id
stringlengths 8
25
| question
stringlengths 13
209
| description
stringlengths 0
7.87k
| open_date
stringlengths 19
20
| close_date
stringlengths 19
27
| resolve_date
stringlengths 19
20
| resolution
stringclasses 2
values | source
stringclasses 2
values |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
meta-20091
|
Will Kalshi win its lawsuit against the U.S. Commodity Futures Trading Commission before November 1, 2024?
|
KalshiEX LLC [sued the U.S. Commodity Futures Trading Commission (CFTC)](https://www.reuters.com/world/us/predictions-market-kalshi-sues-cftc-blocking-election-contracts-2023-11-01/) for overstepping its authority by rejecting its proposal for derivatives contracts to bet on congressional control. Kalshi argued these contracts, aimed at hedging against economic risks from political changes, don't involve unlawful acts and are in the public interest. The CFTC declined to comment but previously expressed concerns about the contracts involving unlawful gaming and not being in the public's interest. The lawsuit claims the CFTC violated the Administrative Procedures Act.
Resolution Criteria: This question will resolve **Yes** if either of the following occurs before November 1, 2024:
1. An initial litigated bench or jury verdict rules that the U.S. Commodity Futures Trading Commission (CFTC) overstepped its authority by rejecting KalshiEX LLC's proposal for derivatives contracts to bet on congressional control.
2. A settlement is reached such that the proposal for derivatives contracts to bet on congressional control is approved.
Otherwise, the question will resolve **No**
Fine Print: This question regards only the initial lawsuit, and not any subsequent appeals or parallel suits.
|
2023-11-23T18:41:00Z
|
2024-11-01T00:00:00Z
|
2024-09-06T13:00:00Z
|
yes
|
METACULUS
|
meta-20063
|
Will the November 2023 Israel-Hamas humanitarian pause be extended?
|
On November 22, 2023, [Qatar announced](https://www.mofa.gov.qa/en/statements/the-state-of-qatar-announces-that-a-humanitarian-pause-has-been-agreed-in-gaza) that Israel and Hamas had reached an agreement to implement a humanitarian pause. The announcement reads a follows:
>The State of Qatar announces the success of its joint mediation efforts undertaken with the Arab Republic of Egypt and the United States of America between Israel and the Islamic Resistance Movement (Hamas), resulting in an agreement for a humanitarian pause. The starting time of the pause will be announced within the next 24 hours and last for four days, subject to extension.
>
>The agreement includes the release of 50 civilian women and children hostages currently held in the Gaza Strip in exchange for the release of a number of Palestinian women and children detained in Israeli prisons, the number of those released will be increased in later stages of implementing the agreement.
>
>The humanitarian pause will also allow the entry of a larger number of humanitarian convoys and relief aid, including fuel designated for humanitarian needs.
>
>The State of Qatar affirms its commitment to ongoing diplomatic efforts to de-escalate tensions, stop the bloodshed, and protect civilians. In this regard, the State of Qatar appreciates the efforts of the Arab Republic of Egypt and the United States of America in reaching this agreement.
Resolution Criteria: This question will resolve as **Yes** if [credible sources](https://www.metaculus.com/help/faq/#definitions) report that the length of the November 2023 humanitarian pause between Israel and Hamas has been extended beyond the default length of four days **and** the extension has begun. If credible sources report that the humanitarian pause will not begin this question will be **annulled**. If the four-day humanitarian pause begins but credible sources report that it has ended before the default length was reached this question will resolve as **No**.
Fine Print: * The extension or ending of the pause will be determined based on credible reports stating that the pause has officially been ended or has officially been extended. Media reports that one side is not respecting the pause will be immaterial. For example, if Hamas leadership were to criticize a strike taken by Israel during the pause, or vice versa, this question will still resolve as **Yes** so long as credible sources report that the pause was extended.
* The extension must actually commence, an agreement to extend the pause is not sufficient. If the extension to the pause starts but is then called off by one or more sides, this still resolves as **Yes**.
|
2023-11-22T19:00:00Z
|
2023-11-30T23:00:00Z
|
2023-11-28T10:00:00Z
|
yes
|
METACULUS
|
meta-20043
|
Will the majority of OpenAI's Board of Directors leave the Board before December 1, 2023?
|
From [The Washington Post](https://www.washingtonpost.com/technology/2023/11/20/microsoft-openai-sam-saltman-fired/).
> The future of OpenAI was thrown into chaos Monday after nearly all employees at the artificial intelligence company threatened to quit and join ousted chief executive Sam Altman at Microsoft, extending the dramatic Silicon Valley boardroom saga.
> More than 700 of the company’s roughly 770 employees have signed a letter threatening to quit unless the current board resigns and reappoints Altman as CEO, according to a person familiar with the matter. In a bizarre twist, the letter included among the signatories Ilya Sutskever, the company’s chief scientist and a key member of the company’s four-person board, who voted to oust Altman on Friday.
> “Your actions have made it obvious that you are incapable of overseeing OpenAI,” the employees wrote in the letter. “We are unable to work for or with people that lack competence, judgment and care for our mission and employees.”
Resolution Criteria: The question resolves Yes if at least three of the following individuals leave the [OpenAI board](https://openai.com/our-structure) before December 1, 2023:
- Ilya Sutskever
- Adam D'Angelo
- Helen Toner
- Tasha McCauley
|
2023-11-20T21:00:00Z
|
2023-11-30T19:00:00Z
|
2023-11-30T01:08:00Z
|
yes
|
METACULUS
|
meta-20042
|
Will Israel and Hamas conduct a prisoner exchange involving ≥20 Israelis and ≥20 Palestinians in 2023?
|
Per [Reuters](https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/what-do-we-now-about-hamas-hostages-2023-10-19/) on October 20, Hamas has said it captured 200 hostages and that 50 more are held by other groups in Gaza, while public broadcaster Kan said 200 Israelis were being held in Gaza.
On October 26, Hamas said that "almost 50" of those held captive had died in Israeli strikes on Gaza. On 2 November, it said a further 7 had died in a strike on the Jabalia refugee camp. These numbers may change and may not be very accurate as intense bombing persists. (https://www.scmp.com/news/world/middle-east/article/3239336/israel-gaza-war-hamas-says-almost-50-israeli-hostages-killed-tel-avivs-raids)
Resolution Criteria: The question resolves Yes based on credible reports that a hostage exchange has been carried out. Through the exchange:
- Hamas must release at least 20 Israelis
- Israel must release at least 20 Palestinians
|
2023-11-21T23:30:00Z
|
2023-12-31T21:59:00Z
|
2023-11-25T21:48:00Z
|
yes
|
METACULUS
|
meta-20039
|
Will Adobe acquire Figma by the end of 2024?
|
On September 15, 2022, Adobe announced an [agreement to purchase Figma](https://news.adobe.com/news/news-details/2022/Adobe-to-Acquire-Figma/default.aspx) for $20 billion USD.
Since then, reports have emerged that the [U.S. Justice Department is preparing an antitrust lawsuit to block the deal](https://www.reuters.com/legal/us-preparing-antitrust-suit-block-adobe-plan-buy-figma-bloomberg-news-2023-02-23/).
Adobe previously created a product which directly competes with Figma, named Adobe XD. As of April 25, 2023, Adobe [no longer lists XD in its product lineup](https://www.adobe.com/products/catalog.html) and XD is no longer available for download in the Creative Cloud store.
Resolution Criteria: This question resolves as Yes if Adobe announces that it has completed a deal to acquire Figma before January 1, 2025.
|
2023-11-24T21:02:00Z
|
2025-01-01T20:00:00Z
|
2025-01-04T03:30:00Z
|
no
|
METACULUS
|
meta-20038
|
Will OpenAI report having ≥99% uptime for ChatGPT and the OpenAI API in December 2023?
|
ChatGPT's uptime has exceeded 99% for every month except the month of launch, with Feburary at 98.28%.
Software reliability is often measured in "number of 9"s, i.e. 90%, 99%, 99.9%, 99.99%, etc.
OpenAI's future is uncertain following the ouster of CEO Sam Altman, prompting speculation that ChatGPT may [cease to work](https://thezvi.substack.com/p/openai-facts-from-a-weekend).
Resolution Criteria: This question resolves **Yes** if, on January 1, 2024, [OpenAI's status page](https://status.openai.com/uptime/tbwycthtqm69?page=1) for both ChatGPT and the API reports ≥ 99% uptime for the month of December 2023. It resolves **No** otherwise, including in cases where the status page ceases to exist.
The question also resolves **No** if OpenAI discontinues either ChatGPT or the API and the status page is not updated to reflect this.
Forecasters can find the uptime in grey text to the right of the relevant month. Forecasters will need to adjust the dropdown menu to see the status for both the API and ChatGPT.
|
2023-11-20T20:00:00Z
|
2023-12-31T19:00:00Z
|
2024-01-03T17:39:00Z
|
yes
|
METACULUS
|
meta-20024
|
Will Sweden join NATO before 2025?
|
NATO is an is an intergovernmental military alliance established in the aftermath of World War II. During the Cold War, the main purpose of NATO was to provide collective security against the Soviet Union and its allies, the Warsaw Pact. Recently, NATO has provided a European system of security against Russia, viewed by many in Europe as a hostile threat, especially after its invasion of Ukraine.
Sweden was neutral throughout both World Wars. However, in the wake of the Russian invasion of Ukraine, its neighbor Finland, which also had [a longstanding policy](https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-europe-61397478) of neutrality, [joined NATO](https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/news_213448.htm).
Recently, Sweden has applied to NATO. NATO accession requires the unanimous consent of NATO members, and Turkey has [delayed](https://www.reuters.com/world/swedens-nato-bid-delayed-turkish-parliament-2023-11-16/) its vote on Sweden has NATO. A [previous Metaculus question](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/10084/sweden-to-join-nato-before-2024/) asked if Sweden would join NATO before 2024. Here, we ask if Sweden will join NATO before 2025.
Disclaimer: I [sourced much of the description](https://www.france24.com/en/live-news/20220301-ukraine-war-brings-sweden-finland-even-closer-to-nato) from here.
Resolution Criteria: This question will resolve Yes if an official statement by NATO or the Country of Sweden, issued before January 1, 2025, declares that Sweden has joined NATO.
|
2023-12-10T17:34:00Z
|
2025-01-01T12:00:00Z
|
2024-03-07T17:00:00Z
|
yes
|
METACULUS
|
meta-20005
|
Will Sam Altman and Greg Brockman start a new AI company, or join a competitor to OpenAI, before 2025?
|
On November 17, 2023, Sam Altman was [fired as CEO of OpenAI](https://www.wsj.com/tech/sam-altman-departs-open-ai-mira-murati-interim-ceo-41f6d51e).
In a [statement](https://openai.com/blog/openai-announces-leadership-transition), OpenAI's board said:
> Mr. Altman’s departure follows a deliberative review process by the board, which concluded that he was not consistently candid in his communications with the board, hindering its ability to exercise its responsibilities. The board no longer has confidence in his ability to continue leading OpenAI.
In a [tweet](https://twitter.com/sama/status/1725631621511184771) the same day, Altman said he would have news on next steps soon.
Shortly thereafter, OpenAI President and Chairman of the Board Greg Brockman tweeted "[I quit](https://twitter.com/gdb/status/1725667410387378559)."
Resolution Criteria: The question resolves Yes if, before January 1, 2025, both Sam Altman and Greg Brockman are either:
1. Cofounders of a new company that aims to train foundation models
2. Employees of an existing company that aims to train foundation models
That company must not be OpenAI. They must both be cofounders or employees at the same company.
Fine Print: "Foundation models" will be considered to be those described by the language below from the [draft EU AI Act](https://www.europarl.europa.eu/doceo/document/TA-9-2023-0236_EN.html#:~:text=group%20of%20persons%3B-,Amendment%20168,-Proposal%20for%20a). Metaculus may make a determination if there is ambiguity regarding whether a company founded by or employing both individuals aims to train foundation models.
>‘foundation model’ means an AI system model that is trained on broad data at scale, is designed for generality of output, and can be adapted to a wide range of distinctive tasks.
|
2023-11-18T03:30:00Z
|
2024-12-31T19:00:00Z
|
2025-01-06T20:09:00Z
|
no
|
METACULUS
|
meta-19997
|
Will the weekly rate of hospitalizations per 100,000 in the US for each of COVID, influenza, and RSV equal or exceed 3.0 in the same week in the 2023-24 season?
|
The US Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) closely monitors respiratory illnesses, particularly when these illnesses increase in prevalence during the winter. One monitoring and data sharing tool the CDC uses is [RESP-NET](https://www.cdc.gov/surveillance/resp-net/dashboard.html), which it describes as follows:
>The Respiratory Virus Hospitalization Surveillance Network (RESP-NET) comprises three networks that conduct population-based surveillance for laboratory-confirmed hospitalizations associated with COVID-19, respiratory syncytial virus (RSV), and influenza among children and adults. While RESP-NET does not collect data on all hospitalizations caused by respiratory illnesses, it can describe hospitalizations caused by three viruses that account for a large proportion of these hospitalizations. Surveillance is conducted through a network of acute care hospitals in select counties or county equivalents in 12 states for RSV surveillance, 13 states for COVID-19 surveillance, and 14 states for influenza surveillance. The surveillance platforms for COVID-19, RSV, and influenza (known as [COVID-NET](https://www.cdc.gov/coronavirus/2019-ncov/covid-data/covid-net/purpose-methods.html), [RSV-NET](https://www.cdc.gov/rsv/research/rsv-net/overview-methods.html), and [FluSurv-NET](https://www.cdc.gov/flu/weekly/influenza-hospitalization-surveillance.htm), respectively) cover more than 30 million people and include an estimated 8-10% of the U.S. population.
The underlying source data for the RESP-NET dashboard can be found at [this link](https://data.cdc.gov/Public-Health-Surveillance/Rates-of-Laboratory-Confirmed-RSV-COVID-19-and-Flu/kvib-3txy).
In its [Respiratory Disease Season Outlook](https://www.cdc.gov/respiratory-viruses/whats-new/2023-2024-season-outlook.html) for 2023-24, the CDC describes the 2022-23 peak as a "tripledemic" due to high incidence of COVID, flu, and RSV at the same time. The [RESP-NET](https://www.cdc.gov/surveillance/resp-net/dashboard.html) figures for the 2022-23 season show a large combined peak hospitalization rate of 22.2 per 100,000 for the week ending December 3, 2022, the sum of the following rates for the three respiratory illnesses:
* COVID-19: 9.3
* Flu: 8.7
* RSV: 4.2
Resolution Criteria: This question will resolve as **Yes** if all of COVID, influenza, and RSV show a hospitalization rate of 3.0 or higher in the same week for at least one week in the 2023-24 season, according to the CDC's [RESP-NET](https://www.cdc.gov/surveillance/resp-net/dashboard.html). The CDC uses "epidemiological weeks" which begin on Sunday and end on Saturday. The rate used will be that for all ages, races, and sexes. See the fine print for the correct filters. For the purposes of this question, the 2023-2024 season will be considered to begin with the week ending on October 7, 2023, and end on the week ending June 1, 2024.
To allow for data revisions and reporting delays the question will resolve according to data shown after the reporting delay period, when the relevant figures for the current season is not shown as a dashed line, typically 4 weeks after the week end date.
Fine Print: * The following filters will be selected:
* **Chart Selection:** "Season"
* **View:** "Weekly Rates"
* **Season:** "2023-24"
* **Pathogen:** "All"
|
2023-12-01T22:30:00Z
|
2024-05-25T22:00:00Z
|
2024-01-03T15:39:00Z
|
yes
|
METACULUS
|
meta-19975
|
Will a new SARS-CoV-2 variant be classified as a Variant of Concern (VOC) or worse in the United States before March 1, 2024?
|
The SARS-CoV-2 Interagency Group (SIG), established by the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, coordinates between the CDC, National Institutes of Health, Food and Drug Administration, Biomedical Advanced Research and Development Authority, and Department of Defense. This group is responsible for classifying and monitoring emerging SARS-CoV-2 variants.
The US Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) tracks [SARS-CoV-2 variants](https://www.cdc.gov/coronavirus/2019-ncov/variants/variant-classifications.html) classified by the SIG. As of December 1, 2023, the CDC shows four variant classifications which describe the characteristics of certain variants for use in informing the public health response. The four classifications are described as follows:
**Variants Being Monitored (VBM)**
>. . . Variants designated as VBM include:
>
>* lineages with potential impact on available medical countermeasures based on analysis of genetic sequence data.
>* lineages that previously caused more severe disease or increased transmission but that are no longer detected.
>* lineage with an unusually large number of antigenic mutations AND presence in multiple countries with collection dates within 4 weeks.
>*lineages previously designated as a VOI, VOC, or VOHC that are currently circulating at very low levels in the United States.
>
>A Variant of Interest or a Variant of Concern may be downgraded to this list after it is no longer circulating at sustained levels and no longer poses significant risk to public health in the United States. Classifications may change over time, based on the evolving situation and information available.
**Variant of Interest (VOI)**
>. . . Variants designated as VOI include variants that have:
>
>* reduced neutralization by antibodies generated against previous infection or vaccination.
>* reduced efficacy of FDA approved treatments, or diagnostic tests.
>* predicted increase in transmissibility or disease severity.
>
>Possible attributes of a Variant of Interest include:
>
>* specific genetic markers that are predicted to affect transmission, diagnostics, therapeutics, or immune escape.
>* evidence that it is the cause of an increased proportion of cases or unique outbreak clusters.
**Variant of Concern (VOC)**
>. . . In addition to the possible attributes of a variant of interest, variants designated as VOC include:
>
>* increase in transmissibility.
>* more severe disease (for example, increased hospitalizations or deaths).
>* significant reduction in neutralization by antibodies generated during previous infection or vaccination.
>* reduced effectiveness of treatments or vaccines, or diagnostic detection failures.
**Variant of High Consequence (VOHC)**
>A VOHC has clear evidence that prevention measures or medical countermeasures (MCMs) have significantly reduced effectiveness relative to previously circulating variants. . . In addition to the possible attributes of a variant of concern, variants designated as VOHC include impact on MCMs such as:
>
>* demonstrated failure of diagnostic test targets.
>* evidence to suggest a significant reduction in vaccine effectiveness, a disproportionately high number of infections in vaccinated persons, or very low vaccine-induced protection against severe disease.
>* significantly reduced susceptibility to multiple EUA or approved therapeutics.
>* more severe clinical disease and increased hospitalizations.
The variant class hierarchy is described by the CDC as follows:
>Each variant classification includes the possible attributes of lower classes (for example, VOC includes the possible attributes of VOI). . . U.S. classifications may differ from the WHO classifications because the impact of variants may differ by location.
As of December 1, 2023, only "Omicron (parent lineages)" is classified as a VOC. All other variants are classified as VBM, except for "variants containing the F456L spike mutations" which is classified as a VOI. Previously the only variants to have reached the level of VOC were Alpha, Beta, Gamma, Delta, Epsilon, and Omicron, though all but "Omicron (parent lineages)" have since been downgraded.
Resolution Criteria: This question will resolve as **Yes** if, after December 1, 2023 and before March 1, 2024, the SARS-CoV-2 Interagency Group announces (or the CDC [shows on its SARS-CoV-2 variant classifications page](https://www.cdc.gov/coronavirus/2019-ncov/variants/variant-classifications.html)) a new SARS-CoV-2 Variant of Concern (VOC) or Variant of High Consequence (VOHC) that was not previously identified as a VOC or VOHC at any point.
Fine Print: If a new variant is classified using a new classification that is clearly described as being a level above VOC or having properties in addition to the possible attributes of a VOC or VOHC this question will also resolve as **Yes**.
|
2023-12-01T22:30:00Z
|
2024-02-29T23:00:00Z
|
2024-03-01T15:01:00Z
|
no
|
METACULUS
|
meta-19969
|
Will the US Congress approve additional aid for Ukraine before 2024?
|
**See also**: [How much additional aid for Ukraine will the US Congress approve before October 1, 2023?](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/18694/amount-of-new-ukraine-aid-package/)
Between January 2022 and July 2023, the US has provided Ukraine with $46.6 billion in military aid, $3.9 billion in humanitarian aid and $26.4 billion in financial aid, totaling roughly $77 billion, according to a recent analysis from the Council on Foreign Relations (CFR)
Despite previous bipartisan support on September 30, 2023 the US Congress passed a bill that [didn't include](https://www.foxnews.com/politics/democrat-senator-temporarily-held-up-senate-vote-hours-before-shutdown-over-ukraine-funding) new foreign aid for Ukraine.
Resolution Criteria: This questions resolves as _Yes_ if at any point in time between November 16, 2023 and January 1, 2024 credible sources report that the US Congress has approved an additional package of foreign aid for Ukraine. The foreign aid must be included in a bill (or bills) sent to President Biden for signature by the end of the day on December 31, 2023.
|
2023-11-28T19:00:00Z
|
2023-12-31T23:00:00Z
|
2023-12-14T15:45:00Z
|
yes
|
METACULUS
|
meta-19960
|
Will Representative George Santos be expelled from the US. House of Representatives before January 1, 2024?
|
George Santos, a U.S. Representative, faces scrutiny over fabrications in his background and potential legal issues. On the 16th of November, [the House Ethics committee released a report into various aspects of Santos' conduct](https://ethics.house.gov/press-releases/statement-chairman-and-ranking-member-committee-ethics-regarding-representative-76). Santos has not resigned, but has announced he will not seek reelection at the end of his term, at the end of the current session. Expulsion from the House requires a two-thirds majority vote, a high threshold historically rarely met. Only [five members](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_United_States_representatives_expelled,_censured,_or_reprimanded) have been expelled in the House's history, typically for severe misconduct like treason or bribery.
Resolution Criteria: This question will resolve as **Yes** if the House of Representatives expels Representative George Santos from the House of Representatives before January 1, 2024.
|
2023-11-16T20:00:00Z
|
2023-12-31T23:00:00Z
|
2023-12-01T16:30:00Z
|
yes
|
METACULUS
|
meta-19959
|
Will a third-party or independent candidate win at least 15% of the popular vote in the 2024 US presidential election?
|
Although [large numbers of Americans consistently say they want a third party](https://news.gallup.com/poll/244094/majority-say-third-party-needed.aspx), electoral performance of parties other than the Democratic and Republican parties has historically been poor. For example, no non-Democrat non-Republican has won a presidential election since [1848](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/1848_United_States_presidential_election).
The most recent time a non-Democrat non-Republican received over 10% of the national popular vote was 1992, with Perot-Stockdale winning 19%. (Perot-Choate came close in 1996, with 8%.)
Resolution Criteria: This question resolves **Yes** if any single candidate not running for the Democratic or Republican party receives 15% or more of the national popular vote, and **No** if one does not
|
2023-11-17T18:54:00Z
|
2024-11-04T19:00:00Z
|
2025-01-21T16:09:00Z
|
no
|
METACULUS
|
meta-19942
|
Will TikTok US be sold to a US entity before 2025?
|
In December 2022, the US Senate introduced a bill that would [impose a ban on "all transactions from any social media company in, or under the influence of, China, Russia, and several other foreign countries of concern,"](https://www.cnbc.com/2022/12/13/lawmakers-unveil-bipartisan-bill-that-aims-to-ban-tiktok-in-the-us.html) over privacy concerns involving the government of China. This would amount to [banning TikTok in the US](https://www.economist.com/united-states/2023/03/23/america-may-be-a-step-closer-to-banning-tiktok). A second possibility is what the Trump Administration attempted in 2020 and 2021, to [force a sale of TikTok US operations to a US company, e.g. Oracle, which did not go through.](https://techcrunch.com/2021/02/10/tiktoks-forced-sale-to-oracle-is-put-on-hold/) As of March 2023, TikTok US remains accessible in the US and remains under the control of ByteDance.
Resolution Criteria: This question will resolve as Yes if, before January 1, 2025, credible sources report that TikTok US will be (or has been) sold to a US company, foundation, or entity. The transaction need not be complete in 2024 but must at least be announced in 2024. For a transaction to count, more than 50% of TikTok US has to be sold.
If TikTok is not sold before 2025, or is banned within the US and remains banned for the entirety of 2024, this question will resolve as No.
If TikTok successfully conducts an initial public offering by end of 2024, this question resolves ambiguously.
|
2023-12-12T21:19:00Z
|
2024-11-30T11:00:00Z
|
2025-01-14T07:49:00Z
|
no
|
METACULUS
|
meta-19919
|
Will Delhi perform cloud seeding before December 1, 2023?
|
[New Delhi](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/New_Delhi), the capital of India, has [been experiencing](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/19590/new-delhi-air-quality-end-of-october-2023/) very poor air quality. According to data from [AirNow](https://www.airnow.gov/international/us-embassies-and-consulates/#India$New_Delhi), the majority of the month of November has been at an [air quality index](https://www.airnow.gov/aqi/aqi-basics/) (AQI) level of "Very Unhealthy" or worse, and nearly half of the month has been at levels of "Hazardous".
[According to a November 10th Nature article](https://www.nature.com/articles/d41586-023-03517-1):
>As the Hindu festival of Diwali kicks off on 10 November, the Indian capital of Delhi, already blanketed in choking smog, is bracing for pollution to worsen. Over the past week, children struggling to breath the acrid air have flooded hospital emergency departments, and schools have been forced to close. . .
>
>“Every year it is a similar story,” says Vinayak Sinha, an atmospheric chemist at the Indian Institute of Science Education and Research Mohali.
>
>But although Delhi’s air is attracting attention now, scientists say that the spike is actually typical for this time of year. The post-monsoon season, which lasts from October to December, delivers an annual pollution bomb to Delhi, a megacity of more than 30 million people. Other cities in India are also plagued by poor air quality at this time of year.
>
>Sinha says that atmospheric conditions after the monsoon exacerbate pollution. Rainfall that washes pollutants out of the air during the monsoon ceases. As temperatures fall, the upper boundary of the troposphere — the lowest layer of atmosphere — drops in altitude and the troposphere shrinks. That causes the soup of pollutants in the troposphere to become more concentrated, says Sinha. “You have a smaller container now into which your air emissions are being stored,” he says.
>
>Even so, current conditions came as something of a surprise, says Karthik Ganesan, a policy researcher at the Council on Energy Environment and Water in New Delhi. That’s because the amount of crop waste burnt in the neighbouring Punjab region was lower than usual this year, causing some people to expect a milder increase in pollution.
>
>But as it turned out, air quality was as poor as ever because of changing meteorological conditions, including drops in wind speed on certain days. When wind speed falls, the air stagnates, trapping local emissions and leading to a pollution spike, says Ganesan.
New Delhi is reportedly considering new approaches to improve the air quality, such as cloud seeding. [According to Wired](https://www.wired.com/story/delhi-smog-air-pollution-cloud-seeding/):
>India’s capital, New Delhi, is preparing a new weapon in the fight against deadly air pollution: cloud seeding. The experiment, which could take place as early as next week, would introduce chemicals like silver iodide into a cloudy sky to create rain and, it’s hoped, wash away the fine particulate matter hovering over one of the world’s largest cities.
>
>The need is desperate. Delhi has already tried traffic restriction measures, multimillion-dollar air filtration towers, and the use of fleets of water-spraying trucks to dissolve the particulate matter in the air—but to no avail.
>
>. . .
>
>Now, Delhi officials are seeking permission from federal agencies in India to try cloud seeding. The technique involves flying an aircraft to spray clouds with salts like silver or potassium iodide or solid carbon dioxide, also known as dry ice, to induce precipitation. The chemical molecules attach to moisture already in the clouds to form bigger droplets that then fall as rain. China has used artificial rain to tackle air pollution in the past—but for cloud seeding to work properly, you need significant cloud cover with reasonable moisture content, which Delhi generally lacks during the winter. If weather conditions are favorable, scientists leading the project at the Indian Institute of Technology in Kanpur plan to carry out cloud seeding around November 20.
Resolution Criteria: This question will resolve as **Yes** if, after November 14, 2023, and before December 1, 2023, credible sources report that Delhi has performed cloud seeding.
Fine Print: * The cloud seeding need not successfully produce rain or cut down on the smog. This question only asks whether cloud seeding will be performed.
* The cloud seeding need not occur directly over the Delhi region, so long as reports indicate that it was carried out with approval from the Delhi regional or local government.
* There is no requirement on the scope or scale of the cloud seeding, so long as credible sources report that cloud seeding has been performed.
