mneb/malware-text-db · Datasets at Hugging Face

input stringlengths 1 785	output dict	schema listlengths 0 0
The system information could be used to identify processes to exploit in the future, however since the attacker has already triggered the execution of a file on the victim's system, it is surprising that more was not taken, or that a RAT (custom or widely available) was not used.	{ "entities": { "entity": [ { "text": "the attacker", "start": 99, "end": 111 }, { "text": "the execution of a file on the victim's system", "start": 134, "end": 180 } ], "action": [ { "text": "triggered", "start...	[]
A RAT would have provided much greater access alongside IP information By not providing remote access and other RAT functionality, the program looks less like malware, and may attract less attention from endpoint protection tools and scanners.	{ "entities": { "entity": [ { "text": "the program", "start": 131, "end": 142 }, { "text": "less like malware", "start": 149, "end": 166 }, { "text": "less attention", "start": 184, "end": 198 } ], ...	[]
Detections were low when the file was first submitted to VirusTotal, for example.	{ "entities": {} }	[]
It registered only 6/55 detections by anti virus scanners, or a 10% detection rate.	{ "entities": { "entity": [ { "text": "It", "start": 0, "end": 2 }, { "text": "only 6/55 detections by anti virus scanners, or a 10% detection rate", "start": 14, "end": 82 } ], "action": [ { "text": "registered", ...	[]
Transmitting the malware via e-mail also provides a degree of obscurity, and has the additional advantage of providing a layer of abstraction between the attacker and the target: there is no need to maintain a RAT command-and-control server.	{ "entities": { "action": [ { "text": "Transmitting", "start": 0, "end": 12 } ], "entity": [ { "text": "the malware", "start": 13, "end": 24 }, { "text": "e-mail", "start": 29, "end": 35 } ], ...	[]
The malware transmits autonomously, leaving the material in an inbox for the attacker to collect at a later time.	{ "entities": { "entity": [ { "text": "The malware", "start": 0, "end": 11 }, { "text": "the material", "start": 44, "end": 56 }, { "text": "an inbox", "start": 60, "end": 68 }, { "text": "the...	[]
The malware has no obfuscation processes and is not highly technical in its development or interaction with Windows.	{ "entities": {} }	[]
Nevertheless, we believe that the author of the program is aware of certain techniques to reduce the visibility of malware on a network, including transmitting data via encrypted e-mail communications.	{ "entities": { "action": [ { "text": "reduce", "start": 90, "end": 96 }, { "text": "transmitting", "start": 147, "end": 159 } ], "entity": [ { "text": "the visibility of malware on a network", "start": 97, ...	[]
However, the attacker has not correctly implemented encrypted e-mail: the malware will not attempt to use a TLS connection in certain cases.	{ "entities": {} }	[]
As a result, account login credentials may be readily available in network traffic.	{ "entities": {} }	[]
In addition, the malware uses the old PKWARE implementation of zip encryption, which is not particularly secure.	{ "entities": { "entity": [ { "text": "the malware", "start": 13, "end": 24 }, { "text": "the old PKWARE implementation of zip encryption", "start": 30, "end": 77 } ], "action": [ { "text": "uses", "start": 25, ...	[]
The password for the zipped file is also present in the binary without encryption or obfuscation.	{ "entities": {} }	[]
Citizen Lab researchers have developed the Targeted Threat Index (TTI) as a tool to standardize information about the sophistication of targeted threats against civil society groups in our research.	{ "entities": {} }	[]
The index captures information about the level of social engineering used ('' Targeting Sophistication''), and adds a Technical Sophistication value for the attack as a multiplier.	{ "entities": {} }	[]
This attack, which has little technical sophistication (i.e., it uses no exploits, code obfuscation, or techniques to frustrate reversing, etc.	{ "entities": { "entity": [ { "text": "This attack", "start": 0, "end": 11 } ] } }	[]
), nevertheless has carefully developed social engineering in the seeding materials and bait document.	{ "entities": { "action": [ { "text": "developed", "start": 30, "end": 39 } ], "entity": [ { "text": "social engineering", "start": 40, "end": 58 }, { "text": "the seeding materials and bait document", "start": 6...	[]
Taken together it rates a 3 for Targeting Sophistication and a 1.25 for Technical Sophistication by our metric, yielding a TTI score of 3.75.	{ "entities": {} }	[]
Citizen Lab research using the TTI has found that, despite low levels of technical sophistication, with well-crafted social engineering malware attacks remain highly effective against civil society groups.	{ "entities": {} }	[]
More information is available about the TTI in a recent Usenix Security paper.	{ "entities": {} }	[]
There are at least three possible sources for this malware attack: We evaluate each of these possibilities in turn, drawing on the information available to us after almost three years of tracking regime-linked malware.	{ "entities": {} }	[]
