input stringlengths 1 785 | output dict | schema listlengths 0 0 |
|---|---|---|
Lightweight Backdoor: This is a backdoor listener that is designed as a service DLL. | {
"entities": {
"entity": [
{
"text": "This",
"start": 22,
"end": 26
},
{
"text": "a backdoor listener",
"start": 30,
"end": 49
}
],
"action": [
{
"text": "is",
"start": 27,
"end": 29
}
]
}
} | [] |
It includes functionality such as file transfer, system survey, process manipulation, file time matching and proxy capability. | {
"entities": {
"entity": [
{
"text": "It",
"start": 0,
"end": 2
},
{
"text": "file transfer",
"start": 34,
"end": 47
},
{
"text": "system survey",
"start": 49,
"end": 62
},
{
"text": "process... | [] |
The listener can also perform arbitrary code execution and execute commands on the command line. | {
"entities": {
"entity": [
{
"text": "The listener",
"start": 0,
"end": 12
},
{
"text": "arbitrary code execution",
"start": 30,
"end": 54
},
{
"text": "commands",
"start": 67,
"end": 75
},
{
... | [] |
This tool includes functionality to open ports in a victim host's firewall and take advantage of universal Plug and Play (UPNP) mechanisms to discover routers and gateway devices, and add port mappings, allowing inbound connections to victim hosts on Network Address Translated (NAT) private networks. | {
"entities": {
"entity": [
{
"text": "This tool",
"start": 0,
"end": 9
},
{
"text": "ports",
"start": 41,
"end": 46
},
{
"text": "a victim host's firewall",
"start": 50,
"end": 74
},
{
"text"... | [] |
There are no callback domains associated with this malware since connections are inbound only on a specified port number. | {
"entities": {}
} | [] |
Proxy Tool: Implants in this malware family are typically loaded via a dropper installed as a service, then configured to listen on TCP port 443. | {
"entities": {
"entity": [
{
"text": "Implants in this malware family",
"start": 12,
"end": 43
},
{
"text": "a dropper",
"start": 69,
"end": 78
},
{
"text": "a service",
"start": 92,
"end": 101
},
{
... | [] |
The implant may have an associated configuration file which can contain a configurable port. | {
"entities": {}
} | [] |
This proxy tool has basic backdoor functionality, including the ability to fingerprint the victim machine, run remote commands, perform directory listings, perform process listings, and transfer files. | {
"entities": {
"entity": [
{
"text": "This proxy tool",
"start": 0,
"end": 15
},
{
"text": "basic backdoor functionality",
"start": 20,
"end": 48
},
{
"text": "the victim machine",
"start": 87,
"end": 105
... | [] |
Destructive Hard Drive Tool: This tool is a tailored hard-drive wiping tool that is intended to destroy data past the point of recovery and to complicate the victim machine's recovery. | {
"entities": {
"entity": [
{
"text": "This tool",
"start": 29,
"end": 38
},
{
"text": "a tailored hard-drive wiping tool",
"start": 42,
"end": 75
},
{
"text": "data",
"start": 104,
"end": 108
},
{
... | [] |
If the CNE operator has administrator-level privileges on the host, the program will over-write portions of up-to the first four physical drives attached, and over-write the master boot record (MBR) with a program designed to cause further damage if the hard drive is re-booted. | {
"entities": {
"entity": [
{
"text": "the program",
"start": 68,
"end": 79
},
{
"text": "portions of up-to the first four physical drives attached",
"start": 96,
"end": 153
},
{
"text": "the master boot record (MBR)",
"... | [] |
This further results in the victim machine being non-operational with irrecoverable data. | {
"entities": {
"entity": [
{
"text": "This",
"start": 0,
"end": 4
},
{
"text": "the victim machine being non-operational with irrecoverable data",
"start": 24,
"end": 88
}
],
"action": [
{
"text": "results in",
... | [] |
(There is a caveat for machines installed with the windows 7 operating system: windows 7 machines will continue to operate in a degraded state with the targeted files destroyed until after reboot, in which the infected MBR then wipes the drive. | {
