (such as the WPC), formed additional fronts and
satellites. TheVienna-based InternationalInstitute for Peace
(IIP) is one example; its hierarchy was made up of high-ranking
officers ofthe WPC. The UP sought to attract noncommunist
academics and professionals who were willing to accept the
false notion ... |
PSYOP 8.pdf | a, their WPC
connection carefullyobscured. The ELF wasturned on and off
as the Soviet International Department required.
Another Soviet front that was created through WPC organi-
zational efforts was Generals for Peace and Disarmament
(GPD). Its membership comprised 13 retiredsenior NATO
officers. Foremost among them w... |
PSYOP 8.pdf | aired by
retired Brig Michael Harbottle, the GPD was found by the
British Foreign Office to have collective views that were
contrary to those ofthe British government and its allies.
BrigadierHarbottle and some others did a considerable
amount of traveling, seeking media interviews andpublic
forums from which tospeakag... |
PSYOP 8.pdf | ts positioned
themselves to lead the IYPcelebration. (The IYPchairman,
Viacheslav A. Ustinov, was undersecretary general for UN
political andsecurity councilaffairs.)
In all, therewere more than 800 NGOs, only sevenofwhich
were Soviet-directedfronts. Yet, when the 250-member
Conference on Non-Governmental Organizations... |
PSYOP 8.pdf | theUN governing
body.
Throughout 1986, these particularfronts, calling themselves
closely cooperating NGOs, preached the Soviet propaganda
line on disarmamentand peace. They collectively moved
toward a climactic assembly held in October 1986 in
Copenhagen underthe rubric ofa WorldPeace Congress. An
attempt was made toi... |
PSYOP 8.pdf | ish pressreported accordingly.
This exposure didnot stop theevent,butthe SDPspokesman
issued this statement: "The members of the Congress
Preparatory Committeedo not represent abroadselection of
political affiliations. We have checkedthenames ofthe people
on the organizing committee and the vast majority are
Communist.... |
PSYOP 8.pdf | oviet Friendship Society.
The Gorbachev Era
When PresidentReagan metwith GeneralSecretaryGorbachev
in Geneva in 1985, their viewsofdisarmament revealed major
differences. There was one area, however, in which all
162
COPP
participants at the summit appeared to be in agreement: the
needto have agreater degree of cultura... |
PSYOP 8.pdf | as 'recently as June 1987.
" Post-Geneva Soviet and surrogate propaganda implied
that the CIA was behind the assassination ofSwedish Prime
Minister OlofPalme.
" Post-Geneva Tass claimed that the US Air Force had
bombed Honduran peasants with poisonous substances at
night. (The charge was completelyrefuted by Honduran ... |
PSYOP 8.pdf | s.
" Soviet sources alleged that the CIA perpetrated the 1978
Jonestown massacre in Guyana (a US congressman and 918
cult members were killed). The story appearedfirst in Izuestiya
on 30 January 1987 and again in the Leningrad Komsomol
(communist youth organization) newspaper on 10 April 1987.
A particularly gruesome a... |
PSYOP 8.pdf | e AIDS virus was
scientificallyengineered ina US laboratory atFort Detrick,
Maryland, and released intothe mainstream by criminals and
homosexuals who had volunteered to be guinea pigs. In
October 1985, Literatumaya Gazeta attempted to launch such
a campaign through the NewDelhi Patriot, but there was only
sporadic pic... |
PSYOP 8.pdf | ific claims were
ridiculous.
TheHarare NonalignedSummit (NAM) became the launch
pad for another Soviet-directed AIDS disinformation campaign
thatwas to have far moresuccess thanthe previous attempts
tosell the lie. For several months priorto the NAM, Soviet and
pro-Sovietmedia had claimedthatthe US government (CIA)
was... |
PSYOP 8.pdf | ence, due in part
toa swift retraction by the Harare Sunday Mail, which carried
aninterview withanAmericanvirologist onthe faculty ofthe
University ofZimbabwe. The virologist foundthe document to
betotally without scientificmerit.
Therewas no further mention ofAIDS until Novosti, the
Soviet news agency, reported from M... |
PSYOP 8.pdf | eftist magazine Weekly
Topic.
Later, theLondon Sunday Express, certainly no partof the
Soviet active measures apparatus, ran an interview storywith
Professor Jgcob Segal andhis wife, Lilli, principal authors of
the Harare Summit AIDS document. The Expressreported that
Segal, and to a lesser degree his specialist collea... |
PSYOP 8.pdf | eportedreprintings
ofthe Express story. By endof the month, the totalapproached
30. Publications in Africa, Latin America, the Middle East,
India, and Western Europe carried the disinformation. In
Wellington, New Zealand, The Dominion ran the story on its
front page under the heading, Bizarre Theory onAIDS Origin.