Pro-regime malware actors have continually targeted the Syrian opposition with waves of malware since at least late 2011.	{ "entities": {} }	[]
Those campaigns have been extensively reported on by a range of groups, including Kaspersky, FireEye, Citizen Lab, the Electronic Frontier Foundation, and many others.	{ "entities": {} }	[]
Regime-linked malware has a number of common features that typically serve as distinguishing characteristics: Social engineering focusing on the needs and interests of the opposition.	{ "entities": {} }	[]
Although targeted, the malware seeding often aims at classes of people (e.g., people interested in'shocking' news about a fighter, or'leaked' information about the Assad regime) rather than carefully written spear phishing targeting a single individual or small group.	{ "entities": { "entity": [ { "text": "the malware seeding", "start": 19, "end": 38 }, { "text": "classes of people", "start": 53, "end": 70 } ], "action": [ { "text": "aims", "start": 45, "end": 49 ...	[]
Use of widely available RATs (njRAT, Xtreme Rat, ShadowTech Rat, DarkComet RAT, and Blackshades RAT, among others).	{ "entities": { "action": [ { "text": "Use", "start": 0, "end": 3 } ], "entity": [ { "text": "widely available RATs", "start": 7, "end": 28 } ] } }	[]
At least one command-and-control server located within Syrian IP space (often from a limited range of addresses).	{ "entities": { "entity": [ { "text": "At least one command-and-control server", "start": 0, "end": 39 }, { "text": "Syrian IP space", "start": 55, "end": 70 } ], "action": [ { "text": "located", "start": 40, ...	[]
Frequent use of Dynamic DNS providers like no-ip.	{ "entities": {} }	[]
Use of'' crypters'' to obscure the binary.	{ "entities": { "action": [ { "text": "Use", "start": 0, "end": 3 } ], "entity": [ { "text": "'' crypters''", "start": 6, "end": 19 }, { "text": "obscure the binary", "start": 23, "end": 41 } ],...	[]
These characteristics are not all present in every sample, but we have typically found one or more in almost every binary we have examined that is Syrian regime-linked.	{ "entities": {} }	[]
This malware attack differs from known regime-linked groups in each of these elements.	{ "entities": {} }	[]
Not only is it exceptionally targeted, but it is also not a commonly available RAT.	{ "entities": { "action": [ { "text": "is", "start": 9, "end": 11 } ], "entity": [ { "text": "it", "start": 12, "end": 14 }, { "text": "exceptionally targeted", "start": 15, "end": 37 } ] } }	[]
Nor does it have RAT functionality.	{ "entities": {} }	[]
The function of the malware appears to be: identify and unmask the IP address of target (s), and resend them to the attacker with each reboot.	{ "entities": { "entity": [ { "text": "the malware", "start": 16, "end": 27 }, { "text": "the IP address of target (s)", "start": 63, "end": 91 }, { "text": "them", "start": 104, "end": 108 }, { ...	[]
In addition, data is sent to an Internet e-mail address, and no crypter is used to obscure the binary.	{ "entities": { "entity": [ { "text": "data", "start": 13, "end": 17 }, { "text": "an Internet e-mail address", "start": 29, "end": 55 } ], "action": [ { "text": "is sent", "start": 18, "end": 25 } ...	[]
We are aware of only one previous case in Syria in which e-mail was used to transmit data, and that we believed was regime linked.	{ "entities": { "entity": [ { "text": "e-mail", "start": 57, "end": 63 }, { "text": "transmit data", "start": 76, "end": 89 } ], "action": [ { "text": "was used", "start": 64, "end": 72 } ], ...	[]
That incident, observed in 2012, also used hardcoded e-mail to exfiltrate.	{ "entities": { "action": [ { "text": "used", "start": 38, "end": 42 } ], "entity": [ { "text": "hardcoded e-mail", "start": 43, "end": 59 }, { "text": "exfiltrate", "start": 63, "end": 73 } ], ...	[]
However, that malware had substantially more functionality than this case: not only did it drop a second stage from a compromised site, but was also included a mechanism for exfiltrating credentials from Facebook and hooking programs like Skype.	{ "entities": { "entity": [ { "text": "it", "start": 88, "end": 90 }, { "text": "a second stage", "start": 96, "end": 110 }, { "text": "a compromised site", "start": 116, "end": 134 }, { "text...	[]
The lack of overlap in Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures (TTPs) between this attack and prior attacks does not rule out Syrian regime-linked attackers.	{ "entities": {} }	[]
It is possible that regime-linked groups are trying a new approach.	{ "entities": {} }	[]
However, given that known regime-linked groups continued to remain active during the same date range using familiar TTPs, this scenario seems unlikely.	{ "entities": {} }	[]
In addition, it would be strange for regime-linked malware groups to undertake significant effort to prepare and send an implant that has significantly less functionality than what they commonly use.	{ "entities": {} }	[]
Taken together, we find this evidence supports the hypothesis that familiar regime-linked groups did not conduct the attack.	{ "entities": {} }	[]
RSS operates in territory controlled by ISIS, and has faced extensive targeting by ISIS.	{ "entities": {} }	[]
Currently, they appear to be directly targeted by ISIS for kidnappings and other retaliation, including executions.	{ "entities": {} }	[]
