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meta-13725
|
Will Ukraine regain control of the Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Power Plant before March 1, 2023?
|
The [Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Power Plant](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/ZNPP) (ZNPP) is the largest nuclear power plant in Europe, with an electric output of 5.7 GWh. After invading Ukraine in February 2022, Russian forces took control over the plant. In recent months, there have been multiple shelling incidents at the site, with both sides blaming the other for the shelling and the risk of a resulting nuclear incident.
The [International Atomic Energy Agency](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/International_Atomic_Energy_Agency) (IAEA) has requested Russia to relinquish control over the plant, a request that so far Russia has refused. Ukraine has also made attempts to recapture the plant by force, which so far have failed.
Resolution Criteria: This question will resolve as 'yes' if credible media outlets report that Ukrainian forces are in physical control over the ZNPP, on or before February 28, 2023, and maintain that control for at least seven consecutive days. Otherwise, the question will resolve as 'no.' If control is maintained for seven consecutive days, the question will resolve as "yes," regardless of whether control changes again after that date.
The presence, or invitation, of IAEA personnel, UN observers or peacekeepers, Russian military or civilian personnel, or any other parties, or the striking of any deals between Russia and Ukraine, will not be sufficient to resolve as 'yes', unless Ukraine is reported to be in physical control of the site on or before the expiry date.
The international status, operational status, or any accidents or incidents at the ZNPP, do not by themselves affect the resolution outcome
|
2022-12-18T05:00:00Z
|
2023-03-01T08:00:00Z
|
2023-03-01T16:08:00Z
|
no
|
METACULUS
|
meta-13700
|
Will Philip Davis cease to be Prime Minister of the Bahamas before January 1, 2024?
|
[Philip Edward "Brave" Davis](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Philip_Davis_(Bahamian_politician)) KC MP, born 7 June 1951, is a Bahamian lawyer and politician serving as the Prime Minister of the Bahamas since September 17 2021. His Progressive Liberal Party won [the 2021 general election](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/2021_Bahamian_general_election) in a landslide.
In November 2022, Bahamas-based cryptocurrency exchange [FTX](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/FTX_(company)) filed for Chapter 11 bankruptcy protection in the United States and its founder and CEO, former billionaire [Sam Bankman-Fried](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Sam_Bankman-Fried), resigned amid [allegations of incompetence, severe corporate governance failures,](https://www.cnbc.com/2022/11/17/ftx-ceo-shreds-bankman-fried-never-seen-such-a-failure-of-controls-.html) and [possible criminal activity.](https://www.coindesk.com/policy/2022/11/17/bahamian-ftx-liquidators-cite-serious-fraud-and-mismanagement-in-court-filings/)
Davis had [opened FTX's offices in the Bahamas](https://thenassauguardian.com/pm-officially-opens-ftx-office-invites-more-fintech-firms-to-bahamas/) a year prior, and had [spoken at FTX's Crypto Bahamas Conference](https://youtu.be/2iYXXLH8yu0?t=345) in May 2022.
On November 21, 2022, Bahamian news source Our News Bahamas published an article entitled ["PM Denies Involvement with FTX"](https://ournews.bs/pm-denies-involvement-with-ftx/) (later deleted, no archive available):
>NASSAU, BAHAMAS – Prime Minister Philip Davis has denied knowing of promises from FTX to build boutique hotels and other investments in The Bahamas.
Later that day, it published a second article: [PM Denies Receiving FTX Contributions](https://ournews.bs/pm-denies-receiving-ftx-contributions/):
>NASSAU, BAHAMAS – The prime minister seeking to clear the air about claims that members of the PLP received any gifts or contributions from FTX. He’s also calling the flack in the international press unfair.
>Prime Minister Philip Davis shooting down claims that the PLP received donations from FTX.
>The prime minister also insisting he has no interest in FTX.
Resolution Criteria: This question will resolve as **Yes** if before January 1, 2024, Philip Davis ceases to be the Prime Minister of the Bahamas, and does not resume holding that role within 168 hours (seven full days) of ceasing to be Prime Minister
|
2022-11-23T22:00:00Z
|
2024-01-01T00:00:00Z
|
2024-01-01T01:09:00Z
|
no
|
METACULUS
|
meta-13540
|
Will Tweets be inaccessible on Twitter.com for any seven days starting before 2024?
|
Resolution Criteria: ####*See also:*
* #### *[>60 minute Twitter outage before mid-2023](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/13538/twitter-outage-before-mid-2023/)*
* #### *[>6 hour Twitter outage before mid-2023](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/13499/6-hour-twitter-outage-before-mid-2023/)*
----
[Elon Musk](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Elon_Musk) is a technology company founder and business executive whose net worth, depending on the fortunes of the stock market, has often ranked him as the world’s wealthiest person. He first made a fortune as a member of “[the Paypal Mafia](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/PayPal_Mafia)”; today his companies include Tesla, SpaceX, Neuralink, OpenAI, and The Boring Company.
[Twitter](https://twitter.com/) is a social media microblogging service with several hundred million users that is especially influential for journalists, academics, government officials and other elites. It has been perceived as both [an important catalyst for pro-democratic uprisings](https://www.pewresearch.org/journalism/2012/11/28/role-social-media-arab-uprisings/) and [a cesspool of misinformation and hate speech](https://www.nytimes.com/2022/11/14/opinion/elon-musk-twitter-free-speech-india.html), and has attracted [significant attention from regulators.](https://www.politico.com/news/2022/11/18/ed-markey-deep-dive-00069221)
On October 27th, 2022, Elon Musk [completed](https://www.nytimes.com/2022/10/27/technology/elon-musk-twitter-deal-complete.html) a $44 billion buyout of Twitter. As of November 2022, Musk's brief tenure as Twitter’s new head had been marked by massive layoffs, not only from such supporting roles as [diversity, equity, and inclusion,](https://fortune.com/2022/11/16/tech-layoffs-human-resources-diversity-dei-teams/) but [including significant numbers of engineers](https://gizmodo.com/elon-musk-twitter-layoffs-engineering-spreadsheet-1849767712). According to a [New York Times article](https://www.nytimes.com/2022/11/11/technology/elon-musk-twitter-takeover.html) from Nov 11, 2022:
> In Redbird, Twitter’s platform and infrastructure organization, Mr. Musk shed numerous managers. The unit also lost about 80 percent of its engineering staff, raising internal concerns about the company’s ability to keep its site up and running.
That article also reported, as a result of these layoffs, a ratio of 70 engineers to each product manager at Twitter. Separately, [top compliance officers resigned](https://twitter.com/caseynewton/status/1590724257608134657), suggesting potential troubles with the FTC.
As of November 18th, 2022, discussion of potential future Twitter outages or even the complete infrastructural collapse of Twitter was so widespread that [it triggered false alarms at Downdetector.com](https://www.cnn.com/2022/11/18/tech/twitter-employee-exodus-fallout/index.html), whose system flagged the discussions as indicative of a real outage.
***Will Tweets be inaccessible on Twitter.com for any continuous 168-hour period starting before 2024?***
This question will resolve as **Yes** if any 168-hour period elapses during which the majority of all Tweets that would normally be accessible to the public or to registered Twitter users are no longer so accessible at Twitter.com.
If Tweets are available intermittently, unreliably, or only with difficulty then the standard is as follows:
Metaculus admins will review credible published sources reporting on the Twitter outage, to determine whether a clear preponderance of such sources report that old Tweets were mostly inacessible for at least a 168-hour period. If such a consensus exists then they will resolve this question as **Yes**.
If not, Metaculus admins will examine Twitter's own self-evaluation at https://api.twitterstat.us/, and in particular the reported status of the "Standard endpoints," or whichever subsequent metric includes basic visibility of old tweets. If there is any 168-hour period during which "Partial Outage," "Major Outage," or "Maintenance" status are indicated, and during which "Operational" status is not indicated for any continual 60 minutes, then they will resolve this question as **Yes.**
Metaculus admins will make a reasonable effort using their best considered judgement to resolve **Yes** or **No,** but because of the complex and diverse nature of possible outage scenarios and the lack of complete information, it is possible that **Ambiguous** resolution may be indicated.
|
2022-11-19T17:00:00Z
|
2024-01-01T04:59:00Z
|
2024-01-01T08:00:00Z
|
no
|
METACULUS
|
meta-13531
|
Will Ukraine sever the land bridge between Crimea and Russia before 2024?
|
In late February and March 2014, following the Euromaidan uprising and removal of pro-Russian Ukrainian President Viktor Yanukovych, thinly disguised Russian military and paramilitary forces seized control of the Crimean peninsula in the far South of Ukraine and of most of the provinces of Donetsk and Luhansk in its East, leading to a protracted conflict.
In February 2022, Russia launched its full-scale conventional invasion of Ukraine. One of its first objectives was to seize the band of territory in Ukraine's southeast, between the Azov Sea and the Dnipro river, which connects Crimea in the south and Donetsk and Luhansk in the East.
Through the Spring and Summer of 2022, Ukraine achieved a series of counteroffensive victories and expelled Russian forces from a large area of the country. In September, Zaluzhny, the commander-in-chief of the Armed Forces of Ukraine (AFU), in his [programmatic article](https://www.ukrinform.ua/rubric-ato/3566162-ak-zabezpeciti-voennu-kampaniu-u-2023-roci-ukrainskij-poglad.html) on Ukraine’s coming campaign of 2023, called Crimea the "*center of gravity of the enemy*" and advised planning operations to seize it. Removing the Russian protective belt around the peninsula would be the first step towards achieving this goal. If executed simultaneously with destroying the Crimean bridge near Kerch it would cut off Crimea from supplies by land. Already in August, Arestovych, an advisor to president Zelensky, had [floated the idea]( https://www.unian.net/war/arestovich-schitaet-uspeh-v-melitopole-strategicheski-vazhnym-dlya-vsu-novosti-vtorzheniya-rossii-na-ukrainu-11935857.html) of an offensive on Melitopol, a key transportation hub on the land bridge, and opined that its success would collapse the entire Russian frontline.
In November 2022, with their supply lines in serious danger from Ukrainian artillery, the Russian occupiers fled Kherson for the left (eastern) bank of the Dnipro, leaving the southeastern land bridge as the obvious next objective. Several Russian military bloggers predicted a land bridge offensive, with variations in timing, possible tactics and the exact direction of attack, e.g. [Dimitriev](https://t.me/russ_orientalist/12458), [MIG]( https://t.me/mig41/22148), [Moscow Calling]( https://t.me/m0sc0wcalling/14259), [Nesmiyan]( https://t.me/RSaponkov/3947) and [Saponkov]( https://t.me/RSaponkov/3947).
On the Ukrainian side, the [New York Times cited](https://www.nytimes.com/2022/11/12/world/europe/ukraine-war-strategy-russia.html) "*hints from the troops on the ground and volunteers close to them*" that preparations for such an offensive were in the works. Russian forces were said to be aware of the danger and [to have been reinforcing their units and fortifying their lines]( https://ria.ru/20221019/svo-1825016250.html) in the Southeast for some time.
There is some flexibility with the direction of the offensive. Ukraine can strike in the east, towards Mariupol, in the center, towards Berdyansk or Melitopol (the most discussed option), or even in the west, from the newly captured Kherson towards Henichesk. Cutting the land bridge in two could be a first step to reoccupying it entirely, leaving Russia with no more territory than it started with, and potentially bringing the war closer to its termination.
Resolution Criteria: This question will resolve as **Yes** if the [Institute for the Study of War](https://www.understandingwar.org/) or other reliable sources report Ukraine has severed the land bridge from Crimea to Russia at some point between November 1, 2022 to January 1, 2024, 00:00 [EET](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Eastern_European_Time).
For the purposes of this question, severing the land bridge is defined as extending the overall zone of Ukrainian territorial control continuously from Kyiv to some point on the southeastern coastline from Henichesk in the southwest along the Azov sea northeast to the Russian border. Control means physical occupation; indirect control by artillery or other fires, by destroying infrastructure, etc does not suffice
|
2022-11-17T05:00:00Z
|
2023-12-31T21:59:00Z
|
2023-12-31T22:00:00Z
|
no
|
METACULUS
|
meta-13527
|
Will the Digital Commodities Consumer Protection Act (DCCPA) be passed before 2025?
|
In August 2022, Sens. Debbie Stabenow (D-MI) and John Boozman (R-AR) officially introduced the [Digital Commodities Consumer Protection Act (DCCPA)](https://www.congress.gov/bill/117th-congress/senate-bill/4760/text), a bill aimed at providing a regulatory framework for cryptocurrencies within the context of the Commodity Futures Trading Commission (CFTC). The draft of this bill has been [leaked on Twitter](https://twitter.com/lex_node/status/1582814734587265024?ref_src=twsrc%5Etfw%7Ctwcamp%5Etweetembed%7Ctwterm%5E1582814734587265024%7Ctwgr%5E4a8506fcaf909a8b2ed867c4fcc7cac474f83c04%7Ctwcon%5Es1_&ref_url=https%3A%2F%2Fdecrypt.co%2F112420%2Fcftc-dccpa-bill-leak-defi-regulation) in October 2022.
According to [DLA Piper](https://www.dlapiper.com/en/us/insights/publications/2022/08/how-the-digital-commodities-consumer-protection-act-of-2022/), the central proposals of the DCCPA are:
>Close regulatory gaps by requiring all digital commodity platforms (defined to mean a person that is one or more of the following: digital commodity broker, a digital commodity custodian, a digital commodity dealer, a digital commodity trading facility) to register with the CFTC
>Require digital commodity platforms to prohibit abusive trading practices, eliminate or disclose conflicts of interest, maintain sufficient financial resources, have strong cybersecurity programs, protect customer assets and report suspicious transactions
>Require digital commodity platforms to adhere to advertising standards and disclose information about digital commodities and their risks, bringing greater transparency and accountability to the marketplace
>Authorize the CFTC to impose user fees on digital commodity platforms to fully fund its oversight of the digital commodity market
>Direct the CFTC to examine racial, ethnic and gender demographics of customers participating in digital commodity markets and use that information to inform its rulemaking and provide outreach to customers and
>Recognize that other financial agencies have a role in regulating digital assets that are not commodities, but function more like securities or forms of payment.
This proposed bill has been supported by several figures in the cryptocurrency industry, such as [Brian Armstrong](https://decrypt.co/111106/coinbase-very-supportive-cftc-bitcoin-ethereum) (Coinbase) and [Sam Bankman-Fried](https://twitter.com/sbf_ftx/status/1582539579168419840?s=46&t=MIxvyFx75JEnEUfMnNt-Fw) (formerly of FTX). There has been [some discussion](https://decrypt.co/112420/cftc-dccpa-bill-leak-defi-regulation) about the effects of this bill on what has come to be called 'decentralised finance' (or DeFi), with some worrying that it may massively restrict this sector of the cryptocurrency industry.
Further, given the [bankruptcy of FTX](https://www.cnbc.com/2022/11/11/sam-bankman-frieds-cryptocurrency-exchange-ftx-files-for-bankruptcy.html) (and its associated businesses), Sam Bankman-Fried's lobbying in Washington in favour of the DCCPA has raised concerns. At the same time, the FTX crash has also increased calls for regulation more broadly. Recently, both senators Stavenow (D-MI) and Boozman (R-AR) have said that the collapse of FTX showed ["the need for greater federal oversight of the digital asset industry"](https://cointelegraph.com/news/us-senators-commit-to-advancing-crypto-bill-despite-ftx-collapse).
As of November 2022, there has not been a clear schedule as to when the bill will be published for the US Senate to review.
Resolution Criteria: This question resolves positively if DCCPA in its current or revised form is passed by the US Senate and the US House of Representatives before 2025.
The passage of a different bill aimed at regulating cryptocurrencies will not trigger resolution
|
2022-11-19T23:00:00Z
|
2024-12-31T12:00:00Z
|
2025-01-21T16:47:00Z
|
no
|
METACULUS
|
meta-13518
|
Will Twitter have a corporate credit rating in the "C"s or worse before July 2023?
|
[Elon Musk](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Elon_Musk) is a technology company founder and business executive whose net worth, depending on the fortunes of the stock market, has often ranked him as the world’s wealthiest person. He first made a fortune as a member of “[the Paypal Mafia](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/PayPal_Mafia)”; today his companies include Tesla, SpaceX, Neuralink, OpenAI, and The Boring Company.
[Twitter](https://twitter.com/) is a social media microblogging service with several hundred million users that is especially influential for journalists, academics, government officials and other elites. It has been perceived as both [an important catalyst for pro-democratic uprisings](https://www.pewresearch.org/journalism/2012/11/28/role-social-media-arab-uprisings/) and [a cesspool of misinformation and hate speech](https://www.nytimes.com/2022/11/14/opinion/elon-musk-twitter-free-speech-india.html), and has attracted [significant attention from regulators.](https://www.politico.com/news/2022/11/18/ed-markey-deep-dive-00069221)
On October 27, 2022, Elon Musk [completed](https://www.nytimes.com/2022/10/27/technology/elon-musk-twitter-deal-complete.html) a $44 billion buyout of Twitter. Soon after this deal closed, [credit rating agency Moody’s downgraded Twitter’s corporate credit rating](https://www.moodys.com/research/Moodys-downgrades-Twitters-CFR-and-unsecured-note-ratings-to-B1--PR_470869) two steps to B1 from Ba2, citing “governance risk” associated with Twitter’s new ownership. (See also [Moody’s rating scale and definitions.](https://www.moodys.com/sites/products/productattachments/ap075378_1_1408_ki.pdf))
As of November 2022, Musks brief tenure as Twitter’s new head had been marked by massive layoffs, not only from such supporting roles as [diversity, equity, and inclusion,](https://fortune.com/2022/11/16/tech-layoffs-human-resources-diversity-dei-teams/) but [including significant numbers of engineers](https://gizmodo.com/elon-musk-twitter-layoffs-engineering-spreadsheet-1849767712). According to a [New York Times article](https://www.nytimes.com/2022/11/11/technology/elon-musk-twitter-takeover.html) from Nov 11, 2022:
> In Redbird, Twitter’s platform and infrastructure organization, Mr. Musk shed numerous managers. The unit also lost about 80 percent of its engineering staff, raising internal concerns about the company’s ability to keep its site up and running.
That article also reported, as a result of these layoffs, a ratio of 70 engineers to each product manager at Twitter. Separately, [top compliance officers resigned](https://twitter.com/caseynewton/status/1590724257608134657), suggesting potential troubles with the FTC.
Resolution Criteria: This question will resolve as **Yes** if at any time between November 1, 2022 to July 1, 2023 at least two of the Big Three credit reporting agencies (S&P, Moody's, and Fitch) assess Twitter's credit rating for senior, unsecured corporate bonds as *Caa1* grade or worse, indicating poor standing and very high credit risk. It will resolve as **No** if July 1, 2023 arrives without this having happened.
Fine Print: As explained in [this comment](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/13518/twitter-c-credit-rating-before-july-2023/#comment-109332) Twitter's rating has been withdrawn by two agencies. If ratings are still withdrawn as of July 1, 2023, this resolves **No**, if ratings are reinstated and above C it resolves **No**, if they're reinstated and C or below it resolves **Yes**.
|
2022-11-19T17:00:00Z
|
2023-07-01T03:59:00Z
|
2023-07-01T15:40:00Z
|
no
|
METACULUS
|
meta-13514
|
Will Coinbase file for bankruptcy protection before 2024?
|
[Coinbase Global, Inc.](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Coinbase), branded Coinbase, is an American publicly-traded company incorporated in Delaware that operates a cryptocurrency exchange platform. It is the largest cryptocurrency exchange in the United States by trading volume.
In May 2022, amid a broad rout in the cryptocurrency markets, as [reported by Bloomberg](https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2022-05-11/coinbase-ceo-says-no-risk-of-bankruptcy-amid-black-swan-event),
>Coinbase Global Inc. Chief Executive Officer Brian Armstrong said there is “no risk of bankruptcy” for the largest U.S. cryptocurrency exchange, even amid a “black swan” event.
>A filing late Tuesday by Coinbase included a “new risk factor” based on recent Securities and Exchange Commission requirement for public companies that hold crypto assets for third parties.
>“Because custodially held crypto assets may be considered to be the property of a bankruptcy estate, in the event of a bankruptcy, the crypto assets we hold in custody on behalf of our customers could be subject to bankruptcy proceedings and such customers could be treated as our general unsecured creditors,” Coinbase wrote in the filing.
On May 11 2022, CEO Brian Armstrong [tweeted](https://twitter.com/brian_armstrong/status/1524233602661109760), inter alia,
>"We have no risk of bankruptcy, however we included a new risk factor based on an SEC requirement called SAB 121, which is a newly required disclosure for public companies that hold crypto assets for third parties."
In November 2022, amid the fallout from the [potential collapse of crypto exchange FTX](https://www.cnbc.com/2022/11/09/binance-backs-out-of-ftx-rescue-leaving-the-crypto-exchange-on-the-brink-of-collapse.html), the price of bitcoin and various other cryptocurrencies fell significantly due to [fears about possible contagion and industry-wide consequences](https://www.ft.com/content/3dadaed2-f959-482e-8897-1a40803de5ae).
Resolution Criteria: This question will resolve as **Yes** if Coinbase Global Inc., or any parent company thereof, files any petition for bankruptcy protection in the United States, under any chapter of the United States Bankruptcy Code, before January 1, 2024. The question resolves on the filing of such a petition, not on whether any bankruptcy protection is granted by a court. The question will resolve as **No** if no such petition is filed by that date
|
2022-11-10T20:00:00Z
|
2024-01-01T04:59:00Z
|
2024-01-01T05:00:00Z
|
no
|
METACULUS
|
meta-10791
|
Will pediatric cases of hepatitis with unknown origin be conclusively linked to COVID vaccination?
|
In recent months there have been dozens of reported cases of severe [hepatitis](https://www.cdc.gov/hepatitis/abc/index.htm) in young children in which the cause is of [unknown](https://www.eurosurveillance.org/content/10.2807/1560-7917.ES.2022.27.15.2200318) origin.
In an outbreak [report](https://www.who.int/emergencies/disease-outbreak-news/item/multi-country-acute-severe-hepatitis-of-unknown-origin-in-children) on 23 April, the World Health Organization stated that 12 countries have reported at least 169 cases of hepatitis of unknown origin in children. The age range of cases is 1 month to 16 years old. Seventeen of the children have undergone liver transplants and at least one has died. None of the viruses that cause acute viral hepatitis (hepatitis viruses A, B, C, D and E) have been detected in any of the 169 cases.
The United Kingdom has had the greatest number of reported cases so far, with 108 cases as of 21 April [according](https://www.gov.uk/government/news/increase-in-hepatitis-liver-inflammation-cases-in-children-under-investigation) to the UK Health Security Agency. 77% of cases have tested positive for [adenovirus](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Adenoviridae). None of the confirmed cases is known to have received a COVID vaccine.
In the United States, the state of Alabama was the first to report cases. All nine of the reported cases have tested positive for adenovirus [according](https://emergency.cdc.gov/han/2022/han00462.asp) to the U.S. CDC. Five of these were sequenced, and adenovirus type 41 infection was identified in all five. Adenovirus type 41 is [known](https://www.mdpi.com/1999-4915/8/2/42/htm) to commonly cause pediatric acute gastroenteritis, but is not known to be a cause of hepatitis in otherwise healthy children.
Currently the [leading hypothesis](https://www.eurosurveillance.org/content/10.2807/1560-7917.ES.2022.27.15.2200318) for the causative agent involves adenovirus, with either an already-circulating variant severely impacting immunologically naive young children or there being a new variant with a more severe clinical profile. The former may be the result of less social mixing during the COVID pandemic. However, public health officials have [emphasized](https://www.statnews.com/2022/04/23/who-says-12-countries-have-reported-unusual-cases-of-hepatitis-in-kids/) that other hypotheses have not been ruled out. [Other hypotheses](https://www.science.org/content/article/mysterious-hepatitis-outbreak-sickens-young-children-europe-cdc-probes-cases-alabama) include COVID infection or an unidentified toxin. Some have [suggested](https://twitter.com/DrHirschfield/status/1515432706368315395) COVID vaccination may be a cause and a recent [paper](https://www.mdpi.com/1467-3045/44/3/73/htm?s=09) has found that mRNA vaccine can enter a human liver cell line in vitro: "Our results indicate a fast up-take of BNT162b2 into human liver cell line Huh7, leading to changes in LINE-1 expression and distribution."
Resolution Criteria: This question will resolve on the basis of research findings/government reports. The systematic review (either peer-reviewed or a pre-print deemed credible by Metaculus) or statement by the [WHO](https://www.who.int/), [US CDC](https://www.cdc.gov/), [UK HSA](https://www.gov.uk/government/organisations/uk-health-security-agency), or [EU ECDC](https://www.ecdc.europa.eu/en) that is most recent as of 1 April 2023 and which conclusively identifies the causative agent will be considered. If the causative agent is COVID vaccination, then this resolves positive.
If as of 1 April 2023 there is no systematic review or statement by the [WHO](https://www.who.int/), [US CDC](https://www.cdc.gov/), [UK HSA](https://www.gov.uk/government/organisations/uk-health-security-agency), or [EU ECDC](https://www.ecdc.europa.eu/en) that identifies the causative agent, then Metaculus will conduct a review of all relevant published papers available as of 1 April 2023 that can be found via Google Scholar and that attempt to identify the causative agent. If at least 85% of these published papers claim a statistically significant and/or clinically meaningful association between severe pediatric hepatitis and COVID vaccination, then this will resolve positive.
COVID vaccination need not be the only cause of severe pediatric hepatitis, it just needs to be a main cause. e.g.: if cases of severe pediatric hepatitis are conclusively linked to some interaction between adenovirus infection and COVID vaccination, but not to either one of these on their own, then this will resolve positive.
Also see [this](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/10787/pediatric-hepatitis-linked-to-adenovirus/) question on whether pediatric cases of hepatitis with unknown origin will be conclusively linked to adenovirus infection
|
2022-04-26T04:00:00Z
|
2023-03-31T16:00:00Z
|
2023-04-01T16:43:00Z
|
no
|
METACULUS
|
meta-10790
|
Will Dnipro be under Russian control on June 1, 2023?
|
[Dnipro](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Dnipro) experienced its [first missile attack](https://www.cnn.com/2022/03/11/europe/russia-invasion-ukraine-03-11-intl/index.html) in early March 2022 since the beginning of the Russo-Ukrainian war in February, resulting in at least one death. Former NATO commander in Europe, Wesley Clark [said on CNN](https://www.newsweek.com/putin-plans-envelopment-ukraine-forces-holding-back-separatists-clark-1694578) on April 3, 2022, "[...] the Russians are north and south of Dnipro. Dnipro is going to be the next key objective. If they can drive to Dnipro they'll cut off the Ukrainian forces that are holding back the separatists in the Donbas."
