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PSYOP 8.pdf | s by
Crimean Tatars for their rights, and pressures for greater
Jewish emigration. Demographic analysis of the Soviet
population suggests that the Great Russian nationality itself
was becoming a minority in its own country as CentralAsian
birthrates skyrocketed.
As Soviet policymakers sought answers to these problems,
... |
PSYOP 8.pdf | ated overand over in a variety of contexts, whether one is
considering AIDS, baby parts, or chemical weapons.
One might add that, although the Soviet Union did have its
share ofextremely sophisticated propagandists, such as
Georgii Arbatov of the Institute ofthe USA and Canada,
Politburo member Aleksandr Yakovlev, and ... |
PSYOP 8.pdf | o everything the Soviet
Union stood for. Forexample, Zionism was defined as a
"deadly enemy ofthe Soviet State from its very beginning." Z
There was usually a plurality of Soviet ultimate enemies,
depending on the internationalsituation.An ultimate enemy
in Soviet propaganda was firstdehumanized, then made part
of an a... |
PSYOP 8.pdf | ofSovietreality. For one
example, Iwill draw from personal experience.
In theearly 1980s, Imet a Soviet emigre womanwho was
convincedthatevangelical Christiansin the Ukraine sacrificed
babies by rolling them in barrels with spikes aspart ofsome
religious ritual. She, of course, had never witnessed such a
thing, but sai... |
PSYOP 8.pdf | e matter of the spikes continued to bother
me: why such aparticular disinformation image? Where did it
come from? Dida propagandist simply make it up out ofthin
air, or did it spring from some othersource? Ihave no final
answer to this question, but a year or so later, when I was
readingMichaelVoslensky'swork, Nomenkla... |
PSYOP 8.pdf | han one-half century. Are they somehow
related, or didlater Soviet propagandists simplymakeup the
recent vicious accusation out ofthin air? One cannot be
certain, of course, butI wouldposit this as apossible example
of amirrorimage projected out of the past.
Zionism and Nazism
In examining the concept of ultimate enemy... |
PSYOP 8.pdf | he memory of
Nazi fascism, which cost 20 million Soviet lives during World
War II and the fear that German revanchism wouldonceagain
rear its ugly head. Soviet propagandists simplycombined the
two images.
What this tells us is thatthe Soviet propagandamachine
(regardless ofits short-term goalsfor the propaganda, such a... |
PSYOP 8.pdf | ime, the Soviet Union appearsto have been one of the few
nations to do it consistently overtime during periods of peace.
As a footnote, one mightconsider how sensitive the Soviets
themselves were to being stereotyped in the West. The TV
series "Amerika" showed the Soviets as adversaries, but
adversaries possessingmany ... |
PSYOP 8.pdf | t only
attacked -he United States for invading Grenada but also
accused US forces (allegedly quotingthe Mexican newspaper
ElDia) of using chemical weapons to poison some 2,000
Grenadens, includingwomen and children, and ofrecording
theirsufferinganddeaths on film.This gruesome fabrication,
whichwas read by millions ofS... |
PSYOP 8.pdf | son. In his especially
pernicious articleabout Grenada, Kuvshinnikov attempted to
set up a parallel between theWWII Nazi death campswith
their humanexperiments and the US invasion of Grenada.
This is another example ofthe ultimate-enemy image. No
citation wasgivenfor El Dia, whichwas described by Izuestiya
as an influe... |
PSYOP 8.pdf | n (who may have
195
PSYCHOLOGICALOPERATIONS
participated in brutal crimes against civilians) eased when
they thought the United States had done worse?
Mirror imaging in Soviet propaganda is, I believe, an analysis
area of great value to all who study the former Soviet
Union-especially those who seek to understand the n... |
PSYOP 8.pdf |
4. Forafascinatingaccount ofallegedPolitburoviews of worldwide
conspiracies, seeArkady N. Shevchenko, Breaking withMoscow (NewYork:
Alfred A.Knopf, 1985).
