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meta-28022
|
Will SpaceX make any new posts on its Updates page before October 1, 2024?
|
As of September 8, 2024, SpaceX's most recent post was timestamped August 12, 2024.
Resolution Criteria: This question resolves as **Yes** if a new post appears at SpaceX's Updates page, which can be accessed at [this address](https://www.spacex.com/updates/), timestamped after the close of this question and before October 1, 2024. If there is no such post, this question resolves as **No**.
Fine Print: No other web address than the one mentioned will count. If the web page is down when a Metaculus Admin attempts to access it, this question resolves as No--forecasters are therefore encouraged if they think there is a material chance of the page being down to incorporate that into their forecast.
|
2024-09-10T14:30:00Z
|
2024-09-11T14:30:00Z
|
2024-10-01T21:28:00Z
|
no
|
METACULUS
|
meta-28021
|
Will the New York Yankees win more games than the Baltimore Orioles in the 2024 MLB season, before October 1, 2024?
|
As of September 9, 2024, the Yankees and Orioles both had 82 wins.
Resolution Criteria: This question resolves as **Yes** if the New York Yankees have more wins than the Baltimore Orioles in the 2024 regular season, as shown by the Major League Baseball [standings tracker](https://www.mlb.com/standings/) when checked by Metaculus Admins on October 1, 2024. If this is not the case, this question resolves as **No**.
Fine Print: In the case of a tie for the number of wins between the two teams, this question resolves as **No**.
|
2024-09-10T14:30:00Z
|
2024-09-11T14:30:00Z
|
2024-10-01T21:27:00Z
|
yes
|
METACULUS
|
meta-28020
|
Will the Boeing Starliner Commercial Crew program be canceled before October 1, 2024?
|
Boeing, one of two selected contractors for the [NASA Commercial Crew program](https://www.nasa.gov/humans-in-space/commercial-space/commercial-crew-program/) (the other being SpaceX), has developed its spacecraft, named *Starliner* to deliver astronauts to and from the ISS.
Unfortunately, since inception, this Boeing program has been riddled with issues and delays. The [first orbital demo flight](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Boeing_Orbital_Flight_Test), taking place in December 2019, was a failure as while the capsule was safely recovered, multiple serious issues during flight resulted in not completing mission objectives, such as reaching and docking with the ISS.
Due to these issues, Boeing agreed to perform a [second orbital flight test](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Boeing_Orbital_Flight_Test_2) at "no cost to the taxpayer" with an estimated US$410 million out-of-pocket expenditure, and while this mission was nominally successful with the spacecraft docking to the ISS and returning safely, multiple serious issues were discovered both pre-launch--causing delays--and during operation including numerous failures of the maneuvering thruster system.
The latest flight of Starliner, the [crew flight test](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Boeing_Crew_Flight_Test) launched in 2024 and gained massive media attention as failures in the thruster system resulted in the astronauts getting "stranded" aboard the ISS. After investigation, Boeing and NASA have decided to not risk returning the astronauts on the partially defective Starliner capsule, instead returning them on a different spacecraft. The defective Starliner will return to earth, unmanned.
Looking towards the future, there is currently a planned [Starliner-1 mission](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Boeing_Starliner-1) in the "fully operational phase" of the Starliner Commercial Crew program, scheduled for no earlier than August, 2025. This mission, if it takes place, will begin a series of regular operational missions where Starliner transports four astronauts up to the ISS on a schedule.
Generally though, there are serious doubts about the future of the Boeing Starliner program. [For example, NASA has already double-booked the Starliner-1 Flight with the SpaceX-11 Flight](https://spacepolicyonline.com/news/starliner-passes-in-orbit-tests-but-first-operational-launch-slips/) in anticipation that Boeing will not be ready in time.
The technical issues, and more critically, the apparent inability of Boeing to fix known technical issues throw serious doubt upon Boeing's engineering skill and commitment to the program, making it likely that, for example, NASA insists on a fourth demo flight or potentially, Boeing decides to cut their losses and cancels the program.
Resolution Criteria: This question resolves as **Yes** if either of these events occur before October 1, 2024:
- The Boeing Starliner Program ceases to be part of NASA's Commercial Crew Program.
- Boeing withdraws from the NASA Commercial Crew Program.
|
2024-09-10T14:30:00Z
|
2024-09-11T14:30:00Z
|
2024-10-01T21:31:00Z
|
no
|
METACULUS
|
meta-28008
|
Will the US weekly 30-year fixed mortgage rate be above 6.35% on October 1, 2024, according to Freddie Mac?
|
The 30-year fixed rate mortgage according to the resolution sounce as of September 8, 2024 was 6.35%.
Resolution Criteria: This question resolves as **Yes** if the 30 year fixed-rate mortgage exceeds 6.35% at the Freddie Mac tracker page at [this location](https://www.freddiemac.com/pmms), when accessed by Metaculus Admins on October 1, 2024. If the 30-Yr FRM is less than or equal to 6.35%, this question resolves as **No**.
Fine Print: The resolution amount of the 30-year fixed-rate mortgage will be the one displayed at the moment Metaculus Admins access the Freddie Mac tracker page on October 1, 2024. It will be the rate listed as the 30-Yr FRM under "Primary Mortgage Market Survey®". It will be immaterial what period that covers, and the question will resolve based on whatever figure is shown. The time of day on October 1, 2024, that the page will be accessed is also not going to be listed; Metaculus Admins will merely access the webpage at their convenience at some point on that date and record the rate listed.
|
2024-09-09T14:30:00Z
|
2024-09-10T14:30:00Z
|
2024-10-02T16:35:00Z
|
no
|
METACULUS
|
meta-28007
|
Will the national price of gasoline exceed $3.25 per gallon when accessed by Metaculus Admins on October 1, 2024?
|
The national price of a gallon of gasoline is listed by AAA as $3.273 as of September 8, 2024.
Resolution Criteria: This question resolves as **Yes** if the national price of gasoline ("Today’s AAA National Average") exceeds $3.250 at the AAA tracker page at [this location](https://gasprices.aaa.com/), when accessed by Metaculus Admins on October 1, 2024. If the price is less than or equal to $3.250, this question resolves as **No**.
Fine Print: The resolution price will be the one displayed at the moment Metaculus Admins access the AAA tracker page on October 1, 2024. It will be the price listed as Today’s AAA National Average." Please note that it will be immaterial the date of the price, so for example if it lists "Price as of 9/30/24" but the page is accessed by Metaculus Admins on October 1, 2024, that is the price that will count for resolution. The time of day on October 1, 2024, that the page will be accessed is also not going to be listed; Metaculus Admins will merely access the webpage at their convenience at some point on that date and record the price listed.
|
2024-09-09T14:30:00Z
|
2024-09-10T14:30:00Z
|
2024-10-01T19:47:00Z
|
no
|
METACULUS
|
meta-28006
|
Will Kamala Harris say "I'm speaking" in the presidential debate with Donald Trump?
|
Kamala Harris and Donald Trump are currently scheduled for a presidential debate on September 10, 2024. Harris is well-known for saying "I'm speaking" in response to her debate opponents trying to interrupt her, such as in her 2020 vice presidential debate against Mike Pence. Notably, however, the microphones are currently planned in her debate with Trump to be muted for the candidate unless it's their turn to speak.
Resolution Criteria: This question resolves as **Yes** if Kamala Harris utters the literal phrase "I'm speaking" or "I am speaking" in a formal, live presidential debate with Donald Trump before September 11, 2024. If this does not happen before that date, this question resolves as "No".
Fine Print: No other phrases will count, even if they express the same sentiment (e.g., "I'm talking.") Alternative events in place of a debate, such as dueling town hall interviews, will not count.
|
2024-09-09T14:30:00Z
|
2024-09-10T14:30:00Z
|
2024-09-11T12:46:00Z
|
no
|
METACULUS
|
meta-28002
|
Will the lithium carbonate (CNY/T) price fall below 70,000 before October 1, 2024?
|
Lithium carbonate, a key component in electric vehicle (EV) batteries, has experienced a significant price decline in recent months. As of September 2024, lithium carbonate prices in China have stabilized at around CNY 75,000 per tonne, the lowest level in over three years, before dropping again to 72,500 to close out the first week of trading.
This recent decline in lithium prices is part of a larger trend that has seen spot prices [fall over 80% since December 2022](https://www.bradley.com/insights/publications/2024/02/lithium-prices-in-free-fall-implications-for-clean-energy-transition-in-the-private-sector). The sudden deceleration in demand for lithium, particularly in the EV industry, caught suppliers by surprise, leading to a surplus that placed downward pressure on prices.
Despite the current slump, the long-term outlook for lithium demand remains strong, as governments and private sector initiatives continue to push for a transition away from fossil fuels towards renewable energy solutions. According to a study by [McKinsey](https://www.mckinsey.com/industries/automotive-and-assembly/our-insights/battery-2030-resilient-sustainable-and-circular), global demand for lithium-ion batteries is predicted to grow from around 700 gigawatt hours (GWh) in 2022 to 4,700 GWh in 2030, driven primarily by EVs, stationary storage, and consumer electronics.
[S&P Global](https://www.spglobal.com/commodityinsights/en/market-insights/latest-news/metals/121923-us-canada-lithium-prospects-hope-to-advance-in-2024-despite-headwinds) projects that lithium carbonate prices will stabilize near current levels in a range between $20,000/mt and $25,000/mt from 2024 to 2027. However, given the recent volatility and the potential for further market disruptions, the question remains whether lithium carbonate prices will continue to decline in the near term, potentially falling below CNY 70,000 per tonne before October 1, 2024.
Resolution Criteria: This question will resolve as "Yes" if the lithium carbonate (CNY/T) price, as reported by [Trading Economics](https://tradingeconomics.com/commodity/lithium), falls below 70,000, for any day's closing price, after September 10, 2024, and before October 1, 2024.
The question will resolve as "No" if the lithium carbonate price does not fall below 70,000 CNY/T during the specified time period.
|
2024-09-10T14:30:00Z
|
2024-10-01T03:59:00Z
|
2024-10-07T22:13:00Z
|
no
|
METACULUS
|
meta-28000
|
Will Boar’s Head deli meat be safe to eat by November 30, 2024?
|
The Boar's Head listeria outbreak began in July 2024, causing [9 deaths](https://abcnews.go.com/Health/listeria-outbreak-left-57-sick-9-dead/story?id=113276874) linked to the outbreak. According to the USDA's [latest announcement](https://boarshead.com/products-recall-2024) recalling and additional 7 million additional pounds of ready-to-eat meat and poultry products:
>The problem was discovered when FSIS was notified that a liverwurst sample collected by the Maryland Department of Health tested positive for L. monocytogenes. The Maryland Department of Health, in collaboration with the Baltimore City Health Department, collected an unopened liverwurst product from a retail store for testing as part of an outbreak investigation of L. monocytogenes infections. Further testing determined the product sample tested positive for the outbreak strain. Anyone concerned about illness should contact a healthcare provider.
>FSIS is working with the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) and state public health partners to investigate the multistate outbreak of L. monocytogenes infections linked to meats sliced at delis. As of July 30, 2024, 34 sick people have been identified in 13 states, including 33 hospitalizations and two deaths. Samples were collected from sick people from May 29, 2024, to July 12, 2024. The investigation is ongoing, and FSIS continues to work with the CDC and state partners.
For further context and background please see:
- Forbes: [Everything To Know About The Listeria Outbreaks—As Boar’s Head Plant Closes Indefinitely](https://www.forbes.com/sites/maryroeloffs/2024/09/13/everything-to-know-about-the-listeria-outbreaks-as-boars-head-plant-closes-indefinitely/)
- AP: [Recall of Boar’s Head deli meats announced during investigation of listeria outbreak](https://www.news10.com/news/national/ap-recall-of-boars-head-deli-meats-announced-during-investigation-of-listeria-outbreak/)
- [July 2024 Boar's Head Product Recall Information](https://boarshead.com/products-recall-2024)
Resolution Criteria: This question resolves as **Yes** if the status of the Boar's Head Provisions Co., Inc. [recall posted](https://www.fsis.usda.gov/recalls-alerts/boars-head-provisions-co--expands-recall-ready-eat-meat-and-poultry-products-due) by the U.S. Department of Agriculture’s Food Safety and Inspection Service (FSIS) is changed from Active to Closed before November 30, 2024.
If the recall is still shown as Active when the above link is accessed by Metaculus on or after November 30, 2024, this question resolves as **No**.
Fine Print: No other resolution source will be considered.
|
2024-09-17T11:00:00Z
|
2024-11-30T17:00:00Z
|
2024-11-06T05:01:00Z
|
yes
|
METACULUS
|
meta-27995
|
Will Intel get dropped from the Dow Jones Industrial Average before October 1, 2024?
|
On September 4, 2024, Reuters [reported](https://www.reuters.com/technology/intels-dow-status-under-threat-struggling-chipmakers-shares-plunge-2024-09-03/) that Intel was "likely" to be removed from the Dow Jones Industrial Average:
>A removal from the index will hurt Intel's already bruised reputation. The company has missed out on the artificial intelligence boom after passing on an OpenAI investment and losses are mounting at the contract manufacturing unit that the chipmaker has been building out in hopes of challenging TSMC [Taiwan Semiconductor].
>To fund a turnaround, Intel suspended [its] dividend and announced layoffs affecting 15% of its workforce during its earnings report last month. But some analysts and a former board member believe the moves might be too little, too late for the chipmaker.
>"Intel being removed was likely a long time coming," said Ryan Detrick, chief market strategist at the Carson Group.
>The latest results may be the final push needed to finally see the company removed from the Dow, Detrick added.
Along with Microsoft, Intel first entered the Dow [in October 1999](https://money.cnn.com/1999/10/26/markets/dowindustrials/), replacing Goodyear and Sears at the time, in a move considered to be one of the largest shakeups to date in the index, which was over a century old at that point.
Established [in 1896](https://www.investopedia.com/ask/answers/100214/when-did-dow-jones-industrial-average-djia-begin.asp), the Dow Jones Industrial Average was intended as a small representative sample of the largest companies in the the US stock market, an objective it largely retains to this day. It's important to note that at the time, the word "industrial" had a broader meaning than it does today, for example [defined in 1912](https://www.google.com/books/edition/New_Websterian_1912_Dictionary/VkoZAAAAYAAJ?hl=en&gbpv=1&bsq=industrial) as "pertaining to productive industry," which is more akin to how the word "corporate" or "business" is defined today, as compared with the more narrow [modern definitions](https://dictionary.cambridge.org/us/dictionary/english/industrial) mentioning factories or production of goods. (The original DJIA components and their histories are listed [here](https://www.dividend.com/dividend-education/the-complete-history-of-the-original-dow-dozen/).)
Two contenders to replace Intel are:
- Nvidia. Please see [Is Nvidia Going to Be Added to the Dow? Here's What 128 Years of History Suggests Will Happen.](https://www.fool.com/investing/2024/06/17/nvidia-added-to-dow-what-128-years-history-suggest/)
- Texas Instruments. Mentioned by the Reuters report as "a nearly century-old chipmaker with significant production capacity within the United States."
Resolution Criteria: This question resolves as **Yes** upon any official announcement or confirmation that Intel Corporation will no longer be a component of the Dow Jones Industrial Average (DJIA) or [credible source](https://www.metaculus.com/help/faq/#definitions) reporting either on the official announcement or that Intel has been or will be removed from the index.
If no such announcement or reporting occurs before October 1, 2024, this question resolves as **No**.
Fine Print: Although removals from the index are generally effective immediately in order to forestall frontrunning, this is not a requirement for this question. All that is required is for there to be an announcement or confirmation before October 1, 2024 that Intel will be removed from the DJIA at any point in time. Therefore this question will resolve based on the announcement or confirmation, not on the actual removal date, if that removal date is after September 30, 2024.
Forecasters will note that this question makes certain implicit assumptions such as the DJIA index continuing to exist in its present form. For any edge cases that might make this question unable to be resolved, please refer to Metaculus's ambiguity and annulment policies [here](https://www.metaculus.com/help/faq/#ambiguous-annulled).
|
2024-09-10T14:30:00Z
|
2024-10-01T03:59:00Z
|
2024-10-01T14:29:00Z
|
no
|
METACULUS
|
meta-27969
|
Will Fargo win the 2024 Primetime Emmy Award for Outstanding Limited or Anthology Series?
|
Fargo is on FX. Other contenders are: Baby Reindeer (Netflix), Lessons in Chemistry (Apple TV+), Ripley (Netflix), True Detective: Night Country (HBO)
Resolution Criteria: This question resolves as **Yes** if the TV series Fargo wins the 2024 Primetime Emmy Award for Outstanding Limited or Anthology Series. The resolution source will be the Wikipedia page [76th Primetime Emmy Awards](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/76th_Primetime_Emmy_Awards) or other [credible sources](https://www.metaculus.com/help/faq/#definitions) reporting on the awards ceremony. If this does not happen, this question closes as **No**.
Fine Print: The 2024 Primetime Emmy Awards show is scheduled for September 15, 2024.
|
2024-09-05T14:30:00Z
|
2024-09-06T14:30:00Z
|
2024-09-16T12:30:00Z
|
no
|
METACULUS
|
meta-27968
|
Will Taylor Swift win 5 or more awards at the 2024 MTV Video Music Awards?
|
Taylor Swift has, at the time of this question, been nominated for the following 10 awards: Video of the Year, Song of the Year, Artist of the Year, Best Collaboration, Best Pop, Best Visual Effects, Best Editing, Best Direction, Best Art Direction, and Best Cinematography.
Resolution Criteria: "This question resolves as **Yes** if Taylor Swift wins at least 5 awards at the 2024 MTV Video Music Awards. The resolution source will be the Wikipedia page [2024 MTV Video Music Awards
](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/2024_MTV_Video_Music_Awards) or other credible sources reporting on this awards ceremony. If this does not happen, this question closes as **No**."
Fine Print: The awards show is scheduled for September 10, 2024. For purposes of this question, any award, including special awards such as the Global Icon Award or the Video Vanguard Award, will count.
|
2024-09-05T14:30:00Z
|
2024-09-06T14:30:00Z
|
2024-09-12T11:23:00Z
|
yes
|
METACULUS
|
meta-27967
|
Before October 1, 2024, will Tech Crunch report new layoffs at Tesla?
|
Tesla had two layoff events listed in April 2024, one for its charging team and one for an announced layoff round of 10% of its global workforce. Tesla has come under stress recently as its sales growth in its automotive segment have lagged.
Resolution Criteria: This question resolves as **Yes** if, according to Tech Crunch's tracker "A comprehensive list of 2024 tech layoffs," which can be accessed [here](https://techcrunch.com/2024/08/07/tech-layoffs-2024-list/), Tesla has layoffs following the launch of this question and before October 1, 2024, To resolve the question, a Metaculus Admin will go to the Tech Crunch link on October 1, 2024 and see if Tesla appears for August 2024 or September 2024. If Tesla is not listed as having a layoff event under those months, then this question resolves as **No**.
Fine Print: Tech Crunch's "comprehensive list of 2024 tech layoffs" will be the sole source used for resolution of this question, regardless of information from other sources. If a layoff event appears in the time period listed, this question resolves as Yes, and if not, it resolves as No.
According to Tech Crunch, "Below you’ll find a comprehensive list of all the known layoffs in tech that have occurred in 2024, to be updated regularly." Admins to resolve this question will only be looking to see what is on the page at the time of resolution. If Tech Crunch ceases to publish updates on the resolution source following the launch of this question (regardless of what can be found elsewhere on the Tech Crunch website), this question resolves as **No**.
For ease of resolution, in this series of questions, in order to count the Tech Crunch page must specifically list the company in question, which in this case is Tesla. This is true regardless of subsidiaries or ownerships. So for example, a question on Microsoft must specifically mention Microsoft, and a layoff event at LinkedIn will not count for purposes of this question (unless the subheading mentions Microsoft), even though LinkedIn is owned by Microsoft.
|
2024-09-05T14:30:00Z
|
2024-09-06T14:30:00Z
|
2024-10-01T23:09:00Z
|
no
|
METACULUS
|
meta-27966
|
Will Greystone Logistics, Inc., file its 10-K annual report with the SEC before October 1, 2024?
|
On August 30, 2024, Greystone Logistics, Inc., received a [notification](https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1088413/000143774924028106/glgi20240829_nt10k.htm) of failure to file its annual report.
Resolution Criteria: This question resolves as **Yes** if there is a Form 10-K filed for the fiscal year ended May 31, 2024, for Greystone Logistics, Inc., at [this specific SEC Edgar link](https://www.sec.gov/cgi-bin/browse-edgar?CIK=0001088413&owner=exclude). If there is no such 10-K filed before October 1, 2024, this question resolves as **No**.
Fine Print: For purposes of this question, in order to facilitate streamlined resolution no other resolution source will be considered, so forecasters are urged to predict accordingly. If SEC's Edgar site is down, resolution will wait for up to 7 days. If the resolution source link remains inaccessible after that time for any reason (including the SEC discontinuing its "Classic version"), this question resolves as No.
|
2024-09-05T14:30:00Z
|
2024-09-06T14:30:00Z
|
2024-09-14T02:22:00Z
|
yes
|
METACULUS
|
meta-27961
|
Will a UWF student create a bot for the AI Forecasting Benchmark Series by 2025?
|
Learn more about the [AI Forecasting Benchmark Series here](https://www.metaculus.com/aib/).
Resolution Criteria: This question resolves 'yes' if at least one UWF student creates a bot account and it makes at least one forecast before 2025.
|
2024-09-04T21:42:00Z
|
2024-12-31T18:00:00Z
|
2025-01-28T03:34:00Z
|
yes
|
METACULUS
|
meta-27935
|
Will China's youth unemployment rate be greater than 18.0 for August 2024?
|
China's youth unemployment rate, which measures the percentage of people aged 16 to 24 who are not in school and are unemployed, has been a growing concern for the country's policymakers and economists. In July 2024, the rate [soared to 17.1%](https://www.cnbc.com/2024/08/20/chinas-youth-unemployment-soars-above-17percent-in-july.html), the highest level since the new system of record-keeping began in December 2023.
The new calculation method, introduced in late 2023, excludes those who are still in school, as more people in China are pursuing higher education amid a more competitive job market. Under the previous calculation method, the youth unemployment rate had reached a record high of 21.3% in June 2023.
The rising youth unemployment rate has been attributed to various factors, including the ongoing economic challenges, the impact of the COVID-19 pandemic, and structural changes in the labor market. As the issue continues to draw attention, this question aims to predict the youth unemployment rate for August 2024, providing insight into the short-term trajectory of this critical economic indicator.
Resolution Criteria: This question will resolve based on the youth unemployment rate for August 2024, as reported by [Trading Economics](https://tradingeconomics.com/china/youth-unemployment-rate), using data from the National Bureau of Statistics of China.
The question will resolve based on the reported youth unemployment rate, rounded to the nearest 0.1 percentage point.
Fine Print: The youth unemployment rate is defined as the percentage of the labor force aged 16-24 without work but available for and seeking employment, based on the calculation method used by the National Bureau of Statistics of China as of August 2024.
If the National Bureau of Statistics of China revises its calculation method or age range for the youth unemployment rate before September 2024, the question will be resolved using the most up-to-date definition and methodology.
In the event that Trading Economics does not report the youth unemployment rate for August 2024 before October 7, 2024, or if the data is not available from the National Bureau of Statistics of China (NBS), the question will resolve as "Annulled". The data can be found [directly from the NBS here](https://data.stats.gov.cn/english/easyquery.htm?cn=A01) by selecting "The Urban Surveyed Unemployment Rate" under "Indicators" on the left side and observing the data in the row labeled "The Urban Surveyed Unemployment Rate of the Population Aged from 16 to 24 Excluding Students(%)".
|
2024-09-06T14:30:00Z
|
2024-09-07T14:30:00Z
|
2024-09-20T11:30:00Z
|
yes
|
METACULUS
|
meta-27934
|
Will China's youth unemployment rate be greater than 17.0 and less than or equal to 18.0 for August 2024?
|
China's youth unemployment rate, which measures the percentage of people aged 16 to 24 who are not in school and are unemployed, has been a growing concern for the country's policymakers and economists. In July 2024, the rate [soared to 17.1%](https://www.cnbc.com/2024/08/20/chinas-youth-unemployment-soars-above-17percent-in-july.html), the highest level since the new system of record-keeping began in December 2023.
The new calculation method, introduced in late 2023, excludes those who are still in school, as more people in China are pursuing higher education amid a more competitive job market. Under the previous calculation method, the youth unemployment rate had reached a record high of 21.3% in June 2023.
The rising youth unemployment rate has been attributed to various factors, including the ongoing economic challenges, the impact of the COVID-19 pandemic, and structural changes in the labor market. As the issue continues to draw attention, this question aims to predict the youth unemployment rate for August 2024, providing insight into the short-term trajectory of this critical economic indicator.
Resolution Criteria: This question will resolve based on the youth unemployment rate for August 2024, as reported by [Trading Economics](https://tradingeconomics.com/china/youth-unemployment-rate), using data from the National Bureau of Statistics of China.
The question will resolve based on the reported youth unemployment rate, rounded to the nearest 0.1 percentage point.
Fine Print: The youth unemployment rate is defined as the percentage of the labor force aged 16-24 without work but available for and seeking employment, based on the calculation method used by the National Bureau of Statistics of China as of August 2024.
If the National Bureau of Statistics of China revises its calculation method or age range for the youth unemployment rate before September 2024, the question will be resolved using the most up-to-date definition and methodology.
In the event that Trading Economics does not report the youth unemployment rate for August 2024 before October 7, 2024, or if the data is not available from the National Bureau of Statistics of China (NBS), the question will resolve as "Annulled". The data can be found [directly from the NBS here](https://data.stats.gov.cn/english/easyquery.htm?cn=A01) by selecting "The Urban Surveyed Unemployment Rate" under "Indicators" on the left side and observing the data in the row labeled "The Urban Surveyed Unemployment Rate of the Population Aged from 16 to 24 Excluding Students(%)".
|
2024-09-06T14:30:00Z
|
2024-09-07T14:30:00Z
|
2024-09-20T11:31:00Z
|
no
|
METACULUS
|
meta-27933
|
Will China's youth unemployment rate be greater than 16.0 and less than or equal to 17.0 for August 2024?
|
China's youth unemployment rate, which measures the percentage of people aged 16 to 24 who are not in school and are unemployed, has been a growing concern for the country's policymakers and economists. In July 2024, the rate [soared to 17.1%](https://www.cnbc.com/2024/08/20/chinas-youth-unemployment-soars-above-17percent-in-july.html), the highest level since the new system of record-keeping began in December 2023.
The new calculation method, introduced in late 2023, excludes those who are still in school, as more people in China are pursuing higher education amid a more competitive job market. Under the previous calculation method, the youth unemployment rate had reached a record high of 21.3% in June 2023.
The rising youth unemployment rate has been attributed to various factors, including the ongoing economic challenges, the impact of the COVID-19 pandemic, and structural changes in the labor market. As the issue continues to draw attention, this question aims to predict the youth unemployment rate for August 2024, providing insight into the short-term trajectory of this critical economic indicator.
Resolution Criteria: This question will resolve based on the youth unemployment rate for August 2024, as reported by [Trading Economics](https://tradingeconomics.com/china/youth-unemployment-rate), using data from the National Bureau of Statistics of China.
The question will resolve based on the reported youth unemployment rate, rounded to the nearest 0.1 percentage point.
Fine Print: The youth unemployment rate is defined as the percentage of the labor force aged 16-24 without work but available for and seeking employment, based on the calculation method used by the National Bureau of Statistics of China as of August 2024.
If the National Bureau of Statistics of China revises its calculation method or age range for the youth unemployment rate before September 2024, the question will be resolved using the most up-to-date definition and methodology.
In the event that Trading Economics does not report the youth unemployment rate for August 2024 before October 7, 2024, or if the data is not available from the National Bureau of Statistics of China (NBS), the question will resolve as "Annulled". The data can be found [directly from the NBS here](https://data.stats.gov.cn/english/easyquery.htm?cn=A01) by selecting "The Urban Surveyed Unemployment Rate" under "Indicators" on the left side and observing the data in the row labeled "The Urban Surveyed Unemployment Rate of the Population Aged from 16 to 24 Excluding Students(%)".
|
2024-09-06T14:30:00Z
|
2024-09-07T14:30:00Z
|
2024-09-20T11:31:00Z
|
no
|
METACULUS
|
meta-27932
|
Will China's youth unemployment rate be less than or equal to 16.0 for August 2024?
|
China's youth unemployment rate, which measures the percentage of people aged 16 to 24 who are not in school and are unemployed, has been a growing concern for the country's policymakers and economists. In July 2024, the rate [soared to 17.1%](https://www.cnbc.com/2024/08/20/chinas-youth-unemployment-soars-above-17percent-in-july.html), the highest level since the new system of record-keeping began in December 2023.
The new calculation method, introduced in late 2023, excludes those who are still in school, as more people in China are pursuing higher education amid a more competitive job market. Under the previous calculation method, the youth unemployment rate had reached a record high of 21.3% in June 2023.
The rising youth unemployment rate has been attributed to various factors, including the ongoing economic challenges, the impact of the COVID-19 pandemic, and structural changes in the labor market. As the issue continues to draw attention, this question aims to predict the youth unemployment rate for August 2024, providing insight into the short-term trajectory of this critical economic indicator.
Resolution Criteria: This question will resolve based on the youth unemployment rate for August 2024, as reported by [Trading Economics](https://tradingeconomics.com/china/youth-unemployment-rate), using data from the National Bureau of Statistics of China.