In addition, ISIS supporters have explicitly suggested that the group is under surveillance and actively hunted.	{ "entities": {} }	[]
Together this evidence suggests that ISIS has a strong motivation for using social engineering and/or malware to locate the members of RSS.	{ "entities": {} }	[]
We think there are several features of the malware attack that align with the needs and constraints of ISIS and its supporters in Ar-Raqqah, more so than other groups, as we understand them.	{ "entities": {} }	[]
For example: The malware beacons location but does not provide RAT functionality.	{ "entities": { "entity": [ { "text": "The malware", "start": 13, "end": 24 }, { "text": "location", "start": 33, "end": 41 } ], "action": [ { "text": "beacons", "start": 25, "end": 32 } ] } }	[]
The seeding attempts to obtain a'private' Facebook identity from RSS through social engineering.	{ "entities": { "entity": [ { "text": "The seeding", "start": 0, "end": 11 }, { "text": "a'private' Facebook identity", "start": 31, "end": 59 }, { "text": "RSS", "start": 65, "end": 68 }, { "...	[]
The malware exfiltrates to an online e-mail account, thus not requiring the attacker to maintain a command-and- control server online.	{ "entities": { "entity": [ { "text": "The malware", "start": 0, "end": 11 }, { "text": "an online e-mail account", "start": 27, "end": 51 } ], "action": [ { "text": "exfiltrates", "start": 12, "end": 23 ...	[]
The social media activity of members of RSS is often highly public.	{ "entities": {} }	[]
Their location and exact membership, however, is secret.	{ "entities": {} }	[]
We speculate that if an attacker were interested in maintaining long-term surveillance of the activities of RSS they could have employed a RAT.	{ "entities": {} }	[]
However, if the attacker were interested in unmasking the location of its targets so they could be physically tracked down, collecting IP data and system info would be a more reasonable approach.	{ "entities": {} }	[]
ISIS or its supporters clearly have a strong interest in the (rudimentary) location tracking of the members of RSS that this malware provides.	{ "entities": {} }	[]
Internet connectivity in Raqqah is extremely limited, and some of it is under ISIS control.	{ "entities": {} }	[]
Knowing the IP address of a target could quickly narrow down targets to specific locations, and specific Internet services, or Internet cafes in Raqqah.	{ "entities": {} }	[]
Given that the identities and locations of RSS members are closely guarded, such information would hold significant intelligence value for ISIS.	{ "entities": {} }	[]
Armed with this kind of information, ISIS could physically harm people within Raqqah (and it is also possible that they have the ability to operate in some capacity in border areas of Turkey).	{ "entities": {} }	[]
Little is publicly known about the technical capabilities of ISIS and its supporters; however, reports have begun to emerge suggesting that ISIS is interested in expanding its abilities.	{ "entities": {} }	[]
In addition, ISIS has reportedly gained the support of at least one individual with some experience with social engineering and hacking: Junaid Hussain (aka TriCk), a former member of teamp0ison hacking team.	{ "entities": {} }	[]
While Mr. Hussain and associates have reportedly made threats against Western governments, it is possible that he or others working with ISIS have quietly supported an effort to identify the targeted organization, which is a highly visible thorn in the side of ISIS.	{ "entities": {} }	[]
It is possible that the attack is the product of actors working for unknown purposes and targeting RSS.	{ "entities": {} }	[]
Given the activities of RSS, however, it is unclear who this might be.	{ "entities": {} }	[]
It is not possible, for example, to reject the theory that some unknown group within the FSA, or other groups opposing the Assad regime are responsible.	{ "entities": {} }	[]
Citizen journalists in Ar-Raqqah were previously critical of arbitrary arrests carried out by non-ISIS groups in 2013.	{ "entities": {} }	[]
However, it is unclear why those groups, which no longer control Ar-Raqqah, would be interested in RSS in November 2014.	{ "entities": {} }	[]
It is likely that third party actors, including several intelligence services, are closely monitoring various actors in the conflict through a range of electronic means.	{ "entities": {} }	[]
However, there is little reason to suggest that they would use a tailored but technically rudimentary attack to target RSS in particular.	{ "entities": {} }	[]
After considering each possibility, we find strong but inconclusive circumstantial evidence to support a link to ISIS.	{ "entities": {} }	[]
However, we are unable to connect this attack directly to ISIS, Mr. Hussain, or other ISIS supporters.	{ "entities": {} }	[]
If indeed ISIS or its supporters are responsible, it seems reasonable that such an offensive capability may still be in development.	{ "entities": {} }	[]
We hope that publishing this report will draw attention to a new and concerning threat that includes ISIS critics among its targets.	{ "entities": {} }	[]