Resolution Criteria: This question will resolve as "**Yes**" if more than 50% of [Dnipro's raions](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Dnipro#Subdivisions) are under de facto Russian military control on June 1, 2023.
To determine the extent of Russian control, Metaculus Admins will consider all relevant sources, including government intelligence statements and credible media reports
|
2022-04-27T16:00:00Z
|
2023-05-31T21:00:00Z
|
2023-06-01T17:12:00Z
|
no
|
METACULUS
|
meta-10787
|
Will pediatric cases of hepatitis with unknown origin be conclusively linked to adenovirus infection?
|
In recent months there have been dozens of reported cases of severe [hepatitis](https://www.cdc.gov/hepatitis/abc/index.htm) in young children in which the cause is of [unknown](https://www.eurosurveillance.org/content/10.2807/1560-7917.ES.2022.27.15.2200318) origin.
In an outbreak [report](https://www.who.int/emergencies/disease-outbreak-news/item/multi-country-acute-severe-hepatitis-of-unknown-origin-in-children) on 23 April, the World Health Organization stated that 12 countries have reported at least 169 cases of hepatitis of unknown origin in children. The age range of cases is 1 month to 16 years old. Seventeen of the children have undergone liver transplants and at least one has died. None of the viruses that cause acute viral hepatitis (hepatitis viruses A, B, C, D and E) have been detected in any of the 169 cases.
The United Kingdom has had the greatest number of reported cases so far, with 108 cases as of 21 April [according](https://www.gov.uk/government/news/increase-in-hepatitis-liver-inflammation-cases-in-children-under-investigation) to the UK Health Security Agency. 77% of cases have tested positive for [adenovirus](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Adenoviridae). None of the confirmed cases is known to have received a COVID vaccine.
In the United States, the state of Alabama was the first to report cases. All nine of the reported cases have tested positive for adenovirus [according](https://emergency.cdc.gov/han/2022/han00462.asp) to the U.S. CDC. Five of these were sequenced, and adenovirus type 41 infection was identified in all five. Adenovirus type 41 is [known](https://www.mdpi.com/1999-4915/8/2/42/htm) to commonly cause pediatric acute gastroenteritis, but is not known to be a cause of hepatitis in otherwise healthy children.
Currently the [leading hypothesis](https://www.eurosurveillance.org/content/10.2807/1560-7917.ES.2022.27.15.2200318) for the causative agent involves adenovirus, with either an already-circulating variant severely impacting immunologically naive young children or there being a new variant with a more severe clinical profile. The former may be the result of less social mixing during the COVID pandemic. However, public health officials have [emphasized](https://www.statnews.com/2022/04/23/who-says-12-countries-have-reported-unusual-cases-of-hepatitis-in-kids/) that other hypotheses have not been ruled out. [Other hypotheses](https://www.science.org/content/article/mysterious-hepatitis-outbreak-sickens-young-children-europe-cdc-probes-cases-alabama) include COVID infection or an unidentified toxin.
Resolution Criteria: This question will resolve on the basis of research findings/government reports. The systematic review (either peer-reviewed or a pre-print deemed credible by Metaculus) or statement by the [WHO](https://www.who.int/), [US CDC](https://www.cdc.gov/), [UK HSA](https://www.gov.uk/government/organisations/uk-health-security-agency), or [EU ECDC](https://www.ecdc.europa.eu/en) that is most recent as of 1 April 2023 and which conclusively identifies the causative agent will be considered. If the causative agent is adenovirus infection, then this resolves positive.
If as of 1 April 2023 there is no systematic review or statement by the [WHO](https://www.who.int/), [US CDC](https://www.cdc.gov/), [UK HSA](https://www.gov.uk/government/organisations/uk-health-security-agency), or [EU ECDC](https://www.ecdc.europa.eu/en) that identifies the causative agent, then Metaculus will conduct a review of all relevant published papers available as of 1 April 2023 that can be found via Google Scholar and that attempt to identify the causative agent. If at least 85% of these published papers claim a statistically significant and/or clinically meaningful association between severe pediatric hepatitis and infection with adenovirus, then this will resolve positive.
An adenovirus need not be the only cause of severe pediatric hepatitis, it just needs to be a main cause. e.g.: if cases of severe pediatric hepatitis are conclusively linked to some interaction between COVID and adenovirus 41, but not to either one of these on their own, then this will resolve positive.
Also see [this](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/10791/pediatric-hepatitis-linked-to-covid-vaccine/) question on whether pediatric cases of hepatitis with unknown origin will be conclusively linked to COVID vaccination
|
2022-04-26T04:00:00Z
|
2023-03-31T16:00:00Z
|
2023-03-30T11:44:00Z
|
yes
|
METACULUS
|
meta-10747
|
Will Ukraine formally pledge not to join NATO before 2024?
|
When Ukraine applied for [NATO](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/NATO) membership in [2008](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/2008_Bucharest_summit) their application was denied, though many NATO members (including the USA) were in favor of Ukraine's joining the alliance. In 2019, in a 334-51 vote, Ukraine amended their constitution to include their intentions of joining the EU and NATO (Ukraine Constitution, [Стаття 116, 1-1](https://zakon.rada.gov.ua/cgi-bin/laws/main.cgi?nreg=254%EA%2F96%2D%E2%F0#Text)).
In December 2021, during the escalation of tensions between Russia and Ukraine, [Russia demanded veto power](https://www.reuters.com/world/russia-unveils-security-guarantees-says-western-response-not-encouraging-2021-12-17/) in any future decision on Ukraine's NATO membership. This would be in violation of NATO's ["open door" policy](https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/topics_49212.htm), which NATO leaders [reaffirmed on March 24 2022](https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/official_texts_193719.htm?selectedLocale=en).
Stanley Sloan, an expert in transatlantic relations at Middlebury College and a former international security officer [said in February 2022](https://www.miamiherald.com/news/nation-world/world/article258774458.html) that Ukraine's near-term NATO membership was "Unlikely, unlikely to happen. Just too fraught with too many difficulties at this point."
Resolution Criteria: This question will resolve as "Yes" if, at any time between April 1, 2022 to January 1, 2024, the Ukrainian government makes an official statement or commitment that they will not seek membership to [NATO](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/NATO). This commitment must be effective for a minimum of 1 year, or for an indefinite period. This commitment may be unconditional or conditional (such as in exchange for security guarantees from Russia); in this case, this question will resolve positively if such an agreement is affirmed by all parties at any time between April 1, 2022 to January 1, 2024.
To qualify for resolution, statements must be made by the Ukrainian Cabinet of Ministers or the Minister of Foreign Affairs, or the official spokesperson of those offices. Statements by NATO officials or NATO members are not necessary nor sufficient for the resolution of this question
|
2022-04-20T05:00:00Z
|
2023-12-30T17:00:00Z
|
2023-12-31T22:00:00Z
|
no
|
METACULUS
|
meta-10746
|
Will Ukraine formally pledge not to join the EU before 2024?
|
In 2019, in a 334-51 vote, Ukraine amended their constitution to include their intentions of joining the EU and NATO (Ukraine Constitution, [Стаття 116, 1-1](https://zakon.rada.gov.ua/cgi-bin/laws/main.cgi?nreg=254%EA%2F96%2D%E2%F0#Text). On February 28, 2022, during the [Russian Invasion of Ukraine](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/2022_Russian_invasion_of_Ukraine), [Ukraine submitted an application to the EU](https://apnews.com/article/russia-ukraine-war-016cc6cbc65ae95286d825a4ebebd1c5), asking for urgent approval. On April 8, 2022, European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen [offered Ukraine a faster approval process](https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/eu-chief-promises-speeded-up-process-ukraine-seek-membership-2022-04-08/) for their application, saying "It will not as usual be a matter of years to form this opinion but I think a matter of weeks."
On March 29, 2022, [Russian Diplomat Vladimir Medinsky said](https://ukranews.com/en/news/845091-russia-not-opposed-to-ukraine-joining-eu-russian-delegation-head-medinsky) "For its part, the Russian Federation does not object to Ukraine's desire to join the European Union."
Resolution Criteria: This question will resolve as **Yes** if, at any time between April 1, 2022 to January 1, 2024, the Ukrainian government makes an official statement or commitment that they will not seek membership to the [European Union](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/European_union). This commitment must be effective for a minimum of 6 months, or for an indefinite period. This commitment may be unconditional or conditional (such as in exchange for security guarantees from Russia); in this case, this question will resolve positively if such an agreement is affirmed by all parties at any time between April 1, 2022 to January 1, 2024.
To qualify for resolution, statements must be made by the Ukrainian Cabinet of Ministers or the Minister of Foreign Affairs, or the official spokesperson of those offices. Statements by EU officials or other EU members are not necessary nor sufficient for the resolution of this question
|
2022-04-20T05:00:00Z
|
2023-12-30T17:00:00Z
|
2023-12-31T22:00:00Z
|
no
|
METACULUS
|
meta-10745
|
Will Russia control any formerly Ukrainian territories other than LNR, DNR, or Crimea on January 1, 2024?
|
In February 2014, [Russia annexed the Crimean peninsula](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Annexation_of_Crimea_by_the_Russian_Federation) from Ukraine. While not officially annexed in 2014, some regions of the Donetsk and Luhansk Oblasts have [remained under the control](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/War_in_Donbas) of two Russian-aligned governments since the invasion. These two provinces have claimed independence from Ukraine, calling themselves [Donetsk People's Republic](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Donetsk_People%27s_Republic) and [Luhansk People's Republic](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Luhansk_People%27s_Republic). The Ukrainian Government considers the DPR and LPR to be [terrorist organizations](https://www.kyivpost.com/article/content/war-against-ukraine/ukraines-prosecutor-general-classifies-self-declared-donetsk-and-luhansk-republics-as-terrorist-organizations-348212.html).
Resolution Criteria: This question will resolve positively if, on January 1, 2024, Russia de facto controls any land or territory outside the Crimean peninsula or the Donestk/Luhansk oblasts, which were Ukrainian territory on January 1, 2014. Breakaway secessionist states in Ukraine recieving support from Russian armed forces will be considered "Russian controlled" for the purposes of this question.
Metaculus Admins will consider all credible media reports and international government intelligence statements to determine the extent of Russian de facto control on January 1, 2024
|
2022-04-20T05:00:00Z
|
2023-12-30T17:00:00Z
|
2023-12-31T22:00:00Z
|
yes
|
METACULUS
|
meta-10738
|
Will Ukraine have de facto control of at least 90% of the Donetsk and Luhansk Oblasts on January 1, 2024?
|
In February 2014, [Russia annexed the Crimean peninsula](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Annexation_of_Crimea_by_the_Russian_Federation) from Ukraine. While not officially annexed in 2014, some regions of the Donetsk and Luhansk Oblasts have [remained under the control](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/War_in_Donbas) of two Russian-aligned governments since the invasion. These two provinces have claimed independence from Ukraine, calling themselves [Donetsk People's Republic](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Donetsk_People%27s_Republic) and [Luhansk People's Republic](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Luhansk_People%27s_Republic). The Ukrainian Government considers the DPR and LPR to be [terrorist organizations](https://www.kyivpost.com/article/content/war-against-ukraine/ukraines-prosecutor-general-classifies-self-declared-donetsk-and-luhansk-republics-as-terrorist-organizations-348212.html).
Resolution Criteria: This question will resolve as **Yes** if, on January 1, 2024, the Ukrainian government or military has control of at least 90% of the [Donetsk Oblast](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Donetsk_Oblast) and at least 90% of the [Luhansk Oblast](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Luhansk_Oblast), measured by area.
De facto control can occur through any means, including military victory or ceasefire and peace negotiations.
Metaculus will consider all credible media reports and international government intelligence statements to determine the extent of Ukrainian control in these regions
|
2022-04-20T05:00:00Z
|
2023-12-31T17:00:00Z
|
2023-12-31T22:00:00Z
|
no
|
METACULUS
|
meta-10737
|
Will Ukraine have de facto control of Sevastopol on January 1, 2024?
|
The city of [Sevastopol](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Sevastopol) in Crimea currently holds the Russian [Black Sea Fleet](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Black_Sea_Fleet) in its naval base, which has been crucial to [Russia's operations in Syria](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Russian_military_intervention_in_the_Syrian_civil_war) since 2014.
As the Russo-Ukrainian conflict continues and peace negotiations begin in earnest, it is possible that Ukraine will [reclaim previously annexed pieces of land](https://www.nytimes.com/2022/03/29/world/europe/peace-talks-russia-ukraine.html) claimed by Russia in 2014, including Crimea. This would return Sevastapol to Ukrainian control, and could potentially remove a major Russian naval hold in the Black Sea.
Resolution Criteria: This question will resolve as **Yes** if more than 50% of [Sevastopol's area](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Administrative_and_municipal_divisions_of_Sevastopol) is under de facto Ukrainian military and political control on January 1, 2024. Metaculus Admins will consider all credible media reports and international military intelligence statements to determine resolution
|
2022-04-20T05:00:00Z
|
2023-12-30T17:00:00Z
|
2023-12-31T22:00:00Z
|
no
|
METACULUS
|
meta-10735
|
Will Ukraine have a security guarantee from another country before 2024?
|
Ukraine and Russia entered peace negotiations in March 2022, with the [most recent round](https://www.nytimes.com/2022/03/29/world/europe/peace-talks-russia-ukraine.html) of negotiations in Istanbul on March 29.
[According to Newsweek](https://www.newsweek.com/france-ukraine-macron-nato-russia-security-guarantee-russia-1696367), in April 2022 Ukrainian official Igor Zhovkva said "Ukraine's long-running conflict with Russia cannot end without concrete security guarantees strong enough to deter Moscow."
Sebastian Sprenger from Defense News [wrote on April 4, 2022](https://www.defensenews.com/global/europe/2022/04/04/europeans-weigh-scope-of-security-guarantees-for-ukraine/),
> "Last week, Olha Stefanishyna, Ukraine’s deputy prime minister for European and Euro-Atlantic integration, said her government envisions a security-guarantees regime endorsed by Budapest Memorandum signatories as well as the United Nations Security Council. [...]
> "Sean Monaghan, an analyst with the Washington-based Center for Strategic and International Studies, said the legal format of whatever security guarantees the West can muster for Ukraine will be ultimately secondary. More important, and difficult, he told Defense News, will be the willingness of European populations to back them by military force."
As of April 6, 2022, Ukraine has [entered confidential talks with Germany](https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/germany-is-confidential-talks-over-ukraine-guarantees-scholz-2022-04-06/) about possible security guarantees Germany could offer the country. On April 9, UK Prime Minister Boris Johnson [visited Kyiv](https://www.politico.eu/article/uk-prime-minister-boris-johnson-ukraine-president-volodymyr-zelenskyy-kyiv-war-russia/), offering support in continuation with the [2022 UK-Poland-Ukraine Alliance](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/British%E2%80%93Polish%E2%80%93Ukrainian_trilateral_pact)
Resolution Criteria: This question will resolve as "Yes" if, at any time between April 1, 2022 and January 1, 2024, any country enters a legal agreement with Ukraine to provide a security guarantee for Ukraine with the promise to back that guarantee with the deployment of military personnel. Official statements by Ukraine and their cosignatory will be required for resolution. A security guarantee from Russia to Ukraine will be excluded from resolving this question.
The security guarantee must protect the sovereignty of at least some portion of Ukrainian territory from invasion by either land, sea, or air, or to aid Ukraine with military deployments under other conditions of the treaty. The security guarantee must last for at least 6 months or indefinitely. Agreements to provide Ukraine with any other form of assistance, including funding or weapons, will not be sufficient to resolve the question.
This question asks specifically about security guarantees outside the frameworks of [NATO](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/NATO), [EU](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Common_Security_and_Defence_Policy), or [UN](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/United_Nations_Security_Council) membership
|
2022-04-20T05:00:00Z
|
2023-12-30T17:00:00Z
|
2024-01-01T22:10:00Z
|
no
|
METACULUS
|
meta-10734
|
Will Ukraine officially recognize a former Ukrainian territory as independent before 2024?
|
Prior to the [2022 Russian Invasion of Ukraine](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/2022_Russian_invasion_of_Ukraine), Russian President Vladmir Putin formally recognized the [Donetsk](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Donetsk_People%27s_Republic) and [Luhansk People's Republics](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Luhansk_People%27s_Republic) as independent states. Russia also annexed the [Republic of Crimea](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Republic_of_Crimea) in February 2014. Ukraine formally considers all 3 territories to be "[temporarily occupied territories of Ukraine](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Occupied_territories_of_Ukraine)"
On March 7, 2022, Russian spokesperson [Dmitry Peskov said](https://www.reuters.com/world/kremlin-says-russian-military-action-will-stop-moment-if-ukraine-meets-2022-03-07/) Russia would be willing to halt military operations if Ukraine agreed to demands which included recognition of the independence of Crimea, DNR and LNR.
Resolution Criteria: This question will resolve as "Yes" if, at any time between April 1, 2022 to January 1, 2024, the government of Ukraine formally recognizes any territory [previously held by Ukraine on January 1, 2014](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Occupied_territories_of_Ukraine) as being independent, or as the territory of another nation. This may resolve positively on recognition of the Republic of Crimea, the Donetsk People's Republic, the Luhansk People's Republic, or any other former Ukranian territories comprising at least 2,000 km^2 in total. An official statement by either a member of the Ukrainian executive branch of government, or the Ukrainian Minister of Foreign Affairs will be required for resolution
|
2022-04-20T05:00:00Z
|
2023-12-30T17:00:00Z
|
2023-12-31T22:00:00Z
|
no
|
METACULUS
|
meta-10674
|
Will Kamala Harris be the Democratic Party nominee for President of the United States on election day in 2024?
|
[Kamala Devi Harris](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Kamala_Harris), born October 20, 1964, is an American politician and attorney who is the 49th and current vice president of the United States. She is the first female vice president and the highest-ranking female official in U.S. history, as well as the first African American and first Asian American vice president. A member of the Democratic Party, she previously served as the attorney general of California from 2011 to 2017 and as a United States senator representing California from 2017 to 2021.
Harris sought the 2020 Democratic presidential nomination, but withdrew from the race prior to the primaries. Joe Biden selected her as his running mate and their ticket went on to defeat the incumbent president, Donald Trump, and vice president, Mike Pence, in the 2020 election.
As of April 2022, there is [speculation](https://www.vanityfair.com/news/2022/03/what-will-dems-do-if-biden-doesnt-run) that Harris may seek the Democratic Party's nomination in 2024 for the office of President of the United States.
Resolution Criteria: This question resolves positively if on Tuesday, November 5, 2024, the date of the 60th quadrennial presidential election, Kamala Harris is the Democratic Party's official nominee for the office of President of the United States.
Fine Print: Nomination for the vice presidency does not count; nor does merely becoming the presidential nominee - Harris must be the presidential nominee on election day itself. If she becomes the nominee but is (for any reason) not the nominee on election day, the question resolves negatively.
|
2022-04-30T05:00:00Z
|
2022-08-01T07:00:00Z
|
2024-11-05T12:01:00Z
|
yes
|
METACULUS
|
meta-10673
|
Will Pete Buttigieg be the Democratic Party nominee for President of the United States on election day in 2024?
|
[Peter Paul Montgomery Buttigieg](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Pete_Buttigieg), born January 19, 1982, is an American politician and former military officer who is currently serving as the United States secretary of transportation. A member of the Democratic Party, he was the 32nd mayor of South Bend, Indiana from 2012 to 2020, which earned him the nickname "Mayor Pete".
Buttigieg ran as a candidate for president in the [2020 Democratic Party presidential primaries.](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/2020_Democratic_Party_presidential_primaries) He became one of the first openly gay men to launch a major party presidential campaign. Buttigieg narrowly won the Iowa caucuses and placed a close second in the New Hampshire primary. By winning Iowa, he became the first openly gay candidate to win a presidential primary or caucus.
As of April 2022, there is [speculation](https://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2022/mar/31/buttigieg-2024-presidential-campaign-buzz-grows-am/) that Buttigieg may seek the Democratic Party's nomination in 2024 for the office of President of the United States.
Resolution Criteria: This question resolves positively if on Tuesday, November 5, 2024, the date of [the 60th quadrennial presidential election](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/2024_United_States_presidential_election), Pete Buttigieg is the Democratic Party's official nominee for the office of President of the United States.
Fine Print: Nomination for the vice presidency does not count; nor does merely becoming the presidential nominee - Buttigieg must be the presidential nominee on election day itself. If he becomes the nominee but is (for any reason) not the nominee on election day, the question resolves negatively.
|
2022-04-30T05:00:00Z
|
2022-08-01T07:00:00Z
|
2024-11-05T17:38:00Z
|
no
|
METACULUS
|
meta-10621
|
Will Elon Musk become CEO of Twitter before 2025?
|
[Elon Reeve Musk](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Elon_Musk), born June 28, 1971, is a serial entrepreneur and business executive. He is the founder, CEO, and Chief Engineer at SpaceX; early-stage investor, CEO, and Product Architect of Tesla, founder of The Boring Company, and co-founder of Neuralink and OpenAI. With an estimated net worth of around US$270 billion as of April 2022, Musk is the wealthiest person in the world according to both the [Bloomberg Billionaires Index](https://www.bloomberg.com/billionaires/) and the [Forbes real-time billionaires list](https://www.forbes.com/real-time-billionaires/#186117953d78).
In April 2022, it was [revealed that Musk had built a substantial equity stake in Twitter](https://www.reuters.com/technology/musk-discloses-92-stake-twitter-2022-04-04/), becoming the social media site's largest shareholder. [He was subsequently expected to be appointed to the company's board of directors,](https://www.reuters.com/technology/twitter-name-top-shareholder-musk-board-2022-04-05/) and indicated a desire ["to make significant improvements to Twitter in coming months!"](https://twitter.com/elonmusk/status/1511322655609303043?s=20&t=13tk1jk_1GlkpoyazKfWpA)
However, on April 10 2022, current Twitter CEO Parag Agrawal announced that [Musk had decided not to join the company's board.](https://twitter.com/paraga/status/1513354622466867201) No explanation was given as to why.
Resolution Criteria: This question will resolve as **Yes** if, at any time between April 1, 2022 to January 1 2025, Elon Musk holds the position of CEO of Twitter, including 'Acting CEO' or 'Interim CEO,' or holds a position that carries with it the powers and duties typical of a corporate CEO, even if that is not Musk's actual title
|
2022-04-14T07:00:00Z
|
2025-01-01T00:00:00Z
|
2022-10-31T22:41:00Z
|
yes
|
METACULUS
|
meta-10577
|
Will Donald J. Trump be allowed to operate a Twitter account before the 2024 presidential election?
|
*Related Question on Metaculus:*
* [Will Donald Trump regain a Twitter account in 2022?](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/9163/trump-back-on-twitter-in-2022/)
* [Will Trump gain at least 10M followers on another platform?](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/6322/trump-gain-10m-followers-on-new-platform/) [closed]
----
[Donald John Trump](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Donald_Trump), born June 14, 1946, is an American politician, media personality, and businessman who served as the 45th president of the United States from 2017 to 2021.
Trump's social media presence attracted attention worldwide since he joined Twitter in 2009. He frequently tweeted during the 2016 election campaign and as president, until his ban in the final days of his term. Over twelve years, Trump posted around 57,000 tweets, often using Twitter as a direct means of communication with the public and side-lining the press. He had accrued more than [88 million followers](https://www.forbes.com/sites/tommybeer/2020/12/05/trump-suddenly-loses-220000-twitter-followers-first-big-drop-in-5-years/) on the platform before he was banned.
Trump was '[permanently suspended](https://blog.twitter.com/en_us/topics/company/2020/suspension)' from Twitter following the events of January 6th, 2021:
>After close review of recent Tweets from the @realDonaldTrump account and the context around them — specifically how they are being received and interpreted on and off Twitter — we have permanently suspended the account due to the risk of further incitement of violence.
In April 2022, billionaire entrepreneur and Twitter aficionado [Elon Musk](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Elon_Musk) became Twitter's largest shareholder, [with a 9.2% stake in the company](https://fortune.com/2022/04/04/elon-musk-criticized-twitter-not-supporting-free-speech-bought-stake-shares-jumped/), after criticizing the platform for failing to adhere to the free speech principle.
Elon Musk on Twitter: [Given that Twitter serves as the de facto public town square, failing to adhere to free speech principles fundamentally undermines democracy.](https://twitter.com/elonmusk/status/1507777261654605828)
Resolution Criteria: This question will resolve as **Yes** if, at any time between January 1, 2022 to November 5, 2024, the date of the 60th quadrennial United States presidential election, Donald J. Trump is permitted to directly operate a personal Twitter account. Trump must be allowed to tweet on his own behalf for a positive resolution; restrictions that allow Trump to post only via an intermediary will not count.
Trump need not actually choose to do this to resolve the question as **Yes**; he must merely be allowed to do so.
This question will resolve on the basis of statements by Twitter, or credible media reports
|
2022-04-07T04:00:00Z
|
2024-11-01T00:00:00Z
|
2022-11-20T01:15:00Z
|
yes
|
METACULUS
|
meta-10541
|
Will Hunter Biden be indicted before November 5, 2024?
|
[Robert Hunter Biden](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Hunter_Biden), born February 4, 1970, is an American attorney who is the second son of current U.S. President Joe Biden and his first wife Neilia Hunter Biden. Biden is also a hedge fund, venture capital, and private-equity fund investor who formerly worked as a lobbyist, banker, public administration official, and registered lobbyist-firm attorney.
Weeks before the 2020 United States presidential election, on October 14, 2020, [the New York Post ran a story](https://nypost.com/2020/10/14/email-reveals-how-hunter-biden-introduced-ukrainian-biz-man-to-dad/) showing a screenshot of an alleged email from a top adviser to Ukrainian energy company Burisma to now-President Joe Biden's son Hunter, thanking him for the supposed opportunity to meet his father. The article alleges that this supports claims that Joe Biden used his political power to benefit his son Hunter in business dealings with Ukraine. At the time, other news organizations declined to publicise the story, [on the basis that it was not possible to verify the information.](https://www.realclearpolitics.com/video/2020/10/22/leslie_stahl_were_not_covering_hunter_biden_laptop_because_it_cant_be_verified.html)
In March 2022, [the Washington Post reported](https://www.washingtonpost.com/technology/2022/03/30/hunter-biden-laptop-data-examined/):
>Thousands of emails purportedly from the laptop computer of Hunter Biden, President Biden’s son, are authentic communications that can be verified through cryptographic signatures from Google and other technology companies, say two security experts who examined the data at the request of The Washington Post.