The question will resolve based on the reported youth unemployment rate, rounded to the nearest 0.1 percentage point.
Fine Print: The youth unemployment rate is defined as the percentage of the labor force aged 16-24 without work but available for and seeking employment, based on the calculation method used by the National Bureau of Statistics of China as of August 2024.
If the National Bureau of Statistics of China revises its calculation method or age range for the youth unemployment rate before September 2024, the question will be resolved using the most up-to-date definition and methodology.
In the event that Trading Economics does not report the youth unemployment rate for August 2024 before October 7, 2024, or if the data is not available from the National Bureau of Statistics of China (NBS), the question will resolve as "Annulled". The data can be found [directly from the NBS here](https://data.stats.gov.cn/english/easyquery.htm?cn=A01) by selecting "The Urban Surveyed Unemployment Rate" under "Indicators" on the left side and observing the data in the row labeled "The Urban Surveyed Unemployment Rate of the Population Aged from 16 to 24 Excluding Students(%)".
|
2024-09-06T14:30:00Z
|
2024-09-07T14:30:00Z
|
2024-09-20T11:30:00Z
|
no
|
METACULUS
|
meta-27920
|
Before October 1, 2024, will Ethiopia and Somalia announce an agreement settling their dispute over the Somaliland port deal?
|
A third round of talks between Ethiopia and Somalia [is scheduled](https://www.thereporterethiopia.com/41513/) to begin in Ankara, Turkey on September 17, 2024. The second round [ended](https://www.reuters.com/world/africa/second-round-somalia-ethiopia-talks-turkey-ends-with-no-deal-progress-made-2024-08-13/) on August 20, 2024 without an agreement.
Landlocked Ethiopia is seeking access to the sea, and it signed an [agreement](https://moderndiplomacy.eu/2024/01/05/the-world-shames-ethiopia-over-recognizing-somaliland/) with Somaliland in which Somaliland offered Ethiopia a 20-year lease on the port of Berbera in exchange for Ethiopia's eventual recognition of Somaliland:
<img src="https://moderndiplomacy.eu/wp-content/uploads/2024/01/ethiopia-somaliland.jpg" />
Somaliland is an unrecognized country, and Ethiopia's recognition would be the first time a UN member state has recognized it, which would be a big step toward it normalizing its status in the international community. For its part, Somalia considers Somaliland to be part of its sovereign territory and the government in Hargeisa not entitled to sign the deal. The agreement has [angered](https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2024/1/6/why-is-somalia-angry-about-neighbouring-ethiopias-new-port-deal) Mogadishu, which views it as an attack on its sovereignty, leading to sharply increased tensions.
According to [Foreign Policy](https://foreignpolicy.com/2024/08/21/somalia-ethiopia-turkey-port-somaliland/) (FP) ([archived link](https://archive.ph/SwsUP)):
>Turkey, which has trade and defense ties with both nations and is vying for increased influence in the Horn of Africa, was reportedly asked to intervene by Ethiopian Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed. In a call with the Turkish president, Somali President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud said his country was ready to “engage in economic and development cooperation with Ethiopia” but insisted that “such partnerships must always respect Somalia’s sovereignty, unity, and territorial integrity, and adhere to international law and norms.”
>Turkish Foreign Affairs Minister Hakan Fidan separately met his counterparts, Ahmed Moallim Fiqi from Somalia and Taye Atske Selassie from Ethiopia, on Aug. 13 in Turkey’s capital, Ankara. Fidan told a news conference that there was now “convergence on some major principles.”
See also:
- [Will Ethiopia formally recognise Somaliland in 2024?](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/21138/somaliland-recognition-by-ethiopia-in-2024/)
- [Will there be at least 200 military conflict deaths between Ethiopia, Somalia, and Somaliland in 2024?](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/21137/ethiopia-somalia-somaliland-casualties/)
Resolution Criteria: This question resolves as **Yes** if the governments of Ethiopia and Somalia publicly announce an agreement (acknowledged by both sides) settling their dispute over the [Ethiopia–Somaliland memorandum of understanding](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/2024_Ethiopia%E2%80%93Somaliland_memorandum_of_understanding), according to [credible sources](https://www.metaculus.com/help/faq/#definitions), before October 1, 2024.
If this event does not happen before that date, this question resolves as **No**.
Fine Print: To be clear, the agreement itself need not be entirely public, merely the announcement of its existence and the fact that it settles the Somalian objection to the Ethiopia-Somaliland agreement. The terms offered by Addis Ababa are also not relevant to the question, as long as Somalia is no longer in opposition to the situation.
|
2024-09-06T14:30:00Z
|
2024-09-07T14:30:00Z
|
2024-10-01T22:36:00Z
|
no
|
METACULUS
|
meta-27919
|
Will Edmundo González be deprived of liberty before October 1, 2024?
|
[The Economist reports](https://www.economist.com/the-world-in-brief) that
> A court in Venezuela issued an arrest warrant for Edmundo González. Mr González claims, legitimately, that he defeated President Nicolás Maduro in the presidential election in July. Since stealing the election, Mr Maduro has cracked down on dissent. Mr González, who is in hiding, has been charged with “usurpation”, conspiracy and sabotage.
[According to Reuters](https://www.reuters.com/world/americas/venezuela-attorney-general-requests-arrest-warrant-opposition-leader-gonzalez-2024-09-02/):
>Lawyers consulted by Reuters said that Venezuelan law does not allow those over 70 to serve sentences in jails, instead requiring house arrest. Gonzalez, who turned 75 last week, is married and has two daughters; one lives in Caracas and the other lives in Madrid.
>
>The U.S. has drafted a list of about 60 Venezuelan government officials and family members who could be sanctioned in the first punitive measures following the election, two people close to the matter told Reuters.
>
>. . .
>
>The warrant request came hours after the Biden administration said an aircraft used by Maduro had been confiscated in the Dominican Republic after determining that its purchase violated U.S. sanctions, a move the Venezuelan government slammed as an act of "piracy."
Resolution Criteria: This question resolves **Yes** if Edmundo González is reported by credible sources to be deprived of liberty (detained, arrested, kidnapped, etc.) in any way, by any entity at any time before October 1, 2024.
Fine Print: If Edmundo González is reported to die, this question will be **annulled**. Similarly, staying in hiding does not for the sake of this question count as a deprivation of liberty. The intent of the question is to capture whether anyone will be willing and able to enforce the court order.
González does not need to remain detained by October 1, as long as it has happened at some point before then. Thus, if he is let go, escapes, or dies during detainment this question still resolves **Yes**.
|
2024-09-04T14:30:00Z
|
2024-09-05T14:30:00Z
|
2024-10-01T22:34:00Z
|
no
|
METACULUS
|
meta-27918
|
Will Starliner Calypso undock from ISS before September 16?
|
The Boeing Starliner Spacecraft 3 (named Calypso) brought astronauts Wilmore and Williams to what was intended to be a brief stay at the ISS, [according to The Economist](https://www.economist.com/united-states/2024/08/22/nasa-insists-that-two-astronauts-are-not-stranded-in-space):
> Mr Wilmore and Ms Williams arrived at the ISS aboard the first crewed flight of Boeing's Starliner. What was meant to be an eight-day stay is approaching the three-month mark after their capsule leaked helium and five of its 28 thrusters malfunctioned.
After weeks of deliberation, NASA has decided to [not let the two astronauts ride home on the Starliner that got them there](https://arstechnica.com/space/2024/08/its-official-nasa-calls-on-crew-dragon-to-rescue-the-starliner-astronauts/):
> Instead, the agency has asked SpaceX to use its Crew Dragon spacecraft to fly astronauts Butch Wilmore and Suni Williams back to Earth.
>
> [...] no earlier than September 24, a Crew Dragon spacecraft will launch with two astronauts to the space station with two empty seats. Wilmore and Williams will join these two Crew-9 astronauts for their previously scheduled six-month increment on the space station. All four will then return to Earth on the Crew Dragon vehicle.
This leaves the Starliner capsule hanging onto a space station with no purpose.
> Therefore, Boeing's Starliner spacecraft will undock from the station early next month—the tentative date, according to a source, is September 6—and attempt to make an autonomous return to Earth and land in a desert in the southwestern United States.
Boeing wants the Starliner back to see if they can learn more about what went wrong, but it's not entirely clear whether its software is capable of an autonomous precision deorbit.
Since NASA are aiming for an "early September" undocking, this question asks whether it will happen in the first half of September.
Resolution Criteria: If credible sources report that Starliner has undocked from the ISS before September 16, 2024, this question resolves as **Yes** Otherwise it resolves **No**.
|
2024-09-04T14:30:00Z
|
2024-09-05T14:30:00Z
|
2024-09-07T16:45:00Z
|
yes
|
METACULUS
|
meta-27914
|
Will The Bear win the 2024 Primetime Emmy Award for Outstanding Comedy Series?
|
The Bear is on FX. Other nominees are: Abbott Elementary (ABC), Curb Your Enthusiasm (HBO), Hacks (Max), Only Murders in the Building (Hulu), Palm Royale (Apple TV+), Reservation Dogs (FX), and What We Do in the Shadows (FX).
Resolution Criteria: This question resolves as **Yes** if the TV series The Bear wins the 2024 Primetime Emmy Award for Outstanding Comedy Series. The resolution source will be the Wikipedia page [76th Primetime Emmy Awards](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/76th_Primetime_Emmy_Awards) or other [credible sources](https://www.metaculus.com/help/faq/#definitions) reporting on the awards ceremony. If this does not happen, this question closes as **No**.
Fine Print: The 2024 Primetime Emmy Awards show is scheduled for September 15, 2024.
|
2024-09-04T14:30:00Z
|
2024-09-05T14:30:00Z
|
2024-09-16T12:32:00Z
|
no
|
METACULUS
|
meta-27913
|
Will "Rockstar" by Lisa win the award for Best K-Pop at the 2024 MTV VMAs?
|
Notable other nominees are "Seven" by Jungkook featuring Latto and "Lalalala" by Stray Kids.
Resolution Criteria: This question resolves as **Yes** if "Rockstar" by Lisa wins the Best K-Pop award at the 2024 MTV Video Music Awards. The resolution source will be the Wikipedia page [2024 MTV Video Music Awards
](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/2024_MTV_Video_Music_Awards) or other credible sources reporting on this awards ceremony. If this does not happen, this question closes as **No**.
Fine Print: The awards show is scheduled for September 10, 2024.
|
2024-09-04T14:30:00Z
|
2024-09-05T14:30:00Z
|
2024-09-12T11:21:00Z
|
yes
|
METACULUS
|
meta-27912
|
Before October 1, 2024, will Tech Crunch report new layoffs at Amazon?
|
Amazon had lay off events listed by Tech Crunch in January and February 2024.
Resolution Criteria: This question resolves as **Yes** if, according to Tech Crunch's tracker "A comprehensive list of 2024 tech layoffs," which can be accessed [here](https://techcrunch.com/2024/08/07/tech-layoffs-2024-list/), Amazon has layoffs following the launch of this question and before October 1, 2024, To resolve the question, a Metaculus Admin will go to the Tech Crunch link on October 1, 2024 and see if Amazon appears for August 2024 or September 2024. If Amazon is not listed as having a layoff event under those months, then this question resolves as **No**.
Fine Print: Tech Crunch's "comprehensive list of 2024 tech layoffs" will be the sole source used for resolution of this question, regardless of information from other sources. If a layoff event appears in the time period listed, this question resolves as Yes, and if not, it resolves as No.
According to Tech Crunch, "Below you’ll find a comprehensive list of all the known layoffs in tech that have occurred in 2024, to be updated regularly." Admins to resolve this question will only be looking to see what is on the page at the time of resolution. If Tech Crunch ceases to publish updates on the resolution source following the launch of this question (regardless of what can be found elsewhere on the Tech Crunch website), this question resolves as **No**.
For ease of resolution, in this series of questions, in order to count the Tech Crunch page must specifically list the company in question, which in this case is Amazon. This is true regardless of subsidiaries or ownerships. So for example, a question on Microsoft must specifically mention Microsoft, and a layoff event at LinkedIn will not count for purposes of this question (unless the subheading mentions Microsoft), even though LinkedIn is owned by Microsoft.
|
2024-09-04T14:30:00Z
|
2024-09-05T14:30:00Z
|
2024-10-01T23:15:00Z
|
no
|
METACULUS
|
meta-27911
|
Will Catalent, Inc., file its 10-K annual report with the SEC before October 1, 2024?
|
On August 29, 2024, Catalent, Inc., received a [notification](https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1596783/000119312524211099/d887351dnt10k.htm) of failure to file its annual report.
Resolution Criteria: This question resolves as **Yes** if there is a Form 10-K filed for the fiscal year ended June 30, 2024, for Catalent, Inc., at [this specific SEC Edgar link](https://www.sec.gov/cgi-bin/browse-edgar?CIK=0001596783&owner=exclude). If there is no such 10-K filed before October 1, 2024, this question resolves as **No**.
Fine Print: For purposes of this question, in order to facilitate streamlined resolution no other resolution source will be considered, so forecasters are urged to predict accordingly. If SEC's Edgar site is down, resolution will wait for up to 7 days. If the resolution source link remains inaccessible after that time for any reason (including the SEC discontinuing its "Classic version"), this question resolves as No.
|
2024-09-04T14:30:00Z
|
2024-09-05T14:30:00Z
|
2024-09-14T02:21:00Z
|
yes
|
METACULUS
|
meta-27898
|
Will Edmundo González be deprived of liberty before October 1, 2024?
|
[The Economist reports](https://www.economist.com/the-world-in-brief) that
> A court in Venezuela issued an arrest warrant for Edmundo González. Mr González claims, legitimately, that he defeated President Nicolás Maduro in the presidential election in July. Since stealing the election, Mr Maduro has cracked down on dissent. Mr González, who is in hiding, has been charged with “usurpation”, conspiracy and sabotage.
[According to Reuters](https://www.reuters.com/world/americas/venezuela-attorney-general-requests-arrest-warrant-opposition-leader-gonzalez-2024-09-02/):
>Lawyers consulted by Reuters said that Venezuelan law does not allow those over 70 to serve sentences in jails, instead requiring house arrest. Gonzalez, who turned 75 last week, is married and has two daughters; one lives in Caracas and the other lives in Madrid.
>
>The U.S. has drafted a list of about 60 Venezuelan government officials and family members who could be sanctioned in the first punitive measures following the election, two people close to the matter told Reuters.
>
>. . .
>
>The warrant request came hours after the Biden administration said an aircraft used by Maduro had been confiscated in the Dominican Republic after determining that its purchase violated U.S. sanctions, a move the Venezuelan government slammed as an act of "piracy."
Resolution Criteria: This question resolves **Yes** if Edmundo González is reported by credible sources to be deprived of liberty (detained, arrested, kidnapped, etc.) in any way, by any entity at any time before October 1, 2024.
Fine Print: If Edmundo González is reported to die, this question will be **annulled**. Similarly, staying in hiding does not for the sake of this question count as a deprivation of liberty. The intent of the question is to capture whether anyone will be willing and able to enforce the court order.
González does not need to remain detained by October 1, as long as it has happened at some point before then. Thus, if he is let go, escapes, or dies during detainment this question still resolves **Yes**.
|
2024-09-04T14:30:00Z
|
2024-09-30T10:00:00Z
|
2024-10-01T15:04:00Z
|
no
|
METACULUS
|
meta-27897
|
Will Russia start a second mobilization wave before October 1, 2024, according to the Institute for the Study of War?
|
According to the ISW:
> ISW continues to assess that Putin is likely aware that a second mobilization wave would be widely unpopular and is concerned that such a measure would generate widespread discontent
[RUSSIAN OFFENSIVE CAMPAIGN ASSESSMENT](https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-february-25-2024), February 25, 2024.
[According to Wikipedia:](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/2022_Russian_mobilization)
> On 21 September 2022, seven months into the Russian invasion of Ukraine, Russia declared a partial mobilization of military reservists. The decision was made a day after the announcement of the Russian annexation of the DPR, LPR, Kherson and Zaporizhzhia oblasts.
> The announcement of mobilization was seen as a significant escalation of Russia's military efforts in the war with Ukraine. Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu announced that Russia had a "huge mobilization reserve" and planned to mobilize 300,000 recruits. The precise details of the mobilization plans are currently unclear, however, as the exact number of people to be mobilized is classified.
> On 28 October, Shoigu told Russian president Vladimir Putin that mobilization had been completed, which was followed an announcement by Putin of its completion.
As of this question's writing, there is a lot of uncertainty about second wave of mobilization. On one hand, [Russia suffered staggering losses](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/11243/russian-military-deaths-by-2024/), and Ukraine plans to [mobilize 500'000 more troops](https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/ukraines-military-asks-additional-450000-500000-people-be-mobilised-zelenskiy-2023-12-19/) this year. On the other hand, [Russia probably recruited 400'000 troops last year](https://t.me/medvedev_telegram/402) and plans [to do the same this year](https://www.themoscowtimes.com/2023/12/22/how-russian-officials-plan-to-recruit-400k-new-contract-soldiers-in-2024-a83509).
Related Question on Metaculus: [Will Russia start another wave of mobilization before the following dates?](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/14006/russia-2nd-wave-of-mobilization)
Resolution Criteria: This question will be resolve as **Yes** if, before October 1, 2024, the [Institute for the Study of War](https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/ukraine-conflict-updates) (ISW) reports that a second wave of mobilization is underway in Russia. If this event does not happen, this question will resolve as **No**.
Fine Print: * For this resolution, "mobilization" is defined as the formal conscription or summoning of reservists by the Russian government, as explicitly recognized and reported by ISW. This includes actions officially declared by the government such as a "partial mobilization." However, this does not include unofficial recruitments often referred to as "[crypto-mobilization](https://politics.stackexchange.com/questions/75547/what-is-crypto-mobilization)" or "self-mobilization," or any form of volunteer enlistment. The resolution will rely solely on ISW’s characterization of the mobilization as formally acknowledged by the Russian government.
* If the Institute for the Study of War writes that the next wave of mobilization has not only begun, but has already ended, then this also resolves as Yes.
* ISW will be the sole source used for resolution of this question. If ISW ceases to operate or ceases to publish the relevant updates following the launch of this question, it may resolve as Annulled. Metaculus will determine appropriate resolution based on its assessment of ISW's publications. However, unless ISW’s coverage on the topic is discontinued in this manner, if no official mobilization is reported by ISW before October 1, 2024, then this question will resolve as No.
|
2024-09-03T14:30:00Z
|
2024-09-04T14:30:00Z
|
2024-10-01T21:11:00Z
|
no
|
METACULUS
|
meta-27895
|
Will Alexandre de Moraes cease to be a minister of the Supreme Federal Court of Brazil before October 1, 2024?
|
After shutting down X in Brazil, [Alexandre de Moraes](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Alexandre_de_Moraes), a minister of the Supreme Federal Court, has [been accused](https://www.americasquarterly.org/article/brazils-most-powerful-judge-is-in-the-spotlight-again/) by certain Brazilian voters and international observers including [Elon Musk](https://www.voanews.com/a/alexandre-de-moraes-brazil-judge-in-feud-with-elon-musk/7766449.html) of having unduly influenced the Brazilian General elections in 2022, among other criticisms. As a result, certain political groups have called for de Moraes's impeachment and prosecution.
Judges on the Supreme Federal Court [are appointed](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Supreme_Federal_Court) for life, with a mandatory retirement age of 75. (De Moraes is 55.) For an overview of how a hypothetical impeachment process might play out, please see [The Impeachment of Authorities in Brazil explained](https://www.lickslegal.com/post/the-impeachment-of-authorities-in-brazil-explained).
See Also
- Politico: [Top Brazilian judge orders suspension of X platform in Brazil amid feud with Musk](https://www.politico.com/news/2024/08/30/top-brazilian-judge-orders-suspension-of-x-00176920)
- AFP: [Musk vs. Brazil Supreme Court: five things to know](https://www.france24.com/en/live-news/20240410-musk-vs-brazil-supreme-court-five-things-to-know)
- New York Times: [He Is Brazil’s Defender of Democracy. Is He Actually Good for Democracy? Alexandre de Moraes, a Brazilian Supreme Court justice, was crucial to Brazil’s transfer of power. But his aggressive tactics are prompting debate: Can one go too far to fight the far right?](https://www.nytimes.com/2023/01/22/world/americas/brazil-alexandre-de-moraes.html)
Resolution Criteria: This question resolves as **Yes** if Alexandre de Moraes ceases to be a minister on the Supreme Federal Court of Brazil before October 1, 2024, according to [credible sources](https://www.metaculus.com/help/faq/#definitions), whether through impeachment, resignation, retirement, or any other reason. If this event does not occur before that date, this question resolves as **No**.
Fine Print: Please note that temporarily leaving his role, such as suspension from office during an impeachment trial, taking an extended leave of absence, or being temporarily incapacitated, will not count.
In case of any dispute about whether de Moraes has ceased to be a Supreme Federal Court minister, the confirmation of a successor would count as the definitive evidence. Generally, however, Admins will seek to resolve the question based on credible source reporting.
|
2024-09-03T14:30:00Z
|
2024-09-04T14:30:00Z
|
2024-10-01T21:19:00Z
|
no
|
METACULUS
|
meta-27887
|
Will Baby Reindeer win the 2024 Primetime Emmy Award for Outstanding Limited or Anthology Series?
|
Baby Reindeer is on Netflix. Other contenders are: Fargo (FX), Lessons in Chemistry (Apple TV+), Ripley (Netflix), and True Detective: Night Country (HBO)
Resolution Criteria: This question resolves as **Yes** if the TV series Baby Reindeer wins the 2024 Primetime Emmy Award for Outstanding Limited or Anthology Series. The resolution source will be the Wikipedia page [76th Primetime Emmy Awards](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/76th_Primetime_Emmy_Awards) or other [credible sources](https://www.metaculus.com/help/faq/#definitions) reporting on the awards ceremony. If this does not happen, this question closes as **No**.
Fine Print: The 2024 Primetime Emmy Awards show is scheduled for September 15, 2024.
|
2024-09-02T14:30:00Z
|
2024-09-03T14:30:00Z
|
2024-09-16T12:31:00Z
|
yes
|
METACULUS
|
meta-27886
|
Will Taylor Swift win 4 or more awards at the 2024 MTV Video Music Awards?
|
Taylor Swift has, at the time of this question, been nominated for the following 10 awards: Video of the Year, Song of the Year, Artist of the Year, Best Collaboration, Best Pop, Best Visual Effects, Best Editing, Best Direction, Best Art Direction, and Best Cinematography.
Resolution Criteria: This question resolves as **Yes** if Taylor Swift wins at least 4 awards at the 2024 MTV Video Music Awards. The resolution source will be the Wikipedia page [2024 MTV Video Music Awards
](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/2024_MTV_Video_Music_Awards) or other credible sources reporting on this awards ceremony. If this does not happen, this question closes as **No**.
Fine Print: The awards show is scheduled for September 10, 2024. For purposes of this question, any award, including special awards such as the Global Icon Award or the Video Vanguard Award, will count.
|
2024-09-02T14:30:00Z
|
2024-09-03T14:30:00Z
|
2024-09-12T11:24:00Z
|
yes
|
METACULUS
|
meta-27885
|
Will Super Micro Computer, Inc., file its 10-K annual report with the SEC before October 1, 2024?
|
On August 30, 2024, Super Micro Computer, Inc., received a [notification](https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1375365/000137536524000031/smci-form12bx25nt10xkx2024.htm) of failure to file its annual report.
Resolution Criteria: This question resolves as **Yes** if there is a Form 10-K filed for the fiscal year ended June 30, 2024, for Super Micro Computer, Inc., at [this specific SEC Edgar link](https://www.sec.gov/cgi-bin/browse-edgar?CIK=0001375365&owner=exclude). If there is no such 10-K filed before October 1, 2024, this question resolves as **No**.
Fine Print: For purposes of this question, in order to facilitate streamlined resolution no other resolution source will be considered, so forecasters are urged to predict accordingly. If SEC's Edgar site is down, resolution will wait for up to 7 days. If the resolution source link remains inaccessible after that time for any reason (including the SEC discontinuing its "Classic version"), this question resolves as No.
|
2024-09-02T14:30:00Z
|
2024-09-03T14:30:00Z
|
2024-10-01T12:54:00Z
|
no
|
METACULUS
|
meta-27877
|
Will there be a frontier open-source AI model on October 1, 2024?
|
*This question was written in partnership with the [Effective Institutions Project](https://effectiveinstitutionsproject.org/).*
This question aims to shed light on whether the gap between leading AI labs' models and open-source models is likely to grow, shrink, or stay roughly the same.
Throughout the last couple of years, open-source models have not quite been at the cutting edge of large language models, but they have also not been far behind. (Note: this question was written in September 2023.) For instance, [Cottier (2022)](https://forum.effectivealtruism.org/posts/nc3JFZbqnzWWAPkmz/understanding-the-diffusion-of-large-language-models-summary-1) estimates that there was a gap of 23 months between the release of GPT-3, then the best large language model to date, and the release of an open-source model that was as good as GPT-3.
Chatbot Arena is a [benchmarking platform for large language models (LLMs)](https://lmsys.org/blog/2023-05-03-arena/). It uses an Elo rating system, similar to the one used in chess, to rank LLMs by their capabilities. Rankings are based on user ratings of different LLM systems. Note that it generally takes about a month for a model to get an Arena rating after its release.
Resolution Criteria: Each subquestion resolves as **Yes** if, on October 1, 2024, an open-source model (i.e., a model with a license that is anything other than “proprietary”) is either:
* Top 3 on the [chat.lmsys.org](chat.lmsys.org) leaderboard when [ranked by Arena ELO, MMLU, or MT-bench](https://huggingface.co/spaces/lmsys/chatbot-arena-leaderboard).
* Within 50 rating points of the #1 ranked model by [Arena ELO](https://huggingface.co/spaces/lmsys/chatbot-arena-leaderboard) rating on the [chat.lmsys.org](chat.lmsys.org) leaderboard.
Fine Print: Chatbot Arena in its present form is a benchmarking platform for large language models (LLMs), which are the frontier type of AI model at present. In a few years time, however, it may be the case that frontier AI models are not LLMs. If this is the case, then the resolution criteria will be adapted in a way that fits the spirit of the original wording as closely as possible. For example, if Chatbot Arena has a new subsection of its site dedicated to frontier AI models (not necessarily LLMs), where the models are ranked by Elo, then the resolution wording would be unchanged other than linking to a different part of the Chatbot Arena site. A further example: If Chatbot Arena remains focused on LLMs but another site ranks the top AI models, then the resolution will be changed to link to this other site and we will do our best to match up the original bar for resolution with the new bar, if the other site does not rank models by Elo.
|
2024-09-02T14:30:00Z
|
2024-09-03T14:30:00Z
|
2024-10-01T22:38:00Z
|
no
|
METACULUS
|
meta-27876
|
Will Russia control Pokrovsk Before October 1, 2024?
|
In the months since Russia captured Avdiivka, they have gained control of land at a relatively steady pace on the [eastern frontline](https://archive.ph/ABnN0), though likely at high personnel costs. If the city of Pokrovsk is captured, Ukraine will have mounting difficulties controlling Russian advances in DONETSK Oblast. A recent Ukrainian offensive in Kursk has not appeared to slow Russian momentum near Pokrovsk.
Resolution Criteria: This question will resolve as **yes** if the coordinates in Pokrovsk of 48°17'12.9"N 37°10'39.8"E are assessed as under Russian control according to [this Institute for the Study of War map](https://storymaps.arcgis.com/stories/36a7f6a6f5a9448496de641cf64bd375) before October 1, 2024. This question will resolve as **no** otherwise.
Fine Print: If Ukraine or Russia cease to exist, this question will resolve as **ambiguous**.
If the ISW ceases to update maps (at least weekly) or ceases to exist, [DeepStateMap](https://deepstatemap.live/en#14/48.2869053/37.1777344) will be used instead.
|
2024-09-02T14:30:00Z
|
2024-09-03T14:30:00Z
|
2024-10-01T22:40:00Z
|
no
|
METACULUS
|
meta-27804
|
Will Pavel Durov leave France before October 1, 2024?
|
Pavel Durov is a Russian enterpreneur, founder of several projects, most known for VK social networking site, Telegram messaging app and TON blockchain network.
He left Russia in 2014 and was forced to sell VK after refusing to give Russian state agencies access to private user messages. He went on to found Telegram messaging app which faced similar issues, and was blocked in Russia after refusal to provide encryption keys to FSB, which led to several years of whack-a-mole game between Roskomnadzor and Telegram, former trying to prevent access to latter, and Telegram [winning this game in 2020](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Blocking_of_Telegram_in_Russia), when Roskomnadzor officially gave up.
Reportedly, neither Russian nor Western intelligence agencies currently have access to Telegram encryption keys and *encrypted* user messages. Pavel Durov [was arrested in France on August 24](https://www.nytimes.com/2024/08/25/technology/pavel-durov-telegram-detained-france.html) during his private jet emergency refueling stop, on accounts of assisting terrorism and drug trafficking (and some others, totaling 20) by refusing to provide Telegram encryption keys to French state agencies.
Resolution Criteria: This questions resolves as **Yes** if [credible sources](https://www.metaculus.com/help/faq/#definitions) report before October 1, 2024, that Pavel Durov has left France. If no such report is made before deadline, question resolves as **No**.
Fine Print: * Durov's legal status does not affect resolution of this question (e.g. being extradited counts as Yes).
* Duration of leave does not affect question resolution either (a reported overnight trip to London, then back to France counts as **Yes**).
