mneb/malware-text-db · Datasets at Hugging Face

input stringlengths 1 785	output dict	schema listlengths 0 0
One of these samples was probably used in attacks in late summer 2013, using a'' leaked report'' lure which contained a decoy document related to Pakistan's alleged inability to locate Osama Bin Laden.	{ "entities": { "entity": [ { "text": "One of these samples", "start": 0, "end": 20 }, { "text": "a'' leaked report'' lure which contained a decoy document related to Pakistan's alleged inability to locate Osama Bin Laden", "start": 77, "end": 200 ...	[]
After publication of the TCIRT blog and our communications with Tranchulas occurred in August 2013, no new samples of BITTERBUG or its support components (based on compile times) were identified until September (various support components) and October (a new BITTERBUG variant).	{ "entities": {} }	[]
Interestingly, the samples compiled following the blog publication used entirely new and generic debug paths (Figure 11) as well as a compilation tactic to conceal the C2 address from static analysis.	{ "entities": { "entity": [ { "text": "a compilation tactic", "start": 132, "end": 152 }, { "text": "the C2 address from static analysis", "start": 164, "end": 199 } ], "action": [ { "text": "conceal", "start": 1...	[]
Between September and December, we observed more variations of BITTERBUG and its support components in terms of packaging, host-based activities, and decoys (or the lack of them) compared to the samples before our blog post.	{ "entities": {} }	[]
This could indicate that the threat actors were aware of the blog post and modified their malware and related components to distance them from prior indicators.	{ "entities": {} }	[]
Between December 2013 and late March 2014, we observed several new lures used in BITTERBUG self-extracting RAR (SFXRAR) files.	{ "entities": { "entity": [ { "text": "several new lures", "start": 55, "end": 72 }, { "text": "BITTERBUG self-extracting RAR (SFXRAR) files", "start": 81, "end": 125 } ], "action": [ { "text": "used", "start": 7...	[]
One from December contained several BITTERBUG variants and used a decoy PDF document (Figure 12) related to the December arrest of Devyani Khobragade, an Indian diplomat in the United States.	{ "entities": { "entity": [ { "text": "One from December", "start": 0, "end": 17 }, { "text": "a decoy PDF document (Figure 12) related to the December arrest of Devyani Khobragade, an Indian diplomat in the United States", "start": 64, "end": 190 ...	[]
In spring 2014, we observed a SFXRAR file with a filename lure related to the March 2014 disappearance of Malaysis Airlines Flight 370 (cast as a Pakistan-related hijacking).	{ "entities": { "entity": [ { "text": "we", "start": 16, "end": 18 }, { "text": "a SFXRAR file with a filename lure related to the March 2014 disappearance of Malaysis Airlines Flight 370 (cast as a Pakistan-related hijacking)", "start": 28, "end":...	[]
This SFXRAR contained the latest BITTERBUG variant, which had new dependencies on support components.	{ "entities": {} }	[]
Interestingly, this SFXRAR's filename was the only lure element related to the MH370 event; it did not contain a decoy document.	{ "entities": { "entity": [ { "text": "this SFXRAR's filename", "start": 15, "end": 37 }, { "text": "the only lure element related to the MH370 event", "start": 42, "end": 90 } ], "action": [ { "text": "was", "st...	[]
We provide a more detailed report on this SFX and the related variant in Appendix A: Malware Details.	{ "entities": {} }	[]
BITTERBUG continued to rely on the same network behaviors to communicate with its C2s.	{ "entities": { "entity": [ { "text": "BITTERBUG", "start": 0, "end": 9 }, { "text": "the same network behaviors", "start": 31, "end": 57 }, { "text": "communicate with its C2s", "start": 61, "end": 85 } ...	[]
Connections to its C2 nodes relied on PHP and used communications that included'' .php? compname='' and'' .php? srs='', as well as direct file/component retrieval from the C2s.	{ "entities": { "entity": [ { "text": "Connections to its C2 nodes", "start": 0, "end": 27 }, { "text": "PHP", "start": 38, "end": 41 }, { "text": "communications that included'' .php? compname='' and'' .php? srs='', as well as ...	[]
Though many of the samples that we have observed use direct IPs for HTTP communications, we have observed more limited use of a No-IP domain.	{ "entities": { "entity": [ { "text": "many of the samples that we have observed", "start": 7, "end": 48 }, { "text": "direct IPs", "start": 53, "end": 63 }, { "text": "HTTP communications", "start": 68, "end": 8...	[]
Operation Arachnophobia consists of an apparent targeted exploitation campaign, dating back to early 2013, using the BITTERBUG malware family and seemingly directed against entities involved in India-Pakistan issues.	{ "entities": {} }	[]
The threat actor appears to have exclusively used VPSNOC, a probable Pakistan-based VPS service provider who leased U.S. hosting services, for both the delivery and C2 phases of attack.	{ "entities": { "entity": [ { "text": "The threat actor", "start": 0, "end": 16 }, { "text": "VPSNOC, a probable Pakistan-based VPS service provider who leased U.S. hosting services", "start": 50, "end": 137 }, { "text": "both t...	[]
Research later identified that a Pakistan-based VPSNOC representative had a social network affiliation with a Tranchulas employee as well as apparent affiliations with the Anonymous and AntiSec movements.	{ "entities": {} }	[]
After the August 6, 2013 blog, Tranchulas provided TCIRT and the media an official statement and explanation of BITTERBUG activity, however, this explanation contained discrepancies.	{ "entities": {} }	[]
The TCIRT addressed some of these discrepancies with Tranchulas personnel, who were unresponsive, increasing our suspicion of the activity.	{ "entities": {} }	[]
