input stringlengths 1 785 | output dict | schema listlengths 0 0 |
|---|---|---|
He registered the ajaxtm [. | {
"entities": {}
} | [] |
] org domain name using the email address keyvan.ajaxtm @gmail [. | {
"entities": {}
} | [] |
] com. | {
"entities": {}
} | [] |
This was also the email address used to register the domain aerospace2014 [.] org, which was used in spear phishing attacks against companies in the U.S. and is linked with malware activity directed at users of anti-censorship tools in Iran. | {
"entities": {
"entity": [
{
"text": "the domain aerospace2014 [.] org",
"start": 49,
"end": 81
},
{
"text": "spear phishing attacks against companies in the U.S.",
"start": 101,
"end": 153
}
],
"action": [
{
"text": "w... | [] |
'' HUrr! c4nE!'' features prominently in all the group's activities and defacements. | {
"entities": {}
} | [] |
Although there has been a decline in public-facing Ajax Security Team activity, this coincides with an increase in malware activity linked to the group's infrastructure. | {
"entities": {}
} | [] |
The increasing politicization of the Ajax Security Team aligns with the timing of their activities against the perceived enemies of Iran. | {
"entities": {}
} | [] |
In addition to attacking companies in the U.S., they have targeted domestic users of anti-censorship technology. | {
"entities": {}
} | [] |
While the objectives of this group are consistent with Iran's efforts at controlling political dissent and expanding offensive cyber capabilities, the relationship between this group and the Iranian government remains inconclusive. | {
"entities": {}
} | [] |
For example, the Ajax Security Team could just be using anti-censorship tools as a lure because they are popular in Iran, in order to engage in activities that would be considered traditional cybercrime. | {
"entities": {
"entity": [
{
"text": "the Ajax Security Team",
"start": 13,
"end": 35
},
{
"text": "anti-censorship tools",
"start": 56,
"end": 77
},
{
"text": "a lure",
"start": 81,
"end": 87
}
],
... | [] |
In one case,'' HUrr! c4nE!'', using the email address keyvan.ajaxtm @gmail [. | {
"entities": {}
} | [] |
] com, has been flagged for possible fraud by an online retailer. | {
"entities": {}
} | [] |
While'' HUrr! c4nE!'' is engaged in operations that align with Iran's political objectives, he may also be dabbling in traditional cybercrime. | {
"entities": {}
} | [] |
This indicates that there is a considerable grey area between the cyber espionage capabilities of Iran's hacker groups and any direct Iranian government or military involvement. | {
"entities": {}
} | [] |
On the spectrum of state responsibility, these attacks align with state-encouraged attacks, which are defined as attacks in which: Third parties control and conduct the attack, but the national government encourages them as a matter of policy. | {
"entities": {}
} | [] |
Recruiting hackers through this model allows Iran to influence their activities, and provides the Iranian government plausible deniability, but a lack of direct control also means that the groups may be unpredictable and engage in unsanctioned attacks. | {
"entities": {}
} | [] |
The increased politicization of the Ajax Security Team, and the transition from nuisance defacements to operations against internal dissidents and foreign targets, coincides with moves by Iran aimed at increasing offensive cyber capabilities. | {
"entities": {}
} | [] |
While the relationship between actors such as the Ajax Security Team and the Iranian government is unknown, their activities appear to align with Iranian government political objectives. | {
"entities": {}
} | [] |
The capabilities of the Ajax Security Team remain unclear. | {
"entities": {}
} | [] |
This group uses at least one malware family that is not publicly available. | {
"entities": {}
} | [] |
We have not directly observed the Ajax Security Team use exploits to deliver malware, but it is unclear if they or other Iranian actors are capable of producing or acquiring exploit code. | {
"entities": {}
} | [] |
While the Ajax Security Team's capabilities remain unclear, we know that their current operations have been somewhat successful as measured by the number of victims seen checking into to an Ajax Security Team controlled CnC server. | {
"entities": {}
} | [] |
We believe that if these actors continue the current pace of their operations they will improve their capabilities in the mid-term. | {
"entities": {}
} | [] |
FireEye has invented a purpose-built, virtual machine-based security platform that provides real-time threat protection to enterprises and governments worldwide against the next generation of cyber attacks. | {