If ISIS is responsible, while this attack targets in-country impediments to ISIS objectives, other targets may include ideological or military adversaries abroad.	{ "entities": {} }	[]
Whether or not ISIS is responsible, this attack is likely the work of a non-regime threat actor who may be just beginning to field a still-rudimentary capability in the Syrian conflict.	{ "entities": {} }	[]
The entry costs for engaging in malware attacks in a conflict like the Syrian Civil War are low, and made lower by the fact that the rule of law is nonexistent for large parts of the country.	{ "entities": {} }	[]
In still other parts (under regime control), malware attacks appear to be state sanctioned.	{ "entities": {} }	[]
Citizen Lab research into targeted digital threats against civil society confirms that civil society groups face grave threats from targeted malware attacks, despite being under-resourced to defend against them.	{ "entities": {} }	[]
The case highlighted here is no exception: lack of IT and security resources have made it difficult for the Syrian opposition to address targeted and persistent digital threats against them.	{ "entities": {} }	[]
In addition, if ISIS is indeed responsible, this case suggests how easy it is for belligerents in a conflict to begin fielding basic offensive digital capabilities, and how quickly the capabilities can be pointed at unarmed civil society groups.	{ "entities": {} }	[]
This attack was exceptionally targeted, and clearly reflected the work of an actor familiar with the operations of the targeted organization.	{ "entities": { "entity": [ { "text": "This attack", "start": 0, "end": 11 } ], "action": [ { "text": "was exceptionally targeted", "start": 12, "end": 38 } ] } }	[]
As most organizations working on issues surrounding Syria are aware, malware delivered with good social engineering is a constant source of danger.	{ "entities": {} }	[]
This particular attack can be prevented by not opening files sent by unknown persons.	{ "entities": {} }	[]
However, many attacks in Syria come from hijacked accounts and impersonate people known to the targets.	{ "entities": {} }	[]
Social engineering remains an unsolved problem, and continues to compromise groups throughout the Syrian opposition and their supporters.	{ "entities": {} }	[]
This attack reaffirms the dangers posed by social engineering attacks, whether they deliver phishing campaigns or malware.	{ "entities": {} }	[]
The circumstantial evidence of ISIS involvement suggests that groups working on topics that ISIS considers a threat, and their partner organizations and supporters, should urgently examine their security policies and assess the possible risks to their operations, and the consequences of exposure of sensitive informatio...	{ "entities": {} }	[]
Even if the link to ISIS turns out to be incorrect, it is possible that this will be a threat in the future.	{ "entities": {} }	[]
Individuals and groups at risk can also consult materials in Arabic provided by Cyber Arabs including a series of very accessible videos on digital security.	{ "entities": {} }	[]
The malware files Files dropped by the malware Collected Information Files (unencrypted) Exfiltrated file (encrypted) Registry Keys Acknowledgements: We are grateful to Cyber Arabs and the Institute for War and Peace Reporting for their critical work and assistance.	{ "entities": {} }	[]
Special thanks to: several anonymous Syrians, Masashi Crete-Nishihata, Sarah McKune, Morgan Marquis-Boire, Ron Deibert, Bill Marczak, Nart Villeneuve, Irene Poetranto, and Kristen Dennesen.	{ "entities": {} }	[]
Support for this research is provided by grants from the John D. and Catherine T. MacArthur Foundation and the Ford Foundation.	{ "entities": {} }	[]
Cyber Squared Inc.'s ThreatConnect Intelligence Research Team (TCIRT) tracks a number of threat groups around the world.	{ "entities": {} }	[]
Beginning in the summer of 2013, TCIRT identified a suspected Pakistani-origin threat group.	{ "entities": {} }	[]
This group was revealed by TCIRT publicly in August 2013.	{ "entities": {} }	[]
In the months following the disclosure, we identified new activity.	{ "entities": {} }	[]
Cyber Squared partnered with experts at FireEye Labs to examine these new observations in an attempt to discover new research and insight into the group and its Operation'' Arachnophobia''.	{ "entities": {} }	[]
The following report is a product of collaborative research and threat intelligence sharing between Cyber Squared Inc.'s TCIRT and FireEye Labs.	{ "entities": {} }	[]
• While we are not conclusively attributing BITTERBUG activity to Tranchulas or a specific Pakistani entity, we can confidently point to many characteristics of a Pakistan-based cyber exploitation effort that is probably directed against Indian targets and/or those who are involved in India-Pakistan issues.	{ "entities": {} }	[]
• The threat actors utilized a hosting provider that is a Pakistani-based company with subleased VPS space within the U.S. for command and control (C2).	{ "entities": { "entity": [ { "text": "The threat actors", "start": 2, "end": 19 }, { "text": "a hosting provider that is a Pakistani-based company with subleased VPS space within the U.S.", "start": 29, "end": 122 }, { "text": ...	[]