"entities": {
"entity": [
{
"text": "the targeted files",
"start": 148,
"end": 166
},
{
"text": "the infected MBR",
"start": 206,
"end": 222
},
{
"text": "the drive",
"start": 234,
"end": 243
}
],
... | [] |
) If the actor has user-level access, the result includes specific files being deleted and practically irrecoverable, but the victim machine would remain usable. | {
"entities": {
"entity": [
{
"text": "specific files",
"start": 58,
"end": 72
}
],
"action": [
{
"text": "being deleted",
"start": 73,
"end": 86
}
]
}
} | [] |
Destructive Target Cleaning Tool: This tool renders victim machines inoperable by overwriting the Master Boot Record. | {
"entities": {
"entity": [
{
"text": "This tool",
"start": 34,
"end": 43
},
{
"text": "victim machines",
"start": 52,
"end": 67
},
{
"text": "inoperable",
"start": 68,
"end": 78
},
{
"text": ... | [] |
The tool is dropped and installed by another executable and consists of three parts: an executable and a dll which contain the destructive components, and an encoded command file that contains the actual destruction commands to be executed. | {
"entities": {
"entity": [
{
"text": "The tool",
"start": 0,
"end": 8
},
{
"text": "another executable",
"start": 37,
"end": 55
},
{
"text": "an executable and a dll",
"start": 85,
"end": 108
},
{
... | [] |
Network Propagation Wiper: The malware has the ability to propagate throughout the target network via built-in Windows shares. | {
"entities": {
"entity": [
{
"text": "The malware",
"start": 27,
"end": 38
},
{
"text": "the target network",
"start": 79,
"end": 97
},
{
"text": "built-in Windows shares",
"start": 102,
"end": 125
}
]... | [] |
Based on the username/password provided in the configuration file and the hostname/IP address of target systems, the malware will access remote network shares in order to upload a copy of the wiper and begin the wiping process on these remote systems. | {
"entities": {
"entity": [
{
"text": "the malware",
"start": 113,
"end": 124
},
{
"text": "remote network shares",
"start": 137,
"end": 158
},
{
"text": "a copy of the wiper",
"start": 178,
"end": 197
},
... | [] |
The malware uses several methods to access shares on the remote systems to begin wiping files. | {
"entities": {
"entity": [
{
"text": "The malware",
"start": 0,
"end": 11
},
{
"text": "shares",
"start": 43,
"end": 49
},
{
"text": "the remote systems",
"start": 53,
"end": 71
},
{
"text": ... | [] |
Checking for existing shares via'' \\hostname\admin $\system32'' and'' \\hostname\shared $\system32'' or create a new share'' cmd.exe /q /c net share shared $=% SystemRoot% /GRANT: everyone, FULL''. | {
"entities": {
"action": [
{
"text": "Checking",
"start": 0,
"end": 8
},
{
"text": "create",
"start": 105,
"end": 111
}
],
"modifier": [
{
"text": "for",
"start": 9,
"end": 12
},
{
"t... | [] |
Once successful, the malware uploads a copy of the wiper file'' taskhostXX.exe'', changes the file-time to match that of the built-in file'' calc.exe'', and starts the remote process. | {
"entities": {
"entity": [
{
"text": "the malware",
"start": 17,
"end": 28
},
{
"text": "a copy of the wiper file'' taskhostXX.exe''",
"start": 37,
"end": 80
},
{
"text": "the file-time",
"start": 90,
"end": 103... | [] |
The remote process is started via the command'' cmd.exe /c wmic.exe /node: hostname /user: username /password: pass PROCESS CALL CREATE''. | {
"entities": {
"entity": [
{
"text": "The remote process",
"start": 0,
"end": 18
},
{
"text": "the command'' cmd.exe /c wmic.exe /node: hostname /user: username /password: pass PROCESS CALL CREATE''",
"start": 34,
"end": 137
}
],
"ac... | [] |
Hostname, username, and password are then obtained from the configuration file. | {
"entities": {}
} | [] |
Afterwards, the remote network share is removed via'' cmd.exe /q /c net share shared $/delete''. | {
"entities": {