5. A.Kuvshinnikov,Izvestiya, 9December 1983,4.
6. Ibid., 21 August 1987,4.
Indoctrination of Hate
LevYudovich
Soviet military doctrine required the soldier to devel... |
PSYOP 8.pdf | feeling of
superiority overthem. Wemustshowthe soldier the strong andweak
points ofourenemies.Wehaveto define the enemy in termsofhis
psychologicalcharacteristics (or stereotypes) thatare related tohis
nationality orethnic group.1
The Soviet soldier was constantly being indoctrinated to
develop hatred for the West. The... |
PSYOP 8.pdf | myth helped Soviet
military and political leadership instill prejudice inthe soldier.
He was trained to become suspicious offoreignersand their
way oflife. His suspicion and deep distrust becamethe basis
for hate. According tothe Soviet view, "the political mythis an
Thisarticleprovidedcourtesy ofthe USJohnF.Kennedy S... |
PSYOP 8.pdf | y explaining that,in
the past,the final moral hardening ofthe soldier could be
achieved during the course ofcombat. In the future war, how-
ever, therewill not be enough time forpsychologicalprepared-
ness. The soldier must, therefore, be prepared through
training. He must put aside anymoral convictions he might
have a... |
PSYOP 8.pdf | murderer with a very low morallevel. He had
no convictions, and his main reason for fighting was to get
money. The Soviets stated thatthe US soldier was notreliable
in Vietnam. As the military situation in Vietnam got worse,
said the Soviets, there were more deserters, and racial
tensions increased. Thereason they pres... |
PSYOP 8.pdf | a skilledmurdererr3 American officers
encourage US soldiers to be murderers and rapists. In the
Korean War, according to the colonel, allAmerican soldiers
rapedKorean women andgirls, and officers created special
brothels in which Korean women were forced against their will
to provide sexual services forthe soldiers.4 A... |
PSYOP 8.pdf | ical workers indoctrinated hate
during every majormaneuver from Dnepr to Shield '84. 8 One
dramatic exampleof such indoctrination utilized thesite of
Nazi victims' mass graves. Veterans andformer partisans
assembled for ceremonies at those sites and stated their
recollections ofNazi brutalities. Thepolitical workerspoi... |
PSYOP 8.pdf | s were visited by political
workers.9
Even in theface ofnew political thinking aimedatreducing
the mutual militarythreat ofthe SovietUnion andtheUnited
States,the Soviets continuedto instillhatred for Americans in
their regular indoctrination programs. For example, a Soviet
military journalincluded an article stating t... |
PSYOP 8.pdf | justified by their
current blood policy and their intent to invade ourhomeland
with weaponsofmass destruction." 10
199
PSYCHOLOGICAL OPERATIONS
The Soviets were developing not only hatred but also
arguments tojustify it and explain to the Soviet soldier why he
should hate the Americans. Animportant reason for hatred
w... |
PSYOP 8.pdf | but they lack
discipline' and have low moral qualities. Theyhave only a
narrow political mental outlook."" In the seventies, that
evaluationstarted tochange.
The majority ofSovietmilitary writers pointed out that,in a
future war, American soldiers would be wellindoctrinated for
fightingthe Soviet Union.12 "Thefuture w... |
PSYOP 8.pdf | the American military gangster-murderer. Because
the good fighting quality ofthe American soldier was
recognized, propaganda was increased. Every attempt was
made to show that the American soldier was actually anobject
ofscorn. The propagandists stressed the message that the
American soldier mustbe thoroughly hated. Su... |
PSYOP 8.pdf | 9.
10. CommunistofArmedForces 14,July 1986, 71.
11. F. O.Mikchei, Atomnoye Oruzhie V. Armii(Moscow: lzdatelstvo Inos-
trannoiLiteraturi, 1956), 39-40.
12. Korobeinikov,9.
13. K.Volkogonov, Psihologicheskay Voyna(Moscow: Voyennoye Izdatel-
stvo, 1984), 263.