* Metaculus may wait for additional confirmation from credible sources to resolve if the credibility of the initial reporting is in doubt.
|
2023-11-15T20:10:00Z
|
2023-11-30T23:00:00Z
|
2023-12-01T16:10:00Z
|
no
|
METACULUS
|
meta-19909
|
Will Volodymyr Zelenskyy visit Israel before 2024?
|
From the onset of the [Gaza-Israel](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Gaza–Israel_conflict) conflict, many pro-Israeli nations have shown their support for Israel [via high profile visits](https://www.usnews.com/news/best-countries/articles/2023-11-03/why-canada-is-taking-a-cautious-approach-to-the-israel-hamas-war) including, US President Joe Biden, UK Prime Minister Rishi Sunak, French President Emmanuel Macron and German Chancellor Olaf Scholz.
Ukraine is another nation which is seen as pro-Israeli, however, in past and present times, the [relationship](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Israel–Ukraine_relations#:~:text=Both%20countries%20recognized%20each%20other,a%20consulate%2Dgeneral%20in%20Haifa.) between both nations has appeared tentative. Israel still maintains friendly relations with Russia, and Israel has yet to outright condemn Russia's invasion of Ukraine. Israel has also, [until recently](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/10293/israel-arms-ukraine-before-2024/?category=all&duration=1&year=2023), refused to send military aid to Ukraine which is in stark contrast to many of Israel's western allies.
Volodymyr Zelenskyy initially indicated his [intention to visit](https://www.axios.com/2023/10/11/zelensky-israel-hamas-war-gaza-visit-netanyahu) Israel in a show of support, however this was initially [shot-down](https://news.yahoo.com/media-israel-refuses-zelensky-visit-140611433.html) by Netanyahu, stating that the "*time is not right*".
This decision was short-lived, as it was recently [reported](https://www.timesofisrael.com/liveblog_entry/preparations-for-zelensky-to-visit-israel-next-week-reportedly-in-advanced-phase/) that Zelenskyy's trip to Israel was in advanced stages of planning. Said reporting, however, was leaked (presumably by members of Netenyahu's government), and the trip was promptly [cancelled](https://www.lemonde.fr/en/international/article/2023/11/06/zelensky-s-trip-to-israel-in-doubt-after-media-leak_6231250_4.html):
>According to the diplomat, the Ukrainian president "wanted the trip to be public when he stepped on Israeli soil." "He's very disappointed," he added.
Resolution Criteria: This question will resolve as **Yes** if Volodymyr Zelenskyy steps foot in Israel, for any reason, before 23:59 IST, December 31, 2023.
Otherwise, it will resolve **No**.
|
2023-11-15T15:00:00Z
|
2023-12-04T12:00:00Z
|
2024-01-03T17:33:00Z
|
no
|
METACULUS
|
meta-19898
|
Will Bitcoin reach $40,000 before January 1, 2024?
|
At the beginning of 2023 BTC traded at between $16,000 and $17,000 in the wake of the [FTX collapse](https://www.nytimes.com/2022/11/10/technology/ftx-binance-crypto-explained.html) in late 2022 and a general [crypto market downturn in 2022](https://www.bloomberg.com/graphics/2022-crypto-contagion-from-bitcoin-to-FTX/). Since then, BTC has surged to over $37,000, levels that had not been seen since early 2022. Whether or not BTC will reach the $40,000 threshold in 2023 has been a [topic of recent discussion.](https://coinpedia.org/price-analysis/bitcoins-battle-for-40k-what-lies-ahead-in-q4-2023/#:~:text=Bitcoin%20Price%20Prediction%20By%20Crypto%20Analyst%3A&text=The%20analysts%20predicted%20that%20if,year%20around%20the%20same%20range.)
Resolution Criteria: This question will resolve as **Yes** if Bitcoin (BTC) reaches a price of $40,000 or more before January 1, 2024. Whether or not the price is at or above $40,000 at the end of the year does not matter. This question resolves solely on the basis of whether BTC reaches or exceeds the $40,000 threshold. The primary resolution source is [CoinMarketCap]( https://coinmarketcap.com/currencies/bitcoin/). If the resolution source is unavailable, other comparable sources may be used. However, if sources disagree, CoinMarketCap is the primary source.
Fine Print: In the case of uncertainty regarding whether the threshold has been met on CoinMarketCap, we will use the five minute increments available on the one day price view on the chart. Note that the most recent few minutes may use a smaller time increment, however, to resolve as **Yes** the threshold must be met or exceeded at the five minute or larger time increment when the resolution source is accessed at a later time by Metaculus.
|
2023-11-15T15:00:00Z
|
2023-12-31T12:00:00Z
|
2023-12-04T00:35:00Z
|
yes
|
METACULUS
|
meta-19877
|
Will at least 2 of the countries listed below be reinfected with either WPV1 or cVDPV before June 1, 2024?
|
In May 2014, the [WHO declared the spread of poliovirus a global health emergency,](https://polioeradication.org/polio-today/polio-now/public-health-emergency-status/#:~:text=On%205%20May%202014%20the,poliovirus%2C%20and%20requested%20a%20reassessment) leading to ongoing efforts to combat the disease. As of 2023, countries like Afghanistan, Pakistan, and several African nations continue to report cases of wild and vaccine-derived poliovirus. Conversely, nations such as Canada, Egypt, and Uganda, previously affected, now [face the risk of reinfection despite being currently free of active cases](https://polioeradication.org/polio-today/polio-now/public-health-emergency-status/). This situation highlights the persistent threat of polio, especially in areas with inadequate vaccination coverage, and underscores the need for sustained vigilance and immunization efforts globally to prevent resurgence and achieve eradication. For a weekly update, [see here](https://polioeradication.org/this-week/).
Resolution Criteria: This question will resolve as **Yes** if two or more countries that are currently listed as no longer infected but vulnerable to re-infection are no longer on that list as of May 31, 2024, due to experiencing re-infection, according to the [Global Polio Eradication Initiative](https://polioeradication.org/polio-today/polio-now/public-health-emergency-status/). The relevant countries are: Djibouti, Canada, Egypt, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Gambia, Mauritania, Senegal, Uganda, and Ukraine that are currently no longer infected. On May 31, this list will be accessed again and any of the above listed countries that are listed as a state infected with any of the polio variants will be counted for resolution. The final value is the sum of these.
Fine Print: * New additions to the list of no longer infected countries will not be relevant for resolution.
* If the resolution source is no longer updated, we will refer to publications from any PHEIC meeting that occur before the resolution date, using the most recent ones.
|
2023-12-01T15:30:00Z
|
2024-02-29T12:00:00Z
|
2024-06-06T16:59:00Z
|
yes
|
METACULUS
|
meta-19873
|
Will there be at least one operational nuclear power plant in Germany on May 31, 2024?
|
Germany finalized its long-planned exit from nuclear energy in [April 2023](https://www.base.bund.de/EN/ns/nuclear-phase-out/nuclear-phase-out_node.html), shutting down its last three nuclear power plants. This decision was part of a [policy shift that began in 1998](https://world-nuclear.org/information-library/country-profiles/countries-g-n/germany.aspx), with the government initially planning to phase out nuclear power, a plan briefly cancelled in 2009 but reinstated in 2011 following the [Fukushima Daiichi](https://world-nuclear.org/information-library/safety-and-security/safety-of-plants/fukushima-daiichi-accident.aspx) accident. By early 2011, Germany had 17 nuclear reactors supplying over one-quarter of its electricity, but this number was progressively reduced. The final closure of the remaining reactors in 2023 marked a significant energy transition for Germany, moving away from nuclear power towards other energy sources. A [2023](https://www.radiantenergygroup.com/reports/restart-of-germany-reactors-can-it-be-done) report found that two-thirds of Germans support nuclear energy and that at least 8 of the old reactors can be restarted within as little as 9 months.
Resolution Criteria: This question will resolve as 'Yes' if there is at least one operational nuclear power plant in Germany on May 31, 2024. The primary source for this determination will be the [Nuclear power in Germany](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Nuclear_power_in_Germany) page, which is expected to be updated with the operational status of nuclear power plants. If the page has not been updated or there is ambiguity regarding the operational status, the question will resolve based on the most recent and reliable information from German government announcements, energy oversight bodies, or reputable energy sector news outlets. If no clear information is available by the specified date and sources disagree, the question will resolve as ambiguous.
|
2023-12-01T15:30:00Z
|
2024-02-29T12:00:00Z
|
2024-06-01T16:07:00Z
|
no
|
METACULUS
|
meta-19871
|
Will any OpenAI or Anthropic model be in the top-10 model with a non-proprietary license on May 31, 2024?
|
In the current AI landscape, there's a significant divide between proprietary and open-source AI models. Proprietary AI, represented by LLM models like OpenAI's ChatGPT and Anthropic's Claude, boasts substantial market influence and development, supported by extensive resources and large model and training run sizes. On the other hand, open-source AI models like Llama, Falcon, and Mistral rely on more open source approaches as well as lower model sizes. At the moment, proprietary models dominate the LLM [leaderboards](https://huggingface.co/spaces/lmsys/chatbot-arena-leaderboard), though given the fast-moving nature of this industry, it is unclear whether the advantage of large, proprietary models will be sustained.
Resolution Criteria: This question will resolve as **Yes** if there is at least one model in the top-10 that has a non-proprietary licence and is released by Anthropic or OpenAI based on the rankings of models on the [Chatbot Arena Leaderboard](https://huggingface.co/spaces/lmsys/chatbot-arena-leaderboard) hosted on the Hugging Face website. Any license that is not ‘Proprietary’ is sufficient for a model to count for resolution. If the leaderboard does not provide sufficient information regarding the licensing or is not updated by the resolution date, the question will resolve as ambiguous.
|
2023-12-01T15:30:00Z
|
2024-02-29T12:00:00Z
|
2024-05-31T16:15:00Z
|
no
|
METACULUS
|
meta-19870
|
Will an LLM by Apple be ranked in the top-5 on the Chatbot Arena Leaderboard on May 31, 2024?
|
While major tech companies like OpenAI, Meta, and Google have actively released their Large Language Models (LLMs) to the public, Apple remains an exception in this trend. Despite its significant advancements and investments in AI, particularly with the internal development of the rumoured [Ajax-powered chatbot](https://www.theverge.com/2023/7/19/23800430/apple-gpt-ai-chatbot-generative-ai), Apple has not yet made any of its generative AI technologies publicly available. This contrasts with the faster approaches of its competitors, who are rapidly deploying and releasing their LLMs for widespread use and research, showcasing a divergent strategy in the competitive field of artificial intelligence. Given Apple’s large resources and track-record of strong product launches, any potential Apple LLM may be one of the strongest contenders.
Resolution Criteria: This question will resolve based on the ranking of language model chatbots on the Chatbot Arena Leaderboard hosted on the Hugging Face website at [Chatbot Arena Leaderboard](https://huggingface.co/spaces/lmsys/chatbot-arena-leaderboard). If an LLM developed by Apple or a subsidiary of Apple is listed among the top-5 positions on May 31, 2024, the question will resolve as 'Yes'. If no such LLM by Apple or a subsidiary of Apple appears in the top-5, or if the leaderboard is not updated or accessible by the resolution date, the question will resolve as 'No'.
|
2023-12-01T15:30:00Z
|
2024-02-29T12:00:00Z
|
2024-06-01T04:00:00Z
|
no
|
METACULUS
|
meta-19869
|
Will OpenAI be a public company on May 31, 2024?
|
Founded in 2015 by notable figures like Elon Musk and Sam Altman, OpenAI began as a non-profit organization with a vision to advance AI technology for the benefit of humanity. However, in 2019, OpenAI transitioned to a ["capped" for-profit model](https://www.lxahub.com/stories/the-history-of-openai), known as OpenAI LP, allowing it to attract investments and offer its employees company stakes. This transformation also enabled key partnerships, most notably with [Microsoft](https://openai.com/blog/openai-and-microsoft-extend-partnership), which invested $1 billion in OpenAI and later announced a substantial $10 billion investment in 2023. These partnerships have been pivotal for OpenAI, particularly in funding and scaling their ambitious projects. According to Sam Altman, there are currently no plans to take OpenAI [public](https://www.reuters.com/technology/openai-ceo-has-no-ipo-plan-due-strange-company-structure-2023-06-06/).
Resolution Criteria: This question will resolve as 'Yes' if OpenAI is publicly traded on any stock exchange as of May 31, 2024. This will be determined by official announcements from OpenAI, [stock exchange listings](https://stockanalysis.com/list/biggest-companies/), and [credible financial news](https://www.wsj.com/market-data/quotes/company-list/country/united-states) reports. If these sources indicate that OpenAI is not publicly listed and is a private entity as of the specified date, the question will resolve as 'No'.
|
2023-12-01T15:30:00Z
|
2024-02-29T12:00:00Z
|
2024-06-01T16:04:00Z
|
no
|
METACULUS
|
meta-19868
|
Will X (formerly Twitter) be a public company on May 31, 2024?
|
In October 2022, Elon Musk completed the acquisition of Twitter for [$44 billion](https://www.nytimes.com/2022/10/27/technology/elon-musk-twitter-deal-complete.html), transitioning the company from a public to a [private entity](https://www.nytimes.com/2022/10/28/technology/twitter-changes.html#:~:text=Making%20Twitter%20a%20private%20company,tightly%20controlled%20by%20an%20owner.). This change represents a significant shift in the company's structure and governance. Public companies, like Twitter was previously, are subject to strict disclosure requirements and shareholder scrutiny, with their shares traded on public stock exchanges. In contrast, a private company like Twitter under Musk's ownership is not obligated to disclose as much information and its shares are not publicly traded. This transition to a private structure grants Musk more control over the company's operations and strategic direction, allowing for potentially more rapid and significant changes in policies and practices. However, the long-term impact of this privatization on Twitter's operational and financial performance remains to be seen, as it introduces new dynamics in terms of management, debt obligations, and strategic vision implementation.
Resolution Criteria: This question will resolve as 'Yes' if X (formerly Twitter) is publicly traded on any stock exchange on May 31, 2024. This will be determined by official announcements from X, [stock exchange listings](https://stockanalysis.com/list/biggest-companies/), and [credible financial news](https://www.wsj.com/market-data/quotes/company-list/country/united-states) reports. If these sources indicate that X is not publicly listed and is a private entity as of the specified date, the question will resolve as 'No'.
|
2023-12-01T15:30:00Z
|
2024-02-29T12:00:00Z
|
2024-05-31T15:42:00Z
|
no
|
METACULUS
|
meta-19867
|
Will Elon Musk be chairman of X (formerly Twitter) on May 31, 2024?
|
Elon Musk, the world’s richest person known for leading companies like SpaceX and Tesla, expanded his portfolio by acquiring Twitter for [$44 billion](https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/technology-63402338) in October 2022. Under his leadership, the company underwent significant changes, including a rebranding to "X" in July 2023. While Musk initially served as CEO, he transitioned to the roles of Chairman and Chief Technology Officer, passing the [CEO position to Linda Yaccarino in June 2023.](https://twitter.com/elonmusk/status/1657050349608501249?lang=en)
Resolution Criteria: This question will resolve as 'Yes' if Elon Musk is listed as the chairman of X (formerly Twitter) on May 31, 2024 according to the Twitter page on [Wikipedia](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Twitter). If the Wikipedia page has not been updated by the specified date or if there is a dispute regarding the accuracy of the information, confirmation will be sought from at least two credible and independent national or international news sources. If neither Wikipedia nor news sources confirm Elon Musk's status as chairman by the specified date, the question will resolve as 'No'.
|
2023-12-01T15:30:00Z
|
2024-02-29T12:00:00Z
|
2024-05-31T16:01:00Z
|
yes
|
METACULUS
|
meta-19866
|
Will at least one nuclear whistle-blower go public between January 1, 2024 and May 31, 2024?
|
Nuclear whistle-blowers in the United States have played a crucial role in highlighting safety concerns in the nuclear industry, often at significant personal risk. Beginning with prominent figures like [Karen Silkwood in 1974](https://www.britannica.com/biography/Karen-Silkwood), who raised alarms about health and safety issues at a nuclear fuel plant, the trend continued with the actions of the GE Three in 1976, who exposed safety problems at nuclear power plants. These individuals, along with others like Ronald Goldstein and Arnold Gundersen, faced harsh retaliation including dismissal and harassment. Their disclosures not only brought critical safety issues to public attention but also influenced significant policy and legislative changes, demonstrating the vital role of whistle-blowers in maintaining safety standards in the nuclear sector.
Note that while the background is primarily concerned with US whistleblowers the question being asked is global in scope.
Resolution Criteria: This question will resolve as **Yes** if at least one new entry to the Wikipedia page for [List of nuclear whistle-blowers](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_nuclear_whistleblowers) shows that an individual has gone public between January 1, 2024, and May 31, 2024, or credible sources report that a nuclear whistleblower has gone public in that period.
Fine Print: * There is no geographic restriction on the whisteblower event, an event meeting all of the criteria will count no matter where it occurs.
* Any additions to the Wikipedia list must be backed by reporting from credible sources.
* A qualifying whistleblower report must relate to a nuclear power or nuclear weapons safety or environmental issue. Metaculus may make a determination as to whether a potentially qualifying event is sufficiently similar to the other entries appearing on the Wikipedia list.
|
2023-12-01T15:30:00Z
|
2024-02-29T12:00:00Z
|
2024-06-06T20:33:00Z
|
no
|
METACULUS
|
meta-19865
|
Will the Georgia Power Co Vogtle nuclear power plant Unit 4 be operational in May, 2024?
|
Building nuclear power plants in the United States is an [exceptionally challenging and complex endeavor.](https://www.eia.gov/todayinenergy/detail.php?id=57280#:~:text=Most%20U.S.%20nuclear%20reactors%20were,reactor%20came%20online%20in%202016.) The process is fraught with stringent regulatory requirements, high financial costs, advanced technological needs, and often public and political scrutiny. These challenges contribute to the rarity of new nuclear projects; for instance, Vogtle Unit 3 was the first new nuclear unit constructed in the U.S. in more than 30 years.
Against this backdrop, the progress of Georgia Power Co's Vogtle Unit 4 at Plant Vogtle near Waynesboro, Ga., is significant. [This unit has reached a crucial milestone with the commencement of fuel loading, an essential step towards its start up and commercial operation](https://www.georgiapower.com/company/news-center/2023-articles/vogtle-unit-4-starts-nuclear-fuel-load.html). The successful construction and operation of Vogtle Unit 4, following the recent commissioning of Unit 3, reflect Georgia Power's commitment to expanding nuclear energy. This commitment is underscored by the unit's potential to provide reliable, emissions-free energy to a significant number of homes and businesses. However, the project isn't without its challenges, including managing construction costs, scheduling, and ensuring adherence to safety and regulatory standards.
Resolution Criteria: This question will resolve as 'Yes' if Georgia Power Co Vogtle nuclear power plant Unit 4 is listed as operational on the EIA's monthly update of the [Electric Generator Inventory](https://www.eia.gov/electricity/data/eia860m/) on June 1, 2024. If the May report is not published by June 7, 2024, the resolution will be based on the most recent report available. For positive resolution, the Entity Name of the data set has to be ‘Georgia Power Co’ and the Generator ID has to be ‘4’.
|
2023-12-01T15:30:00Z
|
2024-02-29T12:00:00Z
|
2024-06-01T07:00:00Z
|
yes
|
METACULUS
|
meta-19851
|
Will Rishi Sunak be Prime Minister of the UK on May 31, 2024?
|
Rishi Sunak assumed office as the Prime Minister of the United Kingdom in October 2022, following the turbulent tenure of Liz Truss. His first year was dominated by efforts to stabilize the UK's economy, grappling with high inflation and the repercussions of Truss’s policies. Sunak focused on [austerity measures and pragmatic policymaking](https://www.instituteforgovernment.org.uk/comment/rishi-sunak-first-year-prime-minister), including the [Windsor Framework](https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/the-windsor-framework) which improved UK-EU relations, particularly concerning the Northern Ireland protocol. Despite these efforts, challenges such as persistent inflation and political scandals have continued. In terms of internal party dynamics, Sunak's leadership has been a balancing act within the Conservative Party, addressing divergent views and unifying the party ahead of the next [general election](https://www.parliament.uk/about/how/elections-and-voting/general/), which is scheduled for no later than January 2025.
Resolution Criteria: This question will resolve as 'Yes' if Rishi Sunak is listed as the Prime Minister of the UK on the [official government website](https://www.gov.uk/government/ministers/prime-minister) on May 31, 2024. In the event of a discrepancy or delay in the update of the government website, the question will additionally resolve based on real-time reports from at least two reputable and independent national news outlets. These sources must directly confirm Rishi Sunak's status as Prime Minister on the specified date. If neither the official website nor independent news outlets confirm his position as Prime Minister, the question will resolve as 'No'.
|
2023-12-01T15:30:00Z
|
2024-02-29T12:00:00Z
|
2024-05-31T23:56:00Z
|
yes
|
METACULUS
|
meta-19850
|
Will at least one of Egypt, Jordan, or Lebanon be at war with Israel on May 31, 2024?
|
As of late 2023, the Gaza Strip has been at the centre of [intense conflict and humanitarian crisis](https://edition.cnn.com/2023/10/28/middleeast/israel-hamas-war-one-month-explainer-mime-intl/index.html#:~:text=The%20conflict%20has%20led%20to,nowhere%20to%20escape%20Israel's%20bombs.), primarily due to the escalating violence between Israel and Hamas. The situation deteriorated significantly following a major terrorist attack on Israel by Hamas militants on October 7, described as the largest terrorist attack in Israel's history. This attack led to over [1,400 fatalities and numerous hostages](https://www.npr.org/2023/11/05/1210641727/israel-war-hamas-latest-updates), prompting a severe military response from Israel. In retaliation, the Israeli military launched an extensive offensive involving air, sea, and ground operations against Gaza. This has included a total siege aimed at curtailing the capabilities of Hamas, the ruling authority in the Gaza Strip. The conflict has resulted in a dire humanitarian situation in Gaza, exacerbating the long-standing difficulties faced by the civilian population in the area.
In [previous wars](https://history.state.gov/milestones/1945-1952/arab-israeli-war) Israel engaged in warfare with up to five Arab nations. At the moment, however, it is unclear and unlikely that neighbouring Arab countries will join the fighting, having already shown [unwillingness to take refugees](https://apnews.com/article/palestinian-jordan-egypt-israel-refugee-502c06d004767d4b64848d878b66bd3d).
Resolution Criteria: This question will resolve as 'Yes' if, on May 31, 2024, any of the nations Egypt, Jordan, or Lebanon is engaged in a state of war with Israel, characterized by any of the following being true:
• Official statements by any of the involved nation's government or military acknowledging a state of war.
• Official statements by the governments of at least two permanent members of the UN Security Council that acknowledge a state of war.
The primary source for resolution will be the official statements or press releases from the respective governments. If no official or credible report of a state of war is found by June 1, 2024, the question will resolve as 'No'.
Fine Print: * Whether Hezbollah declares war on Israel does not impact the resolution of this question as only nation states are relevant.
* Note that this question relies on official government statements, and it may be possible for there to be a substantial number of conflict deaths between Israel and one or more of these countries without either side acknowledging a state of war. In such a situation the question would still resolve as **No**.
* For the purposes of this question, an official statement will be one made in an official capacity on behalf of the government or a government agency, including in speeches or in response to questions from reporters.
* A statement referencing an "act of war" will generally not be considered to count as a "state of war", the statement must more broadly refer to a state of warfare between the militaries of the two nations.
* In the case of Lebanon, which is [technically still at war with Israel](https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/war-decades-lebanon-israel-edge-towards-rare-deal-2022-10-11/), the statements must be in reference to an escalation, continuation, or resumption of the war with Israel and related to combat between the overtly flagged members of each nation's military.
|
2023-12-01T15:30:00Z
|
2024-02-29T12:00:00Z
|
2024-05-31T16:09:00Z
|
no
|
METACULUS
|
meta-19849
|
Will there be United Nations peacekeeping troops in Gaza on May 31, 2024?
|
As of late 2023, the Gaza Strip has been at the centre of [intense conflict and humanitarian crisis](https://edition.cnn.com/2023/10/28/middleeast/israel-hamas-war-one-month-explainer-mime-intl/index.html#:~:text=The%20conflict%20has%20led%20to,nowhere%20to%20escape%20Israel's%20bombs.) due to the escalating violence between Israel and Hamas. The situation deteriorated significantly following a major terrorist attack on Israel by Hamas militants on October 7, described as the largest terrorist attack in Israel's history. This attack led to [1,200 fatalities and numerous hostages](https://www.npr.org/2023/11/05/1210641727/israel-war-hamas-latest-updates) (Israel initially estimated 1,400 fatalities, later [revised down to around 1,200](https://thehill.com/policy/international/4304838-israeli-death-toll-estimate-down-to-about-1200/)), prompting a severe military response from Israel. In retaliation, the Israeli military launched an extensive offensive involving air, sea, and ground operations against Gaza. This has included a total siege aimed at curtailing the capabilities of Hamas, the ruling authority in the Gaza Strip. The conflict has resulted in a dire humanitarian situation in Gaza, exacerbating the long-standing difficulties faced by the civilian population in the area.
In light of the crisis, there have been discussions about international interventions to stabilize the situation. One of the [proposed solutions](https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2023-10-31/us-and-israel-weigh-peacekeepers-for-the-gaza-strip-after-hamas?leadSource=reddit_wall) is the deployment of a multinational peacekeeping force in Gaza, potentially including troops from the United States, the United Kingdom, and France. Another option under consideration is placing Gaza under United Nations oversight.
Resolution Criteria: This question will resolve as 'Yes' if, on May 31, 2024, there is an active United Nations-led peacekeeping operation physically present in the Gaza Strip. For the purposes of this question:
• An 'operation' is defined as any UN-led mission that includes peacekeeping troops, advisors, or observers officially deployed in a capacity recognized by the UN Security Council.
• The presence must be confirmed through an official announcement or mission update on the [UN Peacekeeping: Where We Operate]( https://peacekeeping.un.org/en/where-we-operate) page.
• If the primary source is unavailable or not updated, resolution will be based on official statements from the United Nations or reports by at least two reputable international news organizations.
• The presence of any form of a UN delegation or individual personnel engaged in diplomatic discussions, without an accompanying peacekeeping mandate, does not fulfill the resolution criteria. Neither does the presence of members of the UN Palestine Refugee Agency (UNRWA).
|
2023-12-01T15:30:00Z
|
2024-02-29T12:00:00Z
|
2024-05-31T15:57:00Z
|
no
|
METACULUS
|
meta-19846
|
Will Dutch supermarket Albert Heijn still sell crompouces by April 30, 2024?
|
Late October 2023, [a new pastry called the _crompouce_](https://nltimes.nl/2023/10/28/tiktok-craze-bakery-crompouce-becomes-new-pastry-sensation) [went viral in The Netherlands](https://www.iamexpat.nl/lifestyle/lifestyle-news/crompouce-croissant-tompouce-hybrid-takes-over-dutch-tiktok). A crompouce is a hybrid between a croissant and the traditional Dutch pastry [tompouce](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Tompouce). News outlets attribute the hype to TikTok. Many local bakeries jumped in on the hype and started selling crompouces, [as did supermarket chain Albert Heijn](https://www.ah.nl/producten/product/wi567589/ah-crompouce). On the other hand, Hema (one of the most iconic stores that sell the traditional tompouce) started a humorous campaign that rejects the crompouce and advertises their classic tompouce. In [an interview published by newspaper AD on November 5th](https://www.ad.nl/binnenland/crompouce-leidt-tot-weerstand-in-bakkerswereld-je-kunt-overal-wel-room-tussen-stoppen~adee2d7a/), one baker said “I predict the hype is over in a few weeks”.
Is the crompouce a fad, or is it here to stay?
Resolution Criteria: This question resolves positive if, on April 30, 2024, crompouces are available for purchase on ah.nl, the website of supermarket Albert Heijn.
Fine Print: As of November 11, 2023, crompouces are available for sale [at this url](https://www.ah.nl/producten/product/wi567589/ah-crompouce), but the product for sale does not have to be exactly this item as long as it’s still a crompouce. If crompouces are temporarily out of stock but the website lists a date at which they will be available again, the question still resolves positive.
|
2023-11-25T21:24:00Z
|
2024-04-30T10:00:00Z
|
2024-04-30T20:14:00Z
|
yes
|
METACULUS
|
meta-19810
|
Will western sources conclude, before 2025, that Israel has used white phosphorus improperly?
|
There have been [several](https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/human-rights-watch-says-israel-used-white-phosphorous-gaza-lebanon-2023-10-12/) [accusations](https://apnews.com/article/israel-gaza-lebanon-white-phosphorus-war-5aebf0cc8d587951a718cefe329bc8b3) of Israel using white phosphorus following the [October 7 attack](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/2023_Hamas_attack_on_Israel) on Israel by Hamas. According to [CBS News](https://www.cbsnews.com/news/what-is-white-phosphorus-russia-ukraine/):
>Because of its incendiary effects, the use of phosphorus in war is supposed to be tightly regulated under international law — but it is not banned. Phosphorus is not classed as a chemical weapon under the Chemical Weapons Convention.