* If Pavel Durov goes missing or dies in France before October 1, 2024, this question should be **Annulled**
|
2024-08-30T14:30:00Z
|
2024-08-31T14:30:00Z
|
2024-10-01T22:46:00Z
|
no
|
METACULUS
|
meta-27797
|
Will Starliner Calypso undock from ISS before September 16?
|
The Boeing Starliner Spacecraft 3 (named Calypso) brought astronauts Wilmore and Williams to what was intended to be a brief stay at the ISS, [according to The Economist](https://www.economist.com/united-states/2024/08/22/nasa-insists-that-two-astronauts-are-not-stranded-in-space):
> Mr Wilmore and Ms Williams arrived at the ISS aboard the first crewed flight of Boeing's Starliner. What was meant to be an eight-day stay is approaching the three-month mark after their capsule leaked helium and five of its 28 thrusters malfunctioned.
After weeks of deliberation, NASA has decided to [not let the two astronauts ride home on the Starliner that got them there](https://arstechnica.com/space/2024/08/its-official-nasa-calls-on-crew-dragon-to-rescue-the-starliner-astronauts/):
> Instead, the agency has asked SpaceX to use its Crew Dragon spacecraft to fly astronauts Butch Wilmore and Suni Williams back to Earth.
>
> [...] no earlier than September 24, a Crew Dragon spacecraft will launch with two astronauts to the space station with two empty seats. Wilmore and Williams will join these two Crew-9 astronauts for their previously scheduled six-month increment on the space station. All four will then return to Earth on the Crew Dragon vehicle.
This leaves the Starliner capsule hanging onto a space station with no purpose.
> Therefore, Boeing's Starliner spacecraft will undock from the station early next month—the tentative date, according to a source, is September 6—and attempt to make an autonomous return to Earth and land in a desert in the southwestern United States.
Boeing wants the Starliner back to see if they can learn more about what went wrong, but it's not entirely clear whether its software is capable of an autonomous precision deorbit.
Since NASA are aiming for an "early September" undocking, this question asks whether it will happen in the first half of September.
Resolution Criteria: If credible sources report that Starliner has undocked from the ISS before September 16, 2024, this question resolves as **Yes** Otherwise it resolves **No**.
|
2024-09-04T14:30:00Z
|
2024-09-09T10:00:00Z
|
2024-09-06T22:06:00Z
|
yes
|
METACULUS
|
meta-27791
|
Will cannabis be removed from Schedule I of the Controlled Substance Act before September 30, 2024?
|
According to Victoria Litman, M.Div., J.D., LL.M. writing at Harvard Law School's [Bill of Health blog](https://blog.petrieflom.law.harvard.edu/2024/05/28/what-you-need-to-know-about-marijuana-rescheduling/):
>On May 21, 2024, the Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) published a Notice of Proposed Rulemaking (NPRM) signed by Attorney General Merrick Garland in the Federal Register. This publication kicks off a 62-day comment period on a rule that would move marijuana to Schedule 3 of the Controlled Substances Act (CSA), classifying it as a substance with “a moderate to low potential for physical and psychological dependence.” The process of rescheduling may be long and is unlikely to create a pathway to federal compliance for state-legal marijuana businesses without further federal legislation. Ultimately, Congress likely will need to clarify the division of federal and state regulatory powers over cannabis.
Resolution Criteria: This question will resolve Yes if, before September 30, 2024, marijuana is officially classified as something other than a schedule I drug in the US. If it is later reclassified as a schedule I drug, the question still resolves Yes.
|
2024-08-29T14:30:00Z
|
2024-08-30T14:30:00Z
|
2024-10-01T22:50:00Z
|
no
|
METACULUS
|
meta-27790
|
Will OpenAI announce GPT-5 before September 30, 2024?
|
On May 13, 2024, OpenAI announced its latest flagship model in the [GPT](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/ChatGPT) family, GPT-4o. Please find its product announcement [here](https://openai.com/index/hello-gpt-4o/).
Resolution Criteria: This question resolves as **Yes** if OpenAI publishes a document (e.g., a blog post, paper, or video, but not a tweet) announcing the existence of GPT-5. Otherwise it resolves as **No**. Metaculus admins will be consulted should there be any ambiguity.
Fine Print: * For the purposes of this question GPT-5 will be considered to exist if the document published by OpenAI describes some performance results from GPT-5 or states that GPT-5 has been created. A reference to progress in training or developing GPT-5 would not qualify on its own. If OpenAI publishes some performance results from GPT-5 and states that GPT-5 is still undergoing some form of training or testing this question will resolve as **Yes**.
* The model must be announced by OpenAI, or any entity which legally acquires or merges with OpenAI. If Microsoft or any other entity exercises its existing rights or purchases rights such that it announces a model called "GPT-5" or claimed to be a successor to GPT-4 but without having legally acquired or merged with OpenAI it will **not** be sufficient.
* If OpenAI does not explicitly refer to a potentially qualifying model as GPT-5, Metaculus may make a determination as to whether the model is generally considered to be the successor to GPT-4 that was [previously described as GPT-5](https://finance.yahoo.com/news/openai-building-next-generation-ai-173047260.html).
|
2024-08-29T14:30:00Z
|
2024-08-30T14:30:00Z
|
2024-09-30T17:07:00Z
|
no
|
METACULUS
|
meta-27789
|
Will the bubble in the Magnificent Seven pop before September 30, 2024?
|
US mega-cap stocks Apple, Microsoft, Alphabet (parent of Google), Amazon, Nvidia, Meta Platforms (Facebook), and Tesla are collectively known as [the Magnificent Seven](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Magnificent_Seven_(stocks)). At the time of writing, they are collectively worth $13.1 trillion, and their performance [has driven most of the gains in the S&P 500 over 2023](https://finance.yahoo.com/news/one-chart-shows-how-the-magnificent-7-have-dominated-the-stock-market-in-2023-203250125.html).
The Magnificent Seven's rise has left the S&P [more concentrated than at any time in the last 100 years](https://www.investopedia.com/magnificent-7-stocks-overcrowding-8576644) and prompted fears of a bubble.
On the other hand, it is possible that recent advances in artificial intelligence will generate so much profit that the Magnificent Seven's current share prices are fully justified by future cash flow.
Resolution Criteria: This question will resolve positively if at any point between now and before September 30, 2024, shares of at least four of the Magnificent Seven stocks (Apple, Microsoft, Alphabet, Amazon, Nvidia, Meta Platforms, and Tesla) close at least 50% below their all-time high.
The question shall be resolved by using the daily closing share prices available from [Yahoo Finance](https://finance.yahoo.com/) under the 'historical data' tab or, at the discretion of Metaculus admins, any other credible source of share price data.
Whatever data source is used should be adjusted for share splits, so that this question does not resolve positive just because a few of the Magnificent Seven decide to do a stock split (ie offer N new shares for each old share).
Fine Print: In case the text above isn't clear enough, an example: If Stock X's all-time high is $1,000 then it qualifies as down >50% if the share price falls below $500.
Positive resolution requires that at least four of the Magnificent Seven stocks close down >50% from their all time high. Alphabet has two traded share classes, but only counts as one out of the seven companies. Alphabet counts if either of its two traded share classes (tickers GOOG and GOOGL) is at least 50% below its all-time high.
So if GOOG is down 51% and GOOGL is down 49% and 3 other stocks in the Magnificent Seven are down >50% then this question resolves positively.
|
2024-08-29T14:30:00Z
|
2024-08-30T14:30:00Z
|
2024-09-28T12:55:00Z
|
no
|
METACULUS
|
meta-27788
|
Will Tesla increase its deliveries in Q3 2024 compared with Q2 2024?
|
In Q2 2024, Tesla delivered 443,956 vehicles. Since the beginning of 2023, Tesla's deliveries were as follows: 422,875 in Q1 2023, 466,140 in Q2 2023, 435,059 in Q3 2023, 484,507 in Q4 2023, 386,810 in Q1 2024, and 443,956 in Q2 2024.
Resolution Criteria: This question resolves as **Yes** if Tesla reports greater than 443,956 vehicles delivered for the third quarter of 2024. If it reports deliveries of 443,956 vehicles or fewer, this question resolves as **No**.
Fine Print: Resolves based on reporting from Tesla's Investor Relations site. Generally Tesla reports deliveries two days after the quarter's end, which means the report is expected October 2, 2024. If Tesla does not report these numbers before October 16, 2024, this question will be annulled.
|
2024-08-29T14:30:00Z
|
2024-08-30T14:30:00Z
|
2024-10-02T16:38:00Z
|
yes
|
METACULUS
|
meta-27783
|
Will Allan Lichtman’s September 2024 prediction of the electoral college winner for the 2024 US Presidential Election be correct?
|
Dr. Allan Lichtman’s “Keys to to the Whitehouse” model has predicted most if not all of the presidential election winners in the last 40 years. Despite this track record of success, his model is not the only robust election prediction model and in 2024, the circumstances in America can only be described as “unique”. Will this be the year in which his model fails?
For more information about the Keys including their past performance, please see Wikipedia: [The Keys to the White House](https://en.m.wikipedia.org/wiki/The_Keys_to_the_White_House)
See also:
- The [13 Keys Tracker](https://www.13keystracker.com/)
- [My prediction is COMING SOON! | Lichtman Live #70](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=_UUi73VOKR8) - Lichtman says he will make his final prediction "within a week give or take a day or two of Labor Day."
Resolution Criteria: This question resolves as **Yes** if the following two events occur:
1. Dr. Allan Lichtman makes a prediction about the 2024 US Presidential Election, specifically the winner as measured by apportioned electoral college votes won. The prediction is scheduled to be announced by Dr. Lichtman on his [YouTube channel](https://www.youtube.com/@AllanLichtmanYouTube) after September 2, 2024 and before October 1, 2024.
2. Lichtman's prediction is correct.
If Lichtman's prediction of the electoral college winner of the US Presidential Election turns out to be incorrect, this question resolves as **No**.
If Lichtman does not make his prediction before October 1, 2024, this question will be **annulled**.
Fine Print: Since 2016, Dr. Lichtman has been predicting the electoral college outcome rather than the popular vote outcome. Therefore this question will resolve based on the electoral college outcome and whether it is consistent with Lichtman’s stated prediction. If for some reason Dr. Lichtman changes his mind and predicts something else such as the popular vote outcome, then this question will be **Annulled**.
Lichtman's prediction must explicitly state which candidate he expects to win the electoral college. Vague or ambiguous statements will not be considered a valid prediction.
If a candidate is replaced after Lichtman's prediction but before the election, the question will be annulled.
In case of a disputed election, resolution will wait until the outcome is clear, and in case of inordinate delays the resolution will use the final electoral college vote counts as of the issuance of Certificates of Ascertainment, which for the 2024 election is [scheduled](https://web.archive.org/web/20240416054143/https://www.archives.gov/electoral-college/key-dates) for December 11, 2024.
Since Lichtman is predicting the winner of the electoral college, if no candidate wins 270 apportioned electoral votes (such as through a 269-269 tie or a 3rd party candidate winning electoral votes), this means there is no electoral college winner (i.e., the election [leaves the electoral college](https://www.archives.gov/electoral-college/faq#no270) and is decided by the House of Representatives) and this question will be **annulled**.
Predictions made by Lichtman after September 31, 2024 will be disregarded for purposes of this question.
If Lichtman chooses an alternative venue to his Youtube channel to make his prediction, such as doing it on a major media interview, that will count as well.
|
2024-09-03T13:28:00Z
|
2024-09-20T23:29:04.250000Z
|
2024-11-07T01:03:00Z
|
no
|
METACULUS
|
meta-27749
|
Will Alireza Firouzja win the Speed Chess Championship 2024?
|
The chess.com Speed Chess Championships for 2024 [are scheduled](https://www.chess.com/events/info/2024-speed-chess-championship) for September 6-8, 2024 in Paris France.
The four finalists are:
- Magnus Carlsen. The [#1-rated](https://www.chess.com/ratings) chess player in the world, Carlsen [won in 2023](https://www.chess.com/news/view/2023-speed-chess-championship-final-nakamura-carlsen) and also won in 2016 and 2017. In 2023 he also [achieved](https://www.chess.com/news/view/carlsen-hits-highest-blitz-rating) the highest rating in blitz chess ever on chess.com, surpassing the previous record by Hikaru Nakamura.
- Hikaru Nakamura. Nakamura won five years in a row, dominating from 2017 to 2022 and [beating Carlsen](https://www.chess.com/news/view/2022-speed-chess-championship-final-nakamura-carlsen) for the 2022 championship and losing the next year to Carlsen. This year Nakamura and Carlsen are semifinalists with different opponents and may take on each other in a final that would be be highly anticipated, if it were to take place.
- Hans Niemann. Niemann is taking on Carlsen in the semifinals. He [famously beat](https://www.hindustantimes.com/sports/others/hans-niemann-the-guy-who-s-up-against-the-world-101724162034596.html) Magnus Carlsen as black in game 3 of the 2022 Sinquefield Cup, sparking Carlsen to [accuse](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Carlsen%E2%80%93Niemann_controversy) Niemann of cheating.
- Alireza Firouzja. The 21 year-old Firouzja is taking on Nakamura in the semifinals and is notable for having [skyrocketed](https://www.chess.com/players/alireza-firouzja) to a rating of over 2,800 at a record youngest age for having achieved this feat.
Resolution Criteria: This question will resolve **Yes** if Alireza Firouzja wins the Speed Chess Championship 2024 tournament, according to the [official results](https://www.chess.com/events/2024-speed-chess-championship-main-event/results) or [credible sources](https://www.metaculus.com/help/faq/#definitions).
Fine Print: If the winner is not known before October 1, 2024 (for example due to the remainder of the tournament being cancelled or postponed for any reason), this question will resolve **No**.
|
2024-08-30T14:30:00Z
|
2024-08-31T14:30:00Z
|
2024-09-08T22:58:00Z
|
no
|
METACULUS
|
meta-27748
|
Will Hans Niemann win the Speed Chess Championship 2024?
|
The chess.com Speed Chess Championships for 2024 [are scheduled](https://www.chess.com/events/info/2024-speed-chess-championship) for September 6-8, 2024 in Paris France.
The four finalists are:
- Magnus Carlsen. The [#1-rated](https://www.chess.com/ratings) chess player in the world, Carlsen [won in 2023](https://www.chess.com/news/view/2023-speed-chess-championship-final-nakamura-carlsen) and also won in 2016 and 2017. In 2023 he also [achieved](https://www.chess.com/news/view/carlsen-hits-highest-blitz-rating) the highest rating in blitz chess ever on chess.com, surpassing the previous record by Hikaru Nakamura.
- Hikaru Nakamura. Nakamura won five years in a row, dominating from 2017 to 2022 and [beating Carlsen](https://www.chess.com/news/view/2022-speed-chess-championship-final-nakamura-carlsen) for the 2022 championship and losing the next year to Carlsen. This year Nakamura and Carlsen are semifinalists with different opponents and may take on each other in a final that would be be highly anticipated, if it were to take place.
- Hans Niemann. Niemann is taking on Carlsen in the semifinals. He [famously beat](https://www.hindustantimes.com/sports/others/hans-niemann-the-guy-who-s-up-against-the-world-101724162034596.html) Magnus Carlsen as black in game 3 of the 2022 Sinquefield Cup, sparking Carlsen to [accuse](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Carlsen%E2%80%93Niemann_controversy) Niemann of cheating.
- Alireza Firouzja. The 21 year-old Firouzja is taking on Nakamura in the semifinals and is notable for having [skyrocketed](https://www.chess.com/players/alireza-firouzja) to a rating of over 2,800 at a record youngest age for having achieved this feat.
Resolution Criteria: This question will resolve **Yes** if Hans Niemann wins the Speed Chess Championship 2024 tournament, according to the [official results](https://www.chess.com/events/2024-speed-chess-championship-main-event/results) or [credible sources](https://www.metaculus.com/help/faq/#definitions).
Fine Print: If the winner is not known before October 1, 2024 (for example due to the remainder of the tournament being cancelled or postponed for any reason), this question will resolve **No**.
|
2024-08-30T14:30:00Z
|
2024-08-31T14:30:00Z
|
2024-09-08T22:59:00Z
|
no
|
METACULUS
|
meta-27747
|
Will Hikaru Nakamura win the Speed Chess Championship 2024?
|
The chess.com Speed Chess Championships for 2024 [are scheduled](https://www.chess.com/events/info/2024-speed-chess-championship) for September 6-8, 2024 in Paris France.
The four finalists are:
- Magnus Carlsen. The [#1-rated](https://www.chess.com/ratings) chess player in the world, Carlsen [won in 2023](https://www.chess.com/news/view/2023-speed-chess-championship-final-nakamura-carlsen) and also won in 2016 and 2017. In 2023 he also [achieved](https://www.chess.com/news/view/carlsen-hits-highest-blitz-rating) the highest rating in blitz chess ever on chess.com, surpassing the previous record by Hikaru Nakamura.
- Hikaru Nakamura. Nakamura won five years in a row, dominating from 2017 to 2022 and [beating Carlsen](https://www.chess.com/news/view/2022-speed-chess-championship-final-nakamura-carlsen) for the 2022 championship and losing the next year to Carlsen. This year Nakamura and Carlsen are semifinalists with different opponents and may take on each other in a final that would be be highly anticipated, if it were to take place.
- Hans Niemann. Niemann is taking on Carlsen in the semifinals. He [famously beat](https://www.hindustantimes.com/sports/others/hans-niemann-the-guy-who-s-up-against-the-world-101724162034596.html) Magnus Carlsen as black in game 3 of the 2022 Sinquefield Cup, sparking Carlsen to [accuse](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Carlsen%E2%80%93Niemann_controversy) Niemann of cheating.
- Alireza Firouzja. The 21 year-old Firouzja is taking on Nakamura in the semifinals and is notable for having [skyrocketed](https://www.chess.com/players/alireza-firouzja) to a rating of over 2,800 at a record youngest age for having achieved this feat.
Resolution Criteria: This question will resolve **Yes** if Hikaru Nakamura wins the Speed Chess Championship 2024 tournament, according to the [official results](https://www.chess.com/events/2024-speed-chess-championship-main-event/results) or [credible sources](https://www.metaculus.com/help/faq/#definitions).
Fine Print: If the winner is not known before October 1, 2024 (for example due to the remainder of the tournament being cancelled or postponed for any reason), this question will resolve **No**.
|
2024-08-30T14:30:00Z
|
2024-08-31T14:30:00Z
|
2024-09-08T22:59:00Z
|
no
|
METACULUS
|
meta-27746
|
Will Magnus Carlsen win the Speed Chess Championship 2024?
|
The chess.com Speed Chess Championships for 2024 [are scheduled](https://www.chess.com/events/info/2024-speed-chess-championship) for September 6-8, 2024 in Paris France.
The four finalists are:
- Magnus Carlsen. The [#1-rated](https://www.chess.com/ratings) chess player in the world, Carlsen [won in 2023](https://www.chess.com/news/view/2023-speed-chess-championship-final-nakamura-carlsen) and also won in 2016 and 2017. In 2023 he also [achieved](https://www.chess.com/news/view/carlsen-hits-highest-blitz-rating) the highest rating in blitz chess ever on chess.com, surpassing the previous record by Hikaru Nakamura.
- Hikaru Nakamura. Nakamura won five years in a row, dominating from 2017 to 2022 and [beating Carlsen](https://www.chess.com/news/view/2022-speed-chess-championship-final-nakamura-carlsen) for the 2022 championship and losing the next year to Carlsen. This year Nakamura and Carlsen are semifinalists with different opponents and may take on each other in a final that would be be highly anticipated, if it were to take place.
- Hans Niemann. Niemann is taking on Carlsen in the semifinals. He [famously beat](https://www.hindustantimes.com/sports/others/hans-niemann-the-guy-who-s-up-against-the-world-101724162034596.html) Magnus Carlsen as black in game 3 of the 2022 Sinquefield Cup, sparking Carlsen to [accuse](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Carlsen%E2%80%93Niemann_controversy) Niemann of cheating.
- Alireza Firouzja. The 21 year-old Firouzja is taking on Nakamura in the semifinals and is notable for having [skyrocketed](https://www.chess.com/players/alireza-firouzja) to a rating of over 2,800 at a record youngest age for having achieved this feat.
Resolution Criteria: This question will resolve **Yes** if Magnus Carlsen wins the Speed Chess Championship 2024 tournament, according to the [official results](https://www.chess.com/events/2024-speed-chess-championship-main-event/results) or [credible sources](https://www.metaculus.com/help/faq/#definitions).
Fine Print: If the winner is not known before October 1, 2024 (for example due to the remainder of the tournament being cancelled or postponed for any reason), this question will resolve **No**.
|
2024-08-30T14:30:00Z
|
2024-08-31T14:30:00Z
|
2024-09-08T22:58:00Z
|
yes
|
METACULUS
|
meta-27745
|
Will Taylor Swift publicly endorse Kamala Harris for president before October 1, 2024?
|
According to sources close to Taylor Swift, the popular singer is [reportedly preparing](https://www.hindustantimes.com/world-news/taylor-swift-ready-to-endorse-kamala-harris-within-she-wants-strong-woman-president-101724633030603.html) to endorse Kamala Harris for president within the next four to six weeks as the 2024 US presidential election campaign intensifies. Swift, who has a history of supporting the Democratic Party, is said to be driven by her desire to see a strong woman in the White House.
During the 2020 election, Swift supported the Biden-Harris ticket, and her endorsement is considered more likely to go to Harris than to Donald Trump, whom she previously wanted to vote out. Swift's endorsement could have a significant impact on the election, as her previous 'go vote' appeal led to a surge in youth voter turnout.
Sources claim that Swift is excited about the prospect of Harris becoming the first female president in U.S. history and sees her as a unifying figure who will address the issues people face and excel at running the country.
Resolution Criteria: This question will resolve as "Yes" if [credible sources](https://www.metaculus.com/help/faq/#definitions) report that Taylor Swift publicly endorses Kamala Harris for president through an official statement, social media post, or public appearance, before October 1, 2024, 12:00 AM EDT.
The question will resolve as "No" if Taylor Swift does not publicly endorse Kamala Harris before the specified date and time, or if she endorses another candidate.
Fine Print: - The endorsement must be a clear, unambiguous statement of support for Kamala Harris's presidential campaign. Vague statements or implications of support will not count. Reports which describe Swift as "endorsing" Harris or similar should suffice, or reports which include quotes from Swift saying unambiguously that she intends to vote for Harris would also count.
- The endorsement must come directly from Taylor Swift or her official representatives. Statements from anonymous sources or speculation will not be considered. Reports that she has told people privately that she will vote for Harris will not count for the purpose of this question.
- If Taylor Swift endorses Kamala Harris after October 1, 2024, or if she does not endorse any candidate, the question will still resolve as "No".
- Announcing that she will vote for Harris or is encouraging other people to vote for Harris will count as an endorsement.
- In the event that Kamala Harris withdraws from the presidential race or is not the Democratic nominee, the question will be Annulled.
|
2024-08-30T14:30:00Z
|
2024-08-31T14:30:00Z
|
2024-09-11T12:31:00Z
|
yes
|
METACULUS
|
meta-27733
|
Will there be a US presidential debate between Donald Trump and Kamala Harris held on September 10, 2024?
|
ABC News [is scheduled](https://abcnews.go.com/Politics/next-biden-trump-presidential-debate-september-abc/story?id=111408116) to host the 2nd and final presidential debate between Vice President Kamala Harris and former President Donald Trump. "World News Tonight" anchor David Muir and ABC News Live Prime anchor Linsey Davis are slated to moderate the debate at the National Constitution Center in Philadelphia, with final rules still to be determined, and the two campaigns reportedly [clashing](https://thehill.com/homenews/campaign/4847464-trump-harris-debate-mic-dispute/) over whether microphones would be muted.
On August 26, 2024, Trump [suggested](https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/2024/08/26/trump-harris-debate-abc/) he may skip the debate, posting on social media:
>I watched ABC FAKE NEWS this morning, both lightweight reporter Jonathan Carl’s (K?) ridiculous and biased interview of Tom Cotton (who was fantastic!), and their so-called Panel of Trump Haters, and I ask, why would I do the Debate against Kamala Harris on that network?
For its part the Harris campaign has [remained in favor](https://deadline.com/2024/08/trump-harris-presidential-debate-abc-news-1236050101/) of the debate despite the current disputes over the rules.
On August 27, 2024, Trump posted on Truth Social saying he had [reached an agreement](https://www.newsweek.com/donald-trump-gives-debate-update-kamala-harris-1945130) with Harris for a debate on September 10, though the post disparaged the debate host, ABC News, saying
>It will be Broadcast Live on ABC FAKE NEWS, by far the nastiest and most unfair newscaster in the business. . .
Historically with debates involving Trump, the presidential debate scheduled for October 15, 2020 [was cancelled](https://www.cnn.com/2020/10/09/politics/second-presidential-debate-canceled/index.html), as was a presidential primary [debate](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/2016_Republican_Party_presidential_debates_and_forums#March_21,_2016_%E2%80%93_Salt_Lake_City,_Utah) originally scheduled for March 21, 2016.
Resolution Criteria: This question resolves as **Yes** if a formal, live presidential debate which includes both Donald Trump and Kamala Harris takes place on September 10, 2024.
If there is no such debate on that exact date, whether because it has been rescheduled, canceled, Harris or Trump have declined to participate, or for any other reason, this question resolves as **No**.
Fine Print: A debate is [currently scheduled](https://www.cbsnews.com/news/when-is-second-presidential-debate-2024/) for 9 PM Eastern Time on September 10, 2024, hosted by ABC News. Any other time or host would count, however, as long as the debate is held on that date.
A debate that begins on September 9, 2024 or ends on September 11, 2024 ([Eastern Time](https://time.is/ET)) will count, as long as any portion of it takes place on September 10, 2024.
Please note that this must be a presidential debate for it to count. Therefore if either Harris or Trump is no longer the Democratic or Republican presidential nominee, respectively, on September 10, 2024 then this question resolves as No.
A qualifying debate must be a live, formal event specifically billed as a presidential debate between the Democratic and Republican nominees for president in the 2024 US election.
Both Harris and Trump as the Democratic and Republican presidential nominees, respectively, must participate in the debate, responding to each other and/or moderator questions in real time. The presence of third-party candidates does not disqualify the debate as long as both Harris and Trump are present. If either Trump or Harris is absent from the debate, regardless of the reason for or presence of third-party candidates, the question will resolve as No.
The debate may be conducted in person or virtually, as long as both candidates are participating live and simultaneously. Pre-recorded video statements or responses do not count as participation in a live debate.
The debate does not need to complete its scheduled duration; it is sufficient for the debate to start with both Trump and Harris participating live.
Alternative events, such as separate town hall interviews or forums where candidates do not directly engage with each other, will not count as a debate for the purposes of this question.
|
2024-08-28T14:30:00Z
|
2024-08-29T14:30:00Z
|
2024-09-11T01:07:00Z
|
yes
|
METACULUS
|
meta-27732
|
Will another Chinese military aircraft violate Japanese territorial airspace before October 1, 2024?
|
On Monday, August 26, 2024, the Japanese Defense Ministry [confirmed](https://www.japantimes.co.jp/news/2024/08/26/japan/china-japan-airspace-violation/) that a Chinese military Y-9 intelligence-gathering plane had briefly entered Japanese territory near the Danjo Islands off Nagasaki Prefecture. This incident marked the [first time](https://www.cnn.com/2024/08/27/asia/japan-china-military-plane-airspace-violation-intl-hnk-ml/index.html) a Chinese military aircraft was confirmed to have violated Japanese territorial airspace.
In response to the violation, Japan strongly protested the move, and the Air Self-Defense Force scrambled fighter jets to respond to the incident. The fighter jets reportedly took steps such as "issuing warnings," but no weapons or flares were fired.
This incident has raised concerns about the potential for future violations of Japanese airspace by Chinese military aircraft, as tensions between the two countries remain high due to ongoing territorial disputes and geopolitical rivalries in the region.
Resolution Criteria: This question will resolve as "Yes" if, between August 28, 2024, and September 30, 2024 (inclusive), the Japanese Defense Ministry officially states that a Chinese military aircraft has violated Japanese territorial airspace.
The question will resolve as "No" if no such violation is stated to have occurred by the Japanese Defense Ministry during the specified time period.
Fine Print: - The violation must be officially stated to have occurred by the Japanese Defense Ministry through a public statement, press release, or other official communication channels.
- The aircraft involved must be identified as belonging to the Chinese military (People's Liberation Army Air Force, Navy, or other branches).
- The violation must occur within Japanese territorial airspace, as defined by international law (for example, 12 nautical miles out from any of its coastlines) and recognized by the Japanese government.
- Incursions into Japan's Air Defense Identification Zone (ADIZ) that do not enter Japanese territorial airspace will not count as violations for the purpose of this question.
- If multiple violations occur during the specified time period, the question will still resolve as "Yes".
|
2024-08-28T14:30:00Z
|
2024-08-29T14:30:00Z
|
2024-10-01T22:51:00Z
|
no
|
METACULUS
|
meta-27723
|
Will "Feelslikeimfallinginlove" by Coldplay win the award for Best Rock at the 2024 MTV VMAs?
|
Notable other nominees are "Dilemma" by Green Day, "Mustang" by Kings of Leon, and "Atomic City" by U2.
Resolution Criteria: This question resolves as **Yes** if "Feelslikeimfallinginlove" by Coldplay wins the Best Rock award at the 2024 MTV Video Music Awards. The resolution source will be the Wikipedia page [2024 MTV Video Music Awards
](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/2024_MTV_Video_Music_Awards) or other credible sources reporting on this awards ceremony. If this does not happen, this question closes as **No**.