Further, [CBS News reported](https://www.cbsnews.com/news/hunter-biden-federal-investigation-new-details/):
>The federal investigation into Hunter Biden's business practices is broader than previously known, with multiple sources telling CBS News the probe is exploring whether the younger Biden and his associates violated tax, money laundering and foreign lobbying laws.
>Business records reviewed by CBS News and documents released by Republicans in Congress indicate Hunter Biden and his firm were involved in multiple financial transactions with a Chinese energy company called CEFC. Republicans allege that the company is an arm of the Chinese government.
Subsequently, as [reported by The Hill](https://thehill.com/homenews/media/600372-cnn-realistic-chance-hunter-biden-could-be-indicted/):
>A top legal analyst at CNN said it is possible President Biden’s son Hunter Biden could be indicted by the U.S. government following an investigation into his foreign business dealings.
>“This is a very real, very substantial investigation of potentially serious federal crimes,” Elie Honig said Wednesday morning on the network. “We are seeing federal prosecutors in Delaware do exactly what you would expect to see federal prosecutors do in this situation.”
>Honig said it appears the investigation into Hunter Biden’s business overseas is “gaining steam.”
Resolution Criteria: This question resolves positively if before November 5, 2024, the date of the 60th quadrennial presidential election, Hunter Biden has been indicted in the United States on any charge(s) alleging violation of state or federal law. The question resolves negatively if this does not occur. No conviction is necessary for a positive resolution; this question concerns only indictment
|
2022-04-03T04:00:00Z
|
2024-11-04T00:00:00Z
|
2023-09-14T17:28:00Z
|
yes
|
METACULUS
|
meta-10490
|
Will the TSA extend or reimpose a mask mandate on public transportation before 2024?
|
Mask mandates were widely introduced following the coronavirus pandemic. Yet, because of vaccines, natural immunity, and effective anti-virals, many people now believe that the virus poses only a minor risk to life and health, and thus, wish to return to a normal life. As of March 2022 in the United States, nearly all private and public institutions appear to have dropped their mask mandates, or are planning on doing so shortly.
However, the federal Transportation Security Administration (TSA) appears to be among the last holdouts of this wave of normality. On March 10th, the TSA [announced](https://www.tsa.gov/news/press/statements/2022/03/10/statement-regarding-face-mask-use-public-transportation) that they were extending the mask mandate on public transportation, in consultation with the CDC, until April 18th. It remains to be seen whether this mandate will be extended again, perhaps due to the [BA.2 variant](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Lineage_BA.2), or reimposed as cases rise again next winter.
Resolution Criteria: This question will resolve as **Yes** if the TSA announces that at least some passengers in the United States are required to wear masks on ANY form of public transportation before 2024, following the current April 18th deadline when the [current mandate](https://www.tsa.gov/news/press/statements/2022/03/10/statement-regarding-face-mask-use-public-transportation) is scheduled to expire.
Fine Print: If, for example, the mandate is extended for planes but not trains, the question shall resolve positively. If the mandate is imposed in some places, but not all places, it still resolves positively. However, local mandates affecting public transportation do not count; only federal mandates will count for the purpose of this question.
|
2022-03-31T04:00:00Z
|
2024-01-01T05:00:00Z
|
2024-01-01T18:15:00Z
|
no
|
METACULUS
|
meta-10430
|
Will the Social Democrats hold a position in government after the next Danish general election?
|
[General elections were held in Denmark on 5 June 2019](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/2019_Danish_general_election):
>The elections resulted in a victory for the "red bloc", comprising parties that supported the Social Democrats' leader Mette Frederiksen as candidate for Prime Minister. The "red bloc", consisting of the Social Democrats, the Social Liberals, Socialist People's Party, the Red–Green Alliance, the Faroese Social Democratic Party and the Greenlandic Siumut,[5] won 93 of the 179 seats, securing a parliamentary majority. Meanwhile, the incumbent governing coalition, consisting of Venstre, the Liberal Alliance and the Conservative People's Party whilst receiving parliamentary support from the Danish People's Party and Nunatta Qitornai, was reduced to 76 seats (including the Venstre-affiliated Union Party in the Faroe Islands).
The Coronavirus situation resulted in a large uptick in support for the ruling Social Democratic government as measured by [voting](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Opinion_polling_for_the_next_Danish_general_election) [polls](https://www.politico.eu/europe-poll-of-polls/denmark/), headed by Mette Frederiksen. However, the support has been dwindling in the last couple months. The next election will be held on or by 4 June 2023, as Denmark practices a 4 year maximum period between elections.
Resolution Criteria: If the next government following elections include the Social Democrats, this resolves positively. Otherwise, it resolves negatively. (Specifically, this will resolve negatively in the case where the Social Democrats provide support for a government but do not have any ministers in the government
|
2022-03-30T22:00:00Z
|
2023-06-03T10:00:00Z
|
2022-12-15T17:49:00Z
|
yes
|
METACULUS
|
meta-10295
|
Will Turkey declare sanctions on Russia before 2024?
|
Turkey, a NATO member, has been involved in [efforts to mediate](https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2022/3/10/top-russia-ukraine-diplomats-arrive-in-turkey-for-talks) the war between Ukraine and Russia and has recently had a [rapprochement](https://www.dailysabah.com/business/economy/turkey-israel-to-weigh-in-on-deepening-cooperation-amid-rapprochement) with Israel, who is also involved in the mediation efforts. Turkey has [been selling](https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2022/3/11/turkey-drones-use-ukraine) [drones](https://www.spectator.co.uk/article/turkish-drones-are-transforming-the-war-in-ukraine) to Ukraine since 2019 and has recently agreed to [co-produce the drones with Ukraine](https://www.defensenews.com/global/europe/2022/02/04/turkey-and-ukraine-to-coproduce-tb2-drones/). Turkey claims that [this is a private sale](https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/turkey-balancing-russia-ties-says-drones-ukraine-are-sales-not-aid-sabah-2022-03-03/), though the Turkish defense company Baykar which makes the drones is led by Selcuk Bayraktar, an [MIT-educated engineer who is married to the daughter of Turkish President Erdogan](https://www.ft.com/content/7529a862-7928-4b4e-a4c5-b2f50747d1f6). Turkish drones played a [crucial role](https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/middle_east/turkey-drones-libya-nagorno-karabakh/2020/11/29/d8c98b96-29de-11eb-9c21-3cc501d0981f_story.html) in the 2020 war between Azerbaijan and Armenia.
Turkey has said that it has [no intention](https://www.dailysabah.com/politics/diplomacy/turkey-has-no-intention-of-joining-sanctions-against-russia) of joining the sanctions against Russia. Several yachts linked to Russian oligarch [Roman Abramovich](https://www.jpost.com/international/article-702025) have docked in Turkey. Turkey has a [complicated](https://www.businessinsider.com/turkey-growing-ties-with-russia-have-caused-problem-for-nato-2022-1) relationship with Russia. In the Syrian Civil War, Turkey was a staunch supporter of the Syrian opposition, while Russia backed the Assad regime.
Furthermore, despite Turkey being a NATO member, it has a [complicated](https://www.cfr.org/report/future-u.s.-turkey) [relationship](https://warontherocks.com/2020/11/turkeys-crisis-with-the-west-how-a-new-low-in-relations-risks-paralyzing-nato/) with the US and with NATO, which was the subject of a [previous Metaculus question](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/3238/will-turkey-be-a-nato-member-continuously-until-1-january-2025/).
Resolution Criteria: This question will resolve as **Yes** if before January 1, 2024, the Turkish government officially imposes [international sanctions](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/International_sanctions) against Russia.
Tariffs will be considered sanctions
|
2022-03-25T23:00:00Z
|
2024-01-01T05:00:00Z
|
2023-12-31T21:00:00Z
|
no
|
METACULUS
|
meta-10294
|
Will Israel impose sanctions on Russia before 2024?
|
Israel, a [close US ally](https://www.jpost.com/international/article-701406), has [given humanitarian aid to](https://www.timesofisrael.com/israels-foreign-ministry-to-boost-aid-to-ukraine-including-generators-for-hospital/) and has [established a field hospital](https://israelpolicyforum.org/2022/03/10/zelenskys-appeal-to-jewish-solidarity-must-overcome-one-big-obstacle/) in Ukraine. It has [accepted some Ukrainian refugees](https://www.timesofisrael.com/facing-bitter-criticism-israel-eases-limits-on-entry-of-ukrainian-refugees/) and [voted to condemn the Russian invasion at the UN and helped convince the UAE to do the same](https://www.timesofisrael.com/liveblog_entry/at-us-request-israel-said-to-help-convince-uae-to-back-un-resolution-condemning-russia/). Israel [condemned the Russian invasion of Ukraine](https://www.nationalreview.com/2022/03/the-false-narrative-of-israeli-neutrality-in-russias-ukraine-invasion/), but the [rhetoric has not been as strong and consistent](https://www.al-monitor.com/originals/2022/02/israel-reluctantly-condemns-russia-over-ukraine) as that from the US and many European states. Ukraine [have complained](https://www.jpost.com/israel-news/article-701022) that Israel has not sent military aid to Ukraine, or joined the sanctions against Russia, though that has [started to change](https://twitter.com/BarakRavid/status/1503316397773971463). Israel [is mediating between Russia and Ukraine](https://www.voanews.com/a/israel-launches-effort-to-mediate-between-russia-ukraine/6478435.html) and maintains relations with both parties. Ukraine [has praised](https://www.timesofisrael.com/zelensky-chief-of-staff-lauds-israels-brave-mediation-efforts-new-refugee-rules/) these mediation efforts, in which Israel is a [key mediator](https://www.haaretz.com/israel-news/bennett-key-mediator-in-ukraine-russia-talks-report-says-1.10680094). However, some critics that have alleged that the Israeli mediation efforts are not the reason for Israel's lack of military aid, but rather its [fear of Russia](https://www.timesofisrael.com/ukraine-envoy-israel-is-afraid-of-russia-and-should-drop-neutral-position/), with which it has a [deconfliction mechanism](https://www.jpost.com/middle-east/article-699108) in Syria. A majority of Israelis [support Ukraine](https://www.jpost.com/israel-news/politics-and-diplomacy/article-699374). There has been a [report](https://www.timesofisrael.com/israel-said-likely-to-shift-to-more-pro-ukraine-stance-as-russian-invasion-escalates/) that if situation continues to escalate, Israel will support Ukraine more openly.
With respect to sanctions, Israel's Foreign Minister Yair Lapid has said that Israel will not be [used to bypass sanctions](https://www.reuters.com/world/israel-will-not-be-route-bypass-sanctions-imposed-russia-foreign-minister-2022-03-14/) but Israel is not focused on [imposing sanctions](https://www.timesofisrael.com/israel-not-about-to-impose-sanctions-on-russia-or-oligarchs-officials-say/). Russian-Israeli oligarch Roman Abramovich's plane [was not allowed to be on the ground in Israel more than 24 hours](https://www.jpost.com/israel-news/article-701230). Israel [has not formally joined](https://www.jpost.com/international/article-700768) the sanctions against Russia.
Resolution Criteria: This question will resolve as **Yes** if before January 1, 2024, the Israeli government officially imposes [international sanctions](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/International_sanctions) against Russia.
Tariffs will be considered sanctions
|
2022-03-28T07:00:00Z
|
2024-01-01T05:00:00Z
|
2024-01-01T00:00:00Z
|
no
|
METACULUS
|
meta-10293
|
Will Israel arm Ukraine before 2024?
|
Israel, a [close US ally](https://www.jpost.com/international/article-701406), has [given humanitarian aid to](https://www.timesofisrael.com/israels-foreign-ministry-to-boost-aid-to-ukraine-including-generators-for-hospital/) and has [established a field hospital](https://israelpolicyforum.org/2022/03/10/zelenskys-appeal-to-jewish-solidarity-must-overcome-one-big-obstacle/) in Ukraine. It has [accepted some Ukrainian refugees](https://www.timesofisrael.com/facing-bitter-criticism-israel-eases-limits-on-entry-of-ukrainian-refugees/) and [voted to condemn the Russian invasion at the UN and helped convince the UAE to do the same](https://www.timesofisrael.com/liveblog_entry/at-us-request-israel-said-to-help-convince-uae-to-back-un-resolution-condemning-russia/). Israel [condemned the Russian invasion of Ukraine](https://www.nationalreview.com/2022/03/the-false-narrative-of-israeli-neutrality-in-russias-ukraine-invasion/), but the [rhetoric has not been as strong and consistent](https://www.al-monitor.com/originals/2022/02/israel-reluctantly-condemns-russia-over-ukraine) as that from the US and many European states. Ukraine [has complained](https://www.jpost.com/israel-news/article-701022) that Israel has not sent military aid to Ukraine, or joined the sanctions against Russia, though that has [started to change](https://twitter.com/BarakRavid/status/1503316397773971463). Israel [is mediating between Russia and Ukraine](https://www.voanews.com/a/israel-launches-effort-to-mediate-between-russia-ukraine/6478435.html) and maintains relations with both parties. Ukraine [has praised](https://www.timesofisrael.com/zelensky-chief-of-staff-lauds-israels-brave-mediation-efforts-new-refugee-rules/) these mediation efforts, in which Israel is a [key mediator](https://www.haaretz.com/israel-news/bennett-key-mediator-in-ukraine-russia-talks-report-says-1.10680094). However, some critics that have alleged that the Israeli mediation efforts are not the reason for Israel's lack of military aid, but rather its [fear of Russia](https://www.timesofisrael.com/ukraine-envoy-israel-is-afraid-of-russia-and-should-drop-neutral-position/), with which it has a [deconfliction mechanism](https://www.jpost.com/middle-east/article-699108) in Syria. American officials including Lindsey Graham, a strong supporter of Israel, have [criticized Israel](https://www.i24news.tv/en/news/israel/diplomacy/1646303501-us-officials-call-on-israel-to-take-harder-stance-on-ukraine-war), with Graham specifically protesting Israel's refusal to sell Stinger missiles to Ukraine. A majority of Israelis [support Ukraine](https://www.jpost.com/israel-news/politics-and-diplomacy/article-699374). There has been a [report](https://www.timesofisrael.com/israel-said-likely-to-shift-to-more-pro-ukraine-stance-as-russian-invasion-escalates/) that if the situation continues to escalate, Israel will support Ukraine more openly. Israeli military experts [have expressed openness](https://www.haaretz.com/israel-news/.premium.HIGHLIGHT-should-israel-arm-ukraine-israeli-generals-speak-out-1.10678157) to sending Ukraine helmets.
Resolution Criteria: This question will resolve as **Yes** if reliable media reports indicate that Israel sent military equipment to Ukraine after February 24, 2022, and before January 1, 2024. An Israeli company or any other entity sending arms to Ukraine will be enough to trigger resolution if the transaction requires the permission of the Israeli government. Otherwise, This question will resolve as **No**
|
2022-03-29T04:00:00Z
|
2024-01-01T05:00:00Z
|
2022-11-17T10:15:00Z
|
yes
|
METACULUS
|
meta-10249
|
Will Georgia impose sanctions against Russia before 2024?
|
Russia [invaded Georgia in 2008](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Russo-Georgian_War). Since the 2012 elections, pro-Russian candidates have been elected, and there's a growing perception that Georgia has slowly begun to move away from the West. One account of recent political events in Georgia can be found [here](https://www.forbes.com/sites/melikkaylan/2021/10/05/what-just-happened-in-tbilisi-will-affect-all-of-you/).
On March 1, 2022, Radio Free Europe reported in its article [Protesters in Tbilisi Decry Georgian Government´s Inadequate Support for Ukraine](https://www.rferl.org/a/ukraine-invasion-tbilisi-protest-georgia/31731006.html) that:
> "Demonstrations in support of Ukraine have taken place in Tbilisi and other Georgian cities since Russia invaded Ukraine on February 24, but so far they have not been political. The rally on March 1 was the first in which an opposition leader took the stage. The rally demanded the resignation of Georgian Prime Minister Irakli Garibashvili and his government, active steps to support Ukraine, and the backing of an official request for EU membership.
> [...] After Russia's invasion of Ukraine last week, Garibashvili said Tbilisi did not plan to join Western sanctions against Russia.
> [...] On February 28, Georgian authorities did not allow a Ukrainian plane that was supposed to shuttle 30 Georgian volunteers to Kyiv to land at Tbilisi's airport."
Resolution Criteria: This question resolves positively if before January 1, 2024, the Georgian government officially imposes [international sanctions](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/International_sanctions) against Russia.
Tariffs will be considered sanctions
|
2022-03-15T23:00:00Z
|
2023-12-31T09:00:00Z
|
2024-01-02T06:00:00Z
|
no
|
METACULUS
|
meta-10246
|
Will a coup or regime change take place in Russia in 2022 or 2023?
|
[Wikipedia](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Coup_d%27%C3%A9tat) defines a coup in the following way:
> A coup [...] is a seizure and removal of a government and its powers. Typically, it is an illegal seizure of power by a political faction, rebel group, military, or a dictator.
[Their definition of regime change](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Regime_change) is similar:
> Regime change is the forcible or coerced replacement of one government regime with another. Regime change may replace all or part of the state's most critical leadership system, administrative apparatus, or bureaucracy.
A coup or regime change of the Russian government would likely have a significant impact on the [2022 military conflict](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/2022_Russian_invasion_of_Ukraine) in Ukraine.
Resolution Criteria: This question will resolve as **Yes** if, any time between March 1, 2022 to January 1, 2024, at least 6 of the following 10 sources publish a public report or article claiming that either a "coup" or "regime change" has taken place in Russia:
- The Economist
- The New York Times
- Reuters
- The Associated Press
- The Guardian
- The BBC
- Al Jazeera
- South China Morning Post
- [The Institute for the Study of War](https://www.understandingwar.org/)
- [International Crisis Group](https://www.crisisgroup.org/)
This question will not resolve as **Yes** if Russian President Vladimir Putin (or any successor of Putin) voluntarily resigns during this period
For the purposes of this question:
> A coup [...] is a seizure and removal of a government and its powers. Typically, it is an illegal seizure of power by a political faction, rebel group, military, or a dictator.
An unsuccessful coup attempt therefore is not sufficient for a **Yes** resolution.
Fine Print: A resignation will be considered "voluntary" if it is not coerced. In the event of a resignation, a team of three Metaculus admins will make a determination of whether the resignation was coerced.
|
2022-03-15T23:00:00Z
|
2023-12-31T11:00:00Z
|
2023-12-31T21:00:00Z
|
no
|
METACULUS
|
meta-10154
|
Will there be a serious radiation incident at any nuclear plant in Ukraine before 2024?
|
According to [Wikipedia](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Nuclear_and_radiation_accidents_and_incidents):
> "A nuclear and radiation accident is defined by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) as "an event that has led to significant consequences to people, the environment or the facility. Examples include lethal effect to individuals, large radioactivity release to the environment, reactor core melt." The prime example of a "major nuclear accident" is one in which a reactor core is damaged and significant amounts of radioactive isotopes are released, such as in the Chernobyl disaster in 1986 and Fukushima nuclear disaster in 2011.
Russian military forces [seized Chernobyl](https://cen.acs.org/safety/Russia-took-control-Chernobyl-nuclear-site-in-Ukraine-What-does-that-mean/100/web/2022/02) during the first day of the Ukrainian invasion as well as [Zaporizhzhia](https://www.theguardian.com/world/2022/mar/04/zaporizhzhia-nuclear-power-plant-everything-you-need-to-know), the largest nuclear plant of its kind in Europe, during the seventh day.
Fighting near nuclear power plants could possibly mean an increased risk of a serious radiation incident.
Resolution Criteria: The question will resolve as **Yes** if at any time between March 4, 2022 and December 31, 2023 [the International Atomic Energy Agency](https://www.iaea.org/) reports, in connection with any nuclear power plant within the borders of Ukraine – as they stood in December 2021 – an accident of level 5, 6 or 7 of the [International Nuclear and Radiological Event Scale](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/International_Nuclear_Event_Scale)
|
2022-03-07T08:00:00Z
|
2023-12-30T20:00:00Z
|
2024-01-01T15:45:00Z
|
no
|
METACULUS
|
meta-10147
|
Will it become public that the FBI sought a warrant to launch an operation to disrupt web shells on private computers in 2022?
|
In April 2021, the Justice Department [announced](https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/justice-department-announces-court-authorized-effort-disrupt-exploitation-microsoft-exchange#:~:text=WASHINGTON%20%E2%80%93%20The%20Justice%20Department%20today,%2Dlevel%20e%2Dmail%20service.) that the FBI had undertaken court-authorized operation to search and uninstall malicious web-shells on U.S-based Microsoft Exchange Servers. The warrant was issued under the Search and Seizure rule in the Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 41(b)(6)(B), and represented, to public knowledge, the first time that this authority was used for an operation like this.
Resolution Criteria: This question will resolve as **yes** if it is publicly reported by May 30, 2023 that the FBI sought a warrant under Rule 41(b)(6)(B) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure in 2022 and the cause for the warrant was the malicious use of web shell technology. Whether the warrant was granted or not is not relevant
|
2022-03-08T15:00:00Z
|
2022-12-31T21:58:00Z
|
2023-06-01T13:20:00Z
|
no
|
METACULUS
|
meta-10137
|
Will there be a publicly reported cyberattack against the global navigation satellite systems between April 1, 2022 and May 31, 2023?
|
Both civilian and military processes rely heavily on space-based infrastructure -- a trend that is likely to increase. Space-based systems and their Earth-based components are [frequently subjected to cyberattacks](https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/2021/11/30/space-race-china-david-thompson/) and other non-kinetic forms of attack. To our knowledge, none of these has yet resulted in significant damage.
Satellites are predicted to become one of the most targeted space-based assets in the coming years for hackers and other forms of cyber attacks. A [recent example](https://www.politico.com/news/2022/03/02/russia-space-chief-hacking-satellites-war-00013211) of an attack was reported to have occurred in early March on Russian satellites by the hacking group, Anonymous.
Resolution Criteria: This question will resolve as **Yes** if, between April 1, 2022 to May 31, 2023, there is a cyberattack which results in any one of the following:
1. Causes an estimated $1 million or more in direct damages to the compan(ies) or government(s) owning or operating the GNSS system, OR
2. Results in a loss of control over any space-based asset(s) for at least one hour, OR
3. Results in the loss of GNSS capabilities for a period of at least 24 hours.
Note that there are [4 GNSS](https://www.geospatialworld.net/blogs/what-are-the-various-gnss-systems/) globally. Only one of them is the US' GPS system.
A cyberattack will be [defined as](https://csrc.nist.gov/glossary/term/Cyber_Attack):
> "An attack, via cyberspace, targeting an enterprise’s use of cyberspace for the purpose of disrupting, disabling, destroying, or maliciously controlling a computing environment/infrastructure; or destroying the integrity of the data or stealing controlled information."
As an attack may occur for an extended period of time, we will define a single attack as an attack that is instigated by a single individual or group against the same system or systems regardless of the amount of time that attack occurs for. The beginning of the attack will be considered the moment of unauthorized intrusion: an action such as port scanning does not count.
If an attack is publicly announced within the period as having occurred between April 1, 2022 to May 31, 2023, but the attack technically began before this period, then the attack will still count toward resolution as long as the attack lasts more than 48 hours within the time frame.
|
2022-03-22T15:00:00Z
|
2022-12-31T20:52:00Z
|
2023-06-01T13:33:00Z
|
no
|
METACULUS
|
meta-10111
|
Will there be a successful cyberattack on the 2022 FIFA World Cup?
|
Ellie Burns at [TechMonitor reports](https://techmonitor.ai/techonology/hardware/from-wimbledon-to-rio-2016-olympics-as-hackers-move-the-goalposts-its-no-time-for-sports-heavy-hitters-to-pull-cyber-security-punches-4950451) that major global sporting events such as the Olympics and World Cup have frequently been targets of major cyberattacks. [FIFA officials reported](https://apnews.com/article/37126ec376004506954374894d1fdb60) that they were hacked in 2018 and 2016.
Resolution Criteria: This question will resolve as **Yes** if all of the following conditions are met:
1. There is a successful cyberattack on FIFA's systems or physical infrastructure supporting the 2022 World Cup.
2. The incident must occur between November 21, 2022 to December 18, 2022.
3. The targeted system must be unavailable or unusable for at least one hour.
4. The incident must be reported in at least two major U.S. media outlets and may be publicly reported by March 1, 2023.
5. The intention behind the attack must be to prevent the ability of systems to function as necessary. For that purpose, resolution will not be triggered by [cyber espionage](https://www.vmware.com/topics/glossary/content/cyber-espionage.html) or by [data breaches](https://www.trendmicro.com/vinfo/us/security/definition/data-breach)
|
2022-03-15T15:00:00Z
|
2022-11-20T19:55:00Z
|
2023-03-01T19:10:00Z
|
no
|
METACULUS
|
meta-10109
|
Will China make a successful, major cyberattack on Taiwanese critical infrastructure before December 31, 2022?
|
In 2021, the Taiwanese Defense Minister warned that tensions between Taiwan and China -- which has repeatedly claimed that Taiwan is part of its territory -- were at a [40-year high](https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-58812100). Similarly, U.S. Secretary of State Antony Blinken has [warned](https://www.reuters.com/world/china/blinken-warns-chinas-increasingly-aggressive-actions-against-taiwan-2021-04-11/) that China has been taking "increasingly aggressive actions" towards Taiwan.
Assistant professor Chen Yi-fan from Taiwan's Tamkang University suggested that [cyberattacks could precede a Chinese invasion of Taiwan](https://www.voanews.com/a/how-china-could-cyberattack-taiwan/6349594.html), making the invasion less costly on Chinese resources.
Resolution Criteria: ***Will China make a successful cyberattack on Taiwanese critical infrastructure before December 31, 2022?***
This question will resolve positively if any of Taiwan's [16 critical infrastructure sectors](https://www.cisa.gov/critical-infrastructure-sectors) identified by the U.S. Department of Homeland Security are attacked by Chinese actors between March 8, 2022 to December 31, 2022.