We later observed BITTERBUG activity following August 2013 with subtle changes that further generalized debug paths.	{ "entities": {} }	[]
It was this chain of events that served as a catalyst for extra scrutiny of the activity and collaboration between the ThreatConnect and FireEye Labs teams to share information.	{ "entities": {} }	[]
While we are not conclusively attributing BITTERBUG activity to Tranchulas or a specific Pakistani entity, we can confidently point to many characteristics of a Pakistan-based cyber exploitation effort that is probably directed against Indian targets or those who are involved in India-Pakistan issues.	{ "entities": {} }	[]
Many of the notable characteristics of the BITTERBUG activity suggest that this is indeed part of a Pakistan-based cyber exploitation effort that has apparently attempted to obfuscate its malware characteristics and origins (behind U.S. infrastructure), before and after public disclosure in August 2013.	{ "entities": { "entity": [ { "text": "a Pakistan-based cyber exploitation effort", "start": 98, "end": 140 }, { "text": "its malware characteristics", "start": 184, "end": 211 } ], "action": [ { "text": "obfuscate", ...	[]
On the surface, BITTERBUG serves as an example of how threat actors mask their operations across social, cultural and geographic boundaries.	{ "entities": {} }	[]
More importantly, it demonstrates the value of threat intelligence sharing and industry collaboration.	{ "entities": {} }	[]
As one organization begins to pull at a thread of evidence and share their findings with another, a larger understanding and shared perspective is revealed.	{ "entities": {} }	[]
It is through this process that a shared awareness emerges into a larger, more comprehensive story that explains what we are seeing and why-ultimately it is this story that better serves us all.	{ "entities": {} }	[]
BITTERBUG is a backdoor executable capable of uploading and downloading files, listing running processes, generating file listings, and automatically transferring selected files to its command and control (C2) server.	{ "entities": { "entity": [ { "text": "BITTERBUG", "start": 0, "end": 9 }, { "text": "a backdoor executable", "start": 13, "end": 34 }, { "text": "files", "start": 72, "end": 77 }, { "text": "...	[]
BITTERBUG appears to be virtual machine aware and may not execute on a VMWare or VirtualBox VM.	{ "entities": { "entity": [ { "text": "BITTERBUG", "start": 0, "end": 9 }, { "text": "be virtual machine aware", "start": 21, "end": 45 }, { "text": "a VMWare or VirtualBox VM", "start": 69, "end": 94 } ...	[]
We have observed BITTERBUG installed by a self-extracting RAR archive disguised as a screensaver.	{ "entities": { "entity": [ { "text": "BITTERBUG", "start": 17, "end": 26 }, { "text": "a self-extracting RAR archive", "start": 40, "end": 69 }, { "text": "a screensaver", "start": 83, "end": 96 } ], ...	[]
Upon execution, the self-extracting RAR archive may extract configuration files, dependency DLLs, and the BITTERBUG executable.	{ "entities": { "entity": [ { "text": "the self-extracting RAR archive", "start": 16, "end": 47 }, { "text": "configuration files, dependency DLLs, and the BITTERBUG executable", "start": 60, "end": 126 } ], "action": [ { ...	[]
The timeline below is of BITTERBUG activity from May 2013 through March 2014.	{ "entities": {} }	[]
Upon execution the self-extracting RAR may install < BITTERBUG > .exe and the following DLLs: The self-extracting RAR may install the following benign configuration files: BITTERBUG first may execute the following Windows Management Instrumentation (WMI) command to detect the presence of a virtual machine (VM): BITTERB...	{ "entities": { "entity": [ { "text": "the self-extracting RAR", "start": 15, "end": 38 }, { "text": "< BITTERBUG > .exe and the following DLLs", "start": 51, "end": 92 }, { "text": "The self-extracting RAR", "start": 94...	[]
The backdoor then may enter an infinite sleep loop if recovery.txt contains either one of the aforementioned strings (Example in Figure 13).	{ "entities": { "entity": [ { "text": "The backdoor", "start": 0, "end": 12 }, { "text": "an infinite sleep loop", "start": 28, "end": 50 }, { "text": "recovery.txt contains either one of the aforementioned strings (Example in F...	[]
Next BITTERBUG typically will beacon to the C2 server by sending the computer name and username of the compromised system.	{ "entities": { "entity": [ { "text": "BITTERBUG", "start": 5, "end": 14 }, { "text": "the C2 server", "start": 40, "end": 53 }, { "text": "sending the computer name and username of the compromised system", "start": 57, ...	[]
An example beacon request is shown in Figure 14.	{ "entities": {} }	[]
BITTERBUG then may perform an HTTP GET request for the following URI: If the C2 server responds with a filename, the filename received is deleted from% APPDATA% \Microsoft < FILENAMEFROM C2 >.	{ "entities": { "entity": [ { "text": "BITTERBUG", "start": 0, "end": 9 }, { "text": "an HTTP GET request for the following URI", "start": 27, "end": 68 }, { "text": "the filename received", "start": 113, "end": ...	[]
The purpose of this command might be to delete older versions of BITTERBUG, although we have not observed this command occurring in the wild.	{ "entities": { "entity": [ { "text": "this command", "start": 15, "end": 27 }, { "text": "older versions of BITTERBUG", "start": 47, "end": 74 } ], "action": [ { "text": "delete", "start": 40, "end": 46 ...	[]
BITTERBUG then may attempt to download the files listed in Table 1.	{ "entities": { "entity": [ { "text": "BITTERBUG", "start": 0, "end": 9 }, { "text": "the files listed in Table 1", "start": 39, "end": 66 } ], "action": [ { "text": "download", "start": 30, "end": 38 ...	[]
The purpose of the first three files is unknown.	{ "entities": {} }	[]
