input stringlengths 1 785 | output dict | schema listlengths 0 0 |
|---|---|---|
IntelRS.exe waits in an indefinite loop, until AppTransferWiz.DLL defines this state. | {
"entities": {}
} | [] |
Once the state is set, IntelRS.exe proceeds to collect data from various areas in the system as described below: IntelRS.exe loads a Delphi component called DelphiNative.DLL, which implements some additional data theft functionality for the following: The Stealer component uses common techniques to acquire credential d... | {
"entities": {
"entity": [
{
"text": "IntelRS.exe",
"start": 23,
"end": 34
},
{
"text": "data",
"start": 55,
"end": 59
},
{
"text": "various areas in the system as described below",
"start": 65,
"end": 111
... | [] |
For instance, it loads vaultcli.DLL and uses various APIs shown below to acquire RDP accounts from the Windows vault. | {
"entities": {
"entity": [
{
"text": "it",
"start": 14,
"end": 16
},
{
"text": "vaultcli.DLL",
"start": 23,
"end": 35
},
{
"text": "various APIs shown below",
"start": 45,
"end": 69
},
{
"tex... | [] |
Harvested data is encrypted and written to disk on the local host. | {
"entities": {
"entity": [
{
"text": "Harvested data",
"start": 0,
"end": 14
},
{
"text": "disk",
"start": 43,
"end": 47
},
{
"text": "the local host",
"start": 51,
"end": 65
}
],
"action": [
... | [] |
The filenames for these encrypted files follow this naming scheme: The {stolen data type} parameter indicates where the data was harvested from (e.g., a Web browser, an instant messenger application, installed proxy software). | {
"entities": {}
} | [] |
Analysis of the malware indicates that the data is encrypted via a Rijndael cipher implementation; more specifically it uses AES which is a specific set of configurations of Rijndael. | {
"entities": {
"entity": [
{
"text": "the data",
"start": 39,
"end": 47
},
{
"text": "a Rijndael cipher implementation",
"start": 65,
"end": 97
}
],
"action": [
{
"text": "is encrypted",
"start": 48,
"en... | [] |
It uses a key size of 256 bytes and block size of 128 bytes, which conforms to the FIPS-197 specification of AES-256. | {
"entities": {}
} | [] |
It utilizes the passphrase'HavijeBaba' and a salt of'salam! *% #' as an input to PBKDF2 (Password-Based Key Derivation Function 2) to derive the key and initialization vector for the encryption. | {
"entities": {}
} | [] |
This key derivation implementation in .NET | {
"entities": {}
} | [] |
is done using the Rfc2898DeriveBytes class. | {
"entities": {}
} | [] |
The passphrase and salt are Persian language words. | {
"entities": {}
} | [] |
'' Havij'' means'' carrot'','' Baba'' means'' father'', and'' Salam'' is a common greeting that means'' Peace''. | {
"entities": {}
} | [] |
We identified 17 droppers during this research, including: The 2009 compile time appears to have been forged, while the 2013 compile times may be legitimate. | {
"entities": {}
} | [] |
In some cases, we found an implant but not the parent dropper. | {
"entities": {}
} | [] |
In total, 22 of the 23 implants that we identified during our research had unique compile times ranging from 2013-10-29 until 2014-03-15. | {
"entities": {}
} | [] |
We identified two implants that were both compiled on 2014-3-15 at 23:16. | {
"entities": {}
} | [] |
These compile times appear to be legitimate and coincide with attempted intrusion activity attributed to these attackers. | {
"entities": {}
} | [] |
Many of the malicious executables (droppers) that we collected were bundled with legitimate installers for VPN or proxy software. | {
"entities": {
"entity": [
{
"text": "Many of the malicious executables (droppers) that we collected",
"start": 0,
"end": 62
},
{
"text": "legitimate installers for VPN or proxy software",
"start": 81,
"end": 128
}
],
"action": [
... | [] |
Examples include: • 6dc7cc33a3cdcfee6c4edb6c085b869d was bundled with an installer for Ultrasurf Proxy software. | {
"entities": {
"entity": [
{
"text": "6dc7cc33a3cdcfee6c4edb6c085b869d",
"start": 20,
"end": 52
},
{
"text": "an installer for Ultrasurf Proxy software",
"start": 70,
"end": 111
}
],
"action": [
{
"text": "was bundled",... | [] |
• 3d26442f06b34df3d5921f89bf680ee9 was bundled with an installer for Gerdoovpn virtual private network software. | {
"entities": {
"entity": [
{
"text": "3d26442f06b34df3d5921f89bf680ee9",
"start": 2,
"end": 34
},
{
"text": "an installer for Gerdoovpn virtual private network software",
"start": 52,
"end": 111
}
],
"action": [
{
"text... | [] |