The system information could be used to identify processes to exploit in the future, however since the attacker has already triggered the execution of a file on the victim's system, it is surprising that more was not taken, or that a RAT (custom or widely available) was not used.

{ "entities": { "entity": [ { "text": "the attacker", "start": 99, "end": 111 }, { "text": "the execution of a file on the victim's system", "start": 134, "end": 180 } ], "action": [ { "text": "triggered", "start...

[]

A RAT would have provided much greater access alongside IP information By not providing remote access and other RAT functionality, the program looks less like malware, and may attract less attention from endpoint protection tools and scanners.

{ "entities": { "entity": [ { "text": "the program", "start": 131, "end": 142 }, { "text": "less like malware", "start": 149, "end": 166 }, { "text": "less attention", "start": 184, "end": 198 } ], ...

[]

Detections were low when the file was first submitted to VirusTotal, for example.

{ "entities": {} }

[]

It registered only 6/55 detections by anti virus scanners, or a 10% detection rate.

{ "entities": { "entity": [ { "text": "It", "start": 0, "end": 2 }, { "text": "only 6/55 detections by anti virus scanners, or a 10% detection rate", "start": 14, "end": 82 } ], "action": [ { "text": "registered", ...

[]

Transmitting the malware via e-mail also provides a degree of obscurity, and has the additional advantage of providing a layer of abstraction between the attacker and the target: there is no need to maintain a RAT command-and-control server.

{ "entities": { "action": [ { "text": "Transmitting", "start": 0, "end": 12 } ], "entity": [ { "text": "the malware", "start": 13, "end": 24 }, { "text": "e-mail", "start": 29, "end": 35 } ], ...

[]

The malware transmits autonomously, leaving the material in an inbox for the attacker to collect at a later time.

{ "entities": { "entity": [ { "text": "The malware", "start": 0, "end": 11 }, { "text": "the material", "start": 44, "end": 56 }, { "text": "an inbox", "start": 60, "end": 68 }, { "text": "the...

[]

The malware has no obfuscation processes and is not highly technical in its development or interaction with Windows.

{ "entities": {} }

[]

Nevertheless, we believe that the author of the program is aware of certain techniques to reduce the visibility of malware on a network, including transmitting data via encrypted e-mail communications.

{ "entities": { "action": [ { "text": "reduce", "start": 90, "end": 96 }, { "text": "transmitting", "start": 147, "end": 159 } ], "entity": [ { "text": "the visibility of malware on a network", "start": 97, ...

[]

However, the attacker has not correctly implemented encrypted e-mail: the malware will not attempt to use a TLS connection in certain cases.

{ "entities": {} }

[]

As a result, account login credentials may be readily available in network traffic.

{ "entities": {} }

[]

In addition, the malware uses the old PKWARE implementation of zip encryption, which is not particularly secure.

{ "entities": { "entity": [ { "text": "the malware", "start": 13, "end": 24 }, { "text": "the old PKWARE implementation of zip encryption", "start": 30, "end": 77 } ], "action": [ { "text": "uses", "start": 25, ...

[]

The password for the zipped file is also present in the binary without encryption or obfuscation.

{ "entities": {} }

[]

Citizen Lab researchers have developed the Targeted Threat Index (TTI) as a tool to standardize information about the sophistication of targeted threats against civil society groups in our research.

{ "entities": {} }

[]

The index captures information about the level of social engineering used ('' Targeting Sophistication''), and adds a Technical Sophistication value for the attack as a multiplier.

{ "entities": {} }

[]

This attack, which has little technical sophistication (i.e., it uses no exploits, code obfuscation, or techniques to frustrate reversing, etc.