Fine Print: The awards show is scheduled for September 10, 2024.
|
2024-08-28T14:30:00Z
|
2024-08-29T14:30:00Z
|
2024-09-12T00:58:00Z
|
no
|
METACULUS
|
meta-27722
|
Before October 1, 2024, will Tech Crunch report new layoffs at Nvidia?
|
Nvidia has not had a layoff event in 2024 according to the resolution source. Although Nvidia has had layoff events in the past, over the years its CEO, Jensen Huang, has publicly stated a strong aversion to layoffs many times. Nvidia is notable for having a reputation of engaging in fewer layoffs compared to its large tech peers.
Resolution Criteria: This question resolves as **Yes** if, according to Tech Crunch's tracker "A comprehensive list of 2024 tech layoffs," which can be accessed [here](https://techcrunch.com/2024/08/07/tech-layoffs-2024-list/), Nvidia has layoffs following the launch of this question and before October 1, 2024, To resolve the question, a Metaculus Admin will go to the Tech Crunch link on October 1, 2024 and see if Nvidia appears for August 2024 or September 2024. If Nvidia is not listed as having a layoff event under those months, then this question resolves as **No**.
Fine Print: Tech Crunch's "comprehensive list of 2024 tech layoffs" will be the sole source used for resolution of this question, regardless of information from other sources. If a layoff event appears in the time period listed, this question resolves as Yes, and if not, it resolves as No.
According to Tech Crunch, "Below you’ll find a comprehensive list of all the known layoffs in tech that have occurred in 2024, to be updated regularly." Admins to resolve this question will only be looking to see what is on the page at the time of resolution. If Tech Crunch ceases to publish updates on the resolution source following the launch of this question (regardless of what can be found elsewhere on the Tech Crunch website), this question resolves as **No**.
For ease of resolution, in this series of questions, in order to count the Tech Crunch page must specifically list the company in question, which in this case is Nvidia. This is true regardless of subsidiaries or ownerships. So for example, a question on Microsoft must specifically mention Microsoft, and a layoff event at LinkedIn will not count for purposes of this question (unless the subheading mentions Microsoft), even though LinkedIn is owned by Microsoft.
|
2024-08-28T14:30:00Z
|
2024-08-29T14:30:00Z
|
2024-10-01T23:15:00Z
|
no
|
METACULUS
|
meta-27721
|
Will Plug Power file for bankruptcy before October 1, 2024?
|
Hydrogen fuel cell company Plug Power has faced financial challenges recently. From its recent SEC filings: "At the time of the issuance of the Company’s 2023 third quarter Form 10-Q, conditions existed that raised substantial doubt about the Company’s ability to continue as a going concern."
Resolution Criteria: This question will resolve as **Yes** if Plug Power, Inc. files any petition for bankruptcy protection in the United States, under any chapter of the United States Bankruptcy Code, before October 1, 2024. The question will resolves on the filing of such a petition, not on whether any bankruptcy protection is granted by a court. If no such petition is filed by that date, this question will resolve as **No**.
Only petitions filed by Plug Power, Inc., or a renamed business entity comprising substantially all of its business (as judged by moderators) as of July 22, 2024, will count towards resolution; any bankruptcy protection petitions filed by subsidiary entities or spin-off companies will not count.
|
2024-08-28T14:30:00Z
|
2024-08-29T14:30:00Z
|
2024-10-01T22:53:00Z
|
no
|
METACULUS
|
meta-27720
|
Will Jensen Huang be in the top 10 of the Forbes Real-Time Billionaires List on September 30, 2024?
|
As of Aug 27, 2024, Jensen Huang had a net worth of $112 B according to Forbes. The 10th place ranked Amancio Ortega was listed as having a net worth of $123 B.
Resolution Criteria: This question resolves as **Yes** if according to the [Forbes Real-Time Billionaires List](https://www.forbes.com/real-time-billionaires/#482980403d78) Jensen Huang is in the top 10 (ranked 10th or higher) on September 30, 2024. Otherwise, this question resolves as **No**.
Fine Print: If he is in a tie for 10th, this resolves as **No**. If Huang is in a tie for 9th or better, this will resolve as **Yes**. If the resolution source is unavailable on September 30, 2024, resolution will wait until it is available (at which point it resolves based on the data shown), until October 6, 2024, at which point this question will be **annulled**. For more details on various edge cases regarding availability of or changes to the resolution source, please see Metaculus's ambiguity and annulment policies [here](https://www.metaculus.com/help/faq/#ambiguous-annulled).
|
2024-08-28T14:30:00Z
|
2024-08-29T14:30:00Z
|
2024-09-30T22:21:00Z
|
no
|
METACULUS
|
meta-27713
|
Will another Chinese military aircraft violate Japanese territorial airspace before October 1, 2024?
|
On Monday, August 26, 2024, the Japanese Defense Ministry [confirmed](https://www.japantimes.co.jp/news/2024/08/26/japan/china-japan-airspace-violation/) that a Chinese military Y-9 intelligence-gathering plane had briefly entered Japanese territory near the Danjo Islands off Nagasaki Prefecture. This incident marked the [first time](https://www.cnn.com/2024/08/27/asia/japan-china-military-plane-airspace-violation-intl-hnk-ml/index.html) a Chinese military aircraft was confirmed to have violated Japanese territorial airspace.
In response to the violation, Japan strongly protested the move, and the Air Self-Defense Force scrambled fighter jets to respond to the incident. The fighter jets reportedly took steps such as "issuing warnings," but no weapons or flares were fired.
This incident has raised concerns about the potential for future violations of Japanese airspace by Chinese military aircraft, as tensions between the two countries remain high due to ongoing territorial disputes and geopolitical rivalries in the region.
Resolution Criteria: This question will resolve as "Yes" if, between August 28, 2024, and September 30, 2024 (inclusive), the Japanese Defense Ministry officially states that a Chinese military aircraft has violated Japanese territorial airspace.
The question will resolve as "No" if no such violation is stated to have occurred by the Japanese Defense Ministry during the specified time period.
Fine Print: - The violation must be officially stated to have occurred by the Japanese Defense Ministry through a public statement, press release, or other official communication channels.
- The aircraft involved must be identified as belonging to the Chinese military (People's Liberation Army Air Force, Navy, or other branches).
- The violation must occur within Japanese territorial airspace, as defined by international law (for example, 12 nautical miles out from any of its coastlines) and recognized by the Japanese government.
- Incursions into Japan's Air Defense Identification Zone (ADIZ) that do not enter Japanese territorial airspace will not count as violations for the purpose of this question.
- If multiple violations occur during the specified time period, the question will still resolve as "Yes".
|
2024-08-28T14:30:00Z
|
2024-10-01T03:59:00Z
|
2024-10-01T15:10:00Z
|
no
|
METACULUS
|
meta-27711
|
Will Taylor Swift publicly endorse Kamala Harris for president before October 1, 2024?
|
According to sources close to Taylor Swift, the popular singer is [reportedly preparing](https://www.hindustantimes.com/world-news/taylor-swift-ready-to-endorse-kamala-harris-within-she-wants-strong-woman-president-101724633030603.html) to endorse Kamala Harris for president within the next four to six weeks as the 2024 US presidential election campaign intensifies. Swift, who has a history of supporting the Democratic Party, is said to be driven by her desire to see a strong woman in the White House.
During the 2020 election, Swift supported the Biden-Harris ticket, and her endorsement is considered more likely to go to Harris than to Donald Trump, whom she previously wanted to vote out. Swift's endorsement could have a significant impact on the election, as her previous 'go vote' appeal led to a surge in youth voter turnout.
Sources claim that Swift is excited about the prospect of Harris becoming the first female president in U.S. history and sees her as a unifying figure who will address the issues people face and excel at running the country.
Resolution Criteria: This question will resolve as "Yes" if [credible sources](https://www.metaculus.com/help/faq/#definitions) report that Taylor Swift publicly endorses Kamala Harris for president through an official statement, social media post, or public appearance, before October 1, 2024, 12:00 AM EDT.
The question will resolve as "No" if Taylor Swift does not publicly endorse Kamala Harris before the specified date and time, or if she endorses another candidate.
Fine Print: - The endorsement must be a clear, unambiguous statement of support for Kamala Harris's presidential campaign. Vague statements or implications of support will not count. Reports which describe Swift as "endorsing" Harris or similar should suffice, or reports which include quotes from Swift saying unambiguously that she intends to vote for Harris would also count.
- The endorsement must come directly from Taylor Swift or her official representatives. Statements from anonymous sources or speculation will not be considered. Reports that she has told people privately that she will vote for Harris will not count for the purpose of this question.
- If Taylor Swift endorses Kamala Harris after October 1, 2024, or if she does not endorse any candidate, the question will still resolve as "No".
- Announcing that she will vote for Harris or is encouraging other people to vote for Harris will count as an endorsement.
- In the event that Kamala Harris withdraws from the presidential race or is not the Democratic nominee, the question will be Annulled.
|
2024-08-28T14:30:00Z
|
2024-10-01T03:59:00Z
|
2024-09-11T03:00:00Z
|
yes
|
METACULUS
|
meta-27642
|
Before October 1, 2024, will Ethiopia and Somalia announce an agreement settling their dispute over the Somaliland port deal?
|
A third round of talks between Ethiopia and Somalia [is scheduled](https://www.thereporterethiopia.com/41513/) to begin in Ankara, Turkey on September 17, 2024. The second round [ended](https://www.reuters.com/world/africa/second-round-somalia-ethiopia-talks-turkey-ends-with-no-deal-progress-made-2024-08-13/) on August 20, 2024 without an agreement.
Landlocked Ethiopia is seeking access to the sea, and it signed an [agreement](https://moderndiplomacy.eu/2024/01/05/the-world-shames-ethiopia-over-recognizing-somaliland/) with Somaliland in which Somaliland offered Ethiopia a 20-year lease on the port of Berbera in exchange for Ethiopia's eventual recognition of Somaliland:
<img src="https://moderndiplomacy.eu/wp-content/uploads/2024/01/ethiopia-somaliland.jpg" />
Somaliland is an unrecognized country, and Ethiopia's recognition would be the first time a UN member state has recognized it, which would be a big step toward it normalizing its status in the international community. For its part, Somalia considers Somaliland to be part of its sovereign territory and the government in Hargeisa not entitled to sign the deal. The agreement has [angered](https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2024/1/6/why-is-somalia-angry-about-neighbouring-ethiopias-new-port-deal) Mogadishu, which views it as an attack on its sovereignty, leading to sharply increased tensions.
According to [Foreign Policy](https://foreignpolicy.com/2024/08/21/somalia-ethiopia-turkey-port-somaliland/) (FP) ([archived link](https://archive.ph/SwsUP)):
>Turkey, which has trade and defense ties with both nations and is vying for increased influence in the Horn of Africa, was reportedly asked to intervene by Ethiopian Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed. In a call with the Turkish president, Somali President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud said his country was ready to “engage in economic and development cooperation with Ethiopia” but insisted that “such partnerships must always respect Somalia’s sovereignty, unity, and territorial integrity, and adhere to international law and norms.”
>Turkish Foreign Affairs Minister Hakan Fidan separately met his counterparts, Ahmed Moallim Fiqi from Somalia and Taye Atske Selassie from Ethiopia, on Aug. 13 in Turkey’s capital, Ankara. Fidan told a news conference that there was now “convergence on some major principles.”
See also:
- [Will Ethiopia formally recognise Somaliland in 2024?](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/21138/somaliland-recognition-by-ethiopia-in-2024/)
- [Will there be at least 200 military conflict deaths between Ethiopia, Somalia, and Somaliland in 2024?](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/21137/ethiopia-somalia-somaliland-casualties/)
Resolution Criteria: This question resolves as **Yes** if the governments of Ethiopia and Somalia publicly announce an agreement (acknowledged by both sides) settling their dispute over the [Ethiopia–Somaliland memorandum of understanding](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/2024_Ethiopia%E2%80%93Somaliland_memorandum_of_understanding), according to [credible sources](https://www.metaculus.com/help/faq/#definitions), before October 1, 2024.
If this event does not happen before that date, this question resolves as **No**.
Fine Print: To be clear, the agreement itself need not be entirely public, merely the announcement of its existence and the fact that it settles the Somalian objection to the Ethiopia-Somaliland agreement. The terms offered by Addis Ababa are also not relevant to the question, as long as Somalia is no longer in opposition to the situation.
|
2024-09-04T14:30:00Z
|
2024-10-01T03:59:00Z
|
2024-10-01T15:12:00Z
|
no
|
METACULUS
|
meta-27641
|
Will there be a US presidential debate between Donald Trump and Kamala Harris held on September 10, 2024?
|
ABC News [is scheduled](https://abcnews.go.com/Politics/next-biden-trump-presidential-debate-september-abc/story?id=111408116) to host the 2nd and final presidential debate between Vice President Kamala Harris and former President Donald Trump. "World News Tonight" anchor David Muir and ABC News Live Prime anchor Linsey Davis are slated to moderate the debate at the National Constitution Center in Philadelphia, with final rules still to be determined, and the two campaigns reportedly [clashing](https://thehill.com/homenews/campaign/4847464-trump-harris-debate-mic-dispute/) over whether microphones would be muted.
On August 26, 2024, Trump [suggested](https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/2024/08/26/trump-harris-debate-abc/) he may skip the debate, posting on social media:
>I watched ABC FAKE NEWS this morning, both lightweight reporter Jonathan Carl’s (K?) ridiculous and biased interview of Tom Cotton (who was fantastic!), and their so-called Panel of Trump Haters, and I ask, why would I do the Debate against Kamala Harris on that network?
For its part the Harris campaign has [remained in favor](https://deadline.com/2024/08/trump-harris-presidential-debate-abc-news-1236050101/) of the debate despite the current disputes over the rules.
On August 27, 2024, Trump posted on Truth Social saying he had [reached an agreement](https://www.newsweek.com/donald-trump-gives-debate-update-kamala-harris-1945130) with Harris for a debate on September 10, though the post disparaged the debate host, ABC News, saying
>It will be Broadcast Live on ABC FAKE NEWS, by far the nastiest and most unfair newscaster in the business. . .
Historically with debates involving Trump, the presidential debate scheduled for October 15, 2020 [was cancelled](https://www.cnn.com/2020/10/09/politics/second-presidential-debate-canceled/index.html), as was a presidential primary [debate](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/2016_Republican_Party_presidential_debates_and_forums#March_21,_2016_%E2%80%93_Salt_Lake_City,_Utah) originally scheduled for March 21, 2016.
Resolution Criteria: This question resolves as **Yes** if a formal, live presidential debate which includes both Donald Trump and Kamala Harris takes place on September 10, 2024.
If there is no such debate on that exact date, whether because it has been rescheduled, canceled, Harris or Trump have declined to participate, or for any other reason, this question resolves as **No**.
Fine Print: A debate is [currently scheduled](https://www.cbsnews.com/news/when-is-second-presidential-debate-2024/) for 9 PM Eastern Time on September 10, 2024, hosted by ABC News. Any other time or host would count, however, as long as the debate is held on that date.
A debate that begins on September 9, 2024 or ends on September 11, 2024 ([Eastern Time](https://time.is/ET)) will count, as long as any portion of it takes place on September 10, 2024.
Please note that this must be a presidential debate for it to count. Therefore if either Harris or Trump is no longer the Democratic or Republican presidential nominee, respectively, on September 10, 2024 then this question resolves as No.
A qualifying debate must be a live, formal event specifically billed as a presidential debate between the Democratic and Republican nominees for president in the 2024 US election.
Both Harris and Trump as the Democratic and Republican presidential nominees, respectively, must participate in the debate, responding to each other and/or moderator questions in real time. The presence of third-party candidates does not disqualify the debate as long as both Harris and Trump are present. If either Trump or Harris is absent from the debate, regardless of the reason for or presence of third-party candidates, the question will resolve as No.
The debate may be conducted in person or virtually, as long as both candidates are participating live and simultaneously. Pre-recorded video statements or responses do not count as participation in a live debate.
The debate does not need to complete its scheduled duration; it is sufficient for the debate to start with both Trump and Harris participating live.
Alternative events, such as separate town hall interviews or forums where candidates do not directly engage with each other, will not count as a debate for the purposes of this question.
|
2024-08-28T14:30:00Z
|
2024-09-11T00:00:00Z
|
2024-09-11T01:05:00Z
|
yes
|
METACULUS
|
meta-27640
|
Will YouTube be banned in Russia before October 1, 2024?
|
Since 2012 Russian Federal Service for Supervision of Communications, Information Technology and Mass Media (Roskomnadzor) maintains a list of sites that must be blocked by all telecom providers in Russia.
Some of the notable examples in this list are twitter.com, instagram.com, and facebook.com, which were blocked shortly after the Russian invasion of Ukraine in 2022.
Despite [initial expectations of the Metaculus community that YouTube will be blocked as well](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/10040/youtube-blocking-in-russia-in-2022/), it still remains available in Russia in the year 2024, but now that can change.
In July 2024, Roskomnadzor announced that it started [degrading YouTube performance](https://en.thebell.io/russia-puts-the-brakes-on-youtube-whatsapp/), which may suggest [plans for completely banning YouTube](https://www.msn.com/en-us/news/world/moscow-plans-to-block-youtube-in-fall-russian-media-claims/ar-BB1pSr1A) in autumn.
Resolution Criteria: This question resolves as **Yes** if after July 30 and before October 1, 2024, access to YouTube is blocked on the territory of Russia.
The state of blocking will be checked by entering the query `youtube.com` in the text field on Roskomnadzor's official [blocklist site](https://blocklist.rkn.gov.ru/) and submitting the form.
If the message returned is: "доступ ограничивается к странице" (access to the page is limited), this would mean that the site is in the blocklist and this question resolves as **Yes**.
If the message returned is: "По Вашему запросу ничего не найдено" (nothing has been found for your query), this would mean that the site is *not* included in the blocklist and this question resolves as **No**.
This question also resolves as **Yes** if YouTube is blocked in Russia according to [credible sources](https://www.metaculus.com/help/faq/#definitions).
Fine Print: Note that the shortened version, `youtu.be` is already included in the blocklist, and this site does NOT trigger the resolution.
Metaculus admins may also use another [credible source](https://www.metaculus.com/help/faq/#definitions) if they have reasons to believe that the Roskomnadzor site's data are inaccurate.
Changes in the phrasing used by Roskomnadzor's blocklist site will not affect resolution of this question, since the question resolves based on whether access to YouTube is limited or restricted according to Roskomnadzor, regardless of the exact wording.
|
2024-08-27T14:30:00Z
|
2024-08-28T14:30:00Z
|
2024-10-02T12:49:00Z
|
no
|
METACULUS
|
meta-27639
|
Will the median person on Bloomberg's Billionaires Index be from the United States on September 16, 2024?
|
On July 10, 2024, of the 10 individuals ranked 246-255 on Bloomberg's list, 7 were from the United States. On the entire list, 189 out of 500 indivduals were from the United States.
Resolution Criteria: This question resolves as **Yes** if the person ranked 250th on the Bloomberg Billionaires Index (available at [this link](https://www.bloomberg.com/billionaires/)) is listed as being from the United States, when accessed by Metaculus Admins on September 16, 2024, after 5:00 PM Eastern Time (i.e., over an hour after the US stock market closes for regular trading). It resolves as **No** if the 250th-ranked person is from any other country.
Fine Print: "For purposes of this question, the "median" from the question's title is defined as the 250th ranked person on the Bloomberg Billionaires Index.
If the list contains fewer than 250 people on the resolution date, this question will be resolved as the last person on the list.
If Bloomberg's Billionaires Index is unavailable on September 16, 2024, resolution will wait until it is available (at which point it resolves based on the data shown), until September 23, 2024, at which point this question will be annulled. For more details on various edge cases regarding availability of or changes to the resolution source, please see Metaculus's ambiguity and annulment policies [here](https://www.metaculus.com/help/faq/#ambiguous-annulled).
|
2024-08-27T14:30:00Z
|
2024-08-28T14:30:00Z
|
2024-09-16T21:11:00Z
|
yes
|
METACULUS
|
meta-27638
|
Before October 1, 2024, will Tech Crunch report new layoffs at Meta, Facebook or Instagram?
|
As of the launch of the question, neither Meta, Facebook nor Instagram had any listings at the resolution source. Previously Meta/Facebook has done significant rounds of layoffs in 2023 and 2022.
Resolution Criteria: This question resolves as **Yes** if, according to Tech Crunch's tracker "A comprehensive list of 2024 tech layoffs," which can be accessed [here](https://techcrunch.com/2024/08/07/tech-layoffs-2024-list/), Meta, Facebook or Instagram have layoffs following the launch of this question and before October 1, 2024, To resolve the question, a Metaculus Admin will go to the Tech Crunch link on October 1, 2024 and see if Meta, Facebook or Instagram appear for August 2024 or September 2024. If Meta, Facebook or Instagram are not listed as having a layoff event under those months, then this question resolves as **No**.
Fine Print: Tech Crunch's "comprehensive list of 2024 tech layoffs" will be the sole source used for resolution of this question, regardless of information from other sources. If a layoff event appears in the time period listed, this question resolves as Yes, and if not, it resolves as No.
According to Tech Crunch, "Below you’ll find a comprehensive list of all the known layoffs in tech that have occurred in 2024, to be updated regularly." Admins to resolve this question will only be looking to see what is on the page at the time of resolution. If Tech Crunch ceases to publish updates on the resolution source following the launch of this question (regardless of what can be found elsewhere on the Tech Crunch website), this question resolves as **No**.
For ease of resolution, in this series of questions, in order to count the Tech Crunch page must specifically list the company in question, which in this case is Meta, Facebook or Instagram. This is true regardless of subsidiaries or ownerships. So for example, a question on Microsoft must specifically mention Microsoft, and a layoff event at LinkedIn will not count for purposes of this question (unless the subheading mentions Microsoft), even though LinkedIn is owned by Microsoft.
|
2024-08-27T14:30:00Z
|
2024-08-28T14:30:00Z
|
2024-10-01T23:16:00Z
|
no
|
METACULUS
|
meta-27637
|
Will "Dilemma" by Green Day win the award for Best Rock at the 2024 MTV VMAs?
|
Notable other nominees are "Feelslikeimfallinginlove" by Coldplay, "Mustang" by Kings of Leon, and "Atomic City" by U2.
Resolution Criteria: This question resolves as **Yes** if "Dilemma" by Green Day wins the Best Rock award at the 2024 MTV Video Music Awards. The resolution source will be the Wikipedia page [2024 MTV Video Music Awards
](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/2024_MTV_Video_Music_Awards) or other credible sources reporting on this awards ceremony. If this does not happen, this question closes as **No**.
Fine Print: The awards show is scheduled for September 10, 2024.
|
2024-08-27T14:30:00Z
|
2024-08-28T14:30:00Z
|
2024-09-12T00:57:00Z
|
no
|
METACULUS
|
meta-27629
|
Will Russia control Pokrovsk Before 2025?
|
In the months since Russia captured Avdiivka, they have gained control of land at a relatively steady pace on the [eastern frontline](https://archive.ph/ABnN0), though likely at high personnel costs. If the city of Pokrovsk is captured, Ukraine will have mounting difficulties controlling Russian advances in DONETSK Oblast. A recent Ukrainian offensive in Kursk has not appeared to slow Russian momentum near Pokrovsk.
Resolution Criteria: This question will resolve as **yes** if the coordinates in Pokrovsk of 48°17'12.9"N 37°10'39.8"E are assessed as under Russian control according to [this Institute for the Study of War map](https://storymaps.arcgis.com/stories/36a7f6a6f5a9448496de641cf64bd375) before January 1, 2025. This question will resolve as **no** otherwise.
Fine Print: If Ukraine or Russia cease to exist, this question will resolve as **ambiguous**.
If the ISW ceases to update maps (at least weekly) or ceases to exist, [DeepStateMap](https://deepstatemap.live/en#14/48.2869053/37.1777344) will be used instead.
|
2024-08-29T12:00:00Z
|
2025-01-01T04:59:00Z
|
2025-01-09T18:46:00Z
|
no
|
METACULUS
|
meta-27625
|
Will Pavel Durov leave France before January 1, 2025?
|
Pavel Durov is a Russian enterpreneur, founder of several projects, most known for VK social networking site, Telegram messaging app and TON blockchain network.
He left Russia in 2014 and was forced to sell VK after refusing to give Russian state agencies access to private user messages. He went on to found Telegram messaging app which faced similar issues, and was blocked in Russia after refusal to provide encryption keys to FSB, which led to several years of whack-a-mole game between Roskomnadzor and Telegram, former trying to prevent access to latter, and Telegram [winning this game in 2020](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Blocking_of_Telegram_in_Russia), when Roskomnadzor officially gave up.
Reportedly, neither Russian nor Western intelligence agencies currently have access to Telegram encryption keys and *encrypted* user messages. Pavel Durov [was arrested in France on August 24](https://www.nytimes.com/2024/08/25/technology/pavel-durov-telegram-detained-france.html) during his private jet emergency refueling stop, on accounts of assisting terrorism and drug trafficking (and some others, totaling 20) by refusing to provide Telegram encryption keys to French state agencies.
Resolution Criteria: This questions resolves as **Yes** if [credible sources](https://www.metaculus.com/help/faq/#definitions) report before January 1, 2025, that Pavel Durov has left France. If no such report is made before deadline, question resolves as **No**.
Fine Print: * Durov's legal status does not affect resolution of this question (e.g. being extradited counts as Yes).
* Duration of leave does not affect question resolution either (a reported overnight trip to London, then back to France counts as **Yes**).
* If Pavel Durov goes missing or dies in France before January 1, 2025, this question should be **Annulled**
|
2024-08-27T18:00:00Z
|
2025-01-01T09:00:00Z
|
2025-01-02T15:59:00Z
|
no
|
METACULUS
|
meta-27610
|
Will Ukrainian forces capture Kursk Nuclear Plant 51°40'30.1"N 35°36'11.5"E before October 1, 2024?
|
As of August 21, 2024, Ukrainian forces were continuing to make advances in Russia's Kursk oblast, in an incursion that began on August 8, 2024:
<img src="https://www.understandingwar.org/sites/default/files/UAF%20Kursk%20Incursion%20August%2021%2C%202024_0.png" />
The Institute for the Study of War has made the following mentions of these areas:
Tetkino ([wiki](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Tyotkino)) -
>Russian milbloggers claimed on August 17 that Russian forces destroyed several bridges across the Seim River in Tetkino and Popovo-Lezhachi (both southwest of Korenevo and along the international border) in order to stop Ukrainian forces advancing from the international border and that Ukrainian forces have consolidated positions in Otruba and up to the west bank of the river ([source](https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-august-17-2024))
>A prominent Russian milblogger claimed that there are unconfirmed reports that Ukrainian forces entered Otruba (north of Tetkino and on the west [right] bank of the Seim River), and another Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces are operating near Tetkino." ([source](https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-august-18-2024))
Korenevo ([wiki](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Korenevo,_Korenevsky_District,_Kursk_Oblast)) -
>Geolocated footage published on August 19 shows that Ukrainian forces have advanced westward along Sudzhanskiy Shlyakh Street (38K-030 highway) in eastern Korenevo as well as in fields northeast of Korenevo.[3] Russian milbloggers widely claimed on August 20 that Ukrainian forces continued mechanized assaults on the outskirts of Korenevo and that Russian forces were conducting artillery and airstrikes to contain Ukrainian advances.[4] Russian milbloggers indicated that Russian forces regained some lost positions and advanced in fields south of Safonovka (northeast of Koreveno and 30km from the international border). ([source](https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-august-20-2024))
Glushkovo ([wiki](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Glushkovo,_Glushkovsky_District,_Kursk_Oblast)) -
>Ukrainian forces appear to be continuing efforts to strike Russian pontoon bridges and pontoon engineering equipment west of the current Kursk Oblast salient over the Seim River in Glushkovo Raion—geolocated footage published on August 20 shows Ukrainian drones striking Russian equipment bringing pontoons to a staging area near the Seim River about 3km north of Glushkovo.
Bolshoye Soldatskoye ([wiki](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Bolshoye_Soldatskoye)) - According to Wikipedia:
>Bolshoye Soldatskoye (Russian: Большое Солдатское) is a rural locality (a selo) and the administrative center of Bolshesoldatsky District, Kursk Oblast, Russia.
Kursk Nuclear Plant -
>Several prominent Russian authorities, including the Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD), nuclear energy operator Rosatom, Russian diplomats, and occupation authorities claimed on August 17 that Ukrainian authorities are preparing a false-flag attack against the KNPP ([source](https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-august-17-2024))
According to [Wikipedia](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Kursk_Nuclear_Power_Plant):
>The International Atomic Energy Agency's Director General Rafael Grossi urged both Russia and Ukraine to exercise "maximum restraint" to avoid an accident at the plant during the August 2024 Kursk Oblast incursion following reports of "significant military activity" near the facility. On 11 August 2024, it was reported that Russia had been constructing defensive trench lines near the power plant and up to 8 km away, with additional National Guard of Russia (Rosgvardiya) forces. Fighting occurred 20 miles (35 km) from the plant.
Resolution Criteria: This question will resolve as **Yes** if, before October 1, 2024, the Institute for the Study of War reports in its [interactive map](https://storymaps.arcgis.com/stories/36a7f6a6f5a9448496de641cf64bd375) that Ukraine controls Kursk Nuclear Plant at the coordinates 51°40'30.1"N 35°36'11.5"E
The longer and more detailed instructions are as follows:
1. Go to the Institute for the Study of War and AEI Critical Threats Project map page, [here](https://storymaps.arcgis.com/stories/36a7f6a6f5a9448496de641cf64bd375).