>
>When used as a weapon, it can cause fire to rain down on targets, inflicting indiscriminate damage. It is illegal, therefore, for phosphorus to be used near civilians, because international law requires that combatants distinguish between civilian and military elements.
Resolution Criteria: This question will resolve as **Yes** if, before January 1, 2025, any three of the following government or media sources conclude that Israel has used white phosphorus in an illegal or improper manner any time after October 7, 2023:
* The United Kingdom
* The United States
* France
* Germany
* Japan
* South Korea
* Israel
* The United Nations
* The Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW)
* Reports published by one of the following sources and based on independent investigations conducted by the same source or commissioned by the same source each also count as one qualifying report
* BBC
* The Guardian
* AP
* Reuters
The use of white phosphorus must be explicitly stated by these sources, including an assertion that the use was improper or illegal, and the reported use must occur within the stated timeframe. Negative statements do not in themselves resolve this question as **No**. The question will resolve as **No** if no such use is reported by the deadline. Any use reported after the deadline will not count towards the resolution of this question.
Fine Print: * Statements must be conclusive. For example a statement must use language such as "we have concluded that Israel used white phosphorus improperly" or "we have proof that Israel used white phosphorus in an illegal manner". Statements such as "we think it is likely that Israel used white phosphorus improperly" or "Israel may have used white phosphorus improperly" or any other statements expressing uncertainty will **not** qualify.
* Concluding that white phosphorus was used in an illegal or improper manner will be taken as any statement generally condemning the use, which may or may not include assertions that the use violated international law. A statement such as "Israel's use of white phosphorus was reckless and harmful" would be considered to meet this requirement.
* Opinion pieces published by the listed media sources do not count, even if they reference or endorse a qualifying independent investigation.
* Leaks, anonymous statements, and other non-public statements will not qualify.
* Metaculus may make a determination in the event there is ambiguity about whether a statement satisfies these criteria.
|
2023-11-07T15:56:00Z
|
2024-12-31T23:00:00Z
|
2025-01-10T00:35:00Z
|
no
|
METACULUS
|
meta-19765
|
Will Donald Trump spend at least one hour confined in a jail cell before January 1, 2024?
|
Donald Trump is facing [four indictments](https://www.cnn.com/interactive/2023/07/politics/trump-indictments-criminal-cases/) (in [New York, Florida, Washington DC, and Georgia](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Indictments_against_Donald_Trump)) as well as a [civil case in New York](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/New_York_civil_investigation_of_The_Trump_Organization).
In the New York civil case, Trump was fined twice, first for $5,000 [on October 20](https://www.cnbc.com/2023/10/20/trump-threatened-with-prison-for-violating-gag-order.html) and then again for $10,000 [on October 25](https://www.pbs.org/newshour/politics/trump-fined-10000-over-comment-about-judges-staff-in-new-york-civil-fraud-trial), for violating a gag order against commenting publicly about Judge Arthur Engoron's staff.
Trump was also subject to a gag order imposed in the DC case by Judge Tanya Chutkan on October 16th against commenting about court staff, prosecutors, or witnesses. That gag order was lifted on October 20th after Trump appealed, but was [reinstated on October 29th](https://www.yahoo.com/news/federal-judge-revives-donald-trump-124156833.html).
Following the reinstatement, Ty Cobb, former White House lawyer during Trump's presidency, [said](https://www.newsweek.com/donald-trump-violate-gag-order-jail-ty-cobb-1839408):
>Well, the New York judge fined him $10,000. That’s in a civil case. That’s not as consequential as Judge Chutkan’s case. . . I think she’ll come in with a much heavier penalty, and ultimately, I think he’ll spend a night or a weekend in jail.
Resolution Criteria: This question will resolve as **Yes** if, before January 1, 2024, [credible sources](https://www.metaculus.com/help/faq/#definitions) report that Donald Trump has been confined to a jail or prison cell for at least one hour as a result of court proceedings.
|
2023-11-02T15:00:00Z
|
2023-12-31T23:00:00Z
|
2024-01-03T17:34:00Z
|
no
|
METACULUS
|
meta-19764
|
Will the second Starship integrated flight test achieve liftoff before January 1, 2024?
|
[SpaceX's first integrated flight](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/SpaceX_Starship_Integrated_Flight_Test) took place on April 20, 2023, with the rocket reaching about 39 kilometers of altitude before breaking up. During the launch the launchpad [suffered significant damage](https://www.cnbc.com/2023/04/24/spacex-starship-explosion-spread-particulate-matter-for-miles.html) and the launch produced significant debris and particulate matter that led to concerns of the potential impact on the surrounding environment and community.
In response, the [Federal Aviation Administration](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Federal_Aviation_Administration) (FAA) conducted a mishap investigation, a safety review, and an environmental review. The mishap investigation [ended on September 8, requiring 63 corrective actions](https://spacenews.com/faa-closes-starship-mishap-investigation-directs-63-corrective-actions-for-spacex/), and the safety investigation [concluded on October 31](https://www.space.com/faa-finishes-spacex-starship-safety-review). However, the environmental review is still pending. [According to space.com](https://www.space.com/faa-finishes-spacex-starship-safety-review), the FAA stated:
>The FAA is continuing to work on the environmental review. As part of its environmental review, the FAA is consulting with the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service (USFWS) on an updated Biological Assessment under the Endangered Species Act. The FAA and the USFWS must complete this consultation before the environmental review portion of the license evaluation is completed.
Resolution Criteria: This question will resolve as **Yes** if, before January 1, 2024, the second Starship integrated flight test occurs and Starship leaves the launchpad intact and under its own power.
Fine Print: An integrated flight test requires the Starship spacecraft to be stacked on top of the [Super Heavy booster](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/SpaceX_Super_Heavy) with both launched together.
|
2023-11-02T15:00:00Z
|
2023-12-31T23:00:00Z
|
2023-11-18T13:00:00Z
|
yes
|
METACULUS
|
meta-19754
|
Will the German value-added tax (VAT) of plant-based milks be reduced to be the same as cow's milk by end of 2024?
|
Most basic foods in Germany are only taxed by 7% VAT. Plant-based milk is currently taxed at the default 19%. [Recently, the Green party and the governing SPD talked about reducing the VAT for plant-based milks.](https://www.tagesschau.de/wirtschaft/verbraucher/mehrwertsteuer-milchersatzprodukte-100.html)
Resolution Criteria: This question resolves **Yes** based on credible reports that the German government has reduced the VAT rate for plant-based milks to the same VAT that is used for cow's milk, which is currently 7%. This change must be announced an implemented before January 1, 2025.
Fine Print: - In order for the question to resolve Yes, the change must be implemented. If it is only announced, the question resolves **No**.
- The VAT of plant-based milk must be reduced from the current 19% for a Yes resolution.
|
2023-12-12T21:24:00Z
|
2024-12-31T22:59:00Z
|
2025-01-06T16:28:00Z
|
no
|
METACULUS
|
meta-19741
|
Will Macky Sall step down as president of Senegal at or before the currently scheduled end of his term?
|
Senegal was [scheduled to hold presidential elections on February 25, 2024](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/2024_Senegalese_presidential_election), but on February 5 Senegalese President [Macky Sall](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Macky_Sall) announced that the elections would be [delayed until December](https://www.cnn.com/2024/02/05/africa/senegal-parliament-debates-extending-presidents-mandate-intl/index.html). The delayed vote has led to [protests and unrest](https://news.yahoo.com/ahead-planned-march-over-vote-122105603.html), as well as a state crackdown against the protests.
Sall's term is scheduled to end on April 2, 2024, and the delayed elections have [led to uncertainty regarding whether Sall will respect the term limit](https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-68253255).
Senegal is in the geographical region of Africa that has seen a high rate of coups the past three years. Despite this, Senegal had previously maintained some stability and helped coordinate responses against coups elsewhere in the region.
Yet when Sall was [interviewed by *The Economist*](https://www.economist.com/middle-east-and-africa/2023/10/26/senegals-president-asks-if-democracy-can-work-in-africas-coup-belt) in October 2023 he asked,
> "Is democracy as we want to do it really suitable?"
Previously there had been a damaging fight between the incumbent president and an opposition leader, Ousmane Sonko. The Economist wrote,
> The fight centres around the question of whether Senegal’s government is trying to tilt the election by using the courts to keep Mr Sonko off the ballot.
This has involved accusations of rape (acquitted), corruption of youth (convicted), plotting an insurrection (still active). The opposition claims this is repeating a pattern from 2019 when the opposition was also barred from running due to criminal convictions. The incumbent president denies this.
> The charge and conviction sparked large protests, some of them violent, in support of Mr Sonko. The demonstrations were also fuelled by hints from Mr Sall that he might try to run for a third presidential term, even though Senegal’s constitution has a two-term limit. It was only in July that Mr Sall definitively said he would not seek office again, after more than two years of protests and at least 37 deaths, according to Amnesty International, a rights group.
> Mr Sall’s announcement led to a lull in the violence, though it lasted less than a month until Mr Sonko was once more arrested. The government also dissolved his political party, Pastef, and arrested many of its leaders, including several mayors. As protests flared, the government cut mobile-internet access for almost a week.
There seems to be insecurities around how peaceful Senegal's democracy really is:
> Many fear more violence before the election, especially if Mr Sonko is definitively barred from running. Even Mr Sall prevaricates when asked if he expects the election to be peaceful. [...] Mr Sall bristles at the suggestion there has been a backsliding of democracy on his watch. “Those who say that [there has been] are supporters of anarchy and chaos,” he retorts. “Senegal has no lessons in democracy to learn from anyone.”
Resolution Criteria: This question will resolve as **Yes** if, before April 4, 2024, [credible sources](https://www.metaculus.com/help/faq/#definitions) report that Macky Sall has stepped down from the office of president of Senegal.
Fine Print: * This question requires Sall to acknowledge the end of his presidency or to otherwise comply with the end of his presidency, and will resolve as **No** if Sall's seat or power is contested for any reason but he has refused to step down. This includes cases where Sall is arrested or flees the country but does not relinquish his claim to the presidency, in those cases the question would resolve as **No**.
* This question asks whether Macky Sall will step down before April 4, 2024, and will still resolve as **No** if a law is enacted that extends the end of his term and he remains president of Senegal on April 4, 2024.
* If Sall steps down as president but announces before April 4, 2024, that he will continue on as interim or caretake president, or a similar position, and holds that position through April 4, it will not count as having stepped down and the question will resolve as **No**.
* To resolve as **Yes** there must be credible reports published before April 4, 2024, that state that Sall is complying with the end of his term. If the available reporting indicates that Sall has remained silent or has otherwise not confirmed or complied with the end of his term the question will resolve as **No**.
* If Sall dies the question will resolve as **Yes**.
* If the circumstances are difficult to discern or reports conflict, Metaculus may use the available information to make a determination or resolve the question as **Ambiguous**.
|
2024-02-15T15:30:00Z
|
2024-04-03T22:00:00Z
|
2024-04-02T18:28:00Z
|
yes
|
METACULUS
|
meta-19700
|
Will there be an additional Russian IPO on the MICEX in 2023?
|
An [initial public offering](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Initial_public_offering) (IPO) is the process by which a privately-held company goes public by offering a portion of its shares to public investors for the first time. So far in 2023, five Russian companies have IPO-ed on the [MICEX](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Moscow_Exchange) trading floor [according to PREQVECA.ru](http://preqveca.ru/en/placements/?sf%5Bipo_t%5D=&sf%5Bipo%5D=0&sf%5Bstatus%5D=0&sf%5Bcountr%5D=2&sf%5Bspec%5D=0&sf%5Blisting%5D=9&sf%5Bpsf%5D=&sf%5Bpst%5D=&sf%5Bpt%5D=1&sf%5Bind%5D=0&sf%5Bpef%5D=01.01.2023&sf%5Bpet%5D=31.12.2023#search_r):
| IPO / SPO Name | Industry | Trading Floor | Placement Volume (mln. USD) | End of Placement |
|-------------------|---------------------------------------------------------|---------------|-----------------------------|------------------|
| Henderson | Retail and Consumer Sector, Textiles and Clothing | MICEX | Not Provided | 02.11.2023 |
| Astra Linux | Technologies, Telecommunications and Media | MICEX | 36 | 13.10.2023 |
| SmartTechGroup | Financial Services | MICEX | 11 | 03.07.2023 |
| Genetico | Biotechnologies and Life Sciences, Healthcare | MICEX | 2 | 25.04.2023 |
| Kaluga's distillery Kristall | Food processing | MICEX | | 31.12.2023 |
Resolution Criteria: This question will resolve as **Yes** if there is at least one additional Russian IPO on the MICEX in 2023, based on [data according to PREQVECA.ru]( http://preqveca.ru/en/placements/?sf%5Bipo_t%5D=&sf%5Bipo%5D=0&sf%5Bstatus%5D=0&sf%5Bcountr%5D=2&sf%5Bspec%5D=0&sf%5Blisting%5D=9&sf%5Bpsf%5D=&sf%5Bpst%5D=&sf%5Bpt%5D=1&sf%5Bind%5D=0&sf%5Bpef%5D=01.01.2023&sf%5Bpet%5D=31.12.2023#search_r). As of November 1, 2023, there have been five Russian IPOs in 2023, so this question asks whether there will be six or more in 2023.
The search criteria are:
* Placement type: IPO
* Trading floor: MICEX
* Country of operation: Russia
* End of Placement:
* from: January 1, 2023
* to: December 31, 2023
* All other: Leave empty
For an IPO to count for this question, it has to have an ‘End of placement’ date between January 1, 2023, and December 31, 2023, inclusive. If **6 or more companies meet this criterion, this question resolves as Yes**.
Fine Print: Placement volume does not impact resolution of this question.
|
2023-11-02T15:00:00Z
|
2023-12-31T12:00:00Z
|
2023-11-21T15:15:00Z
|
yes
|
METACULUS
|
meta-19593
|
Will Mike Johnson remain Speaker until 2024?
|
Mike Johnson has been elected the [Speaker of the House of Representatives](https://www.house.gov/feature-stories/2023-10-25-new-speaker-of-the-house), securing 220 votes, amid a tumultuous period marked by intra-Republican discord. He is the fourth Republican to be nominated for the role since Kevin McCarthy's removal on [October 3](https://edition.cnn.com/politics/live-news/matt-gaetz-kevin-mccarthy-house-speakership-10-03-23/index.html). Johnson's victory symbolizes a win for the conservative, Trump-aligned faction within the Republican Party. In his address, he outlined border security, inflation, and Middle East conflict as key priorities and pledged his first bill in support of Israel. The election also underlines looming challenges including an impending [November 17 deadline](https://research.umn.edu/news/potential-federal-shutdown) to agree on government funding to avoid a shutdown. Johnson, known for his conservative stances on various policy issues, has raised [concerns among some Democrats, especially with respect to his challenging the 2020 election results](https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-us-canada-67220358), underlining the political divisions and challenges ahead in finding bipartisan solutions.
Resolution Criteria: This question will resolve as **Yes** if Mike Johnson remains the Speaker of the US House of Representatives continuously until the end of 2023. This question will resolve as **No** if Mike Johnson ceases to be Speaker of the House for any reason (including but not limited to resignation, retirement, election loss, loss of majority party status, vote of no confidence, expulsion, impeachment and conviction, disqualification, death, or incapacity) in 2023. Resolution will be determined according to reporting from [credible sources](https://www.metaculus.com/help/faq/#definitions).
|
2023-11-01T15:00:00Z
|
2023-12-31T12:00:00Z
|
2024-01-03T17:35:00Z
|
yes
|
METACULUS
|
meta-19592
|
Will India request that another Canadian diplomat be recalled before 2024?
|
Canada and India have been in an [ongoing dispute](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/2023_Canada%E2%80%93India_diplomatic_row) following Canada's public [allegation in September of 2023 that India was responsible for the killing of a Canadian citizen](https://www.cbc.ca/news/politics/trudeau-indian-government-nijjar-1.6970498). [Hardeep Singh Nijjar](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Hardeep_Singh_Nijjar) was a leader in the movement for an [independent Sikh state](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Khalistan_movement) to be established in the Punjab region of India. He was killed in Canada on June 18, 2023.
Canada's statement led to escalating diplomatic tensions between the two countries, including India's [expulsion of a top Canadian diplomat](https://apnews.com/article/canada-india-sikh-diplomat-trudeau-modi-3c5572d9027769ea6adbd047ec6f462a) and a [temporary suspension of Indian visas](https://edition.cnn.com/2023/09/21/india/india-canada-travel-advisory-assassination-row-intl-hnk/index.html) to Canadian nationals in the days after the accusation, as well as an [ultimatum issued October 3 by India](https://apnews.com/article/canada-india-diplomats-090f136eebed1dd50c9a199e40360826) for Canada to remove 41 of its diplomats from India, which [Canada complied with by recalling the diplomats](https://www.cbsnews.com/news/canada-recalls-41-of-its-diplomats-from-india/) on October 19.
Resolution Criteria: This question will resolve as **Yes** if, after October 25, 2023, and before January 1, 2024, [credible sources](https://www.metaculus.com/help/faq/#definitions) report that India has requested that at least one additional Canadian diplomat be recalled.
Fine Print: * The diplomat need not actually be withdrawn or recalled from India, only a statement from India requesting that Canada recall one or more of its diplomats or expelling one or more Canadian diplomats is required.
|
2023-10-27T14:00:00Z
|
2023-12-31T23:00:00Z
|
2024-01-02T22:13:00Z
|
no
|
METACULUS
|
meta-19590
|
Will New Delhi experience a "Very Unhealthy" or worse air quality index on at least four of the seven days for the week starting October 29?
|
According to an [article published by the BBC on October 24, 2023](https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-india-67166585):
>The air quality in India's capital Delhi has fallen to poor levels and is expected to deteriorate further in the coming days, officials have said.
>
>. . .
>
>Delhi is one of the world's most polluted cities through the year.
>
>But its air turns especially toxic in winter due to various factors, including burning of crop remains by farmers, low wind speeds and bursting of firecrackers during festivals.
>
>. . .
>
>Environment Minister Gopal Rai said that the second phase of a Graded Response Action Plan (GRAP) has been implemented to combat the effect of increased pollution.
>
>As part of the strategy, all public transport services, including the Delhi metro and electric bus services, have been instructed to increase their frequency to curb vehicle emissions in the city.
An overview of the GRAP is [available here](https://www.business-standard.com/india-news/explained-what-is-grap-and-how-does-it-combat-air-pollution-in-delhi-ncr-123102500329_1.html).
Resolution Criteria: This question will resolve as **Yes** if the air quality index (AQI) in the Indian city of New Delhi reaches a level of "Very Unhealthy" or worse for at least four of the seven days from October 29 to November 4, inclusive, according to [AirNow](https://www.airnow.gov/international/us-embassies-and-consulates/#India$New_Delhi).
Fine Print: * The question will resolve according to the AQI values listed in the "historical" tab of the AirNow page for New Delhi. A day will be considered to have reached "Very Unhealthy" if at least one hour on that date is listed in the historical data as "Very Unhealthy" or worse (AQI value of 201 or higher).
* The question will resolve according to the historical data shown on or after November 6, 2023, when first accessed by Metaculus.
* The YTD values will take precedence over those shown in the MTD values in the event that they differ, and both files may be used to resolve the question.
|
2023-10-27T14:00:00Z
|
2023-11-03T22:00:00Z
|
2023-11-06T23:13:00Z
|
yes
|
METACULUS
|
meta-19554
|
Will Israel use nuclear weapons in combat before October 7, 2024?
|
On October 7, 2023, Palestinian militants led by Hamas launched a [surprise offensive](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/2023_Israel%E2%80%93Hamas_war) against Israeli forces surrounding the Gaza strip, occupying considerable territory inside internationally-recognized Israeli borders. Israeli counterattacks in the early days of the war expelled the Palestinian fighters from most of the territory they captured. However, Israeli leadership has insisted on launching a ground offensive into the Gaza strip in order to fully eliminate Hamas and other Palestinian militant groups operating in the territory.
As of October 24, 2023, Israel's ground offensive has been [delayed](https://news.sky.com/story/israeli-diplomat-explains-gaza-ground-offensive-delay-is-no-bad-thing-to-avoid-hamass-deadly-trap-12991638#:~:text=Hamas%20took%20more%20than%20220,rest%20are%20still%20being%20held.) multiple times. Israeli officials have argued that the country's armed forces required additional time to plan rescues of hostages, retrain troops, gain intelligence on Palestinian military operations/defense plans, and conduct artillery and airstrike preparation. Nonetheless, this has raised questions regarding whether or not Israel is capable of capturing the Gaza strip using conventional means with acceptable losses. While Israel officially denies having nuclear weapons, it is [widely believed](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Nuclear_weapons_and_Israel) to possess them, given information leaks and statements by Israeli officials. Moreover, Israeli officials have [suggested](https://www.newsweek.com/israeli-official-calls-doomsday-nuclear-missile-option-1833585) that the country could use nuclear weapons against Hamas if necessary, or if it is attacked by external actors such as Hezbollah or Iran.
Resolution Criteria: This question will resolve as **Yes** if reporting from [credible sources](https://www.metaculus.com/help/faq/#definitions) indicates that Israel has used nuclear weapons as an act of war before 12:00 AM on October 7, 2024. Any Israeli nuclear detonation occurring within territory *de facto* controlled by another state or group will resolve this question as Yes, unless that other nation unambiguously states that such a detonation was done with its government's consent. Nuclear detonations done as tests or accidents will not resolve the question as Yes, as well as those done in territory not *de facto* controlled by any group, such as international waters. A nuclear detonation occurring inside territory *de facto* controlled by Israel will resolve this question as Yes if at least one casualty (death or injury) occurs as a direct result of this detonation outside of this territory within a nation or area which unambiguously condemns Israel's actions within 30 days of this detonation occurring. If this does not occur by the resolution date, the question resolves as **No**.
|
2023-10-26T02:53:00Z
|
2024-10-07T03:00:00Z
|
2024-10-08T11:25:45Z
|
no
|
METACULUS
|
meta-19525
|
Will George Weah win re-election in the 2023 Liberian General Election?
|
The 2023 Liberian election has led to a closely contested race between the incumbent President George Weah and opposition leader Joseph Boakai. The first round of the election, held on 10th October 2023, did not result in a clear winner as neither candidate secured the more than 50% of the votes required to avoid a runoff, with [99.93% of votes counted]( https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/2023_Liberian_general_election).
George Weah, the incumbent president, running with Jewel Taylor for the [Coalition for Democratic Change](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Coalition_for_Democratic_Change#:~:text=The%20Coalition%20for%20Democratic%20Change,a%20political%20alliance%20in%20Liberia.), secured 803,674 votes (43.84%) in the 2023 Liberian general election's first round. Joseph Boakai, former vice president, alongside running mate Jeremiah Koung from the [Unity Party](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Unity_Party_(Liberia)), garnered 796,313 votes (43.44%). As the [FT](https://www.ft.com/content/1958a8c3-0425-42e2-aa8b-d8521261addf) outlines:
> Weah had positioned himself as the plucky outsider who could shake things up in contrast to Boakai, an establishment figure, who had been vice-president for more than a decade and was a government minister in the 1980s.
> Boakai is running on an anti-Weah platform and campaigning to revive the economy by investing in infrastructure and agriculture projects. But the 78-year-old is dogged by questions over his health and has been dubbed “Sleepy Joe” after falling asleep at events during his time as vice-president.
Liberia is thus headed for a [run-off election](https://www.reuters.com/world/africa/liberia-presidential-election-still-headed-second-round-2023-10-17/#:~:text=Following%20the%20Oct,the%20West%20African%20nation). This election has to be held [within 15 days of finalising the vote count for the first election](https://www.africanews.com/2023/10/19/liberia-close-results-towards-a-second-round-of-the-presidential-election//), making [November 7](https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-67142550) a likely date for the election.
The [FT](https://www.ft.com/content/1958a8c3-0425-42e2-aa8b-d8521261addf) reports:
> A fresh run-off between the two men would mark a repeat of the 2017 elections. That time, Weah won the second round with 61.54 per cent of the vote.
> However, analysts believe the results of this year’s are likely to be closer. “There’s an opportunity for both candidates to win,” said Alex Vines, head of the Africa programme at UK think-tank Chatham House.
Resolution Criteria: This question will resolve as **Yes** if George Weah is elected as president of Liberia in 2023 according to statements from the [National Elections Commission](https://www.necliberia.org/) (NEC).
Fine Print: * The question may resolve early based on media calls/reports, but final resolution will be determined according to official results released by the NEC, and the question may be re-resolved if the official results differ from the initial calls.
* If the expected run-off election has to be re-run in 2024 or the election is otherwise delayed into 2024, this question will be **annulled**. The question will also be **annulled** if the NEC does not officially declare a winner before 2024.
* If George Weah drops out or does not participate in the run-off election for whatever reason, but the election happens in 2023 and/or a new president is announced by the NEC, this question resolves as **No**.
|
2023-10-25T14:00:00Z
|
2023-11-05T12:00:00Z
|
2023-11-17T21:23:00Z
|
no
|
METACULUS
|
meta-19492
|
Will Israel launch a large-scale ground offensive into Gaza before November 1, 2023?
|
On October 7, 2023, [Hamas launched an attack on Israel](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Operation_Al-Aqsa_Flood), with [reports](https://www.cnn.com/2023/10/16/middleeast/israel-hamas-gaza-war-explained-week-2-mime-intl/index.html) stating that more than 1,400 Israeli civilians were killed. Following the attack [media reports](https://www.npr.org/2023/10/14/1205951163/israel-is-expected-to-launch-a-ground-invasion-of-gaza) have suggested that an Israeli ground offensive into Gaza is imminent. [On October 13, Politico reported:](https://www.politico.com/news/2023/10/13/gaza-ground-invasion-israel-00121452):
>Israel’s ground invasion of Gaza is “imminent,” two Israeli officials said Friday, confirming that the much-anticipated operation will happen in the coming hours or days.
>
>. . .
>
>But officials in Jerusalem and the Israel Defense Forces never confirmed that a ground invasion was in the works, even as Israel called up 300,000 reservists and, Friday, ordered the evacuation of 1.1 million people from northern Gaza.
>
>The Israeli officials, who were granted anonymity to discuss sensitive military plans, said the evacuation order was issued to save as many Palestinian lives as possible ahead of the ground operation. The short window of time for that evacuation was necessary so that Hamas wouldn’t have much time to prepare, they said.
However, on October 17 Israeli Defense Force Lieutenant Colonel Richard Hecht [told Reuters](https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/israeli-army-spokesman-says-next-phase-war-may-be-different-expectations-2023-10-17/):
>We are preparing for the next stages of war. We haven't said what they will be. Everybody's talking about the ground offensive. It might be something different.
Resolution Criteria: This question will resolve as **Yes** if, before November 1, 2023, at least two of the internationally recognized media sources listed below publish reports that unequivocally state that a large-scale Israeli ground offensive into Gaza has begun. Operations characterized as [raids](https://www.timesofisrael.com/idf-launches-first-localized-raids-into-gaza-ahead-of-expected-ground-invasion/) will generally not qualify.
* [BBC News](https://www.bbc.com/news)
* [The Economist](https://www.economist.com)
* [The New York Times](https://www.nytimes.com)
* [The Wall Street Journal](https://www.wsj.com)
Fine Print: * To meet the threshold for a **Yes** resolution, a report must rely on sourced reporting. Sourced reporting can include government sources quoted on condition of anonymity, but the report must not be an opinion piece. For example:
- The hypothetical statement "A high-level official in the US intelligence community stated, on the condition of anonymity, that Israel's ground offensive began on October 25th" would be sufficient for a **Yes** resolution.
- The hypothetical statements "Israel's much-anticipated ground offensive may begin at any moment" or "It appears Israel's ground offensive may have begun" would not be sufficient for a **Yes** resolution.
* It is possible the actual start date of the ground offensive is before November 1, 2023, and that there is evidence available attesting to such a start date, but that the question resolves **No** because the evidence has not been reported definitively in one of the four listed outlets.
* A raid, which does not qualify, will generally be considered a brief incursion with a specific goal after which troops will withdraw. Metaculus will defer to the characterization of the listed sources. In the event at least two sources state that a large-scale ground offensive into Gaza has begun but also use terminology such as "raid", the question will still resolve as **Yes**. For example, the [2006 Israeli operation in Beit Hanoun](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/2006_Israeli_operation_in_Beit_Hanoun) would be considered a raid.