{ "entities": { "entity": [ { "text": "This attack", "start": 0, "end": 11 } ] } }

[]

), nevertheless has carefully developed social engineering in the seeding materials and bait document.

{ "entities": { "action": [ { "text": "developed", "start": 30, "end": 39 } ], "entity": [ { "text": "social engineering", "start": 40, "end": 58 }, { "text": "the seeding materials and bait document", "start": 6...

[]

Taken together it rates a 3 for Targeting Sophistication and a 1.25 for Technical Sophistication by our metric, yielding a TTI score of 3.75.

{ "entities": {} }

[]

Citizen Lab research using the TTI has found that, despite low levels of technical sophistication, with well-crafted social engineering malware attacks remain highly effective against civil society groups.

{ "entities": {} }

[]

More information is available about the TTI in a recent Usenix Security paper.

{ "entities": {} }

[]

There are at least three possible sources for this malware attack: We evaluate each of these possibilities in turn, drawing on the information available to us after almost three years of tracking regime-linked malware.

{ "entities": {} }

[]

Pro-regime malware actors have continually targeted the Syrian opposition with waves of malware since at least late 2011.

{ "entities": {} }

[]

Those campaigns have been extensively reported on by a range of groups, including Kaspersky, FireEye, Citizen Lab, the Electronic Frontier Foundation, and many others.

{ "entities": {} }

[]

Regime-linked malware has a number of common features that typically serve as distinguishing characteristics: Social engineering focusing on the needs and interests of the opposition.

{ "entities": {} }

[]

Although targeted, the malware seeding often aims at classes of people (e.g., people interested in'shocking' news about a fighter, or'leaked' information about the Assad regime) rather than carefully written spear phishing targeting a single individual or small group.

{ "entities": { "entity": [ { "text": "the malware seeding", "start": 19, "end": 38 }, { "text": "classes of people", "start": 53, "end": 70 } ], "action": [ { "text": "aims", "start": 45, "end": 49 ...

[]

Use of widely available RATs (njRAT, Xtreme Rat, ShadowTech Rat, DarkComet RAT, and Blackshades RAT, among others).

{ "entities": { "action": [ { "text": "Use", "start": 0, "end": 3 } ], "entity": [ { "text": "widely available RATs", "start": 7, "end": 28 } ] } }

[]

At least one command-and-control server located within Syrian IP space (often from a limited range of addresses).

{ "entities": { "entity": [ { "text": "At least one command-and-control server", "start": 0, "end": 39 }, { "text": "Syrian IP space", "start": 55, "end": 70 } ], "action": [ { "text": "located", "start": 40, ...

[]

Frequent use of Dynamic DNS providers like no-ip.

{ "entities": {} }

[]

Use of'' crypters'' to obscure the binary.

{ "entities": { "action": [ { "text": "Use", "start": 0, "end": 3 } ], "entity": [ { "text": "'' crypters''", "start": 6, "end": 19 }, { "text": "obscure the binary", "start": 23, "end": 41 } ],...

[]

These characteristics are not all present in every sample, but we have typically found one or more in almost every binary we have examined that is Syrian regime-linked.

{ "entities": {} }

[]

This malware attack differs from known regime-linked groups in each of these elements.

{ "entities": {} }

[]

Not only is it exceptionally targeted, but it is also not a commonly available RAT.

{ "entities": { "action": [ { "text": "is", "start": 9, "end": 11 } ], "entity": [ { "text": "it", "start": 12, "end": 14 }, { "text": "exceptionally targeted", "start": 15, "end": 37 } ] } }

[]

Nor does it have RAT functionality.

{ "entities": {} }

[]

The function of the malware appears to be: identify and unmask the IP address of target (s), and resend them to the attacker with each reboot.

{ "entities": { "entity": [ { "text": "the malware", "start": 16, "end": 27 }, { "text": "the IP address of target (s)", "start": 63, "end": 91 }, { "text": "them", "start": 104, "end": 108 }, { ...

[]

In addition, data is sent to an Internet e-mail address, and no crypter is used to obscure the binary.

{ "entities": { "entity": [ { "text": "data", "start": 13, "end": 17 }, { "text": "an Internet e-mail address", "start": 29, "end": 55 } ], "action": [ { "text": "is sent", "start": 18, "end": 25 } ...

[]

We are aware of only one previous case in Syria in which e-mail was used to transmit data, and that we believed was regime linked.

{ "entities": { "entity": [ { "text": "e-mail", "start": 57, "end": 63 }, { "text": "transmit data", "start": 76, "end": 89 } ], "action": [ { "text": "was used", "start": 64, "end": 72 } ], ...

[]

That incident, observed in 2012, also used hardcoded e-mail to exfiltrate.

