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The domain digitallinx.com is registered to Perasona #1.
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He uses email addresses naseer @digitallinx.com and nbhatti @gmail.com as the domain registrant email address, along with address 638-F Johar Town, Lahore Pakistan and telephone 966.548805579.
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The DigitalLinx (digitallinx.com) website states that it is'' a web hosting/Web Solutions & Processing Outsourcing Company based in Pakistan''.
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Open source research of the phone number 925-665-1427 indicates that it is also used within site content as a phone number for defiantmarketing.com.
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This domain is registered by Persona #2 who uses the aliases'' agnosticon'' and'' agnostic''.
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Persona #2 lists VPSNOC as the registrant organization, and uses the registration email address of abunasar @yahoo.com with an address of House 12, Street 21, F-8/1 Islamabad Federal 44000.
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The domain defiantmarketing.com domain has used ns1.abunasar.net and ns2.abunasar.net for name services.
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Within a January 2009 posting to a Debian users forum, Persona #2 sends an email from the abunasar @yahoo.com with a reply-to as abunasar @army.com.
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Within the post, Persona #2 responds to the question'' Who's using Debian'' listing DigitalLinx, Kansas City MO and the link to digitallinx.com.
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Also, the seemingly abandoned Twitter profile for Persona #2 is only following the Twitter profile for @VPSNOC.
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In an April 2012 post to blackhatworld.com, a user with the alias'' agnosticon'' posted promotional codes for VPSNOC hosting services, engaging with customers, providing them feedback regarding VPS services and thanking them for positive reviews.
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Within the posting the user'' agnosticon'' included an image which was an actual advertisement that was hosted at http: //vpsnoc.
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com/order.png.
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Within the posted image it states'' VPSNOC is a subdivision of Digital Linx Hosting.
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We have been in business since 2008''.
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The posting concludes with'' If you have any further questions/queries please contact us directly at: support @vpsnoc.com'' Muhammad Naseer Bhatti's LinkedIn profile indicates that he is currently the founder for Digital Linx LLC and vBilling (vbilling.org) as well as a consultant for a U.S. company.
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Both Bhatti and Digital Linx are listed as the registrants for vbilling.org, v-billing.
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com, vgriffins.com and my-server.co, which use P.O.
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Box 295658, Riyadh Saudi Arabia as the registration address.
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This is also the address for two U.S. companies' local operations.
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Bhatti is also listed as the owner of the netblock 46.4.139.224/28.
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Both passive DNS sources as well as Robtex highlight this overlapping infrastructure.
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From September 7-9, 2011, Tranchulas in cooperation with the Pakistan National University of Sciences and Technology (NUST), offered a Certified Penetration Testing Profession (CPTP) Workshop (Figure 17).
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During the workshop, basic penetration techniques and skills were presented.
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It is likely that CPTP workshops and alignment with NUST have allowed Tranchulas the opportunity to recruit student interns.
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Within the CPTP event registration contact information for Muhammad Naseer was listed next to a Tranchulas office number (051- 2871433).
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It is important to note that Muhammad Naseer Bhatti has been previously known to drop the family name'' Bhatti'' within online correspondence (Figure 18).
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In a June 2012 episode of Engineering and Technology Magazine podcast a Mohammed Nasser, Penetration Tester at Tranchulas was interviewed.
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A Mohammed Nasser may also be directly affiliated with Tranchulas.
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This links Tranchulas to a Pakistani employee or consultant also named Muhammad Naseer.
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It is unknown if this is the same Muhammad Naseer that is associated with VPSNOC's parent company Digital Linx, the Pakistan-based service provider which hosted the original BITTERBUG malware.
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Abunasar Khan also maintains the aliases'' agnosticon'' and'' agnostic'' in addition to the email addresses abunasar @yahoo.
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com and abunasar @army.com.
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He has been previously associatedwith VPSNOC & Digital Linx.
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An April 2012 Whois registrant record for the domain zeusadnetwork.com includes the first and last name Khan along with the same (925) 665-1427 phone number seen within the Digial Linx Hosting domains.
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Khan registered a variety of domains, many of which use his abunasar.net for name services and abunasar.yahoo.com within the Start of Authority (SOA) records.
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For example a July 2014 record (Figure 19) for defiantmarketing.com and an August 2013 record (Figure 20) for ns2.vpsnoc.com both maintain these references.
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Abunasar Khan registered abunasar.net and previously (May 2007) and maintained whitehate.org, which have both been used to demonstrate an affinity for and alignment with AntiSec and Anonymous movements.
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The abunasar.net website prominently displays ascii art of the term'' antisec'' with antisec related content'' Blend in.
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Get trusted.
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Trust nobody.
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Own everybody.
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Disclose nothing.
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Destroy everything.
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Take back the scene.
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'' This is a shared affinity that is also reflected amongst with the culture of Tranchulas employees.
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The pure.whitehate.org domain has also been previously associated with Khan, examples can be found within #phrack and #darknet IRC sessions.