* If there is ambiguity about whether the criteria have been met, a team of three Metaculus admins will make the final determination.
|
2023-10-20T14:30:00Z
|
2023-10-31T22:00:00Z
|
2023-10-31T10:00:00Z
|
yes
|
METACULUS
|
meta-19467
|
Will Western institutions determine Israel was responsible for the attack on the Al-Ahli Baptist Hospital in Gaza City before 2024?
|
On the 17th of October 2023, [multiple](https://www.euronews.com/2023/10/17/at-least-500-killed-in-gaza-city-hospital-blast) [agencies](https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/least-500-victims-israeli-air-strike-hospital-gaza-health-ministry-2023-10-17/) [reported](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Al-Ahli_Arab_Hospital_explosion) that the Al Ahli Hospital/Gaza City Hospital was rocked by an explosion. The number of fatalities is not clear. Palestinian officials said as many as [471 people were killed](https://www.theguardian.com/world/2023/oct/18/al-ahli-arab-hospital-piecing-together-what-happened-as-israel-insists-militant-rocket-to-blame).
Hamas claims that the explosion was caused by an Israeli Defense Force airstrike on the hospital. The IDF disputes this and allege the explosion was [caused by rockets fired by Islamic Jihad](https://twitter.com/IDF/status/1714397390432612795).
Resolution Criteria: This question resolves **Yes** if any of the following occurs before January 1, 2024.
1. The Israeli Government, the Israeli Defense Force, or a high elected official or civil servant of Israel acting in an official capacity says the explosion was caused by Israeli military action;
2. [Three of the five permanent members of the United Nations Security Council](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Permanent_members_of_the_United_Nations_Security_Council#:~:text=The%20permanent%20members%20of%20the,Kingdom%2C%20and%20the%20United%20States.) publicly attribute the attack to Israel;
3. Two reports have been published by credible sources, each quoting a separate government source from a [Five Eyes country](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Five_Eyes) which attributes the attack to Israel. To meet the threshold, a given report must rely on a government source or document; independent investigations will not be sufficient for the purposes of this question. The reports must, together, provide at least two statements or documents that independently attribute the explosion to Israel.
If there is ambiguity about any of #1-3, a panel of three Metaculus admins will make the final determination by majority decision.
The question resolves **No** if the above does not occur before January 1, 2024. It also resolves **No** if any group other than Israel claims responsibility for the attack and that claim is validated by credible sources.
Fine Print: For #3, the reports may include a document obtained by the media, provided that the veracity of such a document is not subsequently disputed by the applicable government within 3 days of publication.
Metaculus holds a high standard for [credible sources](https://www.metaculus.com/help/faq/#definitions) which we will follow in assessing whether the threshold in #3 has been met:
> A "credible source" will be taken to be an online or in-print published story from a journalistic source, or information publicly posted on a the website of an organization by that organization making public information pertaining to that organization, or in another source where the preponderance of evidence suggests that the information is correct and that there is no significant controversy surrounding the information or its correctness. It will generally not include unsourced information found in blogs, Facebook or Twitter postings, or websites of individuals.
|
2023-10-18T20:00:00Z
|
2023-12-31T17:00:00Z
|
2024-01-03T17:52:00Z
|
no
|
METACULUS
|
meta-19444
|
Will the US and Iran be primary actors on opposite sides of a war before 2025?
|
On October 7, 2023, [Hamas launched a surprise attack on Israel](https://www.foreignaffairs.com/middle-east/martin-indyk-why-hamas-attacked-and-why-israel-was-taken-surprise). Some reports have suggested that Iran was closely involved in planning the attack. The [Wall Street Journal reported](https://www.wsj.com/world/middle-east/iran-israel-hamas-strike-planning-bbe07b25):
>Iranian security officials helped plan Hamas’s Saturday surprise attack on Israel and gave the green light for the assault at a meeting in Beirut last Monday, according to senior members of Hamas and Hezbollah, another Iran-backed militant group.
>
>Officers of Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps had worked with Hamas since August to devise the air, land and sea incursions—the most significant breach of Israel’s borders since the 1973 Yom Kippur War—those people said.
However, Iran has [denied that it was involved](https://www.timesofisrael.com/iran-denies-it-had-role-in-hamas-attack-on-israel-claims-accusation-is-political/) and [US Secretary of State Anthony Blinken has stated](https://www.cnn.com/2023/10/08/politics/us-intelligence-iran-connection-israel-attack/index.html):
>In this specific instance, we have not yet seen evidence that Iran directed or was behind this particular attack. That’s something we’re looking at very carefully, and we’ve got to see where the facts lead.
Tensions between the US and Iran have been high in recent years following the [US withdrawal from the Iran nuclear deal](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Joint_Comprehensive_Plan_of_Action#U.S._denies_recertification_and_then_withdraws_(2017%E2%80%93present)) in 2017, the [US assassination of Iranian general Qasem Soleimani in 2020](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Assassination_of_Qasem_Soleimani), and Iran's [enrichment of uranium](https://www.nbcnews.com/news/world/iran-enriching-uranium-weapons-grade-nuclear-iaea-rcna72753) to levels approaching those needed to create a nuclear weapon. Some observers [have expressed fears of war](https://www.usip.org/publications/2020/01/are-us-and-iran-really-brink-war) between the two countries.
The [Uppsala Conflict Data Program](https://www.pcr.uu.se/research/ucdp/) (UCDP) has been collecting data on organized violence for nearly 40 years. The UCDP tracks and categorizes conflicts and conflict deaths according to a [specific set of definitions](https://www.pcr.uu.se/research/ucdp/definitions/). The following sample of conflicts involving the US illustrate some of the different categorizations (note that these categorizations may not necessarily correspond to those specified in the resolution criteria):
* The [2003 Iraq war](https://ucdp.uu.se/conflict/420) involved Australia, the UK, and the US [as primary parties on one side of the conflict](https://ucdp.uu.se/additionalinfo/420/1), with Iraq as the primary party on the other side.
* In the [conflict between Yugoslavia and Kosovo](https://ucdp.uu.se/conflict/412) the NATO member countries, including the US, [are listed individually in 1999 as secondary warring parties](https://ucdp.uu.se/additionalinfo/412/1) reflecting NATO's [bombing of Yugoslavia](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/NATO_bombing_of_Yugoslavia).
* In the [conflict between Iran and Israel](https://ucdp.uu.se/conflict/14609) the United States is [listed as a secondary warring party](https://ucdp.uu.se/additionalinfo/14609/1#2020) starting in 2020 when the US assassinated Soleimani and [Iran's retaliatory attack](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Assassination_of_Qasem_Soleimani#IRGC_retaliatory_strike) against US military bases in Iraq.
Resolution Criteria: This question will resolve as **Yes** if, for the years 2023 and 2024 combined the following is true:
* The [Uppsala Conflict Data Program (UCDP)](https://ucdp.uu.se/encyclopedia) reports that both the United States and Iran are primary parties on opposite sides of a conflict resulting in 1,000 or more state-based conflict deaths (specifically, the category "state-based violence").
OR
Both of the following are true:
* The US government reports that at least 25 US military personnel have died as a result of military conflict with Iran (the deaths must be caused by conflict with Iranian combatants).
* The conflict with Iran and the US on opposite sides is reported by the [Uppsala Conflict Data Program (UCDP)](https://ucdp.uu.se/encyclopedia) to have resulted in 1,000 or more state-based conflict deaths (specifically, the category "state-based violence").
The 1,000 deaths need not occur in a single year. We will defer to UCDP's [methodology](https://www.pcr.uu.se/research/ucdp/methodology/) in calculating conflict deaths.
Fine Print: * There is currently not an existing UCDP conflict page with the United States and Iran as primary parties. The following [UCDP definition](https://www.pcr.uu.se/research/ucdp/definitions/) will be used to determine whether the US and Iran are primary parties:
* **Primary party:** The parties that have formed the [incompatibility](https://www.pcr.uu.se/research/ucdp/definitions/#incompatibility_2).
* US deaths may come from explicit statements, or from the US Department of Defense (DoD) [Casualty Status](https://www.defense.gov/casualty.pdf) publications (using hostile deaths and the appropriate military operation, if it can be determined that those deaths are primarily caused by Iranian combatants). Note that the Casualty Status publication can currently be found linked from the DoD’s [publications page](https://www.defense.gov/News/Publications/).
* If the US or Iran meet this criteria for only one of the years (for example, they are listed as primary parties for 2023 but not 2024, and there is a sum total of 1,000 battle-related deaths in the conflict across 2023 and 2024) then this question will resolve as **Yes**.
* Important note: there can be multiple primary parties on one side of a conflict.
* If UCDP does not report data for 2023 or 2024 **and** credible sources have reported conflict involving the United States and Iran that in the judgment of Metaculus clearly warrants a relevant conflict page under UCDP's definitions, the question will resolve as **Ambiguous**.
|
2023-10-16T22:30:00Z
|
2024-12-31T23:00:00Z
|
2025-01-02T14:23:00Z
|
no
|
METACULUS
|
meta-19442
|
Will Peter Bone MP be suspended from Parliament in 2023 (without first resigning)?
|
Peter Bone, a British Conservative Party politician, served as Deputy Leader of the House of Commons in 2022 and has been representing Wellingborough as an MP since 2005. On 16 October 2023, he was recommended for suspension from the House of Commons by the [Independent Expert Panel](https://rb.gy/ddpkb) for multiple acts of bullying and one act of sexual misconduct against a staff member in 2012 and 2013. For the full report, see [here](https://www.parliament.uk/globalassets/mps-lords--offices/standards-and-financial-interests/independent-expert-panel/hc-1904---the-conduct-of-mr-peter-bone-mp.pdf).
The recommendation of the panel is a suspension of 6 weeks:
> This is a serious case of misconduct. […] The bullying involved violence, shouting and swearing, mocking, belittling and humiliating behaviour, and ostracism. […]
> This wilful pattern of bullying also included an unwanted incident of sexual misconduct, when the complainant was trapped in a room with the respondent in a hotel in Madrid, […]. This was a deliberate and conscious abuse of power using a sexual mechanism: indecent exposure.
This suspension, if approved, will trigger the Recall of MPs Act 2015, initiating a recall petition in Bone's constituency which, if signed by 10% of the electorate within six weeks, will lead to a by-election due to the seat being declared vacant.
Resolution Criteria: This question will resolve as **Yes**, if Peter Bone MP is suspended from Parliament for any reason before January 1, 2024, as reported by credible sources.
Fine Print: * A suspension for any length of time is sufficient to resolve as **Yes**.
* Removal from a party or other duties does not qualify, only being suspended as a MP from the House of Commons is sufficient.
* If Peter Bone resigns from the House of Commons before he is suspended this question will resolve as **No**.
|
2023-10-19T14:00:00Z
|
2023-12-31T12:00:00Z
|
2023-10-25T17:45:00Z
|
yes
|
METACULUS
|
meta-19406
|
Will Sarah Bernstein or Chetna Maroo win the 2023 Booker Prize?
|
The [Booker Prize](https://thebookerprizes.com/the-booker-library/prize-years/2023) is an annual literary award for the best English-language novel published in the UK and Ireland. Established in 1969, it comes with a £50,000 prize and is selected by a five-person expert panel. The award has broad cultural impact, often boosting the winner's book sales.
This year, the winner will be announced at an event at Old Billingsgate, London, on November 26, 2023. The short-listed books and authors are as follows.
| Book Title | Author | Summary |
|----------------------|-------------------|------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
| The Bee Sting | Paul Murray | A patch of ice on the road, a casual favour to a charming stranger, a bee caught beneath a bridal veil – can a single moment of bad luck change the direction of a life? |
| Western Lane | Chetna Maroo | Chetna Maroo's tender and moving debut novel about grief, sisterhood, a teenage girl's struggle to transcend herself – and squash. |
| Prophet Song | Paul Lynch | A mother faces a terrible choice, in Paul Lynch’s exhilarating, propulsive and confrontational portrait of a society on the brink. |
| This Other Eden | Paul Harding | Full of lyricism and power, Paul Harding's spellbinding novel celebrates the hopes, dreams and resilience of those deemed not to fit in a world brutally intolerant of difference. |
| If I Survive You | Jonathan Escoffery | An exhilarating novel-in-stories that pulses with style, heart and barbed humour, while unravelling what it means to carve out an existence between cultures, homes and pay cheques. |
| Study for Obedience | Sarah Bernstein | In her accomplished and unsettling second novel, Sarah Bernstein explores themes of prejudice, abuse and guilt through the eyes of a singularly unreliable narrator. |
For the first time in eight years, the shortlist for the Booker prize is [male dominated](https://www.theguardian.com/books/2023/sep/21/booker-shortlist-2023-just-one-british-writer-chetna-maroo), with two out of the four authors being women. Moreover, the past three prizes (2020, 2021, and 2022) have all been [won by men too](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Booker_Prize).
As the [Guardian](https://www.theguardian.com/books/2023/sep/21/booker-shortlist-2023-just-one-british-writer-chetna-maroo) reports:
"Commenting on the fact that more men appear on the list than in recent years, Edugyan said that “it’s the strength and the quality of the work that landed these writers” on the shortlist. Her fellow judge, the actor Robert Webb, joked that “it was very much the work that we were concentrating on rather than whether or not they were called Paul”."
Resolution Criteria: This question will resolve as **Yes** if either Sarah Bernstein or Chetna Maroo win the 2023 Booker Prize as announced by [The Booker Prizes](https://thebookerprizes.com/the-booker-library/prize-years/2023).
If either of them share the prize with any other author, this question will resolve as **Yes** too.
|
2023-11-09T19:00:00Z
|
2023-11-25T12:00:00Z
|
2023-11-27T04:18:00Z
|
no
|
METACULUS
|
meta-19396
|
Will Victor Wembanyama make the NBA All-Star Game in his rookie season?
|
French basketball phenom Victor Wembanyama was picked first overall in the 2023 NBA Draft. Soon after, [he was given an 84 rating for NBA 2k24, the highest rating for a rookie in the franchise's history.](https://bleacherreport.com/articles/10085735-victor-wembanyamas-nba2k24-rating-revealed-highest-rated-rookie-in-games-history) [The hype around Wembanyama](https://hoopshabit.com/2022/10/16/victor-wembanyama-best-prospect/) [has reached](https://theathletic.com/3690276/2022/10/19/victor-wembanyama-nba-draft/) [a fever pitch](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Rxl6xX02WS4) in [major media outlets.](https://sports.yahoo.com/is-it-even-possible-for-victor-wembanyama-to-live-up-to-the-hype-194708455.html?guccounter=1)
[Since the 1990s, only six NBA rookies have made the All-Star Game in their first season.](https://www.statmuse.com/nba/ask/how-many-nba-rookies-have-been-all-stars-in-their-rookie-season) This is a good indicator of a future Hall of Fame entry, as the majority of players who made the All-Star game in their first season since the 1979-80 season have eventually made the Hall.
Resolution Criteria: This question will resolve positively if the NBA announces that Victor Wembanyama was selected for the 2024 NBA All-Star Game. If he is not selected, this question will resolve negatively.
|
2023-10-26T21:03:00Z
|
2023-12-31T17:00:00Z
|
2024-02-02T00:48:00Z
|
no
|
METACULUS
|
meta-19386
|
Will there be a non-test nuclear detonation in Iran before 2025?
|
On October 7, 2023, [Hamas launched a surprise attack on Israel](https://www.foreignaffairs.com/middle-east/martin-indyk-why-hamas-attacked-and-why-israel-was-taken-surprise).
According to *[Foreign Policy](https://foreignpolicy.com/2023/10/07/hamas-attack-israel-declares-war-gaza-why-explained/)*:
> Initial information suggests that the attack has no precedent in recent Israeli history. The IDF [said](https://www.cnn.com/middleeast/live-news/al-aqsa-storm-militants-infiltrate-israel-after-gaza-rockets-10-07-intl-hnk/h_011c2f08e2646aa47a072dcd2d1caf33) approximately 2,200 rockets were launched in the initial barrages, making it the largest rocket attack against Israel since Hamas took control of Gaza in [2007](https://www.google.com/url?q=https://freedomhouse.org/country/gaza-strip/freedom-world/2021&sa=D&source=docs&ust=1696706417450975&usg=AOvVaw1huk_OBuqJV0SQOIKAP6BQ). The number of rockets launched was an order of magnitude larger than the attacks at the beginning of the [2014](https://www.inss.org.il/wp-content/uploads/systemfiles/Rocket%20Warfare%20in%20Operation%20Protective%20Edge.pdf) and [2021](https://www.nytimes.com/2021/05/10/world/middleeast/jerusalem-protests-aqsa-palestinians.html) crises. Hamas also appears to have been quite innovative, [using paragliders](https://news.sky.com/video/israel-hamas-fighters-appear-to-paraglide-across-border-in-released-footage-12978986) among other means to enter Israel by surprise. The infiltration is particularly devastating for Israel due to the lives lost and the hostages taken.
> Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu [declared](https://www.nytimes.com/live/2023/10/07/world/israel-gaza-attack), “We are at war,” and launched [Operation Iron Swords](https://www.jpost.com/breaking-news/article-762075), conducting airstrikes in Gaza and calling up reservists. Al Jazeera reports that the Israeli response has already [claimed 232 lives](https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2023/10/7/sirens-warn-of-rockets-launched-towards-israel-from-gaza-news-reports) in Gaza, with many more deaths sure to come.
Some reports have suggested that Iran was closely involved in planning the attack. The [Wall Street Journal reported](https://www.wsj.com/world/middle-east/iran-israel-hamas-strike-planning-bbe07b25):
>Iranian security officials helped plan Hamas’s Saturday surprise attack on Israel and gave the green light for the assault at a meeting in Beirut last Monday, according to senior members of Hamas and Hezbollah, another Iran-backed militant group.
>
>Officers of Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps had worked with Hamas since August to devise the air, land and sea incursions—the most significant breach of Israel’s borders since the 1973 Yom Kippur War—those people said.
However, Iran has [denied that it was involved](https://www.timesofisrael.com/iran-denies-it-had-role-in-hamas-attack-on-israel-claims-accusation-is-political/) and [US Secretary of State Anthony Blinken has stated](https://www.cnn.com/2023/10/08/politics/us-intelligence-iran-connection-israel-attack/index.html):
>In this specific instance, we have not yet seen evidence that Iran directed or was behind this particular attack. That’s something we’re looking at very carefully, and we’ve got to see where the facts lead.
While Israel [does not publicly confirm that it has nuclear weapons](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Samson_Option#Nuclear_ambiguity), based on US intelligence the [Federation of American Scientists estimates](https://fas.org/initiative/status-world-nuclear-forces/) that Israel has 90 nuclear warheads.
Resolution Criteria: This question will resolve as **Yes** if, before January 1, 2025, a non-test nuclear weapon is detonated in Iran. A [deliberate, inadvertent, or accidental/unauthorised](http://scienceandglobalsecurity.org/archive/sgs21barrett.pdf) detonation would result in the question resolving as **Yes**. For the purposes of this question, Iranian territory will include its 12 nautical mile [territorial sea](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Territorial_waters#Territorial_sea). To qualify, the nuclear weapon must be detonated less than 100 kilometers above Earth's mean sea level.
Fine Print: For the purposes of this question, a "nuclear weapon" is a bomb which uses a nuclear fission or fusion reaction as its primary energy source, excluding conventional bombs which spread radioactive fallout (so called "[dirty bombs](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Dirty_bomb)").
|
2023-10-13T20:00:00Z
|
2024-12-31T23:00:00Z
|
2025-01-08T07:01:00Z
|
no
|
METACULUS
|
meta-19375
|
Will there be 400 or more deaths due to armed conflict between Israel and Hezbollah before 2024?
|
Following the [October 7, 2023, Hamas attack on Israel](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Operation_Al-Aqsa_Flood), rocket and artillery fire [was also exchanged](https://www.nbcnews.com/news/world/israel-hamas-war-will-iran-hezbollah-lebanon-rcna120046) between Israel and [Hezbollah](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Hezbollah), a political party and militant group active in Lebanon, as well as [acting as a belligerent in the Syrian civil war](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Hezbollah_involvement_in_the_Syrian_civil_war). The [US government considers Hezbollah (or Hizballah) to be a terrorist organization](https://www.state.gov/foreign-terrorist-organizations/).
Hezbollah has [expressed support](https://www.newsweek.com/hezbollah-issues-threat-israel-us-hamas-war-escalates-1832928) for Hamas' attack on Israel and issued threats to Israel, [raising concerns](https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/new-atlanticist/what-will-hezbollah-do-next-heres-how-the-hamas-israel-conflict-could-engulf-the-region/) about the possibility of larger scale conflict between Israel and Hezbollah.
Resolution Criteria: This question will resolve as **Yes** if, after October 12, 2023 and before January 1, 2024, [credible sources](https://www.metaculus.com/help/faq/#definitions) report that there have been 400 or more deaths caused by armed conflict between the military forces or law enforcement personnel of Israel and Hezbollah.
Fine Print: * Both combatant and non-combatant deaths count toward the total.
* Deaths will be summed over the entirety of the period in question.
* In the event death totals are reported but it is not clear which conflict the deaths occurred in (for example, if deaths of Israeli military members are reported in total and not disaggregated between those occurring in conflict with Hamas and those occurring in conflict with Hezbollah) Metaculus may use the available estimates to make a determination whether the threshold has been met.
* Metaculus may wait for additional confirmation from credible sources to resolve if the credibility of the initial reports is in doubt.
* The median will be used if a range is provided. If estimates differ Metaculus may combine the estimates or select one it considers most credible, and may resolve the question as **Ambiguous** if the estimates differ substantially.
|
2023-10-13T00:00:00Z
|
2023-12-31T23:00:00Z
|
2024-01-09T18:21:00Z
|
no
|
METACULUS
|
meta-19361
|
Will Hong Kong Chief Executive John Lee be invited to the APEC summit in November 2023?
|
On July 27, 2023, the United States announced that it will [bar Hong Kong's Chief Executive, John Lee, from attending the APEC summit](https://www.washingtonpost.com/national-security/2023/07/27/hong-kong-john-lee-apec/), even though Hong Kong is an APEC member. Since then, the Hong Kong government has been [appealing to the U.S. government](https://www.scmp.com/news/hong-kong/hong-kong-economy/article/3229190/hong-kong-leader-john-lee-expected-be-banned-apec-meeting-us-move-strongly-condemned-beijing) to let him attend the trade talks.
John Lee has been [sanctioned by the US](https://home.treasury.gov/news/press-releases/sm1088) since August 2020 for suppressing pro-democracy protests in Hong Kong. Exiled activists from Hong Kong have been calling to ban him from APEC.
China has been [vaguely hinting](https://twitter.com/theserenadong/status/1706649655424241917) at the US to reconsider and invite John Lee to the APEC summit, but the US has not yield to China's demands.
Resolution Criteria: This question resolves **Yes** if a credible source reports that the Chief Executive of Hong Kong has received an invitation to attend the APEC summit from November 14-16, 2023 in the capacity of the leader of Hong Kong. It does not matter whether he accepts the invitation or not.
This question resolves **No** if there are no credible reports before November 14, 2023, that the Chief Executive of Hong Kong has received an invite to the APEC summit.
Fine Print: This question resolves **Yes** if the Chief Executive of Hong Kong changes and the new Chief Executive of Hong Kong is invited to the APEC summit.
The question is annulled if the 2023 APEC Summit is not held before December 31, 2023.
|
2023-10-27T02:44:00Z
|
2023-11-15T04:00:00Z
|
2023-10-31T06:00:00Z
|
yes
|
METACULUS
|
meta-19358
|
Will the Federal Funds Rate be raised before December 18, 2023?
|
The U.S. federal funds target rate, often simply called the "fed funds rate," is the interest rate at which depository institutions (primarily banks) lend reserve balances to other depository institutions overnight on an uncollateralized basis. Set by the Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC) of the Federal Reserve, the nation's central bank, this rate serves as a benchmark for various other interest rates in the economy, including those for mortgages, car loans, and credit cards. The FOMC adjusts the rate to influence monetary conditions, aiming to achieve policy objectives such as full employment and stable prices. By raising or lowering the fed funds rate, the Federal Reserve can either cool down an overheated economy or stimulate economic activity, thereby indirectly influencing inflation, employment, and overall economic growth.
Since July 26, 2023, the Federal Funds Rate has been at 5.25% to 5.50%. In late August, Federal Reserve Chairman Jerome Powell gave a speech at [Jackson Hole](https://www.barrons.com/livecoverage/jackson-hole-meeting-jerome-powell-speech-today/card/transcript-read-jerome-powell-s-jackson-hole-speech-WVKhbYPJrWlYI9GYj4hB?mod=article_inline), where he emphasized the Fed's commitment to bringing inflation down to its 2% target. Over the past year, the Federal Reserve has significantly tightened its monetary policy to combat persistently high inflation. While the inflation rate has declined from its peak, it remains elevated. Powell stated that the Fed is prepared to raise rates further if necessary and plans to maintain a restrictive policy stance until inflation is on a sustainable downward path. The speech also touched upon the complexities and uncertainties the Fed faces in balancing its dual mandate of price stability and full employment, particularly in the context of lingering pandemic-induced supply and demand dislocations.
While there were no rate hikes in [September](https://www.cnbc.com/2023/09/20/live-updates-fed-decision-september-2023.html), [markets](https://www.cmegroup.com/markets/interest-rates/cme-fedwatch-tool.html) put an implied probability of 27.8% on the outcome of a rate rise before the end of the year, though much of this depends on economic factors that remain uncertain.
Resolution Criteria: This question will resolve as **Yes** if, after October 17, 2023, and before December 18, 2023, the Federal Funds target range as reported [by the Federal Reserve Bank of New York](https://www.newyorkfed.org/markets/reference-rates/effr) is higher than 5.25-5.50%.
|
2023-10-18T14:00:00Z
|
2023-12-12T12:00:00Z
|
2023-12-18T16:29:00Z
|
no
|
METACULUS
|
meta-19350
|
Before 2024, will the US government state that Iran likely helped Hamas plan the October 7 attack on Israel?
|
On October 7, 2023, [Hamas launched a surprise attack on Israel](https://www.foreignaffairs.com/middle-east/martin-indyk-why-hamas-attacked-and-why-israel-was-taken-surprise).
According to *[Foreign Policy](https://foreignpolicy.com/2023/10/07/hamas-attack-israel-declares-war-gaza-why-explained/)*:
> Initial information suggests that the attack has no precedent in recent Israeli history. The IDF [said](https://www.cnn.com/middleeast/live-news/al-aqsa-storm-militants-infiltrate-israel-after-gaza-rockets-10-07-intl-hnk/h_011c2f08e2646aa47a072dcd2d1caf33) approximately 2,200 rockets were launched in the initial barrages, making it the largest rocket attack against Israel since Hamas took control of Gaza in [2007](https://www.google.com/url?q=https://freedomhouse.org/country/gaza-strip/freedom-world/2021&sa=D&source=docs&ust=1696706417450975&usg=AOvVaw1huk_OBuqJV0SQOIKAP6BQ). The number of rockets launched was an order of magnitude larger than the attacks at the beginning of the [2014](https://www.inss.org.il/wp-content/uploads/systemfiles/Rocket%20Warfare%20in%20Operation%20Protective%20Edge.pdf) and [2021](https://www.nytimes.com/2021/05/10/world/middleeast/jerusalem-protests-aqsa-palestinians.html) crises. Hamas also appears to have been quite innovative, [using paragliders](https://news.sky.com/video/israel-hamas-fighters-appear-to-paraglide-across-border-in-released-footage-12978986) among other means to enter Israel by surprise. The infiltration is particularly devastating for Israel due to the lives lost and the hostages taken.
> Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu [declared](https://www.nytimes.com/live/2023/10/07/world/israel-gaza-attack), “We are at war,” and launched [Operation Iron Swords](https://www.jpost.com/breaking-news/article-762075), conducting airstrikes in Gaza and calling up reservists. Al Jazeera reports that the Israeli response has already [claimed 232 lives](https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2023/10/7/sirens-warn-of-rockets-launched-towards-israel-from-gaza-news-reports) in Gaza, with many more deaths sure to come.
Some reports have suggested that Iran was closely involved in planning the attack. The [Wall Street Journal reported](https://www.wsj.com/world/middle-east/iran-israel-hamas-strike-planning-bbe07b25):
>Iranian security officials helped plan Hamas’s Saturday surprise attack on Israel and gave the green light for the assault at a meeting in Beirut last Monday, according to senior members of Hamas and Hezbollah, another Iran-backed militant group.
>
>Officers of Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps had worked with Hamas since August to devise the air, land and sea incursions—the most significant breach of Israel’s borders since the 1973 Yom Kippur War—those people said.