"entities": {}
} | [] |
These highly sophisticated cyber attacks easily circumvent traditional signature-based defenses, such as next-generation firewalls, IPS, anti-virus, and gateways. | {
"entities": {}
} | [] |
The FireEye Threat Prevention Platform provides real-time, dynamic threat protection without the use of signatures to protect an organization across the primary threat vectors and across the different stages of an attack life cycle. | {
"entities": {}
} | [] |
The core of the FireEye platform is a virtual execution engine, complemented by dynamic threat intelligence, to identify and block cyber attacks in real time. | {
"entities": {}
} | [] |
FireEye has over 1,500 customers across more than 40 countries, including over 100 of the Fortune 500. | {
"entities": {}
} | [] |
We thank Kenneth Geers and Jen Weedon for their support and analysis on these findings. | {
"entities": {}
} | [] |
by John Scott-Railton and Seth Hardy With the collaboration of Cyber Arabs. | {
"entities": {}
} | [] |
Media coverage: Associated Press, Forbes This report describes a malware attack with circumstantial links to the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria. | {
"entities": {}
} | [] |
In the interest of highlighting a developing threat, this post analyzes the attack and provides a list of Indicators of Compromise. | {
"entities": {}
} | [] |
A Syrian citizen media group critical of Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) was recently targeted in a customized digital attack designed to unmask their location. | {
"entities": {}
} | [] |
The Syrian group, Raqqah is being Slaughtered Silently (RSS), focuses its advocacy on documenting human rights abuses by ISIS elements occupying the city of Ar- Raqah. | {
"entities": {}
} | [] |
In response, ISIS forces in the city have reportedly targeted the group with house raids, kidnappings, and an alleged assassination. | {
"entities": {}
} | [] |
The group also faces online threats from ISIS and its supporters, including taunts that ISIS is spying on the group. | {
"entities": {}
} | [] |
Though we are unable to conclusively attribute the attack to ISIS or its supporters, a link to ISIS is plausible. | {
"entities": {}
} | [] |
The malware used in the attack differs substantially from campaigns linked to the Syrian regime, and the attack is focused against a group that is an active target of ISIS forces. | {
"entities": {}
} | [] |
As the Syrian Civil War continues, Syrian citizen journalists and nonviolent activists operate in an increasingly unsafe environment. | {
"entities": {}
} | [] |
The regime has never welcomed their work, and has often targeted them for arrest and detention, and a multi-year hacking campaign (see Pro-Regime/Regime Linked Groups). | {
"entities": {}
} | [] |
Additionally, not all elements of the Syrian opposition have uniformly supported nonviolent activists and citizen journalists. | {
"entities": {}
} | [] |
More recently, in areas like Raqqah, nonviolent activists face a new and exceptionally grave threat: ISIS. | {
"entities": {}
} | [] |
A growing number of reports suggest that ISIS is systematically targeting groups that document atrocities, or that communicate with Western media and aid organizations, sometimes under the pretext of finding'' spies''. | {
"entities": {}
} | [] |
Ar-Raqqah, the city in which the case study is located, is situated in northern Syria and continues to be a key conflict flashpoint of the Syrian Civil War. | {
"entities": {}
} | [] |
In the spring of 2013, Islamists and Free Syrian Army (FSA) fighters took over Ar- Raqqah from regime forces. | {
"entities": {}
} | [] |
As ISIS gained momentum, they consolidated their control over the city, edging out FSA- affiliated groups through attacks, summary executions, and kidnappings against a range of groups, including ethnic and religious minorities. | {
"entities": {}
} | [] |
During 2014, there were a number of reports-many unconfirmed-that ISIS confiscated smartphones and laptops from captured activists. | {
"entities": {}
} | [] |
According to Syrians who experienced these searches and spoke with one of the reports' authors, ISIS sometimes extracts data from confiscated smartphones and laptops to collect information about people and groups they are targeting, as well as to seek evidence of'' un-Islamic'' activities. | {
"entities": {}
} | [] |