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Ironically, in February 2011, Khan's Rootkit.com user profile was compromised revealing his profile's username, password hash, email (abunasar @army.com), and the registration IP address of 202.125.143.67 (Islamabad, Pakistan).
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During his registration, Khan specified the name'' anony mo us'' when registering the profile.
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As of 16 August 2013, a Pastebin post contained details of a customer database compromise for nowclothing.pk, which included Khan's name, email abunasar @army.com, and cell phone number 03215488881.
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Research of the 03215488881 cell phone number yields a user profile'' abunasark'' in an April 2009 posting.
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Khan posts pictures of his blue Baleno and includes another phone number 03234764838.
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In a secondary profile user'' Ak'' uses the same cell phone number 03215488881 in a 2009 sales posting for a 2004 blue Baleno.
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Khan's affinity for Suzuki Baleno cars is made obvious in a May 2009 registration for clubaleno.co.uk that was registered by Khan at VPSNOC using the name services of ns1.abunasar.net and ns2.abunasar.net with a SOA record of abunasar.yahoo.com.
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Later in a June 2009 posting, Khan using the alias'' agnostic'' attempts to sell the domain clubaleno.co.uk and uses his abunasar @army.com email address as a point of contact.
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Khan is also observed using the alias'' agnosticon'' and a Toyota Racing Development avitar within posts to blackhatworld.com and again within a 2011 post where he posts a cpanel error that also includes his'' abunasar'' username within system output.
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The Google+ profile for Khan reveals established social network links to a Team Lead for Penetration Testing at Tranchulas and a Digital Linx employee Shoaib Riaz who also maintains a social network association with the Digital Linx founder Muhammad Nasser Bhatti.
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The Tranchulas website states that they provide a range of security services and training to include penetration and offensive cyber initiative (OCI), in which they'' help national level cyber security programs on strategies for managing offensive technical threats''.
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In a September 2011 YouTube user'' tranchulascert'' posted a video titled'' Tranchulas Cyber Ranges-P @sha ICT Awards 2011'', where they awarded runner up.
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Within the video, the cyber ranges were referenced as being developed for'' defense forces'' that were aimed to'' help them in developing offensive and defensive warfare skills'' and'' combating anti-state hackers''.
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Although Tranchulas brands itself as a multi-national company, their respective operating addresses within United Kingdom the United States and New Zealand are all associated with either virtual office spaces or address forwarding services.
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The Tranchulas website lists its Pakistan address within the 2nd floor of the Evacuee Trust Complex on Sir Agha Khan Road F-5/1 Islamabad 44000.
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The Evacuee Trust Complex is also known as Software Technology Park 2 or STP2 and hosts a variety of other commercial and government offices.
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The Tranchulas employee, Hamza Qamar, that handled the response to our inquiry has a public LinkedIn profile that states that he'' Engaged in system and enterprise level network and Web application security testing for clients ranging from large federal agencies, DoD, and commercial clients.
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'' The profile does not specify if DoD is a reference to the U.S. Department of Defense or another country's Ministry of Defense.
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Interestingly, Qamar's Google+ page showed one'' friend'' in his circle despite more than 40 followers, Abunasar Khan a VPSNOC employee.
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It is likely that Tranchulas provides services to the Pakistani government.
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The offensive cyber initiative services offered by Tranchulas is offered to'' national-level cyber security programs'' suggesting a commercial demand from'' national-level'' customers.
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The stated purpose and intent of the Tranchulas'' Cyber Ranges'' P @sha ICT 2011 awards video suggests the ranges were specifically developed in support of national interests for offensive and defensive purposes.
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The domain registration by Zubair Khan using an official Pakistani government address with his zubair @tranchulas.com email address indicates that Khan may have or currently maintains a physical address at a location where other Pakistani government officials reside.
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Historic Whois registration records for the domains textcrypter.com, taggnation.com, bookadoconline.com and saadiakhan.
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net lists Tranchulas CEO Zubair Khan (zubair @tranchulas.com) as the registrant for the domains.
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At the time of registration Khan used the address 15-B, Mehran Block of the Gulshan-e-Jinnah F-5/1 Islamabad Pakistan for the domains.
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In an April 2008 Request for Proposals, the Pakistan Public Works Department issued a tender for the Constriction of Government Servant Quarters and Garages at Gulshan-e-Jinnah Complex F-5/1 Islamabad.
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Later in May of 2010 within a Pakistani Senate question and answer session, the Gulshan-e-Jinnah Complex was cited under Federal Lodges/Hostels in Islamabad under the control of Pakistan Ministry for Housing and Works.
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A December 2010 TheNews Pakistan ran a story that detailed the differential in rents between commoners within Islamabad and Pakistani government officers accommodated at Gulshan-e-Jinnah.
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According to Google Maps it is approximately 650 meters (8 minute walk) from the Gulshan-e-Jinnah Complex to the Tranchulas offices within the Evacuee Trust Complex.