The affected infrastructure must be physically located in Taiwan – that is, it may not simply be an asset owned by a Taiwanese national and located abroad. As such, the affected entity must be within 40 kilometers of the island to qualify.
The Attribution of the attack may be issued by the United States, a [Five Eyes nation](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Five_Eyes), or a NATO member; or by reputable cybersecurity companies or research organizations; or by at least three major news media outlets. Attribution must be formal – i.e. in an on-the-record speech or in writing. A publication that uses any phrases such as "China is suspected," or "China is possibly," or "China is likely" will not trigger resolution.
"Chinese actors" can include state or non-state actors within China. To be acting within the Chinese mainland is to be considered within the state's internationally recognized land or naval borders.
At least one of the following conditions must be met regarding the severity of the attack:
1. The attack is estimated to have caused at least $1 million direct property damage (excluding intellectual property).
2. The attack is estimated to have caused at least $10 million of direct or indirect costs to the economy.
3. The attack causes loss of an essential service (such as electricity, water, gas pumps) affecting at least 10,000 people for at least 1 week.
4. The attack causes a sharp rise in price of essential goods (such as food or gasoline) by at least 50% for a community of at least 10,000 people.
5. The attack is estimated to have caused at least 10 fatalities.
This question will resolve based on public information available by March 31, 2023.
|
2022-03-15T15:00:00Z
|
2022-12-31T18:48:00Z
|
2023-03-31T16:14:00Z
|
no
|
METACULUS
|
meta-10105
|
Will the US “Rewards for Justice” program pay the $10M reward offered for information on the interference in the 2020 presidential election?
|
On November 18, 2021, two Iranian nationals were charged for interference in the US 2020 election through their use of cyber-enabled misinformation and threat campaigns.
The [U.S. Department of Justice](https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/two-iranian-nationals-charged-cyber-enabled-disinformation-and-threat-campaign-designed) writes:
> "An indictment was unsealed in New York today charging two Iranian nationals for their involvement in a cyber-enabled campaign to intimidate and influence American voters, and otherwise undermine voter confidence and sow discord, in connection with the 2020 U.S. presidential election."
According to court documents, Seyyed Mohammad Hosein Musa Kazemi (سید محمد حسین موسی کاظمی), aka Mohammad Hosein Musa Kazem, aka Hosein Zamani, 24, and Sajjad Kashian (سجاد کاشیان), aka Kiarash Nabavi, 27, both of Iran, obtained confidential U.S. voter information from at least one state election website; sent threatening email messages to intimidate and interfere with voters; created and disseminated a video containing disinformation about purported election infrastructure vulnerabilities; attempted to access, without authorization, several states’ voting-related websites; and successfully gained unauthorized access to a U.S. media company’s computer network that, if not for successful FBI and victim company efforts to mitigate, would have provided the conspirators another vehicle to disseminate false claims after the election."
As part of the process to bring Kazemi and Kashian to justice, the [Rewards for Justice Program](https://rewardsforjustice.net/terrorist-rewards/seyyed-kazemi/) offered a reward of up to $10M US Dollars for information on Kazemi and his involvement in the cyber-attacks during the 2020 elections. They offered the same for [Kashian](https://rewardsforjustice.net/terrorist-rewards/sajjad-kashian/).
Resolution Criteria: This question will resolve as **Yes** if the U.S Department of Justice, or at least three other reputable media outlets, report a payment having been made to an individual or individuals in direct relation to the Rewards for Justice program targeted at Kazemi and Kashian, two Iranian hackers charged for participating in a disinformation campaign during the 2020 elections. The payment can be any or all of the allocated $10 million USD amount.
If no such payment or public announcement has been made by May 31, 2023, then this question will resolve negatively
|
2022-03-08T15:00:00Z
|
2022-12-31T18:35:00Z
|
2023-06-01T17:25:00Z
|
no
|
METACULUS
|
meta-10085
|
Will Finland join NATO before 2024?
|
*Related Question on Metaculus:*
* [Will Sweden join NATO before 2024?](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/10084/sweden-to-join-nato-before-2024/)
----
[NATO](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/NATO) is an is an intergovernmental military alliance among 28 European countries and 2 North American countries. Established in the aftermath of World War II.
NATO constitutes a system of collective security, whereby its independent member states agree to mutual defense in response to an attack by any external party.
[Finland](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Finland) maintained neutrality during the Cold War. But has since moved towards cooperation with NATO. For example by joining the [NATO Response Force](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/NATO_Response_Force).
[France 24 reports](https://www.france24.com/en/live-news/20220301-ukraine-war-brings-sweden-finland-even-closer-to-nato)
>The Russian invasion of Ukraine has upended the status quo in traditionally non-aligned Finland and Sweden, ushering in an "historic" surge in support for NATO, "exceptional" arms exports and defiance to Moscow's demands.
> Stockholm and Helsinki have ruled out applying to join the NATO military alliance for the time being but the two countries have never been so close to taking the plunge, analysts say.
> "Anything is possible at the moment and the signal from NATO countries is that a membership application can be processed in a very short time-span," said Zebulon Carlander, defence analyst with the Society and Defence organisation in Sweden.
Resolution Criteria: This question will resolve positively if an official statement by NATO, issued before the 1st of January 2024, declares that Finland has joined the organization and its membership has been ratified by member states.
*[March 13, 2022: question edited, see changes in the fine print]*
Fine Print: *Edit March 13 2022:
Changed "This question will resolve positively if an official statement by NATO, issued before the 1st of January 2024, declares that Finland has joined the organization" to read "This question will resolve positively if an official statement by NATO, issued before the 1st of January 2024, declares that Finland has joined the organization **and its membership has been ratified by member states."***
|
2022-03-06T05:00:00Z
|
2023-12-30T23:01:00Z
|
2023-04-04T14:30:00Z
|
yes
|
METACULUS
|
meta-10084
|
Will Sweden join NATO before 2024?
|
[NATO](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/NATO) is an is an intergovernmental military alliance among 28 European countries and 2 North American countries. Established in the aftermath of World War II.
NATO constitutes a system of collective security, whereby its independent member states agree to mutual defense in response to an attack by any external party.
[Sweden](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Sweden) has since 1905 been at peace, maintaining an official policy of neutrality in foreign affairs. Sweden was formally neutral through both world wars and the Cold War, although Sweden has since 2009 openly moved towards cooperation with NATO.
[France 24 reports](https://www.france24.com/en/live-news/20220301-ukraine-war-brings-sweden-finland-even-closer-to-nato)
>The Russian invasion of Ukraine has upended the status quo in traditionally non-aligned Finland and Sweden, ushering in an "historic" surge in support for NATO, "exceptional" arms exports and defiance to Moscow's demands.
> Stockholm and Helsinki have ruled out applying to join the NATO military alliance for the time being but the two countries have never been so close to taking the plunge, analysts say.
> "Anything is possible at the moment and the signal from NATO countries is that a membership application can be processed in a very short time-span," said Zebulon Carlander, defence analyst with the Society and Defence organisation in Sweden.
Resolution Criteria: This question will resolve positively if an official statement by NATO, issued before the January 1, 2024, declares that Sweden has joined NATO
|
2022-03-06T05:00:00Z
|
2023-12-30T23:01:00Z
|
2023-12-31T23:00:00Z
|
no
|
METACULUS
|
meta-10081
|
Will Ukraine join the European Union before 2024?
|
Resolution Criteria: *Related Question on Metaculus:*
* [Will Ukraine join the EU before 2030?](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/10043/ukraine-joins-eu-before-2030/)
----
Following the [Russian invasion of Ukraine in 2022](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/2022_Russian_invasion_of_Ukraine), Ukrainian President Zelensky [urged](https://www.nytimes.com/2022/02/28/world/europe/ukraine-european-union-zelensky.html) the European Union to admit Ukraine as a member. Various [news](https://www.thenational.scot/news/19961538.ukraine-joined-eu-become-candidate-experts-lay-facts/) [outlets](https://www.nytimes.com/2022/03/01/world/europe/ukraine-european-union-membership.html)
[have discussed](https://www.npr.org/2022/02/28/1083528087/ukraine-european-union) the prospect of Ukrainian membership in the European Union, voicing some degree of skepticism that it will happen in the near term.
***Will Ukraine join the European Union by 2024?***
This question will resolve as **Yes** if Ukraine becomes a member state of the European Union at any time between March 1, 2022 to January 1, 2024. Official statements by the EU will be used for resolution.
|
2022-03-06T05:00:00Z
|
2023-12-31T05:00:00Z
|
2023-12-31T23:00:00Z
|
no
|
METACULUS
|
meta-10055
|
Will Medvedchuk become president of Ukraine before 2024?
|
Resolution Criteria: As Wikipedia states:
> “Viktor Volodymyrovych Medvedchuk is an Ukrainian politician, lawyer, business oligarch and [People's Deputy of Ukraine](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/People%27s_Deputy_of_Ukraine) from 29 August 2019. He is the chairman of the pro-Russia political organization [Ukrainian Choice](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ukrainian_Choice) and an opponent of Ukraine joining the European Union. Some commentators have called him Putin's closest ally in Ukraine.”
[The Russian invasion of Ukraine](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/2022_Russian_invasion_of_Ukraine) could possibly lead to the installation of a puppet government or pro-Russian government in Ukraine. Thus we ask:
***Will Medvedchuk become the president of Ukraine before 2024?***
Resolution will be based on reporting from reputable media sources. This question will also resolve positively if his presidency is a part of a government that has de facto control of Ukrainian territory, even if it is not internationally recognized.
|
2022-03-02T04:00:00Z
|
2023-12-31T00:44:00Z
|
2023-12-31T22:00:00Z
|
no
|
METACULUS
|
meta-10053
|
By 2024, will Vladimir Putin be charged with war crimes by the International Criminal Court in connection to the Russian invasion of Ukraine?
|
As [the New York Times](https://www.nytimes.com/live/2022/02/28/world/ukraine-russia-war) in connection to the Russian invasion of Ukraine reports:
> "President Volodymyr Zelensky of Ukraine called for an international tribunal to investigate Russia for war crimes."
Also Lithuania’s prime minister, Ingrida Simonyte, told the [Washington Post](https://www.theguardian.com/world/2022/feb):
> “What Putin is doing is just a murder and nothing else, and I hope he will be in The Hague.”
The International Criminal Court sits in the Hague and prosecutes individuals for the international crimes of genocide, crimes against humanity, [war crimes](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/War_crime#Definition) and the crime of aggression. Its prosecutor has announced that he will launch an investigation into possible war crimes or crimes against humanity in Ukraine.
Resolution Criteria: This question will resolve positively if Vladimir Putin is charged by January 1, 2024 by the International Criminal Tribunal in The Hague for any war crime in relation to Russia's 2022 invasion of Ukraine.
War crimes in this case will include any and all crimes that Vladimir Putin may commit during his offensive attack on Ukraine. This will include, but is not limited to, crimes against humanity, genocide, contempt of court, or the officially designated list of war crimes by the UN.
The UN lists for all crimes under the labels 'crimes against humanity' and 'war crimes' can be found [here](https://www.un.org/en/genocideprevention/crimes-against-humanity.shtml) and [here](https://www.un.org/en/genocideprevention/war-crimes.shtml), respectively.
_Edit March 2, 2022: The ICC announcing either an indictment or an arrest warrant is sufficient for positive resolution._
> _According to [Wikipedia](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_people_indicted_in_the_International_Criminal_Court):_
> _An individual is **indicted** when a Pre-Trial Chamber issues either an arrest warrant or a summons after it finds that "there are reasonable grounds to believe that the person has committed a crime within the jurisdiction of the Court"._
> _An **arrest warrant** is issued where it appears necessary "to ensure the person's appearance at trial, to ensure that the person does not obstruct or endanger the investigation or the court proceedings, or, where applicable, to prevent the person from continuing with the commission of that crime or a related crime which is within the jurisdiction of the Court and which arises out of the same circumstances"
|
2022-03-02T04:00:00Z
|
2023-12-31T00:40:00Z
|
2023-03-17T15:22:00Z
|
yes
|
METACULUS
|
meta-10047
|
Will any member of NATO call for Hungary to be expelled before 2024?
|
As [Politico](https://www.politico.eu/article/hungary-foreign-minister-peter-szijjarto-weapon-transit-ukraine/) reports:
> "Hungary will not allow the transit of lethal weapons to Ukraine through its territory."
>[...]
>"Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orbán — who is facing a tough parliamentary election on April 3, 2022 — has insisted over the past days that his country must “stay out” of the conflict and that Hungary itself will not supply weapons to its neighbor."
Though it does not contain an explicit procedure for expulsion, according to an [analysis by Just Security](https://www.justsecurity.org/66574/can-turkey-be-expelled-from-nato/) NATO member states can by unanimous agreement, effectively expel a member state for material breach of the treaty:
Should the conditions for the existence of a material breach be satisfied, NATO’s member states would be entitled, by unanimous agreement, to suspend the operation of the treaty in whole or in part or to terminate it either in their relations with the defaulting state or among them all (Article 60(2) of the Vienna Convention). For these purposes, a unanimous decision of the North Atlantic Council, excluding the defaulting state, would suffice. No further procedural requirements apply, including those laid down in Article 65 of the Vienna Convention.
Resolution Criteria: This question will resolve as "Yes" if at least one head of state or head of government in a NATO member country calls for Hungary to be expelled from NATO, at any time from March 1, 2022 to January 1, 2024. This does not need to occur through a formal legal process or through the invocation of Article 60(2).
This question will resolve based on reputable media reports.
_Edit March 2, 2022: "Senior government official" has now been updated to read "head of state or head of government."
|
2022-03-02T04:00:00Z
|
2023-12-31T00:08:00Z
|
2024-01-01T10:01:00Z
|
no
|
METACULUS
|
meta-10028
|
Will the US Supplemental Poverty Measure be higher in 2022 than 2021?
|
The US Census Bureau and Bureau of Labor Statistics created the [Supplemental Poverty Measure (SPM)](https://www.census.gov/topics/income-poverty/supplemental-poverty-measure.html) in the 2000s to address shortcomings of the Official Poverty Measure (OPM). Unlike the OPM, the SPM adjusts for in-kind benefits, tax liabilities, and local housing costs. For these reasons, [poverty researchers generally prefer the SPM over the OPM](https://www.vox.com/2015/9/16/9337041/supplemental-poverty-measure).
The Census Bureau typically reports the SPM and OPM each September, along with the Current Population Survey March Supplement data upon which they're both calculated. In September 2021, they reported the [2020 SPM as 9.1 percent](https://www.census.gov/library/publications/2021/demo/p60-275.html), down from 11.8 percent in 2019.
Resolution Criteria: This question will resolve positively if the 2022 [Supplemental Poverty Measure](https://www.census.gov/topics/income-poverty/supplemental-poverty-measure.html) exceeds its 2021 value. In each year from 2014 to 2021, the Census Bureau has reported the SPM between September 12 and October 14
|
2022-04-05T07:00:00Z
|
2023-01-01T07:59:00Z
|
2023-09-12T22:51:00Z
|
yes
|
METACULUS
|
meta-10023
|
Will a state actor successfully use an ASAT weapon against a foreign satellite before 2024?
|
[Anti-Satellite (ASAT) weapons](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Anti-satellite_weapon) are weapons that destroy or damage satellites in orbit. Several of these have been developed and [tested](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/7644/asat-weapons-tests-and-space-debris-by-2023/). However, they have not been used in warfare.
ASAT weapons in warfare have a variety of uses, including disrupting communications, reconnaissance, and navigation systems. Development and deployment of such systems continues, and has been called an [emerging arms race](https://hir.harvard.edu/anti-satellite-weapons-and-the-emerging-space-arms-race/).
Recently, Russia has [threatened](https://arstechnica.com/science/2022/10/russia-threatens-a-retaliatory-strike-against-us-commercial-satellites/) to use such weapons in relation to the war in Ukraine.
Resolution Criteria: This question will resolve as **Yes** if a consensus of [credible sources](https://www.metaculus.com/help/faq/#definitions) reports a state actor has used an ASAT weapon to damage a manmade orbital target which that state does not own before January 1, 2024, without the permission of the owner of the manmade orbital target. The damage must be physical, cyberattacks do not qualify
|
2022-11-01T04:00:00Z
|
2023-12-31T07:00:00Z
|
2024-01-01T19:00:00Z
|
no
|
METACULUS
|
meta-10008
|
Will Romania unite with Moldova before 2025?
|
Moldova and Romania speak the same language and [reunification has been a possibility since independence](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Unification_of_Moldova_and_Romania#Impact_of_a_unification_scenario). This Jan 2022 [article](https://www.geopoliticalmonitor.com/assessing-a-possible-moldova-romania-unification/) quotes a poll finding 44% support in Moldova for union with Romania.
That was before Russia invaded Ukraine. Romania is in both NATO and the EU, so by joining Romania, Moldova could essentially shortcut the membership requirements for both organisations at the cost of giving up sovereignty. This bargain looks a lot more attractive now that the perceived risk of Russian invasion is higher. I note Metaculus already has [a question](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/9943/russia-recognize-transnistria-in-2022/) on whether Russia will recognise Moldova's breakaway region Transnistria this year.
Resolution Criteria: Positive resolution will be based on an announcement of a union by both relevant governments, effective on or before 1st Jan 2025. Union here means that the two countries become one country. If Romania unites with Moldova but excludes Transnistria and/or Gagauzia then that still counts as a positive resolution.
Fine Print: Positive resolution needs the union to be effective, not just announced. A union effective on midnight of the 31st Dec 2024 would count for positive resolution.
This question doesn't take a position on the form of the union - any constitutional arrangement counts so long as the resulting entity becomes one country, even if in practice the former-Romania and former-Moldova each separately have a lot of power to make laws, for example in a decentralised federation.
|
2022-03-16T23:00:00Z
|
2023-12-31T23:00:00Z
|
2025-01-02T14:40:00Z
|
no
|
METACULUS
|
meta-10005
|
Will Russia be removed from the UN Security Council by 2024?
|
As the Conversation summarizes in its article [Ukraine invasion: should Russia lose its seat on the UN Security Council?](https://theconversation.com/ukraine-invasion-should-russia-lose-its-seat-on-the-un-security-council-177870):
> “The Security Council was established by the 1945 UN Charter and comprises 15 members. Ten rotating non-permanent countries are elected by the UN General Assembly to do a two-year term on the Security Council. Five members – the USSR (now Russia), Republic of China (now People’s Republic of China), the US, UK and France – have the status of permanent members and so have a veto on any vote before the Council.”
Article 23 of the UN Charter says that [the USSR, not Russia, is the permanent member](https://www.un.org/en/about-us/un-charter/chapter-5) of the UN Security Council, as Ukraine’s ambassador, Sergiy Kyslytsya, has suggested in February 2022. This could be used as an argument that Russia is not, in fact, a legitimate permanent member of the Security Council.
Resolution Criteria: This question will resolve positively if between February 26, 2022 and December 31, 2023 the official website of the United Nations will include neither USSR, nor Russia among permanent members of its UN Security Council.
In the case that the UN Security Council ceases to function or the role of permanent members of the UN Security Council no longer exists, the question will resolve ambiguously
|
2022-02-26T18:00:00Z
|
2023-12-31T06:06:00Z
|
2024-01-01T05:00:00Z
|
no
|
METACULUS
|
meta-10004
|
Will a major nuclear power plant in Germany be operational on June 1, 2023?
|
According to [Wikipedia](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Nuclear_power_in_Germany):
> Nuclear power in Germany accounted for 13.3% of German electricity supply in 2021, generated by six power plants, of which three were switched off at the end of 2021, the other three due to cease operation at the end of 2022 according to the complete nuclear phase-out plan of 2011.
Germany has been planning to stop generating electricity from nuclear power for 20 years. As ABCNews in its article [Germany shuts down half of its 6 remaining nuclear plants](https://abcnews.go.com/International/wireStory/correction-germany-nuclear-shutdown-story-82051054) inform:
> “The decision to phase out nuclear power and shift from fossil fuels to renewable energy was first taken by the center-left government of Gerhard Schroeder in 2002. His successor, Angela Merkel, reversed her decision to extend the lifetime of Germany’s nuclear plants in the wake of the 2011 Fukushima disaster in Japan and set 2022 as the final deadline for shutting them down.”
However, the current situation in Ukraine and the potential for an energy crisis in Europe could change or delay Germany’s decision to shut down its remaining nuclear power plants.
Germany’s [three active nuclear reactors](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Nuclear_power_in_Germany#Reactors) as of February 2022 are:
- Emsland
- Isar 2
- Neckarwestheim 2
Resolution Criteria: This question will resolve as **Yes** if [Wikipedia’s page](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Nuclear_power_in_Germany#Reactors) on Germany's nuclear reactors reports any as “Operational” on June 1, 2023. If wikipedia does not report this information, or it is clearly inaccurate, credible media reports may be used instead
|
2022-02-26T18:00:00Z
|
2023-05-31T19:00:00Z
|
2023-06-01T17:01:00Z
|
no
|
METACULUS
|
meta-10003
|
Will Russia invade Latvia, Lithuania, or Estonia before 2024?
|
On February 23, 2022, [Russia invaded Ukraine](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/2022_Russian_invasion_of_Ukraine). In January 2021, the [German Council on Foreign Relations](https://dgap.org/en/research/publications/russias-strategic-interests-and-actions-baltic-region) released a report on Russia's strategic interests in the Baltic region:
>Recently, Russia has added another element to its hybrid instruments and actions. In breaching the 1987 Intermediate-range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty, it has deployed new ground-based, intermediate-range nuclear-capable missiles. For the first time in almost 30 years, large parts of Europe face a potential nuclear threat from Russian soil. [...] A considerable number of strategy experts believe that Russia is preparing for regional wars in its strategic neighborhood, in particular in the Baltic and Black Sea regions.
Resolution Criteria: This question will resolve as **Yes** if, between February 26, 2022 and December 31, 2023, either the Russian Federation or any three [Permanent Members](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Permanent_members_of_the_United_Nations_Security_Council) of the United Nations Security Council announce or acknowledge that more than 100 Russian ground troops have entered Latvia, Lithuania, or Estonia.
From the statement, it must be clear the troops are acting deliberately on orders and without permission of the currently recognized government of that country or the assent of the UN. These announcements must be describing events which took place (at least in part) during the same period, from February 26, 2022 to December 31, 2023
|
2022-02-26T20:00:00Z
|
2023-12-31T05:57:00Z
|
2023-12-31T22:00:00Z
|
no
|
METACULUS
|
meta-9994
|
Will at least 5 million refugees from Ukraine seek assistance from other countries?
|
*Related Questions on Metaculus:*
* [How many refugees will leave Ukraine by July 1, 2022?](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/10248/-of-ukrainian-refugees-by-july-1-2022/)
* [How many refugees will leave Ukraine in 2022?](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/10252/ukrainian-refugees-in-2022/)
* [How many Internally Displaced Ukrainians will be estimated by the UN in 2022?](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/9944/internally-displaced-ukrainians-in-2022/)
----
A number of countries are actively preparing for a large influx of refugees from Ukraine as the military conflict escalates. The UN chief announced today that in the first 48 hours of the conflict, over [50,000 Ukranians](https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2022/2/25/un-warns-russias-invasion-could-trigger-up-to-5m-refugees) have fled their country, seeking refuge amongst their neighboring countries.
> “The U.S. government [estimates](https://www.cnbc.com/2022/02/25/ukraine-crisis-poland-neighbors-ready-for-influx-of-migrants.html ) that an invasion could prompt one to five million Ukrainians to flee the country, and Ukraine’s defense minister put the figure at three to five million. Charity Unicef on Friday also projected that up to 5 million Ukrainians could flee the country.”
Other Eastern European countries, especially Poland, Hungary, Slovakia, Moldova, and Romania, are expecting the brunt of the flow of refugees from Ukraine. Poland is actively preparing for up to a million new refugees to enter the country, and the Pentagon has sent 3,000 US troops to Poland to assist with the relocation and rehabilitation of migrants.
Resolution Criteria: This question will resolve positively if at least 5 million people attempt to flee Ukraine and seek refugee status within other countries during the Russo-Ukrainian war beginning February 23, 2022.
We will be using the [definition](https://refugeesmigrants.un.org/definitions#:~:text=Refugees%20are%20persons%20who%20are,a%20result%2C%20require%20international%20protection.) of a refugee from the United Nations.
Reports may come directly from individual country’s governments who are accepting refugees, or may come from at least five reputable media outlets all confirming at least a total of 5 million refugees. Any reports from the United Nations, including from UNICEF or UNHCR, can count as one of the resolution sources, but will not count as an exclusive source in replacement of the four other sources
|
2022-02-26T18:00:00Z
|
2023-12-31T18:00:00Z
|
2022-04-20T16:00:00Z
|
yes
|
METACULUS
|
meta-9981
|
Will China reverse its decision to ban financial institutions from trading and engaging in cryptocurrency transactions before 2024?
|
China has long been [at odds with](https://www.coindesk.com/learn/china-crypto-bans-a-complete-history/) the growing cryptocurrency market. In September 2021, The People's Bank of China (PBOC) instituted a ban against all cryptocurrency transactions due to a capital flight of approximately $50B between 2019 and 2020 from the country.
The [World Economic Forum](https://www.weforum.org/agenda/2022/01/what-s-behind-china-s-cryptocurrency-ban/) writes:
> "In late September 2021, the People’s Bank of China (PBOC) banned all cryptocurrency transactions. The PBOC cited the role of cryptocurrencies in facilitating financial crime as well as posing a growing risk to China’s financial system owing to their highly speculative nature. However, one other possible reason behind the cryptocurrency ban is an attempt to combat capital flight from China.
> According to the Chainalysis Blockchain data platform, more than $50 billion worth of cryptocurrency left East Asian accounts to areas outside the region between 2019 and 2020. As China has an outsized presence in East Asian cryptocurrency exchanges, Chainalysis staff believe that much of this net outflow of cryptocurrency was actually capital flight from China. Although Chainalysis does not have a definitive figure for how much capital fled China between 2019 and 2020, they estimate that it could be as high as $50 billion."
Resolution Criteria: This question will resolve positively if the People's Bank of China announces that they will allow financial institutions to trade and engage in cryptocurrency transactions before 2024-01-01.
Financial institutions must be able to engage in cryptocurrency transactions at the same level and with the same freedoms as before the ban.
The allowance of individual entities to engage in cryptocurrency at the behest of the government will not trigger resolution.