As ISIS cements their control of Ar-Raqqah and other territories, reports have emerged recently (though not all of them confirmed) suggesting that elements within ISIS are growing increasingly sophisticated at imposing control and targeting opponents using digital methods. | {
"entities": {}
} | [] |
Reports about ISIS targeting Internet cafés have grown increasingly common, and in some cases reports point to the possible use of keyloggers as well as unspecified'' IP sniffers'' to track behaviour in Internet cafes. | {
"entities": {}
} | [] |
Nonviolent activists and citizen journalists based in Ar-Raqqah have provided the outside world with much of what we know about how ISIS treats the population. | {
"entities": {}
} | [] |
These activists and journalists face mortal danger for their actions, and reports have emerged of their detention and torture at the hands of ISIS. | {
"entities": {}
} | [] |
As ISIS continues to use social media to push the message that it is welcomed by the population of Ar-Raqqah, groups like Raqqah is being Slaughtered Silently (RSS) provide a compelling counter narrative. | {
"entities": {}
} | [] |
RSS hasn't escaped ISIS' notice, and the group has been targeted for kidnappings, house raids, and at least one alleged targeted killing. | {
"entities": {}
} | [] |
At the time of writing, ISIS is allegedly holding several citizen journalists in Ar-Raqqah. | {
"entities": {}
} | [] |
In addition, RSS is targeted online by ISIS supporters with harassment, including threats to the physical safety of its members. | {
"entities": {}
} | [] |
For example, ISIS supporters have claimed that ISIS has established a system of CCTV cameras in Ar-Raqqah to observe residents' movements. | {
"entities": {}
} | [] |
While this claim may be a bluff or exaggeration, at least one ISIS supporter has indicated on social media that this system could be used to look for members of RSS. | {
"entities": {}
} | [] |
This section describes a highly targeted attack sent to an e-mail address belonging to RSS. | {
"entities": {
"entity": [
{
"text": "a highly targeted attack",
"start": 23,
"end": 47
},
{
"text": "an e-mail address belonging to RSS",
"start": 56,
"end": 90
}
],
"action": [
{
"text": "sent",
"start": 48,
... | [] |
The Citizen Lab analyzed this attack with the consent of RSS, which requested that their name be used in this report. | {
"entities": {}
} | [] |
The attack took the form of an unsolicited e-mail containing a download link to a decoy file. | {
"entities": {
"entity": [
{
"text": "The attack",
"start": 0,
"end": 10
},
{
"text": "the form of an unsolicited e-mail containing a download link to a decoy file",
"start": 16,
"end": 92
}
],
"action": [
{
"text": "to... | [] |
The file contained custom malware that profiled the victim's computer and beaconed its IP address to an e-mail account under the attacker's control. | {
"entities": {
"entity": [
{
"text": "custom malware",
"start": 19,
"end": 33
},
{
"text": "the victim's computer",
"start": 48,
"end": 69
},
{
"text": "its IP address",
"start": 83,
"end": 97
},
{
... | [] |
The unsolicited message below was sent to RSS at the end of November 2014 from a Gmail email address. | {
"entities": {
"entity": [
{
"text": "The unsolicited message below",
"start": 0,
"end": 29
},
{
"text": "RSS",
"start": 42,
"end": 45
},
{
"text": "the end of November 2014",
"start": 49,
"end": 73
},
... | [] |
The message was carefully worded, and contained references specific to the work and interests of RSS. | {
"entities": {}
} | [] |
Thank you for your efforts to deliver a true picture of the reality of life in Raqqah. | {
"entities": {}
} | [] |
As Syrians residing in Canada we are working with media because we believe in the importance of shedding light on the realities of life in Syria, and Raqqah in particular. | {
"entities": {}
} | [] |
We are preparing a lengthy news report on the realities of life in Raqqah. | {
"entities": {}
} | [] |
We are sharing some information with you with the hope that you will correct it in case it contains errors. | {
"entities": {}
} | [] |
We have prepared a map of the city of Raqqah, in addition to a preliminary report. | {
"entities": {}
} | [] |
We hope that you have a look at it with them and inform us of any errors. | {
"entities": {}
} | [] |
We also hope that if you happen to be on Facebook, you could provide us with the account of the person responsible for the campaign, if you don't mind, so that we can communicate with him directly. | {
"entities": {}
} | [] |
You can see a preliminary copy of the report on this linkhttp: //tempsend [DOT] com/ [Redacted] With all respect [Name Redacted] We are unsure why the attacker specifically mentions Canada in the email lure. | {