The final two files are downloaded to the user's Startup directory and executed at startup in order to maintain persistence.	{ "entities": { "entity": [ { "text": "The final two files", "start": 0, "end": 19 }, { "text": "the user's Startup directory", "start": 38, "end": 66 }, { "text": "startup", "start": 83, "end": 90 }, ...	[]
Next, BITTERBUG may scan through each drive letter and search recursively for files with the following file extensions: BITTERBUG then typically creates a file list containing all documents (excluding those whose filename contains MediaUtils) to the following locations: BITTERBUG may also write a list of all running pr...	{ "entities": { "entity": [ { "text": "BITTERBUG", "start": 6, "end": 15 }, { "text": "each drive letter", "start": 33, "end": 50 }, { "text": "files with the following file extensions", "start": 78, "end": 118 ...	[]
In one case, an actor appeared to manually null out the'' Cert-India'' user directory in one of the file paths (see figures 15 and 16 below) contained in two binaries (support components).	{ "entities": {} }	[]
These files shared the same import hash (4e96e86db5a8a025b996aefdc218ff74) and were virtually the same files minus modification to a few bytes in the second sample.	{ "entities": {} }	[]
As these samples point to, we also observed use of the C++ Boost libraries, which introduced a new file path to monitor for operational security purposes.	{ "entities": {} }	[]
We observed at least one case in which files mixed old and new file paths, as seen in the figures 17 and 18 below.	{ "entities": {} }	[]
In both cases, it is possible that the actors intentionally did this in an attempt to mislead further research efforts into post-blog samples or cast suspicion on'' Cert-India'' as a more-revealing element.	{ "entities": {} }	[]
For example, analysis of files deployed alongside the nulled-out'' Cert-India'' sample mentioned above revealed a lack of concern over the same string.	{ "entities": {} }	[]
Alternatively, these inconsistencies could also indicate sloppy tradecraft and/or teamwork.	{ "entities": {} }	[]
BITTERBUG Hashes BITTERBUG and Support Component Debug Strings (in order of first use) BITTERBUG Import Hashes HTTP Requests BITTERBUG Domain & IPs The Kansas-City-based hosting provider sent an introductory email message on July 24th, 2013 at 1500 CDT and would be received by TCIRT at 1400 EDT and VPSNOC on Thursday J...	{ "entities": {} }	[]
Analysis of the VPSNOC email header indicated that the message was sent on Thursday 25 July at 02:28:41 +0500 GMT, which is consistent with Pakistan's time zone.	{ "entities": {} }	[]
Of note, the email message was sent with an X-Originating IP Address of 184.75.214.10 corresponding to a Private Internet Access Canadian proxy.	{ "entities": {} }	[]
VPSNOC's use of this commercial proxy service likely demonstrates the intent to mask the apparent origin of the sender.	{ "entities": {} }	[]
These two examples highlight that VPSNOC's inbound and outbound email communications consistently utilized a +0500 Pakistani timezone.	{ "entities": {} }	[]
Due to the apparent Pakistani nexus within the BITTERBUG malware and the Pakistan time zone consistently observed within the VPSNOC emails, the TCIRT applied additional scrutiny and research of the content within the Tranchulas'' Response ThreatConnect.docx'' to validate their claims.	{ "entities": {} }	[]
In the following section we will examine the inconsistencies observed.	{ "entities": {} }	[]
Within the response we observed the following inconsistencies: Our review of the'' ResponseThreatConnect.docx'' focused in on the email screenshot (Figure 3) image1.png that Khan provided revealing that the date probably had been modified to appear as though they were the first to notify VPSNOC.	{ "entities": {} }	[]
Within the official response, Zubair Khan indicated that Tranchulas was'' already aware of this incident ...	{ "entities": {} }	[]
and contacted hosting company.	{ "entities": {} }	[]
'' The official response included a screenshot depicting an email sent to VPSNOC from an unidentified (redacted) tranchulas.com email address that was sent on'' Tue, Jul 21, 2013 at 11:36 PM'' with no evidence of the date in which it was received by or responded to by VPSNOC.	{ "entities": {} }	[]
This message contained a notable misalignment between the date and day of the week.	{ "entities": {} }	[]
July 21, 2013 was a Sunday, not a Tuesday.	{ "entities": {} }	[]
'' Tuesday'' would have pre-dated our official notification that occurred on Wednesday July 24, 2013, and could indicate that Tranchulas may have obtained insight into the original TCIRT notification through Pakistan- based contacts within VPSNOC.	{ "entities": {} }	[]
The TCIRT subsequently responded to Mr. Khan's official explanation with a follow-up inquiry, offering Khan an opportunity to explain the date inconsistency within the email screenshot.	{ "entities": {} }	[]
Mr. Khan deferred our request to Mr. Hamza Qamar, a Penetration Testing Team Lead at Tranchulas, who later responded with a simple denial that the email message had not been altered apart from blurring the name of the original sender.	{ "entities": {} }	[]
The email screenshot (image1.png) from within the Tranchulas response demonstrated awareness of information that we initially withheld and later released in our blog post: one malware variant that contained a debug string with'' umairaziz27'' the same username as a Tranchulas employee.	{ "entities": {} }	[]
The Tranchulas message to VPSNOC incorrectly claimed to identify malware on 199.91.173.43 that contained the'' company's name and ...	{ "entities": {} }	[]
employee's name''.	{ "entities": {} }	[]