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Within a May 2013 interview Khan specified that he comes from a family with a strong military background.
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He detailed his interest in'' the world of hacking'' grew during his teen years, referencing his father's diplomatic assignment to the Philippines in 2003.
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Khan would go on to establish Tranchulas in February 2006 after an independent audit of Pakistani Governments National Database and Registration Authority (NADRA).
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Digital Appendix 1 contains additional research collateral collected when conducting Operation Arachnophobia research.
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Digital Appendix 2 contains raw email communications.
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These .eml
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files include raw SMTP headers, content and attachments.
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Digital Appendix 3 contains screenshots of web content used to conduct analysis.
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Digital Appendix 4 contains visualization files that depict relationships and contain metadata associated with our Operation Arachnophobia research.
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Original release date: December 19, 2014 Microsoft Windows US-CERT was recently notified by a trusted third party of cyber threat actors using a Server Message Block (SMB) Worm Tool to conduct cyber exploitation activities recently targeting a major entertainment company.
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This SMB Worm Tool is equipped with a Listening Implant, Lightweight Backdoor, Proxy Tool, Destructive Hard Drive Tool, and Destructive Target Cleaning Tool.
{ "entities": { "entity": [ { "text": "This SMB Worm Tool", "start": 0, "end": 18 }, { "text": "a Listening Implant", "start": 36, "end": 55 }, { "text": "Lightweight Backdoor", "start": 57, "end": 77 }, ...
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SMB Worm Tool: This worm uses a brute force authentication attack to propagate via Windows SMB shares.
{ "entities": { "entity": [ { "text": "This worm", "start": 15, "end": 24 }, { "text": "a brute force authentication attack", "start": 30, "end": 65 }, { "text": "Windows SMB shares", "start": 83, "end": 101 ...
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It connects home every five minutes to send log data back to command and control (C2) infrastructure if it has successfully spread to other Windows hosts via SMB port 445.
{ "entities": { "entity": [ { "text": "It", "start": 0, "end": 2 }, { "text": "home", "start": 12, "end": 16 }, { "text": "five minutes", "start": 23, "end": 35 }, { "text": "log data", ...
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The tool also accepts new scan tasking when it connects to C2.
{ "entities": { "entity": [ { "text": "The tool", "start": 0, "end": 8 }, { "text": "new scan tasking", "start": 22, "end": 38 }, { "text": "it connects to C2", "start": 44, "end": 61 } ], "action":...
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There are two main threads: the first thread calls home and sends back logs (a list of successful SMB exploitations), and the second thread attempts to guess passwords for SMB connections.
{ "entities": { "entity": [ { "text": "the first thread", "start": 28, "end": 44 }, { "text": "home", "start": 51, "end": 55 }, { "text": "logs (a list of successful SMB exploitations)", "start": 71, "end": 116 ...
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If the password is correctly guessed, a file share is established and file is copied and run on the newly-infected host.
{ "entities": { "entity": [ { "text": "a file share", "start": 38, "end": 50 }, { "text": "file", "start": 70, "end": 74 }, { "text": "the newly-infected host", "start": 96, "end": 119 } ], "action"...
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Listening Implant: During installation of this tool, a portion of the binaries is decrypted using AES, with a key derived from the phrase'' National Football League.
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'' Additionally, this implant listens for connections on TCP port 195 (for'' sensvc.exe'' and'' msensvc.exe'') and TCP port 444 (for'' netcfg.dll'').
{ "entities": { "entity": [ { "text": "this implant", "start": 17, "end": 29 }, { "text": "connections", "start": 42, "end": 53 }, { "text": "TCP port 195 (for'' sensvc.exe'' and'' msensvc.exe'') and TCP port 444 (for'' netcfg.d...
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Each message sent to and from this implant is preceded with its length, then XOR encoded with the byte 0x1F.
{ "entities": { "entity": [ { "text": "Each message", "start": 0, "end": 12 }, { "text": "this implant", "start": 30, "end": 42 }, { "text": "the byte 0x1F", "start": 94, "end": 107 } ], "action": [...
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Upon initial connection, the victim sends the string,'' HTTP/1.1 GET /dns? \x00.'' The controller then responds with the string'' 200 www.yahoo.com! \x00'' (for'' sensvc.exe'' and'' msensvc.exe'') or with the string'' RESPONSE 200 OK!!'' (for'' netcfg.dll'').
{ "entities": { "entity": [ { "text": "the victim", "start": 25, "end": 35 }, { "text": "the string,'' HTTP/1.1 GET /dns? \\x00.''", "start": 42, "end": 82 }, { "text": "The controller", "start": 83, "end": 97 ...
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The controller sends the byte''!'' (0x21) to end the network connection.
{ "entities": { "entity": [ { "text": "The controller", "start": 0, "end": 14 }, { "text": "the byte''!'' (0x21)", "start": 21, "end": 41 }, { "text": "end the network connection", "start": 45, "end": 71 } ...
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This special message is not preceded with a length or XOR encoded.
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