"entity": [
{
"text": "the remote network share",
"start": 12,
"end": 36
},
{
"text": "'' cmd.exe /q /c net share shared $/delete''",
"start": 51,
"end": 95
}
],
"action": [
{
"text": "is removed",
... | [] |
Once the wiper has been uploaded, the malware reports its status back to one of the four C2 IP addresses. | {
"entities": {
"entity": [
{
"text": "the wiper",
"start": 5,
"end": 14
},
{
"text": "the malware",
"start": 34,
"end": 45
},
{
"text": "its status",
"start": 54,
"end": 64
},
{
"text": "one ... | [] |
Technical and strategic mitigation recommendations are included in the Solution section below. | {
"entities": {}
} | [] |
US-CERT recommends reviewing the Security Tip Handling Destructive Malware #ST13-003. | {
"entities": {}
} | [] |
Cyber threat actors are using an SMB worm to conduct cyber exploitation activities. | {
"entities": {}
} | [] |
This tool contains five components–a listening implant, lightweight backdoor, proxy tool, destructive hard drive tool, and destructive target cleaning tool. | {
"entities": {
"entity": [
{
"text": "This tool",
"start": 0,
"end": 9
},
{
"text": "a listening implant",
"start": 35,
"end": 54
},
{
"text": "lightweight backdoor",
"start": 56,
"end": 76
},
{
... | [] |
The SMB worm propagates throughout an infected network via brute-force authentication attacks, and connects to a C2 infrastructure. | {
"entities": {
"entity": [
{
"text": "The SMB worm",
"start": 0,
"end": 12
},
{
"text": "an infected network",
"start": 35,
"end": 54
},
{
"text": "brute-force authentication attacks",
"start": 59,
"end": 93
... | [] |
Due to the highly destructive functionality of this malware, an organization infected could experience operational impacts including loss of intellectual property and disruption of critical systems. | {
"entities": {}
} | [] |
Users and administrators are recommended to take the following preventive measures to protect their computer networks: Use and maintain anti-virus software–Anti-virus software recognizes and protects your computer against most known viruses. | {
"entities": {}
} | [] |
It is important to keep your anti-virus software up-to-date (see Understanding Anti-Virus Software for more information). | {
"entities": {}
} | [] |
Keep your operating system and application software up-to-date–Install software patches so that attackers can't take advantage of known problems or vulnerabilities. | {
"entities": {}
} | [] |
Many operating systems offer automatic updates. | {
"entities": {}
} | [] |
If this option is available, you should enable it (see Understanding Patches for more information). | {
"entities": {}
} | [] |
Review Security Tip Handling Destructive Malware #ST13-003 and evaluate their capabilities encompassing planning, preparation, detection, and response for such an event. | {
"entities": {}
} | [] |
Review Recommended Practices for Control Systems, and Improving Industrial Control Systems Cybersecurity with Defense-in-Depth Strategies (pdf). | {
"entities": {}
} | [] |
The following is a list of the Indicators of Compromise (IOCs) that can be added to network security solutions to determine whether they are present on a network. | {
"entities": {}
} | [] |
The malware has the following characteristics: While the original filename of this file is unknown, it was likely'' diskpartmg16.exe''. | {
"entities": {}
} | [] |
This file serves as a dropper. | {
"entities": {
"entity": [
{
"text": "This file",
"start": 0,
"end": 9
},
{
"text": "a dropper",
"start": 20,
"end": 29
}
],
"action": [
{
"text": "serves",
"start": 10,
"end": 16
}
],
"mod... | [] |
It drops destructive malware:'' igfxtrayex.exe''. | {
"entities": {
"entity": [
{
"text": "It",
"start": 0,
"end": 2
},
{
"text": "destructive malware:'' igfxtrayex.exe''",
"start": 9,
"end": 48
}
],
"action": [
{
"text": "drops",
"start": 3,
"end": 8
... | [] |
When the dropper file was executed, it started a second instance of itself with'' -i'' as an argument, and then terminated. | {