While it is possible that Tranchulas' analysts discovered this variant independent of the blog post, it added to the inconsistent elements of the response and further suggested that the blog post may have inspired its communications with VPSNOC.	{ "entities": {} }	[]
We note that we requested additional information such as the'' detailed analysis report'' within the exchange from Tranchulas but did not receive a response.	{ "entities": {} }	[]
The Tranchulas response indicates that'' Tranchulas' research team was already aware of this incident before publication of this report.	{ "entities": {} }	[]
Our team contacted hosting company of server to seek an explanation.	{ "entities": {} }	[]
'' Considering there are no public references to the identified infrastructure identifying VPSNOC as the'' hosting company''.	{ "entities": {} }	[]
The only way for Tranchulas to identify VPSNOC as the hosting company was to either have previous insider knowledge of the activity, or to have been privately introduced by the Kansas-City-based service provider to their'' client'' VPSNOC, of which was never mentioned or discussed when we initially exchanged with eithe...	{ "entities": {} }	[]
Public registration of the 199.91.173.43 reveals the Kansas-City-based hosting provider as the official registrant and owner of the infrastructure.	{ "entities": {} }	[]
The only way to know that VPSNOC was subleasing the infrastructure was to obtain this information directly from them.	{ "entities": {} }	[]
There was no public reference which would have revealed VPSNOC as the entity which maintained root access to the 199.91.173.43.	{ "entities": {} }	[]
Had Tranchulas legitimately conducted an initial victim notification sometime in late July 2013, they would have likely done so through the Kansas-City-based hosting provider and not VPSNOC.	{ "entities": {} }	[]
On August 15, 2013, Hamza Qamar's response to TCIRT's follow up inquiry to the observed inconsistencies redirected TCIRT personnel to VPSNOC to obtain an explanation versus attempting to explain the observed day date inconsistency and document properties within the Tranchulas email.	{ "entities": {} }	[]
The TCIRT's suspicion mounted when presenting Tranchulas with the opportunity to set the record straight, that Tranchulas could not substantiate their claims, rather deferring the TCIRT inquiry to a third party (VPSNOC).	{ "entities": {} }	[]
Within the'' ResponseThreatConnect.docx'' the image'' image1.png'' contains an undated response from VPSNOC to the'' Tue, Jul 21, 2013'' Tranchulas notification.	{ "entities": {} }	[]
The undated VPSNOC response that Tranchulas received is nearly identical to the response that TCIRT and the Kansas-City-based service provider obtained on July 24th.	{ "entities": {} }	[]
Tranchulas does not include the date or time as to when they obtained a response from VPSNOC.	{ "entities": {} }	[]
The TCIRT found it unusual that neither the Kansas-City-based service provider or VPSNOC personnel ever indicated either way that they knew about the activity or had been previously contacted by either party.	{ "entities": {} }	[]
When considering all of the inconsistencies, order of events and studying, Gmail webmail layout, similarities of keywords, salutations and closings within the'' Tue, Jul 21, 2013'' Tranchulas notification and the respective VPSNOC response.	{ "entities": {} }	[]
The TCIRT grew increasingly suspicious of the exchanges with VPSNOC and subsequent exchanges with Tranchulas personnel.	{ "entities": {} }	[]
Analysis of metadata within two benign decoy documents that were originally used within July 2013 BITTERBUG operations, Report.docx and NaxalitesFundedbyPakistan.docx, both maintained the author properties of'' hp''.	{ "entities": { "entity": [ { "text": "two benign decoy documents", "start": 28, "end": 54 }, { "text": "July 2013 BITTERBUG operations", "start": 88, "end": 118 } ], "action": [ { "text": "were originally used", ...	[]
In reviewing the document metadata within the'' ResponseThreatConnect.docx'' that was sent from Mr. Zubair Khan on August 6, 2013, the TCIRT also identified that this document maintained the creator properties of'' hp.	{ "entities": {} }	[]
'' (Figure 10) While the author field of'' hp'' doesn't conclusively prove a relationship, it contributes to a body of circumstantial evidence which matches the document properties of the official Tranchulas response to the document properties that were also found within decoy documents that were bundled with BITTERBUG...	{ "entities": {} }	[]
According to the vpsnoc.com website'' In 2007 five VPS experts decided to invest in their very own private rack space in the heart of Kansas, the United States.	{ "entities": {} }	[]
Their aim? To bring service-oriented, quality managed and unmanaged VPS solutions to clients all over the world.	{ "entities": {} }	[]
Just 1 year later, after beginning their enterprise on 3 servers they had filled 2 server racks with happy clients receiving quality U.S support.	{ "entities": {} }	[]
Their company continued to build momentum.	{ "entities": {} }	[]
'' Whois records for vpsnoc.com indicate that another individual registered the domain and listed Digital Linx Hosting as the registrant organization with a Kansas City-based address, telephone number 925-665-1427, and administrative email address admin @digitallinx.	{ "entities": {} }	[]
org.	{ "entities": {} }	[]
This is the same registrant record for the digitallinx.net domain.	{ "entities": {} }	[]
The digitallinx.net/sitemap.xml and the corresponding Google cache for digitallinx.net/sitemap.xml indiciate that both digitallinx.net and digitallinx.com have shared the same sitemap.xml at the same time.	{ "entities": {} }	[]
The digitallinx.net/Contact.html identified similar overlaps with data across the .org	{ "entities": {} }	[]
, .net	{ "entities": {} }	[]
, and .com	{ "entities": {} }	[]