However, Iran has [denied that it was involved](https://www.timesofisrael.com/iran-denies-it-had-role-in-hamas-attack-on-israel-claims-accusation-is-political/) and [US Secretary of State Anthony Blinken has stated](https://www.cnn.com/2023/10/08/politics/us-intelligence-iran-connection-israel-attack/index.html):
>In this specific instance, we have not yet seen evidence that Iran directed or was behind this particular attack. That’s something we’re looking at very carefully, and we’ve got to see where the facts lead.
Resolution Criteria: This question will resolve as **Yes** if, before January 1, 2024, one or more US government officials acting in an official government capacity state that Iran was likely involved in planning the October 7 Hamas attack on Israel, and the statement it not contradicted within seven days.
Fine Print: * If a statement does not directly say that Iran was involved in planning the attack but instead directly presents intelligence findings, evidence that members of the Iranian government or military communicated with Hamas regarding the attack prior to the attack will be considered sufficient to count as Iranian involvement in planning the attack.
* "Acting in an official government capacity" will be considered to mean an official statement on behalf of the US government or responding to reporter questions on behalf of the US government. The following is a non-exhaustive list representing the kinds of reports that will **not** be considered to be "acting in an official government capacity":
* Reporting as an anonymous source
* Congressional representatives describing information or evidence they have seen
* Personal opinions (for example "I believe that. . ." or "In my view the evidence is clear. . .")
* Leaked information not confirmed by the US government
* The following non-exhaustive list of terms will be considered to meet the "likely" threshold specified in the criteria:
* "Likely"
* "Probable"
* "Highly likely"
* "High confidence"
* "Has concluded that"
* Terms such as "possible", "plausible", or similar will not be considered to meet the "likely" threshold.
* A statement will be considered to be contradicted within seven days if the US government or a US government official, including the same official who made the original statement, either reports a different conclusion, reports a confidence level below "likely", states that there is insufficient evidence, or disavows the original statement.
* If it is unclear whether a statement meets the specified criteria, Metaculus may make a determination to resolve the question or resolve the question as **Ambiguous**.
|
2023-10-10T22:00:00Z
|
2023-12-31T23:00:00Z
|
2024-01-23T17:22:00Z
|
no
|
METACULUS
|
meta-19333
|
Will Yahya Sinwar cease to act as Hamas Chief in the Gaza Strip before 2024?
|
Gaza, also known as the [Gaza Strip](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Gaza_Strip) is a small, densely populated coastal territory located on the eastern coast of the Mediterranean Sea. It borders Israel to the north and east, Egypt to the south, and the Mediterranean Sea to the west. Covering an area of about 365 square kilometers (141 square miles), the Gaza Strip is home to more than two million Palestinians.
In the [1948 Arab-Israeli War](https://history.state.gov/milestones/1945-1952/arab-israeli-war), Egypt occupied the Gaza Strip, and it remained under Egyptian control until the [Six-Day War in 1967](https://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-39960461), when Israel captured it. In 1994, as a result of the [Oslo Accords](https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2023/9/13/what-were-oslo-accords-israel-palestinians) the Palestinian Authority was established and took over the administration of the Gaza Strip, along with parts of the West Bank.
In 2007, following internal Palestinian conflict, [Hamas](https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/what-hamas), an Islamist political and militant group, took de facto control of the Gaza Strip. Hamas's rise to power in Gaza was marked by its victory in the [2006 Palestinian legislative elections](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/2006_Palestinian_legislative_election), a result that surprised many and led to tensions with political rival Fatah, culminating in the [2007 clashes](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Fatah%E2%80%93Hamas_conflict). Since then, the Gaza Strip has been under the administrative and military control of Hamas, while the West Bank remains under the [Palestinian Authority](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Palestinian_National_Authority).
On October 7, 2023, [Hamas launched a surprise attack on Israel](https://www.foreignaffairs.com/middle-east/martin-indyk-why-hamas-attacked-and-why-israel-was-taken-surprise).
According to *[Foreign Policy](https://foreignpolicy.com/2023/10/07/hamas-attack-israel-declares-war-gaza-why-explained/)*:
> Initial information suggests that the attack has no precedent in recent Israeli history. The IDF [said](https://www.cnn.com/middleeast/live-news/al-aqsa-storm-militants-infiltrate-israel-after-gaza-rockets-10-07-intl-hnk/h_011c2f08e2646aa47a072dcd2d1caf33) approximately 2,200 rockets were launched in the initial barrages, making it the largest rocket attack against Israel since Hamas took control of Gaza in [2007](https://www.google.com/url?q=https://freedomhouse.org/country/gaza-strip/freedom-world/2021&sa=D&source=docs&ust=1696706417450975&usg=AOvVaw1huk_OBuqJV0SQOIKAP6BQ). The number of rockets launched was an order of magnitude larger than the attacks at the beginning of the [2014](https://www.inss.org.il/wp-content/uploads/systemfiles/Rocket%20Warfare%20in%20Operation%20Protective%20Edge.pdf) and [2021](https://www.nytimes.com/2021/05/10/world/middleeast/jerusalem-protests-aqsa-palestinians.html) crises. Hamas also appears to have been quite innovative, [using paragliders](https://news.sky.com/video/israel-hamas-fighters-appear-to-paraglide-across-border-in-released-footage-12978986) among other means to enter Israel by surprise. The infiltration is particularly devastating for Israel due to the lives lost and the hostages taken.
> Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu [declared](https://www.nytimes.com/live/2023/10/07/world/israel-gaza-attack), “We are at war,” and launched [Operation Iron Swords](https://www.jpost.com/breaking-news/article-762075), conducting airstrikes in Gaza and calling up reservists. Al Jazeera reports that the Israeli response has already [claimed 232 lives](https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2023/10/7/sirens-warn-of-rockets-launched-towards-israel-from-gaza-news-reports) in Gaza, with many more deaths sure to come.
[Yahya Sinwar](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Yahya_Sinwar) is the Hamas Chief in the Gaza Strip. Israel was previously [reported to have threatened](https://www.timesofisrael.com/israel-said-to-threaten-action-against-hamas-chief-sinwar-over-terror-cheerleading/) Sinwar in 2022 in response to his [calls for violence against Israel](https://www.timesofisrael.com/sinwar-warns-israel-hamas-wont-hesitate-to-take-any-steps-if-al-aqsa-is-violated/), and some Israeli politicians have previously called for his assassination. Following the October 7, 2023, attack on Israel [it was reported](https://www.timesofisrael.com/liveblog_entry/idf-said-to-hit-gaza-home-of-hamas-chief-yahya-sinwar-amid-terror-group-assault/) that Sinwar's home was bombed by Israel.
Resolution Criteria: This question will resolve as **Yes** if, before January 1, 2024, [credible sources](https://www.metaculus.com/help/faq/#definitions) report that Yahya Sinwar has either stepped down or been replaced as Hamas Chief in the Gaza Strip, been captured by Israel, or that he has died. The question will resolve as **No** if he continuously holds his position or if there is no reporting indicating a change in status.
Fine Print: * Metaculus may wait for additional confirmation from credible sources to resolve if the credibility of the initial reports is in doubt.
|
2023-10-09T20:00:00Z
|
2023-12-31T23:00:00Z
|
2024-01-03T17:42:00Z
|
no
|
METACULUS
|
meta-19332
|
Will Israel carry out and explicitly acknowledge a deadly attack on Iran before 2024?
|
On October 7, 2023, [Hamas launched a surprise attack on Israel](https://www.foreignaffairs.com/middle-east/martin-indyk-why-hamas-attacked-and-why-israel-was-taken-surprise).
According to *[Foreign Policy](https://foreignpolicy.com/2023/10/07/hamas-attack-israel-declares-war-gaza-why-explained/)*:
> Initial information suggests that the attack has no precedent in recent Israeli history. The IDF [said](https://www.cnn.com/middleeast/live-news/al-aqsa-storm-militants-infiltrate-israel-after-gaza-rockets-10-07-intl-hnk/h_011c2f08e2646aa47a072dcd2d1caf33) approximately 2,200 rockets were launched in the initial barrages, making it the largest rocket attack against Israel since Hamas took control of Gaza in [2007](https://www.google.com/url?q=https://freedomhouse.org/country/gaza-strip/freedom-world/2021&sa=D&source=docs&ust=1696706417450975&usg=AOvVaw1huk_OBuqJV0SQOIKAP6BQ). The number of rockets launched was an order of magnitude larger than the attacks at the beginning of the [2014](https://www.inss.org.il/wp-content/uploads/systemfiles/Rocket%20Warfare%20in%20Operation%20Protective%20Edge.pdf) and [2021](https://www.nytimes.com/2021/05/10/world/middleeast/jerusalem-protests-aqsa-palestinians.html) crises. Hamas also appears to have been quite innovative, [using paragliders](https://news.sky.com/video/israel-hamas-fighters-appear-to-paraglide-across-border-in-released-footage-12978986) among other means to enter Israel by surprise. The infiltration is particularly devastating for Israel due to the lives lost and the hostages taken.
> Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu [declared](https://www.nytimes.com/live/2023/10/07/world/israel-gaza-attack), “We are at war,” and launched [Operation Iron Swords](https://www.jpost.com/breaking-news/article-762075), conducting airstrikes in Gaza and calling up reservists. Al Jazeera reports that the Israeli response has already [claimed 232 lives](https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2023/10/7/sirens-warn-of-rockets-launched-towards-israel-from-gaza-news-reports) in Gaza, with many more deaths sure to come.
Some reports have suggested that Iran was closely involved in planning the attack. The [Wall Street Journal reported](https://www.wsj.com/world/middle-east/iran-israel-hamas-strike-planning-bbe07b25):
>Iranian security officials helped plan Hamas’s Saturday surprise attack on Israel and gave the green light for the assault at a meeting in Beirut last Monday, according to senior members of Hamas and Hezbollah, another Iran-backed militant group.
>
>Officers of Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps had worked with Hamas since August to devise the air, land and sea incursions—the most significant breach of Israel’s borders since the 1973 Yom Kippur War—those people said.
However, Iran has [denied that it was involved](https://www.timesofisrael.com/iran-denies-it-had-role-in-hamas-attack-on-israel-claims-accusation-is-political/) and [US Secretary of State Anthony Blinken has stated](https://www.cnn.com/2023/10/08/politics/us-intelligence-iran-connection-israel-attack/index.html):
>In this specific instance, we have not yet seen evidence that Iran directed or was behind this particular attack. That’s something we’re looking at very carefully, and we’ve got to see where the facts lead.
Resolution Criteria: This question will resolve as **Yes** if, after October 9, 2023, and before January 1, 2024, [credible sources](https://www.metaculus.com/help/faq/#definitions) report that Israel has carried out an attack with damage occurring within the borders of the country of Iran that has killed at least five Iranians, and that either of the following is true:
* Israel has explicitly acknowledged and taken credit for the attack
* Israel performed the attack in an unobscured manner, such that credible sources report without ambiguity that the attack was carried out by Israel.
Fine Print: * The attack need not involve Israeli forces within the borders of Iran, cross-border missile or ballistic attacks are sufficient.
* An attack must be a [kinetic attack](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Kinetic_military_action), using weaponry or physical violence. A cyberattack would not count, even one resulting in deaths.
* Israel will be considered to have explicitly acknowledged and taken credit for the attack if the Israeli government or any agency of the Israeli government publicly confirms that the attack was carried out by Israel.
* The five deaths threshold must be met in the span of 24 hours, smaller events over a longer timespan would not count. The deaths do not need to occur in the same location, a coordinated strike on multiple targets in the country would be sufficient, as would multiple assassinations taking place in the same 24 hour span that Israel acknowledges and takes credit for.
|
2023-10-09T19:00:00Z
|
2023-12-31T23:00:00Z
|
2024-01-03T17:45:00Z
|
no
|
METACULUS
|
meta-19308
|
Will Hamas lose control of Gaza before 2024?
|
Gaza, also known as the [Gaza Strip](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Gaza_Strip) is a small, densely populated coastal territory located on the eastern coast of the Mediterranean Sea. It borders Israel to the north and east, Egypt to the south, and the Mediterranean Sea to the west. Covering an area of about 365 square kilometers (141 square miles), the Gaza Strip is home to more than two million Palestinians.
In the [1948 Arab-Israeli War](https://history.state.gov/milestones/1945-1952/arab-israeli-war), Egypt occupied the Gaza Strip, and it remained under Egyptian control until the [Six-Day War in 1967](https://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-39960461), when Israel captured it. In 1994, as a result of the [Oslo Accords](https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2023/9/13/what-were-oslo-accords-israel-palestinians) the Palestinian Authority was established and took over the administration of the Gaza Strip, along with parts of the West Bank.
In 2007, following internal Palestinian conflict, [Hamas](https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/what-hamas), an Islamist political and militant group, took de facto control of the Gaza Strip. Hamas's rise to power in Gaza was marked by its victory in the [2006 Palestinian legislative elections](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/2006_Palestinian_legislative_election), a result that surprised many and led to tensions with political rival Fatah, culminating in the [2007 clashes](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Fatah%E2%80%93Hamas_conflict). Since then, the Gaza Strip has been under the administrative and military control of Hamas, while the West Bank remains under the [Palestinian Authority](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Palestinian_National_Authority).
On October 7, 2023, [Hamas launched a surprise attack on Israel](https://www.foreignaffairs.com/middle-east/martin-indyk-why-hamas-attacked-and-why-israel-was-taken-surprise).
According to *[Foreign Policy](https://foreignpolicy.com/2023/10/07/hamas-attack-israel-declares-war-gaza-why-explained/)*:
> Initial information suggests that the attack has no precedent in recent Israeli history. The IDF [said](https://www.cnn.com/middleeast/live-news/al-aqsa-storm-militants-infiltrate-israel-after-gaza-rockets-10-07-intl-hnk/h_011c2f08e2646aa47a072dcd2d1caf33) approximately 2,200 rockets were launched in the initial barrages, making it the largest rocket attack against Israel since Hamas took control of Gaza in [2007](https://www.google.com/url?q=https://freedomhouse.org/country/gaza-strip/freedom-world/2021&sa=D&source=docs&ust=1696706417450975&usg=AOvVaw1huk_OBuqJV0SQOIKAP6BQ). The number of rockets launched was an order of magnitude larger than the attacks at the beginning of the [2014](https://www.inss.org.il/wp-content/uploads/systemfiles/Rocket%20Warfare%20in%20Operation%20Protective%20Edge.pdf) and [2021](https://www.nytimes.com/2021/05/10/world/middleeast/jerusalem-protests-aqsa-palestinians.html) crises. Hamas also appears to have been quite innovative, [using paragliders](https://news.sky.com/video/israel-hamas-fighters-appear-to-paraglide-across-border-in-released-footage-12978986) among other means to enter Israel by surprise. The infiltration is particularly devastating for Israel due to the lives lost and the hostages taken.
> Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu [declared](https://www.nytimes.com/live/2023/10/07/world/israel-gaza-attack), “We are at war,” and launched [Operation Iron Swords](https://www.jpost.com/breaking-news/article-762075), conducting airstrikes in Gaza and calling up reservists. Al Jazeera reports that the Israeli response has already [claimed 232 lives](https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2023/10/7/sirens-warn-of-rockets-launched-towards-israel-from-gaza-news-reports) in Gaza, with many more deaths sure to come.
Resolution Criteria: The question resolves **Yes** if at any point between Oct 7, 2023 and Dec 31, 2023, the consensus of credible reports is that Hamas no longer has de facto control of the majority of the land area of the Gaza Strip. It resolves **No** in all other cases, including if the consensus of credible reports is that control of Gaza is disputed, or if there is no consensus of credible reports.
|
2023-10-08T12:00:00Z
|
2023-12-31T19:00:00Z
|
2024-01-03T20:32:00Z
|
no
|
METACULUS
|
meta-19306
|
Will top institutions participating in the UK’s global AI Safety Summit make concrete and meaningful commitments to advance AI safety?
|
*This question was written in partnership with the [Effective Institutions Project](https://effectiveinstitutionsproject.org/).*
The [UK AI Safety Summit](https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/ai-safety-summit-introduction/ai-safety-summit-introduction-html) is taking place November 1st and 2nd, 2023. [According to Computerworld](https://www.computerworld.com/article/3706051/uk-government-outlines-five-objectives-for-ai-safety-summit.html):
> The five objectives of the UK government’s summit are:
>
> - Develop a shared understanding of the risks posed by frontier AI and the need for action
> - Put forward process for international collaboration on frontier AI safety, including how best to support national and international frameworks
> - Propose appropriate measures which individual organisations should take to increase frontier AI safety
> - Identify areas for potential collaboration on AI safety research, including evaluating model capabilities and the development of new standards to support governance
> - Showcase how ensuring the safe development of AI will enable AI to be used for good globally.
Arguably a large part of whether the summit is successful lies in whether or not leading AI labs, and the governments that regulate them, make commitments that they would not have made had the summit not been convened.
Resolution Criteria: The question resolves **Yes** if the UK AI Safety Summit results in a joint declaration or statement, endorsed by at least five of the top institutions cited in Effective Institutions Project’s [AI governance primer](https://effectiveinstitutionsproject.substack.com/i/135267188/the-top-institutions-for-ai-governance) who are also participating parties (nations and/or labs) in the Summit, that includes at least three of the following commitments [proposed by the Future of Life Institute](https://futureoflife.org/wp-content/uploads/2023/09/FLI_AI_Summit_Recommendations.pdf):
* An agreement to reconvene in six months (or less) to work on AI governance
* A commitment to increase public funding for AI safety research
* A commitment by signatory nations to develop a national-level AI strategy that contains at least two of the following measures:
* Standards for advanced AI, with associated benchmarks and thresholds for dangerous capabilities
* Mandatory pre-deployment audits for potentially dangerous AI systems by independent third parties
* Monitoring of entities with large-scale AI compute concentrations
* Safety protocols to prevent systems with dangerous capabilities from being developed, deployed, or stolen
* Restrictions on open source AI based on capability thresholds
* Immediate enhancement of cybersecurity standards at leading AI companies
* Adaptation of national liability law to AI-specific challenges
* A post-summit working group with a mandate to develop a blueprint for international AI governance
* Encouragement of AI labs to share information with the UK Foundation Model Task Force
The question also resolves **Yes** if no such declaration is issued, but the [Future of Life Institute](https://futureoflife.org/) issues a public statement indicating that the outcomes from the summit have nevertheless exceeded the organization’s expectations.
Fine Print: * A joint declaration or statement endorsed by at least five of the following institutions or official representatives of the institutions attending the Summit is required for resolution:
* The United States government
* The Chinese government
* The European Union
* OpenAI
* Google DeepMind
* Anthropic
* Alphabet
* Microsoft
* Amazon
* Meta
* A joint statement meeting these criteria must be publicly available before November 10, 2023, or 168 hours following the end of the Summit, whichever is later.
* If the UK AI Summit does not take place before March 1, 2024, this question will resolve as **No**.
|
2023-10-10T14:00:00Z
|
2023-10-31T22:00:00Z
|
2023-11-21T13:59:00Z
|
no
|
METACULUS
|
meta-19297
|
Will the Conservatives hold on to their seat in the Mid Bedfordshire by-election?
|
The Mid Bedfordshire constituency in Bedfordshire, UK has been held by the Conservatives since 1931, with Nadine Dorries as MP since 2005. On June 9, 2023, Dorries unexpectedly announced she was resigning as MP "with immediate effect", triggering a [by-election](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/2023_Mid_Bedfordshire_by-election). However, she then delayed formally resigning until August 29, with the by-election now being scheduled for October 19, 2023.
The Conservatives, Labour, Liberal Democrats, Reform UK, Greens and others have all selected candidates: The Conservatives have selected Bedfordshire Police Commissioner [Festus Akinbusoye](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Festus_Akinbusoye) as their candidate. Labour chose Alistair Strathern, a former math teacher, London councillor and Bank of England climate lead. The Liberal Democrats selected local councillor Emma Holland-Lindsay. Other candidates include Reform UK's Dave Holland, independent councillor Gareth Mackey, and candidates from the Greens and other parties.
The seat is expected to be closely fought, with polling form early September showing Conservatives and Labour at 29% and Lib Dems at 22%. At the last election (2019 general election), Dorries won the constituency with a majority of [24,664 votes](https://members.parliament.uk/constituency/3603/election/397), that being 59.8% of the votes.
Resolution Criteria: This question will resolve as **Yes** if a candidate for the UK Conservative party is declared the winner of the 2023 Mid Bedfordshire election, as reported by the [BBC](https://www.bbc.co.uk/).
Fine Print: This question will resolve as the first by-election being held before 2024. If there is a re-run for whatever reason, or if there is a second by-election, replacing the candidate winning the first one, the results of the first run will determine the resolution of this question.
|
2023-10-10T14:00:00Z
|
2023-10-18T11:00:00Z
|
2023-10-20T21:11:00Z
|
no
|
METACULUS
|
meta-19192
|
Will the MONUSCO UN peacekeeping mission to the Democratic Republic of the Congo be extended with a military personnel ceiling above 11,000 before January 1, 2024?
|
Since 1999, the [United Nations Organization Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/MONUSCO) (MONUSCO) has been active in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) to aid in stabilizing the region during and after the [Second Congo War](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Second_Congo_War). The original mission was known as the United Nations Organization Mission in Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUC) until 2010 when it was replaced by MONUSCO. [According to the UN](https://monusco.unmissions.org/en/about):
>The new mission has been authorized to use all necessary means to carry out its mandate relating, among other things, to the protection of civilians, humanitarian personnel and human rights defenders under imminent threat of physical violence and to support the Government of the DRC in its stabilization and peace consolidation efforts.
MONUSCO has been [planning for a withdrawal](https://press.un.org/en/2020/sc14374.doc.htm) from the DRC, however in September of 2023 DRC President Felix-Antoine Tshisekedi [insisted](https://apnews.com/article/congo-peacekeeping-united-nations-85bbfdfa87553d876800dfbdfd6be9b5) that the start of MONUSCO's "accelerated retreat" should begin a year sooner, at the end of December 2023. Following Tshisekedi's statement, the UN Security Council "[expressed its readiness to decide](https://press.un.org/en/2023/sc15443.doc.htm), by the end of this year and as a matter of priority, the future of MONUSCO and its gradual, responsible and sustainable withdrawal, as well as realistic and concrete steps to be taken in that regard."
The UN had [extended the MONUSCO mandate for one year](https://press.un.org/en/2022/sc15152.doc.htm) on December 20, 2022, authorizing a troop ceiling [as follows](https://monusco.unmissions.org/sites/default/files/resolution_2666_2022_0.pdf):
>. . . MONUSCO’s authorised troop ceiling will comprise 13,500
military personnel, 660 military observers and staff officers, 591 police personnel, and 1,410 personnel of formed police units, and *invites* the Secretariat to consider further reduction of MONUSCO’s level of military deployment, in line with the joint strategy on the progressive and phased drawdown of MONUSCO ([S/2020/1041](https://documents-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N20/287/47/PDF/N2028747.pdf?OpenElement)).
An August 2023 Report of the Secretary-General](https://reliefweb.int/report/democratic-republic-congo/options-adapting-configuration-monusco-and-future-united-nations-configuration-country-beyond-current-mandate-mission-report-secretary-general-s2023574-enarruzh) described options for the future of the mission and included the following paragraph:
>As a first step towards the Mission’s full withdrawal, the force would consolidate its presence in the 13 high-risk territories of Ituri, as well as North and South Kivu. This would be accompanied by a rationalization of permanent and temporary bases that would allow the force to reduce its reliance on framework battalions in favour of units that are more fit for purpose in the current context. All units from South Kivu (southern sector) would subsequently be repatriated together with one static framework battalion from North Kivu (central sector) and some specialist units, military observers and staff officers, resulting in a reduction of its current deployed strength from 12,500 to approximately 10,500 military personnel. As the Mission’s focus shifts to North Kivu and Ituri, it would nonetheless retain projection capacity for South Kivu. The generation of heavy artillery and attack helicopters to enable MONUSCO to support FARDC and maintain a credible posture vis-à-vis armed groups, both foreign and Congolese, would remain a priority.
Resolution Criteria: This question will resolve as **Yes** if, after November 15, 2023, and before January 1, 2024, MONUSCO's mission has been renewed or extended with a troop ceiling of 11,000 "military personnel" or more.
Fine Print: * Only the troop ceiling for "military personnel" will be counted for this question, other personnel such as military observers and staff officers, police personnel, or personnel of formed police units will be immaterial.
* Actual deployed strength is immaterial to the question, this question only refers to the the authorized troop ceiling on "military personnel".
* If the mandate is not renewed or otherwise extended this question will resolve as **No**.
* The question will still resolve as **Yes** if the renewal or extension is referred to as something other than a mandate, so long as MONUSCO's mission in the DRC is extended for any period of time with a qualifying troop ceiling.
|
2023-11-15T20:12:00Z
|
2023-12-31T23:00:00Z
|
2023-12-19T15:00:00Z
|
yes
|
METACULUS
|
meta-19173
|
[Short Fuse] Will a vote on the motion to vacate be held before October 4, 2023?
|
On October 2, 2023, Representative Matt Gaetz [filed a motion to vacate the Office of Speaker of the House of Representatives](https://apnews.com/article/kevin-mccarthy-matt-gaetz-speaker-vacate-congress-e7e5ccc6cf79ccbf5b4a7b73b9d5a3ae) in a bid to oust Kevin McCarthy. The resolution requires a simple majority to pass, and upon passing Kevin McCarthy would be removed from his position. Republicans [hold 221 seats in the House](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/United_States_House_of_Representatives) and Democrats hold 212. Assuming all Democrats vote to remove McCarthy, five Republicans would have to vote in favor of the motion to vacate as well for it to pass. According to reporter Jake Sherman, [Matt Gaetz may have the votes against McCarthy](https://twitter.com/JakeSherman/status/1709209301611409498). Sherman [also reports](https://twitter.com/JakeSherman/status/1709200194967904314) that the vote is currently scheduled for 1 PM ET on October 3, 2023.
According to [reporting from CNN](https://www.cnn.com/2023/10/03/politics/mccarthy-gaetz-vote-motion-to-vacate/index.html):
>A vote on a resolution to remove the speaker could still be preempted, however, even once it is on track to come to the floor for consideration.
>
>For example, when the resolution is called up on the floor, a motion to table – or kill – the resolution could be offered and would be voted on first. That vote would also only require a simple majority to succeed – and if it did succeed then there would not be a vote directly on the resolution to remove the speaker because the resolution would instead be tabled.
*See below for additional background regarding the motion to vacate from [this question](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/18854/gop-calls-speaker-vote-before-october/)*
---
[Kevin McCarthy](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Kevin_McCarthy) was elected Speaker of the US House of Representatives [on January 7, 2023](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/2023_Speaker_of_the_United_States_House_of_Representatives_election), after [15 ballots](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/14379/-ballot-rounds-to-elect-us-house-speaker/), the first time since 1923 an election for Speaker required more than one ballot. The contentious election and [concessions to the House Freedom Caucus](https://www.brookings.edu/blog/fixgov/2023/01/10/mccarthy-paid-a-steep-price-for-his-speakership-now-what/) — including rules that allow any member of the House to [call for a vote](https://www.nbcnews.com/politics/congress/speaker-of-the-house-ousted-motion-to-vacate-rcna64902) that would oust the Speaker by simple majority — have weakened his position as Speaker.
The rules for the House of Representatives of the 118th Congress adopt [those of the 117th Congress](https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/GPO-CLERK-RULE-PAMPHLET-117/xml/GPO-CLERK-RULE-PAMPHLET-117.xml) with some amendments. The relevant portion of the rules is Rule IX, the text of which is quoted below. The [amended rules](https://www.congress.gov/bill/118th-congress/house-resolution/5/text) remove subparagraph (3) of clause 2(a) (shown in bold).
>1\. Questions of privilege shall be, first, those affecting the rights of the House collectively, its safety, dignity, and the integrity of its proceedings; and second, those affecting the rights, reputation, and conduct of Members, Delegates, or the Resident Commissioner, individually, in their representative capacity only.
>
>2\. (a)(1) A resolution reported as a question of the privileges of the House, or offered from the floor by the Majority Leader or the Minority Leader as a question of the privileges of the House, or offered as privileged under clause 1, section 7, article I of the Constitution, shall have precedence of all other questions except motions to adjourn. A resolution offered from the floor by a Member, Delegate, or Resident Commissioner other than the Majority Leader or the Minority Leader as a question of the privileges of the House shall have precedence of all other questions except motions to adjourn only at a time or place, designated by the Speaker, in the legislative schedule within two legislative days after the day on which the proponent announces to the House an intention to offer the resolution and the form of the resolution. Oral announcement of the form of the resolution may be dispensed with by unanimous consent.
>
>(2) The time allotted for debate on a resolution offered from the floor as a question of the privileges of the House shall be equally divided between (A) the proponent of the resolution, and (B) the Majority Leader, the Minority Leader, or a designee, as determined by the Speaker.