"entities": {
"entity": [
{
"text": "the dropper file",
"start": 5,
"end": 21
},
{
"text": "it",
"start": 36,
"end": 38
},
{
"text": "a second instance of itself",
"start": 47,
"end": 74
},
{
... | [] |
The second instance of the dropper file installed itself as the'' WinsSchMgmt'' service with'' -k'' as a command line argument, started the service, and then terminated. | {
"entities": {
"entity": [
{
"text": "The second instance of the dropper file",
"start": 0,
"end": 39
},
{
"text": "itself",
"start": 50,
"end": 56
},
{
"text": "the'' WinsSchMgmt'' service",
"start": 60,
"end":... | [] |
The'' WinsSchMgmt'' service executed the file with'' -k'' as an argument, which started another instance of the file using'' -s'' as an argument. | {
"entities": {
"entity": [
{
"text": "The'' WinsSchMgmt'' service",
"start": 0,
"end": 27
},
{
"text": "the file",
"start": 37,
"end": 45
},
{
"text": "'' -k'' as an argument",
"start": 50,
"end": 72
},
... | [] |
The'' -s'' instance dropped and executed'' igfxtrayex.exe'', created'' netver.dat'', and began generating network traffic over TCP ports 445 and 139 to victim IP addresses. | {
"entities": {
"entity": [
{
"text": "The'' -s'' instance",
"start": 0,
"end": 19
},
{
"text": "'' igfxtrayex.exe''",
"start": 40,
"end": 59
},
{
"text": "'' netver.dat''",
"start": 68,
"end": 83
},
... | [] |
This is a log file created by the dropper, and appended to as the scans progress. | {
"entities": {
"entity": [
{
"text": "a log file",
"start": 8,
"end": 18
},
{
"text": "the dropper",
"start": 30,
"end": 41
}
],
"action": [
{
"text": "created",
"start": 19,
"end": 26
}
]
}
... | [] |
It contains what appear to be hostnames, IP addresses, and the number 2. | {
"entities": {}
} | [] |
Entries in the file have the structure'' HOSTNAME | IP Address | 2''. | {
"entities": {}
} | [] |
This file is destructive malware: a disk wiper with network beacon capabilities. | {
"entities": {
"entity": [
{
"text": "This file",
"start": 0,
"end": 9
},
{
"text": "destructive malware",
"start": 13,
"end": 32
}
],
"action": [
{
"text": "is",
"start": 10,
"end": 12
}
]
}... | [] |
If'' igfxtrayex.exe'' is run with no parameters, it creates and starts a copy of itself with the'' –i'' argument. | {
"entities": {
"entity": [
{
"text": "it",
"start": 49,
"end": 51
},
{
"text": "a copy of itself",
"start": 71,
"end": 87
},
{
"text": "the'' –i'' argument",
"start": 93,
"end": 112
}
],
"action": ... | [] |
After 10 minutes, the'' igfxtrayex.exe'' makes three copies of itself and places them in the same directory from which it was executed. | {
"entities": {
"entity": [
{
"text": "the'' igfxtrayex.exe''",
"start": 18,
"end": 40
},
{
"text": "three copies of itself",
"start": 47,
"end": 69
}
],
"action": [
{
"text": "makes",
"start": 41,
"end":... | [] |
These copies are named according to the format'' taskhostXX.exe'' (where X is a randomly generated ASCII character). | {
"entities": {}
} | [] |
These copies are then executed, each with a different argument (one being'' -m'', one being'' -d'' and the other'' -w''). | {
"entities": {
"entity": [
{
"text": "These copies",
"start": 0,
"end": 12
}
],
"action": [
{
"text": "are then executed",
"start": 13,
"end": 30
}
]
}
} | [] |
Network connection attempts are made to one of three hard-coded IP addresses in a random order to port 8080 or 8000. | {
"entities": {
"entity": [
{
"text": "Network connection attempts",
"start": 0,
"end": 27
},
{
"text": "one of three hard-coded IP addresses",
"start": 40,
"end": 76
},
{
"text": "a random order",
"start": 80,
"... | [] |
If a connection to the IP address can not be made, it attempts to connect to another of the three IP addresses, until connections to all three IP addresses have been attempted. | {
"entities": {
"entity": [
{
"text": "it",
"start": 51,
"end": 53
},
{
"text": "another of the three IP addresses",
"start": 77,