• 3efd971db6fbae08e96535478888cff9 was bundled with an installer for the Psiphon proxy. | {
"entities": {
"entity": [
{
"text": "3efd971db6fbae08e96535478888cff9",
"start": 2,
"end": 34
},
{
"text": "an installer for the Psiphon proxy",
"start": 52,
"end": 86
}
],
"action": [
{
"text": "was bundled",
... | [] |
• 288c91d6c0197e99b92c06496921bf2f was bundled with an installer for Proxifier software. | {
"entities": {
"entity": [
{
"text": "288c91d6c0197e99b92c06496921bf2f",
"start": 2,
"end": 34
},
{
"text": "an installer for Proxifier software",
"start": 52,
"end": 87
}
],
"action": [
{
"text": "was bundled",
... | [] |
These droppers were also designed to visually spoof the appearance of the above applications. | {
"entities": {
"entity": [
{
"text": "These droppers",
"start": 0,
"end": 14
},
{
"text": "the appearance of the above applications",
"start": 52,
"end": 92
}
],
"action": [
{
"text": "spoof",
"start": 46,
... | [] |
These droppers contained icons used in the legitimate installers for these programs. | {
"entities": {
"entity": [
{
"text": "These droppers",
"start": 0,
"end": 14
},
{
"text": "icons used in the legitimate installers for these programs",
"start": 25,
"end": 83
}
],
"action": [
{
"text": "contained",
... | [] |
Analysis of the PDB strings seen in the implants indicates that there may be more than one developer working on the source code for the Stealer builder. | {
"entities": {}
} | [] |
The following two PDB paths were seen in the collection of implants that we collected: These strings indicate that the Stealer source code was stored in two different paths but not necessarily on two different computers. | {
"entities": {}
} | [] |
The f:\Projects\ path may be from an external storage device such as a thumb drive. | {
"entities": {}
} | [] |
It is therefore possible that only one person has access to the source code, but keeps a separate repository on an external storage device. | {
"entities": {}
} | [] |
Alternatively, the different file paths could be the result of two different actors storing their source code in two different locations. | {
"entities": {}
} | [] |
In nine of the implants that we collected, we found a consistent portable executable (PE) resource with a SHA256 of 5156aca994ecfcb40458ead8c830cd66469d5f5 a031392898d323a8d7a7f23d3. | {
"entities": {}
} | [] |
This PE resource contains the VSVERSIONINFO. | {
"entities": {}
} | [] |
In layman's terms, this can best be described as the metadata describing the executable file. | {
"entities": {}
} | [] |
This specific PE resource contained the following information: Note the InternalName of'Stealer.exe'. | {
"entities": {}
} | [] |
This is the attackers' name for this malware family. | {
"entities": {}
} | [] |
During our research, we recovered two different tools used by the members of the Ajax Security Team in conjunction with targeted intrusion activities. | {
"entities": {}
} | [] |
The first tool, labeled the'Stealer Builder' was compiled on 2014-04-08. | {
"entities": {}
} | [] |
This compile date may indicate that the group is still active. | {
"entities": {}
} | [] |
Upon executing the'Stealer Builder' the user is presented with an option to load the'Builder' or to'Decrypt' logs generated from a victim and exfiltrated to a command-and-control (CnC) server under the groups' control. | {
"entities": {
"entity": [
{
"text": "logs",
"start": 109,
"end": 113
},
{
"text": "a command-and-control (CnC) server under the groups' control",
"start": 157,
"end": 217
}
],
"action": [
{
"text": "exfiltrated",
... | [] |
The Builder option enables an attacker to configure a new Stealer backdoor. | {
"entities": {
"entity": [
{
"text": "an attacker",
"start": 27,
"end": 38
},
{
"text": "a new Stealer backdoor",
"start": 52,
"end": 74
}
],
"action": [
{
"text": "configure",
"start": 42,
"end": 51
... | [] |
The user can configure the new backdoor to connect to a specific CnC server with a personalized username and password. | {
"entities": {
"entity": [
{
"text": "the new backdoor",
"start": 23,
"end": 39
},
{
"text": "a specific CnC server",
"start": 54,
"end": 75
},
{
"text": "a personalized username and password",
"start": 81,
"end... | [] |
The attacker can bind the backdoor to a legitimate application of his or her choosing, or they can cloak it with an icon designed to make the backdoor appear as though it is a legitimate file. | {
"entities": {
"entity": [
{
"text": "The attacker",
"start": 0,
"end": 12
},
{
"text": "the backdoor",
"start": 22,
"end": 34
},
{