"entities": {}
} | [] |
However, it is well known that Syria's extensive diaspora (including in Canada) regularly engages in advocacy, sometimes in coordination with groups within Syria. | {
"entities": {}
} | [] |
Thus, the message is not on its face implausible. | {
"entities": {}
} | [] |
However, we note that the attacker also attempts to social engineer the identity of individuals working with RSS, by requesting a personal Facebook page. | {
"entities": {
"entity": [
{
"text": "the attacker",
"start": 22,
"end": 34
},
{
"text": "the identity of individuals working with RSS",
"start": 68,
"end": 112
}
],
"action": [
{
"text": "social engineer",
"sta... | [] |
The custom malware used in this attack infects a user who views the decoy'' slideshow,'' and beacons home with the IP address of the victim's computer and details about his or her system each time the computer restarts. | {
"entities": {
"entity": [
{
"text": "The custom malware used in this attack",
"start": 0,
"end": 38
},
{
"text": "a user who views the decoy'' slideshow,''",
"start": 47,
"end": 88
},
{
"text": "home",
"start": 101,
... | [] |
Unlike Syrian regime-linked malware, it contains no Remote Access Trojan (RAT) functionality, suggesting it is intended for identifying and locating a target. | {
"entities": {
"entity": [
{
"text": "it",
"start": 105,
"end": 107
},
{
"text": "a target",
"start": 149,
"end": 157
}
],
"action": [
{
"text": "identifying and locating",
"start": 124,
"end": 148
... | [] |
Further, because the malware sends data captured by the malware to an e-mail address, it does not require that the attackers maintain a command-and-control server online. | {
"entities": {
"entity": [
{
"text": "the malware",
"start": 17,
"end": 28
},
{
"text": "data captured by the malware",
"start": 35,
"end": 63
},
{
"text": "an e-mail address",
"start": 67,
"end": 84
}
... | [] |
This functionality would be especially useful to an adversary unsure of whether it can maintain uninterrupted Internet connectivity. | {
"entities": {}
} | [] |
Accessing the link provided in the malicious e-mail sends the user to a .zip | {
"entities": {}
} | [] |
file hosted on file-sharing site tempsend.com. | {
"entities": {}
} | [] |
At the time of writing the file had been downloaded only 10 times This file is a self-extracting archive with an icon intended to suggest to the victim that it is itself a slideshow. | {
"entities": {}
} | [] |
When run, the file opens a slideshow of Google Earth screen captures to the victim, displaying a series of locations in Syria, and highlighting an'' ISIS HQ'' and other images showing the alleged locations of US airstrikes. | {
"entities": {}
} | [] |
Examples of images in the slideshow as follows: When opened, the'' slideshow.zip'' file writes and executes several files:'' AdobeR1.exe'' is malicious, while'' pictures.exe'' is the genuine slideshow displayed to the victim. | {
"entities": {
"modifier": [
{
"text": "When",
"start": 48,
"end": 52
}
],
"entity": [
{
"text": "opened",
"start": 53,
"end": 59
},
{
"text": "the'' slideshow.zip'' file",
"start": 61,
"end": 87
}... | [] |
When the slideshow is closed both AdobeR1.exe and pictures.exe are deleted. | {
"entities": {
"modifier": [
{
"text": "When",
"start": 0,
"end": 4
}
],
"entity": [
{
"text": "the slideshow is closed",
"start": 5,
"end": 28
},
{
"text": "both AdobeR1.exe and pictures.exe",
"start": 29,
... | [] |
The AdobeR1 file writes a series of executable files that perform information collection and communication functions, including: The program sequence of data collection and sending is somewhat unusual, with each program performing a single task and communicating via markers left in the registry. | {
"entities": {
"entity": [
{
"text": "The AdobeR1 file",
"start": 0,
"end": 16
},
{
"text": "a series of executable files",
"start": 24,
"end": 52
},
{
"text": "information collection",
"start": 66,
"end": 88
... | [] |
Programs appear to make use of the Visual C++ Runtime Library. | {
"entities": {}
} | [] |
First, the program nvidrv adds itself to autorun: It also creates a series of registry keys that the individual programs use to communicate: Registry keys and programs using them: It then runs GooglUpd, which cleans up the program files if they exist, and runs AdbrRader. | {
"entities": {
"entity": [
{
"text": "the program nvidrv",
"start": 7,
"end": 25
},
{
"text": "itself",
"start": 31,
"end": 37
},
{
"text": "autorun",
"start": 41,
"end": 48
},
{
"text": "It"... | [] |