One of these samples was probably used in attacks in late summer 2013, using a'' leaked report'' lure which contained a decoy document related to Pakistan's alleged inability to locate Osama Bin Laden.

{ "entities": { "entity": [ { "text": "One of these samples", "start": 0, "end": 20 }, { "text": "a'' leaked report'' lure which contained a decoy document related to Pakistan's alleged inability to locate Osama Bin Laden", "start": 77, "end": 200 ...

[]

After publication of the TCIRT blog and our communications with Tranchulas occurred in August 2013, no new samples of BITTERBUG or its support components (based on compile times) were identified until September (various support components) and October (a new BITTERBUG variant).

{ "entities": {} }

[]

Interestingly, the samples compiled following the blog publication used entirely new and generic debug paths (Figure 11) as well as a compilation tactic to conceal the C2 address from static analysis.

{ "entities": { "entity": [ { "text": "a compilation tactic", "start": 132, "end": 152 }, { "text": "the C2 address from static analysis", "start": 164, "end": 199 } ], "action": [ { "text": "conceal", "start": 1...

[]

Between September and December, we observed more variations of BITTERBUG and its support components in terms of packaging, host-based activities, and decoys (or the lack of them) compared to the samples before our blog post.

{ "entities": {} }

[]

This could indicate that the threat actors were aware of the blog post and modified their malware and related components to distance them from prior indicators.

{ "entities": {} }

[]

Between December 2013 and late March 2014, we observed several new lures used in BITTERBUG self-extracting RAR (SFXRAR) files.

{ "entities": { "entity": [ { "text": "several new lures", "start": 55, "end": 72 }, { "text": "BITTERBUG self-extracting RAR (SFXRAR) files", "start": 81, "end": 125 } ], "action": [ { "text": "used", "start": 7...

[]

One from December contained several BITTERBUG variants and used a decoy PDF document (Figure 12) related to the December arrest of Devyani Khobragade, an Indian diplomat in the United States.

{ "entities": { "entity": [ { "text": "One from December", "start": 0, "end": 17 }, { "text": "a decoy PDF document (Figure 12) related to the December arrest of Devyani Khobragade, an Indian diplomat in the United States", "start": 64, "end": 190 ...

[]

In spring 2014, we observed a SFXRAR file with a filename lure related to the March 2014 disappearance of Malaysis Airlines Flight 370 (cast as a Pakistan-related hijacking).

{ "entities": { "entity": [ { "text": "we", "start": 16, "end": 18 }, { "text": "a SFXRAR file with a filename lure related to the March 2014 disappearance of Malaysis Airlines Flight 370 (cast as a Pakistan-related hijacking)", "start": 28, "end":...

[]

This SFXRAR contained the latest BITTERBUG variant, which had new dependencies on support components.

{ "entities": {} }

[]

Interestingly, this SFXRAR's filename was the only lure element related to the MH370 event; it did not contain a decoy document.

{ "entities": { "entity": [ { "text": "this SFXRAR's filename", "start": 15, "end": 37 }, { "text": "the only lure element related to the MH370 event", "start": 42, "end": 90 } ], "action": [ { "text": "was", "st...

[]

We provide a more detailed report on this SFX and the related variant in Appendix A: Malware Details.

{ "entities": {} }

[]

BITTERBUG continued to rely on the same network behaviors to communicate with its C2s.

{ "entities": { "entity": [ { "text": "BITTERBUG", "start": 0, "end": 9 }, { "text": "the same network behaviors", "start": 31, "end": 57 }, { "text": "communicate with its C2s", "start": 61, "end": 85 } ...

[]

Connections to its C2 nodes relied on PHP and used communications that included'' .php? compname='' and'' .php? srs='', as well as direct file/component retrieval from the C2s.

{ "entities": { "entity": [ { "text": "Connections to its C2 nodes", "start": 0, "end": 27 }, { "text": "PHP", "start": 38, "end": 41 }, { "text": "communications that included'' .php? compname='' and'' .php? srs='', as well as ...

[]

Though many of the samples that we have observed use direct IPs for HTTP communications, we have observed more limited use of a No-IP domain.

{ "entities": { "entity": [ { "text": "many of the samples that we have observed", "start": 7, "end": 48 }, { "text": "direct IPs", "start": 53, "end": 63 }, { "text": "HTTP communications", "start": 68, "end": 8...