Intelligence and
Psychological Operations
ColJoseph S.Gordon,US... |
PSYOP 8.pdf | is, andpropaganda analysis. 1
Research
Research is geared to supportthe mission ofPSYOP, which
is to create in hostile, friendly, or neutral foreign groups the
emotions, attitudes, or behavior tosupport the achievementof
national objectives.Theeffective PSYOPcampaign requires
systematic research ofthe highest scholarly... |
PSYOP 8.pdf | ailored to support PSYOP. One
example is the basic PSYOP study, whichsupplements area
studies by focusing on relevant PSYOP issues, defined as
highly emotional matters, deeply rooted in a particular
country's history, customs, fears, or foreignpolicy. The issues
203
PSYCHOLOGICALOPERATIONS
are selected largely for thei... |
PSYOP 8.pdf | f PSYOP materials.PSYOP
intelligence analysts also produce special studies in response
to timely events orto the need for greater focus and depth on
an aspect of a country or society notcovered elsewhere.
Current intelligence is obtained from all possible sources
and is used to update studies and files. Should a PSYOP
... |
PSYOP 8.pdf | tinentsubjects are distributed to
PSYOP organizations. Such organizations may also request
intelligence collection for specific items offactual information.
Liaison with other agencies outside the DepartmentofDefense
(DOD) often can produce valuable information. Some agencies
that can assist PSYOP in obtaininginformati... |
PSYOP 8.pdf | deniedareas
in both peace and war. The sources of human intelligence
include emigres, refugees, and prisoners ofwar.
No discussion of intelligence research is complete without
mentioning the qualifications of the analyst. Because PSYOP
204
GORDON
demands extensiveknowledgeofthehistory, politics, society,
economy, cultu... |
PSYOP 8.pdf | he third world. Highly capable
intelligence analysts are essentialfor a successful PSYOP
program.
Target Analysis
The intelligence effort in target analysis canbe divided into
five elements,the first ofwhichis to determinekey audiences.
Based on systematic research, one determines the major
elements of a given society ... |
PSYOP 8.pdf | econd element of target analysis is to determine the
attitudes ofkeyaudiences. Basicresearch provides intelligence
on long-standingattitudestoward political, military, economic,
and social subjects. This information is refined as much as
possible to delineate the views ofvariousage cohorts, social
strata,and occupation... |
PSYOP 8.pdf | rabilities andattitudes
ofthe targetprovide afoundation on which to build thematic
materials for a PSYOP campaign. These materials must
support the plans and policies of the campaign, and the
vulnerabilities/attitudes they are basedon must be an accurate
assessment determined by scientific analysis andevaluation.
Furth... |
PSYOP 8.pdf | ective. It is also good to avoid the
smallerrors,which are easily made, in idiomatic language or
cultural incongruitiesthat can immediatelydestroy credibility.
There are several methods for pretesting PSYOP materials,
many of which can also be used to analyze the effects of
communication. But testing is usually highly ... |
PSYOP 8.pdf | ns to ensure representativeness.
This technique determines whether the message is
understood, credible, evokes the desiredresponse, or has
provoked undesirable effects.
Another method of testing PSYOP material is the panel,
which differsfrom the survey in thatthe panel participants are
repeatedly questioned atregular i... |
PSYOP 8.pdf | ts of the PSYOP materials in
question. The discussion panel has a weakness, however:
significant viewscanbe suppressed by peer-group criticism.
A final method oftesting is the individual interview. Ideally,
it should be performed by a trainedpsychologist. The main
purpose ofthe individual interview is to obtain insight... |
PSYOP 8.pdf | erindicators, the first of which is physical
response to the campaign. If the audience acts as the PSYOP
message suggested (e.g., to defect, surrender, or cause a
disturbance), there is evidence of effectiveness. One must be
aware, however, that this action could have been caused
entirely or in part by other factors. T... |
PSYOP 8.pdf | political,
economic, social, and military situation ina given country (if
not the possible intentions of action in a given situation).
207
PSYCHOLOGICAL OPERATIONS
Second, domesticpropaganda inrevealing suchinformation
may also disclose vulnerabilities that can be used in our
PSYOP campaigns.Further analysis ofexternal... |
PSYOP 8.pdf | ed? Howsuccessful is the propagandistin accomplishing
theobjective?
Although these analytical questions may seem rather
simple, answering them canrequire sophisticated examination
ofthe propaganda materials. It is not sufficient tomerely deal
with the themes and the logic conveyed in the propaganda
message, one must pa... |
PSYOP 8.pdf | even more important to PSYOP. Itis
critical throughoutthe spectrum ofoperationsfromthe initial
planning to the campaign evaluation. PSYOP is not only a
user, itis also a producer ofintelligence. Itis capable of
contributing to the overall national effort as wellas servicing
itsown needs.