For the purpose of this question an announcement by the PBOC will be enough to trigger resolution, the end of the ban does not need to have come into full effect before 2024-01-01 for positive resolution
|
2022-03-15T15:00:00Z
|
2023-12-31T15:00:00Z
|
2024-01-04T17:36:00Z
|
no
|
METACULUS
|
meta-9980
|
Will Shanghai continue to subsidize up to 30% of investment in semiconductor materials and equipment projects within the city until 2024?
|
China remains incredibly reliant on the import of semiconductors to fuel its technological development and progress. To combat this perceived vulnerability, some urban, technological powerhouses are [offering subsidies](https://www.protocol.com/bulletins/shanghai-semiconductor-incentives) on semiconductor R&D investments.
> "Shanghai’s municipal government on Wednesday announced new policies meant to bolster China’s advanced chipmaking capabilities.
> Shanghai, the largest Chinese city and the country’s financial center, has spelled out plans to woo R&D talent in integrated circuits, industrial software, emerging technology software, and cybersecurity software.
> To support semiconductor companies, the Shanghai government will match 30% of the investment in new semiconductor material and equipment projects and chip-software projects such as electronic design automation tools, up to 100 million RMB ($15.8 million)."
Resolution Criteria: This question resolves positively if Shanghai continues to offer at least a 30% subsidy on semiconductor R&D by 2024-01-01.
Resolution will come from reports from at least two reputable news sources
|
2022-03-15T15:00:00Z
|
2023-12-31T00:00:00Z
|
2024-01-04T17:25:00Z
|
yes
|
METACULUS
|
meta-9977
|
Will China reverse its ban on bitcoin mining and trading before 2024?
|
China has long been [at odds with](https://www.coindesk.com/learn/china-crypto-bans-a-complete-history/) the growing cryptocurrency market. In September 2021, The People's Bank of China (PBOC) instituted a ban against all cryptocurrency transactions due to a capital flight of approximately $50B between 2019 and 2020 from the country.
The [World Economic Forum](https://www.weforum.org/agenda/2022/01/what-s-behind-china-s-cryptocurrency-ban/) writes:
> "In late September 2021, the People’s Bank of China (PBOC) banned all cryptocurrency transactions. The PBOC cited the role of cryptocurrencies in facilitating financial crime as well as posing a growing risk to China’s financial system owing to their highly speculative nature. However, one other possible reason behind the cryptocurrency ban is an attempt to combat capital flight from China.
According to the Chainalysis Blockchain data platform, more than $50 billion worth of cryptocurrency left East Asian accounts to areas outside the region between 2019 and 2020. As China has an outsized presence in East Asian cryptocurrency exchanges, Chainalysis staff believe that much of this net outflow of cryptocurrency was actually capital flight from China. Although Chainalysis does not have a definitive figure for how much capital fled China between 2019 and 2020, they estimate that it could be as high as $50 billion."
Resolution Criteria: This question will resolve positively if the People's Bank of China announces that they will allow all people and legal entities to trade and engage in cryptocurrency transactions before 2024-01-01.
All individuals and entities must be able to engage in cryptocurrency transactions at the same level and with the same freedoms as before the ban.
For the purpose of this question an announcement by the PBOC will be enough to trigger resolution, the end of the ban does not need to have come into full effect before 2024-01-01 for positive resolution
|
2022-03-15T15:00:00Z
|
2023-12-31T00:00:00Z
|
2024-01-04T17:21:00Z
|
no
|
METACULUS
|
meta-9969
|
Will China get involved in the Russo-Ukrainian conflict by 2024?
|
Even before the Russian invasion of Ukraine, China has started making noteworthy statements about the Russian-Ukrainian conflict:
> China's foreign minister Wang Yi called Russia's security concerns "legitimate", saying they should be "taken seriously and addressed."
> Chinese ambassador to the UN Zhang Jun went further and said outright that China disagreed with US claims that Russia was threatening international peace. He also criticised the US for convening a meeting of the UN Security Council, likening it to "megaphone diplomacy" that was "not conducive" for negotiations.
According to [the Economist](https://www.economist.com/china/2022/01/29/what-china-thinks-of-possible-war-in-ukraine), China’s relations with Russia are the strongest they have been for 70 years. Thus we ask:
Resolution Criteria: This question will resolve positively if between March 1, 2022 and December 31, 2023, representatives of China announce or acknowledge the Chinese involvement in the conflict. By the Chinese involvement we mean a situation where China supports one of the parties in the conflict, either by military presence on Ukrainian territory or by military material aid of any value.
Purely commercial transactions (including weapon sales) between Chinese suppliers (be they private or state-owned companies) and one side of the conflict will be counted only if they are openly supported, endorsed, organized or subsidized by the Chinese government. Dual-use material aid will be counted only if provided with the stated purpose of helping one side's efforts in the conflict (as opposed to e.g. civilian relief).
Fine Print: Clarification issued on March 3, 2023: To count as "openly supported, endorsed, organized or subsidized" the government of China must officially announce material aid to one side of the conflict. Approval of a commercial arms deal does not qualify, unless it were to be accompanied by either an official statement describing the deal as supporting one side of the conflict or the government of China sharing some of the material cost of the deal.
|
2022-03-01T15:00:00Z
|
2023-12-31T00:00:00Z
|
2024-01-04T16:52:00Z
|
no
|
METACULUS
|
meta-9963
|
Will the UN open an investigation or otherwise intervene on the issue of the Xinjiang internment camps before 2024?
|
In 2017, the [Xinjiang internment camps](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Xinjiang_internment_camps) were instituted for the Uyghur muslims by Xi Jinping. The topic of much controversy of the last several years for their reported human rights violations, the United Nations has yet to take any action to investigate or otherwise intervene on the issue.
At a convention of the United Nations in 2019, 54 nations including China rejected the accusations of human rights violations, while 23 countries called on country to abolish the camps for the UN to intervene. After evidence of increased building and expansion of the camps in 2020, the number of countries supporting China fell to 45, with an additional 16 unique countries voicing complaints against China.
In March 2021, after the publication of an [open letter](https://www.accessnow.org/cms/assets/uploads/2020/09/UN_China_Access_Now.pdf) by 300+ NGOs and other social actor groups condemning the actions of China, the [UN announced](https://news.un.org/en/story/2021/03/1088612) that it was "deeply concerned by the allegations," and yet by October 2021, no further action had taken place.
Resolution Criteria: This question will resolve as **Yes** if the United Nations authorizes an official investigation into the internment camps in Xinjiang and the detention of Uyghur muslims via technical field assessment, fact finding mission, or other similar process by the [Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR)](https://www.ohchr.org/), [Human Rights Council](https://www.ohchr.org/EN/HRbodies/HRC/Pages/Home.aspx) or similar body before January 1, 2024.
TIhe assessment or mission need not actually occur before 2024, it is sufficient for OHCHR/HRC to announce their investigation before January 1, 2024.
The question will resolve based on [a list of official investigations at the OHCHR/HRC website](https://www.ohchr.org/EN/HRBodies/HRC/Pages/ListHRCMandat.aspx) or an official announcement by the OHCHR/HRC (on its website or via a press release)
|
2022-03-01T15:00:00Z
|
2023-12-31T00:00:00Z
|
2023-12-31T16:00:00Z
|
no
|
METACULUS
|
meta-9961
|
Will China adopt any legislation or regulations to prevent contamination of the environment with antimicrobials by 2024?
|
Resolution Criteria: [Antibiotic resistance](https://www.who.int/news-room/fact-sheets/detail/antibiotic-resistance) is one of the biggest threats to global security and health, having the potential for long-lasting effects on agriculture, food security, the environment, and human health.
This effect is [felt disproportionately by lower and middle-income countries](https://gh.bmj.com/content/4/6/e002104) who often lack the types of regulation, governance, and infrastructure needed for appropriate anti-microbial stewardship.
While rapidly successful in some areas, China [continues to suffer](https://www.who.int/china/health-topics/antimicrobial-resistancefrom) the over-prescription and use of antimicrobials and the subsequent antimicrobial resistance. Although use cases have declined enormously since 2011 since the implementation of the One Health National Action Plan, antimicrobial use for hospital inpatients remained at 36% in 2019. In 2017, China reported 73,000 cases of drug-resistant Tuberculosis, representing over 13% of the global level reported.
China's government has implemented a number of regulations, national action plans, and monitoring systems over the last several years to reduce these numbers, all of which are continuously updated and reported through the WHO [Tripartite Antimicrobial Resistance Country Self Assessment Survey](https://www.who.int/publications/m/item/tripartite-amr-country-self-assessment-survey-(tracss)-2019-2020). Despite development in a number of other areas, such as the implementation of a national surveillance system for antimicrobial resistance in humans and a antimicrobial surveillance system for animals with possible exposure to zoonotic pathogenic bacteria, China still does not have, or report to having, any regulation on antimicrobial contamination of the environment, which can lead to antimicrobial resistance in plants, the soil, and all other food or livestock cultivated in the exposed area.
***Will China adopt any legislation or regulations to prevent contamination of the environment with antimicrobials by 2024***
The question resolves positively if China self-reports under question 10.b) as to having implemented or adopted any legislation or regulations to prevent contamination of the environment with antimicrobials by 2024-01-01. Resolution will be found from [the global database on AMR country progress](http://amrcountryprogress.org/#/map-view).
Question 10.b states:
> "Country has legislation and/or regulations to prevent contamination of the environment with antimicrobials?"
If China does not provide an answer to this question (it has not provided it so far), resolution will be negative. If this site is no longer operational and the WHO does not provide the an alternative source for the survey data, or the survey is no longer implemented annually or is discontinued, then this question will resolve ambiguously. If the wording, numbering or order of questions in the survey changes and there is a question equivalent equivalent to the current 10.b, resolution will be based on such question. If there is no question directly corresponding to the current 10.b in the new survey, resolution is ambiguous.
|
2022-03-08T15:00:00Z
|
2023-12-31T00:00:00Z
|
2022-10-31T18:00:00Z
|
yes
|
METACULUS
|
meta-9958
|
Will a member of the Chinese Politburo be expelled or arrested in 2022 or 2023?
|
Resolution Criteria: The Politburo of the Chinese Communist Party, formally known as the Central Political Bureau of the Communist Party of China, is the decision-making body of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP). Currently, the Politburo is a group of 25 top officials who oversee the CCP.
Xi Jinping, President of the People's Republic of China (since 2013) and Chairman of the Central Military Commission (since 2012), is General Secretary of the Chinese Communist Party (since 2012) - General Secretary being the highest Politburo position.
[More than one million CCP officials have been arrested or jailed](https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-china-37748241) in the corruption crackdown that began shortly after Mr Xi took power in 2012. Moreover, several [Politburo members were expelled and/or arrested](https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-asia-china-41691917) around 2017, which was seen by many observers as part of an overall strategy by Xi for consolidating power. (For neutrality, it is worth noting that many other observers claimed these Politburo arrests were legitimate and not politically motivated.)
A trend of Politburo member expulsions or arrests may be some indicator of China’s stability and its political system trajectory, which in turn may affect global cooperation. Thus we ask:
***In 2022 and 2023, will one or more members of the Chinese Politburo be expelled or arrested?***
The question will resolve positively if there will be 3 credible news sources reporting a Politburo member expulsion or arrest. Note that during 2022 a new Politburo is expected to be elected - thus we ask whether any member of either the old or the new Politburo will be expelled or arrested.
|
2022-03-08T15:00:00Z
|
2023-12-31T00:00:00Z
|
2023-12-31T16:00:00Z
|
no
|
METACULUS
|
meta-9957
|
Will China have approved cultivated meat for human consumption by 2024?
|
On November 26, 2020, Singapore became [the first country to approve the commercial sale of cultivated meat](https://www.technologyreview.com/2020/12/01/1012789/cultured-cultivated-meat-just-singapore-approved-food-climate/). China could be one of its successors.
As [the Good Food Institute](https://gfi.org/blog/china-is-making-moves-on-cultivated-meat/) states:
>"A National Key R&D Program titled “Green Biological Manufacturing” was launched by China’s Ministry of Science and Technology in late 2020. Plant-based and cultivated meat manufacturing are among the 20+ research projects supported by this grant, which will unleash a reported 600 million RMB ($93M USD) in funding. It is estimated that around 20 million RMB of that will be specifically aimed at developing alternative protein."
People in China consumed 86 million tonnes of meat in 2020, about 30% of global demand. Thus we ask:
Resolution Criteria: This question resolves positively if China approves at least one cultivated meat product for human consumption (or issues a more general approval for a class of cultivated meat products) before January 1, 2024. The question resolves positively even if the approval is later rescinded.
For a product to be deemed a "cultivated meat product", it must contain at least 20% cultivated meat by weight (where cultivated meat is here defined as meat that is grown primarily or entirely in cell culture, rather than in an animal’s body).
Resolution is by credible news source, reports from regulators, or statements by relevant cultivated meat companies.
The prediction for [a similar question](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/8844/approval-of-cultivated-meat-in-china/) (with a deadline of April 2023) is 52% at the time this question is launched.
Similar question on Metaculus:
[By April 2023, will China approve cultivated meat for human consumption?](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/8844/approval-of-cultivated-meat-in-china/
|
2022-03-08T15:00:00Z
|
2023-12-31T00:00:00Z
|
2023-12-31T16:00:00Z
|
no
|
METACULUS
|
meta-9948
|
Will there be more than 4 deaths between Russia and NATO forces outside of Ukraine before July 1, 2023?
|
Russia invaded Ukraine, a non-NATO member. Ukraine borders Poland, Hungary, Slovakia and Romania, all NATO members.
It is possible that on the border between these countries, or elsewhere, Russian forces fight with NATO forces.
Resolution Criteria: This resolves positively according to 3 credible media accounts of 5 or more deaths between NATO and Russian forces. These forces might be police or military.
These deaths can occur on either side anywhere in the world, between Russia and any NATO country
|
2022-03-01T08:00:00Z
|
2023-06-29T23:01:00Z
|
2023-07-01T15:42:00Z
|
no
|
METACULUS
|
meta-9797
|
Will Microsoft acquire Activision Blizzard by June 30, 2023?
|
On January 18, 2022, Microsoft, manufacturer of the Xbox video game console, [announced](https://news.microsoft.com/2022/01/18/microsoft-to-acquire-activision-blizzard-to-bring-the-joy-and-community-of-gaming-to-everyone-across-every-device/) an agreement to acquire Activision Blizzard for $68.7 billion, which would make Microsoft the 3rd largest video game publisher in the world, behind Tencent and Sony. Activision Blizzard's key franchises are Call of Duty, World of Warcraft, Overwatch League, Diablo, Hearthstone, and Candy Crush. Microsoft stated that it expects the deal to be completed in its 2023 fiscal year, which ends on June 30, 2023.
Bloomberg [reports](https://archive.is/4k6DR) that the US Federal Trade Commission is reviewing the deal as possibly harmful to competition, stating that the agency "has vowed more aggressive policing of deals."
Resolution Criteria: This question resolves as positive based on a Microsoft press release stating that it has acquired Activision Blizzard. It resolves as negative immediately upon an announcement by Microsoft that the acquisition deal has been terminated. Otherwise if no deal has been completed by June 30, 2023, this resolves as negative
|
2022-02-13T05:00:00Z
|
2023-06-30T01:33:00Z
|
2023-07-01T16:17:00Z
|
no
|
METACULUS
|
meta-9783
|
Will Peter Daszak be the president of EcoHealth Alliance on January 1, 2024?
|
From [Wikipedia](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Peter_Daszak):
> Peter Daszak is a British zoologist, consultant and public expert on disease ecology, in particular on zoonosis. He is the president of EcoHealth Alliance, a nonprofit non-governmental organization that supports various programs on global health and pandemic prevention.
> Prior to the pandemic, Daszak and EcoHealth Alliance were the only U.S.-based organization researching coronavirus evolution and transmission in China,[26] where they partnered with the Wuhan Institute of Virology, among others.
Despite his relationship with the Wuhan Institute of Virology—which [some consider to consitute conflicting interests](https://www.wsj.com/articles/who-are-the-covid-investigators-11613401955)—he co-authored [an open letter](https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC7159294/) that stated: "We stand together to strongly condemn conspiracy theories suggesting that COVID-19 does not have a natural origin...and overwhelmingly conclude that this coronavirus originated in wildlife", without mentioning any potential conflicts of interest (though [a statement](https://www.thelancet.com/journals/lancet/article/PIIS0140-6736(21)01377-5/fulltext) regarding competing interests was later added). Similarly, despite his prior involvement with the Wuhan Institute of Virology, he was on a team sent to investigate the origins of the COVID-19 pandemic, including the hypothesis that it emerged at the very institute he had been working with.
Resolution Criteria: This question will resolve as **Yes** if EcoHealth Alliance is still operational and Peter Daszak is EcoHealth Alliance's president on January 1, 2024. This question will resolve as **No** if EcoHealth Alliance is disbanded, or if Peter Daszak is no longer its president.
In case Daszak is suspended or placed on leave, and therefore at the time not the acting president, this question wil resolve as **No**
|
2022-02-11T05:00:00Z
|
2023-12-31T07:00:00Z
|
2024-01-01T05:00:00Z
|
yes
|
METACULUS
|
meta-20764
|
Will there be 10 or more armed forces conflict deaths between China and Taiwan in 2024?
|
China has [repeatedly asserted](https://www.nbcnews.com/news/china/xi-warned-biden-summit-beijing-will-reunify-taiwan-china-rcna130087) a claim to Taiwan since the beginning of independent Taiwanese governance in 1949. The [tense relations](https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/china-taiwan-relations-tension-us-policy-biden) between the two countries has led to fears of a [Chinese invasion of Taiwan](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/11480/china-launches-invasion-of-taiwan/).
Resolution Criteria: This question will resolve as **Yes** if, in calendar year 2024, credible sources report that there have been 10 or more deaths among the overtly flagged members of the armed forces of China or Taiwan caused by confrontation with the armed forces of the other nation. This includes accidents, such as vehicle collisions.
Fine Print: * Armed forces under government control will qualify, for example [China's paramilitary forces](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Paramilitary_forces_of_China), such as the [People's Armed Police](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Paramilitary_forces_of_China).
* Deaths do not need to occur at the same time, or among the same military force, and all deaths among members of the armed forces of either military occurring in calendar year 2024 will count.
* If a range is provided, the lower end of the range must be 10 or more to qualify. Metaculus may wait for additional confirmation from credible sources to resolve if the credibility of the initial reports is in doubt.
* Incidents of friendly fire will not count toward the total, if it can unambiguously and promptly be determined that deaths were caused by friendly fire.
|
2024-01-01T07:00:00Z
|
2024-12-31T23:00:00Z
|
2025-01-07T16:45:00Z
|
no
|
METACULUS
|
meta-20763
|
Will the New Glenn launch vehicle reach an altitude of 100 kilometers in 2024?
|
Blue Origin's [New Glenn](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/New_Glenn) launch vehicle consists of two stages and is planned to be able to [launch 45 metric tons of payload into low Earth orbit](https://www.blueorigin.com/new-glenn). The first launch is [currently planned](https://spacenews.com/nasa-mars-smallsat-mission-to-be-on-first-new-glenn-launch/) to carry a NASA [smallsat](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Small_satellite) in August of 2024.
Resolution Criteria: This question will resolve as **Yes** if, in calendar year 2024, the New Glenn launch vehicle reaches an altitude of 100 kilometers intact.
Fine Print: * Test flights with no payload count.
|
2024-01-01T07:00:00Z
|
2024-12-31T23:00:00Z
|
2025-01-05T04:47:00Z
|
no
|
METACULUS
|
meta-20762
|
Will the Shanghai (SSE) Composite Index go up over 2024?
|
The SSE Composite Index is a stock market index of all stocks on the Shanghai Stock Exchange. While the Chinese economy has grown significantly over the past two decades, the Shanghai Stock Exchange has had more humble returns. For reference, [China's GDP](https://www.macrotrends.net/countries/CHN/china/gdp-gross-domestic-product) grew from 1.47 trillion USD in 2002 to 17.96 trillion USD in 2022, while the [SSE](https://finance.yahoo.com/quote/000001.SS/) went from 1500 at the beginning of 2003 to 3255 at the beginning of 2023.
For further reference, [from 2003 until 2022](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/SSE_Composite_Index), the SSE ended the year up for 11 of those years and down for 9 of those years.
Resolution Criteria: This question will resolve **YES** if on December 31st, 2024, the closing price of the SSE Index is higher than the closing price of the SSE Index was on December 29th, 2023. Otherwise, the question will resolve **NO**.
The closing price will be checked at: https://finance.yahoo.com/quote/000001.SS
Fine Print: If the Yahoo Finance page ceases to exist before January 1st, 2025, another source will be used as chosen by Metaculus.
|
2024-01-01T07:00:00Z
|
2024-12-31T20:00:00Z
|
2025-01-02T14:51:00Z
|
yes
|
METACULUS
|
meta-20761
|
Will Ukraine control central Bakhmut at the end of 2024?
|
**Previous Questions on Metaculus**
- [Will Russian troops reach the center of Bakhmut, Ukraine before 0000 hrs local time on January 27th, 2023?](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/14607/russian-troops-in-central-bakhmut-by-1-27-23/)
- [Will Ukraine regain control of central Bakhmut by the end of May 2023?](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/16743/ukraine-regains-bakhmut-before-june-2023/)
- [Will Ukraine regain control of central Bakhmut by the end of September 2023?](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/17742/ukraine-regains-bakhmut-before-october-2023/)
---
The city of Bakhmut in Ukraine has been [heavily contested](https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2023/5/20/the-battle-for-ukraine-bakhmut-a-timeline), and [according to PBS](https://www.pbs.org/newshour/amp/world/ukraine-ends-year-in-disappointing-stalemate-with-russia-and-anxious-about-aid-from-allies) the battle for Bakhmut has been "the longest and bloodiest battle of the war".
The [Institute for the Study of War](https://www.understandingwar.org/) (ISW) has been tracking the war in Ukraine and charting the control of territory on its [interactive map](https://storymaps.arcgis.com/stories/36a7f6a6f5a9448496de641cf64bd375). As of December 21, 2023, the ISW shows central Bakhmut as under "assessed Russian control".
Resolution Criteria: This question will resolve as **Yes** if, when accessed by Metaculus at 2pm ET on December 31, 2024, the [Institute for the Study of War (ISW) map](https://storymaps.arcgis.com/stories/36a7f6a6f5a9448496de641cf64bd375) shows the Bakhmut State District Administrative Building — located at Oleksandra Sybirtseva St, 33, Bakhmut, Donetsk Oblast, Ukraine, 84500 — is under any of the following categories:
- Ukrainian Control
- Claimed Ukrainian Counteroffensives
- Any other categories created by ISW that indicate Ukrainian control of the location
The question will resolve as **No** if the administrative building is assessed to be within any of the following categories:
- Assessed Russian Control
- Assessed Russian Advance
- Claimed Russian Control
- Reported Ukrainian Partisan Warfare
- Any other categories created by ISW that indicate Russian control of the building
Fine Print: * The sole authoritative source for defining areas of control will be the [Institute for the Study of War (ISW) Ukraine Interactive War Map](https://storymaps.arcgis.com/stories/36a7f6a6f5a9448496de641cf64bd375). If the map has not been updated in the last seven days at the specified time of resolution, the question will be **annulled**.
* Forecasters can see the exact location of the administrative building by viewing the [ISW Map](https://isw.pub/InteractiveUkraineWarMap), clicking on the 'magnifying glass' icon, and searching for "Oleksandra Sybirtseva St, 33, Bakhmut, Donetsk Oblast, Ukraine, 84500".
* If the building itself no longer exists, resolution will be based on the location of the building.
* Credit to [GJOpen](https://www.gjopen.com/questions/2621-will-the-location-of-the-administrative-services-building-in-bakhmut-ukraine-cease-to-be-under-ukrainian-control-before-26-january-2023-according-to-the-institute-for-the-study-of-war) for inspiring the resolution criteria.
|
2024-01-01T07:00:00Z
|
2024-12-30T23:00:16.291000Z
|
2025-01-02T14:42:00Z
|
no
|
METACULUS
|
meta-20760
|
Will a crewed Artemis II flight approach the moon in 2024?
|
NASA's [Artemis program](https://www.nasa.gov/specials/artemis/) is a series of missions to explore the moon. The first mission, [Artemis I](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Artemis_1), was launched on November 16, 2022, and performed an uncrewed flyby of the moon.
The second mission, [Artemis II](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Artemis_2#Mission), is planned to be the first crewed mission to fly by the moon since [humans last left low Earth orbit with the Apollo 17 mission in 1972](https://airandspace.si.edu/stories/editorial/why-50-years-since-humans-went-moon). Its launch is [scheduled to be no earlier than November of 2024](https://www.nasa.gov/mission/artemis-ii/).
<img src="https://www.nasa.gov/wp-content/uploads/2023/02/artemis-2-map-october-2021.jpeg" alt="Artemis II Mission Plan" />
*[Image published by NASA](https://www.nasa.gov/missions/artemis/artemis-ii-map/)*
Resolution Criteria: This question will resolve as **Yes** if, in calendar year 2024, the Artemis II moon mission comes within 20,000 nautical miles of the surface of the moon with a living crew.
|
2024-01-01T07:00:00Z
|
2024-12-31T23:00:00Z
|
2025-01-02T14:31:00Z
|
no
|
METACULUS
|
meta-20759
|
Will an AI win a coding contest on Codeforces in 2024?
|
In February of 2022 Google DeepMind [unveiled AlphaCode](https://deepmind.google/discover/blog/competitive-programming-with-alphacode/), an AI system that it claimed "writes computer programs at a competitive level". AlphaCode was assessed on challenges [Codeforces](https://codeforces.com/), a platform for competitive coding with prizes for the best and most efficient solutions to the problems posed. [According to the Verge](https://www.theverge.com/2022/2/2/22914085/alphacode-ai-coding-program-automatic-deepmind-codeforce):
>AlphaCode was tested on 10 of challenges that had been tackled by 5,000 users on the Codeforces site. On average, it ranked within the top 54.3 percent of responses, and DeepMind estimates that this gives the system a Codeforces Elo of 1238, which places it within the top 28 percent of users who have competed on the site in the last six months.
In December of 2023, DeepMind announced AlphaCode 2, powered by its [new Gemini model](https://blog.google/technology/ai/google-gemini-ai/). In an [accompanying technical report](https://storage.googleapis.com/deepmind-media/AlphaCode2/AlphaCode2_Tech_Report.pdf), DeepMind described AlphaCode2 as a significant improvement over the first AlphaCode and said it performed better than 85% of competition participants on Codeforces.