[]

Operation Arachnophobia consists of an apparent targeted exploitation campaign, dating back to early 2013, using the BITTERBUG malware family and seemingly directed against entities involved in India-Pakistan issues.

{ "entities": {} }

[]

The threat actor appears to have exclusively used VPSNOC, a probable Pakistan-based VPS service provider who leased U.S. hosting services, for both the delivery and C2 phases of attack.

{ "entities": { "entity": [ { "text": "The threat actor", "start": 0, "end": 16 }, { "text": "VPSNOC, a probable Pakistan-based VPS service provider who leased U.S. hosting services", "start": 50, "end": 137 }, { "text": "both t...

[]

Research later identified that a Pakistan-based VPSNOC representative had a social network affiliation with a Tranchulas employee as well as apparent affiliations with the Anonymous and AntiSec movements.

{ "entities": {} }

[]

After the August 6, 2013 blog, Tranchulas provided TCIRT and the media an official statement and explanation of BITTERBUG activity, however, this explanation contained discrepancies.

{ "entities": {} }

[]

The TCIRT addressed some of these discrepancies with Tranchulas personnel, who were unresponsive, increasing our suspicion of the activity.

{ "entities": {} }

[]

We later observed BITTERBUG activity following August 2013 with subtle changes that further generalized debug paths.

{ "entities": {} }

[]

It was this chain of events that served as a catalyst for extra scrutiny of the activity and collaboration between the ThreatConnect and FireEye Labs teams to share information.

{ "entities": {} }

[]

While we are not conclusively attributing BITTERBUG activity to Tranchulas or a specific Pakistani entity, we can confidently point to many characteristics of a Pakistan-based cyber exploitation effort that is probably directed against Indian targets or those who are involved in India-Pakistan issues.

{ "entities": {} }

[]

Many of the notable characteristics of the BITTERBUG activity suggest that this is indeed part of a Pakistan-based cyber exploitation effort that has apparently attempted to obfuscate its malware characteristics and origins (behind U.S. infrastructure), before and after public disclosure in August 2013.

{ "entities": { "entity": [ { "text": "a Pakistan-based cyber exploitation effort", "start": 98, "end": 140 }, { "text": "its malware characteristics", "start": 184, "end": 211 } ], "action": [ { "text": "obfuscate", ...

[]

On the surface, BITTERBUG serves as an example of how threat actors mask their operations across social, cultural and geographic boundaries.

{ "entities": {} }

[]

More importantly, it demonstrates the value of threat intelligence sharing and industry collaboration.

{ "entities": {} }

[]

As one organization begins to pull at a thread of evidence and share their findings with another, a larger understanding and shared perspective is revealed.

{ "entities": {} }

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It is through this process that a shared awareness emerges into a larger, more comprehensive story that explains what we are seeing and why-ultimately it is this story that better serves us all.

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BITTERBUG is a backdoor executable capable of uploading and downloading files, listing running processes, generating file listings, and automatically transferring selected files to its command and control (C2) server.

{ "entities": { "entity": [ { "text": "BITTERBUG", "start": 0, "end": 9 }, { "text": "a backdoor executable", "start": 13, "end": 34 }, { "text": "files", "start": 72, "end": 77 }, { "text": "...

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BITTERBUG appears to be virtual machine aware and may not execute on a VMWare or VirtualBox VM.

{ "entities": { "entity": [ { "text": "BITTERBUG", "start": 0, "end": 9 }, { "text": "be virtual machine aware", "start": 21, "end": 45 }, { "text": "a VMWare or VirtualBox VM", "start": 69, "end": 94 } ...

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We have observed BITTERBUG installed by a self-extracting RAR archive disguised as a screensaver.

{ "entities": { "entity": [ { "text": "BITTERBUG", "start": 17, "end": 26 }, { "text": "a self-extracting RAR archive", "start": 40, "end": 69 }, { "text": "a screensaver", "start": 83, "end": 96 } ], ...

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Upon execution, the self-extracting RAR archive may extract configuration files, dependency DLLs, and the BITTERBUG executable.

{ "entities": { "entity": [ { "text": "the self-extracting RAR archive", "start": 16, "end": 47 }, { "text": "configuration files, dependency DLLs, and the BITTERBUG executable", "start": 60, "end": 126 } ], "action": [ { ...

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The timeline below is of BITTERBUG activity from May 2013 through March 2014.

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Upon execution the self-extracting RAR may install < BITTERBUG > .exe and the following DLLs: The self-extracting RAR may install the following benign configuration files: BITTERBUG first may execute the following Windows Management Instrumentation (WMI) command to detect the presence of a virtual machine (VM): BITTERB...

{ "entities": { "entity": [ { "text": "the self-extracting RAR", "start": 15, "end": 38 }, { "text": "< BITTERBUG > .exe and the following DLLs", "start": 51, "end": 92 }, { "text": "The self-extracting RAR", "start": 94...

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The backdoor then may enter an infinite sleep loop if recovery.txt contains either one of the aforementioned strings (Example in Figure 13).

{ "entities": { "entity": [ { "text": "The backdoor", "start": 0, "end": 12 }, { "text": "an infinite sleep loop", "start": 28, "end": 50 }, { "text": "recovery.txt contains either one of the aforementioned strings (Example in F...