In H... |
PSYOP 8.pdf | ghTass and Pravda. The Sovietofficial news agency used
reports from its New York correspondent, who hadcited out of
context a National Academy of Sciencereport on AIDS. Tass
attemptedto linkfactual scientific information with Segal's
165
PSYCHOLOGICAL OPERATIONS
Fort Detrick disinformation. Segal was again referred to
... |
PSYOP 8.pdf | response.
result of USIA/State Response
Although the disinformation campaign was initially
successful, rebuttals from USIA and State Department INR
quickly helped toreverse original media acceptance ofthe
Soviet effort. Adding to this was the stabilizing effect of two
widely attended AIDS conferences in Brazzaville an... |
PSYOP 8.pdf | gle
reputablescientific journal hadsupported the thesis that AIDS
was man-made. Almost every Westernspecialist is convinced
that the AIDS virus mutated naturallyandspontaneouslyfrom
an animal virus.
In Brazil, OEstado de S. Paulo observed that AIDS and
disinfol7natza are very similar intheir corrosive action: One
infec... |
PSYOP 8.pdf | s developed
by the CIA and the Pentagon. Fort Detrick, Maryland, was
reported by the writer to be the place wherethe disease was
created. He addedjust as incorrectly that a similar US
laboratory in Lahore had bred super mosquitoes and other
insects that could spread dangerous diseases such as yellow
fever, dengue, and ... |
PSYOP 8.pdf | specialist who failed to
attend the mid-November Berlin conference on AIDS. He
maintained thatAIDS was firsttied to Fort Detrickby aBritish
researcher whopublished an articlein aNewZealandjournal.
Segal's wife,Lilli, however, offered a different source-the East
German Urania Press. Urania's primefunction was to dissemi... |
PSYOP 8.pdf | thesurfacing ofthe
disease inNewYork City with its proximity toFort Detrick.
Their report stated that criminals who had engaged in
homosexual practices during thelong time oftheir imprison-
ment "obviously" concentrated in thenearestbigcity after
theirrelease andit wastherefore logicalthat the firstAIDS
cases should ha... |
PSYOP 8.pdf | gainst
biological warfare.
Fort Detrickis not used entirely formilitary purposes. Of the
25 tenants on the installation, one is the Frederick Cancer
Research Facility. It operatesunder the directionof Health and
Human Services with a department devotedto AIDS research.
It has neverbeen a military component. Other resea... |
PSYOP 8.pdf | be traced back to a Soviet-aligned Indian
newspaper. It quoted an unnamed individual whose line oflies
took root in the Soviet press and briefly flourished via a
Soviet-bloc document thatwas completely lacking in scientific
credibility. Later, anew piece of AIDS disinformation emerged
from India. It attempted to link ... |
PSYOP 8.pdf | al Republic ofGermany. Thedocument is
dated 25 November 1983. No such speech was ever made,and
Secretary Weinberger nevermade theremarks attributed to
him. The document was a complete fabrication. Its aimwas to
convince Europeans that theUS purposein developing the
Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI) was not only to gai... |
PSYOP 8.pdf | usage indicated that the
drafter's first language was not English. Forexample, it
asserted that the United States sought "prevalence" over the
Soviet Union at all (military) levels. The forger(s) confused
prevalence with superiority.
A major point made in the forgerywas that the United
States would suffer a disastrous ... |
PSYOP 8.pdf | on Hits Home
Soviet disinformation attempted to "hit home" with aforged
letter purportedly writtenby Herbert Romerstein, United
States InformationAgency (USIA) Soviet active measures
coordinator to US news organizations. The Washington Post
PSYCHOLOGICALOPERATIONS
approached USIA with the forged letter, whichMr Romerst... |
PSYOP 8.pdf | ested that "ourassociates in European informa-
tion media" spread reports that would include the following
details:
" the "number ofvictims should be allegedto be somewhere
between 2,000 and 3,000";
a "mass evacuation ofpopulation from the 100-mile zone"
around Chernobyl should be alleged to have occurred; and
" "trans... |
PSYOP 8.pdf | y been accepted by the press, it wouldhave
given currency tothe notion that rumors about Chernobyl had
been generatedby USIA rather than by the Soviets' refusal to
release sufficient data about the events surrounding Chernobyl.