Notes
1. A valuable source oft... |
PSYOP 8.pdf | 1 citedabove, thefollowingworks were consulted
forpropaganda analysis: LeonardW.Doob,Public OpinionandPropaganda
(New York: HenryHolt, 1948);D.LincolnHarter andJohn Sullivan,Propa-
gandaHandbook (Media,Pa.: 20th CenturyPublishing, 1953);andWilliam
HummelandKeithHuntress,TheAnalysis ofPropaganda (New York:William
Sloane... |
PSYOP 8.pdf | BackgroundNotes. Wash-
ington, D.C.: Bureau of Public Affairs. Useful handbooks
ofregions of the world with regional and individual
country chapters. Covers all parts of the world.Updated
eachAugust.
11. Intelligence
Bibliography ofIntelligence Literature;A Critical andAnnotated
Bibliography of Open Source Literature. ... |
PSYOP 8.pdf | eful to evaluate works consulted in
research.
PublicAffairsInformation Service. Guide to scholarly journals
such as ForeignAffairs and Orbis. A similar service is
provided by the Social Science lrwfex, not listed here.
Readers' Guide to PeriodicalLiterature. Guide to articles in
manypopular publications such as Time an... |
PSYOP 8.pdf | below).
VI. Newspapers
The New York Tinges Index. Guide to newspapers. Considers
itselfthe "BookofRecord" forthe US.
VII. Various
Chiefsof StateandCabinetMembers ofForeign Governments.
Updatedmonthly.
CurrentNews. Pentagon clipping service ofUS newspapers on
defense-related issues. Distributed daily in theWashington,
D... |
PSYOP 8.pdf | Information
Program Cannot Do
GeorgeV.Allen
Aninternational information program cannot change the
basicattitudes andopinions inforeign countries.
One ofthe great Americanfallacies isthe notion, prevalent
among people in all walks oflife, that we need to explain
ourselves, our policies, and our way oflife toforeign peop... |
PSYOP 8.pdf | erican story across to the people offoreign countries. It
should beverysimple, I was told. You need to explain that the
American way oflife-including our democratic principles, our
respect for human rights, and our private enterprise-has
produced the highest standard ofliving inthe world.Everybody
admittedthatnot only ... |
PSYOP 8.pdf | Propaganda andthe Cold War (Washington,D.C.:
Public Affairs Press, 1963). Reprinted withthe permission ofthe Public
Affairs Press, copyright holder.
21 3
PSYCHOLOGICAL OPERATIONS
more or less as they were. We talked a good deal about
evolution instead ofrevolution, and we made it clear that we
did not want the governm... |
PSYOP 8.pdf | hat Moscow was
regarded by most ofthe poorpeople around the world as the
friend ofthe poor and ofthe rebel. When one asks how it is
possible that so many Cubans were attracted towards Moscow
rather than the United States, the painful butrealistic answer
is because they thought Moscow was more likely to support
them tha... |
PSYOP 8.pdf | gnize the facts oflife. Wemusttry
to see ourselves as others see us. We must understand their
motivations and reactions as we try to help them understand
ours. We haveputtoo much emphasis on explaining our point
ofview and not enough on understanding theirs.
Let us turn now from economic to political matters. One of
th... |
PSYOP 8.pdf | freedom,
progress, and peace." In other words, we must make our
214
ALLEN
policies as convincing and acceptable to foreigners as we can,
presuming that our policies are in harmony withtheir proper
aspirations.
I was in India when the United States gave military aid to
Pakistan under our collective security policy. The ... |
PSYOP 8.pdf | rlin disputel
There is a tendency for college professors to claimtoo much
for the growing fieldofcommunications (sometimes improperly
called psychological warfare). Many universities are rapidly
developing studies, and even faculties,in this specialized field.