2. Scroll down to the interactive map.
3. If the search box is not visible, click the 'X' on the top of the legend overlay on the left side of the map to close it.
4. Paste the coordinates into the search box.
This question resolves as **Yes** if the location is marked on the map as Ukrainian-controlled at any point before October 1, 2024. Generally this will mean shades of blue, including but not limited to "Claimed Limit of Ukrainian Advance." Please note two things:
1. Due to the nature of how ISW is currently mapping the area, this will include areas of *claimed* Ukrainian control and advances, not just areas assessed by ISW.
2. If ISW offers new labels or descriptions to indicate Ukraine's territorial control or advances in the area, those will also apply.
If the location is not marked as being under Ukrainian control at any point before that date, the subquestion resolves as **No**.
Fine Print: The sole authoritative source for defining areas of control will be the Institute for the Study of War (ISW) Ukraine Interactive War Map, currently located [here](https://storymaps.arcgis.com/stories/36a7f6a6f5a9448496de641cf64bd375). If the map has not been updated in the last seven days at the specified time of resolution, the question will be **annulled**.
|
2024-08-26T14:30:00Z
|
2024-08-27T14:30:00Z
|
2024-10-02T16:40:00Z
|
no
|
METACULUS
|
meta-27609
|
Will Ukrainian forces capture B. Soldatskoe (51°20'15.4"N 35°30'27.1"E) before October 1, 2024?
|
As of August 21, 2024, Ukrainian forces were continuing to make advances in Russia's Kursk oblast, in an incursion that began on August 8, 2024:
<img src="https://www.understandingwar.org/sites/default/files/UAF%20Kursk%20Incursion%20August%2021%2C%202024_0.png" />
The Institute for the Study of War has made the following mentions of these areas:
Tetkino ([wiki](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Tyotkino)) -
>Russian milbloggers claimed on August 17 that Russian forces destroyed several bridges across the Seim River in Tetkino and Popovo-Lezhachi (both southwest of Korenevo and along the international border) in order to stop Ukrainian forces advancing from the international border and that Ukrainian forces have consolidated positions in Otruba and up to the west bank of the river ([source](https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-august-17-2024))
>A prominent Russian milblogger claimed that there are unconfirmed reports that Ukrainian forces entered Otruba (north of Tetkino and on the west [right] bank of the Seim River), and another Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces are operating near Tetkino." ([source](https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-august-18-2024))
Korenevo ([wiki](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Korenevo,_Korenevsky_District,_Kursk_Oblast)) -
>Geolocated footage published on August 19 shows that Ukrainian forces have advanced westward along Sudzhanskiy Shlyakh Street (38K-030 highway) in eastern Korenevo as well as in fields northeast of Korenevo.[3] Russian milbloggers widely claimed on August 20 that Ukrainian forces continued mechanized assaults on the outskirts of Korenevo and that Russian forces were conducting artillery and airstrikes to contain Ukrainian advances.[4] Russian milbloggers indicated that Russian forces regained some lost positions and advanced in fields south of Safonovka (northeast of Koreveno and 30km from the international border). ([source](https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-august-20-2024))
Glushkovo ([wiki](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Glushkovo,_Glushkovsky_District,_Kursk_Oblast)) -
>Ukrainian forces appear to be continuing efforts to strike Russian pontoon bridges and pontoon engineering equipment west of the current Kursk Oblast salient over the Seim River in Glushkovo Raion—geolocated footage published on August 20 shows Ukrainian drones striking Russian equipment bringing pontoons to a staging area near the Seim River about 3km north of Glushkovo.
Bolshoye Soldatskoye ([wiki](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Bolshoye_Soldatskoye)) - According to Wikipedia:
>Bolshoye Soldatskoye (Russian: Большое Солдатское) is a rural locality (a selo) and the administrative center of Bolshesoldatsky District, Kursk Oblast, Russia.
Kursk Nuclear Plant -
>Several prominent Russian authorities, including the Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD), nuclear energy operator Rosatom, Russian diplomats, and occupation authorities claimed on August 17 that Ukrainian authorities are preparing a false-flag attack against the KNPP ([source](https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-august-17-2024))
According to [Wikipedia](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Kursk_Nuclear_Power_Plant):
>The International Atomic Energy Agency's Director General Rafael Grossi urged both Russia and Ukraine to exercise "maximum restraint" to avoid an accident at the plant during the August 2024 Kursk Oblast incursion following reports of "significant military activity" near the facility. On 11 August 2024, it was reported that Russia had been constructing defensive trench lines near the power plant and up to 8 km away, with additional National Guard of Russia (Rosgvardiya) forces. Fighting occurred 20 miles (35 km) from the plant.
Resolution Criteria: This question will resolve as **Yes** if, before October 1, 2024, the Institute for the Study of War reports in its [interactive map](https://storymaps.arcgis.com/stories/36a7f6a6f5a9448496de641cf64bd375) that Ukraine controls B. Soldatskoe at the coordinates 51°20'15.4"N 35°30'27.1"E
The longer and more detailed instructions are as follows:
1. Go to the Institute for the Study of War and AEI Critical Threats Project map page, [here](https://storymaps.arcgis.com/stories/36a7f6a6f5a9448496de641cf64bd375).
2. Scroll down to the interactive map.
3. If the search box is not visible, click the 'X' on the top of the legend overlay on the left side of the map to close it.
4. Paste the coordinates into the search box.
This question resolves as **Yes** if the location is marked on the map as Ukrainian-controlled at any point before October 1, 2024. Generally this will mean shades of blue, including but not limited to "Claimed Limit of Ukrainian Advance." Please note two things:
1. Due to the nature of how ISW is currently mapping the area, this will include areas of *claimed* Ukrainian control and advances, not just areas assessed by ISW.
2. If ISW offers new labels or descriptions to indicate Ukraine's territorial control or advances in the area, those will also apply.
If the location is not marked as being under Ukrainian control at any point before that date, the subquestion resolves as **No**.
Fine Print: The sole authoritative source for defining areas of control will be the Institute for the Study of War (ISW) Ukraine Interactive War Map, currently located [here](https://storymaps.arcgis.com/stories/36a7f6a6f5a9448496de641cf64bd375). If the map has not been updated in the last seven days at the specified time of resolution, the question will be **annulled**.
|
2024-08-26T14:30:00Z
|
2024-08-27T14:30:00Z
|
2024-10-02T16:39:00Z
|
no
|
METACULUS
|
meta-27608
|
Will Ukrainian forces capture Glushkovo (51°20'43.9"N 34°38'54.9"E) before October 1, 2024?
|
As of August 21, 2024, Ukrainian forces were continuing to make advances in Russia's Kursk oblast, in an incursion that began on August 8, 2024:
<img src="https://www.understandingwar.org/sites/default/files/UAF%20Kursk%20Incursion%20August%2021%2C%202024_0.png" />
The Institute for the Study of War has made the following mentions of these areas:
Tetkino ([wiki](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Tyotkino)) -
>Russian milbloggers claimed on August 17 that Russian forces destroyed several bridges across the Seim River in Tetkino and Popovo-Lezhachi (both southwest of Korenevo and along the international border) in order to stop Ukrainian forces advancing from the international border and that Ukrainian forces have consolidated positions in Otruba and up to the west bank of the river ([source](https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-august-17-2024))
>A prominent Russian milblogger claimed that there are unconfirmed reports that Ukrainian forces entered Otruba (north of Tetkino and on the west [right] bank of the Seim River), and another Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces are operating near Tetkino." ([source](https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-august-18-2024))
Korenevo ([wiki](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Korenevo,_Korenevsky_District,_Kursk_Oblast)) -
>Geolocated footage published on August 19 shows that Ukrainian forces have advanced westward along Sudzhanskiy Shlyakh Street (38K-030 highway) in eastern Korenevo as well as in fields northeast of Korenevo.[3] Russian milbloggers widely claimed on August 20 that Ukrainian forces continued mechanized assaults on the outskirts of Korenevo and that Russian forces were conducting artillery and airstrikes to contain Ukrainian advances.[4] Russian milbloggers indicated that Russian forces regained some lost positions and advanced in fields south of Safonovka (northeast of Koreveno and 30km from the international border). ([source](https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-august-20-2024))
Glushkovo ([wiki](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Glushkovo,_Glushkovsky_District,_Kursk_Oblast)) -
>Ukrainian forces appear to be continuing efforts to strike Russian pontoon bridges and pontoon engineering equipment west of the current Kursk Oblast salient over the Seim River in Glushkovo Raion—geolocated footage published on August 20 shows Ukrainian drones striking Russian equipment bringing pontoons to a staging area near the Seim River about 3km north of Glushkovo.
Bolshoye Soldatskoye ([wiki](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Bolshoye_Soldatskoye)) - According to Wikipedia:
>Bolshoye Soldatskoye (Russian: Большое Солдатское) is a rural locality (a selo) and the administrative center of Bolshesoldatsky District, Kursk Oblast, Russia.
Kursk Nuclear Plant -
>Several prominent Russian authorities, including the Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD), nuclear energy operator Rosatom, Russian diplomats, and occupation authorities claimed on August 17 that Ukrainian authorities are preparing a false-flag attack against the KNPP ([source](https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-august-17-2024))
According to [Wikipedia](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Kursk_Nuclear_Power_Plant):
>The International Atomic Energy Agency's Director General Rafael Grossi urged both Russia and Ukraine to exercise "maximum restraint" to avoid an accident at the plant during the August 2024 Kursk Oblast incursion following reports of "significant military activity" near the facility. On 11 August 2024, it was reported that Russia had been constructing defensive trench lines near the power plant and up to 8 km away, with additional National Guard of Russia (Rosgvardiya) forces. Fighting occurred 20 miles (35 km) from the plant.
Resolution Criteria: This question will resolve as **Yes** if, before October 1, 2024, the Institute for the Study of War reports in its [interactive map](https://storymaps.arcgis.com/stories/36a7f6a6f5a9448496de641cf64bd375) that Ukraine controls Glushkovo at the coordinates 51°20'43.9"N 34°38'54.9"E
The longer and more detailed instructions are as follows:
1. Go to the Institute for the Study of War and AEI Critical Threats Project map page, [here](https://storymaps.arcgis.com/stories/36a7f6a6f5a9448496de641cf64bd375).
2. Scroll down to the interactive map.
3. If the search box is not visible, click the 'X' on the top of the legend overlay on the left side of the map to close it.
4. Paste the coordinates into the search box.
This question resolves as **Yes** if the location is marked on the map as Ukrainian-controlled at any point before October 1, 2024. Generally this will mean shades of blue, including but not limited to "Claimed Limit of Ukrainian Advance." Please note two things:
1. Due to the nature of how ISW is currently mapping the area, this will include areas of *claimed* Ukrainian control and advances, not just areas assessed by ISW.
2. If ISW offers new labels or descriptions to indicate Ukraine's territorial control or advances in the area, those will also apply.
If the location is not marked as being under Ukrainian control at any point before that date, the subquestion resolves as **No**.
Fine Print: The sole authoritative source for defining areas of control will be the Institute for the Study of War (ISW) Ukraine Interactive War Map, currently located [here](https://storymaps.arcgis.com/stories/36a7f6a6f5a9448496de641cf64bd375). If the map has not been updated in the last seven days at the specified time of resolution, the question will be **annulled**.
|
2024-08-26T14:30:00Z
|
2024-08-27T14:30:00Z
|
2024-10-02T16:39:00Z
|
no
|
METACULUS
|
meta-27607
|
Will Ukrainian forces capture Korenevo (51°24'37.7"N 34°54'02.2"E) before October 1, 2024?
|
As of August 21, 2024, Ukrainian forces were continuing to make advances in Russia's Kursk oblast, in an incursion that began on August 8, 2024:
<img src="https://www.understandingwar.org/sites/default/files/UAF%20Kursk%20Incursion%20August%2021%2C%202024_0.png" />
The Institute for the Study of War has made the following mentions of these areas:
Tetkino ([wiki](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Tyotkino)) -
>Russian milbloggers claimed on August 17 that Russian forces destroyed several bridges across the Seim River in Tetkino and Popovo-Lezhachi (both southwest of Korenevo and along the international border) in order to stop Ukrainian forces advancing from the international border and that Ukrainian forces have consolidated positions in Otruba and up to the west bank of the river ([source](https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-august-17-2024))
>A prominent Russian milblogger claimed that there are unconfirmed reports that Ukrainian forces entered Otruba (north of Tetkino and on the west [right] bank of the Seim River), and another Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces are operating near Tetkino." ([source](https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-august-18-2024))
Korenevo ([wiki](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Korenevo,_Korenevsky_District,_Kursk_Oblast)) -
>Geolocated footage published on August 19 shows that Ukrainian forces have advanced westward along Sudzhanskiy Shlyakh Street (38K-030 highway) in eastern Korenevo as well as in fields northeast of Korenevo.[3] Russian milbloggers widely claimed on August 20 that Ukrainian forces continued mechanized assaults on the outskirts of Korenevo and that Russian forces were conducting artillery and airstrikes to contain Ukrainian advances.[4] Russian milbloggers indicated that Russian forces regained some lost positions and advanced in fields south of Safonovka (northeast of Koreveno and 30km from the international border). ([source](https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-august-20-2024))
Glushkovo ([wiki](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Glushkovo,_Glushkovsky_District,_Kursk_Oblast)) -
>Ukrainian forces appear to be continuing efforts to strike Russian pontoon bridges and pontoon engineering equipment west of the current Kursk Oblast salient over the Seim River in Glushkovo Raion—geolocated footage published on August 20 shows Ukrainian drones striking Russian equipment bringing pontoons to a staging area near the Seim River about 3km north of Glushkovo.
Bolshoye Soldatskoye ([wiki](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Bolshoye_Soldatskoye)) - According to Wikipedia:
>Bolshoye Soldatskoye (Russian: Большое Солдатское) is a rural locality (a selo) and the administrative center of Bolshesoldatsky District, Kursk Oblast, Russia.
Kursk Nuclear Plant -
>Several prominent Russian authorities, including the Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD), nuclear energy operator Rosatom, Russian diplomats, and occupation authorities claimed on August 17 that Ukrainian authorities are preparing a false-flag attack against the KNPP ([source](https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-august-17-2024))
According to [Wikipedia](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Kursk_Nuclear_Power_Plant):
>The International Atomic Energy Agency's Director General Rafael Grossi urged both Russia and Ukraine to exercise "maximum restraint" to avoid an accident at the plant during the August 2024 Kursk Oblast incursion following reports of "significant military activity" near the facility. On 11 August 2024, it was reported that Russia had been constructing defensive trench lines near the power plant and up to 8 km away, with additional National Guard of Russia (Rosgvardiya) forces. Fighting occurred 20 miles (35 km) from the plant.
Resolution Criteria: This question will resolve as **Yes** if, before October 1, 2024, the Institute for the Study of War reports in its [interactive map](https://storymaps.arcgis.com/stories/36a7f6a6f5a9448496de641cf64bd375) that Ukraine controls Korenevo at the coordinates 51°24'37.7"N 34°54'02.2"E
The longer and more detailed instructions are as follows:
1. Go to the Institute for the Study of War and AEI Critical Threats Project map page, [here](https://storymaps.arcgis.com/stories/36a7f6a6f5a9448496de641cf64bd375).
2. Scroll down to the interactive map.
3. If the search box is not visible, click the 'X' on the top of the legend overlay on the left side of the map to close it.
4. Paste the coordinates into the search box.
This question resolves as **Yes** if the location is marked on the map as Ukrainian-controlled at any point before October 1, 2024. Generally this will mean shades of blue, including but not limited to "Claimed Limit of Ukrainian Advance." Please note two things:
1. Due to the nature of how ISW is currently mapping the area, this will include areas of *claimed* Ukrainian control and advances, not just areas assessed by ISW.
2. If ISW offers new labels or descriptions to indicate Ukraine's territorial control or advances in the area, those will also apply.
If the location is not marked as being under Ukrainian control at any point before that date, the subquestion resolves as **No**.
Fine Print: The sole authoritative source for defining areas of control will be the Institute for the Study of War (ISW) Ukraine Interactive War Map, currently located [here](https://storymaps.arcgis.com/stories/36a7f6a6f5a9448496de641cf64bd375). If the map has not been updated in the last seven days at the specified time of resolution, the question will be **annulled**.
|
2024-08-26T14:30:00Z
|
2024-08-27T14:30:00Z
|
2024-10-02T16:39:00Z
|
no
|
METACULUS
|
meta-27606
|
Will Ukrainian forces capture Tetkino (51°16'45.1"N 34°16'57.7"E) before October 1, 2024?
|
As of August 21, 2024, Ukrainian forces were continuing to make advances in Russia's Kursk oblast, in an incursion that began on August 8, 2024:
<img src="https://www.understandingwar.org/sites/default/files/UAF%20Kursk%20Incursion%20August%2021%2C%202024_0.png" />
The Institute for the Study of War has made the following mentions of these areas:
Tetkino ([wiki](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Tyotkino)) -
>Russian milbloggers claimed on August 17 that Russian forces destroyed several bridges across the Seim River in Tetkino and Popovo-Lezhachi (both southwest of Korenevo and along the international border) in order to stop Ukrainian forces advancing from the international border and that Ukrainian forces have consolidated positions in Otruba and up to the west bank of the river ([source](https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-august-17-2024))
>A prominent Russian milblogger claimed that there are unconfirmed reports that Ukrainian forces entered Otruba (north of Tetkino and on the west [right] bank of the Seim River), and another Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces are operating near Tetkino." ([source](https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-august-18-2024))
Korenevo ([wiki](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Korenevo,_Korenevsky_District,_Kursk_Oblast)) -
>Geolocated footage published on August 19 shows that Ukrainian forces have advanced westward along Sudzhanskiy Shlyakh Street (38K-030 highway) in eastern Korenevo as well as in fields northeast of Korenevo.[3] Russian milbloggers widely claimed on August 20 that Ukrainian forces continued mechanized assaults on the outskirts of Korenevo and that Russian forces were conducting artillery and airstrikes to contain Ukrainian advances.[4] Russian milbloggers indicated that Russian forces regained some lost positions and advanced in fields south of Safonovka (northeast of Koreveno and 30km from the international border). ([source](https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-august-20-2024))
Glushkovo ([wiki](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Glushkovo,_Glushkovsky_District,_Kursk_Oblast)) -
>Ukrainian forces appear to be continuing efforts to strike Russian pontoon bridges and pontoon engineering equipment west of the current Kursk Oblast salient over the Seim River in Glushkovo Raion—geolocated footage published on August 20 shows Ukrainian drones striking Russian equipment bringing pontoons to a staging area near the Seim River about 3km north of Glushkovo.
Bolshoye Soldatskoye ([wiki](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Bolshoye_Soldatskoye)) - According to Wikipedia:
>Bolshoye Soldatskoye (Russian: Большое Солдатское) is a rural locality (a selo) and the administrative center of Bolshesoldatsky District, Kursk Oblast, Russia.
Kursk Nuclear Plant -
>Several prominent Russian authorities, including the Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD), nuclear energy operator Rosatom, Russian diplomats, and occupation authorities claimed on August 17 that Ukrainian authorities are preparing a false-flag attack against the KNPP ([source](https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-august-17-2024))
According to [Wikipedia](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Kursk_Nuclear_Power_Plant):
>The International Atomic Energy Agency's Director General Rafael Grossi urged both Russia and Ukraine to exercise "maximum restraint" to avoid an accident at the plant during the August 2024 Kursk Oblast incursion following reports of "significant military activity" near the facility. On 11 August 2024, it was reported that Russia had been constructing defensive trench lines near the power plant and up to 8 km away, with additional National Guard of Russia (Rosgvardiya) forces. Fighting occurred 20 miles (35 km) from the plant.
Resolution Criteria: This question will resolve as **Yes** if, before October 1, 2024, the Institute for the Study of War reports in its [interactive map](https://storymaps.arcgis.com/stories/36a7f6a6f5a9448496de641cf64bd375) that Ukraine controls Tetkino at the coordinates 51°16'45.1"N 34°16'57.7"E
The longer and more detailed instructions are as follows:
1. Go to the Institute for the Study of War and AEI Critical Threats Project map page, [here](https://storymaps.arcgis.com/stories/36a7f6a6f5a9448496de641cf64bd375).
2. Scroll down to the interactive map.
3. If the search box is not visible, click the 'X' on the top of the legend overlay on the left side of the map to close it.
4. Paste the coordinates into the search box.
This question resolves as **Yes** if the location is marked on the map as Ukrainian-controlled at any point before October 1, 2024. Generally this will mean shades of blue, including but not limited to "Claimed Limit of Ukrainian Advance." Please note two things:
1. Due to the nature of how ISW is currently mapping the area, this will include areas of *claimed* Ukrainian control and advances, not just areas assessed by ISW.
2. If ISW offers new labels or descriptions to indicate Ukraine's territorial control or advances in the area, those will also apply.
If the location is not marked as being under Ukrainian control at any point before that date, the subquestion resolves as **No**.
Fine Print: The sole authoritative source for defining areas of control will be the Institute for the Study of War (ISW) Ukraine Interactive War Map, currently located [here](https://storymaps.arcgis.com/stories/36a7f6a6f5a9448496de641cf64bd375). If the map has not been updated in the last seven days at the specified time of resolution, the question will be **annulled**.
|
2024-08-26T14:30:00Z
|
2024-08-27T14:30:00Z
|
2024-10-02T16:39:00Z
|
no
|
METACULUS
|
meta-27605
|
Will George R. R. Martin's “The Winds of Winter” be released before October 1, 2024?
|
[The Winds of Winter](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/The_Winds_of_Winter) is a long time upcoming book by bestseller author [George R. R. Martin](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/George_R._R._Martin). It is the sixth and planned penultimate volume of the ["A Song of Ice and Fire"](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/A_Song_of_Ice_and_Fire) series, which has inspired HBO's “Game of Thrones”.
Resolution Criteria: This question will resolve **Yes** if ["The Winds of
Winter" by George R. R. Martin](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/The_Winds_of_Winter) becomes available for purchase on Amazon.com before October 1, 2024. This does not include pre-orders.If the book's title is changed by the author or publisher before release, this question will still resolve based on the release date of the book under its new title, provided it remains part of the ["A Song of Ice and Fire"](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/A_Song_of_Ice_and_Fire) series.
|
2024-08-26T14:30:00Z
|
2024-08-27T14:30:00Z
|
2024-10-01T23:01:00Z
|
no
|
METACULUS
|
meta-27604
|
Will Mexico confirm Clade I mpox infections before October 1, 2024?
|
On August 14, 2024, the WHO [declared mpox a public health emergency of international concern](https://www.who.int/news/item/14-08-2024-who-director-general-declares-mpox-outbreak-a-public-health-emergency-of-international-concern).
> In declaring the PHEIC, Dr Tedros said, "The emergence of a new clade of mpox, its rapid spread in eastern DRC, and the reporting of cases in several neighbouring countries are very worrying. On top of outbreaks of other mpox clades in DRC and other countries in Africa, it’s clear that a coordinated international response is needed to stop these outbreaks and save lives.”
...
> The emergence last year and rapid spread of a new virus strain in DRC, clade 1b, which appears to be spreading mainly through sexual networks, and its detection in countries neighbouring the DRC is especially concerning, and one of the main reasons for the declaration of the PHEIC.
> In the past month, over 100 laboratory-confirmed cases of clade 1b have been reported in four countries neighbouring the DRC that have not reported mpox before: Burundi, Kenya, Rwanda and Uganda. Experts believe the true number of cases to be higher as a large proportion of clinically compatible cases have not been tested.
> Several outbreaks of different clades of mpox have occurred in different countries, with different modes of transmission and different levels of risk.
[According to the UK Health Security Agency](https://www.gov.uk/guidance/clade-1-mpox-virus-infection), "Historically, Clade I MPXV has been reported only in 5 Central African countries."
On August 15, 2024, Swedish health officials [confirmed a case of mpox clade I](https://www.folkhalsomyndigheten.se/the-public-health-agency-of-sweden/communicable-disease-control/disease-information-about-mpox/one-case-of-mpox-clade-i-reported-in-sweden/).
> ["This is the first clade I mpox case to be reported outside of the African continent," CDC spokesman David Daigle said in a statement, noting that the agency is watching the outbreak closely.](https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/who-confirms-first-case-new-mpox-strain-outside-africa-outbreak-spreads-2024-08-15/)
Resolution Criteria: The question resolves as **Yes** if Mexico has a confirmed Clade I mpox infection within its borders before October 1, 2024, according to [credible sources](https://www.metaculus.com/help/faq/#definitions).
Fine Print: Any subclades of Clade I will count. This question uses the [current naming conventions of the World Health Organization](https://www.who.int/news/item/12-08-2022-monkeypox--experts-give-virus-variants-new-names), which state: "Consensus was reached to now refer to the former Congo Basin (Central African) clade as Clade one (I) and the former West African clade as Clade two (II)."
|
2024-08-26T14:30:00Z
|
2024-08-27T14:30:00Z
|
2024-10-02T16:14:00Z
|
no
|
METACULUS
|
meta-27603
|
Will Japan confirm Clade I mpox infections before October 1, 2024?
|
On August 14, 2024, the WHO [declared mpox a public health emergency of international concern](https://www.who.int/news/item/14-08-2024-who-director-general-declares-mpox-outbreak-a-public-health-emergency-of-international-concern).
> In declaring the PHEIC, Dr Tedros said, "The emergence of a new clade of mpox, its rapid spread in eastern DRC, and the reporting of cases in several neighbouring countries are very worrying. On top of outbreaks of other mpox clades in DRC and other countries in Africa, it’s clear that a coordinated international response is needed to stop these outbreaks and save lives.”
...
> The emergence last year and rapid spread of a new virus strain in DRC, clade 1b, which appears to be spreading mainly through sexual networks, and its detection in countries neighbouring the DRC is especially concerning, and one of the main reasons for the declaration of the PHEIC.
> In the past month, over 100 laboratory-confirmed cases of clade 1b have been reported in four countries neighbouring the DRC that have not reported mpox before: Burundi, Kenya, Rwanda and Uganda. Experts believe the true number of cases to be higher as a large proportion of clinically compatible cases have not been tested.
> Several outbreaks of different clades of mpox have occurred in different countries, with different modes of transmission and different levels of risk.
[According to the UK Health Security Agency](https://www.gov.uk/guidance/clade-1-mpox-virus-infection), "Historically, Clade I MPXV has been reported only in 5 Central African countries."
On August 15, 2024, Swedish health officials [confirmed a case of mpox clade I](https://www.folkhalsomyndigheten.se/the-public-health-agency-of-sweden/communicable-disease-control/disease-information-about-mpox/one-case-of-mpox-clade-i-reported-in-sweden/).
> ["This is the first clade I mpox case to be reported outside of the African continent," CDC spokesman David Daigle said in a statement, noting that the agency is watching the outbreak closely.](https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/who-confirms-first-case-new-mpox-strain-outside-africa-outbreak-spreads-2024-08-15/)
Resolution Criteria: The question resolves as **Yes** if Japan has a confirmed Clade I mpox infection within its borders before October 1, 2024, according to [credible sources](https://www.metaculus.com/help/faq/#definitions).
Fine Print: Any subclades of Clade I will count. This question uses the [current naming conventions of the World Health Organization](https://www.who.int/news/item/12-08-2022-monkeypox--experts-give-virus-variants-new-names), which state: "Consensus was reached to now refer to the former Congo Basin (Central African) clade as Clade one (I) and the former West African clade as Clade two (II)."
|
2024-08-26T14:30:00Z
|
2024-08-27T14:30:00Z
|
2024-10-02T16:14:00Z
|
no
|
METACULUS
|
meta-27602
|
Will Russia confirm Clade I mpox infections before October 1, 2024?
|
On August 14, 2024, the WHO [declared mpox a public health emergency of international concern](https://www.who.int/news/item/14-08-2024-who-director-general-declares-mpox-outbreak-a-public-health-emergency-of-international-concern).
> In declaring the PHEIC, Dr Tedros said, "The emergence of a new clade of mpox, its rapid spread in eastern DRC, and the reporting of cases in several neighbouring countries are very worrying. On top of outbreaks of other mpox clades in DRC and other countries in Africa, it’s clear that a coordinated international response is needed to stop these outbreaks and save lives.”
...
> The emergence last year and rapid spread of a new virus strain in DRC, clade 1b, which appears to be spreading mainly through sexual networks, and its detection in countries neighbouring the DRC is especially concerning, and one of the main reasons for the declaration of the PHEIC.
> In the past month, over 100 laboratory-confirmed cases of clade 1b have been reported in four countries neighbouring the DRC that have not reported mpox before: Burundi, Kenya, Rwanda and Uganda. Experts believe the true number of cases to be higher as a large proportion of clinically compatible cases have not been tested.
> Several outbreaks of different clades of mpox have occurred in different countries, with different modes of transmission and different levels of risk.
[According to the UK Health Security Agency](https://www.gov.uk/guidance/clade-1-mpox-virus-infection), "Historically, Clade I MPXV has been reported only in 5 Central African countries."
On August 15, 2024, Swedish health officials [confirmed a case of mpox clade I](https://www.folkhalsomyndigheten.se/the-public-health-agency-of-sweden/communicable-disease-control/disease-information-about-mpox/one-case-of-mpox-clade-i-reported-in-sweden/).