At the same time, USIA wouldhave been cast as amanipu-
lative, rumor-mongeringpropaganda app... |
PSYOP 8.pdf | r-American Defense Board, informing General
Schweitzer about a forgerypurportedly written by him. Even
more obvious, the word copy in Romerstein's handwriting at
the top ofthe Chernobyl forgery is identicalto anotation made
on copies ofthe letter to General Schweitzer.
The forgery had all thehallmarks of a Soviet activ... |
PSYOP 8.pdf | briefing on 20 August 1986, at Washington's
Foreign Press Center, former KGB major and active measures
specialist StanislavLevchenko made some observations about
Anatolii Fedorovich Dobrynin, former Soviet Ambassador to
the US who later headed the Soviet CommunistParty Central
Committee's International Department.
Mr D... |
PSYOP 8.pdf | imtodo that kind ofjob, he could have made him, let's say,
firstdeputy foreignminister in charge ofbilateralrelations with the
United States, andhe could spendallhis days andnights workingin
that field. Instead, Anatolii Dobrynin becomeschiefoftheInternational
Department, which, inanotherparlance,is thelargest subversi... |
PSYOP 8.pdf | the United States to bring a new
professionalismtoits activities.
He,ofcourse, knows about some flawswhich theactive measures
machine hadduring thelast couple of yearswhen hispredecessor,
BorisPonomarev,wasreally gettingold.Ipersonally have no doubt
thatMr Dobrynin will try, within a rather shortperiod oftime,
probabl... |
PSYOP 8.pdf | Union on the
United States,whois generallyconsidered tobe a very talented,
bright person whois, ofcourse, a devoted Communist and quite
a devoted person to the cause of the politburo."
National Security Council Forgery
A very well-done and ambitious forgery surfaced in Lagos,
Nigeria. It bears the title, "US Strategy i... |
PSYOP 8.pdf | g symbols and classification markings. It was
divided into eight topical sections dealing with US policy
toward important regions. It was cleverly crafted,skillfully
weavingtogether US policy with phonyassertions that would
outrage foreign as well as domestic audiences. Forexample,
the United States was falselyportraye... |
PSYOP 8.pdf | y" was the goal of US policy, and
advances inmilitary technology might "suggest" or "even
demand a preemptive strike."
" NATO allies should be pressured "toconformto US policies."
" The US problemwith the Greekleadership was that it had
an "independent attitude."
" The United States is opposed to curbs on nuclear and
c... |
PSYOP 8.pdf | will "seek to hold China to policies
correspondingwith US global interests."
" The United States feelsthat Chinahas an "unpredictable
political future" and an "absence ofstable power succession
procedures."
TheUnited States opposes the successful implementation
ofChina's modernization programbecause it "might lead to
... |
PSYOP 8.pdf | is seenasa "propa-
ganda bonus" which can be utilized to increase US military
and political power in the Persian Gulf region, perhaps even
leading to "the restoration ofAmerican influence in Iran."
" The main lines of US policy in Africa are to exploit the
area as a necessary source ofraw materials and to control
Afric... |
PSYOP 8.pdf | Prime Minister Indira Gandhi, the
answer would be that the Soviet Union, by innuendo, falsely
accused the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) of committing
both crimes and repeated the lie through its propaganda
outlets.
On 31 October 1984, PrimeMinister Indira Gandhi of India
was assassinated by Sikh members ofher bodyg... |
PSYOP 8.pdf | ed by the Soviet press.
Responsible Indian newspapers would have none ofit,
however. A Hindustan Times editorial summed up public
176
COPP
reaction: "The Soviet media saw in the grim event agolden
opportunity to mount cold war propaganda against the United
States.... Cold War propaganda on such atragic occasionby
the S... |
PSYOP 8.pdf | a yearbefore President Reagan
met with General Secretary Gorbachev in Geneva and some 15
months before the murder of Swedish Prime Minister Palme. It
was hoped that the Geneva meeting would bring achange in
the kind of outrageous disinformation that had been spewing
out ofMoscow day in and day out.
Prime Minister Palm... |
PSYOP 8.pdf | e official
Communist Party newspaper, added its commentary. The
writer, Chingiz Aytmatov, academician of the Soviet Academy
of Sciences and delegate to the 27th Congress ofthe CPSU,
raised a basic question and then answered it. Who was, or
who were, the assassin(s)? We do notyet know, butit is clear
evennow that the te... |
PSYOP 8.pdf | ine wordsabout detente and peace when he
allows suchgross propaganda. There is brutal contradiction
between the hopes he has expressed for a relaxation of
internal tension and his continued hammering on public
opinion withanti-.American propaganda."