{ "entities": { "action": [ { "text": "used", "start": 38, "end": 42 } ], "entity": [ { "text": "hardcoded e-mail", "start": 43, "end": 59 }, { "text": "exfiltrate", "start": 63, "end": 73 } ], ...

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However, that malware had substantially more functionality than this case: not only did it drop a second stage from a compromised site, but was also included a mechanism for exfiltrating credentials from Facebook and hooking programs like Skype.

{ "entities": { "entity": [ { "text": "it", "start": 88, "end": 90 }, { "text": "a second stage", "start": 96, "end": 110 }, { "text": "a compromised site", "start": 116, "end": 134 }, { "text...

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The lack of overlap in Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures (TTPs) between this attack and prior attacks does not rule out Syrian regime-linked attackers.

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It is possible that regime-linked groups are trying a new approach.

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However, given that known regime-linked groups continued to remain active during the same date range using familiar TTPs, this scenario seems unlikely.

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In addition, it would be strange for regime-linked malware groups to undertake significant effort to prepare and send an implant that has significantly less functionality than what they commonly use.

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Taken together, we find this evidence supports the hypothesis that familiar regime-linked groups did not conduct the attack.

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RSS operates in territory controlled by ISIS, and has faced extensive targeting by ISIS.

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Currently, they appear to be directly targeted by ISIS for kidnappings and other retaliation, including executions.

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In addition, ISIS supporters have explicitly suggested that the group is under surveillance and actively hunted.

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Together this evidence suggests that ISIS has a strong motivation for using social engineering and/or malware to locate the members of RSS.

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We think there are several features of the malware attack that align with the needs and constraints of ISIS and its supporters in Ar-Raqqah, more so than other groups, as we understand them.

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For example: The malware beacons location but does not provide RAT functionality.

{ "entities": { "entity": [ { "text": "The malware", "start": 13, "end": 24 }, { "text": "location", "start": 33, "end": 41 } ], "action": [ { "text": "beacons", "start": 25, "end": 32 } ] } }

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The seeding attempts to obtain a'private' Facebook identity from RSS through social engineering.

{ "entities": { "entity": [ { "text": "The seeding", "start": 0, "end": 11 }, { "text": "a'private' Facebook identity", "start": 31, "end": 59 }, { "text": "RSS", "start": 65, "end": 68 }, { "...

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The malware exfiltrates to an online e-mail account, thus not requiring the attacker to maintain a command-and- control server online.

{ "entities": { "entity": [ { "text": "The malware", "start": 0, "end": 11 }, { "text": "an online e-mail account", "start": 27, "end": 51 } ], "action": [ { "text": "exfiltrates", "start": 12, "end": 23 ...

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The social media activity of members of RSS is often highly public.

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Their location and exact membership, however, is secret.

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We speculate that if an attacker were interested in maintaining long-term surveillance of the activities of RSS they could have employed a RAT.

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However, if the attacker were interested in unmasking the location of its targets so they could be physically tracked down, collecting IP data and system info would be a more reasonable approach.

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ISIS or its supporters clearly have a strong interest in the (rudimentary) location tracking of the members of RSS that this malware provides.

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Internet connectivity in Raqqah is extremely limited, and some of it is under ISIS control.

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Knowing the IP address of a target could quickly narrow down targets to specific locations, and specific Internet services, or Internet cafes in Raqqah.

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Given that the identities and locations of RSS members are closely guarded, such information would hold significant intelligence value for ISIS.

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Armed with this kind of information, ISIS could physically harm people within Raqqah (and it is also possible that they have the ability to operate in some capacity in border areas of Turkey).

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Little is publicly known about the technical capabilities of ISIS and its supporters; however, reports have begun to emerge suggesting that ISIS is interested in expanding its abilities.

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In addition, ISIS has reportedly gained the support of at least one individual with some experience with social engineering and hacking: Junaid Hussain (aka TriCk), a former member of teamp0ison hacking team.

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While Mr. Hussain and associates have reportedly made threats against Western governments, it is possible that he or others working with ISIS have quietly supported an effort to identify the targeted organization, which is a highly visible thorn in the side of ISIS.

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It is possible that the attack is the product of actors working for unknown purposes and targeting RSS.

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Given the activities of RSS, however, it is unclear who this might be.

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It is not possible, for example, to reject the theory that some unknown group within the FSA, or other groups opposing the Assad regime are responsible.

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Citizen journalists in Ar-Raqqah were previously critical of arbitrary arrests carried out by non-ISIS groups in 2013.

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However, it is unclear why those groups, which no longer control Ar-Raqqah, would be interested in RSS in November 2014.