> ["This is the first clade I mpox case to be reported outside of the African continent," CDC spokesman David Daigle said in a statement, noting that the agency is watching the outbreak closely.](https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/who-confirms-first-case-new-mpox-strain-outside-africa-outbreak-spreads-2024-08-15/)
Resolution Criteria: The question resolves as **Yes** if Russia has a confirmed Clade I mpox infection within its borders before October 1, 2024, according to [credible sources](https://www.metaculus.com/help/faq/#definitions).
Fine Print: Any subclades of Clade I will count. This question uses the [current naming conventions of the World Health Organization](https://www.who.int/news/item/12-08-2022-monkeypox--experts-give-virus-variants-new-names), which state: "Consensus was reached to now refer to the former Congo Basin (Central African) clade as Clade one (I) and the former West African clade as Clade two (II)."
|
2024-08-26T14:30:00Z
|
2024-08-27T14:30:00Z
|
2024-10-02T16:14:00Z
|
no
|
METACULUS
|
meta-27584
|
Will Angola confirm Clade I mpox infections before October 1, 2024?
|
On August 14, 2024, the WHO [declared mpox a public health emergency of international concern](https://www.who.int/news/item/14-08-2024-who-director-general-declares-mpox-outbreak-a-public-health-emergency-of-international-concern).
> In declaring the PHEIC, Dr Tedros said, "The emergence of a new clade of mpox, its rapid spread in eastern DRC, and the reporting of cases in several neighbouring countries are very worrying. On top of outbreaks of other mpox clades in DRC and other countries in Africa, it’s clear that a coordinated international response is needed to stop these outbreaks and save lives.”
...
> The emergence last year and rapid spread of a new virus strain in DRC, clade 1b, which appears to be spreading mainly through sexual networks, and its detection in countries neighbouring the DRC is especially concerning, and one of the main reasons for the declaration of the PHEIC.
> In the past month, over 100 laboratory-confirmed cases of clade 1b have been reported in four countries neighbouring the DRC that have not reported mpox before: Burundi, Kenya, Rwanda and Uganda. Experts believe the true number of cases to be higher as a large proportion of clinically compatible cases have not been tested.
> Several outbreaks of different clades of mpox have occurred in different countries, with different modes of transmission and different levels of risk.
[According to the UK Health Security Agency](https://www.gov.uk/guidance/clade-1-mpox-virus-infection), "Historically, Clade I MPXV has been reported only in 5 Central African countries."
On August 15, 2024, Swedish health officials [confirmed a case of mpox clade I](https://www.folkhalsomyndigheten.se/the-public-health-agency-of-sweden/communicable-disease-control/disease-information-about-mpox/one-case-of-mpox-clade-i-reported-in-sweden/).
> ["This is the first clade I mpox case to be reported outside of the African continent," CDC spokesman David Daigle said in a statement, noting that the agency is watching the outbreak closely.](https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/who-confirms-first-case-new-mpox-strain-outside-africa-outbreak-spreads-2024-08-15/)
Resolution Criteria: The question resolves as **Yes** if Angola has a confirmed Clade I mpox infection within its borders before October 1, 2024, according to [credible sources](https://www.metaculus.com/help/faq/#definitions).
Fine Print: Any subclades of Clade I will count. This question uses the [current naming conventions of the World Health Organization](https://www.who.int/news/item/12-08-2022-monkeypox--experts-give-virus-variants-new-names), which state: "Consensus was reached to now refer to the former Congo Basin (Central African) clade as Clade one (I) and the former West African clade as Clade two (II)."
|
2024-08-23T14:30:00Z
|
2024-08-24T14:30:00Z
|
2024-10-02T16:13:00Z
|
no
|
METACULUS
|
meta-27583
|
Will Zambia confirm Clade I mpox infections before October 1, 2024?
|
On August 14, 2024, the WHO [declared mpox a public health emergency of international concern](https://www.who.int/news/item/14-08-2024-who-director-general-declares-mpox-outbreak-a-public-health-emergency-of-international-concern).
> In declaring the PHEIC, Dr Tedros said, "The emergence of a new clade of mpox, its rapid spread in eastern DRC, and the reporting of cases in several neighbouring countries are very worrying. On top of outbreaks of other mpox clades in DRC and other countries in Africa, it’s clear that a coordinated international response is needed to stop these outbreaks and save lives.”
...
> The emergence last year and rapid spread of a new virus strain in DRC, clade 1b, which appears to be spreading mainly through sexual networks, and its detection in countries neighbouring the DRC is especially concerning, and one of the main reasons for the declaration of the PHEIC.
> In the past month, over 100 laboratory-confirmed cases of clade 1b have been reported in four countries neighbouring the DRC that have not reported mpox before: Burundi, Kenya, Rwanda and Uganda. Experts believe the true number of cases to be higher as a large proportion of clinically compatible cases have not been tested.
> Several outbreaks of different clades of mpox have occurred in different countries, with different modes of transmission and different levels of risk.
[According to the UK Health Security Agency](https://www.gov.uk/guidance/clade-1-mpox-virus-infection), "Historically, Clade I MPXV has been reported only in 5 Central African countries."
On August 15, 2024, Swedish health officials [confirmed a case of mpox clade I](https://www.folkhalsomyndigheten.se/the-public-health-agency-of-sweden/communicable-disease-control/disease-information-about-mpox/one-case-of-mpox-clade-i-reported-in-sweden/).
> ["This is the first clade I mpox case to be reported outside of the African continent," CDC spokesman David Daigle said in a statement, noting that the agency is watching the outbreak closely.](https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/who-confirms-first-case-new-mpox-strain-outside-africa-outbreak-spreads-2024-08-15/)
Resolution Criteria: The question resolves as **Yes** if Zambia has a confirmed Clade I mpox infection within its borders before October 1, 2024, according to [credible sources](https://www.metaculus.com/help/faq/#definitions).
Fine Print: Any subclades of Clade I will count. This question uses the [current naming conventions of the World Health Organization](https://www.who.int/news/item/12-08-2022-monkeypox--experts-give-virus-variants-new-names), which state: "Consensus was reached to now refer to the former Congo Basin (Central African) clade as Clade one (I) and the former West African clade as Clade two (II)."
|
2024-08-23T14:30:00Z
|
2024-08-24T14:30:00Z
|
2024-10-02T16:13:00Z
|
no
|
METACULUS
|
meta-27582
|
Will the US confirm Clade I mpox infections before October 1, 2024?
|
On August 14, 2024, the WHO [declared mpox a public health emergency of international concern](https://www.who.int/news/item/14-08-2024-who-director-general-declares-mpox-outbreak-a-public-health-emergency-of-international-concern).
> In declaring the PHEIC, Dr Tedros said, "The emergence of a new clade of mpox, its rapid spread in eastern DRC, and the reporting of cases in several neighbouring countries are very worrying. On top of outbreaks of other mpox clades in DRC and other countries in Africa, it’s clear that a coordinated international response is needed to stop these outbreaks and save lives.”
...
> The emergence last year and rapid spread of a new virus strain in DRC, clade 1b, which appears to be spreading mainly through sexual networks, and its detection in countries neighbouring the DRC is especially concerning, and one of the main reasons for the declaration of the PHEIC.
> In the past month, over 100 laboratory-confirmed cases of clade 1b have been reported in four countries neighbouring the DRC that have not reported mpox before: Burundi, Kenya, Rwanda and Uganda. Experts believe the true number of cases to be higher as a large proportion of clinically compatible cases have not been tested.
> Several outbreaks of different clades of mpox have occurred in different countries, with different modes of transmission and different levels of risk.
[According to the UK Health Security Agency](https://www.gov.uk/guidance/clade-1-mpox-virus-infection), "Historically, Clade I MPXV has been reported only in 5 Central African countries."
On August 15, 2024, Swedish health officials [confirmed a case of mpox clade I](https://www.folkhalsomyndigheten.se/the-public-health-agency-of-sweden/communicable-disease-control/disease-information-about-mpox/one-case-of-mpox-clade-i-reported-in-sweden/).
> ["This is the first clade I mpox case to be reported outside of the African continent," CDC spokesman David Daigle said in a statement, noting that the agency is watching the outbreak closely.](https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/who-confirms-first-case-new-mpox-strain-outside-africa-outbreak-spreads-2024-08-15/)
Resolution Criteria: The question resolves as **Yes** if the US has a confirmed Clade I mpox infection within its borders before October 1, 2024, according to [credible sources](https://www.metaculus.com/help/faq/#definitions).
Fine Print: Any subclades of Clade I will count. This question uses the [current naming conventions of the World Health Organization](https://www.who.int/news/item/12-08-2022-monkeypox--experts-give-virus-variants-new-names), which state: "Consensus was reached to now refer to the former Congo Basin (Central African) clade as Clade one (I) and the former West African clade as Clade two (II)."
|
2024-08-23T14:30:00Z
|
2024-08-24T14:30:00Z
|
2024-10-02T16:13:00Z
|
no
|
METACULUS
|
meta-27581
|
Will Greg Brockman return to OpenAI following his leave of absence before October 1, 2024?
|
> **Where have OpenAI’s founders gone?**
>
> Just two of OpenAI’s 11-strong founding team are still active at the ChatGPT maker, after an exodus following November’s attempted boardroom coup against chief executive Sam Altman.
>
> Three co-founders have departed so far this year, including John Schulman, who [defected](https://www.ft.com/content/4135d3c0-576a-4964-b79b-4242f8cb2471) to its artificial intelligence rival Anthropic this week. Greg Brockman, OpenAI’s president, also said on Monday he would be taking extended leave from the company.<br/>
> ...
>
> Brockman is a core member of OpenAI’s founding team. He was persuaded by Altman and Musk to leave his job as chief technology officer at financial technology company Stripe and take on the same position at OpenAI.
>
> He has been a key Altman ally since the beginning. When the board moved against Altman in a coup in November, Brockman was also removed as a director. The two returned to their posts together when the board backtracked five days later.
>
> On Monday, the company’s president announced he would be taking a sabbatical for the rest of the year.
>
> “First time to relax since co-founding OpenAI 9 years ago,” he [wrote](https://x.com/gdb/status/1821716026448633933) on X. “I’ve poured my life for the past 9 years into OpenAI, including the entirety of my marriage. Our work is important to me, but so is life.”<br/>
> [—Hammond, 2024](https://www.ft.com/content/638f67f7-5375-47fc-b3a7-af7c9e05b9e0)
Resolution Criteria: This question resolves as **Yes** if Greg Brockman returns to work at OpenAI following his leave of absence and before October 1, 2024, according to [credible reporting](https://www.metaculus.com/help/faq/#definitions). This question resolves as **No** if, following his leave of absence, Brockman exits OpenAI without returning, or does not return by October 1, 2024.
|
2024-08-23T14:30:00Z
|
2024-08-24T14:30:00Z
|
2024-10-02T16:45:00Z
|
no
|
METACULUS
|
meta-27576
|
Will any two countries out of the US, UK, Germany, Canada, France, or Australia curtail diplomatic ties with Israel before 2025, citing Israel’s military actions in Gaza?
|
*This forecasting question is associated with the Verity controversy: [Will Israel Lose International Support for Its Campaign in Gaza?](https://www.verity.news/controversy/Will-Israel-Lose-International-Support-for-its-Campaign-Against-Hamas)*
---
Since its establishment in 1948, Israel has seen [growing international recognition](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Foreign\_relations\_of\_Israel), though is still not universally recognized due to the longstanding [conflict between Israel and a number of the Arab countries](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Arab%E2%80%93Israeli\_conflict). In particular, the [United States has been a close ally of Israel](https://www.vox.com/world-politics/23916266/us-israel-support-ally-gaza-war-aid), with the US having provided [at least $158 billion](https://sgp.fas.org/crs/mideast/RL33222.pdf) in bilateral assistance and missile defense funding since Israel was established.
In the wake of the October 7, 2023, Hamas attack against Israel — which saw [nearly 1,200 people killed](https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/what-hamas\#chapter-title-0-8) and [over 250 taken hostage](https://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-67053011) — many friendly countries [expressed support for Israel](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/International\_reactions\_to\_the\_Israel%E2%80%93Hamas\_war). However, Israel’s responding military campaign against Hamas in Gaza led a [number of countries to sever relations](https://www.axios.com/2023/11/16/israel-gaza-war-countries-against-cease-fire-diplomats) due to the humanitarian situation, which has seen nearly [40,000 Palestinians killed](https://www.ochaopt.org/) as of August 2024 according to the Gaza Ministry of Health (though this number is disputed by Israel), and close to two million Gazans displaced. The US, Germany, Italy, the UK, and Canada have supplied Israel with weapons since the beginning of the war, though Canada, Italy, and the Netherlands [halted arms sales to Israel in early 2024](https://www.reuters.com/world/who-are-israels-main-weapons-suppliers-who-has-halted-exports-2024-05-09/).
But as the war approaches one year of duration and Israel has [expanded into other regions in Gaza](https://thehill.com/policy/defense/4660135-israel-moves-deeper-into-rafah/), the international mood may be shifting against Israel. In March of 2024, the US abstained on a [UN Security Council Resolution demanding a ceasefire](https://www.cnbc.com/2024/03/26/israel-gaza-us-abstention-on-un-cease-fire-vote-triggers-netanyahu-rage.html), allowing it to pass against the wishes of Israel. And in May 2024 the International Criminal Court (ICC) [sought arrest warrants](https://www.newsweek.com/israel-losing-diplomatic-war-palestine-united-nations-europe-1904064) for Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu and Defense Minister Yoav Gallant. Additionally, a number of countries have now granted diplomatic recognition to Palestine in response to the conflict. These actions have [caused some to argue](https://time.com/6963032/israel-netanyahu-allies-global-standing/) that the world is turning against Israel over its operation in Gaza.
The countries of the United States, the United Kingdom, Germany, Canada, France, and Australia make up a subset of the [G20](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/G20), and are among the ten member states of the G20 that [do not recognize Palestine](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/International\_recognition\_of\_the\_State\_of\_Palestine\#:\~:text=while%20ten%20countries%20(Australia%2C%20Canada%2C%20France%2C%20Germany%2C%20Italy%2C%20Japan%2C%20Mexico%2C%20South%20Korea%2C%20the%20United%20Kingdom%2C%20and%20the%20United%20States)%20have%20not).
Resolution Criteria: This question will resolve as **Yes** if, before October 1, 2024, at least two of the United States, the United Kingdom, Germany, Canada, France, or Australia takes any of the following actions relating to their relations with Israel, citing Israel's military actions in Gaza as a contributing factor:
* Recalls its ambassador from Israel, publicly announcing that the recall is in protest of Israel's actions in Gaza
* Downgrades its diplomatic relations with Israel, which is defined as reducing its chief of mission in the country to below the level of ambassador, referred to as a chargé d'affaires.
* Severs diplomatic relations with Israel, which is defined as withdrawing its diplomatic staff from the country.
* Formally announces that it recognizes the state of Palestine.
Additionally if the United States takes any one of the following actions before October 1, 2024, citing Israel's military actions in Gaza as a contributing factor, that will count for the United States as well (so if the United States takes one action listed below, and a different country takes one of the actions above, the question will resolve as **Yes**):
* Votes in favor (not simply abstaining) of a UN Security Council or UN General Assembly resolution that makes a demand or request of Israel relating to the Israeli campaign in Gaza (and any related humanitarian situations).
* Moves the US embassy in Israel from Jerusalem to Tel Aviv (or another location in Israel).
* Explicitly and unambiguously states that it has implemented an arms embargo on Israel.
* The statement must clearly say that an arms embargo is the official policy of the United States toward Israel, and not merely threaten a future arms embargo or cut off only some portion of weaponry. The embargo must cut off both weapons sales and bilateral military aid.
If the criteria above have not been met before October 1, 2024, this question will resolve as **No**.
|
2024-08-23T14:30:00Z
|
2024-08-24T14:30:00Z
|
2024-10-02T16:44:00Z
|
no
|
METACULUS
|
meta-27548
|
Will the CDC's assessment of the risk posed by mpox to the US general public exceed "High" before October 1, 2024?
|
In evolving situations, experts at the U.S. Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) sometimes make [qualitative judgements about the overall risk to the general public of the United States](https://www.cdc.gov/cfa-qualitative-assessments/php/about/risk-assessment-methods.html). CDC's overall qualitative assessments take into account both the likelihood and impact of infections, ranging from "Extremely Low" to "Very High."
As of CDC's [most recent qualitative analysis](https://www.cdc.gov/cfa-qualitative-assessments/php/data-research/mpox-risk-assessment/?CDC_AAref_Val=https://www.cdc.gov/forecast-outbreak-analytics/about/mpox-risk-assessment.html#cdc_data_surveillance_section_6-methods), dated July 8, 2024:
> The risk to the general population is assessed as VERY LOW.
CDC notes that "In response to the recent spread of clade I mpox in Sub-Saharan Africa, CDC is working to update our July 8, 2024, risk assessment."
Here are the [specific definitions](https://www.cdc.gov/cfa-qualitative-assessments/php/about/risk-assessment-methods.html) used by CDC to arrive at an overall risk level. These are provided for reference. However, CDC may change these definitions, and if so, the question still resolves as the highest risk level assessed among the options provided.
># Definitions
> ## Likelihood of infection definitions
> * **Extremely low:** An extremely small number of people are likely to be exposed, the pathogen is not very infectious, or the population is highly immune. We expect an extremely low prevalence of infection in the population, far less than 1% of the population.
> * **Very low:** A very small number of people are likely to be exposed, the pathogen is not very infectious, or the population is highly immune. We expect a very low prevalence of infection in the population.
> * **Low:** There are limited opportunities for exposure for most of the population, but exposure may be high in some areas or subgroups. The pathogen has at least moderate infectiousness or significant gaps in population immunity. We expect a low prevalence of infection in the population, potentially with pockets of higher prevalence.
> * **Moderate:** Many people are likely to be exposed, the pathogen has moderate to high infectiousness, or the population has low levels of immunity. We expect a moderate prevalence of infection in the population.
> * **High:** Most people are likely to be exposed, the pathogen has high infectiousness, or the population has very low immunity. We expect a high prevalence of infection in the population, with most of the population affected.
> * **Very high:** The vast majority of the population is likely to be exposed, the pathogen has very high infectiousness, or the population has extremely low immunity. We expect a very high prevalence of infection in the population, with the vast majority of the population affected.
> ## Impact of infection definitions
> * **Very low:** The pathogen is very unlikely to cause severe disease for this population, there is a very high proportion of population immunity protecting against severe disease, and/or effective treatments are widely available. The disease is very unlikely to cause disruption to normal activities or require additional resources for public health measures.
> * **Low:** The pathogen is unlikely to cause severe disease for this population, there is a very high proportion of population immunity protecting against severe disease, and/or effective treatments are widely available. The disease is unlikely to cause disruption to normal activities or require additional resources for public health measures.
> * **Moderate:** The pathogen causes severe disease for a substantial proportion of this population or pockets within this population, there is limited population immunity protecting people from severe disease, and/or effective treatments are not widely available or accessible. The disease may cause significant disruption to the population and require significant public health resources.
> * **High:** The pathogen typically causes severe disease for this population, there is a very low proportion of population immunity protecting against severe disease, and/or effective treatments are very limited or difficult to access. The disease could cause extensive disruption to normal activities and will potentially require a large amount of public health resources.
> * **Very high:** The pathogen typically causes very severe disease for this population, there is a very low proportion of population immunity protecting against severe disease, and/or there are no effective treatments. The disease could cause prolonged and extensive disruption to normal activities and will potentially require a very high level of public health resources.
Resolution Criteria: The question resolves **Yes** if the risk to the general population of the United States assessed by the CDC in a [Mpox Rapid Risk Assessment](https://www.cdc.gov/cfa-qualitative-assessments/php/data-research/mpox-risk-assessment/?CDC_AAref_Val=https://www.cdc.gov/forecast-outbreak-analytics/about/mpox-risk-assessment.html#cdc_data_surveillance_section_2-risk-assessment-for-general-population-in-the-united-states) or similar document, exceeds "High" between August 15, 2024 and September 30, 2024 (inclusive).
Fine Print: The question resolves as the overall risk. The highest overall risk level is "Very High." The lowest possible overall risk level is "Very Low." The question resolves based on the highest overall risk level, not the sub-categories (likelihood, impact). CDC's level of confidence is irrelevant; if CDC assesses "Very High" risk with low confidence, the question resolves as "Very High."
The question will not resolve based on statements from CDC officials. A written document is necessary.
|
2024-08-23T14:30:00Z
|
2024-08-24T14:30:00Z
|
2024-10-02T16:10:00Z
|
no
|
METACULUS
|
meta-27547
|
Will the CDC's assessment of the risk posed by mpox to the US general public exceed "Moderate" before October 1, 2024?
|
In evolving situations, experts at the U.S. Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) sometimes make [qualitative judgements about the overall risk to the general public of the United States](https://www.cdc.gov/cfa-qualitative-assessments/php/about/risk-assessment-methods.html). CDC's overall qualitative assessments take into account both the likelihood and impact of infections, ranging from "Extremely Low" to "Very High."
As of CDC's [most recent qualitative analysis](https://www.cdc.gov/cfa-qualitative-assessments/php/data-research/mpox-risk-assessment/?CDC_AAref_Val=https://www.cdc.gov/forecast-outbreak-analytics/about/mpox-risk-assessment.html#cdc_data_surveillance_section_6-methods), dated July 8, 2024:
> The risk to the general population is assessed as VERY LOW.
CDC notes that "In response to the recent spread of clade I mpox in Sub-Saharan Africa, CDC is working to update our July 8, 2024, risk assessment."
Here are the [specific definitions](https://www.cdc.gov/cfa-qualitative-assessments/php/about/risk-assessment-methods.html) used by CDC to arrive at an overall risk level. These are provided for reference. However, CDC may change these definitions, and if so, the question still resolves as the highest risk level assessed among the options provided.
># Definitions
> ## Likelihood of infection definitions
> * **Extremely low:** An extremely small number of people are likely to be exposed, the pathogen is not very infectious, or the population is highly immune. We expect an extremely low prevalence of infection in the population, far less than 1% of the population.
> * **Very low:** A very small number of people are likely to be exposed, the pathogen is not very infectious, or the population is highly immune. We expect a very low prevalence of infection in the population.
> * **Low:** There are limited opportunities for exposure for most of the population, but exposure may be high in some areas or subgroups. The pathogen has at least moderate infectiousness or significant gaps in population immunity. We expect a low prevalence of infection in the population, potentially with pockets of higher prevalence.
> * **Moderate:** Many people are likely to be exposed, the pathogen has moderate to high infectiousness, or the population has low levels of immunity. We expect a moderate prevalence of infection in the population.
> * **High:** Most people are likely to be exposed, the pathogen has high infectiousness, or the population has very low immunity. We expect a high prevalence of infection in the population, with most of the population affected.
> * **Very high:** The vast majority of the population is likely to be exposed, the pathogen has very high infectiousness, or the population has extremely low immunity. We expect a very high prevalence of infection in the population, with the vast majority of the population affected.
> ## Impact of infection definitions
> * **Very low:** The pathogen is very unlikely to cause severe disease for this population, there is a very high proportion of population immunity protecting against severe disease, and/or effective treatments are widely available. The disease is very unlikely to cause disruption to normal activities or require additional resources for public health measures.
> * **Low:** The pathogen is unlikely to cause severe disease for this population, there is a very high proportion of population immunity protecting against severe disease, and/or effective treatments are widely available. The disease is unlikely to cause disruption to normal activities or require additional resources for public health measures.
> * **Moderate:** The pathogen causes severe disease for a substantial proportion of this population or pockets within this population, there is limited population immunity protecting people from severe disease, and/or effective treatments are not widely available or accessible. The disease may cause significant disruption to the population and require significant public health resources.
> * **High:** The pathogen typically causes severe disease for this population, there is a very low proportion of population immunity protecting against severe disease, and/or effective treatments are very limited or difficult to access. The disease could cause extensive disruption to normal activities and will potentially require a large amount of public health resources.
> * **Very high:** The pathogen typically causes very severe disease for this population, there is a very low proportion of population immunity protecting against severe disease, and/or there are no effective treatments. The disease could cause prolonged and extensive disruption to normal activities and will potentially require a very high level of public health resources.
Resolution Criteria: The question resolves **Yes** if the risk to the general population of the United States assessed by the CDC in a [Mpox Rapid Risk Assessment](https://www.cdc.gov/cfa-qualitative-assessments/php/data-research/mpox-risk-assessment/?CDC_AAref_Val=https://www.cdc.gov/forecast-outbreak-analytics/about/mpox-risk-assessment.html#cdc_data_surveillance_section_2-risk-assessment-for-general-population-in-the-united-states) or similar document, exceeds "Moderate" between August 15, 2024 and September 30, 2024 (inclusive).
Fine Print: The question resolves as the overall risk. The highest overall risk level is "Very High." The lowest possible overall risk level is "Very Low." The question resolves based on the highest overall risk level, not the sub-categories (likelihood, impact). CDC's level of confidence is irrelevant; if CDC assesses "Very High" risk with low confidence, the question resolves as "Very High."
The question will not resolve based on statements from CDC officials. A written document is necessary.
|
2024-08-23T14:30:00Z
|
2024-08-24T14:30:00Z
|
2024-10-02T16:10:00Z
|
no
|
METACULUS
|
meta-27546
|
Will the CDC's assessment of the risk posed by mpox to the US general public exceed "Low" before October 1, 2024?
|
In evolving situations, experts at the U.S. Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) sometimes make [qualitative judgements about the overall risk to the general public of the United States](https://www.cdc.gov/cfa-qualitative-assessments/php/about/risk-assessment-methods.html). CDC's overall qualitative assessments take into account both the likelihood and impact of infections, ranging from "Extremely Low" to "Very High."
As of CDC's [most recent qualitative analysis](https://www.cdc.gov/cfa-qualitative-assessments/php/data-research/mpox-risk-assessment/?CDC_AAref_Val=https://www.cdc.gov/forecast-outbreak-analytics/about/mpox-risk-assessment.html#cdc_data_surveillance_section_6-methods), dated July 8, 2024:
> The risk to the general population is assessed as VERY LOW.
CDC notes that "In response to the recent spread of clade I mpox in Sub-Saharan Africa, CDC is working to update our July 8, 2024, risk assessment."
Here are the [specific definitions](https://www.cdc.gov/cfa-qualitative-assessments/php/about/risk-assessment-methods.html) used by CDC to arrive at an overall risk level. These are provided for reference. However, CDC may change these definitions, and if so, the question still resolves as the highest risk level assessed among the options provided.
># Definitions
> ## Likelihood of infection definitions
> * **Extremely low:** An extremely small number of people are likely to be exposed, the pathogen is not very infectious, or the population is highly immune. We expect an extremely low prevalence of infection in the population, far less than 1% of the population.
> * **Very low:** A very small number of people are likely to be exposed, the pathogen is not very infectious, or the population is highly immune. We expect a very low prevalence of infection in the population.
> * **Low:** There are limited opportunities for exposure for most of the population, but exposure may be high in some areas or subgroups. The pathogen has at least moderate infectiousness or significant gaps in population immunity. We expect a low prevalence of infection in the population, potentially with pockets of higher prevalence.
> * **Moderate:** Many people are likely to be exposed, the pathogen has moderate to high infectiousness, or the population has low levels of immunity. We expect a moderate prevalence of infection in the population.
> * **High:** Most people are likely to be exposed, the pathogen has high infectiousness, or the population has very low immunity. We expect a high prevalence of infection in the population, with most of the population affected.
> * **Very high:** The vast majority of the population is likely to be exposed, the pathogen has very high infectiousness, or the population has extremely low immunity. We expect a very high prevalence of infection in the population, with the vast majority of the population affected.
> ## Impact of infection definitions
> * **Very low:** The pathogen is very unlikely to cause severe disease for this population, there is a very high proportion of population immunity protecting against severe disease, and/or effective treatments are widely available. The disease is very unlikely to cause disruption to normal activities or require additional resources for public health measures.
> * **Low:** The pathogen is unlikely to cause severe disease for this population, there is a very high proportion of population immunity protecting against severe disease, and/or effective treatments are widely available. The disease is unlikely to cause disruption to normal activities or require additional resources for public health measures.
> * **Moderate:** The pathogen causes severe disease for a substantial proportion of this population or pockets within this population, there is limited population immunity protecting people from severe disease, and/or effective treatments are not widely available or accessible. The disease may cause significant disruption to the population and require significant public health resources.
> * **High:** The pathogen typically causes severe disease for this population, there is a very low proportion of population immunity protecting against severe disease, and/or effective treatments are very limited or difficult to access. The disease could cause extensive disruption to normal activities and will potentially require a large amount of public health resources.
> * **Very high:** The pathogen typically causes very severe disease for this population, there is a very low proportion of population immunity protecting against severe disease, and/or there are no effective treatments. The disease could cause prolonged and extensive disruption to normal activities and will potentially require a very high level of public health resources.
Resolution Criteria: The question resolves **Yes** if the risk to the general population of the United States assessed by the CDC in a [Mpox Rapid Risk Assessment](https://www.cdc.gov/cfa-qualitative-assessments/php/data-research/mpox-risk-assessment/?CDC_AAref_Val=https://www.cdc.gov/forecast-outbreak-analytics/about/mpox-risk-assessment.html#cdc_data_surveillance_section_2-risk-assessment-for-general-population-in-the-united-states) or similar document, exceeds "Low" between August 15, 2024 and September 30, 2024 (inclusive).
Fine Print: The question resolves as the overall risk. The highest overall risk level is "Very High." The lowest possible overall risk level is "Very Low." The question resolves based on the highest overall risk level, not the sub-categories (likelihood, impact). CDC's level of confidence is irrelevant; if CDC assesses "Very High" risk with low confidence, the question resolves as "Very High."