>
>**(3) A resolution causing a vacancy in the Office of Speaker shall not be privileged except if offered by direction of a party caucus or conference.**
>
>(b) A question of personal privilege shall have precedence of all other questions except motions to adjourn.
Resolution Criteria: This question will resolve as **Yes** if, before October 4, 2023 (Eastern Time), a vote is held in the US House of Representatives on final passage of the [motion to vacate submitted by Representative Matt Gaetz on October 2, 2023](https://apnews.com/article/kevin-mccarthy-matt-gaetz-speaker-vacate-congress-e7e5ccc6cf79ccbf5b4a7b73b9d5a3ae).
Fine Print: Procedural votes are immaterial for this question, only a vote on final passage of the resolution qualifies.
|
2023-10-03T15:15:00Z
|
2023-10-03T18:00:00Z
|
2023-10-03T20:01:00Z
|
yes
|
METACULUS
|
meta-19131
|
Will an LLM pass an ARA evaluation before 2025?
|
The [Alignment Research Center](https://www.alignment.org) (ARC) runs a project called [ARC Evals](https://evals.alignment.org) that evaluates AI systems to see if they pose a catastrophic risk to the human species. [Update: [ARC Evals has spun out from ARC](https://metr.org/blog/2023-12-04-metr-announcement/), and has renamed to METR.] As can be seen from [this report](https://evals.alignment.org/blog/2023-08-01-new-report/), ARC has introduced "methodology for assessing the capacity of LLM agents to acquire resources, create copies of themselves, and adapt to novel challenges they encounter in the wild." Also, as noted in the report, OpenAI's GPT-4 and Anthropic's Claude are not currently capable of passing the ARA evaluation.
This questions aims to determine the likelihood of an AI model passing the autonomous replication and adaptation—ARA—evaluation before 2025, because this would present a worrying development for the capability of an AI model to inflict major harm on human civilization.
Resolution Criteria: This question resolves as **Yes** if [METR](https://metr.org/) posts on their website, or if an individual on the METR leadership team states (on the record), that an AI model is potentially capable of autonomous replication and adaptation (ARA) or could pass the ARA threshold based on an ARA evaluation that occurred before 2025.
The question resolves as **No** otherwise. The question also retroactively resolves as Yes (i.e., resolution is changed from No to Yes) if it later comes to light, through a credible report, that the ARA evaluation was passed before 2025.
|
2023-10-04T18:29:00Z
|
2024-12-31T20:00:00Z
|
2025-01-24T13:46:00Z
|
no
|
METACULUS
|
meta-19128
|
Will there be a military conflict between Serbia and Kosovo before January 1, 2024?
|
On September 29, 2023, NATO announced that it was [increasing troop presence in Kosovo](https://apnews.com/article/kosovo-serbia-clashes-raid-police-f671bd21560f60bdca72d2daf7ce50ef) after [violence between Serbian insurgents and Kosovan police](https://apnews.com/article/kosovo-serbia-policeman-killed-tension-kurti-vucic-51a29a3159646ec020851b3b5a24836f) in Kosovo on September 24, 2023.
Additionally, John Kirby of the White House National Security Council [stated on September 29](https://www.rferl.org/a/vucic-kosovo-serbia-monastery-attack/32615778.html):
>We are monitoring a large Serbian military deployment along the border that includes unprecedented staging of advanced Serbian artillery, tanks, and mechanized infantry units. We believe that this is a very destabilizing development.
Resolution Criteria: This question will resolve as **Yes** if, after September 28, 2023, and before January 1, 2024, [credible sources](https://www.metaculus.com/help/faq/#definitions) report that one or more of the following have occurred:
* At least 100 overtly flagged members of the Serbian military have entered Kosovan territory.
* At least 100 overtly flagged members of the Kosovan military have entered Serbian territory.
* Combat between overtly flagged forces of the Serbian and Kosovan militaries has resulted in an estimated 50 or more military deaths within a 30 day period.
Fine Print: * Where estimates of deaths are provided as a range the median will be used. If sources provide conflicting estimates or if it is unclear if the specified threshold has been met Metaculus may resolve the question as **Ambiguous**.
|
2023-09-29T23:00:00Z
|
2023-12-31T23:00:00Z
|
2023-12-31T23:00:00Z
|
no
|
METACULUS
|
meta-19110
|
Will a major political party leave the I.N.D.I.A. alliance before the next Indian general election?
|
The [I.N.D.I.A.](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Indian_National_Developmental_Inclusive_Alliance) alliance was formed on 18th July 2023, as a big-tent political alliance to contest the [next Indian general election](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Next_Indian_general_election) against the incumbent [Bharatiya Janata Party](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Bharatiya_Janata_Party) government, led by [Narendra Modi](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Narendra_Modi).
The alliance brings together parties from across the political spectrum, several of whom have been former rivals. In contrast to the BJP-led [NDA](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/National_Democratic_Alliance), the alliance lacks a coherent ideological inclination. This has caused friction in the recent past. For instance, the son of the leader of the DMK made a remark calling for the eradication of [Sanatana Dharma](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/San%C4%81tana_Dharma), which drew flak from several parties within the alliance. Seat sharing is also a significant issue. For instance, legislators from the AAP and the INC in the state of Punjab have shown resistance to contesting elections together. The appeal of alliance with the BJP is also a factor, and has contributed to splits in the [Shiv Sena](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Shiv_Sena) and the [Nationalist Congress Party](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Nationalist_Congress_Party) in the recent past. These are some factors that could mitigate a split within the I.N.D.I.A. alliance before the next general election. As such, India has had a history of poor coalition unity, as regional parties routinely switch loyalties, often for perceived political gains.
The next general election is expected to take place [between April and May of 2024](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Next_Indian_general_election).
Resolution Criteria: This question will resolve as Yes, if before the first vote cast for the next Indian general election, at least 75% of contesting [Lok Sabha](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Lok_Sabha) candidates from any one of the [Indian National Congress](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Indian_National_Congress), the [Aam Aadmi Party](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Aam_Aadmi_Party), the [Communist Party of India (Marxist)](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Communist_Party_of_India_(Marxist)), the [All India Trinamool Congress](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Trinamool_Congress), the [Janata Dal (United)](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Janata_Dal_(United)), the [Samajwadi Party](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Samajwadi_Party) or the [Dravida Munnetra Kazhagam](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Dravida_Munnetra_Kazhagam) (who are members of these parties as of 01/10/2023), do not contest under the I.N.D.I.A. alliance. If the I.N.D.I.A. factionalizes into 2 or more constituents, with the largest constituent not having at least 25% of contesting Lok Sabha candidates from each of the above parties, this question will also resolve as Yes.
Fine Print: The question will also resolve as Yes, if the I.N.D.I.A. alliance ceases to exist before the first vote cast for the next Indian general election. (A name change would not qualify as "ceasing to exist") "Largest" faction is defined as the faction with the highest number of current [Lok Sabha MPs](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Member_of_Parliament,_Lok_Sabha) considering themselves to be members of that faction.
|
2023-10-14T18:36:00Z
|
2024-03-31T18:30:00Z
|
2024-08-16T16:20:00Z
|
yes
|
METACULUS
|
meta-19104
|
Will Ukraine have de facto control of the Tokmak railway station on January 1, 2024?
|
Tokmak is a city in the Zaporizhzhia Oblast in Ukraine. It has a population of nearly 30,000. At the time of writing, it lies about 20km from the frontlines. The general purportedly leading Ukraine’s counteroffensive has said that liberating Tokmak is "[the minimum goal](https://www.cnn.com/2023/09/23/europe/ukraine-biggest-counteroffensive-to-come-intl-hnk/index.html)” of the Ukrainian counteroffensive that started in June, 2023.
Resolution Criteria: This question will resolve as Yes if, on January 1, 2024, the Institute for the Study of War's map shows the Velikiy Tokmak railway station in Tokmak ([47.234273433498416, 35.71907485774982](https://maps.app.goo.gl/hXQ4a9me5Pa8HwsF6)) as not under either "assessed Russian advance" or "assessed Russian control". Notably, the railway station is on the southern end of the town.
If the ISW ceases to publish this information or changes the naming conventions for the assessed territory, then Metaculus will decide according to information provided by ISW or other credible sources.
If, at the time of resolution, the Velikiy Tokmak railway station no longer stands at its current location or is fully destroyed, then this question will be resolved based on control of the area where the building was located on the 21st of February 2022, the [latest Google Earth image of the station available](https://earth.google.com/web/search/Velikij+Tokmak,+Zaporizhia+Oblast,+Ukraine/@47.23426725,35.71898701,75.01197177a,56.57951574d,35y,-0h,0t,0r/data=CigiJgokCbv42hx1n0dAESVTG6RZnEdAGR4NbapO30FAITn22SZL1kFAOgMKATA) at the time of writing.
|
2023-10-06T22:46:00Z
|
2023-12-31T19:00:00Z
|
2023-12-31T22:00:00Z
|
no
|
METACULUS
|
meta-19102
|
Will Gary Gensler be subpoenaed by Congress before 2025?
|
On September 27, 2023, the House Financial Services Committee, chaired by Patrick McHenry, conducted an oversight hearing of the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC), featuring testimony from SEC Chairman Gary Gensler. McHenry and the Committee Republicans criticized Gensler for what they perceived as a reckless approach to rulemaking, a disregard for capital formation, a crusade against digital assets, and unresponsiveness to Congressional oversight.
Before the hearing, Committee Republicans had sent a letter to Gensler, demanding a halt on finalizing or implementing interrelated rulemakings until their cumulative impacts were evaluated. They sought sufficient time for public and market participants to respond and comply with new regulations.
McHenry expressed frustration over what he saw as Gensler's failure to address concerns raised during his last appearance before the Committee, five months prior. He criticized the SEC’s approach to rulemaking, accusing it of jeopardizing market integrity and putting investors at risk. McHenry called for comprehensive economic analysis of proposed rules and criticized the Commission for not adequately assessing their interplay and cumulative impact.
McHenry also accused Gensler of failing to prioritize capital formation and criticized his approach to digital assets, which he believed had created confusion and harm. He mentioned bipartisan efforts in Congress to provide clear regulations for digital assets and criticized Gensler’s lack of transparency regarding interactions with FTX and Sam Bankman-Fried.
Furthermore, McHenry expressed dissatisfaction with the SEC’s lack of responsiveness to the Committee’s oversight and document requests. He warned Gensler that the Committee’s patience was wearing thin and raised the possibility of issuing a subpoena to the SEC if cooperation did not improve.
McHenry concluded by reminding Gensler of the potential lasting consequences of his actions on the SEC’s reputation, emphasizing that while Gensler’s tenure may be temporary, the repercussions of his actions could be permanent for the agency.
A subpoena of Gary Gensler by Congress would be a formal process aimed at gathering information or investigating specific matters related to the SEC’s mandate or actions. The process would involve preparation, testimony, potential scrutiny, and possible follow-up actions, with the potential to influence regulatory practices and policies.
McHenry Questions Gensler at Hearing to Conduct Oversight of the SEC: <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=UgvKYYeXhUQ>
Oversight of the Securities and Exchange Commission: <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=7tnv9MRh0GM>
US House committee leadership threatens to subpoena SEC over FTX docs:
<https://cointelegraph.com/news/house-committee-threatens-subpoena-ftx-documents>
Resolution Criteria: This question resolves as Yes if, before January 1st 2025, a statement appears on the official SEC website (<https://www.sec.gov>) stating that a subpoena by a congressional committee or subcommittee has been issued to Gary Gensler, formally requesting his testimony or documents related to a specific inquiry or investigation.
|
2023-10-11T02:05:00Z
|
2025-01-01T00:00:00Z
|
2025-01-05T21:56:00Z
|
no
|
METACULUS
|
meta-19089
|
Before October 1, 2023, will US Senator Bob Menendez announce that he is resigning?
|
[Bob Menendez](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Bob_Menendez), a Democratic U.S. Senator from New Jersey, has had a long-standing political career, serving in the Senate since 2006. Before his tenure in the Senate, Menendez held various other political positions, including serving in the House of Representatives from 1993 to 2006.
On September 22, 2023, Menendez was federally indicted on bribery charges along with his wife, Nadine Menendez. The [Department of Justice alleges](https://www.justice.gov/usao-sdny/pr/us-senator-robert-menendez-his-wife-and-three-new-jersey-businessmen-charged-bribery) that Menendez and his wife were indicted for accepting bribes from three New Jersey businessmen, Wael Hana, Jose Uribe, and Fred Daibes:
>accepted hundreds of thousands of dollars of bribes from HANA, URIBE, and DAIBES in exchange for MENENDEZ’s agreement to use his official position to protect and enrich them and to benefit the Government of Egypt. Among other things, MENENDEZ agreed and sought to pressure a senior official at the U.S. Department of Agriculture in an effort to protect a business monopoly granted to HANA by Egypt, disrupt a criminal case undertaken by the New Jersey Attorney General’s Office related to associates of URIBE, and disrupt a federal criminal prosecution brought by the U.S. Attorney’s Office for the District of New Jersey against DAIBES.
A number of Senate Democrats have recently called for Menendez to resign, including a call [on September 26 from Senator Cory Booker](https://www.cnn.com/2023/09/26/politics/menendez-calls-for-resignation-democratic-party-senate/index.html), who holds the other Senate seat from New Jersey.
Resolution Criteria: This question will resolve as **Yes** if, before October 1, 2023, US Senator Bob Menendez has announced that he will resign from his Senate seat.
Fine Print: * Menendez need not actually vacate his seat before October 1, 2023, only an announcement that he will resign is required.
* An announcement that he will not seek reelection does not qualify.
* The announcement must be unequivocal and not an announcement that he is considering resignation or similar.
|
2023-09-27T01:00:00Z
|
2023-09-30T22:00:00Z
|
2023-10-01T07:00:00Z
|
no
|
METACULUS
|
meta-19021
|
Will a major cyberattack, virus, worm, etc. that uses autonomously self-replicating LLMs in some important way occur before January 1st, 2025?
|
Note: This question is a stricter operationalization of [this other question](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/19020/llm-cyberattackvirusworm-before-2025/).
As large language models (LLMs) become widely adopted and increasingly powerful, AI and cybersecurity experts are [concerned](https://www.tomshardware.com/news/wormgpt-black-hat-llm) that LLMs could potentially be used in the execution of cyberattacks and the production of viruses and worms.
Furthermore, as LLMs gain autonomous capabilities as AI agents, such as in the case of AutoGPT and BabyAGI, there is the possibility that such attacks could occur more easily and more frequently.
This question asks whether a major cyberattack or significant virus or worm that uses autonomously self-replicating LLMs (copying weights from one computer to another without any human hacker intervening in between) will arise before 2025.
For the purpose of this question, a cyberattack, worm, or virus, will be considered major if any of the below scenarios occur as a result:
- At least one person is killed
- There is at least 10 million dollars worth of damage
- a medical facility, government facility, or company with a market value of at least 100 million dollars is unable to continue basic functions at any given point because of such a cyberattack, worm, or virus.
Resolution Criteria: This question will resolve positively if credible sources report that an autonomous and self-replicating LLM (that copies its weights from one computer to another without any human hacker intervening in between) has caused a major cyberattack, virus, or worm that results in any of the following:
- At least one person is killed
- There is at least 10 million dollars worth of damage
- a medical facility, government facility, or company with a market value of at least 100 million dollars is unable to continue basic functions at any given point because of such a cyberattack, worm, or virus.
If none of these scenarios occur before January 1st 2025, this question will resolve negatively.
|
2023-09-28T19:28:00Z
|
2024-12-31T20:00:00Z
|
2025-01-06T20:52:00Z
|
no
|
METACULUS
|
meta-19020
|
Will a major cyberattack, virus, worm, etc. that uses LLMs in some important way occur before January 1st, 2025?
|
Note: This question is a looser operationalization of [this other question](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/19021/autonomous-llm-attackvirusworm-before-2025/).
As large language models (LLMs) become widely adopted and increasingly powerful, AI and cybersecurity experts are [concerned](https://www.tomshardware.com/news/wormgpt-black-hat-llm) that LLMs could potentially be used in the execution of cyberattacks and the production of viruses and worms.
This question asks whether a major cyberattack or significant virus or worm that uses LLMs will arise before 2025.
For the purpose of this question, a cyberattack, worm, or virus, will be considered major if any of the below scenarios occur as a result:
- At least one person is killed
- There is at least 10 million dollars worth of damage
- a medical facility, government facility, or company with a market value of at least 100 million dollars is unable to continue basic functions at any given point because of such a cyberattack, worm, or virus.
Resolution Criteria: This question will resolve positively if credible sources report that a major cyberattack, virus, or worm that uses LLMs results in any of the following:
- At least one person is killed
- There is at least 10 million dollars worth of damage
- a medical facility, government facility, or company with a market value of at least 100 million dollars is unable to continue basic functions at any given point because of such a cyberattack, worm, or virus.
If none of these scenarios occur before January 1st 2025, this question will resolve negatively.
|
2023-09-28T19:28:00Z
|
2024-12-31T20:00:00Z
|
2024-12-31T22:00:00Z
|
no
|
METACULUS
|
meta-19019
|
Will a large language model (LLM) that is at least as capable as original GPT-4 be widely available for download before January 1st, 2025?
|
As large language models (LLMs) gain more impressive capabilities, there are increasing fears within the AI alignment community as well as the general public that these models could be misused to cause severely negative outcomes. While companies like OpenAI and Anthropic have kept their models closed, Meta has made its Llama 2 model open source.
This question asks if any LLMs as powerful as GPT-4 will be widely available for download before January 1st, 2025. There are multiple ways this could occur, both legal (open-source) and illegal (leaked models available on the dark web).
Because there is no perfect way to compare the capabilities of various LLMs, for the purpose of this question, an LLM will be determined to be as powerful as GPT-4 by a panel of experts.
[Here](https://cdn.openai.com/papers/gpt-4.pdf) is a paper that OpenAI released that discusses GPT-4's capabilities.
Resolution Criteria: This question will resolve positively if a panel of AI experts chosen by Metaculus concludes at any point before January 1st, 2025 that a model with capabilities at least as impressive as the original GPT-4 is widely available for download.
While there is no ideal way to compare the capabilities of various LLMs, this panel of experts will be called if credible reports arise that a powerful LLM believed to be as impressive as GPT-4 is widely available for download. This panel of experts will then determine if such an LLM meets the threshold to be considered as powerful as GPT-4.
|
2023-09-28T19:28:00Z
|
2024-12-31T20:00:00Z
|
2024-07-23T15:15:00Z
|
yes
|
METACULUS
|
meta-18860
|
Will Stepanakert / Khankendi be under de facto Azerbaijani control on September 30, 2023?
|
[Stepanakert, also known as Khankendi](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Stepanakert), is the largest city in the [Nagorno-Karabakh region](https://freedomhouse.org/country/nagorno-karabakh). The region is mostly ethnic Armenian, but is a *de jure* part of Azerbaijan, which has led to [continuous disputes and two wars](https://www.cfr.org/global-conflict-tracker/conflict/nagorno-karabakh-conflict).
The region is [accessible from Armenia via the Lachin corridor](https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-66852070):
<img src="https://ichef.bbci.co.uk/news/976/cpsprodpb/97A7/production/_131132883_armenia_azerbaijan_nagorno_karabakh_v8-nc.png.webp" alt="Description of image" />
Azerbaijan blockaded this route to Nagorno-Karabakh in December 2022, leading to [shortages](https://freedomhouse.org/country/nagorno-karabakh/freedom-world/2023) of food and medical supplies.
On September 19, 2023, Azerbaijan [launched an "anti-terror" operation](https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-66851975) in Nagorno-Karabakh and demanded "'illegal Armenian military formations' to hand over arms and dissolve their 'illegal regime'." Azerbaijan's actions were condemed by Western nations, including the United States, which [urged](https://www.state.gov/secretary-blinkens-call-with-azerbaijani-president-aliyev-16/) "Azerbaijan to cease military actions in Nagorno-Karabakh immediately and deescalate the situation."
Resolution Criteria: The question resolves **Yes** if, on September 30, 2023, the consensus of credible reports is that Stepanakert / Khankendi is under de facto Azerbaijani control. It resolves **No** if the consensus of credible reports is that Stepanakert / Khankendi is under control of the Republic of Nagorno-Karabakh/the Republic of Artsakh, or another breakaway entity. The question also resolves **No** if the consensus of credible reports is that control of the city is disputed.
The question resolves **Ambiguously** if there is no consensus of credible reports.
|
2023-09-20T14:00:00Z
|
2023-09-30T18:00:00Z
|
2023-10-02T20:57:00Z
|
yes
|
METACULUS
|
meta-18859
|
Will the UN Security Council adopt a resolution related to the Nagorno Karabakh conflict between Azerbaijan and Armenia before October 1, 2023?
|
On September 19, 2023, Azerbaijan [launched a military operation](https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-66852070) in Nagorno-Karabakh, a [breakaway region](https://www.cfr.org/global-conflict-tracker/conflict/nagorno-karabakh-conflict) that has been the location of ongoing conflict - and two wars - between Azerbaijan and neighboring Armenia.
<img src="https://ichef.bbci.co.uk/news/976/cpsprodpb/97A7/production/_131132883_armenia_azerbaijan_nagorno_karabakh_v8-nc.png.webp" alt="Description of image" />
Azerbaijan [dubbed its actions "anti-terrorist activities."](https://www.reuters.com/world/what-is-happening-between-armenia-azerbaijan-over-nagorno-karabakh-2023-09-19/) Armenia's Prime Minister [accused](https://oc-media.org/live-updates-stepanakert-under-fire-as-war-breaks-out-in-nagorno-karabakh/) Azerbaijan of trying to draw Armenia into a military conflict.
France condemned Azerbaijan's actions and [called for an emergency meeting of the UN Security Council](https://www.barrons.com/news/france-seeks-urgent-un-security-council-meeting-on-karabakh-fighting-7ec54484). Armenian media reported the meeting would [convene on September 21st](https://en.armradio.am/2023/09/20/un-security-council-to-hold-emergency-meeting-on-nagorno-karabakh-on-september-21/). A previous emergency meeting [in August](https://apnews.com/article/armenia-azerbaijan-nagornokarabakh-un-blockade-meeting-catastrophe-306273f542bba9b16d3f4cca57d4c8a8) did not result in a Security Council resolution.
Russia holds a permanent seat on the Security Council, and Russian peacekeeping troops are [in Nagorno-Karbakh](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/2023_Nagorno-Karabakh_clashes#Background). Historically Armenia has been one of Russia's closest allies, but last week Armenia conducted [joint drills with US soldiers](https://www.politico.eu/article/we-cant-rely-russia-protect-us-anymore-nikol-pashinyan-armenia-pm/). Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan told Politico:
> “Our strategy should be to try in this situation to maximally decrease our dependency on others. We want to have an independent country, a sovereign country, but we have to have ways to avoid ending up in the center of clashes between West and East, North and South … There cannot be a case when Armenia becomes a ‘proxy.’ This is not permissible.”
Resolution Criteria: The question resolves **Yes** if the UN Security Council [adopts a resolution](https://www.un.org/securitycouncil/content/resolutions-adopted-security-council-2023) related to the [2023 Nagorno-Karabakh clashes](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/2023_Nagorno-Karabakh_clashes) before October 1, 2023. A Security Council resolution that does not mention Nagorno-Karabakh, but mentions both Armenia and Azerbaijan, will also be sufficient for a **Yes** resolution.
|
2023-09-20T14:00:00Z
|
2023-09-30T18:00:00Z
|
2023-10-01T16:48:00Z
|
no
|
METACULUS
|
meta-18857
|
Will a second round of voting be held in the 2024 Finnish presidential elections?
|
[According to Wikipedia](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/2024_Finnish_presidential_election):
>Presidential elections are expected to be held in Finland on Sunday, 28 January 2024, with a possible second round on Sunday, 11 February 2024.
The President is elected by a direct vote, if necessary in two rounds. If one of the candidates receives more than half of the (approved) votes cast in the election, he/she is elected President. If none of the candidates has received a majority of the votes cast, a new election shall be held between the two candidates who received most votes in the first election. The candidate receiving most votes in the second round is elected President.
The Constituency Electoral Committee of Helsinki confirmed the final nomination of candidates on 21 December 2023.
General information about on the presidential elections from the Finnish MOJ:
<https://vaalit.fi/en/presidential-election>
Schedule for the 2024 presidential election from the Finnish MOJ:
<https://vaalit.fi/en/schedule-in-the-presidential-election>
Resolution Criteria: This question will resolve as **Yes**, if following the first round of the presidential election on January 28, 2024, the Finnish government declares that none of the candidates received more than half of the votes cast and that a second election between the two candidates who received the most votes will be held.
|
2024-01-17T15:30:00Z
|
2024-01-28T18:00:00Z
|
2024-01-28T21:34:00Z
|
yes
|
METACULUS
|
meta-18854
|
Will a vote on a Republican-introduced resolution to vacate the Speaker of the House be held before October 1, 2023?
|
*See the previous edition of this question [here](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/14483/gop-member-calls-speaker-vote-before-july/).*
---
[Kevin McCarthy](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Kevin_McCarthy) was elected Speaker of the US House of Representatives [on January 7, 2023](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/2023_Speaker_of_the_United_States_House_of_Representatives_election), after [15 ballots](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/14379/-ballot-rounds-to-elect-us-house-speaker/), the first time since 1923 an election for Speaker required more than one ballot. The contentious election and [concessions to the House Freedom Caucus](https://www.brookings.edu/blog/fixgov/2023/01/10/mccarthy-paid-a-steep-price-for-his-speakership-now-what/) — including rules that allow any member of the House to [call for a vote](https://www.nbcnews.com/politics/congress/speaker-of-the-house-ousted-motion-to-vacate-rcna64902) that would oust the Speaker by simple majority — have weakened his position as Speaker.
The rules for the House of Representatives of the 118th Congress adopt [those of the 117th Congress](https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/GPO-CLERK-RULE-PAMPHLET-117/xml/GPO-CLERK-RULE-PAMPHLET-117.xml) with some amendments. The relevant portion of the rules is Rule IX, the text of which is quoted below. The [amended rules](https://www.congress.gov/bill/118th-congress/house-resolution/5/text) remove subparagraph (3) of clause 2(a) (shown in bold).
>1\. Questions of privilege shall be, first, those affecting the rights of the House collectively, its safety, dignity, and the integrity of its proceedings; and second, those affecting the rights, reputation, and conduct of Members, Delegates, or the Resident Commissioner, individually, in their representative capacity only.
>
>2\. (a)(1) A resolution reported as a question of the privileges of the House, or offered from the floor by the Majority Leader or the Minority Leader as a question of the privileges of the House, or offered as privileged under clause 1, section 7, article I of the Constitution, shall have precedence of all other questions except motions to adjourn. A resolution offered from the floor by a Member, Delegate, or Resident Commissioner other than the Majority Leader or the Minority Leader as a question of the privileges of the House shall have precedence of all other questions except motions to adjourn only at a time or place, designated by the Speaker, in the legislative schedule within two legislative days after the day on which the proponent announces to the House an intention to offer the resolution and the form of the resolution. Oral announcement of the form of the resolution may be dispensed with by unanimous consent.
>
>(2) The time allotted for debate on a resolution offered from the floor as a question of the privileges of the House shall be equally divided between (A) the proponent of the resolution, and (B) the Majority Leader, the Minority Leader, or a designee, as determined by the Speaker.
>
>**(3) A resolution causing a vacancy in the Office of Speaker shall not be privileged except if offered by direction of a party caucus or conference.**
>
>(b) A question of personal privilege shall have precedence of all other questions except motions to adjourn.
On September 19, 2023, journalist Matt Laslo claimed to have discovered a draft motion to vacate the office of Speaker of the House in a bathroom in the US Capitol, with [Matt Gaetz](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Matt_Gaetz) as the member to submit the resolution.
Resolution Criteria: This question resolves as **Yes** if, before October 1, 2023, a member of the Republican Party introduces a resolution to remove Kevin McCarthy as Speaker of the House and a vote on the resolution is held. Both the introduction of the resolution and the vote must occur before October 1, 2023. Otherwise this question resolves as **No**. The outcome of the vote and any such resolutions introduced by representatives who are not Republicans are irrelevant for the purposes of this question.
|
2023-09-20T14:30:00Z
|
2023-09-30T22:00:44.757000Z
|
2023-10-01T07:00:00Z
|
no
|
METACULUS
|
meta-18739
|
Will the UK and India have signed an FTA before the next UK General Election?
|
The UK and India are pursuing a Free Trade Agreement (FTA). While both sides are keen to sign a deal (for political and economic reasons), there are some sticking points (on issues like IP, migration, digital), and FTAs generally take quite a long time (3-10 years) to negotiate. From the UK PM Rishi Sunak's perspective, getting a deal signed before the next General Election could be politically useful.