>When evaluated on the Codeforces platform – a mainstay of competitive programming – AlphaCode 2 solves 43% of problems within 10 attempts, close to twice as many problems as the original AlphaCode (25%). While its predecessor performed at the level of the median competitor, we estimate that AlphaCode 2 reaches the 85th percentile on average.
So far AlphaCode results appear to be based on a comparison of its performance to those of contestants without actually entering the contest. [Discussions of the results](https://codeforces.com/blog/entry/123035) by Codeforces users correctly guessed that a user known as AdamentChicken2 was one of the accounts used to submit AlphaCode 2 solutions, which was [confirmed by the user](https://codeforces.com/blog/entry/123035?#comment-1091379) and in an X (formerly Twitter) posts ([1](https://twitter.com/RemiLeblond/status/1732712334626361671), [2](https://twitter.com/RemiLeblond/status/1732677521290789235)) by DeepMind research scientist Rémi Leblond.
Resolution Criteria: This question will resolve as **Yes** if, in calendar year 2024, credible sources report that an AI has won a coding contest on [Codeforces](https://codeforces.com/) in the highest division.
Fine Print: * To qualify, an AI must generate all code solutions entirely independently, no human editing, direction, or revision of solutions is allowed. For example, human direction iterating on generated output of the form "X line of code is suboptimal, please revise it" is not allowed.
* The AI must top the official leaderboard for the contest, simulating the contest or participating in a virtual round will not be sufficient.
* There is no requirement on how the generated solutions are processed or submitted except that solutions cannot be edited by humans. An AI generating many solutions with human filtering for the most optimal solution is allowed, and humans may make the submissions to the platform.
* Currently the highest division on Codeforces is division 1, for users rated 1900+. The AI must win a contest that allows division 1 users to compete. If Codeforces changes its ratings or divisions the AI must win a contest that allows users in the highest division to enter.
* A qualifying report may be silent on human intervention in the code generation, so long as Metaculus does not have reason to believe that human intervention occurred. Metaculus may wait for additional confirmation from credible sources to resolve if the credibility of the initial reports is in doubt. Where information is conflicting or unclear, Metaculus may make a determination to resolve the question or resolve the question as **Ambiguous**.
|
2024-01-01T07:00:00Z
|
2024-12-31T23:00:00Z
|
2025-01-05T14:13:00Z
|
no
|
METACULUS
|
meta-20758
|
Will OpenAI publish information describing Q* (Q-Star) in 2024?
|
After the OpenAI board [temporarily removed Sam Altman as CEO](https://www.theverge.com/23966325/openai-sam-altman-fired-turmoil-chatgpt) in November 2023, rumors abounded regarding the reasons behind the decision. One such rumor was that the move was sparked by progress in a new AI system with potentially dangerous capabilities. Citing anonymous sources, [Reuters reported the following](https://www.reuters.com/technology/sam-altmans-ouster-openai-was-precipitated-by-letter-board-about-ai-breakthrough-2023-11-22/):
>Ahead of OpenAI CEO Sam Altman’s four days in exile, several staff researchers wrote a letter to the board of directors warning of a powerful artificial intelligence discovery that they said could threaten humanity, two people familiar with the matter told Reuters.
>
>. . .
>
>After being contacted by Reuters, OpenAI, which declined to comment, acknowledged in an internal message to staffers a project called Q\* and a letter to the board before the weekend's events, one of the people said. An OpenAI spokesperson said that the message, sent by long-time executive Mira Murati, alerted staff to certain media stories without commenting on their accuracy.
Resolution Criteria: This question will resolve as **Yes** if, in calendar year 2024, OpenAI publicly acknowledges that a system or method it has explored is the rumored Q\* (or Q-Star) **and** publishes (or has published in the past) a document (e.g., a blog post, paper, or video, but not a tweet) describing the system or method rumored to be Q\*.
Fine Print: * A description of Q\* must state that it is a system or method that was or is currently being developed or explored by OpenAI and must provide some information about what Q\* is (for example, giving an overview of how Q\* works without delving into technical detail). A description of a system or method that was published before 2024 but is publicly acknowledged to be Q\* in 2024 will resolve the question as **Yes**.
* A description does **not** need to contain any of the following:
* A statement that Q\* has been used on or is an AI system that has finished training or that is functional.
* An accompanying release of an AI system known as Q\* or that has been trained using Q\*.
* Any performance results.
* A paper describing it in detail.
* A public acknowledgement that the system or method described is Q\* does not need to be made in the initial document describing the system or method, and can occur at a later time, including from public statements by OpenAI staff, including interviews, media appearances, or podcasts (this does not include statements made anonymously or on background). The question will resolve as **Yes** when all criteria are met. For example, if OpenAI publishes information about an AI system not named Q\*, but in a later interview the OpenAI CEO states that the system is the previously rumored Q\*, the question will resolve as **Yes**.
* The system or method must be announced by OpenAI, or any entity which legally acquires or merges with OpenAI. If Microsoft or any other entity exercises its existing rights or purchases rights such that it announces such a system or method but without having legally acquired or merged with OpenAI it will **not** be sufficient.
* A description specifically of Q\* must be provided, a description of a system or method characterized as a successor to Q\* would not qualify.
|
2024-01-01T07:00:00Z
|
2024-12-31T23:00:00Z
|
2025-01-05T14:18:00Z
|
no
|
METACULUS
|
meta-20757
|
Will the 2024 light duty electric vehicle sales share exceed 11% in the US through November 2024?
|
Electric vehicles have seen significant sales growth in recent years, with plug-in vehicles (PEVs) making up less than 3% of light duty vehicle (LDV) sales in 2020, a figure that [has grown to above 9%](https://www.anl.gov/esia/light-duty-electric-drive-vehicles-monthly-sales-updates) through November 2023.
PEVs consist of both battery electric vehicles (BEVs) and plug-in hybrid electric vehicles (PHEVs).
Resolution Criteria: This question will resolve as **Yes** if, for the total period made up of the months of January 2024 through November 2024, inclusive, the sales share of light duty plug-in vehicles (PEVs) is greater than 11% in the United States according to [data published by Argonne National Laboratory](https://www.anl.gov/esia/light-duty-electric-drive-vehicles-monthly-sales-updates).
Fine Print: * PEVs include both battery electric vehicles (BEVs) and plug-in hybrid electric vehicles (PHEVs).
* Specifically, light duty vehicle sales figures published by Argonne in the [monthly historical data](https://www.anl.gov/esia/reference/light-duty-electric-drive-vehicles-monthly-sales-updates-historical-data) will be used when data for November 2024 first becomes available. The percentage will be computed by using the total PEV sales from January through November 2024 compared to total light duty vehicle (LDV) sales over the same period. The question does **not** require each month to exceed 11% sales share.
|
2024-01-01T07:00:00Z
|
2024-11-30T23:00:00Z
|
2024-12-23T01:54:00Z
|
no
|
METACULUS
|
meta-20754
|
Will the WHO declare a global health emergency (PHEIC) in 2024?
|
The World Health Organization (WHO) [describes](https://www.who.int/news-room/questions-and-answers/item/emergencies-international-health-regulations-and-emergency-committees) a Public Health Emergency of International Concern (PHEIC) as follows:
>A PHEIC is defined in the IHR (2005) as, “an extraordinary event which is determined to constitute a public health risk to other States through the international spread of disease and to potentially require a coordinated international response”. This definition implies a situation that is:
>
> * serious, sudden, unusual or unexpected;
> * carries implications for public health beyond the affected State’s national border; and
> * may require immediate international action.
The International Health Regulations (IHR) Emergency Committee (EC) meets to monitor health risks and provide advice to [WHO Director-General](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Director-General_of_the_World_Health_Organization), who makes the final determination of whether to declare a PHEIC.
There [have been seven](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Public_health_emergency_of_international_concern#Declarations) PHEIC declarations since the IHR was established in 2005. The first was swine flu in 2009, and the most recent was Mpox in 2022.
Resolution Criteria: This question will resolve as **Yes** if the World Health Organization (WHO) declares a new Public Health Emergency of International Concern (PHEIC) in calendar year 2024.
|
2024-01-01T07:00:00Z
|
2024-12-31T23:00:00Z
|
2024-08-14T17:31:00Z
|
yes
|
METACULUS
|
meta-20753
|
Will Benjamin Netanyahu remain Prime Minister of Israel throughout 2024?
|
*The background information text from this question is taken from this earlier question: [When will Benjamin Netanyahu cease to be Prime Minister of Israel?](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/19813/next-prime-minister-of-israel/)*
---
[Benjamin Netanyahu](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Benjamin_Netanyahu) is the current Prime Minister of Israel, having previously held the office from 1996 to 1999 and again from 2009 to 2021. Netanyahu is the longest-tenured prime minister in the country's history, having served for a total of over 16 years.
[A series of coordinated attacks](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/2023_Hamas_attack_on_Israel), conducted by the Palestinian Islamist militant Hamas, from the Gaza Strip onto bordering areas in Israel, commenced on Saturday 7 October 2023. Israel declared war on Hamas on 8 October, and its response to the attack has seen the most significant military escalation in the region since the Yom Kippur War.
Within Israel, Netanyahu's government has been [widely condemned](https://thehill.com/opinion/international/4282509-netanyahu-failed-and-must-resign/) for failures to prepare for these attacks.
Resolution Criteria: If Benjamin Netanyahu has remained the Prime Minister of Israel for the entire duration of calendar year 2024, this question will resolve as **YES** on January 1, 2025. If he ceases to be Prime Minster at any point during 2024, this question resolves **NO**.
|
2024-01-01T07:00:00Z
|
2024-12-31T23:00:00Z
|
2025-01-05T04:46:00Z
|
yes
|
METACULUS
|
meta-20752
|
Will there be a bilateral cease-fire or peace agreement in the Russo-Ukraine conflict in 2024?
|
As of December 2023, the situation in the Russo-Ukrainian conflict remains complex and dynamic, with no clear indications of an imminent bilateral ceasefire or peace agreement. The war, which began when Russia invaded Ukraine on February 24, 2022, has continued with varying intensity.
Recent developments include ongoing hostilities in various regions, including Kherson and the industrial city of Avdiivka, indicating that the conflict remains active with no significant moves towards a ceasefire or peace talks. The Ukrainian military has adopted a more defensive posture after failing to achieve a major breakthrough in their months-long counteroffensive, as [noted by the United Kingdom’s Defence Ministry](https://abcnews.go.com/International/wireStory/analysts-ukraines-forces-pivoting-defense-after-russia-held-105807988).
Resolution Criteria: This question will resolve as Yes if a bilateral cease-fire begins at any point between December 23rd, 2023 and December 31, 2024 and stands for at least 30 days. (The latest possible ceasefire, by this criterion, begins December 31, 2024 and stands through January 30, 2025.) A ceasefire is bilateral if it applies to the majorities of combatants on both the Russian and Ukrainian sides, respectively. A cease-fire is deemed to have stood as long as no reliable sources report that the cease-fire has broken down or is no longer effective. This question will resolve as No if no cease-fire has gone into effect and been sustained for 30 days by January 30th, 2025.
The ceasefire must apply to all military operations in all official and disputed Ukrainian and Russian territory. In other words, a limited ceasefire (such as granting safety to humanitarian corridors or specific regions) is insufficient to resolve the question as Yes.
|
2024-01-01T07:00:00Z
|
2025-01-30T18:00:00Z
|
2025-01-01T00:00:00Z
|
no
|
METACULUS
|
meta-20751
|
In 2024 will there be any change in the composition of the US Supreme Court?
|
As of the end of 2023, the U.S. Supreme Court comprises nine justices with lifetime appointments. The Court's composition includes:
1. Chief Justice John Roberts (appointed 2005)
2. Justice Clarence Thomas (appointed 1991)
3. Justice Samuel Alito (appointed 2006)
4. Justice Sonia Sotomayor (appointed 2009)
5. Justice Elena Kagan (appointed 2010)
6. Justice Neil Gorsuch (appointed 2017)
7. Justice Brett Kavanaugh (appointed 2018)
8. Justice Amy Coney Barrett (appointed 2020)
9. Justice Ketanji Brown Jackson (appointed 2022)
The makeup of the U.S. Supreme Court plays a crucial role in shaping the country's legal landscape and has a significant impact on American society. The lifelong appointments of the justices mean that any changes in the Court's composition, due to retirement, death, or impeachment, can lead to substantial and enduring influences on both legal and societal matters in the United States.
Resolution Criteria: The question resolves as **Yes** if any of the nine current justices retires, dies, is impeached, or resigns. Additionally, a change in size of the Supreme Court would also qualify, such as adding or removing members. In situations like a justice announcing retirement but serving beyond 2024, the resolution is based on the status as of December 31, 2024. If the justice is still serving on this date, the question resolves as **No**.
|
2024-01-01T07:00:00Z
|
2024-12-31T23:00:00Z
|
2025-01-05T04:53:00Z
|
no
|
METACULUS
|
meta-20750
|
Will the Doomsday Clock move closer to midnight in January 2024?
|
*Much of the text from this question is taken from this previous question: [Will the Doomsday Clock move closer to midnight?](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/14601/bas-doomsday-clock-closer-to-midnight-in-2023/)*
The [Doomsday Clock](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Doomsday_Clock) is a symbolic representation of the threat of a man-made global catastrophe. Maintained by the [*Bulletin of Atomic Scientists*](https://thebulletin.org/doomsday-clock), the clock was first introduced in 1947, and its original setting was "seven minutes to midnight." The closer the clock is to midnight, the closer the world is to a global catastrophe, in the opinion of the *Bulletin*.
The clock began as a warning of the threat of a large-scale nuclear conflict. It now includes other factors, including climate change and "disruptive technologies".
The clock's setting is determined by the *Bulletin's* [Security and Science Board](https://thebulletin.org/about-us/science-and-security-board/), typically once each year in January. It is currently at [90 seconds to midnight](https://thebulletin.org/doomsday-clock/).
Resolution Criteria: This question will resolve as **Yes** if the *Bulletin of Atomic Scientists* sets the Doomsday Clock to any setting fewer than 90 seconds to midnight, before February 1, 2024. If the clock is set at or above 90 seconds to midnight, this question will resolve as **No**.
|
2024-01-08T16:00:00Z
|
2024-01-20T23:00:00Z
|
2024-01-23T15:15:00Z
|
no
|
METACULUS
|
meta-20749
|
Will there be faithless electors in the 2024 US Presidential election?
|
In US presidential elections, voters vote for [electors](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/United_States_Electoral_College) who then cast votes for the president and vice president. Typically, electors are pledged to vote for a specific candidate, but in principle it is possible (though illegal in some states) for elector to vote for any candidate.
An elector who votes for a candidate other than the one that they are pledged to is known as a [faithless elector](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Faithless_elector).
In 2016, there were [ten](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Faithless_electors_in_the_2016_United_States_presidential_election) faithless electors, seven of which were not invalidated; this resulted in one electoral vote for Bernie Sanders, one for Faith Spotted Eagle, three for Colin Powell, one for Ron Paul, and one for John Kasich.
Resolution Criteria: This question will resolve as **Yes** if any members of the Electoral College vote for a candidate other than the candidate to whom they had pledged their vote in the 2024 presidential election, and their vote is not invalidated, according to reporting by credible sources.
|
2024-01-01T07:00:00Z
|
2024-12-16T18:00:00Z
|
2024-12-18T05:01:00Z
|
no
|
METACULUS
|
meta-20748
|
Will the FDA or EMA withdraw approval of semaglutide for the treatment of obesity or diabetes in 2024?
|
In 2014, liraglutide was [approved as a drug for weight loss](https://www.accessdata.fda.gov/drugsatfda_docs/nda/2014/206321Orig1s000TOC.cfm) by the US Food and Drug Administration (FDA), then later by [the European Medicines Agency (EMA) in 2015](https://www.ema.europa.eu/en/medicines/human/EPAR/saxenda). It is a once-daily injected drug based on the gut hormone glucagon-like peptide-1 (GLP-1), whose biology has turned out to be a goldmine for the medical management of obesity and type 2 diabetes. Liraglutide, which was developed by Novo Nordisk, causes about [7%](https://doi.org/10.1016/S0140-6736(09)61375-1) [loss](https://doi.org/10.1038/ijo.2011.158) of body weight in people with obesity when paired with diet and exercise advice.
By tweaking the design of GLP-1-based drugs, [Novo Nordisk discovered](https://doi.org/10.1021/acs.jmedchem.5b00726) another drug that had a much longer half-life in the blood and a substantially larger impact on body weight: semaglutide. Semaglutide only requires one injection per week and produces average weight losses of [15](http://doi.org/10.1056/NEJMoa2032183)-[18](https://doi.org/10.1001/jama.2021.3224)% in people with obesity when paired with diet and exercise advice. [Initially approved at lower doses](https://www.accessdata.fda.gov/drugsatfda_docs/nda/2017/209637Orig1s000TOC.cfm) for the treatment of type 2 diabetes, the FDA approved a higher dose (2.4 mg) for the treatment of obesity [in June 2021](https://www.fda.gov/news-events/press-announcements/fda-approves-new-drug-treatment-chronic-weight-management-first-2014). It's marketed under the brand name Wegovy in the US, and Ozempic or Rybelsus in other markets.
Given the checkered history of weight loss drugs, it's reasonable to be cautious about their safety. Semaglutide and related drugs often cause unpleasant gastrointestinal side effects like nausea, heartburn, diarrhea, constipation, fatigue, and headache, but these are typically mild and transient if the dose is started low and escalated slowly. [Few people](http://doi.org/10.1056/NEJMoa2032183) discontinue semaglutide due to side effects.
Some studies have suggested that this class of drugs may increase the risk of [thyroid](https://doi.org/10.1210/en.2009-1272) and [pancreatic](https://doi.org/10.2337/db11-1109) cancer in lab rodents. Yet [randomized controlled trials](https://doi.org/10.1007/s12020-019-02055-z) including 64,000 people with type 2 diabetes have not observed an increased risk of cancer, overall or at any specific site in humans. These trials are limited in duration and don't yet have enough people to reliably identify modest increases in the risk of low-frequency outcomes like thyroid and pancreatic cancer. Observational [monitoring data](https://doi.org/10.3389/fendo.2021.645563) are mixed but have not provided a clear signal of increased risk.
Importantly, trials suggest that semaglutide [reduces major](http://doi.org/10.1056/NEJMoa1901118) [cardiovascular events](http://doi.org/10.1056/NEJMoa1607141) by about one quarter, similar to cholesterol-lowering statin drugs. Furthermore, across seven trials in people with type 2 diabetes, semaglutide and related drugs reduce the overall risk of dying [by 12%](https://doi.org/10.1016/s2213-8587(19)30249-9). These findings are reassuring, but monitoring is ongoing and [some concern remains](https://doi.org/10.3389/fendo.2021.645563).
Resolution Criteria: This question will resolve as **Yes** if either the US Food and Drug Administration or the European Medicines Agency withdraw approval for semaglutide (AKA Wegovy, Ozempic, or any other brand name for semaglutide) before January 1, 2025. The stated reason for withdrawal must include concerns of safety or harmful side effects.
|
2024-01-01T07:00:00Z
|
2024-12-31T18:00:00Z
|
2025-01-05T04:59:00Z
|
no
|
METACULUS
|
meta-20747
|
Will Bitcoin go up over 2024?
|
Bitcoin, the cryptocurrency with the [highest valuation](https://coinmarketcap.com/), increased over 50% from mid-October 2023 until late December of 2023. While Bitcoin is still short of its November 2021 high of over $64,000, the recent rally has renewed interest in cryptocurrency and left [some analysts](https://www.forbes.com/sites/digital-assets/2023/10/24/a-wall-street-giant-has-declared-crypto-winter-over-as-bitcoin-smashes-30000-and-the-price-of-ethereum-and-xrp-suddenly-soar/?sh=3a357ea2917f) wondering if the "crypto winter" is over.
For [reference](https://bitcoinmagazine.com/guides/bitcoin-price-history), from the start of 2010 until the end of 2022, Bitcoin's price increased 10 of those years and decreased 3 of those years.
Resolution Criteria: This question will resolve **YES** if the last measured price of Bitcoin (in USD) on CoinMarketCap on December 31st, 2024 (UTC) is greater than the earliest measured price of Bitcoin on [CoinMarketCap](https://coinmarketcap.com/currencies/bitcoin/) on January 1st, 2024 (UTC). Otherwise, the question will resolve **NO**.
Fine Print: If CoinMarketCap ceases to exist before January 1st, 2025, another website will be used to track the price of Bitcoin.
|
2024-01-01T07:00:00Z
|
2024-12-31T23:00:00Z
|
2025-01-02T14:50:00Z
|
yes
|
METACULUS
|
meta-20741
|
Will the ban on imports of Apple watches with blood oxygen sensors take effect before December 27, 2023?
|
[According to NPR](https://www.npr.org/2023/12/18/1220125508/apple-watch-series-9-ultra-2-masimo-patent):
>In October [2023], the U.S. International Trade Commission [ruled](https://www.usitc.gov/system/files?file=secretary/fed_reg_notices/337/337_1276_notice10262023sgl.pdf) that some Apple Watches violated Masimo's patents for the the blood oxygen feature that Apple has included in most of its smartphone watches since 2020.
On December 18, Apple announced that it would [halt sales of the Apple watches](https://www.theverge.com/2023/12/18/24006080/apple-watch-ban-series-9-ultra-2-itc-import). [According to the Verge](https://www.theverge.com/2023/12/18/24006080/apple-watch-ban-series-9-ultra-2-itc-import):
>.The ban only affects the flagship Series 9 and Ultra 2 models. Since the Apple Watch SE does not have the SpO2 sensor, it remains unaffected. Previous models of the Apple Watch with the blood oxygen sensor will also not be impacted. The ITC ban also only impacts sales of the Series 9 and Ultra 2 within the US — the watches will still be available for sale abroad.
>
>The patent disputes between Apple and Masimo have been thorny over the past few years. Masimo is most well known for its pulse oximeter. Masimo filed two separate cases — one with the US District Court in the Central District of California and a second with the ITC —claiming that Apple infringed on its pulse oximetry tech. This particular import ban is a result of the latter.
>
> . . .
>
>Right now, it’s unclear whether the ITC import ban will stand. It’s currently undergoing a presidential review period, and President Joe Biden will have the opportunity to veto the ban. Presidential vetos, however, are uncommon, though Apple has benefitted from them in the past. In 2013, former President Barack Obama vetoed an ITC import ban on the iPhone 4 and certain iPad models. That said, Biden chose to uphold another ITC ruling that would see Apple Watch imports banned over the EKG feature. The presidential review period ends December 25th, so we’ll have to see if things change between now and then.
Resolution Criteria: This question will resolve as **Yes** if, before December 27, 2023, credible sources report that the ban on imports of some Apple watches containing blood oxygen sensors has taken effect.
Fine Print: * The ban on imports will be considered to have taken effect if the International Trade Commission order [becomes final](https://www.cbp.gov/sites/default/files/documents/2310-006a_3.pdf), or in other words if after the presidential review period the President has not disapproved the order or if the President has affirmatively approved it.
|
2023-12-20T19:00:00Z
|
2023-12-24T23:00:00Z
|
2023-12-26T18:00:00Z
|
yes
|
METACULUS
|
meta-20739
|
Will there be a US military combat death in the Red Sea before 2024?
|
Following the October 7, 2023, Hamas attack on Israel, Yemen's [Houthi rebels](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Houthi_movement) have launched a series of [ongoing attacks on vessels](https://apnews.com/article/red-sea-ship-attacks-bp-yemen-houthis-dcece18717aa59648ff9a6b04fbc798c) in the Red Sea including [against US warships](https://www.politico.com/news/2023/12/03/pentagon-us-warship-attack-red-sea-00129789).
In response to the attacks, the [US has announced](https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2023/dec/19/us-announces-naval-coalition-to-defend-red-sea-shipping-from-houthi-attacks) a naval protection force for merchant ships in the Red Sea. According to [reporting by the Guardian](https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2023/dec/19/us-announces-naval-coalition-to-defend-red-sea-shipping-from-houthi-attacks):
>One analyst, Farea Al-Muslimi from the Chatham House thinktank, said they expected the Houthi attacks to continue for now despite the US announcement – and that commercial shipping was likely to remain wary of using the Red Sea.
>
>“The Houthis will carry on, they love attention and they have a wide degree of support in the Arab world,” Al-Muslimi said. “So far nobody has died as a result of the Houthi attacks – if somebody is killed then there will likely have to be a response.”
Resolution Criteria: This question will resolve as **Yes** if, after December 20, 2023, and before January 1, 2024, credible sources report that a member of the US military has been killed in the Red Sea due to an attack.
Fine Print: * This does not include non-combat deaths, such as those occurring during training or by accident.
|
2023-12-20T19:00:00Z
|
2023-12-31T23:00:00Z
|
2024-01-03T17:38:00Z
|
no
|
METACULUS
|
meta-20722
|
Will Ilya Sutskever still lead OpenAI’s Superalignment team at the end of 2024?
|
OpenAI established the [Superalignment team](https://openai.com/blog/introducing-superalignment) to focus on developing ways to steer, regulate, and govern superintelligent AI systems.
Ilya Sutskever, a co-founder and chief scientist at OpenAI, leads this team alongside Jan Leike. The Superalignment team, formed in mid-2023, is a strategic response to the rapid advancements in AI.
OpenAI, recently faced a significant leadership shakeup. Sutskever, serving as the chief scientist and a board member, played a pivotal role in the temporary ousting of CEO Sam Altman. This event raised questions about Sutskever's future role at the company. Although he was instrumental in forming the superalignment team and his contributions remain significant, his current status within OpenAI has been somewhat ambiguous following these events. [Source 1](https://www.technologyreview.com/2023/12/14/1085344/openai-super-alignment-rogue-agi-gpt-4), [Source 2](https://finance.yahoo.com/news/ilya-sutskever-man-center-openai-211351628.html).
[Reports indicate that Sutskever has been less visible within OpenAI.](https://gizmodo.com.au/2023/12/ilya-sutskevers-team-at-openai-built-tools-to-control-a-superhuman-ai/). There have been speculations about him potentially leaving the organization, especially considering the recent leadership turmoil and his hiring of a lawyer. However, his exact status and future role at OpenAI remain unconfirmed as of now.