But ifthose in the academic world and we in government
over... |
PSYOP 8.pdf | in comprehensible
terms to as many people as possible by the most effective
media. Then wemust rest our case with the common sense of
mankind. I suppose one must have amystic faith, as Jefferson
did, in the ability of the common man to make a right decision
when given adequate information and freedom of choice. Ifyou
... |
PSYOP 8.pdf | ofthe economic and political instability that
prevails during internaldefense operations, many insurgents
can be persuaded to return to their government's cause ifa
sound defector planis instituted. The successfulcampaign
against the Huksinthe Philippine Islands and the more recent
ChienHoi (openarms) defector program ... |
PSYOP 8.pdf | constituted government.
" Exploiting for intelligenceand psychological operations
those individuals who have returned to the side ofthe
government.
" Fulfilling promisestodefectors by providing to them and
theirfamilies security and economic support, to include
vocational and job opportunities that help them become
sel... |
PSYOP 8.pdf | e United States is advising a host country on
military matters:
" The host country should' establish an agency to be
responsibleforexecution of allaspects ofthe defector program,
which should be equalin status to majorcomponents of the
government such asthe military departments and the national
police. This agency's or... |
PSYOP 8.pdf | ntrol offunds
provided by the United States that are used indirect support
of thedefector program.
" Combined civilian and military counterparts should be
established at each level where majordefector operations take
place. These would include district, sector, regional, and
national levels as appropriate to the territ... |
PSYOP 8.pdf | in the
rehabilitation of the defectors. The loyal citizens must accept
21 8
OZAKI
the defectors back into the society or the defectors will
probably return to the insurgent side.
Inducement operations are the responsibility ofPSYOP
personnel although intelligence organizations also play a
major role in this part ofthe ... |
PSYOP 8.pdf | program is implemented, acareful analysis
is made to determine the vulnerabilities of the insurgents.
Common vulnerabilities ofinsurgent forces are hardships,
disillusionment because ofslow progress, and fear of getting
killed. To be effective, the term hardship must be translated
into meaningful facts such as insuffi... |
PSYOP 8.pdf | nd imprinted balloons publicize
the defector program.Encouraging localgovernment officials to
speak about the program may also help.
PSYOP Utilization
Former insurgents are used to the maximum extent possible
in inducement operations. They are extremely effective in
developing PSYOP material because theyknow the enviro... |
PSYOP 8.pdf | and knowledge. For
security purposes, selected individuals ofknown loyaltyare
incorporated in thesespecial units.
An effectivesystem ofrewards is one ofthe most important
aspects ofadefector program. Rewards are coordinated to
ensure that each defector is paid for the assistance he
provides to the government andthat th... |
PSYOP 8.pdf | ive
wide publicity so all cansee that the government livesup toits
word. This addedemphasis may induce other defections,
particularly when large sums of moneyareinvolved.
Exploitation of the returnees involves obtaininginformation,
disseminating the intelligence derived from this information,
and using the intelligence... |
PSYOP 8.pdf | forces.
" Qualified interrogatorsare available at the lowest level
possible, which is important because of the insurgent's
characteristic of frequently moving. It is imperative that
defectors be interviewed within the firstfew hours after
220
OZAKI
defection to determine theirknowledge. Interviewers alsoneed
the neces... |
PSYOP 8.pdf | tablished.
One ofthe major problems confronting a commander isthat
many ofhis, officers and men will not trust the returning
defectors. Tocounter this logical distrust, thecommander
implements amassive command information program that
includes handling, treatment, and use ofdefectors. Experience
proves that one ofthe b... |
PSYOP 8.pdf | members ofcollection and reconnaissance units,
and monitors forinterpreters.
Special interrogation proceduresare necessary for working
with adefector. Experience has shown that most defectors will
talk freelywithout the use ofpressure. Generally, the best
technique is toemploy the interview method. The interviewer
firs... |
PSYOP 8.pdf | important.Although
a private room is desirable, elaborate equipment is not
221
PSYCHOLOGICAL OPERATIONS
necessary. With new defectors, it is helpful to have intelligence
requirements mentally fixedso that resort to paper andpencil
is notnecessary. The defector should be convinced that he is
important andhas valuable in... |
PSYOP 8.pdf | ncies helps to speed informationtothe
user.
Ifthe country is so organized, there is a military reporting
headquarters at district, province, andregion.Forms used for
reportingmust be simple,andsome basicinformation should
be reduced to blocks for checkmarks.It oftenwill be beneficial
ifthe forms arebilingual.