[UK-India FTA, UK Parliamentary Committee](https://publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm5803/cmselect/cmintrade/77/report.html)
There is no firm date for the next UK General Election, but it has to take place (by law) by the end of January 2025. Many experts believe it will most likely be between May-November 2024.
Resolution Criteria: This question will resolve positively if reliable news sources report that a Free Trade Agreement has been signed by a representative from the UK Government and a representative from the Indian Government. This must be called a Free Trade Agreement, as defined by the World Trade Organization, and not another kind of agreement. This agreement does not have to be ratified to resolve positively, just signed.
|
2023-09-22T19:24:00Z
|
2025-01-31T12:00:00Z
|
2024-07-04T17:48:00Z
|
no
|
METACULUS
|
meta-18716
|
Will Donald Trump be removed or blocked from the primary election ballot of any U.S. state for a federal office under Section 3 of the 14th Amendment?
|
*This question is modeled on [this Metaculus question](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/18606/trump-removed-or-blocked-from-the-ballot/), but asks instead about the possibility of Trump's removal from primary election ballots.*
The 14th Amendment to the U.S. Constitution has a section known as the "Disqualification Clause" or Section 3, which may disqualify individuals from holding federal or state office if they have "engaged in insurrection or rebellion against the [U.S.], or given aid or comfort to the enemies thereof." Given the events surrounding the January 6, 2021, riot at the U.S. Capitol, this section has become a subject of considerable debate with respect to former President Donald Trump's eligibility to run for federal office again.
In New Hampshire, Bryant "Corky" Messner, an attorney who ran for U.S. Senate in 2020 with Trump's endorsement, has [expressed intentions to file a legal challenge](https://www.forbes.com/sites/alisondurkee/2023/08/29/trump-14th-amendment-new-hampshire-gop-feuds-as-states-grapple-with-disqualifying-trump-from-ballot/?sh=70038b512e9a) questioning Trump's 2024 candidacy under Section 3 of the 14th Amendment. The Republican Secretary of State of New Hampshire, David Scanlan, while not actively seeking to remove any candidates, has stated that he will seek legal advice on the issue. Additionally, Michigan’s Democratic Secretary of State Jocelyn Benson has indicated that she will seek a legal opinion on this matter. Voters have also filed lawsuits in Florida and Michigan on the issue. Legal battles are widely expected, and these disputes might reach the U.S. Supreme Court.
This question focuses on whether these and similar ongoing discussions and legal challenges will result in Donald Trump being removed from the primary election ballot of any state for a federal office under Section 3 of the 14th Amendment by July 15th, 2024, the planned start of the 2024 Republican National Convention.
Resolution Criteria: This question will resolve as "Yes" if, *on* July 15, 2024:
Donald Trump has been officially removed or blocked from the primary election ballot of any U.S. state for a federal office (President, Senate, House of Representatives) under the grounds of Section 3 of the 14th Amendment.
The removal or block is confirmed through official state government announcements, court decisions, legal documentation, or credible media reports. Speculative reports, opinion pieces, or unofficial announcements will not suffice for resolution.
The question will resolve as "No" if these conditions are not met as of July 15, 2024.
Note: The question does not account for legal battles, appeals, or subsequent reversals that might occur *after* the mentioned date. It strictly pertains to whether Donald Trump has been removed from any state's primary election ballot for a federal office under the specified grounds as of July 15, 2024. If Trump is removed or blocked from a ballot and then reinstated, such that as of July 15th he is not removed or blocked from any ballot, the question resolves negatively.
|
2023-09-12T21:24:00Z
|
2024-07-14T17:00:00Z
|
2024-07-16T01:00:00Z
|
no
|
METACULUS
|
meta-18696
|
Will the US pass the Unidentified Anomalous Phenomena (UAP) Disclosure Act of 2023 before October 1, 2023?
|
The [Unidentified Anomalous Phenomena (UAP) Disclosure Act of 2023](https://www.democrats.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/uap_amendment.pdf) is an extraordinary piece of legislation which contains the following passages:
> NON-HUMAN INTELLIGENCE.—The term ‘‘non-human intelligence’’ means any sentient intelligent non-human lifeform regardless of nature or ultimate origin that may be presumed responsible for unidentified anomalous phenomena or of which the Federal Government has become aware.
> ...
>TECHNOLOGIES OF UNKNOWN ORIGIN.— The term ‘‘technologies of unknown origin’’ means any materials or meta-materials, ejecta, crash de- bris, mechanisms, machinery, equipment, assemblies or sub-assemblies, engineering models or processes, damaged or intact aerospace vehicles, and damaged or intact ocean-surface and undersea craft associated with unidentified anomalous phenomena or incorporating science and technology that lacks prosaic attribution or known means of human manufacture.
> ...
> SEC. ll10. DISCLOSURE OF RECOVERED TECHNOLOGIES OF UNKNOWN ORIGIN AND BIOLOGICAL EVIDENCE OF NON-HUMAN INTELLIGENCE.
Introduced on a [bipartisan basis](https://www.nytimes.com/2023/07/13/us/politics/ufo-records-schumer.html), it passed the US Senate as part of the 2023 National Defense Authorization Act. It now awaits action in the House, pending the end of the federal fiscal year on September 30, 2023.
Resolution Criteria: The question resolves **Yes** if the US Congress passes, and President Biden signs, a bill which includes the language of the proposed [Unidentified Anomalous Phenomena (UAP) Disclosure Act of 2023](https://www.democrats.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/uap_amendment.pdf). The bill must be signed into law by the end of the day on September 30, 2023, the end of the current federal fiscal year, for a **Yes** resolution to occur.
The Disclosure Act may be contained within another bill. For instance, the language is currently part of the 2023 National Defense Authorization Act. If that bill passes, with the Disclosure Act language intact, the question resolves **Yes**.
The question may resolve **Yes** if amendments are made to the proposed language, as long as the following core components remain in the legislation:
- Definitions of "non-human intelligence" and "technologies of unknown origin," or similarly equivalent phrases
- References to objects which lack prosaic attribution due to performance characteristics and properties not previously known to be achievable based upon commonly accepted physical principles.
- A requirement that the US government have eminent domain over recovered technologies of unknown origin and biological evidence of non-human intelligence
- The creation of an independent agency that will rule on disclosure of pertinent items
Fine Print: In the event of amendments, Metaculus administrators may use judgement in evaluating whether the core component remain in the legislation.
|
2023-09-13T16:00:00Z
|
2023-09-30T18:00:00Z
|
2023-10-01T16:55:00Z
|
no
|
METACULUS
|
meta-18695
|
Will Erling Haaland score the most goals in the 2023/24 Premier League season?
|
Erling Haaland plays for Manchester City, a football team which competes in a number of competitions, including the Premier League.
Resolution Criteria: The question resolves **Yes** if Erling Haaland is the player with the largest number of goals after each of the 20 PL teams plays their 38th game of the 2023/24 season, [according to Oracle Cloud via the PL website](https://www.premierleague.com/stats/top/players/goals?se=578)
|
2023-09-26T22:20:00Z
|
2024-05-19T17:59:00Z
|
2024-05-20T01:30:00Z
|
yes
|
METACULUS
|
meta-18693
|
Will Donald Trump participate in the 2nd Republican primary debate?
|
The Republican primary debates are an opportunity for candidates to present themselves to US voters.
As of the creation of this question, the Republican field has a lot of candidates hoping to secure the nomination from the DNC.
The current polling favorite is Donald Trump, with 50%+ [average polling](https://projects.fivethirtyeight.com/polls/president-primary-r/2024/national/), with Ron Desantis, Nikki Haley and Vivek Ramaswamy and others hoping to increase their percentages. This polling advantage has likely encouraged Trump to skip the first Republican debate on August 23rd 2023.
As a result however, it appears that according to several media sources such as FiveThirtyEight, Trump has [lost some support in the GOP primary](https://fivethirtyeight.com/features/after-an-eventful-month-trump-has-lost-support-in-the-gop-primary/).
In the first debate, Trump participated in an interview with Tucker Carlson on X (twitter), and his mughshot was posted by the Fulton County Jail department, which allowed him to dominate the headlines, potentially taking media attention away from other GOP candidates. However, the next time around, he may not be subject to major news events, therefore risking his fall into the background after the 2nd debate.
It's possible to assume that considering the relative fractionalization of the Republican voter base, the more debates Trump doesn't show up, the more GOP voters and party get used to considering an alternative candidate.
This raises the question, "Will Trump participate in the 2nd Republican presidential debate on September 27th?"
Resolution Criteria: This question resolves **Yes** if Donald Trump is on the debate stage as a participant for the second Republican presidential debate on September 27th, 2023.
Fine Print: If the date of the debate is moved, or if the scheduled debate is cancelled, the question resolves based on whether Trump participates in the second debate of the 2024 presidential election season that is [sanctioned by the Republican National Committee](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/2024_Republican_Party_presidential_debates_and_forums#:~:text=The%20Republican%20National%20Committee%20(RNC,official%20RNC%2Dsanctioned%20primary%20debates.)).
If the second debate is not held, the question is annulled.
|
2023-09-13T20:36:00Z
|
2023-09-28T10:00:00Z
|
2023-09-28T04:00:00Z
|
no
|
METACULUS
|
meta-18690
|
Will the Black Sea grain deal be revived before October 1, 2023?
|
*The background has been copied and updated from [this previous question](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/17554/black-sea-grain-deal-extended-in-july-2023/).*
Following the [Russian invasion of Ukraine](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Russian_invasion_of_Ukraine) both countries agreed to the [Black Sea Grain Initiative](https://unctad.org/news/black-sea-grain-initiative-what-it-and-why-its-important-world), which [Wikipedia describes as follows](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Black_Sea_Grain_Initiative):
>The Russian invasion of Ukraine in February [2022] led to a complete halt of maritime grain shipments from Ukraine, previously a major exporter via the Black Sea. Additionally Russia temporarily halted its grain exports, further exacerbating the situation. This resulted in a rise in world food prices and the threat of famine in lower-income countries, and accusation that Russia weaponizing food supplies. To address the issue, discussions began in April, hosted by Turkey (which controls the maritime routes from the Black Sea) and supported by the UN. The resulting agreement was signed in Istanbul on 22 July 2022, valid for a period of 120 days. The July agreement created procedures to safely export grain from certain ports to attempt to address the 2022 food crisis. A joint coordination and inspection center was set up in Turkey, with the UN serving as secretariat.
>
> . . .
>
>The original agreement was set to expire on 19 November 2022. Russia suspended its participation in the agreement for several days due to a drone attack on Russian naval ships elsewhere in the Black Sea, but rejoined following mediation. On 17 November 2022, the UN and Ukraine announced that the agreement had been extended for a further 120 days. In March 2023, Turkey and the UN announced that they secured a second extension for at least another 60 days. In May 2023, the deal was once again extended for 60 days, expiring on 18 July.
The grain deal [expired in July](https://news.un.org/en/story/2023/07/1138752) after Russia withdrew. In early September, Türkiye (formerly Turkey) [has been in talks](https://www.npr.org/2023/09/04/1197544117/russia-ukraine-grain-deal-turkey) with Russia to revive the deal, though as of September 7, 2023, Russian President Vladimir Putin has so far held firm to demands such as only returning to the deal [when western nations lift restrictions on banking and logistics](https://www.npr.org/2023/09/04/1197544117/russia-ukraine-grain-deal-turkey).
Resolution Criteria: This question will resolve as **Yes** if, before October 1, 2023, [credible sources](https://www.metaculus.com/help/faq/#definitions) report that the Black Sea Grain Initiative has been reinstated. To qualify, both Ukraine and Russia must agree to the reinstatement; if it is reported that the deal has been reinstated but either Ukraine or Russia is no longer a party to the agreement then the question will resolve as **No**.
Fine Print: * This question will still resolve as **Yes** even if the reinstatement is reported to alter the [original terms](https://www.un.org/en/black-sea-grain-initiative/resources), so long as credible sources refer to the Black Sea Grain Initiative as being revived or reimplemented, even under a different name. If there are conflicting reports or statements Metaculus will rely primarily on official statements from the United Nations and may resolve the question as **Ambiguous** if the situation is unclear.
* This question will resolve as **No** if an agreement is announced but the start date of the renewed agreement is not before October 1, 2023.
|
2023-09-08T16:00:00Z
|
2023-09-30T22:00:28.449000Z
|
2023-10-01T00:00:00Z
|
no
|
METACULUS
|
meta-18684
|
Will a US spot Ethereum ETF be approved in 2023?
|
The potential for the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) to approve an exchange-traded fund (ETF) directly tracking the price of the cryptocurrency Ethereum has generated enthusiasm within the investment community. Such a product would offer conventional retail investors straightforward exposure to this emergent digital asset by trading on public stock exchanges like existing ETFs.
An SEC-approved Ethereum ETF would constitute a watershed moment for increased mainstream and institutional adoption of cryptocurrencies. By providing a regulated on-ramp for retail investors to gain price exposure to Ethereum, an ETF could rapidly multiply investment flows. The resulting supply-demand imbalance would likely apply significant appreciation pressure on ETH prices.
See <https://www.coindesk.com/business/2023/09/06/cathy-woods-ark-invest-files-for-first-spot-ether-etf/>
Resolution Criteria: This question resolves as Yes if a statement appears on the SEC's official website https://www.sec.gov/news/pressreleases stating that a US Ethereum spot ETF has been approved before January 1, 2024.
|
2023-09-08T21:44:00Z
|
2024-01-01T00:00:00Z
|
2024-01-01T17:03:00Z
|
no
|
METACULUS
|
meta-18681
|
Will a bill be introduced in the Indian Parliament to change the official name of the country to Bharat before September 23, 2023?
|
In early September, India issued invitations to a state dinner at the G20 summit, which it is hosting, that [referred to](https://www.theguardian.com/world/2023/sep/05/bharat-g20-invitation-fuels-rumours-india-may-change-name) the President of India, [Droupadi Murmu](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Droupadi_Murmu), as "president of Bharat". This sparked rumors that India may change its official name.
According to [the Guardian](https://www.theguardian.com/world/2023/sep/05/bharat-g20-invitation-fuels-rumours-india-may-change-name):
>[Indian Prime Minister [Narendra Modi](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Narendra_Modi)] himself typically refers to India as Bharat, a word dating back to ancient Hindu scriptures written in Sanskrit, and one of two official names for the country under its constitution.
>
>Members of his Hindu nationalist ruling party, Bharatiya Janata party (BJP), have previously campaigned against using the name India, which has its roots in western antiquity and was imposed during the British conquest.
>
>The government has called a special session of parliament for later in the month, but remains tight-lipped about its legislative agenda, but the broadcaster News18 said unnamed government sources had told it that BJP lawmakers would put forward a special resolution to give precedence to the name Bharat.
The special session of Parliament is scheduled to run from [September 18 to September 22](https://www.indiatoday.in/india/story/special-parliament-session-to-commence-on-september-18-to-move-to-new-building-2431746-2023-09-06).
Resolution Criteria: This question will resolve as **Yes** if, after September 7, 2023 and before September 23, 2023, [credible sources](https://www.metaculus.com/help/faq/#definitions) report that a bill has been introduced in the Parliament of India that would change the name of the country to Bharat. If India remains an official name in the proposed bill (including if the proposed bill would leave the wording referring to the official names in India's constitution unchanged) but the bill would make Bharat the more prominent official name to be used in most aspects of governance this would resolve as **Yes**. If such a bill would make the name India no longer an official name, leaving the name Bharat as the only official name, this question will also resolve as **Yes**.
|
2023-09-07T16:45:00Z
|
2023-09-22T22:00:00Z
|
2023-09-23T12:48:00Z
|
no
|
METACULUS
|
meta-18680
|
Will the United Auto Workers call a strike against any of the Big Three Detroit automakers before September 19, 2023?
|
The [United Auto Workers](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/United_Auto_Workers) (UAW) union represents [more than 400,000](https://uaw.org/about/) active members primarily [from](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/United_Auto_Workers) "autos and auto parts, health care, casino gambling, and higher education."
On August 25, 2023, following negotiations with the [Big Three US automobile manufacturers](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Big_Three_(automobile_manufacturers)), General Motors, Ford, and Stellantis (formerly Chrysler; all three are headquartered in Detroit) the [UAW announced](https://uaw.org/97-uaws-big-three-members-vote-yes-authorize-strike/) that
>the union’s strike authorization vote passed with near universal approval from the 150,000 union workers at Ford, General Motors and Stellantis. . . The vote does not guarantee a strike will be called, only that the union has the right to call a strike if the Big Three refuse to reach a fair deal.
The existing UAW contracts with the Big Three [expire at 11:59 PM on September 14](https://michiganadvance.com/2023/09/04/column-autoworkers-may-wage-a-historic-strike-against-the-detroit-3/).
Resolution Criteria: This question will resolve as **Yes** if, before September 19, 2023, [credible sources](https://www.metaculus.com/help/faq/#definitions) report that the United Auto Workers (UAW) union has announced that they have called a strike against one or more of the Big Three Detroit automakers: General Motors, Ford, or Stellantis.
Fine Print: * An announcement of a called strike is sufficient to resolve as **Yes**, even if the strike is later cancelled or delayed before taking place.
* A strike must be called by UAW to be sufficient, members of UAW conducting limited strikes that have not been called by UAW do not qualify.
* A strike authorization does not qualify, the strike must actually be called.
|
2023-09-07T16:45:00Z
|
2023-09-14T22:00:00Z
|
2023-09-15T09:56:00Z
|
yes
|
METACULUS
|
meta-18665
|
Will the US see a large-scale riot in 2023 or 2024?
|
[Incidents of civil unrest](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_incidents_of_civil_unrest_in_the_United_States) are not terribly uncommon in the United States, but large-scale rioting is quite rare. One of the most severe incidents in recent history was the [1992 Los Angeles riots](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/1992_Los_Angeles_riots), during which more than 60 people were killed, more than 2,350 people were injured, and more than 12,000 people were arrested.
A more recent, albeit less severe, example of a riot (or civil unrest) is the [January 6 United States Capitol attack](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/January_6_United_States_Capitol_attack) which cuminated in a coordinated attack on the US Capitol building by far-right, pro-Trump militias resulting in 5 deaths and injuries exceeding 100 persons.
This question asks: **Will the United States experience an incident of a large-scale riot in 2023 or 2024?**
Resolution Criteria: For the purposes of this question, 'large-scale riot' is defined as an event of rioting (large-scale disturbance of the peace by a violent crowd) or civil unrest in which any of the following conditions is met:
>1. At least 50 people die due to violence, either due to the actions of rioters or other civilians, or police, military, national guard, or other law enforcement or government agents.
>2. At least 10,000 people are arrested by police, military, national guard, or other law enforcement or government agents.
>3. Property damages are credibly estimated at $1 billion or more. This estimate may come from either the local government of the locality in which the incident takes place, the state government, the federal government, or a major US news publication such as the New York Times, Washington Post, or major broadcast news networks.
Such events should take place in a 100km radius, and within 14 days. As an example, the [1992 LA riots](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/1992_Los_Angeles_riots) would count, but rioting that is spread across all of California or that occurs in separate phases over a long time period would not count if no single incident met any of the above criteria.
Resolution should cite a government statement or credible news reports that indicate that any of the above conditions have been met by an event of rioting.
Fine Print: For the purposes of this question, the "United States" means the 50 states, the District of Columbia, and the 326 American Indian reservations. Civil unrest or rioting in [territories of the United States](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Territories_of_the_United_States) does not count.
|
2023-09-15T16:43:00Z
|
2025-01-01T00:00:00Z
|
2025-01-05T04:33:00Z
|
no
|
METACULUS
|
meta-18611
|
Will large language models become the state of the art for machine translation in 2023?
|
Large language models have established a new state of the art in several areas of natural language processing. It is possible that they will also be widely accepted as the state of the art for machine translation (MT) within the year.
Every year, the MT community compares the quality of research systems at the Conference on Machine Translation. The findings of the shared task on general-purpose MT are taken as an indicator of the current state of the art in MT.
Previous technological paradigm shifts have been reflected in the results of the shared task. For example, the [2016 shared task](https://aclanthology.org/W16-2301/) found that for the first time, end-to-end neural networks have become state of the art in MT.
System submissions for [this year's iteration of the General Machine Translation shared task](http://www2.statmt.org/wmt23/translation-task.html) were submitted in July 2023 and the results of the human evaluation will be presented on December 6–7, 2023. It is conceivable that the majority of language pairs will be won by submissions based on a large language model, which would once again represent a technological paradigm shift for MT.
List of language pairs that will be evaluated:
* Chinese to/from English
* German to/from English
* Hebrew to/from English
* Japanese to/from English
* Russian to/from English
* Ukrainian to/from English
* Czech to Ukrainian
* English to Czech
Resolution Criteria: This question resolves as **Yes** if the official results of the [WMT23 General Machine Translation Task](http://www2.statmt.org/wmt23/translation-task.html) show that for the majority of evaluated language pairs, the top cluster of systems contains a system that is directly based on a large language model.
Fine Print: - In the context of this question, a **large language model** (LLM) is defined as a decoder-only causal language model with at least 7 billion parameters that has been pre-trained primarily on natural language text.
- A system submission is **directly based on an LLM** if it is publicly known that the submitted translations have been generated by an LLM. Approaches such as distillation from an LLM or re-ranking by an LLM are therefore not considered to be directly based on an LLM.
- The **official results** will be published in a paper entitled "Findings of the 2023 Conference on Machine Translation (WMT23)" or similar, which are expected to appear in the Proceedings of the Eighth Conference on Machine Translation (WMT) in the first half of 2024. In the previous years, the official results have been presented in one or more tables with the caption "Official results ...".
- The **top cluster of systems** is identified by grouping systems together that significantly outperform all the other systems in lower ranking clusters, according to a Wilcoxon rank-sum test. In the previous years, the top cluster of systems was denoted with "Rank 1" in the table of official results.
- This question considers the "unconstrained track", i.e., the resources that systems can use are not constrained.
- The **majority of evaluated language pairs** is at least half of the language pairs in the official results. The "to" and "from" directions are treated as two separate language pairs. As of August 30, 2023, the organizers plan to evaluate 14 language pairs, so the majority would be at least 7. If fewer or more pairs will be evaluated, the majority will change accordingly.
- If the official results of the shared task have not been published by the resolve date or if they do not contain significance tests, the question resolves as **Ambiguous**.
|
2023-09-07T22:38:00Z
|
2023-11-30T11:00:00Z
|
2023-12-06T15:57:00Z
|
yes
|
METACULUS
|
meta-18609
|
Will France send their military to intervene in the Gabonese coup in 2023?
|
The Gabonese military has announced a [coup](https://www.aljazeera.com/news/liveblog/2023/8/30/gabon-crisis-live-news-soldiers-seize-power-cancel-election-result) in the wake of Ali Bongo's election victory this month.
Ali Bongo has been placed under house arrest following military leaders appearing on TV channel Gabon 24 saying, “We have decided to defend peace by putting an end to the current regime.”
The coup in the former French colony has followed a string of other coups in Africa this year.
France has adjusted its foreign policy towards former colonies in the past years, taking a less active role.
Resolution Criteria: This question will resolve as **Yes** if, before January 1, 2024, the French government announces that it is taking military action in Gabon to intervene against the coup and [credible sources](https://www.metaculus.com/help/faq/#definitions) report that French soldiers are undertaking such a military operation within the borders of Gabon. This includes military aid or support to other organizations like ECOWAS acting against the coup.
|
2023-09-08T19:22:00Z
|
2023-12-31T23:59:00Z
|
2023-12-31T23:00:00Z
|
no
|
METACULUS
|
meta-18607
|
Will Chevron reach an agreement with the Offshore Alliance to end or prevent industrial actions before September 25, 2023?
|
On August 28, 2023, [Offshore Alliance](https://offshorealliance.org.au/) — an Australian workers union — [announced](https://www.facebook.com/permalink.php?story_fbid=pfbid02DaBqp3BcYqVEijr9oDG42VipbFACwhE16F8KLThtDpAJKmwrLhhabcesJDARmJ1ol&id=100063786371409) that they had notified the oil company [Chevron](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Chevron_Corporation) that the union would be commencing industrial actions [beginning on September 7, 2023](https://maritime-executive.com/article/union-members-authorize-september-strike-at-chevron-australia-s-lng-ops). Under Australia's [Fair Work Act](https://www.fwc.gov.au/issues-we-help/industrial-action/types-industrial-action) employees may take protected [industrial actions](https://www.fairwork.gov.au/tools-and-resources/fact-sheets/rights-and-obligations/industrial-action), such as strikes, go-slows, or protests, when certain conditions are met.
Offshore Alliance announced that the industrial actions would affect three of Chevron's sites in western Australia: Gorgon, Wheatstone downstream, and Wheatstone platform facilities.
Resolution Criteria: This question will resolve as **Yes** if, before September 25, 2023, [credible sources](https://www.metaculus.com/help/faq/#definitions) report that Chevron and Offshore Alliance have reached an agreement which either avoids the commencement of industrial actions currently scheduled for September 7th or ends the industrial actions after they have begun.
Fine Print: * If Chevron and Offshore Alliance reach an agreement to delay the commencement of industrial actions until after September 25, 2023, for any reason, this question will resolve as **Yes**.
* A limited end to industrial actions, such as at one of the three Australian Chevron facilities, does not qualify. Only a broad agreement between Offshore Alliance and Chevron that avoids or ends the industrial actions qualifies.
* An announced agreement that ends or avoids the industrial actions is sufficient to resolve as **Yes**, a full agreement, such as an Enterprise Bargaining Agreement, need not be agreed to or ratified.
* Both parties signing a contract that ends the industrial actions as described above, even one mandated by the government or other intermediator, will result in the question resolving as **Yes**.
|
2023-08-31T16:00:00Z
|
2023-09-24T22:00:00Z
|
2023-09-21T23:20:00Z
|
yes
|
METACULUS
|
meta-18606
|
Will Donald Trump be removed or blocked from the general ballot of any U.S. state for a federal office under Section 3 of the 14th Amendment?
|
The 14th Amendment to the U.S. Constitution has a section known as the "Disqualification Clause" or Section 3, which may disqualify individuals from holding federal or state office if they have "engaged in insurrection or rebellion against the [U.S.], or given aid or comfort to the enemies thereof." Given the events surrounding the January 6, 2021, riot at the U.S. Capitol, this section has become a subject of considerable debate with respect to former President Donald Trump's eligibility to run for federal office again.
In New Hampshire, Bryant "Corky" Messner, an attorney who ran for U.S. Senate in 2020 with Trump's endorsement, has [expressed intentions to file a legal challenge](https://www.forbes.com/sites/alisondurkee/2023/08/29/trump-14th-amendment-new-hampshire-gop-feuds-as-states-grapple-with-disqualifying-trump-from-ballot/?sh=70038b512e9a) questioning Trump's 2024 candidacy under Section 3 of the 14th Amendment. The Republican Secretary of State of New Hampshire, David Scanlan, while not actively seeking to remove any candidates, has stated that he will seek legal advice on the issue. Additionally, Michigan’s Democratic Secretary of State Jocelyn Benson has indicated that she will seek a legal opinion on this matter. Voters have also filed lawsuits in Florida and Michigan on the issue. Legal battles are widely expected, and these disputes might reach the U.S. Supreme Court.
This question focuses on whether these and similar ongoing discussions and legal challenges will result in Donald Trump being removed from the general election ballot of any state for a federal office under Section 3 of the 14th Amendment by November 5, 2024, the date of the presidential election.
**Note: This question focuses on removal from a general election ballot. Another question focuses on Trump's removal from a [primary ballot](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/18716/trump-removed-or-blocked-from-primary-ballot/).**
Resolution Criteria: This question will resolve as "Yes" if, *on* November 5, 2024:
Donald Trump has been officially removed or blocked from the *general election* ballot of any U.S. state for a federal office (President, Senate, House of Representatives) under the grounds of Section 3 of the 14th Amendment.
The removal or block is confirmed through official state government announcements, court decisions, legal documentation, or credible media reports. Speculative reports, opinion pieces, or unofficial announcements will not suffice for resolution.
The question will resolve as "No" if these conditions are not met on November 5, 2024.