OnMonday, the New Delhi Hindi daily Navbharat carried a
Moscow datelin... |
PSYOP 8.pdf | nswere
Communist Party weeklies.InAustralia, the conservativedaily
Australian concludedan account by itsMoscow correspondent
witha quotefromformer Swedish Prime Minister FaIldin: "I
refuse tobelieve itis a politicalassassination.... This must be
theworkofalunatic."
Elsewhere around the globe, the Soviet accusationwas
i... |
PSYOP 8.pdf | case ofreactionary forces."
The Soviet academician was simply following the standard
Leninist technique ofhedging his Praudacommentary with
obfuscation. However,justas the Soviet-oriented accusations
ofCIA guilt inthe assassination ofIndira Ghandi continued to
surface, so, too, did those aboutOlofPalme. His name was
a... |
PSYOP 8.pdf | also by employing the same terminology; for
example, yellow rain.
In March and November 1982, theUS State Department
presented to the United Nations reports of "Soviet involvement in
provision and use oftoxin weapons." The reports offered
"information, Vvidence and an analysis of results the United
States had obtained ... |
PSYOP 8.pdf | nied by the Soviets, who submitted their own scientific
paper. Itmaintained that Agent Orange, the defoliant used by
the US to clear jungle areas during the Vietnam War, had
contaminated the elephant grass. Its infected spores, the Soviet
governmentclaimed, had been carried by prevailingwinds into
Laos and Kampuchea wh... |
PSYOP 8.pdf | aintained that
the US Army was spraying lethal chemicals on civilians in
northern municipalities for experimental purposes. The
chemicals, it reported, caused fainting and convulsions.
Further, it said that strange sores appeared on the bodies of
179
PSYCHOLOGICAL OPERATIONS
children. The reportsaid that the affected c... |
PSYOP 8.pdf | cret flights bythe
US aircraftsaythat 'yellow rain' fallsevery time the aircraft
appear."
That same day, "Radio Moscow" offered a commentary,
repeating the same accusations and using the sameterms.
But the accusationwenteven further.The commentator said
the Pentagon was preparingto launch chemical and biological
warfar... |
PSYOP 8.pdf |
had the US military and a Honduran congressional group.
Underthe heading "Congressmen find downpour ofcalamities
instead ofyellow rain," the newspaper La Prensa, alongwith
other Honduran publications, including Tlempo (which had
broken the original story), cited the cause ofthe problem as an
epidemic ofmangestimulated... |
PSYOP 8.pdf | were spraying sugarcane.
180
COPP
The general added that he believed the purpose ofthe stories
was to discredit US military detachments that were training in
Honduras. Anotherpossibility, he said, "is that the USSR, via
Cuba andNicaragua, is using sophisticated methods.... The
presence of 'yellow rain' in our homeland... |
PSYOP 8.pdf | n ofResistance Fighters (IFIR)
International Institute forPeace (IIP)
International Organization ofJournalists (IOJ)
International Radio and Television Organization (OIRT)
International Union ofStudents (IUS)
Women's International Democratic Federation (WIDF)
WorldFederation ofDemocratic Youth (WFDY)
WorldFederation of... |
PSYOP 8.pdf | H. von Meyenfeldt, Chairman
Norway
GeneralJohan Christie
Portugal
MarshalFrancisco da Costa Gomes
General Rangel de Lima
United Kingdom
BrigadierMichaelHarbottle OBE
189
What Soviet PSFOP Mirror
Imaging Can Tell Us
James Melnich
Soviet psyoperators were sometimes ignorant ofsignificant
nuances concerningthe societies t... |
PSYOP 8.pdf | OPhierarchy appeared tohave
gained in sophistication. Identifying some ofthese tell-tale
characteristics willhelp us to assess the overall Soviet PSYOP
threat.
Glasnost, Gorbachev, and Disinformation
The campaignofglasnost inthe Soviet UnionunderMikhail S.
Gorbachev, withitsemphasison a more openSoviet press, byno
mean... |
PSYOP 8.pdf | rse of
their discussions, he suggestedthatAmerica create separate
states for blacks, Puerto Ricans, and citizens ofPolish back-
ground.' Apart from this being a ludicrous and insulting
PSYCHOLOGICAL OPERATIONS
recommendation, it provides some insights into the Soviet
system. To beginwith,it demonstrates Gorbachev's ign... |
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