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It is likely that third party actors, including several intelligence services, are closely monitoring various actors in the conflict through a range of electronic means.

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However, there is little reason to suggest that they would use a tailored but technically rudimentary attack to target RSS in particular.

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After considering each possibility, we find strong but inconclusive circumstantial evidence to support a link to ISIS.

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However, we are unable to connect this attack directly to ISIS, Mr. Hussain, or other ISIS supporters.

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If indeed ISIS or its supporters are responsible, it seems reasonable that such an offensive capability may still be in development.

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We hope that publishing this report will draw attention to a new and concerning threat that includes ISIS critics among its targets.

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If ISIS is responsible, while this attack targets in-country impediments to ISIS objectives, other targets may include ideological or military adversaries abroad.

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Whether or not ISIS is responsible, this attack is likely the work of a non-regime threat actor who may be just beginning to field a still-rudimentary capability in the Syrian conflict.

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The entry costs for engaging in malware attacks in a conflict like the Syrian Civil War are low, and made lower by the fact that the rule of law is nonexistent for large parts of the country.

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In still other parts (under regime control), malware attacks appear to be state sanctioned.

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Citizen Lab research into targeted digital threats against civil society confirms that civil society groups face grave threats from targeted malware attacks, despite being under-resourced to defend against them.

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The case highlighted here is no exception: lack of IT and security resources have made it difficult for the Syrian opposition to address targeted and persistent digital threats against them.

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In addition, if ISIS is indeed responsible, this case suggests how easy it is for belligerents in a conflict to begin fielding basic offensive digital capabilities, and how quickly the capabilities can be pointed at unarmed civil society groups.

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This attack was exceptionally targeted, and clearly reflected the work of an actor familiar with the operations of the targeted organization.

{ "entities": { "entity": [ { "text": "This attack", "start": 0, "end": 11 } ], "action": [ { "text": "was exceptionally targeted", "start": 12, "end": 38 } ] } }

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As most organizations working on issues surrounding Syria are aware, malware delivered with good social engineering is a constant source of danger.

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This particular attack can be prevented by not opening files sent by unknown persons.

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However, many attacks in Syria come from hijacked accounts and impersonate people known to the targets.

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Social engineering remains an unsolved problem, and continues to compromise groups throughout the Syrian opposition and their supporters.

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This attack reaffirms the dangers posed by social engineering attacks, whether they deliver phishing campaigns or malware.

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The circumstantial evidence of ISIS involvement suggests that groups working on topics that ISIS considers a threat, and their partner organizations and supporters, should urgently examine their security policies and assess the possible risks to their operations, and the consequences of exposure of sensitive informatio...

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Even if the link to ISIS turns out to be incorrect, it is possible that this will be a threat in the future.

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Individuals and groups at risk can also consult materials in Arabic provided by Cyber Arabs including a series of very accessible videos on digital security.

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The malware files Files dropped by the malware Collected Information Files (unencrypted) Exfiltrated file (encrypted) Registry Keys Acknowledgements: We are grateful to Cyber Arabs and the Institute for War and Peace Reporting for their critical work and assistance.

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Special thanks to: several anonymous Syrians, Masashi Crete-Nishihata, Sarah McKune, Morgan Marquis-Boire, Ron Deibert, Bill Marczak, Nart Villeneuve, Irene Poetranto, and Kristen Dennesen.

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Support for this research is provided by grants from the John D. and Catherine T. MacArthur Foundation and the Ford Foundation.

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Cyber Squared Inc.'s ThreatConnect Intelligence Research Team (TCIRT) tracks a number of threat groups around the world.

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Beginning in the summer of 2013, TCIRT identified a suspected Pakistani-origin threat group.

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This group was revealed by TCIRT publicly in August 2013.

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In the months following the disclosure, we identified new activity.

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Cyber Squared partnered with experts at FireEye Labs to examine these new observations in an attempt to discover new research and insight into the group and its Operation'' Arachnophobia''.

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The following report is a product of collaborative research and threat intelligence sharing between Cyber Squared Inc.'s TCIRT and FireEye Labs.

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• While we are not conclusively attributing BITTERBUG activity to Tranchulas or a specific Pakistani entity, we can confidently point to many characteristics of a Pakistan-based cyber exploitation effort that is probably directed against Indian targets and/or those who are involved in India-Pakistan issues.

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• The threat actors utilized a hosting provider that is a Pakistani-based company with subleased VPS space within the U.S. for command and control (C2).

{ "entities": { "entity": [ { "text": "The threat actors", "start": 2, "end": 19 }, { "text": "a hosting provider that is a Pakistani-based company with subleased VPS space within the U.S.", "start": 29, "end": 122 }, { "text": ...

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