Intellige... |
PSYOP 8.pdf | s essential. Ifthe exploitation
program is workingwell, the insurgents will counter it with
attacks against individual returnees andcompounds where
returneesare kept. Normal active andpassive security measures
are improved by organizing the defectors into self-defense
units. Special protection is givento high-level def... |
PSYOP 8.pdf | o evacuate thefamily
to a securearea.
Asuccessful defector program includes effective means for
returnee rehabilitation,a phasethat requiresnational support.
Planning and coordination ofnational resourcesarerequired
when jobs, arable land, andeducational facilities are to be
provided.
Reception Centers
Rehabilitation b... |
PSYOP 8.pdf | orsome time. Aspecial ceremony (such as
aretreatformation) is held to introducethis individual to the
rest ofthe group. In addition to temporaryjobs, such as
sponsoring members, returneesare hired to fill as many ofthe
permanent administrative jobs atthecenter as possible. They
know the problems ofthe returnee; therefo... |
PSYOP 8.pdf | d national coordination is required to
223
PSYCHOLOGICALOPERATIONS
ensure that those individuals who successfully complete
vocational training become gainfullyemployed.
To assist in their own protection, defectors should be
organized into self-defense groups.Therehabilitation complex
should be tied into the defense pla... |
PSYOP 8.pdf | ent andbecoming self-supporting.Field representatives
working with the police receive information from defector
programadministrators when defectors have movedinto their
areas. These representatives determinewhat problems, if any,
the defectors are having in being accepted by the general
population. As a minimum, a sys... |
PSYOP 8.pdf | fectors resettle where
they can find employment in trades learned during the
rehabilitation portionofthe program.
History demonstrates that a sounddefector programis a
valuable aidin defeating an insurgentmovement. A good
defector program supports the existing government by
reducing the number of active insurgents, gai... |
PSYOP 8.pdf | surgency (1946-64) in the
Philippines was the mistreatment endured by the populace at
the hands ofPhilippinesecurity forces. Accounts ofindividual
abuses by police powers inthe Philippines are legion. From
independence until 1950, thepoorly trained security forces
suffered frombadmorale and worse discipline. Inthe fiel... |
PSYOP 8.pdf | antsthatmanyofthem supported orjoinedthe Huks.I
After Ramon Magsaysay became secretary ofnational
defense in September 1950,however, many important and
effective steps weretakento protect noncombatants during
tactical operations and to buildconfidencein their military
forces.
The first step, an innovation intactical or... |
PSYOP 8.pdf | ommander ofthe fourmilitary areas in the
country."2
Second, in those cases where securityforces abused their
authority or did not treat civilians withrespect, an effort was
made to ensure that prompt and appropriate punishmentwas
meted out. Because the objective was popular sympathy, not
merely appropriate punishment, ... |
PSYOP 8.pdf | e effective civic actionprograms, and better
tactical intelligence. Civil affairsofficers were also responsible
inlarge measure forthe implementationofthe population
protection progamm4
A further instrumentto ensure thatthe armedforces acted
withself-restraint toward the civilian populationconsisted ofan
arrangement wi... |
PSYOP 8.pdf | armed
forces formaximum deterrent effect
Yet another change involved the dispatch ofmilitary doctors
with individualunits inthe field.This function served boththe
military and noncombatants inthe area. The doctors provided
medical aid to civilians who were injured through either
combat or accident. They also gave gener... |
PSYOP 8.pdf | he major strategic objective of the
government reacquisition ofthe loyalty and support ofthe
population.
Notes
1. See, for example, Richard M. Leighton, RalphSanders, andJoseN.
Tinio, TheHukRebellion:A Case Study in theSocialDynamics ofInsurrection
(Washington, D.C.: Industrial College ofthe ArmedForces, 1964), 29, 33,... |
PSYOP 8.pdf | hePhilippineAnswerto Communism (Stanford, Calif.:
Stanford University Press, 1955), 28, 35, 36, 49-62, 119; Frances Lucille
Sterner, Magsaysay andthePhilippine Peasantry:TheAgrarian Impact on
Philippine Politics, 1953-1956 (Berkeleyand Los Angeles: University of
CaliforniaPress, 1961), 26, 224 (n. 12); Napoleon Valeria... |
PSYOP 8.pdf | s,Executive Order 113 April 1950:Alfonso
A. Calderon, "Philippine Constabulary," Philippine ArmedForces Journal 3
(September-October 1950):4;Romulo, 131; Romuloand Gray, 124, 127;
Scaff, 36; RobertRoss Smith, "The Philippines, 1946-1954," inD. M.