"text": "a legitimate application of his or her choosing",
"start": 38,
"end": ... | [] |
We also noted that the Builder did not allow the attacker to select a new passphrase or salt used to encrypt the stolen data. | {
"entities": {}
} | [] |
The passphrase'HavijeBaba' and a salt of'salam! *% #' are both hardcoded into the builder. | {
"entities": {}
} | [] |
During testing, we observed that backdoors generated by this Stealer Builder had a timestamp of 2013-12-19. | {
"entities": {}
} | [] |
We had one backdoor in our repository with this same timestamp. | {
"entities": {}
} | [] |
This sample (MD5 1823b77b9ee6296a8b997ffb64d32d21) was configured to exfiltrate data to ultrasms [.] ir. | {
"entities": {
"entity": [
{
"text": "This sample (MD5 1823b77b9ee6296a8b997ffb64d32d21)",
"start": 0,
"end": 50
},
{
"text": "data",
"start": 80,
"end": 84
},
{
"text": "ultrasms [.] ir",
"start": 88,
"end": 10... | [] |
The VSVERSIONINFO PE resource mentioned above (SHA256 5156aca994ecfcb40458ead8c830cd66469d5f5 a031392898d323a8d7a7f23d3) is an artifact of the Stealer builder that we recovered. | {
"entities": {}
} | [] |
The builder generates an executable named IntelRapidStart. | {
"entities": {}
} | [] |
exe. | {
"entities": {}
} | [] |
This executable contains the aforementioned VSVERSIONINFO PE resource. | {
"entities": {}
} | [] |
We also recovered a tool designed to encode plaintext into Base64 encoded text or decode Base64 encoded text into plaintext. | {
"entities": {}
} | [] |
Members of the Ajax Security Team likely this use tool to encode the configuration data seen in RapidStartTech.stl files. | {
"entities": {}
} | [] |
As noted above, the RapidStartTech.stl contains the backdoor's FTP credentials, implant name, decoy name, and screenshot interval, along with boolean settings for startup, keylogger, and screenshot plugins. | {
"entities": {}
} | [] |
Encoding and decoding Base64 data is a straightforward task and the standard Linux operating system offers a number of command line tools to achieve this task. | {
"entities": {}
} | [] |
The presence of a Windows-based GUI tool that simplifies encoding and decoding Base64 data indicates that these tools may have been developed for less adept users. | {
"entities": {}
} | [] |
The CnC infrastructure consists of distinct, but linked, clusters that have targeted both the users of anti-censorship tools in Iran as well as defense contractor companies in the U.S. | {
"entities": {}
} | [] |
The first cluster contains the domain used in the Aerospace Conference attack as well as the domains used in phishing attacks designed to capture user credentials: The website used in the Aerospace Conference attack was aeroconf2014 [. | {
"entities": {
"entity": [
{
"text": "the domains",
"start": 89,
"end": 100
},
{
"text": "phishing attacks",
"start": 109,
"end": 125
},
{
"text": "user credentials",
"start": 146,
"end": 162
}
],
... | [] |
] org, which is registered to info @usa.gov [. | {
"entities": {}
} | [] |
] us. | {
"entities": {}
} | [] |
However, historical WHOIS information shows that the domain was registered by keyvan.ajaxtm @gmail [. | {
"entities": {}
} | [] |
] com-the same domain used to register ajaxtm [. | {
"entities": {}
} | [] |
] org, the website of the Ajax Security Team. | {
"entities": {}
} | [] |
The same email addresses were used to register variations of domain names associated with popular services provided by companies such as Google, Facebook, Yahoo and LinkedIn. | {
"entities": {}
} | [] |
The second cluster comprises the CnC infrastructure used in the anti-censorship attacks. | {
"entities": {}
} | [] |
The majority of the samples we analyzed connect to intel-update [.] com and update-mirror [.] com, which were registered by james.mateo @aim [. | {
"entities": {
"entity": [
{
"text": "The majority of the samples we analyzed",
"start": 0,
"end": 39
},
{
"text": "intel-update [.] com and update-mirror [.] com",
"start": 51,
"end": 97
}
],
"action": [
{
"text": "con... | [] |
] com. | {
"entities": {}
} | [] |
The domain intel-update [. | {
"entities": {}
} | [] |
] com resolved to the IP address 88.150.227.197, which also hosted domains registered by osshom @yahoo [. | {
"entities": {}
} | [] |
] com, many of which are consistent with the pattern of registering domains with associations to Google and Yahoo services. | {
"entities": {}
} | [] |
We also observed crossover with a sample that connected to both intel- update [.] com and ultrasms [.] ir, which was registered by lvlr98 @gmail [. | {