Note: The question does not account for legal battles, appeals, or subsequent reversals that might occur *after* the mentioned date. It strictly pertains to whether Donald Trump has been removed from any state's general election ballot for a federal office under the specified grounds as of November 5, 2024. If Trump is removed or blocked from a general election ballot and then reinstated, such that as of November 5th he is not removed or blocked from any general election ballot, the question resolves negatively.
|
2023-08-31T19:44:00Z
|
2024-11-04T18:00:00Z
|
2024-11-05T17:43:00Z
|
no
|
METACULUS
|
meta-18548
|
Will Ursula von der Leyen be re-appointed as President of the European Commission following the 2024 European elections?
|
Ursula von der Leyen (DE/EPP) is the current President of the European Commission. The European Commission President is elected for a 5-year term by the European Parliament after European elections, meaning her term will end in 2024, coinciding with the 2024 European Parliament elections. The European Council proposes a candidate, usually from the largest political group in the Parliament, considering election results. The Parliament must approve the candidate by an absolute majority, and then the European Council officially appoints the new President.
Resolution Criteria: This question resolves yes if Ursula von der Leyen is officially appointed by the European Council as President of the European Commission after the European elections in June 2024 and before the end of the year 2024.
Resolves no if Von der Leyen is not appointed Commission President in 2024 (another candidate is appointed or negotiations continue beyond 2024).
|
2023-09-01T19:32:00Z
|
2024-12-31T11:00:00Z
|
2024-07-17T13:50:00Z
|
yes
|
METACULUS
|
meta-18535
|
Will the House Oversight Committee receive access to requested Joe Biden records related to Hunter Biden’s Ukraine dealings before September 1st?
|
House Committee on Oversight and Accountability Chairman James Comer has [requested](https://oversight.house.gov/release/comer-seeks-nara-records-revealing-how-then-vp-biden-mixed-official-government-duties-with-familys-influence-peddling/) that the National Archives and Records Administration (NARA) provide special access to then-Vice President Joe Biden’s records concerning his tenure and activities overlapping with his son’s dealings in Ukraine. This request pertains to unredacted documents and communications, specifically those in which then-Vice President Joe Biden used a pseudonym, along with several other associated names, and drafts of a specific speech made in December 2015.
The Committee is investigating meetings and communications between President Biden, certain family members, and their business associates during his tenure as Vice President. The Committee’s stated objective is to address potential deficiencies in the existing legal framework concerning ethics laws and disclosure of financial interests related to the immediate family of Vice Presidents and Presidents.
The House Oversight Committee claims to have evidence suggesting that the Biden family has been involved in schemes, essentially capitalizing on their 'brand', which reportedly garnered millions from foreign nationals.
The full text of the [letter](https://oversight.house.gov/release/comer-seeks-nara-records-revealing-how-then-vp-biden-mixed-official-government-duties-with-familys-influence-peddling/).
Resolution Criteria: This question will resolve as:
* "Yes" if, before September 1, 2023, there is official confirmation from either the National Archives and Records Administration (NARA), the Committee on Oversight and Accountability, or credible news sources, stating that the Committee on Oversight and Accountability was granted access to *any* of the records mentioned in Chairman James Comer's letter, *in response to the letter*. The phrase “unrestricted special access” does not need to appear.
Any subset of the following relevant documents, per Comer's letter, can be provided for positive resolution:
1. Complete, unredacted versions of all documents from Case Number 2023-0022-F;
2. Any document or communication in which a pseudonym for Vice President Joe Biden was included either as a sender, recipient, copied or was included in the contents of the document or communication, including but not limited to Robert Peters, Robin Ware, and JRB Ware;
3. Any document or communication in which Hunter Biden, Eric Schwerin, or Devon Archer was included either as a sender, recipient, copied, or was included in the contents of the document or communication; and
4. All drafts from November 1, 2015 to December 9, 2015 of then-Vice President Biden’s speech delivered to the Ukrainian Rada on December 9, 2015.
* "No" if, before September 1, 2023, no confirmation as described above appears or if there is confirmation that the request was denied.
|
2023-08-26T21:51:00Z
|
2023-08-30T17:00:00Z
|
2023-09-01T05:01:00Z
|
no
|
METACULUS
|
meta-18531
|
Will Yevgeny V. Prigozhin make a public appearance before 23 February 2024?
|
According to the [New York Times](https://www.nytimes.com/live/2023/08/23/world/prigozhin-russia-ukraine-war-news/prigozhin-chief-of-the-wagner-group-was-listed-among-the-passengers-of-a-business-jet-that-crashed?smid=url-share):
> Yevgeny V. Prigozhin, the founder of the Wagner mercenary group who staged a brief mutiny against Russia’s military leadership in June, was listed as a passenger on a plane that crashed Wednesday [23 August 2023], killing all 10 people aboard, according to Russian aviation authorities.
And further:
> Russian media have reported that the plane that crashed on Wednesday was an Embraer Legacy 600 business jet with the tail number RA-02795. Past news reports have linked the plane to Mr. Prigozhin and Wagner.
> Russian media reported that eight bodies had so far been recovered.
Resolution Criteria: This question will resolve as **Yes** if Yevgeny V. Prigozhin makes a public appearance at any time between 23 August 2023 to 23 February 2024, as reported by credible sources. If Prigozhin's dead body is identified before 23 February 2024, *or* if he does not make any public appearance in that time, this question will resolve as **No**.
|
2023-08-24T01:00:00Z
|
2024-02-23T20:00:00Z
|
2024-02-24T15:52:00Z
|
no
|
METACULUS
|
meta-18530
|
Will Yevgeny V. Prigozhin be confirmed to be dead before November 2023?
|
According to the [New York Times](https://www.nytimes.com/live/2023/08/23/world/prigozhin-russia-ukraine-war-news/prigozhin-chief-of-the-wagner-group-was-listed-among-the-passengers-of-a-business-jet-that-crashed?smid=url-share):
> Yevgeny V. Prigozhin, the founder of the Wagner mercenary group who staged a brief mutiny against Russia’s military leadership in June, was listed as a passenger on a plane that crashed Wednesday [23 August 2023], killing all 10 people aboard, according to Russian aviation authorities.
And further:
> Russian media have reported that the plane that crashed on Wednesday was an Embraer Legacy 600 business jet with the tail number RA-02795. Past news reports have linked the plane to Mr. Prigozhin and Wagner.
> Russian media reported that eight bodies had so far been recovered.
Resolution Criteria: This question will resolve as **Yes** if credible sources state before November 1, 2023 that Yevgeny V. Prigozhin is confirmed to be dead (due to any cause). This question will resolve as **No** if Prigozhin makes any public appearance before November 1, 2023, **or** if his health or whereabouts remain unconfirmed at that time.
|
2023-08-24T01:00:00Z
|
2023-10-31T19:00:00Z
|
2023-08-30T01:39:00Z
|
yes
|
METACULUS
|
meta-18525
|
Will a non-proprietary LLM be in the top 5 of the chat.lmsys.org leaderboard on September 30, 2023?
|
Chatbot Arena is a [benchmarking platform for large language models (LLMs)](https://lmsys.org/blog/2023-05-03-arena/). It uses an Elo rating system similar to the one used in chess to rank LLMs by their capabilities. Rankings are based on user ratings of different LLM systems.
As of August 22, 2023, the top five models on the leaderboard, as ranked by Elo, are all proprietary:
| Model | ⭐ Arena Elo rating | 📈 MT-bench (score) | MMLU | License |
|--------------------|--------------------|---------------------|------|--------------------|
| GPT-4 | 1206 | 8.99 | 86.4 | Proprietary |
| Claude-1 | 1166 | 7.9 | 77 | Proprietary |
| Claude-instant-1 | 1138 | 7.85 | 73.4 | Proprietary |
| Claude-2 | 1135 | 8.06 | 78.5 | Proprietary |
| GPT-3.5-turbo | 1122 | 7.94 | 70 | Proprietary |
| Vicuna-33B | 1096 | 7.12 | 59.2 | Non-commercial |
| Vicuna-13B | 1051 | 6.57 | 55.8 | Llama 2 Community |
| MPT-30B-chat | 1046 | 6.39 | 50.4 | CC-BY-NC-SA-4.0 |
| WizardLM-13B-v1.1 | 1040 | 6.76 | 50 | Non-commercial |
| Guanaco-33B | 1038 | 6.53 | 57.6 | Non-commercial |
Resolution Criteria: The question resolves **Yes** if, at noon ET on September 30, 2023, an LLM that is listed as having any non-proprietary license is listed in the top 5 models on the [chat.lmsys.org](https://chat.lmsys.org/?leaderboard) leaderboard.
The question resolves **No** if each of the top 5 models is listed as having a "proprietary" license.
The leaderboard will be sorted by "[Arena ELO rating](https://lmsys.org/blog/2023-05-03-arena/)."
|
2023-08-25T18:53:00Z
|
2023-09-30T15:00:00Z
|
2023-09-30T16:00:00Z
|
no
|
METACULUS
|
meta-18523
|
Will the WHO name BA.2.86 as a SARS-CoV-2 Variant of Interest before October 1, 2023?
|
According to [Nature](https://www.nature.com/articles/d41586-023-02656-9), "Researchers are racing to determine whether a highly mutated coronavirus variant that has popped up in three continents will be a global concern — or much ado about nothing."
On August 17th, the WHO labeled BA.2.86 a "Variant Under Monitoring," noting "mutations relative to putative ancestor BA.2" and "Only 3 sequences available. Added as VUM based on the large number of mutations identified."
WHO could designate BA.2.86 a "[Variant of Interest](https://www.who.int/publications/m/item/updated-working-definitions-and-primary-actions-for--sars-cov-2-variants)," a designation used for:
> - A SARS-CoV-2 variant with genetic changes that are predicted or known to affect virus characteristics such as transmissibility, virulence, antibody evasion, susceptibility to therapeutics and detectability; AND
> - identified to have a growth advantage over other circulating variants in more than one WHO region with increasing relative prevalence alongside increasing number of cases over time, or other apparent epidemiological impacts to suggest an emerging risk to global public health.
[Ars Technica reports](https://arstechnica.com/health/2023/08/ba-2-86-shows-just-how-risky-slacking-off-on-covid-monitoring-is/) that BA.2.86 has gained attention because of " 34 mutations in its spike gene relative to BA.2, the omicron sublineage from which it descended. This number of spike mutations between BA.2.86 and BA.2 is chillingly similar to the number of mutations seen between the original omicron (BA.1) and the ancestral Wuhan strain."
Resolution Criteria: This question resolves as **Yes** if, before October 1, 2023, the WHO lists BA.2.86 as a "Variant of Interest" on their ["Tracking SARS-CoV-2 variants" page](https://www.who.int/activities/tracking-SARS-CoV-2-variants).
Fine Print: For the purposes of this question, BA.2.86 includes any BA.2.86.x pango lineage. Variants that include genetic features of BA.2.86, but which are not classified as a BA.2.86.x pango lineages, are not sufficient for a Yes resolution.
|
2023-08-23T18:00:00Z
|
2023-09-30T18:00:00Z
|
2023-10-01T00:00:00Z
|
no
|
METACULUS
|
meta-18437
|
Will Hawaiian Electric Company file for bankruptcy before 2025?
|
Hawaiian Electric Company, Inc., is owned by Hawaiian Electric Industries, a holding company which also owns American Savings Bank. (See 2022 annual report pdf [here](https://s2.q4cdn.com/268623243/files/doc_financials/2022/ar/Hawaiian-Electric-2022-Annual-Report.pdf)).
The August 2023 wildfires in Lahaina, Hawaii killed at least 106 people, according to the latest [update](https://www.mauicounty.gov/CivicAlerts.aspx?AID=12710) from the County of Maui. A class-action lawsuit alleges that the electric company “chose not to deenergize their power lines during the High Wind Watch and Red Flag Warning conditions for Maui before the Lahaina Fire started." The stock price plunged 47% in the week following the fires, to a 13-year low. [(CNN story)](https://www.cnn.com/2023/08/14/investing/hawaiian-electric-maui-fires-lawsuit/index.html)
In an 8-K filed August 18, 2023, the company [stated](https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/46207/000035470723000071/exhibit991.htm) that although it is seeking advice from "various experts" including restructuring advisors, its "goal is not to restructure the company but to endure as a financially strong utility that Maui and this state need."
In recent years, other electric utility companies have gone bankrupt in the wake of disasters. California's largest utility, Pacific Gas and Electric, [filed](https://www.npr.org/2019/01/29/689591066/california-power-provider-pg-e-files-for-bankruptcy-in-wake-of-fire-lawsuits) bankruptcy in January 2019, following the Camp Fire of November 2018. The Brazos Electric Power Cooperative, which is the largest power cooperative in Texas, [filed](https://www.npr.org/2021/03/01/972408584/texas-energy-co-op-files-for-bankruptcy-after-storm-high-bill) for bankruptcy in March 2021, following the February 2021 Texas icestorm.
Resolution Criteria: This question will resolve as Yes if there is an 8-K filing stating that the entity filing with the SEC under the Central Index Key (CIK) number 46207 [(here)](https://www.sec.gov/edgar/browse/?CIK=46207&owner=exclude) has filed or intends to file a petition in bankruptcy court under Chapter 11 reorganization or Chapter 7 liquidation before January 1, 2025.
Fine Print: This question concerns Hawaiian Electric Company, Inc., not its parent company Hawaiian Electric Industries, Inc. Therefore, if Hawaiian Electric Company files for bankruptcy but not its parent, this would resolve as Yes.
|
2023-08-20T03:36:00Z
|
2024-12-31T17:00:00Z
|
2025-01-06T20:52:00Z
|
no
|
METACULUS
|
meta-18390
|
Will Donald Trump be charged with witness tampering in Georgia before June 1, 2024?
|
On August 14, 2023, former President Donald Trump was [indicted](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Prosecution_of_Donald_Trump_in_Georgia#Indictment) by a grand jury in Georgia, alongside 18 other individuals. The state brought charges against Trump related to Trump's alleged participation in an attempt to overturn the state's 2020 presidential election results.
Trump made statements on his social media platform, Truth Social, which [appeared to warn](https://www.axios.com/2023/08/14/trump-witness-tampering-georgia-indictment) potential witnesses not to testify against him.
> Former President Donald Trump posted on Truth Social, his social media platform, on Monday saying Georgia’s former Lt. Gov. Geoff Duncan “shouldn’t” testify in grand jury proceedings this week regarding allegations that Trump attempted to overturn the 2020 election results in the state—and some legal analysts are saying the post could be witness intimidation or tampering.
> ...
> Per Georgia law, anyone who attempts to [influence](https://law.justia.com/codes/georgia/2020/title-16/chapter-10/article-5/section-16-10-93/) a witness is subject to felony charges and, if convicted, can face one to five years in prison; anyone who [threatens](https://law.justia.com/codes/georgia/2022/title-16/chapter-10/article-2/section-16-10-32/#:~:text=Attempted%20Murder%20or%20Threatening%20of%20Witnesses%20in%20Official%20Proceedings,-Universal%20Citation%3A%20GA&text=shall%20be%20guilty%20of%20a,nor%20more%20than%2020%20years.) a witness is subject to felony charges and, if convicted, faces 10 to 20 years in prison. ([Forbes](https://www.forbes.com/sites/mollybohannon/2023/08/14/trump-suggested-a-witness-shouldnt-testify-in-georgias-grand-jury-proceedings-critics-say-thats-witness-intimidation/?sh=7e14b52a57be))
Resolution Criteria: The question resolves **Yes** if Donald Trump is charged or indicted for any statements related to potential witnesses in *[The State of Georgia v. Donald J. Trump, et al](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Prosecution_of_Donald_Trump_in_Georgia)*. The indictments must occur before June 1, 2024.
|
2023-08-18T02:04:00Z
|
2024-05-31T18:00:00Z
|
2024-06-01T15:47:00Z
|
no
|
METACULUS
|
meta-8356
|
Will the floating storage vessel Safer leak at least 10,000 tonnes of oil before 2025?
|
Since 1988, the former supertanker _Esso Japan_ has been moored in the Red Sea off the Yemeni city of Al Hudaydah as the floating oil storage and offloading vessel _Safer_. Prior to the outbreak of the latest Yemeni civil war, it was used by the state-owned Yemen Oil and Gas Corporation to store crude extracted from Yemen's oil fields and trans-ship it for export. In this configuration it could store up to about 400,000 tonnes (3 MMbbl) of oil.
In 2015, the opposition Houthi movement captured Al Hudaydah and its port, and the _Safer_ fell into disuse and disrepair. In subsequent years, international concern has gradually increased about the ship and its derelict cargo of nearly 150,000 tonnes (1.14 MMbbl). A major spill could close port access for badly needed humanitarian aid, wipe out the fishing industry of a country already experiencing widespread malnutrition, and potentially disrupt global shipping lanes through the confined approaches to the Suez Canal.
Safely removing the oil from the _Safer_ in its current condition ought to be simple mechanically. The problem is obtaining the necessary co-operation from the Houthis. Their troops garrison the vessel. There are fears of naval mines in the surrounding waters, and of booby-traps and scuttling charges aboard the _Safer_ itself.
The Houthi leadership has linked the resolution of the _Safer_ problem to broader diplomatic disputes. In 2020, Houthi leader Mohammed Ali al-Houthi mockingly tweeted, "The life of the shrimps is more precious than the life of Yemeni citizens to the U.S. and its allies. ... Why is Safer more dangerous than the siege and the assault ... on the [Yemeni] people?" In a later tweet, he added: "If, God forbid, an environmental catastrophe occurred with the explosion of the Safer, the world will stop not for a week, as it did in Suez [during the Ever Given incident], but will stop for a long time." Some United Nations officials working on the problem are said to have privately concluded that the Houthis are playing chicken.
As Journalist Ed Caesar [has written](https://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2021/10/11/the-ship-that-became-a-bomb) in _The New Yorker_:
> The _Safer_ is not sinking. It is not on fire. It has not exploded. It is not leaking oil. Yet the crew of the ship, and every informed observer, expects disaster to occur soon. But how soon? A year? Six months? Two weeks? Tomorrow? In May [2021], Ahmed Kulaib, the former executive at [the _Safer_'s operating company], told me that “it could be after five minutes.” Then five minutes passed, and then another... The crisis unfolds at the speed of rust.
Resolution Criteria: This question resolves positively if the majority of credible media report that an oil spill associated with the FSO _Safer_ has released at least 10,000 metric tonnes of oil. This question will resolve negatively if this has not occurred by 2025-01-01.
In the case that estimates of the size of the oil spill vary, such that ranges span above and below 10,000 tonnes, the question may resolve ambiguous if sufficient clarifying evidence is unavailable
|
2021-10-28T04:00:00Z
|
2025-01-01T01:00:00Z
|
2023-08-11T15:00:00Z
|
no
|
METACULUS
|
meta-8341
|
Before 2024, will the ACLU argue that hate speech should not be protected by the First Amendment?
|
Recently, some commenters [have](https://twitter.com/bariweiss/status/1303352142866993154) [criticized](https://www.nytimes.com/2021/09/27/opinion/rbg-aclu-abortion.html)
[the ACLU](https://www.nytimes.com/2021/06/06/us/aclu-free-speech.html) for abandoning its historic stance in favor of free speech. On 2021-10-17, journalist Glenn Greenwald [predicted](https://twitter.com/ggreenwald/status/1449740659036983308) this on twitter:
>I really believe that within 18-24 months, ACLU - either a state affiliate or the national group - will argue in court that hate speech is outside 1st Amendment protections because it infringes the rights of marginalized groups.
Historically, laws regulating [hate speech in the US](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Hate_speech_in_the_United_States) have been found to violate the First Amendment protections of freedom of speech.
Resolution Criteria: This question will resolve as **Yes** if, before January 1, 2024, any part of the ACLU (either a state affiliate or the national group) argues in any court that hate speech should not be protected by the First Amendment protections of Freedom of Speech. "Arguing in Court" here means providing direct aid in a court, not merely filing an amicus brief or making public statements. "Hate Speech" here will mean public speech which is predjudiced or discriminatory towards groups protected by the Fourteenth Amendment, including those defined by disability, race, ethnicity, nationality, national origin, gender, gender identity, or sex
|
2021-12-02T06:00:00Z
|
2024-01-01T05:00:00Z
|
2024-01-01T05:00:00Z
|
no
|
METACULUS
|
meta-8334
|
Will spending on US office construction be less than $77 Billion USD in 2022?
|
The COVID-19 pandemic has had a major impact on commercial real estate, particularly retail and hospitality locations, as well as urban office spaces. In April 2020, Gallup found that [69% of full-time employed americans were working from home](https://news.gallup.com/poll/348743/seven-u.s.-white-collar-workers-still-working-remotely.aspx). Some wonder whether this is the beginning of the end of major downtown office buildings, but [Andra Ghent, associate professor of finance at UNC, predicts](https://kenaninstitute.unc.edu/kenan-insight/how-will-covid-19-affect-commercial-real-estate/) "it’s unlikely that increased technology adoption will affect prime office space in core downtown areas in major cities, where location brings important benefits through networking and access to skilled workers."
In March 2020 US Spending on office construction and maintenance reached an all-time high of $95 Billion, and then declined over the course of the COVID-19 pandemic and lockdowns to $80 Billion in December 2020. Office construction has gone through similar cycles in the past, reaching a low of $34 Billion in February 2011 following the 2008 financial crisis.
Resolution Criteria: This question will resolve positively if the average seasonally-adjusted annual office construction spending in 2022 is less than $77 Billion [according to the US Census Bureau](https://www.census.gov/econ/currentdata/dbsearch?program=VIP&startYear=2002&endYear=2021&categories=A02XX&dataType=T&geoLevel=US&adjusted=1&submit=GET+DATA&releaseScheduleId=).
Fine Print: This question may resolve after 2023-07-01 to account for revisions by the US Census Bureau.
|
2021-10-21T10:00:00Z
|
2023-03-01T05:00:00Z
|
2023-03-01T16:05:00Z
|
no
|
METACULUS
|
meta-8160
|
Will there be a US-Iran war by 2024?
|
See [the Wikipedia article on the 2019–2021 Persian Gulf crisis](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/2019%E2%80%932021_Persian_Gulf_crisis) for some context relevant to this question.
Resolution Criteria: For the purposes of this question, a US-Iran war is defined as the US and Iran collectively suffering [at least 1000 battle-related deaths in conflicts with each other in a single calendar year](https://www.pcr.uu.se/research/ucdp/definitions/), as reported by credible news, government, or multi-national sources. Deaths in battles fought between the US and an ally of Iran or between Iran and an ally of the US will not count towards positive resolution.
We will use [the Uppsala University Department of Peace and Conflict Studies' definition of battle-related deaths](https://www.pcr.uu.se/research/ucdp/definitions/#tocjump_39091158521468405_5).
**Related questions**
* [What will be the number of conflicts with critical impacts on U.S. interests by 2023?](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/7881/critical-conflicts-for-us-by-2023/)
* [Will the US rejoin the Iran Nuclear Deal before 2022?](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/6381/us-rejoins-iran-deal-before-2022/)
* [Will the US rejoin the Iran Nuclear Deal before 2023?](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/7840/us-rejoins-iran-deal-before-2023/)
* [Will Iran possess a nuclear weapon by 2030?](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/5253/iran-gets-nuke-by-2030/)
* [Will there be a US-Iran war in 2020?](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/3462/will-there-be-a-us-iran-war-in-2020/)
* [US invades and attempts a regime change in Iran in 2020?](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/3451/us-invades-and-attempts-a-regime-change-in-iran-in-2020/)
* [How many cyberattacks by Iran against US Govt. systems in Q1 2020?](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/3453/how-many-cyberattacks-by-iran-against-us-govt-systems-in-q1-2020/
|
2021-10-07T14:00:00Z
|
2022-03-11T04:59:00Z
|
2024-01-01T17:00:00Z
|
no
|
METACULUS
|
meta-8159
|
Will there be a deadly clash between Japanese and Chinese armed forces before 2024?
|
*Related Questions on Metaculus:*
* [Will there be a deadly clash between US and Chinese armed forces before 2024?](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/7403/deadly-clash-between-the-us-and-china/)
* [[...] between Indian and Chinese armed forces?](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/7451/deadly-clash-between-china-and-india/)
* [[...] between Russian and Chinese armed forces?](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/7450/deadly-clash-between-russia-and-china/)
----
China and Japan were last at war during World War II.
Resolution Criteria: This question will resolve as **Yes** if, at any time between June 1, 2021 to January 1, 2024, forces serving the Japanese armed forces and the Chinese armed forces have a deadly conflict involving gunfire or explosives, according to credible media reports.
For this question, a gun is used if it is fired, and an explosive is used if it is detonated. Guns do not include weapons that are designed to be less than lethal such as tasers, rubber bullet guns, or bean bag guns. Similarly, explosives do not include weapons that are designed to be less than lethal such as flash bangs.
At least one death must result from the clash. The death need not be caused by the explosive or gunfire.
The military clash can take place in any place or location as long as it involves servicemen enlisted in the armed forces of both the Japan and China
|
2021-10-07T14:00:00Z
|
2023-12-30T04:59:00Z
|
2024-01-01T05:00:00Z
|
no
|
METACULUS
|
meta-8154
|
Will the US propose a ban on hydrazine for spacecraft propulsion by January 20, 2025?
|
*Related Question on Metaculus:*
* [Will there be a European Commission proposal to ban hydrazine for spacecraft propulsion by 2025?](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/8153/proposal-to-ban-hydrazine-in-eu-by-2025/)
----
Ten years ago [(mid 2011)](https://echa.europa.eu/candidate-list-table/-/dislist/details/0b0236e1807da31d) the classic propellant hydrazine was included in the list of substances of very high concern for authorization (SVHC) by [REACH legislation](https://echa.europa.eu/regulations/reach/legislation) of the European Chemicals Agency (ECHA). Hydrazine is one of the high performance monopropellants with low flame temperature, which makes it an efficient propellant. However, its toxicity to humans and environment has put, firstly, an economic burden on using such propellant during various development and operation phases. Secondly, an ethical burden toward the environment if such sense to be considered. It is worthy to note that hydrazine is not just an appealing efficient propellant for Space-use, but it is also seems to take a critical role in aeronautical military applications [such as fueling the auxiliary power units](https://web.archive.org/web/20160304084802/http:/oai.dtic.mil/oai/oai?verb=getRecord&metadataPrefix=html&identifier=ADA065595) of the F-16 fighters and Eurofighter Typhoon.
Speaking of today in 2021/2022 and from a technical point of view, the economical as well as the environmental hazards concerns are taken seriously into account when considering ‘space mission analysis & design.’ The latter two aspects when coupled are crucial during the conceptualization of a given space mission as well as developing modern spacecraft critical components such as the propulsion systems.
Basically, space industry is currently oriented toward adopting the so-called ‘Green Propellants.’ A very simple technical definition for Green Propellants can state that the propellants possessing no (or very marginal) health concerns or environmental hazards either in storage, transportation, or operation phases of a project lifecycle, are considered to be ‘green’ – this would opt out propellants with high-toxicity like hydrazine, but fossil hydrocarbons are not yet considered ‘non-green’ fuels in the framework of Space propulsion applications in contrary to fuels in automobile industry. More detailed technical definitions can be referenced in the these academic articles: [Article 1](http://yadda.icm.edu.pl/baztech/element/bwmeta1.element.baztech-71f98242-5541-4f80-a02b-8b601f7fe31b), [Article 2](https://www.mdpi.com/2226-4310/8/1/20/htm#B3-aerospace-08-00020).
Current Green Propellants industry is reaching maturity that several global research efforts have already provided commercially available and space-tested green propellants. Examples are: the US Air Force developed propellant AF-M315E (currently known and commercialized as [ASCENT](https://www.nasa.gov/mission_pages/tdm/green/gpim-nears-completion.html)); the European [LMP-103S](https://www.ecaps.space/hpgp-performance.php) developed by Bradford ECAPS; and the Japanese [HNP-family](https://encyclopedia.pub/7693) of green monopropellants developed by [IHI Aerospace Co., Ltd](https://www.ihi.co.jp/ia/en/products/space/pinot/pinot-g/en/index.html). These propellants are suitable for spacecraft use in in-space propulsion, usually for the [small spacecraft class](https://www.nasa.gov/smallsat-institute/sst-soa-2020).
There were rumors among the aerospace European community ([particularly since 2017](https://spacenews.com/hydrazine-ban-could-cost-europes-space-industry-billions/)) that EU would ban completely the use of hydrazine by 2021, so far nothing is clear however about this intention.
Resolution Criteria: This question will resolve as **Yes** if any branch of the US federal government makes a formal proposal to ban Hydrazine and Hydrazine-derivative spacecraft fuels before January 20, 2025. It is not necessary for this proposal to recieve a vote or become law to resolve this question
|
2021-11-10T06:00:00Z
|
2025-01-20T23:00:00Z
|
2025-01-21T16:05:00Z
|
no
|
METACULUS
|
Subsets and Splits
No community queries yet
The top public SQL queries from the community will appear here once available.