Condit, Bert H. Cooper, Jr., etal., Challenge andResponseinInternal
Confl... |
PSYOP 8.pdf | .
7. Scaff,135.
227
PART IV
Case Studies
of
PSYOP Applications
Introduction
Thesecase studies presentand clarify PSYOPgoals, roles, and
methods. ColBenjamin F. Findley, Jr., USAFR, condenses and
analyzes US andVietcong PSYOP inthe Vietnam War. He
analyzes theChieu Hoi campaign, the vulnerabilities of the North
Vietname... |
PSYOP 8.pdf | Plessons learned.
Laurence J. OrzellshowsthatPoland's underground media
were nongovernmental PSYOP in action as well as a significant
part ofthePolishsociopolitical scene. According to Orzell, this
undergroundmedia enabledthe Poles to resist the enforce-
ment ofthe adoption ofcommunist ideals and values.
Colonel Goldst... |
PSYOP 8.pdf | cognize and counterpolitical and psychologicalwarfare
conductedagainstUS policies.
In Major Keifer's second piece, he gives an overview ofthe
psychologicaldimension of thePersian GulfWarrelative to the
diplomacy process and thequickendtothe war.
Colonel Goldstein and Col Daniel W. Jacobowitz, USAF,
Retired, in case stu... |
PSYOP 8.pdf | the vulnerabilities ofthe
North Vietnarhese Army and the Vietcong, and key PSYOP
techniques ofboththe US and the Vietcong.
Coordination ofDecentralized United States
Psychological Operations Agencies
The US PSVOP effort during the Vietnam War was
decentralized amongthe US Military Assistance Command,
Vietnam (MACV), t... |
PSYOP 8.pdf | cation ofeffort,
and toincrease the overall effectiveness ofthe effort.
According to then 4th PSYOP Group Conimander Taro
Katagiri, the variety ofagencies involved made it difficult to
coordinate the PSYOP effort as wellas to establish centralized
control and direction in the Republic ofVietnam (RVN) in
1968-69. There ... |
PSYOP 8.pdf | ng the war withoutthe
guidance and control necessary to accomplish the
corresponding goals. The breadth ofAmerican roles andgoals
led to rapid growth in the size of US PSYOP elements. PSYOP
goals:
1. undermine popularsupportfortheinsurgents,
2. enhance the imageofthe government ofthe RVN,
3. increase Vietnamese underst... |
PSYOP 8.pdf | US Army Republic ofVietnam (USARV),
" the4thand 7th PSYOPGroups,
" NavalForces,Vietnam(NAVFORV), and
" the SeventhUS AirForce.
In PSYOP Policy number 51, 28 December 1967, the
JUSPAO Planning Office established the following PSYOP
priorities:
1. the Government ofVietnam(GVN) image,
2. Chien Hoi (come home),
3. revoluti... |
PSYOP 8.pdf | results. The operations were Operation
Roundup in Itien HoaProvince and Project Falling Leaves in
Kien GiangProvince. Operation Roundup produced hundreds
of enemy defectors, according to Colburn Lovett, a USIS
foreignserviceinformation officer. One PSYOPtechnique was
to take pictures of ralliers/defectors and have them... |
PSYOP 8.pdf | ed loudspeakerteams, leafletdrops, radio
tapes, and television appeals by former VC.