"end": 110
},
{
"text": "connections to all three IP addresses have been attempted",
"star... | [] |
The following command-line string is then executed:'' cmd.exe /c net stop MSExchangeIS /y''. | {
"entities": {}
} | [] |
A 120-minute (2 hour) sleep command is issued after which the computer is shut down and rebooted. | {
"entities": {
"entity": [
{
"text": "A 120-minute (2 hour) sleep command",
"start": 0,
"end": 35
},
{
"text": "the computer",
"start": 58,
"end": 70
}
],
"action": [
{
"text": "is issued",
"start": 36,
... | [] |
This file, when executed, starts a listener on localhost port 80. | {
"entities": {
"entity": [
{
"text": "This file",
"start": 0,
"end": 9
},
{
"text": "a listener",
"start": 33,
"end": 43
},
{
"text": "localhost port 80",
"start": 47,
"end": 64
}
],
"action": [
... | [] |
It has 3 files contained in the resource section; all xor'd with 0x63. | {
"entities": {
"entity": [
{
"text": "all",
"start": 50,
"end": 53
},
{
"text": "0x63",
"start": 65,
"end": 69
}
],
"action": [
{
"text": "xor'd",
"start": 54,
"end": 59
}
],
"modifier": [
... | [] |
This SYS file is a commercially available tool that allows read/write access to files and raw disk sectors for user mode applications in Windows 2000, XP, 2003, Vista, 2008 (32-bit). | {
"entities": {}
} | [] |
It is dropped from resource ID 0x81 of'' igfxtrayex.exe''. | {
"entities": {
"entity": [
{
"text": "It",
"start": 0,
"end": 2
},
{
"text": "resource ID 0x81 of'' igfxtrayex.exe''",
"start": 19,
"end": 57
}
],
"action": [
{
"text": "is dropped",
"start": 3,
"end": 1... | [] |
This SYS file is a also a commercially available tool that allows read/write access to files and raw disk sectors for user mode applications in Windows 2000, XP, 2003, Vista, 2008 (64-bit). | {
"entities": {}
} | [] |
It is dropped from resource ID 0x83 of'' igfxtrayex.exe''. | {
"entities": {
"entity": [
{
"text": "It",
"start": 0,
"end": 2
},
{
"text": "resource ID 0x83 of'' igfxtrayex.exe''",
"start": 19,
"end": 57
}
],
"action": [
{
"text": "is dropped",
"start": 3,
"end": 1... | [] |
A summary of the C2 IP addresses: Snort signatures: Listening Implant: Lightweight Backdoor: Proxy Tool: Malware associated with the cyber threat actor: Below are potential YARA signatures to detect malware binaries on host machines: Because of the highly destructive functionality of the malware, an organization infect... | {
"entities": {}
} | [] |
Actual impact to organizations may vary depending on the type and number of systems impacted. | {
"entities": {}
} | [] |
Implement the indicators of compromise within your systems for detection and mitigation purposes. | {
"entities": {}
} | [] |
Encourage users to transfer critical files to network shares, to allow for central backed up. | {
"entities": {}
} | [] |
Execute daily backups of all critical systems. | {
"entities": {}
} | [] |
Periodically execute an'' offline'' backup of critical files to removable media. | {
"entities": {}
} | [] |
Establish emergency communications plans should network resources become unavailable. | {
"entities": {}
} | [] |
Isolate any critical networks (including operations networks) from business systems. | {
"entities": {}
} | [] |
Identify critical systems and evaluate the need for having on-hand spares to quickly restore service. | {
"entities": {}
} | [] |
Ensure antivirus is up to date. | {
"entities": {}
} | [] |
Disable credential caching for all desktop devices with particular importance on critical systems such as servers and restrict the number of cached credential for all portable devices to no more than three if possible. | {
"entities": {}
} | [] |
This can be accomplished through a Group Policy Object (GPO). | {
"entities": {}
} | [] |
Disable AutoRun and Autoplay for any removable media device. | {
"entities": {}
} | [] |
Prevent or limit the use of all removable media devices on systems to limit the spread or introduction of malicious software and possible exfiltration data, except where there is a valid business case for use. | {