Resolution Criteria: This question will resolve YES if at the start of January 1st, 2025, Ilya Sutskever is still serving as the leader of OpenAI's Superalignment team. Further, it resolves No if [credible sources](https://www.metaculus.com/help/faq/#definitions) report he no longer leads it, and that credible sources do not indicate he has returned to lead it, as of the beginning of January 1st, 2025.
The resolution requires that Ilya Sutskever holds the leadership role specifically for the Superalignment team and specifically for OpenAI. The question will resolve Yes if OpenAI renames the team, but announces the team will focus on the same core set of responsibilities.
Leadership is defined as having a primary and active role in guiding the direction, decisions, and activities of the Superalignment team. It is sufficient for OpenAI to define Sutskever's role explicitly as "leading," but it is not necessary.
|
2024-01-01T07:00:00Z
|
2024-12-31T18:00:00Z
|
2025-01-05T04:54:00Z
|
no
|
METACULUS
|
meta-20720
|
Will annual US core CPI inflation be above 3% in December 2024?
|
The [CPI](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Consumer_price_index), or Consumer Price Index, is one of the most widely used measures of inflation by investors. Created by analyzing the price of a certain basket of widely used, urban consumer goods over time with relation to a base time, the CPI can show either monthly or yearly price fluctuations. The CPI for specific cities, types of goods, and by wage-earners can also be calculated. CPI data is released monthly by the [US Bureau of Labor Statistics](https://www.bls.gov/news.release/cpi.nr0.htm).
If the CPI rises, showing a positive percent increase in inflation, goods will become more expensive in the future, thereby decreasing the purchasing power of savings and increasing the amount necessary to pay back on loans of all kinds.
Below is a graph of the annual percentage change in core CPI in the US, seasonally adjusted, from the [Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Federal_Reserve_Bank_of_St._Louis). **Note that the underlying source is the BLS, though the chart may update with subsequent estimates published by the BLS and may not reflect the initial estimate from each month.**
<iframe src="https://fred.stlouisfed.org/graph/graph-landing.php?g=1d3Hg&width=100%25&height=475" scrolling="no" frameborder="0" style="overflow:hidden; width:100%; height:550px;" allowTransparency="true" loading="lazy"></iframe>
Resolution Criteria: This question will resolve as **Yes** if year over year core CPI inflation (CPI excluding food and energy) exceeds 3% from December 2023 to December 2024, according to seasonally adjusted data when first [published by the US Bureau of Labor Statistics](https://www.bls.gov/news.release/cpi.nr0.htm).
|
2024-01-01T07:00:00Z
|
2024-12-31T23:00:00Z
|
2025-01-15T15:42:00Z
|
yes
|
METACULUS
|
meta-20708
|
If Donald Trump is the Republican Nominee for President in 2024, will his name appear on the ballot in the State of Colorado on Election Day?
|
On December 19, 2023, the Colorado Supreme Court issued a ruling [barring Donald Trump from appearing on the state's ballot in 2024](https://www.sos.state.co.us/). In a [4-3 decision](https://www.courts.state.co.us/userfiles/file/Court_Probation/02nd_Judicial_District/Denver_District_Court/11_17_2023%20Final%20Order.pdf), "“a majority of the court holds that Trump is disqualified from holding the office of president under Section 3 of the 14th Amendment."
> “We do not reach these conclusions lightly,” [the Colorado majority opinion reads](https://www.politico.com/news/2023/12/19/colorado-disqualify-donald-trump-00132578). “We are mindful of the magnitude and weight of the questions now before us. We are likewise mindful of our solemn duty to apply the law, without fear or favor, and without being swayed by public reaction to the decisions that the law mandates we reach.”
Trump vowed to appeal the decision to the Supreme Court.
Resolution Criteria: The question resolves **Yes** if:
1. Donald Trump is the [Republican Nominee for President of the United States in 2024](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/11370/2024-republican-nominee-for-us-prez/)
2. Donald Trump's name appears as the Republican candidate on the general election ballot used by voters in the the state of Colorado on Election Day, according to the [Colorado Secretary of State](https://www.sos.state.co.us/)
Fine Print: If Donald Trump is not the Republican Nominee for President in 2024, the question is annulled.
Election day is scheduled to be Tuesday, November 5, 2024. If the date changes to a different date in 2024, the relevant date for this question will adjust as well. If no election is held in 2024, the question is annulled.
|
2023-12-20T00:30:00Z
|
2024-09-01T18:00:00Z
|
2024-11-06T18:37:00Z
|
yes
|
METACULUS
|
meta-20707
|
Will a major shipping company announce that they are resuming shipments through the Red Sea before 2024?
|
Most of the world's largest [container](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_largest_container_shipping_companies) and freight shipping companies [have announced](https://www.cnbc.com/2023/12/18/how-houthi-attacks-in-red-sea-threaten-global-supply-chain.html) that they will pause shipments through the Red Sea due to [ongoing attacks on vessels](https://apnews.com/article/red-sea-ship-attacks-bp-yemen-houthis-dcece18717aa59648ff9a6b04fbc798c) by Yemen's [Houthi rebels](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Houthi_movement).
In response to the attacks, the [US has announced](https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2023/dec/19/us-announces-naval-coalition-to-defend-red-sea-shipping-from-houthi-attacks) a naval protection force for merchant ships in the Red Sea, however it remains to be seen how effective the protection will be and how soon merchant shipping will resume.
Resolution Criteria: This question will resolve as **Yes** if, after December 19, 2023, and before January 1, 2024, credible sources report that a major shipping company from the list below will resume shipments through the Red Sea.
* Mediterranean Shipping Company (MSC)
* Maersk
* CMA CGM
* Hapag-Lloyd
* Evergreen
* BP
Fine Print: * An announcement that shipments through the Red Sea will resume is sufficient, so long as it's not conditional on other developments and, if a date or resumption is provided, the stated date of resumption is before January 15, 2024. For example, an announcement that shipments will resume when there are no Red Sea hostilities would not be sufficient, nor is an announcement that shipments will resume if the United States or another country provides additional protection above what it has committed to.
* An announcement must be unambiguous and convey a planned course of action. For example "we will resume shipments this week" or "we plan to. . ." or "we intend to. . ." would all qualify. Statements or announcements that express a desire or goal will not qualify, for example "we hope to resume shipments this week" would not count. Metaculus may make a determination regarding the language used, and may resolve the question as **Ambiguous** in the event an announcement or statement is unclear.
* Only a qualifying announcement is required, whether a company actually resumes shipping as announced is immaterial.
|
2023-12-20T19:00:00Z
|
2023-12-31T23:00:00Z
|
2023-12-26T19:30:00Z
|
yes
|
METACULUS
|
meta-20695
|
Will the US unemployment rate be above 4% in November 2024?
|
The US [Bureau of Labor Statistics](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Bureau_of_Labor_Statistics) (BLS) provides monthly estimates of the [unemployment rate](https://www.investopedia.com/articles/investing/080415/true-unemployment-rate-u6-vs-u3.asp) in the United States. The most commonly cited unemployment figure is U-3 unemployment, which measures the share of people aged 16 and over in the labor force (meaning people employed or seeking employment) who are unemployed. The BLS [typically releases](https://www.bls.gov/schedule/news_release/empsit.htm) its unemployment estimates for a month in the first half of the following month.
Below is a graph of the monthly seasonally adjusted U-3 unemployment rate, from the [Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Federal_Reserve_Bank_of_St._Louis). **Note that the underlying source is the BLS, though the chart may update with subsequent estimates published by the BLS and may not reflect the initially published estimates.**
<iframe src="https://fred.stlouisfed.org/graph/graph-landing.php?g=XFpS&width=100%25&height=475" scrolling="no" frameborder="0" style="overflow:hidden; width:100%; height:550px;" allowTransparency="true" loading="lazy"></iframe>
Resolution Criteria: This question resolves as **Yes** if the monthly U-3 unemployment figure, in percent, seasonally adjusted, for November, 2024 is greater than 4.0%. Resolution will be determined according to the first estimate published for November 2024 by the BLS, typically found [here](https://www.bls.gov/news.release/empsit.nr0.htm).
|
2024-01-01T07:00:00Z
|
2024-11-30T23:00:00Z
|
2024-12-15T22:22:00Z
|
yes
|
METACULUS
|
meta-20694
|
Will the S&P 500 index go up over 2024?
|
The S&P 500, also known as the Standard & Poor's 500, is a stock market index that measures the stock performance of 500 large companies listed on the stock exchanges in the United States. It is one of the most widely followed equity indices and is considered to be one of the best representations of the U.S. stock market. The companies included in the index are leading corporations from all sectors of the economy, including technology, healthcare, finance, and consumer discretionary, among others. Changes in the S&P 500 are used as a key indicator of the overall health and direction of the U.S. economy.
Resolution Criteria: This question will resolve as **Yes** if the closing value of the S&P 500 Index on December 31, 2024 is higher than that on December 29, 2023.
Fine Print: The "close" values shown on the [history page of Yahoo finance](https://finance.yahoo.com/quote/%5EGSPC/history?p=%5EGSPC) will be used.
|
2024-01-01T07:00:00Z
|
2025-01-01T05:59:00Z
|
2025-01-02T14:47:00Z
|
yes
|
METACULUS
|
meta-20592
|
Will the US Supreme Court grant a writ of certiorari to the presidential immunity case before February 1, 2024?
|
On December 11, 2023, US Special Counsel [Jack Smith](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Jack_Smith_(lawyer)) filed [a petition](https://www.supremecourt.gov/DocketPDF/23/23-624/292946/20231211144948077_U.S.%20v.%20Donald%20J.%20Trump%20--%20final%20final.pdf) for a [writ of certiorari before judgment](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Certiorari_before_judgment) to the Supreme Court, seeking judgment on the following question:
>Whether a former President is absolutely immune from federal prosecution for crimes committed while in office or is constitutionally protected from federal prosecution when he has been impeached but not convicted before the criminal proceedings begin.
This petition reflects the latest event in the ongoing [prosecution of Donald Trump for election interference](https://www.politico.com/interactives/2023/trump-criminal-investigations-cases-tracker-list/#jan-six), following an [attempt by Trump's lawyers to dismiss the case](https://apnews.com/article/trump-justice-department-jan-6-special-counsel-118943be656200bbc3f22cd8612c1f8b) on the grounds of presidential immunity and Judge Tanya Chutkan's decision [rejecting that argument](https://apnews.com/article/trump-capitol-riot-immunity-donald-trump-a98872759762c95fa925ff831df27388). Trump's legal team has appealed this decision to the US court of appeals, pausing proceedings in the district court, however the trial is [scheduled to begin March 4, 2024](https://www.cbsnews.com/news/trump-supreme-court-immunity-special-counsel-jack-smith/), and an appeal might delay the proceedings.
The petition asks the Supreme Court to decide on the immunity issue promptly so that the trial can proceed as scheduled. The Supreme Court has [responded to the petition](https://www.supremecourt.gov/search.aspx?filename=/docket/docketfiles/html/public/23-624.html) with a motion to expedite consideration of the petition and directing Trump to file a response to the petition by December 20th.
Resolution Criteria: This question will resolve as **Yes** if, before February 1, 2024, the US Supreme Court has issued a decision granting a writ of certiorari before judgment for the [petition](https://www.supremecourt.gov/search.aspx?filename=/docket/docketfiles/html/public/23-624.html) filed by US Special Counsel Jack Smith against Donald Trump.
Fine Print: * A writ of certiorari granted to a successor case consisting of one or more cases merged with the petition filed by Jack Smith against Donald Trump will also resolve the question as **Yes**.
|
2023-12-16T15:30:00Z
|
2024-01-15T23:00:00Z
|
2023-12-22T19:50:00Z
|
no
|
METACULUS
|
meta-20569
|
Will NASA re-establish communications with Voyager 1 before 1 Jan 2024?
|
[The Voyager probes](https://science.nasa.gov/mission/voyager/voyager-1/) are the human-made machines that have gone both the fastest and the furthest away from Earth. They were launched in the late '70s,
> Initially designed to last five years, the Voyager probes are the two longest-operating spacecraft in history. Their exceptionally long lifespans mean that both spacecraft have provided additional insights about our solar system and beyond after achieving their preliminary goals of flying by Jupiter, Saturn, Uranus and Neptune decades ago.
However, their continued operation relies on creative ways to shut down instruments to conserve power, and it's not always smooth sailing:
> Along the way, both spacecraft have encountered unexpected issues and dropouts, including a seven-month period in 2020 when Voyager 2 couldn’t communicate with Earth. In August, the mission team used a long-shot “shout” technique to restore communications with Voyager 2 after a command inadvertently oriented the spacecraft’s antenna in the wrong direction.
[Unfortunately, now](https://edition.cnn.com/2023/12/13/world/voyager-1-computer-issue-scn/index.html)
> Voyager 1’s flight data system now appears to be stuck on auto-repeat. The mission team first noticed the issue November 14, when the flight data system’s telecommunications unit began sending back a repeating pattern of ones and zeroes, like it was trapped in a loop.
A fix is [unlikely to to implemented](https://blogs.nasa.gov/sunspot/2023/12/12/engineers-working-to-resolve-issue-with-voyager-1-computer/) before the new year.
> It could take several weeks for engineers to develop a new plan to remedy the issue. Finding solutions to challenges the probes encounter often entails consulting original, decades-old documents written by engineers who didn’t anticipate the issues that are arising today. As a result, it takes time for the team to understand how a new command will affect the spacecraft’s operations in order to avoid unintended consequences.
This question answers *how* unlikely, exactly?
Resolution Criteria: This question resolves **Yes** if, before 1 January 2024, NASA or other credible sources reports that the communications or computer issue with Voyager 1 has been solved. If the solution does not involve the suspected flight data system (FDS), this still resolves **Yes**, as long as NASA starts receiving either of "science or engineering data".
In all other cases this question resolves **No**.
|
2023-12-20T19:00:00Z
|
2023-12-31T11:00:00Z
|
2024-01-03T17:29:00Z
|
no
|
METACULUS
|
meta-20568
|
Before 2024, will it be announced that either of the Harvard or MIT presidents will vacate their positions?
|
Following the October 7, 2023, Hamas attack on Israel and Israel's military response, a number of [protests were held at US universities](https://abcnews.go.com/US/israel-hamas-war-college-campuses-edge-tackling-issue/story?id=105046118), some of which included students making [antisemitic threats](https://abcnews.go.com/Politics/fbi-investigating-antisemitic-threats-targeting-cornell-universitys-jewish/story?id=104480004). In November, the federal government [opened civil rights investigations](https://apnews.com/article/israel-hamas-colleges-civil-rights-investigation-discrimination-f93aa9355f4c2d97b188df8546cc5131) into a number of universities.
In late November the House Committee on Education and the Workforce [announced a hearing](https://www.cnn.com/2023/11/28/business/antisemitism-hearing-college-presidents/index.html) to be held on December 5th featuring testimony on antisemitism on college campuses from Harvard President Claudine Gay, MIT President Sally Kornbluth and Penn President Liz Magill. Following the hearing [all three were criticized](https://apnews.com/article/harvard-penn-mit-president-congress-intifada-193a1c81e9ebcc15c5dd68b71b4c6b71) for not providing clear answers in response to questions about whether antisemitic speech violated university policy. Penn President Liz Magill stepped down after receiving backlash for her responses during the hearing.
Claudine Gay and Sally Kornbluth remain presidents of their respective universities, and on December 12th the Harvard board [unanimously expressed their support](https://www.cnn.com/2023/12/12/business/claudine-gay-harvard/index.html) for Gay. However, Gay has also [faced accusations of plagiarism](https://www.thecrimson.com/article/2023/12/14/gay-new-plagiarism-allegations/) during the increased scrutiny, and on December 13th the US House of Representatives passed a resolution condemning antisemitism that included a call for Gay and Kornbluth to step down. [According to Axios](https://www.axios.com/2023/12/14/antisemitism-vote-harvard-mit-house-democrats):
>The resolution passed 303-126, with 84 Democrats voting in favor of it and 125 voting against it. All Republicans except Rep. Thomas Massie (R-Ky.) voted for it. . . The measure was voted on under a process known as suspension of the rules, meaning it needed two-thirds, or roughly 290 votes, to pass.
Resolution Criteria: This question will resolve as **Yes** if, before January 1, 2024, it is announced by the respective president or university that either Harvard President Claudine Gay or Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT) President Sally Kornbluth will vacate or have vacated the office of president at their university, for any reason.
Fine Print: * The position need not be vacated before 2024, only an announcement is required.
* Such announcement will resolve the question as **Yes**, even if it's later reversed.
|
2023-12-15T15:30:00Z
|
2023-12-31T23:00:00Z
|
2024-01-02T22:13:00Z
|
no
|
METACULUS
|
meta-20560
|
Will the US Supreme Court issue a decision on hearing the case about presidential immunity before January 1, 2024?
|
On December 11, 2023, US Special Counsel [Jack Smith](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Jack_Smith_(lawyer)) filed [a petition](https://www.supremecourt.gov/DocketPDF/23/23-624/292946/20231211144948077_U.S.%20v.%20Donald%20J.%20Trump%20--%20final%20final.pdf) for a [writ of certiorari before judgment](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Certiorari_before_judgment) to the Supreme Court, seeking judgment on the following question:
>Whether a former President is absolutely immune from federal prosecution for crimes committed while in office or is constitutionally protected from federal prosecution when he has been impeached but not convicted before the criminal proceedings begin.
This petition reflects the latest event in the ongoing [prosecution of Donald Trump for election interference](https://www.politico.com/interactives/2023/trump-criminal-investigations-cases-tracker-list/#jan-six), following an [attempt by Trump's lawyers to dismiss the case](https://apnews.com/article/trump-justice-department-jan-6-special-counsel-118943be656200bbc3f22cd8612c1f8b) on the grounds of presidential immunity and Judge Tanya Chutkan's decision [rejecting that argument](https://apnews.com/article/trump-capitol-riot-immunity-donald-trump-a98872759762c95fa925ff831df27388). Trump's legal team has appealed this decision to the US court of appeals, pausing proceedings in the district court, however the trial is [scheduled to begin March 4, 2024](https://www.cbsnews.com/news/trump-supreme-court-immunity-special-counsel-jack-smith/), and an appeal might delay the proceedings.
The petition asks the Supreme Court to decide on the immunity issue promptly so that the trial can proceed as scheduled. The Supreme Court has [responded to the petition](https://www.supremecourt.gov/search.aspx?filename=/docket/docketfiles/html/public/23-624.html) with a motion to expedite consideration of the petition and directing Trump to file a response to the petition by December 20th.
Resolution Criteria: This question will resolve as **Yes** if, before January 1, 2024, the US Supreme Court has issued a decision either granting or denying a writ of certiorari before judgment for the [petition](https://www.supremecourt.gov/search.aspx?filename=/docket/docketfiles/html/public/23-624.html) filed by US Special Counsel Jack Smith against Donald Trump.
Fine Print: * The outcome of the decision is irrelevant, this question only asks whether such a decision has been issued.
|
2023-12-14T15:30:00Z
|
2023-12-31T23:00:00Z
|
2023-12-22T19:27:00Z
|
yes
|
METACULUS
|
meta-20559
|
Will Labour have a majority in the House of Commons after the next UK General Election?
|
The UK's Conservative Party [won control of Parliament in 2010](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/2010_United_Kingdom_general_election) under David Cameron. Since then, the Conservatives have maintained control of Parliament. One of the key issues over the last decade was Britain's relationship with the European Union and its policies on immigration, with Conservatives ultimately paving the way for Brexit, while the Labour Party and other left-wing groups favored remaining.
Conservative leadership has been divided in recent years. In spite of this apparent weakness, Labour has also lacked a key leader, and the rise of the Scottish National Party, which shares appeal with Labour (their founder was Scottish), has led to a loss of most seats from Labour to the SNP. Some Scottish constituencies have experienced vote-splitting between Labour and the SNP, allowing Conservatives to gain seats there.
Currently, British law requires that the next general election be held [no later than January 28, 2025](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Next_United_Kingdom_general_election).
Resolution Criteria: This question resolves as "Yes" if the BBC reports that the Labour Party has won a majority of seats in the House of Commons after the next UK general election that takes place after December 13, 2023. Otherwise, the question resolves as "No."
For the purpose of this question all MPs of the Labour and Co-operative Party are considered Labour MPs.
|
2023-12-14T18:14:00Z
|
2025-01-20T00:00:00Z
|
2024-07-05T07:00:00Z
|
yes
|
METACULUS
|
meta-20547
|
Will the Republican Party retain California's 20th District in the 2024 special election?
|
Rep. Kevin McCarthy has announced his intention to resign from the house before the end of 2023 (and before the end of his term). Subsequently, the Governor of California is mandated by CA state law to schedule a special election to replace McCarthy. [More information about the process can be found here](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/2024_California%27s_20th_congressional_district_special_election). The election is will likely happen in April or May 2024.
Resolution Criteria: This question will resolve **Yes** if a Republican wins the first special election for California's 20th congressional district held in 2024, as verified by the [California Secretary of State](https://electionresults.sos.ca.gov/).
If no special election is held for CA-20 in 2024, the question is annulled.
|
2023-12-17T00:25:00Z
|
2024-05-22T05:59:00Z
|
2024-03-22T22:00:00Z
|
yes
|
METACULUS
|
meta-20533
|
Will Ukraine sever the land bridge between Crimea and Russia before 2025?
|
In late February and March 2014, following the Euromaidan uprising and removal of pro-Russian Ukrainian President Viktor Yanukovych, thinly disguised Russian military and paramilitary forces seized control of the Crimean peninsula in the far South of Ukraine and of most of the provinces of Donetsk and Luhansk in its East, leading to a protracted conflict.
In February 2022, Russia launched its full-scale conventional invasion of Ukraine. One of its first objectives was to seize the band of territory in Ukraine's southeast, between the Azov Sea and the Dnipro river, which connects Crimea in the south and Donetsk and Luhansk in the East.
Through the Spring and Summer of 2022, Ukraine achieved a series of counteroffensive victories and expelled Russian forces from a large area of the country. In September, Zaluzhny, the commander-in-chief of the Armed Forces of Ukraine (AFU), in his [programmatic article](https://www.ukrinform.ua/rubric-ato/3566162-ak-zabezpeciti-voennu-kampaniu-u-2023-roci-ukrainskij-poglad.html) on Ukraine’s coming campaign of 2023, called Crimea the "*center of gravity of the enemy*" and advised planning operations to seize it. Removing the Russian protective belt around the peninsula would be the first step towards achieving this goal. If executed simultaneously with destroying the Crimean bridge near Kerch it would cut off Crimea from supplies by land. Already in August, Arestovych, an advisor to president Zelensky, had [floated the idea]( https://www.unian.net/war/arestovich-schitaet-uspeh-v-melitopole-strategicheski-vazhnym-dlya-vsu-novosti-vtorzheniya-rossii-na-ukrainu-11935857.html) of an offensive on Melitopol, a key transportation hub on the land bridge, and opined that its success would collapse the entire Russian frontline.
In November 2022, with their supply lines in serious danger from Ukrainian artillery, the Russian occupiers fled Kherson for the left (eastern) bank of the Dnipro, leaving the southeastern land bridge as the obvious next objective. Several Russian military bloggers predicted a land bridge offensive, with variations in timing, possible tactics and the exact direction of attack, e.g. [Dimitriev](https://t.me/russ_orientalist/12458), [MIG]( https://t.me/mig41/22148), [Moscow Calling]( https://t.me/m0sc0wcalling/14259), [Nesmiyan]( https://t.me/RSaponkov/3947) and [Saponkov]( https://t.me/RSaponkov/3947).
On the Ukrainian side, the [New York Times cited](https://www.nytimes.com/2022/11/12/world/europe/ukraine-war-strategy-russia.html) "*hints from the troops on the ground and volunteers close to them*" that preparations for such an offensive were in the works. Russian forces were said to be aware of the danger and [to have been reinforcing their units and fortifying their lines]( https://ria.ru/20221019/svo-1825016250.html) in the Southeast for some time.
There is some flexibility with the direction of the offensive. Ukraine can strike in the east, towards Mariupol, in the center, towards Berdyansk or Melitopol (the most discussed option), or even in the west, from the newly captured Kherson towards Henichesk. Cutting the land bridge in two could be a first step to reoccupying it entirely, leaving Russia with no more territory than it started with, and potentially bringing the war closer to its termination.
The Ukrainian offensive [began in June 2022](https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/2023/06/08/russia-ukraine-war-news-counteroffensive/), but as of December 2023, it does not appear close to severing the land bridge, and in fact there are [significant doubts about its chances](https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/2023/12/04/ukraine-counteroffensive-us-planning-russia-war/) [of](https://www.nytimes.com/2023/12/11/us/politics/us-ukraine-war-strategy.html) [success](https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/2023/12/07/ukraine-counteroffensive-russia-war-drones-stalemate/). Even so, [Ukraine will still get F-16s and other weapon systems](https://www.msn.com/en-us/news/world/ukraines-imminent-f-16s-arrival-only-part-of-broader-defense-talks-mod-reveals/ar-AA1ldR3c), and [Zelenzky appears determined to keep fighting](https://www.cbsnews.com/news/ukraine-russia-war-zelenskyy-counteroffensive-results-ap-interview/), [despite](https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-67636302) political difficulties for providing military aid.
Resolution Criteria: This question will resolve as **Yes** if the [Institute for the Study of War](https://www.understandingwar.org/) or other reliable sources report Ukraine has severed the land bridge from Crimea to Russia at some point between November 1, 2022 to January 1, 2025, 00:00 [EET](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Eastern_European_Time).
For the purposes of this question, severing the land bridge is defined as extending the overall zone of Ukrainian territorial control continuously from Kyiv to some point on the southeastern coastline from Henichesk in the southwest along the Azov sea northeast to the Russian border. Control means physical occupation; indirect control by artillery or other fires, by destroying infrastructure, etc does not suffice
Fine Print: If there is a negotiated settlement such that Russia withdraws and Ukraine regains control over the land bridge, the question resolves **Yes**.
|
2023-12-13T16:23:00Z
|
2024-12-31T21:59:00Z
|
2025-01-17T17:32:00Z
|
no
|
METACULUS
|
meta-20468
|
Will Sam Altman leave OpenAI (again) before 2025?
|
Sam Altman is back as a CEO in Open AI, but there is a new board, investigation and many open questions about his behavior.