There are significant PSYOP lessons here for all com-
manders. During thetwo-month period in 1971 when intense
PSYOP supplemented military action, there were 1,150
defectors, while in the sixweeks before and the four weeks
after the in... |
PSYOP 8.pdf | OLOGICAL OPERATIONS
objective bringing Vietnamese government presence back to
the area around Due Co in Pleiku Province. The area had
slippedinto thecontested category. Using theDue Co Special
Forces Campas its base,the PSYOPeffort was aimedatall of
the villages and hamlets within a 10-kilometer radius. This
Chieu Hoic... |
PSYOP 8.pdf | he VC were preventing peacewhilethe
government ofVietnam was working for peace. Valuable
informationconcerning the popular resentment toward VC
methods came to lightand the team members were careful not
to make the same mistakes, particularly with regard to
pressures exerted to bring villagersto propaganda sessions.At
... |
PSYOP 8.pdf | elf-criticism sessions, the three-man
cell, andendlessrepetition ofcommunist themes.A contribu-
tory reason forthe resistance of NVA soldiers to Chieu Hoi
inducements was that defection for most did not hold the
promise ofan early family reunion. (Defecting Vietcong were
South Vietnamese who were goinghome.) Moreover,u... |
PSYOP 8.pdf | y uninhabited areas
and with littlechancefor contact withthe civilian population.
US/GVNPSYOP messages pointed outthree options: (1) to
rally, take advantage ofthe Chieu Hoi programand quickly
become afreecitizenofthe RVN; (2) surrender as a prisoner of
war and awaitrepatriation atthe endofthe war inthe safetyand
relat... |
PSYOP 8.pdf | , the contrast between what they hadbeen toldby the
cadre and what they actually experienced, were the major
exploitable weaknesses.
The surrender program for the Northern troops (Chien Hoi)
received the greatest amount ofAmerican emphasis and money.
Reception centers for defectors (hoichanh) were built at various
loca... |
PSYOP 8.pdf | ships,
3. lossoffaith in victory,
4. concern forfamily, and
5. disillusionment.
237
PSYCHOLOGICAL OPERATIONS
The aim ofthe fear appeal was toconvince the enemy that
he faced an overwhelming danger ofbeing killed if he remained
with the communists.Message themes included "death lurks
everywhere," "born in the northtodie... |
PSYOP 8.pdf | the hoi chanh
felt that thq government wasgloatingover the deaths offellow
Vietnamese.
The hardship appeal reminded enemysoldiers oftheir lone-
liness, homesickness, poor living conditions, and insuffi-
ciencies in food andmedical supplies. The "loss of faith in
communistvictory" appeal sought to convince the enemythat... |
PSYOP 8.pdf | convinced that Hanoi's aims were just, but would be
more willing to defect when he became skepticalofthem.
Four special PSYOP techniques were employed in Vietnam:
distribution ofsafe conductpasses, moneyfor weapons, focus
on returning home to celebrateduring the TetNew Year, and
armed propaganda teams composed ofhoi c... |
PSYOP 8.pdf | h as rural construction, political programs,
medical assistance, or humanitarian efforts. Another mis-
conception was that PSYOP involves just verbal communi-
cations and, thus, many Americans were insensitive to
nonverbal gestures,posture,signs, and physical appearance.
An individual's response to persuasive communica... |
PSYOP 8.pdf | ing good treatment and otheraspects of the amnesty
program.
Cultural Considerations in Vietnam
FortheWesterner, one of the most important elements to
understand about Vietnamese culture is the completely
personal basis of thesociety. "'Truth" for theVietnamese is not
the factual statementor actual occurrence ofan event... |
PSYOP 8.pdf | namese culture, and Vietnamese
people politely keep their distances. Vietnamese answers to
questionswill reflectwhat the questioner may want to hear. A
Vietnamese will avoid lengthy associations with strangers but
will be pleasantlypolite. The Vietnamese culture places a very
high value on the family and on eldercitize... |
PSYOP 8.pdf | tresearch findings substantiate the fact that
intimate Vietnamese associates tendto hold opinions and
attitudes incommon and are reluctant to depart unilaterally from
their groul3 consensus. They talkfrequentlyamongthemselves
and establish a trusting bond offriendship upon which to
primarily base theirdecisions.Interpe... |
PSYOP 8.pdf | edforces was the overriding priorityfor
the VC; violence, armed attacks, assassinations, kidnappings,
terrorist acts,and binhvan were employed.
The top objective ofbinh van was to induce unit desertions,
preferably accompanied by an act ofsabotage. The next
highest objective was to induce individual military desertion ... |
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