"entities": {}
} | [] |
This business case must be approved by the organization Chief IT Security Officer, with policy/guidance on how such media should be used. | {
"entities": {}
} | [] |
Consider restricting account privileges. | {
"entities": {}
} | [] |
It is our recommendation that all daily operations should be executed using standard user accounts unless administrative privileges are required for that specific function. | {
"entities": {}
} | [] |
Configure all standard user accounts to prevent the execution and installation of any unknown or unauthorized software. | {
"entities": {}
} | [] |
Both standard and administrative accounts should have access only to services required for nominal daily duties, enforcing the concept of separation of duties. | {
"entities": {}
} | [] |
Lastly, disable Web and email capabilities on administrative accounts. | {
"entities": {}
} | [] |
Compromise of admin accounts is one vector that allows malicious activity to become truly persistent in a network environment. | {
"entities": {}
} | [] |
Ensure that password policy rules are enforced and Admin password values are changed periodically. | {
"entities": {}
} | [] |
Consider prohibiting hosts within the production environment or DMZ from sharing an Active Directory enterprise with hosts on other networks. | {
"entities": {}
} | [] |
Each environment should have separate forests within Active Directory, with no trust relationships allowed between the forests if at all possible. | {
"entities": {}
} | [] |
If necessary, the trust relationships should be one-way with the low integrity environment trusting the higher integrity environment. | {
"entities": {}
} | [] |
Consider deployment of a coaching page with click through acceptance; these are traditionally deployed in an environment to log the acceptance of network acceptable use policy or to notify users of monitoring. | {
"entities": {}
} | [] |
Coaching pages also provide some measure of protection from automated malicious activity. | {
"entities": {}
} | [] |
This occurs because automated malware is normally incapable of physically clicking an acceptance radial button. | {
"entities": {}
} | [] |
Automated malware is traditionally hardcoded to execute, then retrieve commands or additional executables from the Internet. | {
"entities": {}
} | [] |
If the malware is unable to initiate an active connection, the full train of infection is potentially halted. | {
"entities": {}
} | [] |
The danger still exists that the physical user will authorize access, but through the use of coaching pages, infections can be limited or at least the rate of infection reduced. | {
"entities": {}
} | [] |
Monitor logs -- Maintain and actively monitor a centralized logging solution that keeps track of all anomalous and potentially malicious activity. | {
"entities": {}
} | [] |
Ensure that all network operating systems, web browsers, and other related network hardware and software remain updated with all current patches and fixes. | {
"entities": {}
} | [] |
Organizations should review Security Tip Handling Destructive Malware #ST13-003 and evaluate their capabilities encompassing planning, preparation, detection, and response for such an event. | {
"entities": {}
} | [] |
Always keep your patch levels up to date, especially on computers that host public services accessible through the firewall, such as HTTP, FTP, mail, and DNS services. | {
"entities": {}
} | [] |
Build host systems, especially critical systems such as servers, with only essential applications and components required to perform the intended function. | {
"entities": {}
} | [] |
Any unused applications or functions should be removed or disabled, if possible, to limit the attack surface of the host. | {
"entities": {}
} | [] |
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