1. Washington Post: [OpenAI leaders warned of abusive behavior before Sam Altman’s ouster](https://www.washingtonpost.com/technology/2023/12/08/open-ai-sam-altman-complaints/)
2. New York Times: [Inside OpenAI’s Crisis Over the Future of Artificial Intelligence](https://www.nytimes.com/2023/12/09/technology/openai-altman-inside-crisis.html)
Resolution Criteria: The question resolves Yes if credible sources report Sam Altman has left OpenAI after February 2, 2024 and before Jan 1, 2025.
|
2024-02-03T21:31:00Z
|
2024-12-31T12:00:00Z
|
2025-01-14T08:08:00Z
|
no
|
METACULUS
|
meta-20467
|
If at least one frontier AI model has been trained by a Chinese firm before 2025, will a Chinese frontier AI model have been trained using US cloud compute?
|
Presently, there is nothing to stop Chinese AI developers from carrying out training runs using US [cloud compute](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Cloud_computing)/infrastructure-as-a-service (IaaS), on account of an [export](https://www.bis.doc.gov/index.php/documents/about-bis/newsroom/press-releases/3158-2022-10-07-bis-press-release-advanced-computing-and-semiconductor-manufacturing-controls-final/file) [controls](https://time.com/6324619/us-biden-ai-chips-china/) loophole: While Chinese AI developers are restricted from physically buying many types of cutting edge AI chips, and the machines used to manufacture them, they are not currently restricted from buying [cloud compute](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Cloud_computing) provided by US IaaS firms who possess the exact same chips that are physically export controlled.
Chinese AI developers have not yet made use of this loophole to carry out a frontier AI model training run. However, as they become increasingly hamstrung by physical export controls, the loophole might present an increasingly attractive path forward.
Resolution Criteria: This question resolves as **Yes** if, before January 1, 2025, any [frontier Chinese AI model](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/20879/frontier-chinese-ai-model-by-2027/) is trained using [cloud compute / infrastructure-as-a-service (IaaS) provided by a US firm](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/20880/us-restricts-chinese-iaas-access-by-2025/).
If there is no frontier Chinese AI model before 2025, then this question will be **Annulled**. If there are one or more frontier Chinese AI models before 2025, but none are trained using US IaaS, then this question resolves as **No**.
A “Chinese firm” is a firm headquartered in China. “China” includes mainland China, Hong Kong, and Macao (but not Taiwan). If the PRC annexes Taiwan, then annexed-Taiwan, including the firms located there, counts as being part of China.
------
Whether a Chinese firm has developed a “frontier” model is defined as in the “[Will there be a frontier Chinese AI model before 2027?](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/20879/frontier-chinese-ai-model-by-2027/)” question. In other words, frontier means either i) trained with an amount of compute that's within one order of magnitude of that of the leading AI model in the world at the time, or ii) top 10 in the world, according to [Chatbot Arena Leaderboard's](https://huggingface.co/spaces/lmsys/chatbot-arena-leaderboard) Areno ELO rating.
For i, we will use Epoch AI's "[Parameter, Compute and Data Trends in Machine Learning](https://docs.google.com/spreadsheets/d/1AAIebjNsnJj_uKALHbXNfn3_YsT6sHXtCU0q7OIPuc4/edit#gid=177804471)" database as the resolution source.
Fine Print: On the question of, “How will we know that the training compute comes from US IaaS?,” we will turn to credible report(s) and/or Epoch AI's “[Parameters, Compute and Data Trends in Machine Learning](https://docs.google.com/spreadsheets/d/1AAIebjNsnJj_uKALHbXNfn3_YsT6sHXtCU0q7OIPuc4/edit#gid=177804471)” database.
- The evidence that such a model has been developed—either in the Epoch database or on the Chatbot Arena leaderboard—must be available before January 1, 2025. For example, if a Chinese model that turns out to be frontier is launched in December 2024, but doesn't appear in the Epoch database or on the Arena leaderboard until January 2025, then it does not count for Yes resolution.
- If there's a top Chinese model before 2025 for which there is good reason to suspect that the compute used in the training run comes from US IaaS, but for which there is no credible report available, then a panel of at least three Metaculus admins will do their best to find other sources to help decide if Yes resolution has been triggered. If they cannot decide, then they may rule that the question be Annulled.
------
In case the Epoch AI database or the Chatbot Arena Leaderboard are discontinued, Metaculus admins will do their best to find alternative resolution sources. If this is not possible, then the question may be Annulled.
|
2024-01-11T18:00:00Z
|
2024-12-31T23:59:00Z
|
2025-01-23T17:02:00Z
|
no
|
METACULUS
|
meta-20383
|
Will the German Train Drivers' Union (GDL) go on strike again before January 1, 2024?
|
The [Union of German Train Drivers](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Gewerkschaft_Deutscher_Lokomotivf%C3%BChrer) (Gewerkschaft Deutscher Lokomotivführer or GDL) represents workers in train companies in Germany. The GDL has been negotiating with the national rail company [Deutsche Bahn](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Deutsche_Bahn), and [underwent a "warning strike"](https://www.dw.com/en/german-rail-union-warns-of-fresh-strikes-after-talks-fail/a-67542525) in November due to a perceived lack of progress.
Resolution Criteria: This question will resolve as **Yes** if, after December 5, 2023, and before January 1, 2024, credible sources report that a German Train Drivers' Union (GDL) strike has begun.
Fine Print: * An announcement that a strike will take place is not sufficient, the strike must actually begin.
* Reports that the strike is underway are not strictly necessary. An announcement of a strike combined with an absence of reporting stating that the strike did **not** occur will be sufficient to resolve as **Yes**.
* There is no requirement on the length of time or the size of the strike, so long as it is a GDL strike according to credible reporting.
* A "warning strike" will be sufficient to resolve as **Yes**.
|
2023-12-06T16:00:00Z
|
2023-12-31T23:00:00Z
|
2023-12-07T17:00:00Z
|
yes
|
METACULUS
|
meta-20360
|
Will the Republican Party retain New York's 3rd congressional district (previously held by George Santos) in the special election?
|
[George Santos was expelled from the US House of Representatives on the 1st of December 2023](https://www.nbcnews.com/politics/congress/george-santos-expulsion-congress-ny-house-ethics-committee-rcna127179). His expulsion leaves the position of house representative for New York's 3rd district vacant. [A special election](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/2024_New_York%27s_3rd_congressional_district_special_election) will be held to fill the vacancy on the 13th of February 2024.
Resolution Criteria: This question will resolve as **Yes** if credible sources report that a person representing the Republican Party has won the special election for NY's 3rd district.
|
2024-01-17T15:30:00Z
|
2024-02-14T02:00:00Z
|
2024-02-14T15:16:00Z
|
no
|
METACULUS
|
meta-20334
|
Will the maximum weekly rate of hospitalizations per 100,000 in the US occur within four weeks of the combined peak for each of COVID, influenza, and RSV in the 2023-24 season?
|
The US Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) closely monitors respiratory illnesses, particularly when these illnesses increase in prevalence during the winter. One monitoring and data sharing tool the CDC uses is [RESP-NET](https://www.cdc.gov/surveillance/resp-net/dashboard.html), which it describes as follows:
>The Respiratory Virus Hospitalization Surveillance Network (RESP-NET) comprises three networks that conduct population-based surveillance for laboratory-confirmed hospitalizations associated with COVID-19, respiratory syncytial virus (RSV), and influenza among children and adults. While RESP-NET does not collect data on all hospitalizations caused by respiratory illnesses, it can describe hospitalizations caused by three viruses that account for a large proportion of these hospitalizations. Surveillance is conducted through a network of acute care hospitals in select counties or county equivalents in 12 states for RSV surveillance, 13 states for COVID-19 surveillance, and 14 states for influenza surveillance. The surveillance platforms for COVID-19, RSV, and influenza (known as [COVID-NET](https://www.cdc.gov/coronavirus/2019-ncov/covid-data/covid-net/purpose-methods.html), [RSV-NET](https://www.cdc.gov/rsv/research/rsv-net/overview-methods.html), and [FluSurv-NET](https://www.cdc.gov/flu/weekly/influenza-hospitalization-surveillance.htm), respectively) cover more than 30 million people and include an estimated 8-10% of the U.S. population.
The underlying source data for the RESP-NET dashboard can be found at [this link](https://data.cdc.gov/Public-Health-Surveillance/Rates-of-Laboratory-Confirmed-RSV-COVID-19-and-Flu/kvib-3txy).
In its [Respiratory Disease Season Outlook](https://www.cdc.gov/respiratory-viruses/whats-new/2023-2024-season-outlook.html) for 2023-24, the CDC describes the 2022-23 peak as a "tripledemic" due to high incidence of COVID, flu, and RSV at the same time. The [RESP-NET](https://www.cdc.gov/surveillance/resp-net/dashboard.html) figures for the 2022-23 season show a large combined peak hospitalization rate of 22.2 per 100,000 for the week ending December 3, 2022, coinciding with the maximum rate for flu and less than a month from the maximum rate for RSV which occurred during the week ending November 12, 2022, and also less than a month from the maximum rate for COVID which occurred on the week ending December 31, 2022.
Resolution Criteria: This question will resolve as **Yes** if the maximum weekly rate of hospitalizations per 100,000 for each of COVID, influenza, and RSV that occurs in the 2023-24 season is less than or equal to four weeks (28 days) from the date of the maximum rate for all three combined, according to the CDC's [RESP-NET](https://www.cdc.gov/surveillance/resp-net/dashboard.html). The four weeks will be based on the week end dates. The CDC uses "epidemiological weeks" which begin on Sunday and end on Saturday. The rate used will be that for all ages, races, and sexes. See the fine print for the correct filters. For the purposes of this question, the 2023-2024 season will be considered to begin with the week ending on October 7, 2023, and end on the week ending June 1, 2024.
To allow for data revisions and reporting delays the question will resolve according to data shown after the reporting delay period, when the relevant figures for the current season is not shown as a dashed line, typically 4 weeks after the week end date.
Fine Print: * In the event two or more weeks tie for the maximum of the combined viruses or for any individual virus this question will resolve as **Yes** if there exists any combination of maximums for which the individual maximums are four weeks or less from the same combined maximum.
* The four week distance means that the total qualifying span of time will be eight weeks, four weeks on either side of the combined peak.
* The following filters will be selected:
* **Chart Selection:** "Season"
* **View:** "Weekly Rates"
* **Season:** "2023-24"
* **Pathogen:** "All"
|
2023-12-01T22:30:00Z
|
2024-05-25T22:00:00Z
|
2024-07-12T17:05:00Z
|
yes
|
METACULUS
|
meta-20261
|
Will any additional Republican candidates for president drop out before 2024?
|
The Republican primary election will kick off [on January 15, 2024](https://www.cnn.com/election/2024/calendar), with the Iowa caucus, followed soon after by the New Hampshire primary on January 23rd. Several candidates have already [dropped out](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/2024_Republican_Party_presidential_primaries#Withdrew_before_the_primaries), the most recent being Tim Scott on November 12th. [FiveThirtyEight shows seven major candidates remaining](https://projects.fivethirtyeight.com/polls/president-primary-r/2024/national/) though Donald Trump is polling at roughly 60% as of November 29th and has so far his lead has been stable.
Resolution Criteria: This question will resolve as **Yes** if, after November 29, 2023, and before January 1, 2024, any of the individuals below seeking the nomination as the Republican candidate for president announces that they are dropping out of the race:
* Donald Trump
* Ron DeSantis
* Nikki Haley
* Vivek Ramaswamy
* Chris Christie
* Doug Burgum
* Asa Hutchinson
|
2023-11-30T15:30:00Z
|
2023-12-31T23:00:00Z
|
2023-12-04T16:04:00Z
|
yes
|
METACULUS
|
meta-20260
|
Will a majority of voters approve Venezuela's referendum on incorporating Guayana Esequiba into Venezuela?
|
A [Venezuelan referendum asking five questions is scheduled for December 3, 2023](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/2023_Venezuelan_referendum). The subject of the referendum is the territory of [Guayana Esequiba](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Guayana_Esequiba), administered by Guyana but claimed by Venezuela. Guyana [has asked](https://www.icj-cij.org/case/171) the UN [International Court of Justice](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/International_Court_of_Justice) to halt the referendum, but Venezuela's Vice President [has stated](https://abcnews.go.com/International/wireStory/uns-top-court-venezuela-vows-press-ahead-referendum-104903839) "Nothing will prevent the referendum scheduled for Dec. 3 from being held".
[According to Demerara Waves](https://demerarawaves.com/2023/10/23/venezuelan-electoral-council-approves-five-questions-for-referendum-on-essequibo/) the five questions asked in the referendum are as follows:
1. Do you agree to reject by all means in accordance with the law the line fraudulently imposed by the Paris Arbitration Award of 1899 that seeks to deprive us of our Guayana Esequiba?
2. Do you support the 1966 Geneva Agreement as the only valid legal instrument to reach a practical and satisfactory solution for Venezuela and Guyana regarding the controversy over the territory of Guayana Esequiba?
3. Do you agree with Venezuela’s historical position of not recognizing the jurisdiction of the International Court of Justice to resolve the territorial controversy over Guayana Esequiba?
4. Do you agree to oppose by all means in accordance with the law Guyana’s claim to unilaterally dispose of a sea pending delimitation illegally and in violation of international law?
5. Do you agree with the creation of the Guayana Esequiba state and the development of an accelerated plan for the comprehensive care of the current and future population of that territory that includes, among others, the granting of citizenship and Venezuelan identity card in accordance with the Geneva Agreement and international law, consequently incorporating said state on the map of Venezuelan territory?
Resolution Criteria: This question will resolve as **Yes** if the fifth question in the December 3rd, 2023, Venezuelan referendum — regarding incorporating Guayana Esequiba into Venezuelan territory — receives more votes in favor than opposed, according to the results published by Venezuela and as reported by [credible sources](https://www.metaculus.com/help/faq/#definitions).
Fine Print: * This question asks specifically about the results of the [following referendum question](https://demerarawaves.com/2023/10/23/venezuelan-electoral-council-approves-five-questions-for-referendum-on-essequibo/):
>Do you agree with the creation of the Guayana Esequiba state and the development of an accelerated plan for the comprehensive care of the current and future population of that territory that includes, among others, the granting of citizenship and Venezuelan identity card in accordance with the Geneva Agreement and international law, consequently incorporating said state on the map of Venezuelan territory?
* This question asks about the results that Venezuela reports. Whether those results are broadly seen as credible is immaterial.
* If no referendum is held on December 3rd this question will be **annulled**.
|
2023-11-30T00:00:00Z
|
2023-12-02T23:00:00Z
|
2023-12-04T04:38:00Z
|
yes
|
METACULUS
|
meta-20218
|
Will there be a white Christmas in at least 4 of these 9 large European cities in 2023?
|
Many children wish for a white Christmas, i.e. snow on the days 24th or 25th December. Transit operators and homeless people enjoy it less. It is an important cultural event around the northern Atlantic, though; hence this question!
Cultural note: The majority of inhabitants of Instanbul do not celebrate Christmas at all. Neither do all Russians celebrate Christmas in December. These differences are irrelevant for the question, which is focused on Christmas as celebrated by most cultures around the northern Atlantic.
-----
This question uses METAR data as the source for convenience, because it provides a standardised view into actual observed weather at diverse geographical locations. Here's an example of a METAR report:
> METAR UUEE 050800Z 28003MPS 240V320 7000 -SN SCT006 M11/M13 Q1018 R24L/490336 R24C/490336 NOSIG=
The standard allows for many optional components, but common components are
- The reporting station (in this case `UUEE`, which is a Moscow airport) comes after the preamble
- the day and time of observation (in this case `050800Z` meaning day 5 of the month, at 8 o'clock UTC)
- wind speed and direction (in this case `28003MPS` meaning 280°, 3 m/s)
- visibility (in this case `7000` meaning 7000 metres)
- cloud cover (in this case `SCT006` meaning scattered at 600 feet)
- temperature (in this case `M11/M13` meaning temperature of -11 °C)
- air pressure (in this case `Q1018` meaning 1018 millibar)
- runway information, starting with R
- a near-term forecast (in this case `NOSIG` meaning no significant change expected)
But! Critically for this question, there are also indications of precipitation. In the example above, that's "-SN" for "light snow".
Here are some other examples of reports indicating snow:
> METAR ESSA 270120Z 01005KT 9999 -SN SCT007 BKN009 OVC046 M05/M06 Q1010 RESN BECMG BKN020=`
`RESN` means "recent snow"
> METAR ESNU 252220Z 33009KT 9999 SG FEW018 OVC055 M03/M05 Q1003=
`SG` means "snow grains"
> METAR EFOU 041820Z AUTO 14003KT 9999 -SHSN SCT044 M13/M15 Q1013=
`-SHSN` means "light snow shower"
For decoding reports, [the web tool by Flight Plan Database](https://flightplandatabase.com/METAR) can be a helpful assistant.
Resolution Criteria: The 10 largest cities in Europe [according to Wikipedia](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_European_cities_by_population_within_city_limits#Largest_cities) are
- Istanbul
- Moscow
- London
- Saint Petersburg
- Berlin
- Madrid
- Kyiv
- Rome
- Bucharest
- Paris
For this question, we unfortunately have to exclude Kyiv due to the lack of standardised aerodrome weather reporting in the area.
Each of the remaining 9 cities will have been considered to have had a white Christmas if, on either of the days 24 December or 25 December, there has been precipitation in the form of snow. The selection will be set to begin at hour 0 UTC on the 24th and end at hour 23 UTC on the 25th.
If four or more of them have had a white Christmas, then this question resolves as **Yes**. Otherwise, it resolves as **No**.
Fine Print: To determine whether there has been precipitation in these cities, the [Ogimet METAR](http://www.ogimet.com/metars.phtml.en) historic data for the dates given above will be consulted. If that source is down, a similar one will be located. If none can be found with reasonable effort, the question resolves **Ambiguous**.
The lookup will be made for the following airports (corresponding to the cities listed above, excluding Kyiv): LTFM, UUEE, EGLL, ULLI, EDDB, LEMD, LIRF, LROP, LFPG. Any reference to snow (SN), snow grains (SG), snow pellets (SP or GS), or snow shower (SW) will count as there being precipitation in the form of snow.
|
2023-12-06T16:00:00Z
|
2023-12-16T11:00:00Z
|
2024-01-03T18:07:00Z
|
no
|
METACULUS
|
meta-20133
|
Will a Chinese firm market an ArFi photolithography machine before 2025?
|
In October 2022, the US instituted [new, wide-ranging export controls](https://www.csis.org/analysis/choking-chinas-access-future-ai) aimed at controlling a set of “chokepoint” technologies in the global semiconductor supply chain. China is one of the leading countries in AI, but AI advancements have historically run on compute, and China’s access to cost-competitive machine learning (ML) compute — the Chinese AI industry currently relies in large part on AI chips designed and fabricated abroad, and in particular Nvidia GPUs — is now in question.
The [US export controls](https://www.ecfr.gov/current/title-15/subtitle-B/chapter-VII/subchapter-C) prevent the export of high-performance AI chips to China, as well as the export of advanced tooling and materials used to make such chips. Still, one way for China to gain better access to cost-competitive ML compute is to indigenously produce high-quality AI chips. In 2015, China set out an ambitious plan aiming to bring the proportion of chips bought by Chinese firms that is domestically produced from 15% to 70% by 2025; as of 2021 [that number had gone up to 24%](https://asia.nikkei.com/Politics/International-relations/US-China-tensions/U.S.-tech-curbs-threaten-China-s-quest-for-chip-independence). With the October restrictions — and with US allies like Taiwan, Japan, South Korea, and the Netherlands enacting their own controls — Chinese firms now face substantial challenges in their attempts to indigenize semiconductor production.
Some of the most important inputs into the chip-making process is semiconductor manufacturing equipment (SME) – highly complex and specialized tools essential to the chip-making process. (Other important inputs include specialized materials, software, and more generally capital, talent, and know-how.) Many of these tools — including most tools necessary for producing the most advanced chips — are prohibited from being exported to China.
In particular, the most important type of SME is photolithography machines, which are some of the most complex machinery ever made by humans. These machines expose a photomask (which holds the pattern that needs to be etched onto the silicon wafer) to light; the patterned light then reaches a photoresist material on the wafer. The exposed parts of the photoresist dissolve or harden, and the remaining parts can be removed to yield a mask for the next deposition or etching steps that form the chip’s circuits. The photolithography industry is dominated by the Dutch company ASML.
China’s major [photolithography](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Photolithography) maker is Shanghai Micro Electronics Equipment (SMEE), founded in the early 2000s. SMEE [markets](http://www.smee.com.cn/eis.pub?service=homepageService&method=indexinfo&onclicknodeno=1_4_4_1) krypton fluoride (KrF) and argon fluoride (ArF) dry steppers for mature process nodes, but these either aren’t ready for mass production and/or are far behind (>15 years) Dutch and Japanese KrF and ArF machines in terms of resolution, throughput, and quality. SMEE does not market any more advanced argon fluoride immersion (ArFi) machines, though it is [reportedly](https://www.tomshardware.com/news/chinese-lithography-firm-to-debut-28nm-capable-scanner-report) “on track to reveal its first scanner capable of producing chips on a 28nm process technology by the end of 2023”.
For more information, I have written a primer on [indigenously made Chinese AI chips](https://docs.google.com/document/d/1r-aLT67d2OQnuhZJZihkr0KxxB-PsDMKMut2flaYQ2c/edit?usp=sharing), intended to provide a useful introduction and reference for anyone interested in forecasting or learning more about China’s ability to indigenously produce AI chips. It explains some key concepts, provides an overview of the chip-making process, provides an overview of relevant export controls, and describes key inputs, context, and organizations relevant to understanding Chinese chip-making progress.
Resolution Criteria: The question will resolve as **Yes** if a Chinese firm markets an argon fluoride immersion (ArFi) photolithography machine on its website or credible sources report that a Chinese firm is selling ArFi photolithography machines before January 1st, 2025. The question will resolve as **No** otherwise.
Fine Print: A “Chinese firm” is a firm headquartered in China. “China” includes mainland China, Hong Kong, and Macao (but not Taiwan). If the PRC annexes Taiwan, then annexed-Taiwan, including the chips being produced there, counts as being part of China.
It’s enough that the firm markets such a machine on either the English-language or Chinese-language version of its website. The product can be marketed either on a “product” page, or through a news release, or in any other form on its website, so long as it's accessible on the website.
The website or reporting must mention both (a) that the product is an argon fluoride (ArF or ArFi) machine, and/or that it uses a 193 nm light, and (b) that it’s a lithography machine used for wafers or to fabricate semiconductors (or chips).
If the firm’s website lists an ArFi machine prior to January 1st, 2025, but it’s then removed, the question still resolves as **Yes** (so long as Metaculus can confirm it).
|
2023-12-06T11:00:00Z
|
2025-01-01T11:00:00Z
|
2025-01-10T00:44:00Z
|
no
|
METACULUS
|
meta-20092
|
Will a novel pathogen be identified as responsible for the pneumonia reported in Beijing or Liaoning before December 15, 2023?
|
On November 21, 2023, the Program for Monitoring Emerging Diseases (ProMED) [published an alert](https://promedmail.org/promed-post/?id=8713261) regarding outbreaks of pneumonia with an unidentified cause in the city of Beijing and Liaoning Province in China. The alert quotes [an article](https://www.ftvnews.com.tw/news/detail/2023B21I19M1) published by [FTV News](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/FTV_News), a publication by the Taiwanese broadcasting company [Formosa Television](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Formosa_Television).
ProMED quoted the machine translated article as follows:
>With the outbreak of pneumonia in China, children's hospitals in Beijing, Liaoning and other places were overwhelmed with sick children, and schools and classes were on the verge of suspension. Parents questioned whether the authorities were covering up the epidemic.
>
>In the early morning, Beijing Children's Hospital was still overcrowded with parents and children whose children had pneumonia and came to seek treatment. Mr. [W], a Beijing citizen: "Many, many are hospitalized. They don't cough and have no symptoms. They just have a high temperature (fever) and many develop pulmonary nodules."
>
>The situation in Liaoning Province is also serious. The lobby of Dalian Children's Hospital is full of sick children receiving intravenous drips. There are also queues of patients at the traditional Chinese medicine hospitals and the central hospitals. A staff member of Dalian Central Hospital said: "Patients have to wait in line for 2 hours, and we are all in the emergency department and there are no general outpatient clinics."
>
>Some school classes have even been canceled completely. Not only are all students sick, but teachers are also infected with pneumonia. ...
>
>Mr. [W], a Beijing citizen: "Now you are not allowed to report to school. If you have any symptoms such as fever, cold, cough and then you are hospitalized, you can ask for leave..."
>
>Since China stopped adhering to the "zero" policy at the beginning of the year [2023], epidemics such as influenza, mycoplasma, and bronchopneumonia have broken out from time to time. ...
A [novel pathogen](https://www.goodrx.com/conditions/covid-19/what-does-novel-coronavirus-mean-science-medical-definition) is generally considered to be one which has not previously been found to infect humans.
Resolution Criteria: This question will resolve as **Yes** if, before December 15, 2023, credible sources report that the pneumonia cases reportedly occurring in Beijing or Liaoning have been identified as being caused by a novel pathogen.
Fine Print: * A novel pathogen will be considered to be a pathogen which has previously not been found to have infected humans, and is not an immediate descendent of pathogens currently causing human disease, as described below.
* Immediate descendants of pathogens currently causing human disease, such as variants of SARS-CoV-2, **do not count**. An immediate descendent will be one which is characterized as being a descendent of a pathogen currently causing human disease and with only minor variations from known strains. However, novel pathogens that are the result of [antigenic shift](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Antigenic_shift) **do count**. Among pathogens that cause human disease, antigenic shift is currently [only](https://www.liebertpub.com/doi/10.1089/vim.2017.0141) known to occur with influenza A and this process is described by the US CDC as an "[abrupt, major change in a flu A virus, resulting in new HA and/or new HA and NA proteins in flu viruses that infect humans](https://www.cdc.gov/flu/about/viruses/change.htm)".
* In the event all other criteria are met except that there is ambiguity regarding whether the pathogen is an immediate descendent of pathogens currently causing human disease Metaculus may wait for additional statements from credible sources describing the lineage of the pathogen, and may resolve the question as **Ambiguous** if information provided by credible sources is not clear.
|
2023-11-22T22:00:00Z
|
2023-12-14T23:00:00Z
|
2023-12-15T14:03:00Z
|
no
|
METACULUS
|
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