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Next BITTERBUG typically will beacon to the C2 server by sending the computer name and username of the compromised system.

{ "entities": { "entity": [ { "text": "BITTERBUG", "start": 5, "end": 14 }, { "text": "the C2 server", "start": 40, "end": 53 }, { "text": "sending the computer name and username of the compromised system", "start": 57, ...

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An example beacon request is shown in Figure 14.

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BITTERBUG then may perform an HTTP GET request for the following URI: If the C2 server responds with a filename, the filename received is deleted from% APPDATA% \Microsoft < FILENAMEFROM C2 >.

{ "entities": { "entity": [ { "text": "BITTERBUG", "start": 0, "end": 9 }, { "text": "an HTTP GET request for the following URI", "start": 27, "end": 68 }, { "text": "the filename received", "start": 113, "end": ...

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The purpose of this command might be to delete older versions of BITTERBUG, although we have not observed this command occurring in the wild.

{ "entities": { "entity": [ { "text": "this command", "start": 15, "end": 27 }, { "text": "older versions of BITTERBUG", "start": 47, "end": 74 } ], "action": [ { "text": "delete", "start": 40, "end": 46 ...

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BITTERBUG then may attempt to download the files listed in Table 1.

{ "entities": { "entity": [ { "text": "BITTERBUG", "start": 0, "end": 9 }, { "text": "the files listed in Table 1", "start": 39, "end": 66 } ], "action": [ { "text": "download", "start": 30, "end": 38 ...

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The purpose of the first three files is unknown.

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The final two files are downloaded to the user's Startup directory and executed at startup in order to maintain persistence.

{ "entities": { "entity": [ { "text": "The final two files", "start": 0, "end": 19 }, { "text": "the user's Startup directory", "start": 38, "end": 66 }, { "text": "startup", "start": 83, "end": 90 }, ...

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Next, BITTERBUG may scan through each drive letter and search recursively for files with the following file extensions: BITTERBUG then typically creates a file list containing all documents (excluding those whose filename contains MediaUtils) to the following locations: BITTERBUG may also write a list of all running pr...

{ "entities": { "entity": [ { "text": "BITTERBUG", "start": 6, "end": 15 }, { "text": "each drive letter", "start": 33, "end": 50 }, { "text": "files with the following file extensions", "start": 78, "end": 118 ...

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In one case, an actor appeared to manually null out the'' Cert-India'' user directory in one of the file paths (see figures 15 and 16 below) contained in two binaries (support components).

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These files shared the same import hash (4e96e86db5a8a025b996aefdc218ff74) and were virtually the same files minus modification to a few bytes in the second sample.

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As these samples point to, we also observed use of the C++ Boost libraries, which introduced a new file path to monitor for operational security purposes.

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We observed at least one case in which files mixed old and new file paths, as seen in the figures 17 and 18 below.

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In both cases, it is possible that the actors intentionally did this in an attempt to mislead further research efforts into post-blog samples or cast suspicion on'' Cert-India'' as a more-revealing element.

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For example, analysis of files deployed alongside the nulled-out'' Cert-India'' sample mentioned above revealed a lack of concern over the same string.

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Alternatively, these inconsistencies could also indicate sloppy tradecraft and/or teamwork.

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BITTERBUG Hashes BITTERBUG and Support Component Debug Strings (in order of first use) BITTERBUG Import Hashes HTTP Requests BITTERBUG Domain & IPs The Kansas-City-based hosting provider sent an introductory email message on July 24th, 2013 at 1500 CDT and would be received by TCIRT at 1400 EDT and VPSNOC on Thursday J...

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Analysis of the VPSNOC email header indicated that the message was sent on Thursday 25 July at 02:28:41 +0500 GMT, which is consistent with Pakistan's time zone.

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Of note, the email message was sent with an X-Originating IP Address of 184.75.214.10 corresponding to a Private Internet Access Canadian proxy.

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VPSNOC's use of this commercial proxy service likely demonstrates the intent to mask the apparent origin of the sender.

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These two examples highlight that VPSNOC's inbound and outbound email communications consistently utilized a +0500 Pakistani timezone.

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Due to the apparent Pakistani nexus within the BITTERBUG malware and the Pakistan time zone consistently observed within the VPSNOC emails, the TCIRT applied additional scrutiny and research of the content within the Tranchulas'' Response ThreatConnect.docx'' to validate their claims.

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In the following section we will examine the inconsistencies observed.

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Within the response we observed the following inconsistencies: Our review of the'' ResponseThreatConnect.docx'' focused in on the email screenshot (Figure 3) image1.png that Khan provided revealing that the date probably had been modified to appear as though they were the first to notify VPSNOC.

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Within the official response, Zubair Khan indicated that Tranchulas was'' already aware of this incident ...

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and contacted hosting company.

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'' The official response included a screenshot depicting an email sent to VPSNOC from an unidentified (redacted) tranchulas.com email address that was sent on'' Tue, Jul 21, 2013 at 11:36 PM'' with no evidence of the date in which it was received by or responded to by VPSNOC.

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This message contained a notable misalignment between the date and day of the week.

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July 21, 2013 was a Sunday, not a Tuesday.

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'' Tuesday'' would have pre-dated our official notification that occurred on Wednesday July 24, 2013, and could indicate that Tranchulas may have obtained insight into the original TCIRT notification through Pakistan- based contacts within VPSNOC.