The question will not resolve based on statements from CDC officials. A written document is necessary.
|
2024-08-23T14:30:00Z
|
2024-08-24T14:30:00Z
|
2024-10-02T16:09:00Z
|
no
|
METACULUS
|
meta-27545
|
Will the CDC's assessment of the risk posed by mpox to the US general public exceed "Very Low" before October 1, 2024?
|
In evolving situations, experts at the U.S. Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) sometimes make [qualitative judgements about the overall risk to the general public of the United States](https://www.cdc.gov/cfa-qualitative-assessments/php/about/risk-assessment-methods.html). CDC's overall qualitative assessments take into account both the likelihood and impact of infections, ranging from "Extremely Low" to "Very High."
As of CDC's [most recent qualitative analysis](https://www.cdc.gov/cfa-qualitative-assessments/php/data-research/mpox-risk-assessment/?CDC_AAref_Val=https://www.cdc.gov/forecast-outbreak-analytics/about/mpox-risk-assessment.html#cdc_data_surveillance_section_6-methods), dated July 8, 2024:
> The risk to the general population is assessed as VERY LOW.
CDC notes that "In response to the recent spread of clade I mpox in Sub-Saharan Africa, CDC is working to update our July 8, 2024, risk assessment."
Here are the [specific definitions](https://www.cdc.gov/cfa-qualitative-assessments/php/about/risk-assessment-methods.html) used by CDC to arrive at an overall risk level. These are provided for reference. However, CDC may change these definitions, and if so, the question still resolves as the highest risk level assessed among the options provided.
># Definitions
> ## Likelihood of infection definitions
> * **Extremely low:** An extremely small number of people are likely to be exposed, the pathogen is not very infectious, or the population is highly immune. We expect an extremely low prevalence of infection in the population, far less than 1% of the population.
> * **Very low:** A very small number of people are likely to be exposed, the pathogen is not very infectious, or the population is highly immune. We expect a very low prevalence of infection in the population.
> * **Low:** There are limited opportunities for exposure for most of the population, but exposure may be high in some areas or subgroups. The pathogen has at least moderate infectiousness or significant gaps in population immunity. We expect a low prevalence of infection in the population, potentially with pockets of higher prevalence.
> * **Moderate:** Many people are likely to be exposed, the pathogen has moderate to high infectiousness, or the population has low levels of immunity. We expect a moderate prevalence of infection in the population.
> * **High:** Most people are likely to be exposed, the pathogen has high infectiousness, or the population has very low immunity. We expect a high prevalence of infection in the population, with most of the population affected.
> * **Very high:** The vast majority of the population is likely to be exposed, the pathogen has very high infectiousness, or the population has extremely low immunity. We expect a very high prevalence of infection in the population, with the vast majority of the population affected.
> ## Impact of infection definitions
> * **Very low:** The pathogen is very unlikely to cause severe disease for this population, there is a very high proportion of population immunity protecting against severe disease, and/or effective treatments are widely available. The disease is very unlikely to cause disruption to normal activities or require additional resources for public health measures.
> * **Low:** The pathogen is unlikely to cause severe disease for this population, there is a very high proportion of population immunity protecting against severe disease, and/or effective treatments are widely available. The disease is unlikely to cause disruption to normal activities or require additional resources for public health measures.
> * **Moderate:** The pathogen causes severe disease for a substantial proportion of this population or pockets within this population, there is limited population immunity protecting people from severe disease, and/or effective treatments are not widely available or accessible. The disease may cause significant disruption to the population and require significant public health resources.
> * **High:** The pathogen typically causes severe disease for this population, there is a very low proportion of population immunity protecting against severe disease, and/or effective treatments are very limited or difficult to access. The disease could cause extensive disruption to normal activities and will potentially require a large amount of public health resources.
> * **Very high:** The pathogen typically causes very severe disease for this population, there is a very low proportion of population immunity protecting against severe disease, and/or there are no effective treatments. The disease could cause prolonged and extensive disruption to normal activities and will potentially require a very high level of public health resources.
Resolution Criteria: The question resolves **Yes** if the risk to the general population of the United States assessed by the CDC in a [Mpox Rapid Risk Assessment](https://www.cdc.gov/cfa-qualitative-assessments/php/data-research/mpox-risk-assessment/?CDC_AAref_Val=https://www.cdc.gov/forecast-outbreak-analytics/about/mpox-risk-assessment.html#cdc_data_surveillance_section_2-risk-assessment-for-general-population-in-the-united-states) or similar document, exceeds "Very Low" between August 15, 2024 and September 30, 2024 (inclusive).
Fine Print: The question resolves as the overall risk. The highest overall risk level is "Very High." The lowest possible overall risk level is "Very Low." The question resolves based on the highest overall risk level, not the sub-categories (likelihood, impact). CDC's level of confidence is irrelevant; if CDC assesses "Very High" risk with low confidence, the question resolves as "Very High."
The question will not resolve based on statements from CDC officials. A written document is necessary.
|
2024-08-23T14:30:00Z
|
2024-08-24T14:30:00Z
|
2024-09-12T17:22:00Z
|
yes
|
METACULUS
|
meta-27539
|
Will a non-test nuclear weapon be detonated by October 1, 2024?
|
Resolution Criteria: Weapons in which the energy is provided by nuclear fission or fusion have only twice in history been detonated outside of a controlled test environment, in the Hiroshima and Nagasaki events in World War II.
Since then, the world has nearly gone to nuclear war as a result of international conflict (during the Cuban Missile Crisis) and by accident. There have also been a number of narrowly-averted accidental nuclear detonations. See [this timeline](http://futureoflife.org/background/nuclear-close-calls-a-timeline/) for a sobering look at how close we have come.
This question (which any sane person will hope resolves negatively) regards the probability that a nuclear detonation will occur by Oct 1, 2024, outside of controlled tests. This could include:
- Deliberate or nuclear attack.
- Accidental nuclear attack (launched by accident or on the basis of erroneous information.)
- Accidental detonation of a weapon.
- Nuclear terrorism.
For these purposes we do not consider a radiological weapon — where any fission/fusion energy is energetically sub-dominant to chemical or other explosives — to be a nuclear attack.
|
2024-08-22T14:30:00Z
|
2024-08-23T14:30:00Z
|
2024-10-02T00:13:00Z
|
no
|
METACULUS
|
meta-27538
|
Will Russia detonate a nuclear weapon in Ukraine or Ukrainian-held territory before October 1, 2024?
|
On August 8, 2024, a guest on Russian state TV [floated the idea](https://www.newsweek.com/russian-tv-nuclear-strike-kursk-raid-1936268) of Russia using tactical nuclear weapons on Ukrainian forces in the Kursk region of Russia. In June 2024, Russian president Vladimir Putin [said](https://www.voanews.com/a/putin-says-russia-could-use-nuclear-weapons-if-it-is-threatened/7644941.html):
>If somebody’s actions threaten our sovereignty and territorial integrity, we consider it possible to use all means at our disposal [...] For some reason, they believe in the West that Russia will never use it.
In June 2023, two months before his death, Wagner PMC Chief Yevgeny Prigozhin [said](https://www.newsweek.com/russia-could-nuke-border-region-yevgeny-prigozhin-wagner-group-1804797):
>"I am afraid that they might harbor some foul thoughts about dropping a little nuke on their own territory. Could it be the reason why we are ceding territory in Belgorod region—because we are too scared to hit their [territory], but not our own
>"Lobbing [the bomb] at foreign [territory] is scary, but we can hit our own, to show how sick and psychotic we are. The Ukrainian forces might be occupying some small [Russian] village, and that's where [Russia] will aim the tactical nuclear strike."
(From a forecasting standpoint please note that, in contrast to the [previous version](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/13171/nuclear-detonation-in-ukraine-by-2024/) of this question, this one also includes non-Ukrainian territory that is occupied by Ukraine.)
In May 2024, in response to what Russia's defense ministry said were “provocative statements and threats” by NATO, Putin [ordered](https://www.cnn.com/2024/05/06/europe/putin-tactical-nuclear-weapon-drill-russia-ukraine-intl/index.html) the Russian military to carry out tactical nuclear weapon drills, which was the first time such an announcement was made publicly.
Tactical nuclear weapons, also known as nonstrategic nuclear weapons, are smaller in yield than strategic nuclear weapons and are intended for battlefield usage, when there is a specific target and friendly forces are in close proximity. Russia [is estimated](https://www.armscontrol.org/act/2024-06/news/russia-links-nonstrategic-nuclear-exercises-threats) to have 1,000 to 2,000 of the weapons in its stockpile.
Putin [recently indicated](https://www.armscontrol.org/act/2024-07/news/russian-nuclear-posture-may-change-putin-says) that Russia's nuclear posture may change to a more aggressive doctrine, saying Russia would only use nuclear weapons in “exceptional cases…when there is a threat to the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the country,” but then refusing to “rule out the possibility of making changes to this doctrine.”
Nuclear weapons have not been used in warfare since 1945, when the United States dropped two atomic bombs on the Japanese cities of Hiroshima and Nagasaki.
See Also
- Center for Strategic & International Studies: [Why Russia Keeps Rattling the Nuclear Saber](https://www.csis.org/analysis/why-russia-keeps-rattling-nuclear-saber)
- Carnegie Politika: [Putin’s Russia Will Continue to Pursue Nuclear Escalation](https://carnegieendowment.org/russia-eurasia/politika/2024/06/russia-nuclear-war-threats?lang=en)
Resolution Criteria: This question will resolve as Yes if Russia detonates a nuclear weapon in Ukraine or Ukrainian-held territory before October 1, 2024. A [deliberate, inadvertent, or accidental/unauthorized](https://scienceandglobalsecurity.org/archive/sgs21barrett.pdf) detonation would result in the question resolving as **Yes**. For the purposes of this question, Ukraine will be defined as the [internationally-recognized boundaries prior to 2014](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Russian-occupied_territories_of_Ukraine) (that is, including Crimea, the Donetsk Republic, and the Luhansk Republic), including Ukraine's 12 nautical mile [territorial sea](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Territorial_waters#Territorial_sea). Ukrainian-held territory will include any territory (including in Russia) occupied by Ukrainian troops according to the Institute for the Study of War at [this link](https://storymaps.arcgis.com/stories/36a7f6a6f5a9448496de641cf64bd375). To qualify, the nuclear weapon must be detonated less than 100 kilometers above Earth's mean sea level.
Fine Print: For the purposes of this question, a "nuclear weapon" is a bomb which uses a nuclear fission or fusion reaction as its primary energy source, excluding conventional bombs which spread radioactive fallout (so called "[dirty bombs](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Dirty_bomb)").
External territory occupied by Ukrainian troops includes any category marked by ISW as occupied by Ukrainian forces, including but not limited to: claimed, assessed, and reported.
|
2024-08-22T14:30:00Z
|
2024-08-23T14:30:00Z
|
2024-10-02T00:26:00Z
|
no
|
METACULUS
|
meta-27524
|
Will Ukraine withdraw from Kursk before October 1, 2024?
|
On August 6, 2024, [Ukraine sent troops to Russia's Kursk Oblast](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/August_2024_Kursk_Oblast_incursion), advancing 10 kilometers and capturing over 100 square kilometers within days.
After 5 days, the situation has appeared to stabilize, though the fate of the incursion remains uncertain.
Resolution Criteria: This question will resolve positively if Ukraine no longer holds any territory in the Kursk Oblast according to either [DeepStateMap](https://deepstatemap.live/en) or the [Institute for the Study of War](https://www.understandingwar.org/publications) at any point before October 1, 2024. This question will resolve negatively otherwise.
Fine Print: If Ukraine holds no territory in the Kursk Oblast at any point but captures more territory afterwards, this question will still resolve positively.
If either DeepStateMap or the Institute for the Study of War reports that Ukraine holds no territory in the Kursk Oblast, the question will resolve positively, even if they do not agree.
|
2024-08-21T14:30:00Z
|
2024-08-22T14:30:00Z
|
2024-10-02T16:44:00Z
|
no
|
METACULUS
|
meta-27523
|
Will Yahya Sinwar cease to be the acting Chairman of the Hamas Political Bureau before October 1, 2024?
|
After the July 31, 2024 assassination of Ismail Haniyeh, the head of Hamas's political wing, Yahya Sinwar [was named](https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/hamas-names-gaza-leader-yahya-sinwar-chief-following-haniyeh-killing-statement-2024-08-06/) Haniyeh's successor. According to a recent [CNN report](https://www.cnn.com/2024/08/11/middleeast/hamas-sinwar-ceasefire-netanyahu-intl/index.html), Sinwar favors a ceasefire in the ongoing Israel-Hamas War. For its part, Israel [considers](https://www.timesofisrael.com/liveblog_entry/hamas-names-sinwar-as-new-leader-following-haniyehs-assassination/) Sinwar to be an architect of the Hamas-led attacks on Israel that took place on October 7, 2023. According to General Dan Goldfus of the Israeli Defense Forces, during one raid on the tunnels beneath Gaza, the IDF was "[minutes away](https://www.timesofisrael.com/the-coffee-was-still-hot-idf-general-says-troops-were-minutes-from-catching-sinwar/)" from capturing Sinwar.
Previous Chairmen of the Hamas Political Bureau have been:
- Khaled Mashal, April 17, 2004 to May 6, 2017.
- Ismail Haniyeh, May 6, 2017 to July 31, 2024.
- Yahya Sinwar, August 6, 2024 to present.
Resolution Criteria: This question will be resolved as **Yes** if, before October 1, 2024, any of the following events happen according to [credible sources](https://www.metaculus.com/help/faq/#definitions):
- Yahya Sinwar has stepped down or been replaced as Chairman of the Hamas Political Bureau.
- Sinwar is captured (even if he is still officially in the Chairman role).
- Sinwar has died.
The question will resolve as **No** if there is no such reporting of any of these events.
Fine Print: Metaculus may wait for additional confirmation from credible sources to resolve if the credibility of the initial reports is in doubt.
|
2024-08-21T14:30:00Z
|
2024-08-22T14:30:00Z
|
2024-10-01T20:53:00Z
|
no
|
METACULUS
|
meta-27522
|
Will the decision to reallocate the bronze medal in the women's floor exercise at the 2024 Paris Olympics from the US to Romania be overturned before October 1, 2024?
|
During the women's floor exercise final at the 2024 Paris Olympics, Jordan Chiles of the United States initially finished in fifth place. However, her coach filed an inquiry regarding her difficulty score, which resulted in Chiles being awarded an additional tenth of a point, moving her into third place and earning her the bronze medal.
Romania, whose gymnasts Ana Barbosu and Sabrina Maneca-Voinea finished fourth and fifth respectively after the inquiry, protested the decision, claiming that Chiles' inquiry was filed too late. The Court of Arbitration for Sport (CAS) agreed with Romania's protest and vacated Chiles' inquiry, officially revising her score and placing her back in fifth place.
As a result, the International Olympic Committee (IOC) announced that it would reallocate the bronze medal to Ana Bǎrbosu. However, USA Gymnastics has [challenged](https://www.npr.org/2024/08/11/g-s1-16509/us-gymnast-jordan-chiles-bronze-medal-return) the CAS ruling, submitting video evidence that allegedly proves Chiles' inquiry was filed within the allowed time frame.
[CNN reports](https://www.cnn.com/2024/08/12/sport/jordan-chiles-bronze-olympics-controversy-explained/index.html) that the CAS does not have authority to revisit the case.
A [CAS Bulletin](https://www.tas-cas.org/fileadmin/user_upload/Bulletin202_2011.pdf) published in 2011 explores the issue of CAS appeals in more detail in the section "Appeals against Arbitral Awards by the CAS", starting on page 19 (pdf page 22). The section describes that CAS appeals are heard by the Swiss Federal Tribunal, which is essentially the supreme court of Switzerland, the particular conditions under which an appeal is typically heard, and says the following about the frequency and success of appeals:
>Nowadays the CAS assumes that an appeal will be filed against approximately 10% of its arbitral awards. However, the success rate of these appeals is low. Since the CAS was established in 1984 only five appeals against CAS arbitral awards have succeeded. On average only 1% of all appeals against CAS arbitral awards were successful in 2009 and 2010. If one expresses the number of successful appeals as a percentage of all of the arbitral awards that have so far been delivered by the CAS (1984 – 2010), the success rate is 0.3%.
Resolution Criteria: This question will resolve as **Yes** if, before October 1, 2024, credible sources report that the Court of Arbitration for Sport (CAS)'s decision to reallocate the bronze medal in the women's floor exercise at the 2024 Paris Olympics from the Jordan Chiles of the United States to Ana Bǎrbosu of Romania has been overturned on appeal.
The question will resolve as **No** if no such decision has been announced before October 1, 2024, or if before October 1, 2024, a higher court hears an appeal and announces that it has upheld the original decision, and credible sources report that no higher level of appeal remains.
|
2024-08-21T14:30:00Z
|
2024-08-22T14:30:00Z
|
2024-10-02T16:08:00Z
|
no
|
METACULUS
|
meta-27521
|
Will Claude 3.5 Opus be released before October 1, 2024?
|
Claude 3.5 Sonnet surprised many in the field of AI by unseating OpenAI's GPT-4o as the world's leading large language model, by [numerous metrics](https://ai.plainenglish.io/anthropic-dominates-openai-a-side-by-side-comparison-of-claude-3-5-sonnet-and-gpt-4o-8cca145a466f), upon its release on June 20, 2024.
Regarding future plans, Anthropic [has stated](https://www.anthropic.com/news/claude-3-5-sonnet): "Our aim is to substantially improve the tradeoff curve between intelligence, speed, and cost every few months. To complete the Claude 3.5 model family, we’ll be releasing Claude 3.5 Haiku and Claude 3.5 Opus later this year."
Resolution Criteria: This question resolves **Yes** if a member of the general public can access Anthropic's Claude 3.5 Opus model before October 1, 2024 without first joining a waitlist or participating in an early access or testing phase.
Fine Print: - The resolution will rely on [credible sources](https://www.metaculus.com/help/faq/#definitions), including that it may rely on the ability of Metaculus employees to access Claude 3.5 Opus.
- "Access" may be via API, the Claude interface, or any other method that allows interaction with Claude 3.5 Opus.
- Models that do not include "Claude 3.5 Opus" in the name will not be considered for resolution of this question.
|
2024-08-21T14:30:00Z
|
2024-08-22T14:30:00Z
|
2024-10-02T16:43:00Z
|
no
|
METACULUS
|
meta-27515
|
Will Apple announce an iPhone with 40W fast charging by the end of its September 2024 event?
|
According to [Mac Rumors](https://www.macrumors.com/2024/07/10/iphone-16-pro-40w-fast-charging-20w-magsafe/):
>Apple's forthcoming iPhone 16 Pro and iPhone 16 Pro Max will support 40W wired fast charging and 20W MagSafe charging, claims a rumor currently swirling around China.
>Right now, iPhone 15 and iPhone 15 Pro models are capable of up to 27W peak charging speeds with an appropriate USB-C power adapter, while official MagSafe chargers from Apple and authorized third parties can wirelessly charge the iPhone 15 models at up to 15W. All four iPhone 15 models can charge up to 50% in around 30 minutes with a 20W or higher power adapter, which is the same as Apple's previous iPhone 13 and iPhone 14 models.
Apple's highly-anticipated launch event is [expected](https://economictimes.indiatimes.com/magazines/panache/iphone-16-launch-apple-september-event-to-also-debut-watch-series-10-airpods-4-heres-what-we-know/articleshow/112626834.cms?from=mdr) to be on September 10, 2024. It is widely expected to launch the iPhone 16, which will feature a rumored four new models, which could have larger displays than current iPhone models, faster processors, and improved AI features.
According to [Forbes](https://www.forbes.com/sites/davidphelan/2024/07/16/apple-iphone-16-pro-design-upgrade-promises-key-feature-boost-report-says-iphone-16-pro-max/), this would roughly double the speed at which the phone could be charged. At the current fastest charging speed of 27W, going from zero to 50% takes 30 minutes, while a 40W charger would do it in 15 minutes. A few Android phones already feature faster changing speeds, such as the Samsung Galaxy S24 at 45W, the Xiaomi 14 Pro at options of up to 120W, and the Motorola Edge 40 Pro at 125W.
Resolution Criteria: This question resolves as **Yes** if, by the end of its September 2024 event (the expected iPhone 16 event), Apple officially announces the existence of an iPhone model that supports 40 watts (or higher) charging. If this does not occur by the end of its September 2024 event, or if no iPhone 16 Apple event is held before October 1, 2024, this question resolves as **No**.
Fine Print: Either wired or wireless charging will count.
The official announcement can come from any of Apple's channels including but not limited to: a product launch announcement (such as the [expected](https://wccftech.com/iphone-16-launch-event-in-september/) Apple event possibly on September 10, 2024), press releases, announcements on Apple's official social media accounts, or information published on Apple's website indicating that 40W or higher iPhone charging is supported.
Leaks or unofficial release of information will not count.
Although a Yes resolution will most likely come from an announcement of a new upcoming iPhone model, possibly called the iPhone 16, if Apple instead announces that an existing model of iPhone has been updated to support the faster charging, that will count as well.
Please note that the iPhone with ≥40W charging need not be for sale for the question to resolve as **Yes**. Resolution is based on the announcement or publication of the information by Apple.
Vague statements such as "faster charging" without specifying wattage will not count.
|
2024-08-23T14:30:00Z
|
2024-08-24T14:30:00Z
|
2024-09-10T14:41:00Z
|
no
|
METACULUS
|
meta-27493
|
Will the month over month percentage increase in core CPI inflation in the US in August 2024 be 0.5% or more?
|
In the context of growing concerns about a potential US recession in 2024, inflation remains a key factor in shaping monetary policy decisions and economic outcomes. Throughout 2023 and early 2024, the Federal Reserve has been grappling with persistently high inflation, which has led to a series of [interest rate hikes](https://apnews.com/article/inflation-interest-rates-federal-reserve-economy-jobs-f43eff13abf862ac84cd9f3ef89201db#https://apnews.com/article/inflation-interest-rates-federal-reserve-economy-jobs-f43eff13abf862ac84cd9f3ef89201db#) to tame price pressures.
Core inflation, which excludes the volatile food and energy components, is often seen as a more stable measure of underlying inflation trends. The Fed closely watches core inflation when assessing the appropriate stance of monetary policy.
In recent months, there have been signs that inflation may be moderating, with some economists expecting a gradual return to the Fed's 2% target. However, if inflation proves to be more persistent than anticipated, it could complicate the Fed's efforts to support the economy in the face of a potential downturn.
This question focuses on the US core inflation reading for August 2024, which is [scheduled to be released](https://www.bls.gov/schedule/news_release/cpi.htm) by the Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS) on September 11, 2024. The change in core inflation will provide insight into the trajectory of underlying price pressures and could influence market expectations for Fed policy.
<iframe src="https://fred.stlouisfed.org/graph/graph-landing.php?g=1sOJ2&width=100%25&height=475" scrolling="no" frameborder="0" style="overflow:hidden; width:100%; height:550px;" allowTransparency="true" loading="lazy"></iframe>
Resolution Criteria: The question will resolve as **Yes** if the seasonally adjusted month over month percentage increase in core CPI inflation in the United States in August 2024 is 0.5% or more, as reported by the [BLS](https://www.bls.gov/cpi/).
Fine Print: - Core CPI is defined as the Consumer Price Index for All Urban Consumers (CPI-U), excluding food and energy prices.
- The percentage change will be the rounded value reported by BLS in its release. For example, the figure for July 2024, was [reported as 0.2 percent](https://www.bls.gov/news.release/cpi.nr0.htm#:~:text=increased%200.1%20percent.-,The%20index%20for%20all%20items%20less%20food%20and%20energy%20rose%200.2%20percent%20in%20July,-%2C%20after%20rising%200.1).
- The question will resolve based on the first reported core CPI numbers for August 2024 and will not be affected by any subsequent revisions.
- If the BLS fails to release the August 2024 core CPI data by the end of September 2024, the question will resolve as "Ambiguous".
|
2024-08-22T14:30:00Z
|
2024-08-23T14:30:00Z
|
2024-09-11T12:40:00Z
|
no
|
METACULUS
|
meta-27492
|
Will the month over month percentage increase in core CPI inflation in the US in August 2024 be 0.4%?
|
In the context of growing concerns about a potential US recession in 2024, inflation remains a key factor in shaping monetary policy decisions and economic outcomes. Throughout 2023 and early 2024, the Federal Reserve has been grappling with persistently high inflation, which has led to a series of [interest rate hikes](https://apnews.com/article/inflation-interest-rates-federal-reserve-economy-jobs-f43eff13abf862ac84cd9f3ef89201db#https://apnews.com/article/inflation-interest-rates-federal-reserve-economy-jobs-f43eff13abf862ac84cd9f3ef89201db#) to tame price pressures.
Core inflation, which excludes the volatile food and energy components, is often seen as a more stable measure of underlying inflation trends. The Fed closely watches core inflation when assessing the appropriate stance of monetary policy.
In recent months, there have been signs that inflation may be moderating, with some economists expecting a gradual return to the Fed's 2% target. However, if inflation proves to be more persistent than anticipated, it could complicate the Fed's efforts to support the economy in the face of a potential downturn.
This question focuses on the US core inflation reading for August 2024, which is [scheduled to be released](https://www.bls.gov/schedule/news_release/cpi.htm) by the Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS) on September 11, 2024. The change in core inflation will provide insight into the trajectory of underlying price pressures and could influence market expectations for Fed policy.
<iframe src="https://fred.stlouisfed.org/graph/graph-landing.php?g=1sOJ2&width=100%25&height=475" scrolling="no" frameborder="0" style="overflow:hidden; width:100%; height:550px;" allowTransparency="true" loading="lazy"></iframe>
Resolution Criteria: The question will resolve as **Yes** if the seasonally adjusted month over month percentage increase in core CPI inflation in the United States in August 2024 is 0.4%, as reported by the [BLS](https://www.bls.gov/cpi/).
Fine Print: - Core CPI is defined as the Consumer Price Index for All Urban Consumers (CPI-U), excluding food and energy prices.
- The percentage change will be the rounded value reported by BLS in its release. For example, the figure for July 2024, was [reported as 0.2 percent](https://www.bls.gov/news.release/cpi.nr0.htm#:~:text=increased%200.1%20percent.-,The%20index%20for%20all%20items%20less%20food%20and%20energy%20rose%200.2%20percent%20in%20July,-%2C%20after%20rising%200.1).
- The question will resolve based on the first reported core CPI numbers for August 2024 and will not be affected by any subsequent revisions.
- If the BLS fails to release the August 2024 core CPI data by the end of September 2024, the question will resolve as "Ambiguous".
|
2024-08-22T14:30:00Z
|
2024-08-23T14:30:00Z
|
2024-09-11T12:39:00Z
|
no
|
METACULUS
|
meta-27491
|
Will the month over month percentage increase in core CPI inflation in the US in August 2024 be 0.3%?
|
In the context of growing concerns about a potential US recession in 2024, inflation remains a key factor in shaping monetary policy decisions and economic outcomes. Throughout 2023 and early 2024, the Federal Reserve has been grappling with persistently high inflation, which has led to a series of [interest rate hikes](https://apnews.com/article/inflation-interest-rates-federal-reserve-economy-jobs-f43eff13abf862ac84cd9f3ef89201db#https://apnews.com/article/inflation-interest-rates-federal-reserve-economy-jobs-f43eff13abf862ac84cd9f3ef89201db#) to tame price pressures.
Core inflation, which excludes the volatile food and energy components, is often seen as a more stable measure of underlying inflation trends. The Fed closely watches core inflation when assessing the appropriate stance of monetary policy.
In recent months, there have been signs that inflation may be moderating, with some economists expecting a gradual return to the Fed's 2% target. However, if inflation proves to be more persistent than anticipated, it could complicate the Fed's efforts to support the economy in the face of a potential downturn.
This question focuses on the US core inflation reading for August 2024, which is [scheduled to be released](https://www.bls.gov/schedule/news_release/cpi.htm) by the Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS) on September 11, 2024. The change in core inflation will provide insight into the trajectory of underlying price pressures and could influence market expectations for Fed policy.
<iframe src="https://fred.stlouisfed.org/graph/graph-landing.php?g=1sOJ2&width=100%25&height=475" scrolling="no" frameborder="0" style="overflow:hidden; width:100%; height:550px;" allowTransparency="true" loading="lazy"></iframe>
Resolution Criteria: The question will resolve as **Yes** if the seasonally adjusted month over month percentage increase in core CPI inflation in the United States in August 2024 is 0.3%, as reported by the [BLS](https://www.bls.gov/cpi/).
Fine Print: - Core CPI is defined as the Consumer Price Index for All Urban Consumers (CPI-U), excluding food and energy prices.
- The percentage change will be the rounded value reported by BLS in its release. For example, the figure for July 2024, was [reported as 0.2 percent](https://www.bls.gov/news.release/cpi.nr0.htm#:~:text=increased%200.1%20percent.-,The%20index%20for%20all%20items%20less%20food%20and%20energy%20rose%200.2%20percent%20in%20July,-%2C%20after%20rising%200.1).
- The question will resolve based on the first reported core CPI numbers for August 2024 and will not be affected by any subsequent revisions.