"entities": {
"entity": [
{
"text": "a sample",
"start": 32,
"end": 40
},
{
"text": "both intel- update [.] com and ultrasms [.] ir",
"start": 59,
"end": 105
}
],
"action": [
{
"text": "connected",
"start": 46,... | [] |
] com. | {
"entities": {}
} | [] |
These two clusters are linked by a common IP address (5.9.244.151), which is used by both ns2. | {
"entities": {}
} | [] |
aeroconf2014 [. | {
"entities": {}
} | [] |
] org and office.windows- essentials [. | {
"entities": {}
} | [] |
] tk. | {
"entities": {}
} | [] |
A third cluster of activity was found via analysis of 1d4d9f6e6fa1a07cb0a66a9ee06d624a. | {
"entities": {}
} | [] |
This sample is a Stealer variant that connects to the aforementioned intel-update [.] com as well as plugin-adobe [.] com. | {
"entities": {
"entity": [
{
"text": "This sample",
"start": 0,
"end": 11
},
{
"text": "the aforementioned intel-update [.] com as well as plugin-adobe [.] com",
"start": 50,
"end": 121
}
],
"action": [
{
"text": "conne... | [] |
The domain plugin-adobe [. | {
"entities": {}
} | [] |
] com resolved to 81.17.28.235. | {
"entities": {}
} | [] |
Other domains seen resolving to IP address nearby include the following: Aside from the sample connecting to plugin- adobe [.] com, we have not discovered any malware connecting to these domains. | {
"entities": {
"entity": [
{
"text": "the sample",
"start": 84,
"end": 94
},
{
"text": "plugin- adobe [.] com",
"start": 109,
"end": 130
}
],
"action": [
{
"text": "connecting",
"start": 95,
"end": 105
... | [] |
During our investigation, we were able to recover information on 77 victims from one CnC server that we discovered while analyzing malware samples that were disguised as anti-censorship tools. | {
"entities": {
"entity": [
{
"text": "malware samples",
"start": 131,
"end": 146
},
{
"text": "anti-censorship tools",
"start": 170,
"end": 191
}
],
"action": [
{
"text": "were disguised",
"start": 152,
... | [] |
While analyzing the data from the victims, we found that the majority had either their timezone set to'' Iran Standard Time'' or had their language setting set to Persian: The largest concentration of victims is in Iran, based on the premise that Persian language settings and'' Iran Standard Time'' correlate the victim... | {
"entities": {}
} | [] |
As such, we believe that attackers disguised malware as anti-censorship tools in order to target the users of such tools inside Iran as well as Iranian dissidents outside the country. | {
"entities": {
"entity": [
{
"text": "attackers",
"start": 25,
"end": 34
},
{
"text": "malware",
"start": 45,
"end": 52
},
{
"text": "anti-censorship tools",
"start": 56,
"end": 77
},
{
"text... | [] |
The Ajax Security Team appears to have been formed by personas named'' HUrr! c4nE!'' and'' Cair3x'' in 2010. | {
"entities": {}
} | [] |
Both members were engaged in website defacements prior to the forming of the Ajax Security Team, and both were members of Iranian hacker forums such as ashiyane [. | {
"entities": {}
} | [] |
] org and shabgard [. | {
"entities": {}
} | [] |
] org. | {
"entities": {}
} | [] |
Other members include'' 0day'','' Mohammad PK'' and'' Crim3r''. | {
"entities": {}
} | [] |
The Ajax Security Team website at ajaxtm [. | {
"entities": {}
} | [] |
] org had a Web forum with at least 236 members. | {
"entities": {}
} | [] |
The group published several exploits for content management systems and engaged in defacements. | {
"entities": {}
} | [] |
Initially, the defacements seemed to be motivated by a desire to demonstrate the group's prowess-they even defaced an Iranian government website. | {
"entities": {}
} | [] |
However, the group appears to have become increasingly political. | {
"entities": {}
} | [] |
For example, in a blog post in 2012,'' Cair3x'' announced the targeting of Iran's political opponents. | {
"entities": {}
} | [] |
In 2013, the Ajax Security Team, and'' HUrr! c4nE!'' in particular, took part in'' #OpIsrael'' and'' #OpUSA''. | {
"entities": {}
} | [] |
By early 2014, the Ajax Security Team appears to have dwindled. | {
"entities": {}
} | [] |
There have been no defacements since December 2013. | {
"entities": {}
} | [] |
The website and forum at ajaxtm [. | {
"entities": {}
} | [] |
] org operated by'' HUrr! c4nE!'', aka'' k3yv4n'', is no longer active. | {
"entities": {}
} | [] |
'' HUrr! c4nE!'' has the most open/documented Internet persona of the Ajax Security Team. | {
"entities": {}
} | [] |
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