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The TCIRT subsequently responded to Mr. Khan's official explanation with a follow-up inquiry, offering Khan an opportunity to explain the date inconsistency within the email screenshot.

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Mr. Khan deferred our request to Mr. Hamza Qamar, a Penetration Testing Team Lead at Tranchulas, who later responded with a simple denial that the email message had not been altered apart from blurring the name of the original sender.

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The email screenshot (image1.png) from within the Tranchulas response demonstrated awareness of information that we initially withheld and later released in our blog post: one malware variant that contained a debug string with'' umairaziz27'' the same username as a Tranchulas employee.

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The Tranchulas message to VPSNOC incorrectly claimed to identify malware on 199.91.173.43 that contained the'' company's name and ...

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employee's name''.

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While it is possible that Tranchulas' analysts discovered this variant independent of the blog post, it added to the inconsistent elements of the response and further suggested that the blog post may have inspired its communications with VPSNOC.

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We note that we requested additional information such as the'' detailed analysis report'' within the exchange from Tranchulas but did not receive a response.

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The Tranchulas response indicates that'' Tranchulas' research team was already aware of this incident before publication of this report.

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Our team contacted hosting company of server to seek an explanation.

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'' Considering there are no public references to the identified infrastructure identifying VPSNOC as the'' hosting company''.

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The only way for Tranchulas to identify VPSNOC as the hosting company was to either have previous insider knowledge of the activity, or to have been privately introduced by the Kansas-City-based service provider to their'' client'' VPSNOC, of which was never mentioned or discussed when we initially exchanged with eithe...

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Public registration of the 199.91.173.43 reveals the Kansas-City-based hosting provider as the official registrant and owner of the infrastructure.

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The only way to know that VPSNOC was subleasing the infrastructure was to obtain this information directly from them.

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There was no public reference which would have revealed VPSNOC as the entity which maintained root access to the 199.91.173.43.

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Had Tranchulas legitimately conducted an initial victim notification sometime in late July 2013, they would have likely done so through the Kansas-City-based hosting provider and not VPSNOC.

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On August 15, 2013, Hamza Qamar's response to TCIRT's follow up inquiry to the observed inconsistencies redirected TCIRT personnel to VPSNOC to obtain an explanation versus attempting to explain the observed day date inconsistency and document properties within the Tranchulas email.

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The TCIRT's suspicion mounted when presenting Tranchulas with the opportunity to set the record straight, that Tranchulas could not substantiate their claims, rather deferring the TCIRT inquiry to a third party (VPSNOC).

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Within the'' ResponseThreatConnect.docx'' the image'' image1.png'' contains an undated response from VPSNOC to the'' Tue, Jul 21, 2013'' Tranchulas notification.

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The undated VPSNOC response that Tranchulas received is nearly identical to the response that TCIRT and the Kansas-City-based service provider obtained on July 24th.

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Tranchulas does not include the date or time as to when they obtained a response from VPSNOC.

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The TCIRT found it unusual that neither the Kansas-City-based service provider or VPSNOC personnel ever indicated either way that they knew about the activity or had been previously contacted by either party.

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When considering all of the inconsistencies, order of events and studying, Gmail webmail layout, similarities of keywords, salutations and closings within the'' Tue, Jul 21, 2013'' Tranchulas notification and the respective VPSNOC response.

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The TCIRT grew increasingly suspicious of the exchanges with VPSNOC and subsequent exchanges with Tranchulas personnel.

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Analysis of metadata within two benign decoy documents that were originally used within July 2013 BITTERBUG operations, Report.docx and NaxalitesFundedbyPakistan.docx, both maintained the author properties of'' hp''.

{ "entities": { "entity": [ { "text": "two benign decoy documents", "start": 28, "end": 54 }, { "text": "July 2013 BITTERBUG operations", "start": 88, "end": 118 } ], "action": [ { "text": "were originally used", ...

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In reviewing the document metadata within the'' ResponseThreatConnect.docx'' that was sent from Mr. Zubair Khan on August 6, 2013, the TCIRT also identified that this document maintained the creator properties of'' hp.

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'' (Figure 10) While the author field of'' hp'' doesn't conclusively prove a relationship, it contributes to a body of circumstantial evidence which matches the document properties of the official Tranchulas response to the document properties that were also found within decoy documents that were bundled with BITTERBUG...

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According to the vpsnoc.com website'' In 2007 five VPS experts decided to invest in their very own private rack space in the heart of Kansas, the United States.

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Their aim? To bring service-oriented, quality managed and unmanaged VPS solutions to clients all over the world.

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Just 1 year later, after beginning their enterprise on 3 servers they had filled 2 server racks with happy clients receiving quality U.S support.

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Their company continued to build momentum.

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'' Whois records for vpsnoc.com indicate that another individual registered the domain and listed Digital Linx Hosting as the registrant organization with a Kansas City-based address, telephone number 925-665-1427, and administrative email address admin @digitallinx.

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org.

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This is the same registrant record for the digitallinx.net domain.

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The digitallinx.net/sitemap.xml and the corresponding Google cache for digitallinx.net/sitemap.xml indiciate that both digitallinx.net and digitallinx.com have shared the same sitemap.xml at the same time.

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The digitallinx.net/Contact.html identified similar overlaps with data across the .org

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, .net

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, and .com

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