AdbrRader (communicating through registry key'' 2'') writes the file vgadmysadm.tmp with the name of another registry key'' 2'' with startup info. | {
"entities": {
"entity": [
{
"text": "AdbrRader",
"start": 0,
"end": 9
},
{
"text": "the file vgadmysadm.tmp with the name of another registry key'' 2''",
"start": 60,
"end": 127
},
{
"text": "startup info",
"start": 13... | [] |
Next, nvidrv runs GoogleUpate, which collects system information and writes it to: Then nvidrv runs nvisdvr (registry key'' 4'') that collects a list of running processes, which are written to: Finally, nvidrv runs svhosts, which tests Internet connectivity by doing a DNS query for windowsupdate.microsoft.com. | {
"entities": {
"entity": [
{
"text": "nvidrv",
"start": 203,
"end": 209
},
{
"text": "svhosts",
"start": 215,
"end": 222
},
{
"text": "Internet connectivity",
"start": 236,
"end": 257
},
{
"t... | [] |
It then runs rundl132 if it has not before, by checking whether registry key name'' 6'' is present. | {
"entities": {
"entity": [
{
"text": "It",
"start": 0,
"end": 2
},
{
"text": "rundl132",
"start": 13,
"end": 21
},
{
"text": "it has not before",
"start": 25,
"end": 42
},
{
"text": "whether ... | [] |
It sets the key to'' 0'' and runs it. | {
"entities": {
"entity": [
{
"text": "It",
"start": 0,
"end": 2
},
{
"text": "the key",
"start": 8,
"end": 15
},
{
"text": "'' 0''",
"start": 18,
"end": 24
},
{
"text": "it",
"start":... | [] |
Next,'' rundl132.exe'' performs an HTTP GET request to myexternalip.com and collects the external IP of the infected machine: Next, rundl132 writes: Then rundl132 writes the external IP to: Finally, rundl132 runs AdobeIns, which zips the contents of the win32.tmp folder. | {
"entities": {
"entity": [
{
"text": "'' rundl132.exe''",
"start": 5,
"end": 22
},
{
"text": "an HTTP GET request",
"start": 32,
"end": 51
},
{
"text": "myexternalip.com",
"start": 55,
"end": 71
},
{... | [] |
Program'' AdobeIns.exe'' takes the files written by the other programs and zips them in an encrypted, password- protected file: Data is transmitted by e-mail to an account presumably controlled by the attacker. | {
"entities": {
"entity": [
{
"text": "Program'' AdobeIns.exe''",
"start": 0,
"end": 24
},
{
"text": "them",
"start": 80,
"end": 84
},
{
"text": "an encrypted, password- protected file",
"start": 88,
"end": 126
... | [] |
AdobeIns connects to an account at the online e-mail provider inbox.com via smtp using hardcoded credentials. | {
"entities": {
"entity": [
{
"text": "AdobeIns",
"start": 0,
"end": 8
},
{
"text": "an account",
"start": 21,
"end": 31
},
{
"text": "the online e-mail provider inbox.com",
"start": 35,
"end": 71
},
... | [] |
The malware then sends an e-mail to the same inbox containing the text'' Hello'' and with mxtd file attached. | {
"entities": {
"entity": [
{
"text": "The malware",
"start": 0,
"end": 11
},
{
"text": "an e-mail",
"start": 23,
"end": 32
},
{
"text": "the same inbox",
"start": 36,
"end": 50
}
],
"action": [
... | [] |
SMTP traffic generated by the malware to inbox.com (with redactions) The malware seen in this case study is unusual as it relies on a half-dozen separate executable files, each with a single task, and each communicating via markers dropped in the Registry. | {
"entities": {
"entity": [
{
"text": "markers",
"start": 224,
"end": 231
},
{
"text": "the Registry",
"start": 243,
"end": 255
}
],
"action": [
{
"text": "dropped",
"start": 232,
"end": 239
}
]... | [] |
The malware is also interesting because it does not provide remote access, but only sends an e-mail containing the victim's IP address and miscellaneous system information. | {
"entities": {
"entity": [
{
"text": "The malware",
"start": 0,
"end": 11
},
{
"text": "an e-mail containing the victim's IP address and miscellaneous system information",
"start": 90,
"end": 171
}
],
"action": [
{
"tex... | [] |
The malware resends the information each time the computer is restarted, but it does not refresh the sent information on restart (which may be a bug). | {
"entities": {
"entity": [
{
"text": "The malware",
"start": 0,
"end": 11
},
{
"text": "the information",
"start": 20,
"end": 35
},
{
"text": "time the computer is restarted",
"start": 41,
"end": 71
}
... | [] |
This behaviour strongly suggests that the function of this malware is to serve as a beacon. | {
"entities": {
"entity": [
{
"text": "this malware",
"start": 54,
"end": 66
},
{
"text": "a beacon",
"start": 82,
"end": 90
}
],
"action": [
{
"text": "serve",
"start": 73,
"end": 78
}
],
"... | [] |
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