- If the BLS fails to release the August 2024 core CPI data by the end of September 2024, the question will resolve as "Ambiguous".
|
2024-08-22T14:30:00Z
|
2024-08-23T14:30:00Z
|
2024-09-11T13:15:00Z
|
yes
|
METACULUS
|
meta-27490
|
Will the month over month percentage increase in core CPI inflation in the US in August 2024 be 0.2%?
|
In the context of growing concerns about a potential US recession in 2024, inflation remains a key factor in shaping monetary policy decisions and economic outcomes. Throughout 2023 and early 2024, the Federal Reserve has been grappling with persistently high inflation, which has led to a series of [interest rate hikes](https://apnews.com/article/inflation-interest-rates-federal-reserve-economy-jobs-f43eff13abf862ac84cd9f3ef89201db#https://apnews.com/article/inflation-interest-rates-federal-reserve-economy-jobs-f43eff13abf862ac84cd9f3ef89201db#) to tame price pressures.
Core inflation, which excludes the volatile food and energy components, is often seen as a more stable measure of underlying inflation trends. The Fed closely watches core inflation when assessing the appropriate stance of monetary policy.
In recent months, there have been signs that inflation may be moderating, with some economists expecting a gradual return to the Fed's 2% target. However, if inflation proves to be more persistent than anticipated, it could complicate the Fed's efforts to support the economy in the face of a potential downturn.
This question focuses on the US core inflation reading for August 2024, which is [scheduled to be released](https://www.bls.gov/schedule/news_release/cpi.htm) by the Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS) on September 11, 2024. The change in core inflation will provide insight into the trajectory of underlying price pressures and could influence market expectations for Fed policy.
<iframe src="https://fred.stlouisfed.org/graph/graph-landing.php?g=1sOJ2&width=100%25&height=475" scrolling="no" frameborder="0" style="overflow:hidden; width:100%; height:550px;" allowTransparency="true" loading="lazy"></iframe>
Resolution Criteria: The question will resolve as **Yes** if the seasonally adjusted month over month percentage increase in core CPI inflation in the United States in August 2024 is 0.2%, as reported by the [BLS](https://www.bls.gov/cpi/).
Fine Print: - Core CPI is defined as the Consumer Price Index for All Urban Consumers (CPI-U), excluding food and energy prices.
- The percentage change will be the rounded value reported by BLS in its release. For example, the figure for July 2024, was [reported as 0.2 percent](https://www.bls.gov/news.release/cpi.nr0.htm#:~:text=increased%200.1%20percent.-,The%20index%20for%20all%20items%20less%20food%20and%20energy%20rose%200.2%20percent%20in%20July,-%2C%20after%20rising%200.1).
- The question will resolve based on the first reported core CPI numbers for August 2024 and will not be affected by any subsequent revisions.
- If the BLS fails to release the August 2024 core CPI data by the end of September 2024, the question will resolve as "Ambiguous".
|
2024-08-22T14:30:00Z
|
2024-08-23T14:30:00Z
|
2024-09-11T13:15:00Z
|
no
|
METACULUS
|
meta-27489
|
Will the month over month percentage increase in core CPI inflation in the US in August 2024 be 0.1%?
|
In the context of growing concerns about a potential US recession in 2024, inflation remains a key factor in shaping monetary policy decisions and economic outcomes. Throughout 2023 and early 2024, the Federal Reserve has been grappling with persistently high inflation, which has led to a series of [interest rate hikes](https://apnews.com/article/inflation-interest-rates-federal-reserve-economy-jobs-f43eff13abf862ac84cd9f3ef89201db#https://apnews.com/article/inflation-interest-rates-federal-reserve-economy-jobs-f43eff13abf862ac84cd9f3ef89201db#) to tame price pressures.
Core inflation, which excludes the volatile food and energy components, is often seen as a more stable measure of underlying inflation trends. The Fed closely watches core inflation when assessing the appropriate stance of monetary policy.
In recent months, there have been signs that inflation may be moderating, with some economists expecting a gradual return to the Fed's 2% target. However, if inflation proves to be more persistent than anticipated, it could complicate the Fed's efforts to support the economy in the face of a potential downturn.
This question focuses on the US core inflation reading for August 2024, which is [scheduled to be released](https://www.bls.gov/schedule/news_release/cpi.htm) by the Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS) on September 11, 2024. The change in core inflation will provide insight into the trajectory of underlying price pressures and could influence market expectations for Fed policy.
<iframe src="https://fred.stlouisfed.org/graph/graph-landing.php?g=1sOJ2&width=100%25&height=475" scrolling="no" frameborder="0" style="overflow:hidden; width:100%; height:550px;" allowTransparency="true" loading="lazy"></iframe>
Resolution Criteria: The question will resolve as **Yes** if the seasonally adjusted month over month percentage increase in core CPI inflation in the United States in August 2024 is 0.1%, as reported by the [BLS](https://www.bls.gov/cpi/).
Fine Print: - Core CPI is defined as the Consumer Price Index for All Urban Consumers (CPI-U), excluding food and energy prices.
- The percentage change will be the rounded value reported by BLS in its release. For example, the figure for July 2024, was [reported as 0.2 percent](https://www.bls.gov/news.release/cpi.nr0.htm#:~:text=increased%200.1%20percent.-,The%20index%20for%20all%20items%20less%20food%20and%20energy%20rose%200.2%20percent%20in%20July,-%2C%20after%20rising%200.1).
- The question will resolve based on the first reported core CPI numbers for August 2024 and will not be affected by any subsequent revisions.
- If the BLS fails to release the August 2024 core CPI data by the end of September 2024, the question will resolve as "Ambiguous".
|
2024-08-22T14:30:00Z
|
2024-08-23T14:30:00Z
|
2024-09-11T12:38:00Z
|
no
|
METACULUS
|
meta-27488
|
Will the month over month percentage increase in core CPI inflation in the US in August 2024 be 0.0% or less?
|
In the context of growing concerns about a potential US recession in 2024, inflation remains a key factor in shaping monetary policy decisions and economic outcomes. Throughout 2023 and early 2024, the Federal Reserve has been grappling with persistently high inflation, which has led to a series of [interest rate hikes](https://apnews.com/article/inflation-interest-rates-federal-reserve-economy-jobs-f43eff13abf862ac84cd9f3ef89201db#https://apnews.com/article/inflation-interest-rates-federal-reserve-economy-jobs-f43eff13abf862ac84cd9f3ef89201db#) to tame price pressures.
Core inflation, which excludes the volatile food and energy components, is often seen as a more stable measure of underlying inflation trends. The Fed closely watches core inflation when assessing the appropriate stance of monetary policy.
In recent months, there have been signs that inflation may be moderating, with some economists expecting a gradual return to the Fed's 2% target. However, if inflation proves to be more persistent than anticipated, it could complicate the Fed's efforts to support the economy in the face of a potential downturn.
This question focuses on the US core inflation reading for August 2024, which is [scheduled to be released](https://www.bls.gov/schedule/news_release/cpi.htm) by the Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS) on September 11, 2024. The change in core inflation will provide insight into the trajectory of underlying price pressures and could influence market expectations for Fed policy.
<iframe src="https://fred.stlouisfed.org/graph/graph-landing.php?g=1sOJ2&width=100%25&height=475" scrolling="no" frameborder="0" style="overflow:hidden; width:100%; height:550px;" allowTransparency="true" loading="lazy"></iframe>
Resolution Criteria: The question will resolve as **Yes** if the seasonally adjusted month over month percentage increase in core CPI inflation in the United States in August 2024 is 0.0% or less, as reported by the [BLS](https://www.bls.gov/cpi/).
Fine Print: - Core CPI is defined as the Consumer Price Index for All Urban Consumers (CPI-U), excluding food and energy prices.
- The percentage change will be the rounded value reported by BLS in its release. For example, the figure for July 2024, was [reported as 0.2 percent](https://www.bls.gov/news.release/cpi.nr0.htm#:~:text=increased%200.1%20percent.-,The%20index%20for%20all%20items%20less%20food%20and%20energy%20rose%200.2%20percent%20in%20July,-%2C%20after%20rising%200.1).
- The question will resolve based on the first reported core CPI numbers for August 2024 and will not be affected by any subsequent revisions.
- If the BLS fails to release the August 2024 core CPI data by the end of September 2024, the question will resolve as "Ambiguous".
|
2024-08-22T14:30:00Z
|
2024-08-23T14:30:00Z
|
2024-09-11T12:38:00Z
|
no
|
METACULUS
|
meta-27487
|
Will the Fed cut rates by more than 50 bps at their September meeting?
|
In early August 2024, bond markets have been rallying strongly as traders increasingly bet that the US economy is deteriorating rapidly, potentially heading towards a [recession](https://apnews.com/article/economy-jobs-unemployment-federal-reserve-inflation-22095766804d9c1532b4fcc29565be49). This shift in sentiment has been driven by a series of weaker-than-expected economic data releases, most notably the July jobs report which showed that employers created just 114,000 jobs, far below economists' forecasts, while the unemployment rate rose.
The sharp move in market expectations marks a significant change from earlier in the year, when worries about persistent inflation dominated the narrative. Now, investors appear to be convinced that economic growth will stall unless the Federal Reserve begins to lower interest rates from the current two-decade high of around 5.3%.
Futures markets in early August [were pricing in](https://finance.yahoo.com/news/bond-traders-bet-big-fed-190000721.html?guccounter=1&guce_referrer=aHR0cHM6Ly93d3cuZ29vZ2xlLmNvbS8&guce_referrer_sig=AQAAAAdfa1un1juMjZYChE0Phs5vqjCYVBTfWq5endU3ABCBGCmHIUKZkqTLazDw7_s_fodV9UBEtwlOJd7Ev6dczGYruUERgtgKI6d0NfQ4TcOahRW-u9NBgbitp8itVfGOnZWGqdfd_mpp_N3E3IrHQV-RuRmbEAjurglNZFxOlI22) roughly five quarter-point rate cuts from the Fed through the end of 2024, with some even betting on the possibility of an emergency inter-meeting cut within the next week. Several prominent Wall Street economists, including those at Citigroup and JPMorgan Chase, have revised their forecasts to predict half-percentage-point rate cuts at both the September and November FOMC meetings. As of August 19, the [CME Group FedWatch tool](https://www.cmegroup.com/markets/interest-rates/cme-fedwatch-tool.html) is anticipating approximately 100 bps reducing in the target rate by the end of the year.
The next meeting of the Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC) is [scheduled](https://www.federalreserve.gov/monetarypolicy/fomccalendars.htm) to be held on September 17 and 18, 2024.
Resolution Criteria: The question will resolve **Yes** if the Federal Reserve of the United States cuts rates by more than 50 bps at the September 2024 FOMC meeting.
If the September FOMC meeting is cancelled, this question will resolve as “Annulled”
Fine Print: - The relevant Fed policy rate is the federal funds target. The question will resolve according to the decrease in the target rate announced at the FOMC meeting, such as those shown historically at the [Open Market Operations webpage](https://www.federalreserve.gov/monetarypolicy/openmarket.htm).
- The rate cut will be relative to the target rate prior to the start of the meeting. If the Federal Reserve issues an emergency rate cut prior to the meeting and then cuts rates again at the scheduled September meeting, the question will resolve as the size of the cut issued at the September meeting only.
- The question will resolve based on the official policy announcements from the Federal Reserve, rather than market expectations or speculation.
|
2024-08-22T14:30:00Z
|
2024-08-23T14:30:00Z
|
2024-09-18T18:25:00Z
|
no
|
METACULUS
|
meta-27486
|
Will the Fed cut rates by 50 bps at their September meeting?
|
In early August 2024, bond markets have been rallying strongly as traders increasingly bet that the US economy is deteriorating rapidly, potentially heading towards a [recession](https://apnews.com/article/economy-jobs-unemployment-federal-reserve-inflation-22095766804d9c1532b4fcc29565be49). This shift in sentiment has been driven by a series of weaker-than-expected economic data releases, most notably the July jobs report which showed that employers created just 114,000 jobs, far below economists' forecasts, while the unemployment rate rose.
The sharp move in market expectations marks a significant change from earlier in the year, when worries about persistent inflation dominated the narrative. Now, investors appear to be convinced that economic growth will stall unless the Federal Reserve begins to lower interest rates from the current two-decade high of around 5.3%.
Futures markets in early August [were pricing in](https://finance.yahoo.com/news/bond-traders-bet-big-fed-190000721.html?guccounter=1&guce_referrer=aHR0cHM6Ly93d3cuZ29vZ2xlLmNvbS8&guce_referrer_sig=AQAAAAdfa1un1juMjZYChE0Phs5vqjCYVBTfWq5endU3ABCBGCmHIUKZkqTLazDw7_s_fodV9UBEtwlOJd7Ev6dczGYruUERgtgKI6d0NfQ4TcOahRW-u9NBgbitp8itVfGOnZWGqdfd_mpp_N3E3IrHQV-RuRmbEAjurglNZFxOlI22) roughly five quarter-point rate cuts from the Fed through the end of 2024, with some even betting on the possibility of an emergency inter-meeting cut within the next week. Several prominent Wall Street economists, including those at Citigroup and JPMorgan Chase, have revised their forecasts to predict half-percentage-point rate cuts at both the September and November FOMC meetings. As of August 19, the [CME Group FedWatch tool](https://www.cmegroup.com/markets/interest-rates/cme-fedwatch-tool.html) is anticipating approximately 100 bps reducing in the target rate by the end of the year.
The next meeting of the Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC) is [scheduled](https://www.federalreserve.gov/monetarypolicy/fomccalendars.htm) to be held on September 17 and 18, 2024.
Resolution Criteria: The question will resolve **Yes** if the Federal Reserve of the United States cuts rates by 50 bps at the September 2024 FOMC meeting.
If the September FOMC meeting is cancelled, this question will resolve as “Annulled”
Fine Print: - The relevant Fed policy rate is the federal funds target. The question will resolve according to the decrease in the target rate announced at the FOMC meeting, such as those shown historically at the [Open Market Operations webpage](https://www.federalreserve.gov/monetarypolicy/openmarket.htm).
- The rate cut will be relative to the target rate prior to the start of the meeting. If the Federal Reserve issues an emergency rate cut prior to the meeting and then cuts rates again at the scheduled September meeting, the question will resolve as the size of the cut issued at the September meeting only.
- The question will resolve based on the official policy announcements from the Federal Reserve, rather than market expectations or speculation.
|
2024-08-22T14:30:00Z
|
2024-08-23T14:30:00Z
|
2024-09-18T18:26:00Z
|
yes
|
METACULUS
|
meta-27485
|
Will the Fed cut rates by 25 bps at their September meeting?
|
In early August 2024, bond markets have been rallying strongly as traders increasingly bet that the US economy is deteriorating rapidly, potentially heading towards a [recession](https://apnews.com/article/economy-jobs-unemployment-federal-reserve-inflation-22095766804d9c1532b4fcc29565be49). This shift in sentiment has been driven by a series of weaker-than-expected economic data releases, most notably the July jobs report which showed that employers created just 114,000 jobs, far below economists' forecasts, while the unemployment rate rose.
The sharp move in market expectations marks a significant change from earlier in the year, when worries about persistent inflation dominated the narrative. Now, investors appear to be convinced that economic growth will stall unless the Federal Reserve begins to lower interest rates from the current two-decade high of around 5.3%.
Futures markets in early August [were pricing in](https://finance.yahoo.com/news/bond-traders-bet-big-fed-190000721.html?guccounter=1&guce_referrer=aHR0cHM6Ly93d3cuZ29vZ2xlLmNvbS8&guce_referrer_sig=AQAAAAdfa1un1juMjZYChE0Phs5vqjCYVBTfWq5endU3ABCBGCmHIUKZkqTLazDw7_s_fodV9UBEtwlOJd7Ev6dczGYruUERgtgKI6d0NfQ4TcOahRW-u9NBgbitp8itVfGOnZWGqdfd_mpp_N3E3IrHQV-RuRmbEAjurglNZFxOlI22) roughly five quarter-point rate cuts from the Fed through the end of 2024, with some even betting on the possibility of an emergency inter-meeting cut within the next week. Several prominent Wall Street economists, including those at Citigroup and JPMorgan Chase, have revised their forecasts to predict half-percentage-point rate cuts at both the September and November FOMC meetings. As of August 19, the [CME Group FedWatch tool](https://www.cmegroup.com/markets/interest-rates/cme-fedwatch-tool.html) is anticipating approximately 100 bps reducing in the target rate by the end of the year.
The next meeting of the Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC) is [scheduled](https://www.federalreserve.gov/monetarypolicy/fomccalendars.htm) to be held on September 17 and 18, 2024.
Resolution Criteria: The question will resolve **Yes** if the Federal Reserve of the United States cuts rates by 25 bps at the September 2024 FOMC meeting.
If the September FOMC meeting is cancelled, this question will resolve as “Annulled”
Fine Print: - The relevant Fed policy rate is the federal funds target. The question will resolve according to the decrease in the target rate announced at the FOMC meeting, such as those shown historically at the [Open Market Operations webpage](https://www.federalreserve.gov/monetarypolicy/openmarket.htm).
- The rate cut will be relative to the target rate prior to the start of the meeting. If the Federal Reserve issues an emergency rate cut prior to the meeting and then cuts rates again at the scheduled September meeting, the question will resolve as the size of the cut issued at the September meeting only.
- The question will resolve based on the official policy announcements from the Federal Reserve, rather than market expectations or speculation.
|
2024-08-22T14:30:00Z
|
2024-08-23T14:30:00Z
|
2024-09-18T18:25:00Z
|
no
|
METACULUS
|
meta-27484
|
Will the Fed hold rates steady at their September meeting?
|
In early August 2024, bond markets have been rallying strongly as traders increasingly bet that the US economy is deteriorating rapidly, potentially heading towards a [recession](https://apnews.com/article/economy-jobs-unemployment-federal-reserve-inflation-22095766804d9c1532b4fcc29565be49). This shift in sentiment has been driven by a series of weaker-than-expected economic data releases, most notably the July jobs report which showed that employers created just 114,000 jobs, far below economists' forecasts, while the unemployment rate rose.
The sharp move in market expectations marks a significant change from earlier in the year, when worries about persistent inflation dominated the narrative. Now, investors appear to be convinced that economic growth will stall unless the Federal Reserve begins to lower interest rates from the current two-decade high of around 5.3%.
Futures markets in early August [were pricing in](https://finance.yahoo.com/news/bond-traders-bet-big-fed-190000721.html?guccounter=1&guce_referrer=aHR0cHM6Ly93d3cuZ29vZ2xlLmNvbS8&guce_referrer_sig=AQAAAAdfa1un1juMjZYChE0Phs5vqjCYVBTfWq5endU3ABCBGCmHIUKZkqTLazDw7_s_fodV9UBEtwlOJd7Ev6dczGYruUERgtgKI6d0NfQ4TcOahRW-u9NBgbitp8itVfGOnZWGqdfd_mpp_N3E3IrHQV-RuRmbEAjurglNZFxOlI22) roughly five quarter-point rate cuts from the Fed through the end of 2024, with some even betting on the possibility of an emergency inter-meeting cut within the next week. Several prominent Wall Street economists, including those at Citigroup and JPMorgan Chase, have revised their forecasts to predict half-percentage-point rate cuts at both the September and November FOMC meetings. As of August 19, the [CME Group FedWatch tool](https://www.cmegroup.com/markets/interest-rates/cme-fedwatch-tool.html) is anticipating approximately 100 bps reducing in the target rate by the end of the year.
The next meeting of the Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC) is [scheduled](https://www.federalreserve.gov/monetarypolicy/fomccalendars.htm) to be held on September 17 and 18, 2024.
Resolution Criteria: The question will resolve **Yes** if the Federal Reserve of the United States holds rates steady at the September 2024 FOMC meeting.
If the September FOMC meeting is cancelled, this question will resolve as “Annulled”.
Fine Print: - The relevant Fed policy rate is the federal funds target. The question will resolve according to the decrease in the target rate announced at the FOMC meeting, such as those shown historically at the [Open Market Operations webpage](https://www.federalreserve.gov/monetarypolicy/openmarket.htm).
- The rate cut will be relative to the target rate prior to the start of the meeting. If the Federal Reserve issues an emergency rate cut prior to the meeting and then cuts rates again at the scheduled September meeting, the question will resolve as the size of the cut issued at the September meeting only.
- The question will resolve based on the official policy announcements from the Federal Reserve, rather than market expectations or speculation.
|
2024-08-22T14:30:00Z
|
2024-08-23T14:30:00Z
|
2024-09-18T18:25:00Z
|
no
|
METACULUS
|
meta-27453
|
Will Bangladesh hold parliamentary elections within 6 months of Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina's August 5, 2024 ouster?
|
In Bangladesh, within a context of [democratic backsliding](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Democratic_backsliding_by_country#Bangladesh) and claimed Indian influence, a popular uprising of millions of people in the streets of Dhaka ejected Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina on August 5.
[Nobel laureate Muhammad Yunus](https://www.nobelprize.org/prizes/peace/2006/yunus/biographical/) was called to lead a caretaker government, with tasks including organizing fresh Parliamentary elections.
Will they take place within six months of Hasina's ouster?
Resolution Criteria: This question will resolve as **Yes** if elections to Jatiya Sangsad, the Parliament of Bangladesh, are held on or before February 5, 2025, according to [credible](https://www.metaculus.com/help/faq/#definitions) reporting.
If there are no reports that this has occurred before February 5, 2025 (regardless of the reason), this question will resolve as **No**.
Fine Print: The reference date for the election shall be the last day where votes may be cast, after which counting begins. So early/advance/mail-in votes happening prior to that date do not count.
|
2024-08-23T12:00:00Z
|
2024-12-31T18:00:00Z
|
2025-02-05T02:27:00Z
|
no
|
METACULUS
|
meta-27447
|
Will either of Donald Trump's campaign managers get fired, resign, or otherwise leave their positions before October 1, 2024?
|
According to [The Daily Mail](https://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-13741377/Inside-Trumps-meltdown-Ex-president-lighting-staff-hes-p-ssed-picking-JD-Vance-insiders-fear-hes-going-fire-two-extremely-talented-campaign-gurus.html) on August 14, 2024, "Trump is reportedly talking to his confidantes about firing his campaign managers Chris LaCivita and Susie Wiles." As Newsweek [pointed out](https://www.newsweek.com/donald-trump-fire-campaign-managers-chris-lacivita-susie-wiles-1939578), however, Daily Mail had modified the story to be more guarded in its claims of Trump considering that option, and a Trump campaign spokesman said, "As President Trump said, he thinks Ms. Wiles and Mr. LaCivita are doing a phenomenal job and any rumors to the contrary are false and not rooted in reality."
In his past campaigns Trump fired [Corey Lewandowski](https://www.nytimes.com/2016/06/21/us/politics/corey-lewandowski-donald-trump.html) in June 2016 (who by the way has [recently joined](https://www.politico.com/news/2024/08/15/trump-campaign-brings-corey-lewandowski-back-on-board-00174155) Trump's 2024 campaign as an advisor). Lewandowski was replaced by [Paul Manafort](https://nymag.com/intelligencer/2016/04/how-paul-manafort-took-over-the-trump-campaign.html). Manafort [resigned](https://www.politico.com/story/2016/08/paul-manafort-resigns-from-trump-campaign-227197) in August 2016 and was replaced by Kellyanne Conway, who remained Trump's campaign manager for the duration of the election.
In the 2020 election, Trump's original campaign manager, Brad Parscale, [was demoted](https://www.tpr.org/news/2020-07-15/former-san-antonian-brad-parscale-takes-demotion-from-trumps-2020-presidential-campaign) to senior advisor in June and replaced by Bill Stepien, who served for the duration.
So far in the 2024 campaign, Chris LaCivita and Susie Wiles have remained Trump's campaign co-managers. (See July 10, 2024 Atlantic interview [here](https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2024/07/trump-campain-election-2024-susie-wiles-chris-lacivita/678806/).) On August 16, 2024, Trump was [reportedly](https://www.newsweek.com/donald-trump-campaign-team-corey-lewandowski-kamala-harris-1940141) shaking up his campaign, bringing in new senior staff, with campaign managers LaCivita and Wiles saying in a statement, "As we head into the home stretch of this election, we are continuing to add to our impressive campaign team."
Resolution Criteria: This question resolves as **Yes** if, before October 1, 2024, there is a [credible report](https://www.metaculus.com/help/faq/#definitions) that one or both of the following individuals is no longer campaign manager of Donald Trump's 2024 presidential campaign:
- Chris LaCivita
- Susie Wiles
If there is no such report before October 1, 2024, this question resolves as **No**.
Fine Print: The addition of a new co-campaign manager will not affect resolution.
In addition to resigning or otherwise being terminated as campaign manager, credible reports that LaCivita or Wiles have been demoted to other positions within the Trump Campaign, such as senior advisor, will also resolve this question as Yes, since this question is asking whether they remain as campaign manager.
|
2024-08-22T14:30:00Z
|
2024-08-23T14:30:00Z
|
2024-10-02T13:40:00Z
|
no
|
METACULUS
|
meta-27441
|
Will Greg Brockman return to OpenAI following his leave of absence?
|
> **Where have OpenAI’s founders gone?**
>
> Just two of OpenAI’s 11-strong founding team are still active at the ChatGPT maker, after an exodus following November’s attempted boardroom coup against chief executive Sam Altman.
>
> Three co-founders have departed so far this year, including John Schulman, who [defected](https://www.ft.com/content/4135d3c0-576a-4964-b79b-4242f8cb2471) to its artificial intelligence rival Anthropic this week. Greg Brockman, OpenAI’s president, also said on Monday he would be taking extended leave from the company.<br/>
> ...
>
> Brockman is a core member of OpenAI’s founding team. He was persuaded by Altman and Musk to leave his job as chief technology officer at financial technology company Stripe and take on the same position at OpenAI.
>
> He has been a key Altman ally since the beginning. When the board moved against Altman in a coup in November, Brockman was also removed as a director. The two returned to their posts together when the board backtracked five days later.
>
> On Monday, the company’s president announced he would be taking a sabbatical for the rest of the year.
>
> “First time to relax since co-founding OpenAI 9 years ago,” he [wrote](https://x.com/gdb/status/1821716026448633933) on X. “I’ve poured my life for the past 9 years into OpenAI, including the entirety of my marriage. Our work is important to me, but so is life.”<br/>
> [—Hammond, 2024](https://www.ft.com/content/638f67f7-5375-47fc-b3a7-af7c9e05b9e0)
Resolution Criteria: This question resolves as **Yes** if Greg Brockman returns to work at OpenAI (in either 2024 or 2025) following his leave of absence, according to [credible reporting](https://www.metaculus.com/help/faq/#definitions). This question resolves as **No** if, following his leave of absence, Brockman exits OpenAI without returning, or does not return by January 1, 2026.
|
2024-08-22T17:41:00Z
|
2025-02-01T00:00:00Z
|
2024-11-12T20:00:00Z
|
yes
|
METACULUS
|
meta-27440
|
Will Apple announce an iPhone with 40W fast charging by the end of its September 2024 event?
|
According to [Mac Rumors](https://www.macrumors.com/2024/07/10/iphone-16-pro-40w-fast-charging-20w-magsafe/):
>Apple's forthcoming iPhone 16 Pro and iPhone 16 Pro Max will support 40W wired fast charging and 20W MagSafe charging, claims a rumor currently swirling around China.
>Right now, iPhone 15 and iPhone 15 Pro models are capable of up to 27W peak charging speeds with an appropriate USB-C power adapter, while official MagSafe chargers from Apple and authorized third parties can wirelessly charge the iPhone 15 models at up to 15W. All four iPhone 15 models can charge up to 50% in around 30 minutes with a 20W or higher power adapter, which is the same as Apple's previous iPhone 13 and iPhone 14 models.
Apple's highly-anticipated launch event is [expected](https://economictimes.indiatimes.com/magazines/panache/iphone-16-launch-apple-september-event-to-also-debut-watch-series-10-airpods-4-heres-what-we-know/articleshow/112626834.cms?from=mdr) to be on September 10, 2024. It is widely expected to launch the iPhone 16, which will feature a rumored four new models, which could have larger displays than current iPhone models, faster processors, and improved AI features.
According to [Forbes](https://www.forbes.com/sites/davidphelan/2024/07/16/apple-iphone-16-pro-design-upgrade-promises-key-feature-boost-report-says-iphone-16-pro-max/), this would roughly double the speed at which the phone could be charged. At the current fastest charging speed of 27W, going from zero to 50% takes 30 minutes, while a 40W charger would do it in 15 minutes. A few Android phones already feature faster changing speeds, such as the Samsung Galaxy S24 at 45W, the Xiaomi 14 Pro at options of up to 120W, and the Motorola Edge 40 Pro at 125W.
Resolution Criteria: This question resolves as **Yes** if, by the end of its September 2024 event (the expected iPhone 16 event), Apple officially announces the existence of an iPhone model that supports 40 watts (or higher) charging. If this does not occur by the end of its September 2024 event, or if no iPhone 16 Apple event is held before October 1, 2024, this question resolves as **No**.
Fine Print: Either wired or wireless charging will count.
The official announcement can come from any of Apple's channels including but not limited to: a product launch announcement (such as the [expected](https://wccftech.com/iphone-16-launch-event-in-september/) Apple event possibly on September 10, 2024), press releases, announcements on Apple's official social media accounts, or information published on Apple's website indicating that 40W or higher iPhone charging is supported.
Leaks or unofficial release of information will not count.
Although a Yes resolution will most likely come from an announcement of a new upcoming iPhone model, possibly called the iPhone 16, if Apple instead announces that an existing model of iPhone has been updated to support the faster charging, that will count as well.
Please note that the iPhone with ≥40W charging need not be for sale for the question to resolve as **Yes**. Resolution is based on the announcement or publication of the information by Apple.
Vague statements such as "faster charging" without specifying wattage will not count.
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2024-08-21T14:30:00Z
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2024-09-10T13:00:00Z
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2024-09-09T18:40:00Z
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no
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METACULUS
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